

i

# **The Role of Translation in Shaping Media and Political Discourses in Times of Conflict: The Syrian "Spring" in Context**

**Bilal Mohammad Farhan Ayasrah**

©

**Thesis submitted in fulfillment of the  
requirements for the degree of doctor of  
philosophy**

**Faculty of Social Sciences & Humanities  
(FSSH)**

**London Metropolitan University  
2015**

## The People Want (الشَّعْبُ يُرِيدُ)

فَلَا بُدَّ أَنْ يَسْتَجِيبَ الْقَدْرُ  
وَلَا بُدَّ لِلْفَيْدِ أَنْ يَنْكُسِرُ

إِذَا الشَّعْبُ يَوْمًا أَرَادَ الْحَيَاةَ  
وَلَا بُدَّ لِلَّيْلِ أَنْ يَنْجَلِي

أبو القاسم الشاببي في "لحن الحياة" ١٩٣٣

If the people want life some day  
 Fate must surely grant their wish  
 And their night must surely vanish  
 Their chains must surely break away

[My Translation]

Abu Al Qasem Ashabbi (Melody of Life: 1933)

## **Declaration**

I hereby confirm that this work is my own. No portion of the work referred to in the thesis has been submitted in support of an application for another degree or qualification of this or any other university or other institute of learning.

## Copyright Statement

©This copy of the thesis has been supplied on condition that anyone who consults it is understood to recognise that the copyright rests with its author and that no quotation from the thesis, nor any information derived therefrom, may be published without his prior written consent or the University's (as may be appropriate), and information derived from it should be duly acknowledged.

## Dedication

Only to my **GREAT** mother, Radwah, the unremitting source of inspiration and the flowing river of love, warmth and affection, I dedicate this work.

## Prefatory Notes

1. Given that this thesis is a target- and product-oriented investigation that looks into a translational phenomenon, the main focus will be placed on the TT as an end product. Pym (1998), commenting on Nord's qualitative model of translation-oriented text analysis (1988/2005), lends support to this point of departure when he notes that "if the main factor determining a translation is the target-text function as fixed by the initiator, why should any translator engage in extensive source-text analysis? Surely it would be enough to analyse the prospective target-text function and then take whatever elements are required from the source text<sup>1</sup>". Of course, this focus on the TT does not mean that the ST (without which the TT would not have existed) and its production/reception environment are completely irrelevant and will not be considered; every stage (and step) of analysis shown in chapter four is carried out with the ST in mind as a point of 'back-reference' but not as the point of departure. As justified at the beginning of this note, this is a translational study par excellence whose main concern is the TT, the finished product. In this spirit, it is useful to note that the salient aim of CDA within Translation Studies is to unmask the underlying ideological thrusts and asymmetric power relations in a given discourse.
  
2. Following on from this note, the present thesis is aware of the integration of Discourse Analysis and Translation Studies which, as Munday (2001: 73) sees it, took place with "the emergence and flourishing [in Germany in the 1970s and 1980s] of a functionalist and communicative approach to the analysis of translation" and the shrinkage of a sheer "static linguistic" one which had pervaded in the 1950s-1960s, where new pragmatic concepts as (function, purpose, action, pragmaticity, context, culture, textuality, discourse, etc.) were introduced. However, this thesis is not overtaken by CDA; it predominantly considers the main theoretical underpinnings of SFL and DTS. CDA, in the main, operates from a monolingual (rather than bilingual) prism: (i.e. one language and one culture), Valdeón (2007: 100) maintains that "the study of the discourse of translation could certainly benefit from the insights gained by a critical analysis to primary and secondary discourses, understood here as source texts (STs) and target texts (TTs). For this reason [as in our case], it could be a complementary tool to existing methodological approaches in order to provide us with a comprehensive reflection on [a new] language and culture [environment]". In this study, it is taken on board as an auxiliary tool because it, on the one hand, lends a helping hand in discerning and interpreting the tacit, implicit cues embedded inside and beyond a given discourse (as a whole) and because I look at the TT as an authored text on its own right, and at its producer as an author, on the other. For the purpose of this study, the second acronymous element (Discourse) that appears in CDA chiefly refers to the trans-created (Arabic) text (TT)- my main concern. This makes us speak of Critical *Translation* Analysis (CTA), which, with special focus on the interplay between language, power and ideology, has been carried out, by a number of translation scholars applying CDA to TTs in politically motivated (English-Arabic) media texts of argumentative nature: (Shunnaq 1986, 1992, 1994; Hatim & Mason 1990, 1997; Farghal 1993, 1995, 2008, 2012, 2013). Critical approaches to translation integrating CDA with CTA have recently been adopted by some scholars. Harald Olk (2002: 101), for example, states that such approaches can "reveal how translation is shaped by ideologies and in this way contributes to the perpetuation or subversion of particular discourse".

---

<sup>1</sup> On Nord's Text Analysis (1998): <http://usuaris.tinet.cat/apym/on-line/reviews/nordreview.html>

- 3.** The scope of this study is written rather than oral translation (interpreting); it predominantly investigates a translational (rather than an interpretive) phenomenon in times of conflict. However, owing to the overlapping nature (and roles) of both wartime translators and interpreters (and between Translation Studies & Interpreting Studies at large- the "inevitable points of overlap" between both fields, according to Munday (2001/ 2008: 12-13) who calls for considering both of them as "parallel" fields of study, this study exclusively draws on the translators' normative behaviour in times of conflict, which may also apply to the act of interpreting unless otherwise indicated. Scholars interested in such areas of investigation as Translation and Conflict; Translation and Ethics; Translation and Ideology, etc. strike linkage between the role and positioning of both translators and interpreters in constituting socio-political reality in times of conflict. See, for example, Baker's *Translation and Conflict* (2006a); 'Contextualization in Translator- and Interpreter-Mediated Events' (2006b); 'Interpreters and Translators in the War Zone: Narrated and Narrators' (2010); (with Carol Maier) 'Ethics in Interpreter and Translator Training: Critical Perspectives' (2011); *In Other Words* (2011)/ (Chapter 10): 'Beyond Equivalence: Ethics and Morality'; Salama-Carr's edited volume *Translating and Interpreting Conflicts* (2007a), *The Interpreter and Translator Trainer* (ITT)- an online journal edited by Kelly Dorothy and Julie McDonough, amongst others.
- 4.** The present study is exclusively concerned with occurrences of "distranslation" not those of "mistranslation". Distranslation is a term branded by translation scholar Ali Darwish (2011) and is widely used in ideologically-driven translational analyses (e.g. see Rima Malkawi 2012). Darwish (2011: 33) defines distranslation as "the result of intentional interference with the source text's information content, informative intent and communicative intent". He notes that this term "is akin to disinformation in the source text, where false or fallacious information is provided with the aim to mislead [as opposed to] mistranslation, which may be the result of inadvertent interference", (*ibid*) or the translator's incompetence. In a nutshell, the study is not concerned with obligatorily stylistic interferences (what Nida 1964a termed as "Obligatory Equivalents"; it primarily traces the optional instances (preferences and choices) that bear a significantly "ideological stamp"<sup>2</sup>.
- 5.** This research is NOT concerned with measuring the quality of the TT *per se* but rather with the translators' normativity. It is a predominately descriptive-explanatory study that neither tends to offend nor to defend. Worded differently, offering descriptions (not prescriptions or proscriptions), it intends to explore their prejudiced regularities of behaviour (norms) tacitly formulated in given observables, which may, however, offer some pedagogically insights in passing judgements on the quality of the TT.
- 6.** The back-translations, provided by the author for the Arabic target texts, are concerned with the associations and implications of the TT content in the first place. In congruence with the theme of the present study, the overriding principle is to preserve a TT-BT equal value without subtracting from it or adding to it and make the understanding of the Arabic translated texts clear, accessible and easy to follow. Despite the fact that back-translations are by nature literal (verbatim), I do not resort to literal back-translations but rather to conceptual equivalents of a word or phrase under analysis in order to explicate the TT message for exploratory and comparative purposes: to detect lexico-grammatical shifts as a prelude to their description and interpretation. I do not intend to judge the accuracy/quality of the finished product, neither to point out errors in it nor cases of

---

<sup>2</sup> "Ideological stamp", according to Malkawi (2012: 16), refers to "the impact of ideology on the output of translation mainly in political discourse. News media products [adds Malkawi] are stamped by ideology in order to make it legitimate and acceptable".

incompetence in the translator. My central aim is to re-render The TT message (the forward translation) and its ideological implications/deviations preserving the attitudinal position of the translator (be it negative or positive).

**7.** The "springiness" attached with the Event has been appealing to some and repellent to others. My reference to it (particularly in chapter three) as "*Spring*", Uprising, Revolution, Awakening, Intifada, etc. does not by any means reflect my own position; in most cases, I disinterestedly provide the terminology as intended by its respective owner within the relevant context and *italicised* it in "inverted commas" throughout the whole thesis unless it appears in a direct quotation (headings of books, edited volumes, scholarly articles and the selected English texts). This also applies to other terms such as "regime", "government" as well as honorific titles and appellations.

**8.** All translators of the selected texts (in the body of this thesis and the Appendices) are intentionally anonymised for ethical and safety considerations.

**9.** Some of the translators of the selected texts operate from the heart of the event/the "hot spots" in Syria, others from outside the country (as shown right before each analysis carried out in chapter five); therefore, reference to them as "war translators" only applies to some (not all) of them.

**10.** Translations of quoted items from Arabic resources are mine. I have followed Newmark's communicative approach throughout.

**11.** Typos which appear in the selected texts (English or Arabic) are corrected. Those misprints and ungrammatical items that appear in the direct quotations in the body of the thesis are maintained and marked as [sic].

**12.** British English spelling is followed throughout this thesis unless it appears in a direct quotation.

## List of Abbreviations

**CDA:** Critical Discourse Analysis

**CL:** Critical Linguistics

**CTL:** Critical Text Linguistics

**SFL:** Systemic Functional Linguistics

**DTS:** Descriptive Translation Studies

**ST:** Source Text

**TT:** Target Text

**BT:** Back Translation

**UA:** Unit of Analysis

**MSA:** Modern Standard Arabic

**MENA:** Middle East and North Africa

**FTAs:** Face Threatening Acts

**FSAs:** Face Saving Acts

## **Key to Transliteration (Arabic Transliteration System<sup>3</sup>)**

In order to facilitate the pronunciation of Arabic words appearing in the original texts, especially for non-Arab readers, the following transliteration system has consistently been used in this study.

## 1. Consonants<sup>4</sup>:

• (alif) ‘ (except when initial)

ب	b	ز	z	ف	f
ت	t	س	s	ق	q
ث	th	ش	sh	ك	k
ج	j	ص	ṣ	ل	l
ح	ḥ	ض	ḍ	م	m
خ	kh	ط	ṭ	ن	n
د	d	ظ	ẓ	ه ، هـ	h
ذ	dh	ع	‘ (ayn)	و	w
ر	r	غ	gh	ي	y

## 2. Vowels and Diphthongs:

a  
u  
i

اَيُّ

يِ	I
وَ	aw
هِ	ay

<sup>3</sup> This Arabic Transliteration System is taken from the 'Library of Congress'.

اقٰ و عٰ، ظٰ، طٰ، پٰ صٰ، ذٰ، حٰ، حٰ۔

## Acknowledgements

### **"Feeling gratitude and not expressing it is like wrapping a gift and not giving it"**

This thesis was not created in a vacuum; it would not have been possible without the guidance, support and encouragement of many people to whom I am very grateful.

First and foremost, I would like, from the bottom of my heart, to thank my **GREAT** mother, for her unceasing love and care she had thrown over me during my research journey. Allah has granted me with many blessings, but the most precious of all is to be son to Radwah. Her wisdom, love and devotion have given me oodles of serenity, delightfulness and optimism. Her non-stopping prayers, unflagging supplications as well as placating proverbs impacted me a great deal and steered my direction in very many ways- too numerous to count. I would also like to extend my sincere apologies for being away from her during a long research mission and ask her to forgive me for being up to my head browsing amongst books and volumes even when I was around. I would also like to remember my beloved dad, who left me suddenly and very early- never to return; I lost him, when he was in his thirties, in a black Wednesday when I was six. His acknowledged bravery and openhandedness have inspired me and governed my life style. May his soul rest in peace!

I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my supervisors Dr. Nadia Rahab and Dr. Farid Aitsiselmi for their invaluable insights and constant support which they unconditionally showed with enthusiasm and precision. Their outstanding supervision and sound guidance were all I could have hoped for and much, much more. Nadia and Farid helped me to fathom the paradoxes of translation and sift the wheat from the chaff whenever I swam against the current. I am much indebted to both of them and really glad and proud to have come to know such true friends in my life. Many thanks also go to Dr. Manuela Perteghella for co-supervising my work in its early stage and to Languages, Interpreting & Translation Administrator, Pamela Newman, for her kind cooperation.

Many thanks are also due to Professor Klaus Fisher and Dr. Ahmad Nazari who spared enough time to painstakingly read through this thesis and offer constructive feedback and helpful advice during several stages of my research, although they usually have too many things on their plates.

The University's Postgraduate and Research Office were exceedingly cooperative. I would like to extend my sincerest appreciation to its head, Dr. Catherine Lee and Coordinator, Melanie Goldsmith as well as Research and Enterprise Officer, Hema Joshi, for their unwavering support. I am particularly indebted to my Faculty's Research Administrator, Cathy Larne, who exceptionally diligently followed my research progress as it grew up.

I am at a loss to find the actual words to thank Sifa Mukende for the overflowed sisterly warmth and ardent encouragement which I received from her. From the very onset of my research, Sifa stood next to me through thick and thin. Her sleepless nights in the hospital during a long medication 'saga', despite a busy schedule, are much appreciated and cannot be forgettable.

My heartfelt gratitude and indebtedness, which are difficult to express in words, are due to Wafà (Um Nawwaf), her husband (Emeritus Professor Sa'eed) and family for the ceaseless support which they generously offered before fifteen years. Without Wafà, I could not pursue my studies beyond the High School. She merits every word of respect and appreciation, and much much more.

Last but not least, I would like to offer special thanks to my dear brothers (Ra'ed, Yaser, Ahmad, Jaser and Safwan) and super-caring sisters (Dalal and Hind) for their infinite love, long patience and moral support which have immeasurably fuelled me with much energy to accomplish this project and come through to the other side.

## Abstract

This study is a predominantly qualitative, target-oriented, descriptive and explanatory investigation. It tackles a critical translational issue that has increasingly drawn much research interest over the last couple of decades or so: Translation and Conflict. Generally, it explores the role of translation in shaping media and political discourses in times of conflict within the context of the startlingly unfurling events in Syria. Specifically, it traces the translators' normative behaviour and looks into their ideological intervention together with its potential distortion of the ST intended message.

The study generally pertains to the realm of Critical Text Linguistics (CTL) and is located within a translational context. It considers "language as a form of social practice", (Fairclough 1989: 20) and "social behaviour", (Halliday 1978: 12-13) that cannot be studied in isolation from its socio-cultural and contextual considerations. Therefore, the analysis of the phenomenon under observation operates on three main fronts; the Faircloughian Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), the Hallidayan Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL) and the Touryean Descriptive Translation Studies (DTS) at whose heart the Theory of Norms and Comparative Model lie. These hybridised frameworks of analysis provide insights on how to detect and explain shifts which accumulate as a consequence of preferences opted for by the translators or dictated/exerted upon them by other pressures in argumentative type of texts within politically sensitive contexts and ideologically laden situations.

To this effect, the study selects Arabic texts translated from English and chosen according to a well-devised set of criteria that are both text attribute and corpus attribute. The selected texts represent newspaper opinion articles and indiscriminately reflect both voices of the conflicting rivals: pro-and anti-government. With a view to systematically identifying, describing and interpreting regular potential recurrences (reiterations) that may instantiate bias, it develops an empirical method of analysis that consists of a number of pragma-linguistic categories. Analyses are carried out in five main steps: external (context); internal (content); shifts observation (identification); comparison (the what?) and description (the how?). Conclusions of the analysed data (the why/the what not?)- with the "what-else" left for the readership- are critically interpreted in an attempt to demystify the translators' practice and delve deep down into its root causes with special consideration of the cross-linguistic and cross-cultural discrepancies that feature English and Arabic which are linguistically and culturally distant.

It has been found that wartime translators tend to manipulate the ST message and sabotage its content in various ways and on different levels. In other words, they tend to manage it syntactically and lexically to serve pre-planned rhetorical purposes and pursue unacknowledged agendas in response to their own in-built belief system (ideology), readers' expectations and their world thoughts, or under the pressure of their commissioner. The study reveals (and emphasises) that translators, who are found vulnerable to ideological intervention, should be fully cautious (and honest) when approaching ideologically-motivated texts in order to avoid emotional engagement or ideological intervention whether this translational attitude feeds into their own belief systems or not, thus maintaining the long-awaited ethical values of the practice.

