When the weak survives taking advantage of rivalry between stronger opponents?

Kersmo, Tadesse Biru (2022) When the weak survives taking advantage of rivalry between stronger opponents? International Journal of Arts Humanities and Social Studies (IJAHSS), 4 (5). pp. 184-192. ISSN 2582-3647

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Official URL: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.7289416

Abstract / Description

Not always might is an asset; not always heavyweights win, and lightweights lose. Not all conflicts are two-person zero-sum games in which the winner’s gains equal to the loser's losses. Often, conflicts are “games” played by more than two players with varying skills and strengths; and gains and losses are distributed unevenly. A weak player can survive by exploiting the rivalry among stronger opponents. Political and economic contests are non-zero-sum games in which both competition and cooperation go together, and even the loser gets a stake. Based on a three-person three-way duel, this paper mathematically proves the proposition that, if played strategically, the weak can survive a conflict in a fight against far stronger opponents. The paper has limitations that are intrinsic to rational choice theory. The war between the State of Eritrea, the Federal Republic of Ethiopia, and the Tigray Liberation Front can be analysed using this game model. So long, as there is peace between Ethiopia and Eritrea, the chances of TPLF survival are extremely low.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: game theory; truel; three-way duel; Ethiopia; Eritrea; TPLF
Subjects: 300 Social sciences > 320 Political science
300 Social sciences > 330 Economics
Department: School of Social Sciences and Professions
Depositing User: Mary Burslem
Date Deposited: 29 Nov 2022 13:04
Last Modified: 29 Nov 2022 13:04
URI: https://repository.londonmet.ac.uk/id/eprint/8057


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