Greece under New Democracy rule: a case of "liberal Illiberalism"?

Chryssogelos, Angelos; Tsirbas, Yannis

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Chryssogelos, Angelos and Tsirbas, Yannis (2025) Greece under New Democracy rule: a case of "liberal Illiberalism"? In: Democratic backsliding in Europe. Andrássy Studien zur Europaforschung . Nomos, Baden-Baden. ISBN 978-3-7560-0859-9 (In Press)

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[From the introduction]
Illiberalism and democratic backsliding are often associated with the effects of populists in power. A large literature shows that extended periods of populist rule result in weakening of independent institutions and erosion of democratic norms and procedures (Chryssogelos et al. 2024). As a result, in Europe, the phenomenon of democratic backsliding is associated with the actions of governments under the full control of populist parties, a perspective particularly dominant in policy, journalistic and lay discourses. The paradigmatic case is Hungary under Viktor Orban since 2010, as well as Poland under the Law and Justice government between 2015-23 (Pirro/Stanley 2022).
In this chapter however we want to problematise whether democratic backsliding can only happen under populist governments. A sizeable literature argues that this is possible. Levitsky and Way (2012) claim that democratic norms can be undermined all the while the formal institutions of democracy remain intact under non-populist parties in power. Lührmann and Lindberg (2019) speak of a global wave of "autocratisation" that can equally emanate from pre-existing elites and implemented through legal and incremental means.
Despite the findings of this literature, the impression remains dominant in Europe that non-populist governments are generally "safe" for democracy, not least because such governments explicitly use this rhetoric against their opponents. This is particularly evident in the literature that critically analyzes how the EU can be amenable to democratic backsliding in its member-states, yet its focus remains squarely on populist governments (Emmons/Pavone 2021; Kelemen 2020; 2022) The question then in the particular context of the European Union becomes even more specific: can explicit anti-populism actually lead to processes of democratic backsliding?
We explore the outlines of a tentative answer by looking at the case of Greece. Between 2015-19 Greece was ruled by a fully populist coalition of two parties of the populist left and right, prompting concerns among scholars and policymakers about the future of democratic rule (Matsaganis 2015). But while the SYRIZA-led government left a lot to be desired in terms of policy competence and quality of public discourse, it is arguably since the centre-right New Democracy party returned to power in a single-party government in 2019 that, according to NGOs and other authorities, media freedom, judicial independence and the independence of regulatory bodies have been suffering (European Commission 2024a, 19, 26). Can developments in Greece since 2019 then be seen through the lens of "backsliding" and "illiberalism"?

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