## Table of Contents

Title Page .....	i
The People Want .....	ii
Declaration .....	iii
Copyright Statement .....	iv
Dedication .....	v
Prefatory Notes .....	vi
List of Abbreviations .....	ix
Key to Transliteration .....	x
Acknowledgements .....	xi
Abstract .....	xii
Table of Contents .....	xiii

## CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Preamble .....	1
1.2 Motivation .....	2
1.3 The Dawn of a New Discipline .....	3
1.4 Aims and Objectives .....	7
1.5 Research Questions .....	7
1.6 Research Hypotheses .....	8
1.7 Structure of the Thesis .....	11

## CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 What is Translation? .....	18
2.2 What is Equivalence? .....	19
2.2.1 Equivalence is a "Desideratum" .....	19
2.2.2 Linguistic Theories of Equivalence .....	20
2.2.3 Equivalence within Target-oriented Approaches .....	21
2.3 Translation Shifts .....	24
2.3.1 Shifts & Equivalence .....	25
2.3.2 Shifts & Norms .....	26
2.3.3 Optional Shifts .....	27

<b>2.4 The Functionalist School .....</b>	<b>28</b>
<b>2.4.1 Skopostheorie (Skopos Theory) .....</b>	<b>30</b>
<b>2.4.2 How does the Skopostheorie Inform this Study? .....</b>	<b>33</b>
<b>2.5 Halliday's Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL) .....</b>	<b>34</b>
<b>2.6 Descriptive Approaches to Translation .....</b>	<b>35</b>
<b>2.6.1 Norms, Conventions &amp; Rules .....</b>	<b>35</b>
<b>2.6.2 How Do "Norms" Apply to Translation Analysis? .....</b>	<b>38</b>
<b>2.6.3 "Translation is a Norm-governed Activity" .....</b>	<b>40</b>
<b>2.6.4 Where do Norms Exist? .....</b>	<b>41</b>
<b>2.7 Cultural Turn in Translation Studies .....</b>	<b>43</b>
<b>2.7.1 Translation Studies vs. Cultural Studies .....</b>	<b>44</b>
<b>2.7.2 Translation as Manipulation .....</b>	<b>46</b>
<b>2.7.3 Manipulation &amp; Rewriting .....</b>	<b>49</b>
<b>2.7.4 Reflection or Deflection (Refraction)? .....</b>	<b>52</b>
<b>2.7.5 Cultural Turn &amp; Ideology .....</b>	<b>54</b>
<b>2.8 Managing vs. Monitoring in Translation .....</b>	<b>58</b>
<b>2.8.1 Managing in Translation .....</b>	<b>61</b>
<b>2.8.1.1 Intrinsic Managing (Monitoring) .....</b>	<b>61</b>
<b>2.8.1.2 Extrinsic Managing .....</b>	<b>63</b>
<b>2.9 Managing/Monitoring &amp; Text Typology .....</b>	<b>64</b>
<b>2.9.1 Expository Texts .....</b>	<b>65</b>
<b>2.9.2 Argumentative Texts .....</b>	<b>65</b>
<b>2.9.3 Translation, Text Typology &amp; Ideology .....</b>	<b>69</b>
<b>2.10 Mediation &amp; Intervention in Wartime .....</b>	<b>70</b>
<b>2.11 Translation &amp; Ethics .....</b>	<b>73</b>
<b>2.11.1 Translators or 'Proxy' Soldiers? .....</b>	<b>74</b>
<b>2.12 Translat<u>O</u>RS &amp; Conflict .....</b>	<b>77</b>
<b>2.13 Translation &amp; Conflict .....</b>	<b>79</b>
<b>2.14 Relevance to Previous Research .....</b>	<b>84</b>

## CHAPTER THREE: THE ARAB “SPRING”- FROM INSIDE

<b>3.0 Introduction .....</b>	<b>86</b>
<b>3.0.1 A Story of an Hour has Reshaped the World .....</b>	<b>86</b>
<b>3.0.2 The People Want to Bring Down the Regime .....</b>	<b>88</b>

<b>3.1 Phraseology .....</b>	<b>89</b>
<b>3.2 Major Causes of the Arab "Spring" .....</b>	<b>93</b>
<b>3.3 Outcomes of the Arab "Spring" .....</b>	<b>94</b>
<b>3.4 The Syrian Scene .....</b>	<b>96</b>
<b>3.4.1 How was the Spark Kindled? .....</b>	<b>99</b>
<b>3.4.2 The Regime's Dogmas and Doctrines .....</b>	<b>102</b>
<b>3.4.3 Who Leads the "<i>Uprising</i>"? .....</b>	<b>105</b>
<b>3.4.4 Casualties of the Syrian "<i>Uprising</i>"- (So Far) .....</b>	<b>106</b>
<b>3.5 Conclusion .....</b>	<b>108</b>
<b>3.6 How does this Background Account Inform this Study? .....</b>	<b>109</b>

## CHAPTER FOUR: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY & METHOD

<b>4.1 Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) .....</b>	<b>112</b>
<b>4.1.1 What is CDA? .....</b>	<b>112</b>
<b>4.1.2 Is CDA Critical? .....</b>	<b>113</b>
<b>4.1.3 Evolution of CDA .....</b>	<b>116</b>
<b>4.1.4 What does CDA Aim for? .....</b>	<b>117</b>
<b>4.1.5 Major Tenets and Assumptions of CDA .....</b>	<b>120</b>
<b>4.1.6 Major Criticisms of CDA .....</b>	<b>121</b>
<b>4.1.7 CDA and the Importance of Context .....</b>	<b>122</b>
<b>4.2 Main Approaches of CDA (Adopted in this Study).....</b>	<b>122</b>
<b>4.2.1 Norman Fairclough's Socio-cultural Approach .....</b>	<b>122</b>
<b>4.2.2 Wodak's Discourse-Historical Approach .....</b>	<b>123</b>
<b>4.2.3 Teun A. Van Dijk's Socio-cognitive Approach .....</b>	<b>124</b>
<b>4.3 Descriptivism of CDA .....</b>	<b>125</b>
<b>4.4 Hallidayan Model of Linguistic Analysis .....</b>	<b>126</b>
<b>4.5 How are "Shifts" Identified in this Study?.....</b>	<b>128</b>
<b>4.6 Obligatory vs. Optional Shifts .....</b>	<b>130</b>
<b>4.7 Descriptive Translation Studies (Toury 1980a &amp; 1995a) .....</b>	<b>131</b>
<b>4.7.1 Comparative Model within DTS (TT-ST Comparison) .....</b>	<b>133</b>
<b>4.7.2 "INTO (from) rather than FROM (into)", Toury (1988) .....</b>	<b>134</b>
<b>4.8 Method of Analysis .....</b>	<b>135</b>
<b>4.9 Lexico-grammatical Categories .....</b>	<b>136</b>

<b>4.9.1 Syntax .....</b>	<b>136</b>
<b>4.9.1.1 Modality .....</b>	<b>137</b>
<b>4.9.1.2 Transitivity .....</b>	<b>139</b>
<b>4.9.1.3 Nominalisation .....</b>	<b>140</b>
<b>4.9.2 Lexicon .....</b>	<b>141</b>
<b>4.9.2.1 Over-lexicalisation .....</b>	<b>142</b>
<b>4.9.2.2 Re-lexicalisation .....</b>	<b>142</b>
<b>4.9.2.3 Metaphor .....</b>	<b>143</b>
<b>4.9.3 Ancillary Indicators .....</b>	<b>143</b>
<b>4.9.3.1 Speech Acts .....</b>	<b>145</b>
<b>4.9.3.2 Politeness .....</b>	<b>145</b>
<b>4.9.3.3 Relevance .....</b>	<b>146</b>
<b>4.10 Units of Analysis (Comparison) .....</b>	<b>148</b>
<b>4.11 The Study's Corpus .....</b>	<b>150</b>
<b>4.11.1 What is Corpus? .....</b>	<b>151</b>
<b>4.11.2 How has Corpus Fallen into Translation Studies? .....</b>	<b>151</b>
<b>4.11.3 Aims of Corpus-based Research in Translation .....</b>	<b>152</b>
<b>4.12 Types of Corpora in Translation Research .....</b>	<b>153</b>
<b>4.12.1 Multilingual Corpus .....</b>	<b>153</b>
<b>4.12.2 Comparable Corpus .....</b>	<b>154</b>
<b>4.12.3 Parallel Corpus .....</b>	<b>154</b>
<b>4.13 Corpus Selection Criteria .....</b>	<b>156</b>
<b>4.13.1 Qualitative Selection Criteria .....</b>	<b>156</b>
<b>4.13.1.1 Wholeness (Whole Text Units) .....</b>	<b>156</b>
<b>4.13.1.2 Thematicity .....</b>	<b>157</b>
<b>4.13.1.3 Chronologicality .....</b>	<b>157</b>
<b>4.13.1.4 Directionality .....</b>	<b>157</b>
<b>4.13.1.5 Textual Considerations (Genre, Register, Type) .....</b>	<b>158</b>
<b>4.14 Quantitative Selection Criteria .....</b>	<b>159</b>
<b>4.15 Extra-textual Considerations .....</b>	<b>159</b>
<b>4.15.1 Text Availability .....</b>	<b>160</b>
<b>4.15.2 TT Producer's Competence .....</b>	<b>160</b>
<b>4.15.3 TT Producer's Idiosyncrasy (The Translator's Stamp).....</b>	<b>161</b>
<b>4.15.4 TT/ST Producers and Experts .....</b>	<b>161</b>
<b>4.16 Text Analysis .....</b>	<b>162</b>

<b>4.16.1 Stage One: Extra-Textual/ External Factors (Context) .....</b>	<b>163</b>
<b>4.16.2 Stage Two: Intra-Textual/Internal Factors (Content) .....</b>	<b>165</b>
<b>4.16.3 Stage Three: Shifts Observation (Identification) .....</b>	<b>168</b>
<b>4.16.4 Stage Four: Comparison (What?) .....</b>	<b>169</b>
<b>4.16.5 Stage Five: Description (How?) .....</b>	<b>170</b>
<b>4.16.5.1 Back-translations .....</b>	<b>171</b>
<b>4.16.5.2 Thematic Overall Linkage .....</b>	<b>173</b>
<b>4.16.6 Stage Six: Explanation/ Interpretation (Why?/ What else?) .....</b>	<b>174</b>

## CHAPTER FIVE: DATA ANALYSIS

<b>TEXT 1: Why Can't the Syrian Opposition Get Along? .....</b>	<b>175</b>
<b>TEXT 2: "Wag the Dog" – The Sequel Set in Syria .....</b>	<b>188</b>
<b>TEXT 3: Aleppo: What's Left Behind .....</b>	<b>195</b>
<b>TEXTS 4 &amp; 5: Is Syria Finished? .....</b>	<b>201</b>
<b>TEXT 6: How Obama Chose War Over Peace in Syria .....</b>	<b>213</b>
<b>TEXT 7: Can the Syrian Regime Crush the Uprising? Yes, Suggests History .....</b>	<b>221</b>
<b>TEXT 8: Syria's Middle Class Can Defeat Bashar Al-Assad .....</b>	<b>225</b>
<b>TEXT 9: Geneva II Talks: A Test for Diplomacy .....</b>	<b>229</b>
<b>TEXT 10: Assad's Chemical Romance .....</b>	<b>250</b>

## CHAPTER SIX: SUMMARY, CONCLUSION & RECOMMENDATIONS

<b>6.0 Introduction .....</b>	<b>260</b>
<b>6.1 Research Questions- Re-visited .....</b>	<b>260</b>
<b>6.2 Research Hypotheses- Re-visited .....</b>	<b>261</b>
<b>6.3 General Concluding Observations .....</b>	<b>263</b>
<b>6.3.1 CDA, SFL &amp; DTS Harmoniously Hybridised .....</b>	<b>264</b>
<b>6.3.2 (Context): Language as "A System of Meaning Potential" .....</b>	<b>267</b>
<b>6.3.3 Adequacy vs. Acceptability/ Norms' Violation .....</b>	<b>268</b>
<b>6.3.4 Evitable vs. Inevitable Shifts .....</b>	<b>270</b>
<b>6.3.5 Cross-linguistic and Cross-cultural Asymmetries .....</b>	<b>272</b>
<b>6.3.6 Pressures of the Skopos are not a Licence .....</b>	<b>273</b>
<b>6.3.7 Translation is a Norm-governed and Purposeful Activity .....</b>	<b>275</b>

<b>6.3.8 Managing (Intervention) vs. Monitoring (Mediation) .....</b>	<b>279</b>
<b>6.4 Original Contribution .....</b>	<b>300</b>
<b>6.5 Significance .....</b>	<b>305</b>
<b>6.6 Challenges .....</b>	<b>308</b>
<b>6.7 Limitations and Recommendations .....</b>	<b>310</b>
<b>6.8 Last Word .....</b>	<b>313</b>
<b>6.9 Appendices .....</b>	<b>316</b>
<b>6.10 Bibliography .....</b>	<b>348</b>

## CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

### **1.1 Preamble**

There is no question that we live in the age of a wired, digital world, thanks to the new technologies which have made the globe closely interconnected, yet paradoxically more vulnerable. Over the last decade or so, the explosively-fast growth of mainstream and alternative media outlets has redrawn the world's socio-political map. This particularly came in the immediate wake of the so-called "*War on Terror*" nurtured after 9/11 attacks against America (in September 2001) and similar subsequent atrocities thereafter in many parts of the world, which gave rise to the US-led global "*War on Terror*" initiated by two wars: against Afghanistan in 2001 to oust Al Qaeda-based Taliban rule, and Iraq in 2003 to topple the Baathist "regime" under Saddam Hussein.

Amidst this dramatic change of the 2000s, which had also seen a number of conflicts in the Middle East and elsewhere, the role of translators (of course side by side with reporters) in exacerbating the conflict or negotiating peace has gained an increasingly high profile and their positioning has become exceedingly crucial. A vital need for understanding the ideological content and the communication goals that creep into the political discourse and lie beneath the media content has become perennially pressing.

The decade concluded with a significant event in the region which has not come to a close yet, the Arab "*Spring*"- as it has come to be known- within which the present study is located. As the event has grown, two main conflicting rivals are coming to the fore: the ruling political system on the one hand and the popular masses and civil society components on the other amidst relatively noticeable unequal power relations. Like any conflict, there has been a variety of fighting fronts between these two opponents which have different loyalties and opposing ideological affiliations: military, political, diplomatic let alone propagandistic.

With the last "front" in mind in particular owing to its direct relevance to this study's major concern, the weapon of language, via the translation activity, has played a '*perilous*' role, wherein ideology finds its clearest expression, and translators, who are viewed by many scholars (Tymoczko

and Gentzler 2002a: xix; Baker 2010: 203; Inghilleri, 2010: 175; Inghilleri and Harding 2010: 166), as proxy soldiers/journalists playing a "dual role" perhaps the role of "double agency", have become part and parcel of the conflict; each party has selected texts and processed them to (re)produce and disseminate them in such a way that feeds into their instinct belief systems and pre-planned agendas. Also, each party has at hand the needed tools to glamorise its choice and legitimise its deeds or, conversely, demonise those of its rival. This translational practice has been carried out by employing a wide range of linguistic and pragmatic strategies on the part of the translators in response to several norms, skopi, requirements and pressures in order to influence the public attitude and steer its perception of reality. This is the overriding concern of the present endeavour.

## 1.2 Motivation

In 2007, while I was watching the news bulletin on the Hezbollah's Iran-backed and anti-Israeli Al Manar TV, the news reader offered the following news which caught my attention:

أكد وزير الحرب في الكيان الصهيوني المحتل أن جدار العزل العنصري يحمي ما يسمى إسرائيل.

BT: [Minister of war in the occupying Zionist entity emphasised that the Apartheid Wall protects the so-called Israel].

A pro-Israeli source would instead offer the following wording:

أكد وزير الدفاع الإسرائيلي أن جدار الأمن يحمي دولة إسرائيل.

BT: [Israeli Minister of Defence emphasised that the Security Wall protects the State of Israel].

This very short stretch of news item triggered my journalistic instincts; as soon as I heard it, a plethora of questions and exclamation marks cropped up concerning Al Manar's Arabic wording of the item. I could feel how the news reader reframed the news in such a way that responded to her institution's editorial policy in the first place in order to pursue certain ideological agendas and meet its audience's expectations and pre-suppositions<sup>5</sup>. This reporting attitude that deforms reality of events and offers distorted accounts made me think what truth is after all. Can it reside in words? Is it the first or one of the main casualties in times of conflict?<sup>6</sup> How far, above all, could translators

---

<sup>5</sup> For more specific details, see my discussion in chapter two on the Skopos Theory, mainly, on pages: 30-34, and in chapter four on the Theory of Relevance (4.9.3.3), on page: 146.

<sup>6</sup> See my own article (2013): Truth is the First Casualty in Times of Conflict. Available at:  
<http://en.ammonnews.net/article.aspx?articleno=21058#.U8DC0Z1wbDc>

go when they render two conflicting ideologies in conflictual times? My thinking had grown bigger as soon as I started to contact translation scholar Mona Baker and read her then newly-published seminal book on the topic *Translation and Conflict* (2006a), followed by another relevant influential volume she also recommended entitled *Translating and Interpreting Conflict* then-newly edited by her colleague, famous translation Scholar Professor Mariam Salama-Carr (2007a) whom I met a few years later in a three-day international translation conference (held in Jordan late 2010) which touched on a variety of translation phenomena including translation in times of conflict.

These two books were primarily taken on board and topped the reading list of the syllabi of some specialised translation courses which I was teaching in a number of universities: Theories of Translation, Special Subject in Translation, Media Translation, English for Journalism and Media, Journalistic Skills (I, II and III), amongst many others. The targeted material had predominately drawn upon the Mideast conflict until the so-called Arab “*Spring*” kicked off in 2011 when I applied to pursue a PhD research on the subject (which was on the same day of the death of the Event’s catalyst, Mohammad Al Bouazizi, on January 4, 2011) and secured an unconditional PhD offer from London Metropolitan University (upon the very start of the Syrian events on March 17<sup>th</sup>, 2011). The explosive growth of the events region-wide and the emergence of two main opposing rivals: (ruling political systems and popular powers) further motivated me that investigating this critical phenomenon was worth researching<sup>7</sup>.

### **1.3 The Dawn of a New Discipline**


Before the birth of Translation Studies as an academic field in the 1950s, Translation was not seen as a fully-fledged discipline in its own right. It was accorded a peripheral status and considered as a merely language learning activity. This era (the 1950s), which witnessed the dawn of a new discipline, provided the ground for the field and sharpened increasing awareness towards this newly emerging subject following centuries of misrecognition. A variety of attempts was consecutively

---

<sup>7</sup> In addition to these two motivations (The Al Manar episode & Academic/Professional Profiles), there are also other motivations: my positive attitude towards the worlds of Media, Politics, Law & Human Rights; my strong affinity with Arabic Language's Lexicology & Lexicography; our digital world (2000s) which has seen new technologies & media explosion; the so-called "Global War on Terror" & "many" other regional and global conflicts let alone the scant regard accorded thus far to this fast-growing (under-researched) area of study in the field.

made by some theorists (particularly Eugene Nida and Wolfram Wills) who imported key concepts from the realm of Linguistics and ‘scientifically’ incorporated them into the then-youthful field.

For almost three decades (1950s-1970s), state Neubert and Shreve (1992: vii), this "minor sub-discipline of traditional Philology and Linguistics... had to struggle for legitimacy in traditional philological curricula". Not until James Holmes’s paper “The name and nature of translation studies<sup>8</sup>” did the discipline start to take shape as a legitimate and distinct approach of study. This paper provided a steering ‘roadmap’ which is presented by the descriptivist Gideon Toury (1995a), (see Figure 1.1 below and pay special attention to the locale within which the present study mainly operates: **boldfaced** & underlined items). The Map set up the central corner stone for the then-fledgling discipline. Many translation scholars (Gentzler, 2001; Munday, 2001) indicate that Holmes’s paper was seminal and inspiring. Gentzler (2001: 93) stresses that the Paper incontestably set up the “founding statement” for the discipline. In the same vein, Munday (2001: 12) commends it stating that “the crucial role played by Holmes’s paper is in the delineation of the potential of translation studies. The map is still often employed as a point of departure [and it] proposed both a name and a structure for the field”, (*ibid*: 17).



**Figure 1.1** Holmes’s ‘map’ of translation studies (From Toury 1995a: 10)

<sup>8</sup>Although the Paper was only made widely available in the academic circles in 1988. It was originally written in August, 1972 (for the Third International Congress of Applied Linguistics convened in Copenhagen). The Paper is re-printed in Venuti’s edited volume *The Translation Studies Reader*, 2000 and 2004 (pp. 180-192 and 172-185 respectively).

Over the past six decades, Translation Studies has seen quantum leaps and qualitative shifts; it thenceforth moved from a sub-discipline to an independent discipline which has further expanded to become an inter-, multi- and trans-disciplinary field of study based on well-established grounds and coherent methods. It has no longer remained secondary, peripheral or derivative genre falling under Applied Linguistics. Neubert and Shreve (*ibid*: viii) mention that the increasing growth of the discipline was "characterized by a decline in the influence of Linguistics and a movement to give translation research an interdisciplinary focus. Linguistics is now [1992] just one of many disciplines which contribute to our understanding of translation".

In her introduction to the 1998/2001 influential volume: *The Routledge Encyclopedia of Translation Studies*, Baker seems to be satisfied and effusively commends the remarkably rapid growth of this autonomous field. She (1998/ 2001: viii) states "[a]nd indeed translation studies has not only fulfilled our expectations but greatly *exceeded them*"; [my emphasis]. Earlier on, Baker (1992: 2) highlights the "*unjust* low status accorded to translation as a profession" adding that "throughout its long history, Translation has never really enjoyed the kind of recognition and respect that other professions such as medicine and engineering have enjoyed".

During the 1970s-1980s, research work in Translation Studies bloomed and began to focus on extra-linguistic aspects: text-type (Reiss 1971); purpose (Reiss & Vermeer 1984); and socio-cultural contexts tackling issues like ideology, power within the ambit of the Faircloughian Critical Discourse Analysis (Hatim and Mason 1990). The 1980s, most notably, have seen the emergence of target-oriented Descriptive Translation Studies (DTS<sup>9</sup>) pioneered mainly by Toury (1980a, 1995a) and Poly-system theories taken up mainly by Even Zohar (1978a & b).

The 1990s shifted the emphasis towards postcolonial translation theories (The Postcolonial Turn in Translation Studies) developed by Niranjana (1992) and Spivak (1987/1988) and cultural and

---

<sup>9</sup> Originally branded by Holmes (1988: 71). It is a branch of Translation Studies developed in most detail by Toury (1995a) that involves the empirical, non-prescriptive analysis of STs and TTs with the aim of identifying general characteristics and laws of translation, Hatim and Munday (2004: 338). According to Munday (2001: 10-11), DTS is a branch of 'pure' research in Holmes's map of Translation Studies and has three possible foci: examination of the product, the function and the process. DTS has been further advanced by, amongst other scholars, José Lambert, Theo Hermans, Gideon Toury, Maria Tymoczko, Suzan Bassnett and André Lefevere.

ideological turns adopted mainly by Bassnett & Lefevere (1990) as well as Venuti (1995). Emphasis was also placed on discourse- and text-oriented approaches (Baker 1992; Hatim and Mason 1997), which regarded translation as communicative act that operates within (and influenced by) socio-cultural contexts.

Research focus in the course of the first decade of the third millennium has largely been carried out in response to the dramatic surge in the contemporary global politics and the explosively-growing technology. It has seen a focus on such topics as translation and violent conflict (Baker 2006, Salama-Carr 2007a); translation and globalisation (Tymoczko 1999, 2003, 2007, 2009; Cronin, 2003) amidst increasing growth of ideo-cultural turns as I will discuss at length in the next chapter. This new research interest has been carried out within the incorporation of a more coherent corpus-based research (Lavoisa 2002; Baker 2004; Olohan 2004) and more recently Zanettin (2012).

It should be noted that present-day research is meticulously done over a myriad of different translation phenomena (within the context of postcolonialism, globalization, intercultural communication, ideological studies, etc.) of interdisciplinary nature and tackles topics (translation and conflict; translation and culture, etc.) at the cutting edge of the discipline in a variety of languages (including English and Arabic whose communities have increasingly seen serious socio-political confrontations most notably the US-led global "*War on Terror*"). Considerable masterpieces are published including a wide range of authored books and edited volumes/encyclopedias<sup>10</sup> covering various issues and published by renowned translation publishing houses<sup>11</sup>; periodical journals<sup>12</sup> (oftentimes specialised issues) on translation theory, practice and pedagogy alongside with several under- and postgraduate programmes, numerous training centres as well as countless completed dissertations. Specialised conferences across every corner of the globe also

---

<sup>10</sup> These scholarly publications on the particularities of translation are too numerous to count. See the online "Translation Studies Bibliography" (John Benjamins) and "Translation Studies Abstracts" (St. Jerome) respectively at: <http://www.benjamins.com/online/tsb/> & <https://www.stjerome.co.uk/tsa/>.

<sup>11</sup> Translation publishing houses include, but are not limited to: Routledge, St. Jerome, John Benjamins, Multilingual Matters, Continuum and Rodopi.

<sup>12</sup> The main refereed (international) journals in the field of translation studies proper are: Babel, Meta, Target, The Translator, Translation Studies, Translation and Literature, Across Languages and Cultures, Turjuman, TTR 'Translation, Terminology and Writing', Perspectives, JOSTRANS: Journal of Specialised Translation (online), Transcultural (online), New Voices (online), Translation Review, to name only a few.

regularly convene let alone institutionalised local, regional and international organisations of translation which function as the cradle of the practice and shelter for the profession.

#### **1.4 Aims and Objectives**

The present study by and large explores how social and political reality is constructed through the translators' normative behaviour manifested in pragma-linguistic forms within the Syria's Arab "Spring" as its context. It, in the main, aims at investigating the role of translation in (de)forming socio-political reality in times of conflict. More precisely, it sets out to peel the layers and reveal the bias concealed inside, between and behind media and political discourses by identifying the predominant linguistic and extra-linguistic influences that spawn texts and govern their production.

These aims can be broken down into the following core objectives:

- 1.** Identifying the different levels of potential mismatch between events on the ground and the translated material provided alongside with their effect on the TT reception (shifts),
- 2.** Investigating the ideological interferences that may appear in a selection of translated texts that may regularly accumulate as a result of the translators' own behaviour (norms/ disttranslations),
- 3.** Understanding the stumbling blocks that may hinder the tasks of translators in times of conflict (readership, in-built beliefs, etc.),
- 4.** Exploring the motives behind the translators' act of "managing" and their faltering in rendering disinterestedly and offering partial, selective and prejudiced accounts (skopos, brief, etc.), and
- 5.** Detecting whether translators' personal ethics and instinct affiliations are or are not triggered by narrow motivations of ethnic, nationalistic, political and ideological considerations or other material benefits.

#### **1.5 Research Questions**

In light of these objectives, the study raises (and hopes to) answer the following key questions:

- 1.** What role can translation play in shaping media and political discourses in times of conflict?

- 2.** What manipulative tools (and what pragma-linguistic forms, markers, clues) that may be utilised by translators to distort vital facts and render impartially?
- 3.** What are the institutions which may affect wartime translators and propel them to communicate impartial accounts?
- 4.** What rhetorical purposes or pragmatic goals do wartime translators wish to serve?
- 5.** How can such an analysis further the established objectives of the Study's frameworks of analysis: Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL) & Descriptive Translation Studies (DTS), thus providing new research avenues from different slants of view?
- 6.** How can answers to such questions set pedagogical regulatory instructions and steering guidelines for translation trainees particularly in times of conflict?

### **1.6 Research Hypotheses**

Given that translation is an act of rewriting (Lefevere 1991), as I will argue at length in chapter two, it is bound to be governed by the norms of the target language and host culture. Lefevere (1992: 39) argues that "[o]n every level of the translation process, it can be shown that, if linguistic considerations enter into conflict with considerations of an ideological or poetological nature, the latter tend to win out". More precisely, Hatim and Mason (1997: 161) maintain that ideology is expressly manifested in syntactic and lexical forms and that "behind the *systematic linguistic choices* we make, there is inevitably a prior classification of reality in ideological terms. The content of what we do with language reflects ideology at different levels: at the lexical-semantic level, and at the grammatical-syntactic level"; [emphasis mine].

Also, in view of the fact that the TT readership may have different ideological tendencies and expectations from those of the ST targeted audience, opinion articles will most likely undergo some alterations and manipulations (owing to the politically excessive sensitivity of our context) during the process of translating. In a similar vein, propagandists and their media surrogates often have their own ideological affiliations and unacknowledged agendas which may find their clearest

expression in the weapon of language (translation included). Baker (1992/2011) argues that (wartime) translation play a lead role in conflict causation and escalation (as well as, I see, conflict resolution/settlement). She (1992/2011: 8) writes: "We should be aware that translation and interpreting can be used to sow conflict, support racist agendas, dispossess indigenous populations and manipulate vulnerable groups and individuals".

This research starts with the identification of the (translational) problem and then proceeds further, according to a systematic method as shown in chapter four, to measure the trueness or falseness of this problem. It hypothesises that wartime translators do not provide detached accounts (owing to the nature of conflicts) to serve specific goals and pursue hidden agendas imposed by their own in-built belief system, their commissioner's/initiator's skopi, including sponsors, clients or even readers who may become initiators under the assumption that they hold beliefs that they would like (and expect) to see confirmed by the translators. Nord (1997: 30) mentions that "translation is normally done 'by assignment'. A client needs a text for a particular purpose and calls upon the translator for a translation, thus acting as the initiator of the translation process". These factors, (as Nord 1997, Schäffner 1998b, Munday 2001) show, largely determine the translation methods and strategies<sup>13</sup> and consequently the final product- the "translatum"- to import Vermeer's term (1989: 174) or the translat- in Reiss and Vermeer's word, (1991: 2).

This postulation intrinsically follows on from the nature of the study: this is a centrally corpus-based (rather than corpus-driven) type of study that follows a qualitative method of analysis. Tognini-Bonelli (2001: 17) distinguishes between corpus-based and corpus-driven endeavours in that "the former approach starts with a pre-existing theory which is validated using corpus data", while the latter "builds up the theory step by step *in the presence of the evidence*, the observation of certain patterns leads to a hypothesis, which, in turn, leads to the generalization in terms of rules of

---

<sup>13</sup> Newmark (1988) draws the distinctive line between translation method (aka. global translation strategies) and translation procedures (aka. local translation strategies). He points out that "while translation methods relate to whole texts, translation procedures are used for sentences and the smaller units of language" [such as words and grammatical constructions], Newmark (1988: 81). While the terms "method", "procedure" and "techniques" sometimes overlap and undergo a phraseological dilemma, Newmark's distinction is adopted for the purpose of this study.

usage and finally finds unification in a theoretical statement”, cited in Saldanha (2009: 4); [emphasis maintained].

In light of this, the hypothesis of the present thesis is based on a number of pre-existing theories which spring from functionalist and descriptive underpinnings. In addition to those dogmas that underpin Skopostheorie, it grows from the major theories of the Descriptive Translation Studies (DTS), not least the Theory of Norms which basically proceeds from target-oriented assumptions that a translation (rather than the original) should be investigated within the context of its host culture, which implies that “the resulting entity... is one which never existed before”, (Toury 1995a: 27). Toury justifies this assumption on the basis that a *translatum* is a novelty, which indicates non-conformity to the norms of its receiving culture and, in effect, provides solid ground for shifts in the text pairs in question. (See Toury 1995a: 26f; 1995b: 137f).

Besides the functionalist approach represented in Skopostheorie (Reiss & Vermeer 1984, Nord 1997) and the DTS represented in the Theory of Norms (Toury 1980a, 1995a) as shown above, the hypothesis in this research is also supported by the major approaches of the modern “turns” in the discipline of translation studies: the School of Manipulation (Hermans 1985) and the theoretical approaches of the Cultural Turn of the 1990s (Rewriting- Lefevere and Bassnett 1990; Lefevere 1992); Ideological Turn in the mid-nineties (Venuti 1995) not to mention Translation-and-Conflict Turn (Baker 2006, 2007, 2010; Salama-Carr 2007a; Inghilleri 2008, 2009, 2010 particularly the role and positioning of the translator within a globalised, postmodern and postcolonial context, (Tymoczko 2009; Sue-Ann Harding 2010). All of these trends in Translation Studies have assumed the inevitability of various forms and degrees of manipulation and put the questions of ethics and neutrality at stake particularly in politically motivated contexts and ideologically loaded situations. (See a more detailed presentation for all these approaches in the next chapter: Literature Review).

Specifically, the hypothesis is driven by many factors, foremost of which are the genre and register of its selected texts; that is, the targeted texts pertain to the world of media and, in particular,

opinion newspaper articles, which typically indicates that they are argumentative type of texts. It is important to note that the argumentativeness of the selected texts, at whose heart emotiveness, persuasiveness and evaluativeness lie<sup>14</sup>, articulates that translation is a decision-making process (Munday 2012) which gives way for much intervention<sup>15</sup> and, in turn, supports my hypothesis.

In parallel, the context which spawns the text (particularly the TT for the purpose of this study) and governs both its production and reception should also lend much support to my hypothesis; that is to say, the text is (re)produced, (re)published and (re)received in times of an armed conflict characterised by a rival contest between two bipolar ideologically-different parties: the Syrian government and its opposition rivals. (See more in chapter three which provides a panoramic account on the Arab "*Spring*"). This means that every party strives to disseminate its narrative to propagandise (and legitimise) its own position towards the conflict and ultimately achieve the propagandistic "victory". This hypothesis is going to be systematically tested through various examples that instantiate syntactic and lexical strategies (stratagems) employed (or more precisely preferred) by wartime translators to construct/trans-create socio-political reality in some way. To secure an objective analysis, and, as a result, a reliable judgement, I include texts that reflect the voice of both combating rivals in the war-torn Syria: pro- and anti-regime in terms of the (source and target) text producers and their respective publishing agencies- as shown in-depth under 4.13 Corpus Selection Criteria in chapter four, on page: 156fff.

## **1.7 Structure of the Thesis**

This thesis consists of six chapters: Introduction; Literature Review; The Arab "*Spring*": From Inside; Methodology and Method of Analysis; Data Analysis as well as Summary, Conclusion & Recommendations. In the following, I will offer a short summary of each chapter.

---

<sup>14</sup> According to Hatim, the degree of evaluativeness "is bound to vary in response to whether and how far the text is intended to 'manage' or to 'monitor' a given situation", (Hatim, 1997a: 113). In other words, the degree of evaluativeness is determined by the text type focus and its compositional plan (structure) which can be manifested in many syntactic, lexical, pragmatic and textual features as outlined in my method of analysis, (See also Hatim and Mason 1997: 111-17).

<sup>15</sup> According to Hatim and Mason (*ibid*), "in argumentation, the focus is on what is known as "situation managing", i.e. the dominant function of the text is 'to manage or steer the situation in a manner favourable to the text producer's goals'. In exposition, on the other hand, the focus is on providing a detached account". (See more in chapter two, mainly on pages: 58-63).

Chapter one provides an introduction to the thesis. It starts with a preamble offering some insights on the overall context within which the main investigated translational phenomenon is taking place: the accelerating socio-cultural and political transformations region- and world-wide together with the dramatic technological advancements which cast their shadow on a variety of alternative media outlets. It then moves on to present a very brief historical synopsis on the field of translation studies as an autonomous discipline in its own right in the second half of the twentieth century and its quick growth since then. It sheds light on the development of its main approaches and respective core concepts from its early inception in the 1950s until today with a view to arriving at the context of the present study: translation in times of conflict which came into the open in the wake of cultural and ideological turns amidst revolutionarily new political realities across the globe, thanks to Globalisation and the Informatics, which have made the world constantly smaller. The introduction also presents the motivation of the study; its aim and objectives; questions; hypotheses as well as breakdown of the thesis.

Chapter two starts off by conceptualising the term ‘translation’ with special linkage to its ‘twin’ term: ‘equivalence’ which has occupied theorists for centuries. It attempts to put in one basket the huge stock of the term’s definitions and theories which centrally revolve around the broad sense of the ‘word-for-word’ vs. ‘sense-for-sense’ bipolar opposites. The chapter also offers a précis of the pros and cons on the term showing how translation scholars (proponents and opponents) have viewed it by presenting the major equivalence theories proposed, which also revolve around the binary oppositions of ‘formal’ vs. ‘functional’ that date back to the centuries-old debatable dichotomy: ‘literal’ vs. ‘free’ translation.

The chapter furnishes a comprehensive presentation on the major theoretical notions in the literature that inform the theme of the present endeavour delineated in its previous chapter (chapter one). These notions are: a. linguistic which includes such concepts as (translation equivalence, shifts, fidelity, faithfulness, (non)-translatability, decoding, encoding, transcoding, etc.) and which sees

translation as a mere inter-lingual transfer; b. functionalist which includes such concepts as (skopos, function, purpose, commission, brief, action, loyalty, etc.) and which sees translation as a purposeful activity in response to a variety of pressures and c. descriptive which includes such concepts as (norms, polysystem, etc.) which sees translation as a communicative act governed by norms. The chapter moves on to cover a number of critical ‘turns’ in the field which very much tie in with the present study: the cultural turn (manipulation, rewriting, patronage, foreignisation, domestication, (in)-visibility, etc.); ideological turn (power, hegemony, monitoring vs. managing, mediation/intervention, ethics, etc.) and translation-and-conflict turn particularly the role and positioning of the translator within a globalised, postmodern and postcolonial context. It theoretically locates the study within these approaches in such a way that closely resonates with this study and influences its overriding concern: tracing the wartime translators’ normative behaviour and, more precisely, the potential occurrences of significant ideological shifts that may pervade the TT and take its consumers to a different world.

Chapter three consists of two sections. The first section draws on the Arab “*Spring*” at large. It provides a background picture of the event with particular reference to the recent past, primarily claiming that the on-going Event is the inevitable fallout of a considerable number of Arab mass mobilisations over the last few decades which were destined to failure. In other words, the section argues that the current events are happening within the context of the Arab recent history (1950s-2000s) which had, under despotic political systems, seen a wide range of abortive attempts towards a democratic, pluralistic living. It, *inter alia*, draws attention to the root causes behind the event (be they political, economic or social) and sheds light on other significant factors particularly the role of mainstream and social media outlets amidst generational change with the rising generation of tech-savvy young activists and new technologies. Regional and global influence is also considered. As the present study quintessentially reflects on the Syrian scene, which has been awash with blood of a grinding war for almost four years now, the second part of the chapter reflects on the Event within its historical context (particularly over the last four decades of Al Assad family’s Baathist rule)

together with the main events that foreshadowed the occurrence of the ‘*uprising*’, because background knowledge, no doubt, leads to substantial analyses and eventually solid conclusions.

Chapter four consists of three main parts; the first one draws on the major conceptual, theoretical and epistemological underpinnings of the study’s main frameworks of analysis: Faircloughian Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), Hallidayan Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL) and Touryean Descriptive Translation Studies (DTS)<sup>16</sup>. As far as CDA is concerned<sup>17</sup>, the study owes a debt to the Faircloughian approach (1989, 1992a, 1995a, 2003), who, perhaps more than any other single individual, has provided the fuel that has driven the approach in various directions. (See his various publications included in chapter four under 4.2.1 Norman Fairclough’s Socio-cultural Approach, on page: 122). In addition to the socio-cultural approach of Fairclough, the discourse-historical approach of Ruth Wodak (2001b) and the socio-cognitive approach of Teun A. van Dijk, especially his insights on Discourse and Prejudice (1984) and Discourse and Ideology (1998a), will mainly be taken into consideration. This is because their work closely touches upon the key critical aspects of this study. (See how their approaches inform this study and why they are considered in chapter four under sections 4.2.1; 4.2.2 and 4.2.3, on pages: 122, 123 and 124 respectively).

In this respect, it is noteworthy that the present study considers this framework of analysis and particularly applies it to translated texts (TTs) based on its belief in the validity of such approach of text analysis. Many scholars (Schäffner 2004; Schäffner & Bassnett 2010; Hatim 1998; Mason 1994, Nahrkhalaji 2009, etc.) have voluminously drawn on the applicability of CDA to translation *per se* precisely to politically sensitive discourses produced in times of conflict. (See, for instance, Schäffner’s 2004 ‘Political discourse analysis from the point of view of translation studies’;

---

<sup>16</sup> As can clearly be seen, the present study, which mainly falls under the umbrella of Translation Studies precisely its descriptive and applied foci of Holmes map (1988) as shown above, widens its scope to include such integrally-related linguistic and non-linguistic branches as Text Linguistics, Critical Linguistics, Socio- and Psycho-linguistics, Corpus linguistics, Critical Discourse Analysis, Stylistics, Cultural Studies, etc. This multi-faceted nature is not strange in the field of translation studies in view of its inter-, trans- and multi-disciplinary nature. In the late eighties and before today’s world interconnectedness and heterogeneity, Chesterman (1989: 5) acknowledges this hybridity (integration) when he believes that research in the field of translation studies “must cover a very wide area”.

<sup>17</sup> It is important to emphasise, for the purpose of this very study, that the second eponymous element (Discourse) that appears in CDA mainly refers to the translated (Arabic) version. Therefore, it is safe to speak of (Critical Translation Analysis)- as I have noted under Prefatory Note no. (2), on page: vi.

Schäffner & Bassnett's 2010 *Political Discourse, Media and Translation*; Mason's 1994 'Discourse, ideology and translation'; Nahrkhajali's 2009 'Translation: ideology and power in political discourse', Hatim's 1998 'Discourse analysis and translation'<sup>18</sup>; etc. In her study entitled *Ideology in the Language of the Press from the Perspective of Critical Discourse Analysis*, Farhoud (2009: 3) shows "how Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) in particular can be applied to translation [and highlights] the benefit of insights gained from knowledge of this kind of discourse analysis for professional translating". More precisely, this part will shed light on the conception of CDA, its aims, genesis, essential tenets as well as major approaches and their protagonists along with their antagonisms.

The bulk of the second part of the chapter presents the method of analysis that best answers the question and a priori hypotheses of the present study which is predominantly a critical linguistic investigation that looks into how reality in politically motivated contexts is constructed: (switched, reframed, recreated, reproduced, recycled, manipulated, under-/over-stated, etc.) via employing a number of linguistic and pragmatic strategies (by the translators). The method essentially imports insights from the realm of Critical Text Linguistics (CTL) on two main levels: syntactic and lexical. It also considers a number of extra-linguistic (pragmatic, contextual, etc.) factors/ingredients that control text production and consumption. In this connection, it follows the Hallidayan approach of analysis (1994) (with its triangulatory meta-functions of language: ideational, interpersonal and textual) whose model is highly acknowledged by critical discourse analysts (Fairclough 1992a; Meyer 2001; Fowler 1991; 1996 and Wodak 2001a, among others).<sup>19</sup>

Given that the present project draws on a translational phenomenon in the first place and that it is predominantly based on descriptive, comparative, explanatory and target-text oriented (product-oriented) claims, it also applies, in addition to CDA and SFL, the Touryean Descriptive Translation Studies (DTS) with particular reference to the Theory of Norms and the Comparative Model (Toury

---

<sup>18</sup> Pertinent to this thinking, albeit not directly on translated texts, is the work of Paul Chilton who solely (1997, 2004) and in cooperation with Schäffner (2002), affluently draws on this kind of analysis.

<sup>19</sup> See how they acknowledge this in chapter four, on page: 126ff, under 4.4 Hallidayan Model of Linguistic Analysis.

1980a, 1995a) at whose heart the controversial “troubled”<sup>20</sup> notion of equivalence lies in addition to Hatim and Mason’s model of text analysis (1990, 1997) that places special focus on media argumentative texts (translations) produced in times of conflict<sup>21</sup>. In so doing, I will be able to hold systematic comparisons between selected Arabic TTs and their English counterparts<sup>22</sup> by tracing wartime translators’ normative behaviour, identifying, describing and explaining potential instances of manipulation (manoeuvrings) and "unnecessary" shifts in order to be able to systematically arrive at constant generalisations on the translators’ “normativity” in times of conflict, (see Hermans 1999b 'Translation and Normativity').

Before casting my net and embarking on the texts’ analyses, the chapter in its third part also offers the *fishing tackle*: the necessary tools of analysis which paves the way for the focal part of the present thesis: the work of chapters five (Data Analysis) and six (Summary, Conclusion & Recommendations). It consists of three main sub-sections: corpus (conception, genesis, aims, types and selection criteria (be they text attribute or corpus attribute; qualitative or quantitative) and units of analysis/comparison. Also, I explain the method of analysis in light of the theoretical frameworks chosen a priori. This chiefly includes the (de)-selection process, pathway of the actual analytical processing and the way conclusions are drawn. The chapter concludes with offering the specific stages of text analysis from its selection until conclusions are arrived at (which is taking place in chapter five). The chapter also involves a word on the back-translations of the selected (excerpts of the) TTs and the thematic interconnectedness between the translators’ lexico-grammatical and pragmatic strategies that constitute my method of analysis. These stages include: extra-textual/external factors (context); intra-textual/internal factors (content); shifts observation (Identification); comparison (what?) and description (how?).

---

<sup>20</sup> As termed by some translation scholars who are interested in the notion of equivalence in Translation Studies such as Hermans 1995: 217). See more discussion on the theory of equivalence in chapter two, on pages: 19fff.

<sup>21</sup> See Prefatory Note no. (1), on page: vi.

<sup>22</sup> Toury indicates that translation analysis is carried out from back to front maintaining that “it is performed INTO (from) rather than FROM (into)”, Toury (1988: 83). A thorough discussion is provided in chapter four, mainly on page: 134.

Chapter five and six, as indicated earlier, constitutes the practical part of the thesis. Chapter five is what I am analysing; chapter six, in the main, is what I am saying about my analysis. Chapter five includes systematic analyses of ten (target) texts according to the theoretical frameworks and method of analysis established in the previous chapter. Preliminary conclusions on the thematic overall linkage between the proposed syntactic strategies by the Study's method of analysis: (Modality, Transitivity and Nominalisation); the lexical ones (Over-lexicalisation, Re-lexicalisation and Metaphor) as well as their accompanying pragmatic clues employed by the translator during the process of translating are provided right after the analysis of each text.

Chapter six essentially includes a conclusion to the thesis, of the analysed data on two different levels: descriptive and interpretive in an attempt to debunk the root causes of the translators' shifting practices with special reference to the inevitability of cross-linguistic and cross-cultural discrepancies/similarities that feature English and Arabic. It also includes a re-visit to the research questions and hypothesis to see how far its premises come true, original contribution to knowledge, significance, challenges encountered during the completion of this thesis; its limitations as well as recommendations for further research in future and concludes with a last word. English and Arabic appendices are included in the end of the thesis (with their lines numbered on the left and right margins) together with a bibliography.

## CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW

### **2.1 What is Translation?**

“Translation” is a very broad notion that can be, and has been, viewed, in many different ways. It has remained a debatably problematic term whose definition has not so far been well-established. Translation, as I see it, is simply an activity that decodes the meaning of a text in one language (SL) into a new “*equivalent*” text in another language (TL). Definition of translation, however, has fallen in an imprecise cycle of confusion. It has come to mean different things to different people since its early inception as an autonomous discipline on mainly four different levels/eras as will gradually be traced below: linguistic (1950s-1970s), functionalist (1980s), descriptive (1990s) and most recently conflictual, cultural and ideological "turns" since the 2000s onward.

Thus far, there has been no agreed-upon definition of translation. Nida (1964b/ 2004: 157), states that “definitions of proper translating are almost as numerous and varied as the persons who have undertaken to discuss the subject”. Hatim and Munday (2004: 3) agree with Nida and believe that translation is “an incredibly broad notion which can be understood in many different ways”<sup>23</sup>. Early attempts to define the term (before the birth of the discipline as an area of research in the Academia in the 1950s-1960s), did not provide a well-recognised definition either; they revolved around the broad sense of the ‘literal’ word-for-word vs. ‘free’ sense-for-sense dichotomy that had occupied theorists for centuries since Cicero, Horace and Jerome almost a couple of thousands of years or so ago<sup>24</sup>- ‘the pre-linguistic period of translation’ as called by Newmark (1981: 4).

The second half of the twentieth century, as delineated earlier, saw a systematic and scientific approach to the discipline. Yet, no robust consensus on the concept existed despite considerable attempts. However, translation theorists have tried to define it in light of a web of relations and specific requirements with a close linkage to its twin term: equivalence. Nida (1964b/2004: 160),

---

<sup>23</sup> See also Shuttleworth and Cowie (1997: 181ff) for more discussion.

<sup>24</sup> Munday (2001/ 2008: 33) states that “the vocabulary of early translation theory has persisted widely to the present day. ‘Literal’, ‘free’, ‘loyalty’, ‘faithfulness’, ‘accuracy’, ‘meaning’, ‘style’, and ‘tone’ are words that reappear again and again. He elsewhere maintains that ‘one of the difficulties encountered by translation studies in systematically following up advances in theory may indeed be partly attributable to the overabundance of terminology’, (*ibid*: 46).

for example, believes that a *good* translation is conditional upon ‘four basic requirements’ which echo the centuries-old Voltaire’s statement against literalism: ‘the letter kills and the spirit gives life’. These requirements include: (1) making sense, (2) conveying the spirit and manner of the original, (3) having a natural and easy form of expression, and (4) producing a similar response. This polemic debate, amongst translation thinkers, over the definition of translation has given rise to the controversial concept of equivalence which has remained, as Venuti (2004: 147) puts it, “the controlling concept for most translation theory” and to which I briefly turn next.

## **2.2 What is Equivalence?**

“The central problem of translation practice is that of finding TL translation equivalents. A central task of translation theory is that of defining the nature and conditions of translation equivalence”, Catford (1965: 21).

### **2.2.1 Equivalence is a “Desideratum”**

Like translation, the notion of equivalence has exercised translation theorists for millennia, not least the question of literalism. It has been quite disputatious and remained “one of the central issues in the theory of translation and yet on which linguists seem to have agreed to disagree”, Gutt (1991: 10) citing Svetjcer (1981: 321). The question of equivalence has been tackled from two main perspectives: linguistic and pragmatic (functional, descriptive). Some scholars (such as Baker 1992) stand half way between; she opts for it “for the sake of convenience” and considers it as “relative”.

“The term equivalence is adopted in this book [In Other Words] for the sake of convenience—because most translators are used to it rather than because it has any theoretical status. It is used here with the proviso that although equivalence can usually be obtained to some extent, it is influenced by a variety of linguistic and cultural factors and is therefore always relative”. Baker (1992: 5f).

This ‘relativity’ has been acknowledged by some other translation scholars thereafter. Farghal (1993: 56) argues that optimum equivalence is a myth, a chimera that is close to impossible. “[It is] usually a desideratum rather than a full achievement, due to a wide range of factors involved, e.g. informativity, creativity, and expressivity, and due to the relative closeness or remoteness between the two language cultures”. Surprisingly, (Newmark 1981: 38) sees it as “illusory” while Trosborg

(1997: vii) calls for "other criteria for successful translation" and contends that "in most cases, equivalence can hardly be obtained in translation across cultures or languages, and it may not even be a desirable goal". More surprisingly, as cited in Chifane (2012: 75), "others (Snell-Hornby (1988) and Gentzler (1993) reject the theoretical notion of equivalence, [respectively] claiming it is either irrelevant or damaging to TS".

### **2.2.2 Linguistic Theories of Equivalence**

It is important to reiterate that the present thesis, *inter alia*, seeks to establish comparison between English originals and their correspondent Arabic translations. This exercise, to some extent, involves investigating a theory of equivalence. In what follows, I will briefly present the most influential equivalence theories from both linguistic and non-linguistic (functionalist, descriptive) perspective since its actual birth as an autonomous discipline in the second half of the twentieth century. In so doing, I attempt to minimise the degree of thorniness and intricacy that has revolved around it and, more importantly, show how this central term in the field has come to mean different things in view of the emergence of target-oriented approaches to Translation Studies. In other words, I shall very briefly draw on the linguistic orientations of conceptualising the term (1950-1970s) in order to arrive at what it has, as time went on, come to mean with the emergence of the functionalist, descriptive approaches (1980s) as well as cultural, ideological and conflict turns amidst a very critical juncture in history characterised by a fast and vast growth of mainstream and alternative media outlets and new technologies, which have made the world more interconnected and tellingly offered sites of conflicts and conflicting loyalties.

Over the last six decades or so, many attempts to define equivalence were made based on binary/bipolar oppositions/opposites which, are various in wording but agree on the same theme that intimately chimes back with the classical old dyad: 'sense-for-sense' and 'word-for-word' and which harks long back to the centuries-old debatable dichotomy of literal (word-for-word) vs. free (sense-for-sense). With the shrinkage of the linguistically-oriented school and the rise of the target-

oriented schools, the notion of equivalence is replaced by the notion of norms (Toury 1995a). Disciples of the target-oriented schools reduce the status of the source text viewing it as the point of departure and accord the target one a supreme significance, whereby a paramount attention is placed on the extra-linguistic factors (socio-cultural, historical, and political) that spawn texts and govern their production.

One significant feature of recent approaches to translation deals with critical aspects of pragmatic equivalence manifested in such concepts as presupposition<sup>25</sup> and implicature<sup>26</sup> which, as their proponents argue, requires full awareness on the part of the translator. The present study attends to this level of equivalence as it looks into translation criticism within socio-political boundaries and by applying analytical approaches (CDA, SFL and DTS) which study language within its socio-cultural (pragmatic) confines and power asymmetric relations. In this connection, Baker (2011) travels above and beyond the mainstream thinking on equivalence: in her re-visited version of *In Other Words* (1992) wherein she lays down her hierachal bottom-up understanding of equivalence, she appends a new chapter entitled '**Beyond** Equivalence: Ethics and Morality' which responds to the new theoretical framework of the term in the third millennium, and, in effect, locates equivalence within its new target-oriented, extra-linguistic ambits, which I detail in the next section and all other subsequent sections (under The Descriptive Approaches & Cultural Turns in Translation Studies, etc.).

### **2.2.3 Equivalence within Target-oriented Approaches**

The concept of equivalence has triggered much controversy amongst past and contemporary scholars in the fields of translation theory and translation studies. Relevant linguistic approaches (in the course of the 1950s-1970s) stipulate not only what translation is but also what translation should be (offering prescriptions and proscriptions rather than descriptions). Toury terms this current as

---

<sup>25</sup> Richardson (2007: 63) defines 'presupposition' as "a taken-for-granted, implicit claim embedded within the explicit meaning of a text or utterance".

<sup>26</sup> This is a newly-coined term in the realm of Text Pragmatics. According to Baker (1992/2011: 235), implicature (*pl. implicatures; Arabic: التعریض \ التصریح*; *opp.:* التلخیص \ التلخیم) [explication \ exposition]), is "one of the most important notions to have emerged in text studies in relatively recent years". This 1975 Gricean notion, adds Baker (*ibid* & 302) is "used in Pragmatics to refer to what the speaker means or implies rather than what he or she literally says".

Prescriptive Translation Studies (1980a, 1985: 17)<sup>27</sup>, which brings to the fore the debate between the notions of "adequacy": adherence to the ST and "acceptability"- adherence to the TT.

In the mid-eighties, the term began to engender new angles of view and acquire new outlook where the TT's circumstances of production and reception were given prime significance. Seen through the lens of functionalism, translation came to mean 'the production of a functional TT maintaining a relationship with a given ST that is specified according to intended or demanded function of the TT (translation skopos)', Nord (1991: 28). At that point in time, the notion markedly began to widen as to be seen as an externally motivated industrial activity, a commercial product governed by the supply-and-demand law in the market. Afterwards, phenomena of translating started to be tackled within the locale of the TT's world experience: a transition towards a purely target-text oriented current took place where translation was 'taken to be any target-language utterance which is presented or regarded as such within the target culture, on whatever grounds', (Toury 1985: 20).

As already alluded to, this research accords due regard to the DTS at whose heart the Touryan Theory of Norms lies<sup>28</sup>. Toury, who situates Translation Studies within empirical descriptive-explanatory boundaries, understands the notion of equivalence as only attached with potential translational relations that assumedly exist between two text pairs, (1980a: 39, 56). When Toury first tried his hands with the world of translation, he did not demonstrate much interest in the interplay between the ST and the TT; he (and his fellow descriptivists) placed much focus on the target language (and host culture) system where the concept of equivalence began to take a different shape based on empirical, practical (not merely theoretical) grounds as had been the case with the linguistic-oriented approaches a couple of decades or so earlier.

---

<sup>27</sup> Toury brands this term to show his dissatisfaction vis-à-vis the theoretical translation studies: 'approaches to translation which are normative in outlook, or in other words which impose criteria [and propose recipes] stipulating the way translation should be performed in a particular culture', Shuttleworth and Cowie (1997: 130).

<sup>28</sup>Toury (1999: 11-12) stresses that "it wasn't I who suggested the association of 'translation' and 'norms'. He strongly acknowledges the previous (although implicit) attempts of this translation-norm association (Jiří Levý, (1969 [1963]) and James S. Holmes (1988), "with whom I [Toury] have always felt the strongest affinity... I am probably the one person who would have to take the responsibility- the blame, some will no doubt insist - for having injected the heaviest dose of norms into the veins of Translation Studies in the 1970s and early 1980s...".

Toury (1999: 11) makes this clear when he states that "as always, my main interest lies with *descriptive-explanatory research* rather than mere theorising"; [emphasis his]. In their target-oriented approach, the source text is somehow dethroned and a focus on the final output is given great regard. In fact, Toury does not seem to entirely disregard the ST in carrying out descriptive/comparative analyses; he accepts it "as a point of departure" stressing that the main intention of his descriptive-explanatory approach is "to uncover the *regularities* [that appear in the resultant TT] which mark the relationships assumed to obtain between functions, product and process", Toury (1995a: 24).

Despite the huge *stock* of different definitions of equivalence, translation scholars by and large agree that the end goal of the exercise is to establish a relationship of "sameness or similarity"<sup>29</sup> between the ST and the TT. Besides sameness and similarity, equivalence has been viewed in terms of a number of related "equivalent" notions: symmetry, likeness, correspondence, adequacy, acceptability, equal value as well as quality<sup>30</sup>. A good translation is chiefly gauged against the principle of naturalness: the TT should *fully* conform to the ST linguistic, stylistic let alone cultural conventions and reduce to the absolute minimum the foreignness that exists in the original. Munday (2001: 33) points out that "the [overall] tendency is for a privileging of a 'natural' TT, one which reads as if it were originally written in the TL".

Equivalence has become a "dirty" term in the literature<sup>31</sup>. Chesterman, in an interview with Baker (2008) is curious *to sift the wheat from the chaff* when it comes to the concept of equivalence. He (ibid: 13) raises a variety of questions on the term: "Does this depend on an untenable assumption of objective neutrality? Do you agree with the scholars who seem to have thrown the idea of equivalence out of the window, or would you like to keep it? Is it of any use, theoretically? If we

---

<sup>29</sup> Chesterman (1996: 159-164) argues that in that sense, translation equivalence is better conceived as a kind of similarity instead of sameness. He supports the argument that there is no exact translation noting that this feature of similarity is a matter of cognition; it is not an objective concept and judgments of similarity must be made on some principled grounds, and not be arbitrary. A translation cannot be the same as its original, but this lack of sameness does not necessarily mean that perfect translation cannot be achieved.

<sup>30</sup> Equivalence also relates to the degree and nature of similar features and thus addresses the issue of the quality of translation, which was one of the main approaches discussed by the Linguistically-oriented School. (See Juliane House 1977, 1997 (re-visited): A Model for Translation Quality Assessment.

<sup>31</sup> An interview with Christina Schäffner by Antony Pym (2008): [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ko0-9ALng\\_U](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ko0-9ALng_U)

continue to use it, how should we define it? If we reject it, what alternative concepts could we use instead, in investigating the relations between source and target texts?”. In her reply to these questions, Baker, with some reservations, accepts to keep it on the shelf in view of its significance in TT-ST comparison. She states:

“I don’t think we should ditch the term ‘equivalence’. If we did it would be very difficult to compare source and target texts, an exercise which will continue to remain very important to the discipline, and especially in training translators and interpreters. But we should take a more ‘relaxed’ attitude to it, adopting different definitions of the term in different contexts. As long as we are explicit about how we are using the term on any given occasion, and as long as we alert students and remind ourselves of the inherently problematic nature of the concept, I see no particular difficulty in continuing to use it where it might prove serviceable”, (Baker 2008: 14).

As I hope to have shown, the notion of equivalence is undoubtedly one of the most problematic and controversial issues in the field of translation studies as it has been encapsulated in a huge number of definitions or, more accurately, of attempts to define it. The term has undergone scrutinising investigations yet remained the “the troubled notion”, (Hermans 1995: 217); it has for long caused, and it seems likely that it will continue to cause, heated debates and perpetual discussions in the growing field. This term has been stoutly contested, analysed, evaluated and extensively approached from different angles of view. It has remained a myth, a chimera, a desideratum and most scholars who have been involved in this circular debate seem to understand the utopia around providing a globally-acknowledged definition of the term. Unsurprisingly, these circular arguments reflect, almost automatically, the intricacy and thorniness of this troublesome term which, in my view, will remain the central issue in the field of translation studies on which scholars will continue to agree to disagree.

### **2.3 Translation Shifts**

In addition to the central issue of equivalence, one important phenomenon that had occupied translation scholars was ‘translation shifts’ upon which the present study largely draws. This translation phenomenon is primarily associated with the English linguist J. C. Catford (1965)<sup>32</sup>.

---

<sup>32</sup> Catford’s work (1965) comes under criticism; his examples are almost all invented and not taken from actual translations, i.e. de-contextualised. “He does not look at whole texts nor even above the level of the sentence”, cited in Munday (2001/ 2008: 61).

According to Catford (1965: 73), shifts are “departures from formal correspondence in the process of going from the SL to the TL”. In fact, the French linguists Vinay and Darbelnet (1958) predated Catford in arguing linguistic *changes* in translation although they did not label them as “shifts”. The term first appeared in Catford’s 1965 *A Linguistic Theory of Translation* under a separate chapter entitled “Translation Shifts”). As shown above, Vinay and Darbelnet initiate a comparative ST-TT analysis of English and French texts. They observe *differences* that occur in those two languages and explore the translation strategies and procedures employed during the process of translation. This investigation, one can assume, has paved the way to the incorporation of shifts in translation. They stress the role of translator in the finished product: “to choose from among the available options to express the nuances of the message”, (Vinay & Darbelnet 1995: 30).

### **2.3.1 Shifts & Equivalence**

The interrelation between translation shifts and equivalence has been debatable; scholars (like Hatim 2001, Al-Zoubi and Al-Hassnawi 2001) argue whether or not 'shifts' threaten the principle of equivalence in translation. Hatim (2001) views shifts in translation in a positive light and attempts to change the long-established stereotype that shifts are unwelcome deviations in the target message. He maintains that “shifts in translation are not considered ‘errors’, as many a translation critic has called them. Shifts are seen as part of the process which is naturally embedded in two different text worlds, intellectually, aesthetically and from the perspective of culture at large”, (Hatim, 2001: 67). Thus, shifts are considered as positive consequences of the translator's effort to achieve translation equivalence between two different linguistic and cultural systems. It can be argued that their occurrence is an indicative of the translator's awareness of the ST-TT discrepancies be they linguistic and non-linguistic. In other words, shifts are not problematic but rather problem-solving strategies that lend the translators a helping hand to achieve balanced relations between the source and target language texts known as equivalence.

Al-Zoubi and Al-Hassnawi (2001) see that shifts reflect the translators' avoidable and unavoidable necessities that are dictated by any two linguistic and cultural systems; they (2001: 2) maintain that "shifts are all the mandatory actions of the translator (those dictated by the structural discrepancies between the two language systems involved in this process) and the optional ones (those dictated by [her/]his personal and stylistic preferences) to which [s/]he resorts consciously for the purpose of natural and communicative rendition of an SL text into another language". Hence, Shifts can be obligatory and unavoidable which are conventionally ascribed to linguistic, stylistic and cultural constraints or optional and unnecessary due to the translator's subjective fingerprints and stylistic prejudices. The present study, whose main question is to identify instances of ideological interferences in politically motivated texts, is predominantly concerned with the latter form of shifts (optional shifts) because it centrally endeavours to trace the normative behaviour of the translators- their disttranslations- based on their own decisions and "subjective stamps", that is, their '*non*'-conformity to norms during the process of translating on which I concentrically shed light next.

### **2.3.2 Shifts & Norms**

It must be reiterated that the present study is, amongst others, located within the framework of the Touryean Descriptive Translation Studies (DTS) which views translation as a 'norm-governed activity' (Toury: (1995: 56). This means that translators' decisions are primarily governed by norms and that they respond to the intended audience's expectations, knowledge and pressures of all kinds and within a given situation. It adopts the Touryean Theory of Norms and imports the notions of DTS to systematically establish comparative relation between TT-ST relations in its analyses.

As noted earlier, Toury adopts a systematic approach to analyse TT-ST pairs across different languages. His 'initial' norms come into a fuller play within this approach: the continuum between 'adequacy': (fidelity/loyalty/faithfulness to the source culture system), and 'acceptability': (fidelity/loyalty/faithfulness to the host culture system). Munday (2012: 38) notes that "translation is clearly an example of a text that is produced for a new communicative purpose, or at least that is normally directed at an audience different from that envisaged by the source". Thus, the

significance of the translation shifts (or changes, alterations) lies in their relation with norms which govern the translator's behaviour (fidelity or infidelity) and decisions they make during the process of translating. In other words, identifying shifts is helpful in exploring the norms that are adopted and employed in the process of translation. They are also useful for translation analyses especially the descriptive ones which rely on TT-ST comparative bases as adopted in this research. (See shortly below more details on DTS & the Theory of Norms 2.6, 2.6.1, 2.6.2, 2.6.3 & 2.6.4, on pages: 35, 35, 38, 40 & 41 respectively).

### **2.3.3 Optional Shifts**

The second form of shifts (optional) involves the ‘fingerprints’ of the translator. Arguably, the author and the translator pertain to two different worlds linguistically and culturally. Also, no two languages have similar stylistic, aesthetic and rhetorical patterns. These discrepancies must be considered to justify the inevitability of the occurrence of shifts be they optional or mandatory. It can be argued in this respect that translation is not only a purely linguistic activity neither simply a code-switching operation that requires mastery of two languages; it is an aesthetic practice that involves creativity and innovative touches. In my view, this does not run counter to the principle of fidelity long-established in the discipline; it rather makes the text-to-be more natural and quite functional. Popović (1970: 80) supports this argument and argues that:

“It is not the translator's only business to 'identify' himself with the original; that would merely result in transparent translation. The translator also has the right to differ organically, to be independent, as long as independence is pursued for the sake of the original, a technique applied in order to reproduce it as a living work... Thus shifts do not occur because the translator wishes to 'change' a work, but because he strives to reproduce it as faithfully as possible and to grasp it in its totality”.

This clearly shows that the role of the translator is two-fold: on the one hand, s/he has to show sincerity to the original and comply with its singularities as much as possible, and to free her/himself from the constraints of the source text to, without infringing the ST intended message, re-produce a non-foreign ‘*natural*’ text that must rely on a variety of changes known as ‘shifts’ which are needed to bridge the gap between source- and target-readerships and to adapt the TT to

the expectations of the host culture. This present study, as referred to earlier, is predominantly concerned with the optional type of shifts; it sets out to examine translators' own 'stamps' and 'signatures': (options and preferences).

## 2.4 The Functionalist School

As noted earlier, the first two decades or so of Translation Studies drew on translation issues from sheer linguistic perspectives where focus had primarily been placed over the source rather than the target text. With the Theory of Action, which views translation as purpose-driven, function-oriented, product-oriented or outcome-oriented human interaction, (see Schäffner 1998a: 3), a gradual transition from the 'statically' formal linguistic approach towards a functionalist one took place. Trosborg (1997: vii) states that "[W]ithin translation theory and practice, there has been a shift from an overall concern with equivalence between source and target texts to a recognition of a need for adaptation to the target situation and purpose (c.f. the Skopos Theory)". Since then, Translation Studies has started to 'dethrone' the source text and shift emphasis towards the target text (and culture) giving birth to a new school of translation known as functionalism<sup>33</sup> which had cast its shadow over later theories and approaches. The Functionalist School of translation first came into the open in Germany in the 1970s and 1980s and was largely developed thereafter by a number of *skopists* including, in the main, Vermeer (1989, 1996; Reiss & Vermeer 1984; Holz-Mänttäri 1984; Höning 1997 and Nord 1997). Amongst others, Skopostheorie, the Theory of Action<sup>34</sup> and the question of Loyalty form its main concerns and fall at its heart.

The emergence of the Functionalist School has marked a quantum leap in Translation Studies with new typologies. It has shifted the discipline from traditional approaches of superficially studying ST-TT interrelations towards a more dynamic, systematic and structured ones that accord due regard not only to linguistic factors but also to extra-linguistic (contextual, situational and cultural

---

<sup>33</sup> Nord (1997) draws the thin line between "functionalist" and "functionalism"; she argues that "functionalist means focusing on the function or functions of texts and translations. Functionalism is a broad term for various theories that approach translation in this way", Nord (1997: 1).

<sup>34</sup> This theory was particularly developed by Holz-Mänttäri in 1984. She also named it as "Translatorial Action" (aka. Translational Action).

ones). Advocates of this new trend (Schäffner 1998a, Vermeer 1987, Nord 1997) believe that translation is not (nor primarily) a linguistic activity; it travels far above and beyond sheer linguistic boundaries. Schäffner (1998a: 3) holds that "translation is here [within the context of the function-oriented approach to the theory and practice of translation] conceived as primarily as a process of intercultural communication whose end product is a text which has the ability to function appropriately in specific situations and context of use". In similar vein, Vermeer (1987: 29) (c.f. Nord 1997: 10) declares that "[L]inguistics alone won't help us" citing two reasons: "First, because translating is not merely and not even primarily a linguistic process. Second, because Linguistics has not yet formulated the right questions to tackle our problems. So let's look somewhere else". This "somewhere else" indicates a shift which involves in its very essence the Skopos Theory as a reaction against such static 'dysfunctional' notions as loyalty, fidelity and faithfulness.

Translators tend to produce their *functionally-equivalent* texts in view of their targeted readers' wants and needs that are seen as commissioners or clients. This approach highlights the translator's high status (often equal to the author's) and places her/him in its centre. It acknowledges her/his pivotal role in deciding on what translation strategies to include and what translation strategies to exclude for a functional *translatum*. Furthermore, it equips him/her not only with freedom and flexibility but also with absolute authority to perform the task whose end goal is to satisfy the client, please her/him and fulfill her/his need no matter what.

The "acceptability" yardstick, the goodness or slavishness of the finished product (the output), is essentially seen through the extent to which it accomplishes (or fails to accomplish) the communicative skopos or skopi of the translation assignment and accounts for the clients' 'brief' and commercial purposes. Needless to say, this status, which involves commercial resonance and financial intervention, must result in dishonest renditions and prejudiced touches which would, in turn, deform the actual message intended in the original text and trick the TT receivers. Thus, this trend represents the business face of the translation activity and views it as a paid service-providing

practice- ‘a serving profession’ in the translation market. This aspect of the Skopos Theory (alongside with the echoes of strict loyalty to the client or commissioners of the translation) is criticised by many scholars. Pym (1996: 338), for instance, austerely criticises this trend for producing “mercenary experts, able to fight under the flag of any purpose [skopos] able to pay them”.

#### **2.4.1 Skopostheorie (Skopos Theory)**

The term ‘*skopos*’ (pl. *skopi*) is imported from Greek and employed in the functionalist translation approach in Germany in the mid-eighties by Reiss & Vermeer (1984) to mean purpose. It has been linked up with other ‘similar’ terms such as: aim, intention, function and ‘brief’<sup>35</sup> which all fall in the same basket: teleology. Nord (1997: 30) notes that translation brief is equivalent to Vermeer’s (1989) ‘commission’; Pöchhacker’s (1995: 34) and Kussmaul (1995: 7 et passim) ‘assignment’ as well as her own term: ‘instructions’ ([1988] 1991: 8, note 3). In short, "brief" is the factor that decides on the kind of translation needed<sup>36</sup>. All skopos-related terms are, as noted by Nord, introduced by Vermeer except for ‘translation brief’. To avoid conceptual confusion, Vermeer, it seems, uses them interchangeably as they share the same teleological underpinnings<sup>37</sup> and “[subsumes] them under the generic concept of *skopos*”, Nord (1997: 29). Skopostheorie claims that “the prime principle determining any translation process is the purpose (*skopos*) of the overall translational action [which] fits in with intentionality being part of the very definition of any action”, Nord (ibid: 27); [emphasis maintained].

Skopostheorie is highly inspired by the Theory of Action which implies pre-planned intentional behaviour<sup>38</sup>. This theory “is proposed by Holz-Mänttäri... and views translation as purpose-driven, outcome-oriented human interaction and focuses on the process of translation as message transfer

---

<sup>35</sup> See detailed elaboration on these interrelated terms in Nord (1997: 27-31) who provides a whole sub-section entitled “*Skopos, Aim, Purpose, Intention, Function and Translation Brief*”.

<sup>36</sup> Nord (1997: 30) notes that brief ‘implicitly compares the translator with a **barrister** who has received the basic information and instructions but is then free (as the responsible expert) to carry out those instructions as they see fit’; [my emphasis]

<sup>37</sup> See Reiss and Vermeer (1984: 96) for more elaboration as seen by these two disciples of the Theory.

<sup>38</sup> Shunnaq (1994: 106) holds that ‘in action theory, [translation] action is defined as an event performed with an intention to change a situation’.

compounds involving intercultural transfer”, Munday (2001: 77). Holz-Mänttäri (1984: 7-8) states that Translational Action “is not about translating words, sentences or texts but is in every case about guiding the intended co-operation over cultural barriers enabling functionally oriented communication”, (quoted and translated in Munday (ibid: 78). According to Nord (1997: 29), Skopostherorie claims that “the top ranking rule for any translation is [...] the ‘Skopos rule’, which says that a translational action is determined by its skopos”.

Nord proposes a model of text analysis (2005) which is indeed useful for the purpose of this study and therefore merits some attention because it is presented first and foremost as “a model of text analysis” applied to translation within specific communicative (or set of communicative) functions. She believes that a text is considered a product of its producer's/re-producer's (i.e. translator's) intention, and “remains provisional until it is actually received. It is the reception that completes the communicative situation and defines the function of the text”, (ibid: 18f). In this spirit, translation is not seen as a mere “replacement of textual material in one language (SL) by equivalent material in another language”, as declared by Catford (1965: 20) when Translation Studies was in its infancy.

Clearly then, Skopostheorie, owing to its teleological, utilitarian implications, involves the famous Machiavellian schemata: “the end justifies the means” as stated by Reiss and Vermeer (1984: 101) which measures the rightness of our action according to the final outcomes, regardless the means: licit or illicit. In a similar vein, Ayasrah (2013)<sup>39</sup> sees this teleological consequentialism as amoral, erroneous and fallacious and argues that the “morality or immorality of our actions [translation included] should, first and foremost, be conditional upon the extent to which those actions adhere or fail to adhere to the agreed-upon rules, prevailing norms and observed conventions” of human communication. Vermeer summarises the major claims of skopos rule as follows:

“Each text is produced for a given purpose and should serve this purpose. The skopos rule thus reads as follows: translate/interpret/speak/write in a way that enables your text/translation to function in the situation it is used and with the people who want to use it and precisely in the way they want it to function”; (cited in and translated by Nord, 1997: 29).

---

<sup>39</sup> This argument appears in a recently-published article entitled ‘Two Wrongs Do (NOT) Make a Right! The article is available at: <http://en.ammonnews.net/article.aspx?articleNO=20734>

Farghal (2012: 142) comments on the role of the commissioners' dictates and readers' expectations noting that "the choice between x and y may be costly for the translator, as any oversight may cost him his job, if not something dearer to him". He provides an example on these factors of text production and reception showing how taxing it can be "for a translator working for a newspaper or any other medium in an Arab country to render *The Persian Gulf* in an English text as *al-xaliiju al-faarisiyyu* in his Arabic translation". He cites a real example which took place in 2007 when the Iranian President addressed the Gulf States' summit conference as guest observer in Qatar "used the Persian expression corresponding to "the Persian Gulf" several times [and] every time the interpreter rightly rendered it as "الخليج الفارسي" "The Persian Gulf" because it represents a premeditated ideological move that carries political consequences. Later on, some Arab commentators blamed Arab Gulf States' Heads for remaining quiescent about such a sensitive matter... Both and other similar terms, argues Farghal, "represent the same denotatum, thus creating serious processing problems", (ibid).

It is conventionally reckoned that texts, most notably those of argumentative nature, are (re)produced with a purpose in mind or intention in compliance with a multitude of pressures and dictations that govern the translator and steer her/his direction. Hatim and Mason (1997: 19) stress this axiom and state that "intentionality involves the text producer's attitude that the text in hand should constitute a cohesive and coherent whole and that it should inter-textually link up with a set of socio-textual conventions recognizable by a given community of text users". Translated texts are no exception; it is axiomatically established that translation, like any other human practice, is a "purposeful activity" (Nord 1997 also 2007: 18)<sup>40</sup> and a form of mediated intercultural communication which very much finds echoes in the hypotheses of the present study as has been sketched out in the previous chapter, on pages: 8-11.

---

<sup>40</sup> Nord rightly points out that 'in professional setting, translators don't normally act on their own account, they are asked to intervene by either the sender or the receiver, or perhaps by a third person. From an observer's point of view, this third party will be playing the role of a 'commissioner' or 'initiator'; from the translator's point of view, they will be the 'client' or customer.'

Tymoczko (1999: 110) sees translation as a “commisive act”. This indicates that the act of translating, not least in wartime, is far from a noble mission; i.e. it is (or can arguably be seen as) an ignoble "*co-'mmission*" carried out in accordance with commissions to please specific clients and meet their requirements. As Nord (1997: 30) aptly puts it, “translation is normally done 'by assignment'. A client needs a text for a particular purpose and calls upon the translator for a translation, thus acting as the initiator of the translation process”. This is very frequent and apparent in times of armed conflict: an era of conflicting ideologies between combatant parties and rival opponents who seek power, dominance, hegemony and control. In such settings that are doubtlessly replete with ideological charges, translator's emotional and political involvement is very likely- as the analyses of the selected texts carried out in chapter five will reveal.

#### **2.4.2 How does the Skopostheorie Inform this Study?**

It is particularly important to reiterate that “skopos” here refers mainly to the purpose, communicative function and action of the TT rather than those of the ST, given that this is a critical translation study in the first place. According to Lefevere (1992: vii), translation is an activity that is “carried out in the service of power”. He notes that there are a wide variety of "control factors" or *patronage* including (individuals, groups, religions, political parties, social classes, publishers, etc.) stressing that those factors govern the translators' behaviour to rewrite the original text, "to produce translated texts which conform to their patron's ideology", (*ibid*: 14).

Translators of the study's selected texts are not neutral freelancers. As shown in detail in chapter five which provides ancillary (background) information on the translators and their institutions, they belong (and work for) specific pro- and anti-regime) institutions inside and outside Syria that hire and pay them money so that they can earn acceptable living conditions. The translator is an employee of the media publishing company; therefore she/he could be operating under some constraints to produce a translation that agrees with the parameters set by her/his patrons, lest she/he loses her/his job. As Baker (2008: 17) puts it ‘some translators clearly do not have the luxury of

choosing not to work with specific clients... They have to feed and clothe their families under extremely difficult conditions'. In other words, the translator might be compelled to produce a translation that conforms, in addition to her/his own ideology, to the patron's 'skopos' or share her/his views to secure her/his own economic income, thus be able to earn a decent living and stay alive.

## **2.5 Halliday's Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL)**

Halliday's Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL) claims that language is a "system of meaning potential", Halliday (1978: 39) and meaning is a system of choices/ preferences made by its producers in the first place. It ought to be noted that SFL is not exclusively a linguistic theory; it also considers the socio-cultural role in the process of meaning construction. Halliday (1978: 12f) sees language as a form of "social behaviour" that cannot be understood apart from its socio-cultural environment. In other words, texts reflect the semantic repertoire residing in their producers' own world experience or dictated by socio-cultural systems that, SFL believes, spawn texts and govern their production. Halliday (1978: 141) writes:

"The linguistic system has evolved in social contexts... The system is a meaning potential, which is actualized in the form of text; a text is an instance of social meaning in a particular context of situation. We shall therefore expect to find the situation embodied or enshrined in the text, not piecemeal, but in a way which reflects the systematic relation between the semantic structure and the social environment".

Halliday's approach to systemic functional analysis provides significant insights for textual analysis; he proposes three interrelated metafunctions (which are key components in my method of analysis<sup>41</sup>); the Textual, the Interpersonal and the Ideational. The Textual metafunction refers to how a text coheres, how information in a certain text is organised and presented (cohesion). The Interpersonal metafunction refers to language as a medium for interaction (attitudes) at whose centre modality lies. The Ideational (experiential) metafunction refers to the world of experience and circumstances: "Who does what to whom under what circumstances?", (Butt, et al 2000: 46).

---

<sup>41</sup> See a thorough discussion of Halliday's analytical model in chapter four under (4.4 Hallidian Model of Linguistic Analysis, on page: 126) and the main aspects which the Study's method takes on board.

## 2.6 Descriptive Approaches to Translation

The present study follows an empirical, descriptive as well as applied approach which is “initially devised to study, describe and explain”, Toury (1985: 16). It is based on the assumption that norms rule the translators not the other way around, i.e. they govern the translators' behaviour, determine their strategies and steer their direction towards the text-to-be<sup>42</sup>. Hermans (2009: 96) holds that “Andrew Chesterman (1997a, 1997b) related norms to professional ethics, which, he [Chesterman] claimed, demanded a commitment to adequate expression, the creation of a truthful resemblance between original and translation, the maintenance of trust between the parties involved in the transaction and the minimization of misunderstanding”. In the following, I will provide a detailed description of the Theory of Norms as a tool to help fathom the choices of equivalences and explain how they apply to the current translation analysis and determine the translators' behaviour and, as a result, their output- the translation. Bartsch (1987: 141) believes that "norms act as constraints on behaviour, foreclosing certain options while suggesting others". The current study has strong belief in the validity and feasibility of this theory's theoretical, conceptual, philosophical not to mention epistemological underpinnings that should lend a helping hand in evincing regular translational patterns including potential optional shifts and manipulative practices in the translator's behaviour given that the act of translating involves “a degree of manipulation of the source text for a certain purpose”, Hermans (1985: 11).

### 2.6.1 Norms, Conventions & Rules

Norms, conventions and rules are obviously not similar. However, they share many things in common: all of them agree to regulate the behaviour of individuals and create harmonious interpersonal relations, solid interactions and sound forms of communication amongst them. In a similar vein, they de facto imply a general sense of uprightness, correctness and appropriateness in the socio-cultural system of a given community. Nonetheless, they differ, *inter alia*, in terms of their

---

<sup>42</sup> Toury (1995a: 56fff) allocates one section entitled Translation as a Norm-governed Activity in which he argues that “all decisions in the translation are primarily governed by norms and illustrate[s] the interplay between the translator's responses to expectations, constraints and pressures in social context”, (appears in Schäffner (1999b: back cover).

durability, legitimacy, binding force as well as degree of obligation and consequences. It is, therefore, worth drawing the distinctive line between each of them with special focus on 'norms' being the gauging evaluative tool of the Arabic TTs when compared with their correspondent English originals in this study.

The intimate relationship between "social agreements, conventions, and norms" is acknowledged by Toury who holds that norms link up with prescribed guidelines and social agreements within a given community. On several occasions, and in a practical fashion<sup>43</sup>, Toury (for example, 1980a: 51 & 1980b: 181; 1995a: 54-55; 1999: 15), sees "norms" acting as constraints on the translator's behaviour and defines them through the prism of situation/context: "the translation of general values or ideas shared by a certain community- as to what is right and wrong, adequate or inadequate- into specific performance- instructions appropriate for and applicable to specific situations, specifying what is prescribed and forbidden as well as what is tolerated and permitted in a certain behavioural dimension", He clearly states 'the whole notion of norms is a socio-cultural notion not only theoretically but also in practice... and translators either abide by them or do not', Toury (2005)<sup>44</sup>.

Hatim and Munday (2004: 245) provide two definitions on norms: a general one and within the ambit of Translation Studies. They maintain that norms are "1. The conventions (in the sense of implicitly agreed-upon standards) of 'acceptable content and rhetorical organization, [and] 2. Observed and repeated patterns of translation (or other) behaviour in a linguistic and cultural context". This second definition is the main concern of the present study which predominately seeks to investigate the regularly accumulative patterns chosen/preferred by the translators by way of identifying, describing and interpreting their frequent occurrence.

---

<sup>43</sup> Toury (1999: 11) states that "as always, my main interest lies with *descriptive-explanatory research* rather than mere theorising"; [emphasis is Toury's own].

<sup>44</sup> An interview conducted with Toury in 2005 by Anthony Pym who (on several occasions) agrees with Toury that translational norms are influenced by socio-cultural factors and links them with power relations, (see, for example, Pym 1998: 111). The interview was mainly on the socio-cultural approaches to translation and is available at: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yr6MHzcmHFI>

As for their positions vis-à-vis conventions and rules, they fall half way between both of them: between the leniency of conventions and the severity/strictness of rules. However, although they do not dictate regularities in behaviour, norms give rise to “regularities of behaviour” (Toury 1995a: 55; 1999: 16 & 22) and, by implication, provide basis for behavioural evaluation. In the context of translation, norms- or more conventionally- ‘translational norms’, “function in a community as standards or models of correct or appropriate behaviour and of correct or appropriate behavioural product”, Schäffner (1999a: 5).

Toury (1995a<sup>45</sup>) amply refers to the laws of the translators’ behaviour which may come out as a result of the cumulative identification of norms by way of descriptive/comparative mechanisms. Their recurrent and systematic occurrence, he hopes, will allow the formulation of “laws” of translation and ideally give rise to equivalence standardisation<sup>46</sup> stressing that: "in the long run, the cumulative findings of descriptive studies should make it possible to formulate a series of coherent laws which would state the inherent relations between all the variables that will have been found to be relevant in translation", Toury (1995a: 9); [his emphasis]. He argues that as soon as the ST content is manipulated or unfaithfully rendered, then TT which accommodates to the host language and culture is most certainly likely to appear. In the context of translation, argues Toury (1995a: 268), “textual relations obtaining in the original are often modified, sometimes to the point of being totally ignored, in favour of habitual options offered by a target repertoire”.

Norms are not unchangeable; they undergo change through history and become more and less binding as time goes by. More importantly, they are not universal either; they are culture-bound and relative: they differ from one socio-cultural system to another. In other words, what is binding for a certain culture/community could be more or less- or even not- binding for others. As Schäffner (1999a: 6) puts it: “translational norms prevail at a certain period and within a particular society, and they determine the selection, the production and the reception of translations”. Toury (2000/

---

<sup>45</sup> (See Toury 1995a- particularly Part IV: 295fff: 'Beyond Descriptive Studies: Towards some laws of translational behaviour').

<sup>46</sup> The tentative “laws” Toury proposes are: the “law of growing standardisation” (1995a: 267-274) and the “law of interference” (1995a: 274-279) which is of more relevance to the phenomenon under investigation.

2004) emphasises that norms exist at every stage in the TT production. Distinguishing between two main ‘groups of norms’: "preliminary" and "operational", Toury (1995: 58; also 2000: 202, 2004: 209) holds that ‘norms can be expected to operate not only in translation of all kinds, but also at every stage in the translating event, and hence to be reflected on every level of its product’.

Thus, it is important to keep in mind that translators do not necessarily have to follow (conform to, comply with) norms simply because there are no well-established norms; that is, norms exist in the translator's regularities and frequent occurrences in response to a wide range of demands and requirements: socio-political, ideo-cultural, personal, etc.- as I will show shortly below under (2.6.4 Where do Norms Exist?, on page: 41). This study, therefore, endeavours to disclose and exhibit the translator's normative behaviour in the first place rather than translation quality of the selected texts. Stressing the intimate articulation between language and culture, Nord (1997: 1) states that human communications are situated within specific contexts and situations “which are not universal but are embedded in a cultural habitat”. She notes that these situations are participants-oriented and dictate the way we communicate.

### **2.6.2 How do “Norms” Apply to Translation Analysis?**

The Comparative Model between the two text pairs, in a given translation corpus, lies at the centre of the Theory of Norms. The resultant outcomes following the mapping of the TT onto the ST are intimately tied in with the Touryan concept of “norms”. In his descriptive approach of analysis, Toury adopts a comparison method between both coupled pairs: target and source texts. He believes that holding TT-ST comparative analysis will help to compare and contrast them against each other, with the TT as the point of departure, to examine similarities and differences, which will, in turn, identify, examine and explain the strategies (stratagems/ prejudiced normative choices of equivalences) which are employed (preferred) by the translator during the act of translating. This empirical method of analysis has proved its efficacy in the analysis of translation and is valid (as chapter five illustrates) in the current endeavour which bases its evaluation on the comparison of TTs against their respective STs rather than mere theorisation. Nevertheless, the importance of the

ST, without which the TT would not have existed, is considered in the current research- but as a reference not as a point of departure, as noted earlier (see Prefatory Note no. 1, on page: vi). The comparison is based on ten different Arabic translations of the ST performed by different translators who pertain to different institutional apparatuses and ideological orientations (precisely pro- and anti-regime voices) within the context of the on-going Syrian revolution.

Some linguistically-oriented scholars (Nida 1964a; Catford 1965; Newmark 1982, 1988) see the ST as a ‘sacred original’ to which maximum loyalty should be accorded. This strict faithfulness to the ST is contended by modern translation approaches (functional and descriptive). For example, Schäffner (1998b: 238, c.f. Vermeer 1989/2004; and Höning 1997) views the translator as a TT author who does not operate under the “limitations and restrictions imposed by a narrowly defined concept of loyalty to the source text alone”. More recently, Farghal (2012: 133) argues that this straightforwardness is no longer relevant in today’s translation practice because “some translation theorists regard the translator’s task as mainly reflecting the *skopos* (purpose) of the TT rather than that of the ST”. Hence, translator’s “invented” normativity usually occurs in response to (or is governed by) the pressures of the translation skopos. In our case, skopos of the selected translations is mainly dictated by the pressures of authority: the translators (as analyses in chapter five will show) subscribe, *inter alia*, to the editorial control of the newspapers/institutions they work for.

One criterion of this study’s corpus selection is the authorial voice. Following Schäffner (*ibid*), this research sees the translator as an author. Said another way, both translational voices (pro- and anti-regime) are also considered, during the process of corpus selection which corresponds with Toury’s preliminary type of norms: (the choice of the to-be-translations). This incorporation is two-fold; it strips me of any potential personal prejudices and helps me to drop off my subjective mask, on the one hand, and must guarantee a panoramic investigation into the main question and a priori assumptions of this research to arrive at reliable conclusions and bias-free evaluations, on the other. The analysis of the translations selected, which follows an empirical method, seeks to pinpoint and explain commonalities in the translators’ own choices.

It is worth mentioning in this respect that this thesis, which adopts DTS, follows a descriptive rather than a prescriptive approach of analysis. Kruger (2013: 104) lends support to such claims when she states that "Toury's use of the term [norms] is not prescriptive; descriptive theorists, including Toury, are not interested in *validating* or expounding particular prescriptions and proscriptions for translations, but in *describing* these norms as they emerge from analysis"; [emphasis hers]. This is what the present study quintessentially hopes to reveal: what is done by the translators, why and how they do that *not how it should be done*. In this context, Toury believes that norms govern the translation (or more precisely the translator's strategies and decisions) and dictate its final shape. This is clear in the way he, on several occasions (1980a: 51; 1980b: 181; 1995a: 54-55; 1999: 15) defines the concept of norms as I have just shown in the previous section: "the translation of general values or ideas shared by a certain community- as to what is right and wrong, adequate or inadequate- into specific performance- instructions appropriate for and applicable to specific situations, specifying what is prescribed and forbidden as well as what is tolerated and permitted in a certain behavioural dimension".

### **2.6.3 "Translation is a Norm-governed Activity"**

This heading appears and is very much detailed in Toury (1995a: 56fff) who holds that norms govern the form and degree of equivalence in given text pairs. In this spirit, translation is seen as a decision-making process which governs the translator's regular choices and is governed by a set of ideo-cultural constraints. This, almost automatically, raises the question that not only linguistic but also extra-linguistic conditions can govern this decision and control its final shape (Hermans 1999a; Nord 1997; Baker 2001; Toury 1980a & b, etc.). It also raises a multitude of questions on the authorial intentions of the decision and the rhetorical purposes it seeks to serve. The fact that translation is an activity governed by norms and that analysis of finished products help to fathom how norms govern the translation process and the translator's choices is not as straightforward as it seems. Kruger (2013: 105) agrees on this when she succinctly comments that "norms can be extrapolated from observations of regularities in translation behaviour" concluding that "ultimately,

then, in a research context, norms are a more explanatory hypotheses than actual facts" which follows on from Toury (1999: 15) who argues that "it is important to bear in mind that there is no identity between the norms as the guidelines, as which they act, and any formulation given to them in language".

In this connection, Hermans (1999a: 80) understands "norm" as referring "to both a regularity in behavior, i.e. recurring pattern, and to the underlying mechanism which accounts for this regularity". He writes: "After all, translators do not just mechanically respond to nods and winks, they also act with intent", (ibid). In a purely additive sense, Nord (1997) stresses that translation is a "purposeful activity" that is done in the service of specific agendas to please the 'clients', satisfy their needs and feed into their ideological instincts and belief systems. In like manner, Baker draws on the choices and preferences which translators usually opt for during the act of translating. In Baker's estimation (2001), translators, being humans, have different loyalties which govern their translational behaviour. These loyalties, conflicting in her words, result from the fact that translators have a wide range of identities. She states that:

"A translator's behaviour is often the result of conflicting loyalties, sympathies and priorities- precisely because a translator, like any human being, does not have just one identity but many. He or she plays a multiplicity of roles and speaks simultaneously in a variety of voices, and he or she adopts a whole variety of strategies, often conflicting ones, in the space of even a single translation or a single stretch within translation", Baker (2001: 16).

#### **2.6.4 Where do Norms Exist?**

There has been a circular debate on where translation norms really exist: in the translator's back of the mind or in the translation (the TT) itself? Toury's voluminous studies on norms conclude that they are created and can be as various and many as translators who usually "act differently... when working for different commissioners, e.g. in order to be given more work by the same commissioners, or at least to escape the need to have their products edited by others, which many translators abhor", Toury (1999: 20). Thus, norms do not inherently appear in the translation *per se* but rather reside in the translator's/ individual's own consciousness, and it is the frequency of occurrence in her/his own translational behaviour that imply they exist. They are not set of

prescriptive rules that have an imperative, binding force for them to comply with (or disobey) them. As Toury rightly puts it, norms do not exist in translation but in the translators via their translatorial conduct. Toury (2005) clearly says: "Right from the start, the whole notion of norms was associated with translators not with the translations. There are no norms in the translations; the norms are in the translators"<sup>47</sup>. However, norms are not easily discernible owing to the fact that they are diverse, numerous, changeable and culture-specific. Only by following critical, systemic and descriptive (comparative) procedures can they be detected and explained, which explains the present study's hybridisation of CDA, SFL and DTS as theoretical frameworks of analysis.

Translation is an act that falls within social, cultural as well as historical settings and is done by agents who presumably are affected, in various ways and to different degrees, by a countless number of socio-cultural and other dictations. Translational behaviour, as Toury constantly reiterates (e.g. Toury, 1980a & b, 1995a & b, etc.) has been understood as contextualised social behaviour, motivated by action, fuelled by instinctive belief systems, exerted by 'local and global' pressures and governed by norms. Describing translation, argues Schäffner, "as norm-governed behaviour in a social, cultural and historical situation raises a number of issues. For example, [she asks], how do we reconstruct norm from textual features? What is the relationship between regular patterns in texts and norms? How do translators acquire norms? Do they behave according to norms?", Schäffner: 1999b). These controversial questions and similar others will be considered in this research which is centrally concerned with the translator's normative behaviour within a politically-charged setting in a bid to precisely explore the potential ideological bias that may arise during the process of translating- another key aim of the present enterprise.<sup>48</sup>

Toury (1999: 16-17) points out that translation critical analysts, in order to be able to extract norms themselves, must start with the observation of the "regularities in the observable results of a

<sup>47</sup> An interview conducted by Anthony Pym with Toury in 2005 on socio-cultural approaches to translation: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yr6MHzcmHFI>

<sup>48</sup> It is noteworthy that these questions were the core of an extended debate among the most prominent exponents of the notion of norms including, amongst others, Toury, Hermans, Chesterman, Gile, Pym, and Schäffner herself. The fruits of this debate appear in a special issue edited by Schäffner in (1999b) under the title *Translation and Norms*.

particular kind of behaviour, [which is] assumed to have been governed by norms". Linking norms with power relations, he believes that "norms thus emerge as *explanatory hypotheses* (of observed [results of] behaviour) rather than entities in their own right... norms also serve as a yardstick according to which instances of behaviour and/or their results are evaluated"; [emphasis and bracketing his]. Thus, pinpointing where (and in what way) norms exist will enable researchers (precisely translation critical analysts) to *sift the wheat from the chaff*, and be (made) aware of the translator's biased choices, leanings and inclinations configured in specific pragma-linguistic forms that may instantiate different "doses" of ideological weight in the hope that generalisable guidelines for producing impartial outputs are established or, to hope for the least, translators' attention in times of war is drawn towards the provision of detached accounts *as much as possible*, which, as a result, should cast its shadow over the construction/trans-creation of socio-political reality in conflictual settings. (See more in chapter six under 6.5 Significance, on page: 305).

## 2.7 Cultural Turn in Translation Studies

Cultural Turn first emerged in 1990 when Susan Bassnett and André Lefevere<sup>49</sup> edited a collection of essays entitled *Translation, History and Culture*. Their point of departure is that translation is a cross-cultural transaction, i.e. it is an intermediary activity and that the study of translation intrinsically involves the study of cultural interaction, given that translation is a cultural product of the target system. They argue that "neither the word, nor the text, but the culture becomes the operational 'unit' of translation", (Lefevere and Bassnett 1990: 8). In their introduction to the Volume (*Translation, History and Culture*), they draw the attention to the new course of emphasis in the field of translation studies: from a sheer formalist, static linguistic stage (at whose heart the intricate debates on the notion of equivalence fell as sketched out above) and move out of it towards a broader, deeper and more dynamic stage that considers such extra-linguistic issues as context, culture coupled with other local and global considerations that govern both texts' production and reception. The main approaches that came into the open out of this 'turn' (which closely instruct the

---

<sup>49</sup> Although this trend is primarily associated with these two scholars, the American translation scholar, Lawrence Venuti, is seen to have advanced it via his famous dichotomy 'foreignisation' vs. 'domestication' and the notion of the translator's (in)visibility.

present research) were Polysystem Theory propounded by Even-Zohar (1978a & b) and the Manipulation School pioneered by Hermans in 1985 through his edited volume which included significant contributions by a number of the School's fervent advocates including Gideon Toury, José Lambert, Hendrik van Gorp and Andre Lefevere (all in 1985). Cultural Turn, through these two main schools, has further offered many avenues to research translation from different perspectives over the last three decades including, but not confined to, Translation and Ideology, Translation and Ethics, Translation and Conflict as well as Translation, Post-colonisation and Globalisation. All these trends are presented in detail in the subsequent sections.

### **2.7.1 Translation Studies vs. Cultural Studies**

"No language can exist unless it is steeped in the context of culture; and no culture can exist which does not have at its centre, the structure of natural language".

Lotman & Uspensky (1978: 232)

It is perhaps axiomatic to say that translation and culture are inextricably tangled, inseparably intertwined and tightly linked; both of them intersect and interact with each other in a quite complex fashion. In other words, the translation activity necessitates the understanding of cross-cultural discrepancies, which explains the fact that a competent translator should not only be bilingual but also bicultural<sup>50</sup>. Larry Samovar et al (2000: 36) define culture as "the deposit of knowledge, experience, beliefs, values, actions, attitudes, meanings, hierarchies, religion, notions of time, roles, spatial relations, concepts of the universe, and artifacts acquired by a group of people in the course of generations through individual and group striving". They see that language is deeply embedded in culture and "it is impossible to separate our use of language from our culture", (*ibid*: 122).

Nahrkhalaji (2009: 498-499) notes that "[C]ultural turn is a true indicator of the interdisciplinary nature of contemporary Translation Studies and refers to the analysis of translation in its cultural, political and ideological context". At the very onset of the emergence of this current in the discipline, Bassnett and Lefevere (1990: 12) write: "Now the question has changed. The object of study has been redefined; what is studied is the text embedded in its network of both source and

---

<sup>50</sup> See Snell-Hornby (1990) 'Linguistic Transcoding or Cultural Transfer? A Critique of Translation Theory in Germany'.

target cultural signs and in this way Translation Studies has been able both to utilise the linguistic approach and to move out beyond it<sup>51</sup>. This movement (out of the linguistic bounds) is called the ‘Cultural Turn’ synchronised with then-rapid growth of the Cultural Studies worldwide (thanks to globalisation, trans-continental inter-connectedness let alone the Informatics).

All cultures today are intimately involved in each other in that they are hybrid, heterogeneous and unmonolithic. Bassnett (1998: 138f) outlines the occasions of intersection between the study of translation and culture. She states that “[t]ranslation is, after all, dialogic in its very nature, involving as it does more than one voice. The study of translation, like the study of culture, needs a plurality of voices. And [sic], similarly, the study of culture always involves an examination of the processes of encoding and decoding that comprise translation”. In his foreword to Bassnett and Lefevere 1998, Edwin Gentzler writes: “[a]s cultural studies now enters a new internationalist phase, Bassnett suggests that the moment has now come for the two disciplines to jump off their parallel track and join together. Cultural Studies is now dealing with questions of power relation and textual production... Translation Studies has taken the cultural turn; now Cultural Studies should take the translation turn”, Gentzler 1998: xxv).

Bassnett (1998: 123) underpins this shift of focus by a number of questions that can offer insights on how manipulative textual processes shape up in response to ‘textual and extra-textual constraints’ and focus on the role of the translator: ‘how a text is selected for translation, for example, what role the translator plays in that selection, what role an editor, publisher or patron plays, what criteria determine the strategies that will be employed by the translator, how a text might be received in the target system’. In fact, all these questions are going to be taken on board as they highly instruct the present investigation. In other words, what happens to texts during the process of intercultural transfer (i.e. translation)? What are the pressures and circumstances that control text production? What are target-orientations involved: (commission ‘skopos’, readership

---

<sup>51</sup> Snell-Hornby (2006: 35) refers to the 1970s ‘Pragmatic Turn in Linguistics’ which considers a multitude of extra-linguistic considerations that govern text formation and “encouraged the emancipation of Translation Studies both from Linguistics and from Comparative Literature”. She highlights that the 1970s Pragmatic Turn “made the emergence of Translation Studies as independent discipline possible” paving the way to the emergence of the “Cultural Turn” in the 1980s, (*ibid*: 47).

expectations, their belief systems, cultural background, etc.)? What ideologically-motivated hegemonic relations are there in the finished texts?

Along the same line, Bassnett (1998: 135) holds that '[b]oth translation studies and cultural studies are concerned primarily with questions of power relations and textual production [and] that idea that texts might exist outside a network of power relations is becoming increasingly difficult to accept'. Now it has proven convenient to accept this 'marriage' between them owing to the global interconnectedness accompanied by the implausibly increasing political, cultural and ideological contests and polar oppositions amidst materialistic, capitalist thinking, conflicting loyalties and cultural disparities. Thus, this new shift of emphasis is justified in view of the shared common ground between both trends which strongly supports the Polysystem Theory pioneered in the late 1970s by Itamar Even-Zohar where he situates the translatum within its cultural system or set of systems.

### **2.7.2 Translation as Manipulation**

The concept of manipulation in translation has inspired numerous studies in the past decades (Hermans 1985, Bassnett & Lefevere 1990, Venuti 1992, amongst others). Most of these studies have focused on the role of manipulation in translation, how it affects the target text as a product, and what roles the manipulated target texts play in the target language community. In the preface to his edited volume in 1985 *The Manipulation of Literature Studies in Literary Translation*, Hermans clearly declares that "[F]rom the point of view of the target literature, all translation implies a degree of manipulation of the source text for a certain purpose", (1985a: 11). This trend highlights the interaction between translation and culture. According to Lefevere (1992), one of its major tenets is that translation activities are not done in vacuum but rather manipulated, rewritten and reproduced in certain ways to accomplish certain goals and pursue intended agendas<sup>52</sup>.

---

<sup>52</sup> The Manipulation Model is criticised mainly because it gives the translator too much freedom and imposes no restrictions on the way she/he handles the ST. Moreover, the trend exaggerates in attending to the readership's requirements, presuppositions, knowledge and belief systems which may threaten major professional and ethical values particularly that of loyalty.

This school empowers the translator, gives him a central status and equates him with the ST producer (the author). Lefevere notably introduces three important extrinsic factors that may exert their pressure on the TT and cast their shadow over its final shape: ideology, patronage and dominant poetics. He believes that different ideologies (enforced by the host culture) may produce different translations. In this connection, the present study attempts to explore the level of potential bias and unmask the unacknowledged agendas concealed behind the given texts and their Arabic ‘*equivalence*’. In other words, it looks for ideological interferences of any kind, which, as Hatim and Mason (1997: 161) see it, ‘find [their] clearest expression in language’ with a view to debunking what and how the translator, seen as text producer, does not (or does not wish to) say to legitimise her/his choices and mask the grim face of her/his ignoble deeds.

The significance of the Manipulation School to DTS, regardless of when it occurs in the translation process, is that it well supports the underpinnings of the target-text oriented approach and those of the theory of norms to which the current research largely attends. As my discussion on the transitional process has demonstrated, equivalence has over years shifted from formalistic and static frameworks to more functional and dynamic ones, wherein the source text is disrespected/‘dethroned’ and given peripheral attention, on the one hand, and the translator is empowered, liberated from her/his faithful attachment to the source text and accorded a prime status, on the other.

Cultural Turn sees the translation activity as a task of creative writing rather than a mere code-switching activity. With the shrinkage of the linguistic-oriented approaches to translation over the last few decades and the rise of the culture-oriented descriptive trend which originated from comparative literature, the Manipulation School came out in the mid-eighties. Within this school, some scholars see the translation through its political and ideological motivations. Hatim and Munday (2004: 102), for example, define the Cultural Turn as a “metaphor that has been adopted by Cultural-Studies oriented translation theorists to refer to the analysis of translation in its cultural,

political and ideological context". This notion within its ideological space is the main question that my research raises a priori and endeavours to discern, explain and interpret potential occasions of significant ideological manipulations (manoeuvrings) coupled with their influence on the TT audience's orientations.

It should be noted that frequency of manipulation differs, *inter alia*, in terms of text type, genre, translators' communicative purpose as well as contextual and situational circumstances during which the text is produced (the translated one in our case). The present study is fully aware of these TT conditions and translators' orientations that dictate the way and the form it shapes up. The (target) texts used for the analysis in the present study are (re)produced within politically motivated situations, heavily sensitive settings and ideologically inflicted contexts. In light of these circumstances, the selected texts are argumentative owing to the very nature of conflicts. Put another way, they involve certain rhetorical purposes and specified pragmatic intentions (as my analyses in chapter five amply show) fulfilled by a variety of communicative strategies and manipulative devices in a bid to persuade intended readerships, influence their perceptions of reality and perhaps take them to a different world. It is commonly acknowledged that argumentativeness very often predominates in such 'hot and highly politically-sensitive' contexts. Argumentative texts are seen by Beaugrande and Dressler (1981: 184), as 'those utilised to promote the acceptance or evaluation of certain beliefs or ideas as true vs. false or positive vs. negative'.

It is noteworthy that Manipulationists and Polysystemists share similar target orientation tendencies, but the latter have, to some extent, gone further when they grant the translator more freedom to maneuver, freeing her/him from the constraints, chains and pressures of the ST to produce an acceptably final product that attends to the host culture and the intended audience in the first place. Lefevere moved away from the polysystemists, placed more focus on the influence of culture on translation and saw the finished product (TT) from the lens of "rewriting", which well-deservedly made him the *main* proponent of the "Cultural Turn".

Lefevere was not happy with some linguistic theories that study translation which narrowly confine their examination to small units of analysis- not beyond the text. He went far above and beyond the text and the sheer linguistic factors that govern texts production and expressed his discontent over the ‘Linguistic Translation’ as it has come to be known in the translation circles<sup>53</sup>. Lefevere views the text within its socio-cultural settings travelling beyond the intra-textual factors the create text as to include the extra-linguistic players as well (culture, ideology, power relations, etc.) and illuminates their key role in shaping the translation and thus the receptor’s perception. One major tenet of his thinking is that STs are not translated purposelessly; they are (rewritten/ manipulated, refracted) in a certain way, for a certain goal, which made him introduce the concept of patronage into the realm of critical translation analysis.

In so doing, Lefevere invents the notion of ‘rewriting’ (1985) which claims that translation is primarily an act of rewriting driven, in the main, by a multitude of ideological motivations and a number of similar cultural and power-related considerations. His first reference to this notion appeared in the article ‘Why waste our time with rewrites’ (in Herman 1985) where he outlines his philosophy of rewriting and proposes new theoretical avenues of judging the ‘*translata*’. He claims that all rewriters (translators, text transferors] operate within contextual settings and under ideological belief systems dictated by the target culture to serve a number of purposes and impose ideological instincts on the targeted readership which instruct this act and govern it. Lefevere (1992: 9) openly notes that "[t]ranslation is the most obviously recognizable type of rewriting".

### **2.7.3 Manipulation & Rewriting**

Lefevere (1992: xi) describes translation as a ‘rewriting of an original text’. One may classically ask: is it ‘rewriting’ a different text or the same text in a different language? That said, ‘difference’ should be defined (and if it exists in its direct sense of shifting), explained and justified. Different languages reflect different values and cultures; therefore, in an attempt to mediate different

---

<sup>53</sup> Linguistic Translation is akin to the centuries-old word-for-word translation. According to Shuttleworth and Cowie (1997: 94), it refers to ‘any approach which views translation as simply a question of replacing the linguistic units of SL with ‘equivalent TL’ units without reference to factors such as context or connotation’.

languages, values or cultures, translations “nearly always contain attempts to naturalise the different culture to make it conform more to what the reader of the translation is used to”, (Lefevere 1999: 237), which indicates that translations cannot be '*equivalent*' to the original counterparts. Bassnett-McGuire (1980) further notes that TTs emerge from the STs and that they need to be viewed as free, independent products. She elsewhere later (1998: 135) considers the circumstances and pressures of both text production and reception that play role in spawning texts arguing that “a writer does not just write in a vacuum: he or she is the product of a particular culture, of a particular moment in time... Moreover, the material conditions in which the text is produced, sold, marketed and read also have a crucial role to play”.

For Lefevere, ‘Rewriting’ connects with the ‘final product’ which, undergoes, during the process of translation, the filter of ideology in a certain socio-cultural setting. As he argues (1992: 5), ‘rewriters create images of a writer, a work, a period, a genre, sometimes even a whole literature’ and refracted them, projected them, in a different way, into the host culture. Seen through the prism of ‘Cultural Turn’, rewritings or translations arguably reflect the rewriters’/translators’ efforts in altering/adapting the text to function in a given society in a given pre-planned way dictated by the receiving system. As I have noted above, Lefevere (1992: 9) also points out that of the different forms of adaptations that writers commonly engage in, "translation is the most obviously recognizable type of rewriting" owing to its ability to project the image of the origins "beyond the boundaries" of their culture.

It should be noted that Lefevere’s concept of translation as a form of *rewriting* is centrally based on his investigations of translations of literary works and their influence on socio-cultural and literary developments. However, the theoretical underpinnings of his notion have, as time went on, proven valid for other genres such as journalese, legalese, etc. (Hatim and Mason 1990, 1997; Shunnaq 1992, 1994; Farghal 1993, 2012), thanks to the impact of ideology on the human (socio-political and cultural) practice. This research falls within this space as it attends to reflect critically on media

and political discourses re-produced in times of conflict. These discourses are represented in a wide variety of newspapers opinion articles that reflect a specific slant, which, as Hatim (1997, 2001) argues, are sites of manipulation. In this respect, many features of Lefevere's analysis on literary translation are taken on board with a view to identifying (and explaining) occasions of rewriting that infringe the originally intended message and, in effect, disorient or misinform the TT audience. Translation, as Lefevere and his supporters see it, is a text comprised of refractions (manipulated messages) to project a certain image in the service of certain ideological orientations.

Working along the same lines, many scholars agreed with Lefevere's thinking. In their *The Translator as Writer* (2006), Susan Bassnett and Peter Bush indicate that translation can be seen as a form of rewriting which paves the way for the translators to alter the ST content as they deem suitable. In a purely additive sense, Hatim and Munday (2004: 99) maintain that rewriting is a form of manipulation of the ST that is "purposefully designed to exclude certain readers, authors and ultimately translators". As noted earlier, translation is a purposeful activity that tends to accomplish its targeted readership's needs, presuppositions and expectations. According to many translation scholars (Snell-Hornby 1988, Lefevere 1992, Bassnett 1998, Nord 2005), the act of translating can be governed or motivated by a number of pressures exerted by linguistic, cultural, commercial not to mention ideological factors. Based on this, and in agreement with Lefevere, they assume that translation involves various degrees of manipulation which the present study chiefly seeks to identify and justify (explain and interpret).

Within the same context, some scholars start to see translation as an interventionist act (Munday's 2007 edited volume *Translation as Intervention*; Maier's (2007) 'The translator as an intervenient being'; Baker 2008 'Ethics of renarration', etc.). For them, mediation inevitably involves intervention in different ways. In this connection, Baker is critical of the metaphor of translators being 'bridge-builders' between different cultures which runs counter to the role of translation as mediation and shows the inevitability of manipulation in some way. Baker (2008: 16) writes:

"I find the 'bridge building' metaphor particularly naïve (I have used it myself in the past, of course, so I am not excluding myself from this criticism!); [exclamation hers]. What I find particularly objectionable about it is the way it is used to suggest that there is something inherently good about translation, and by implication about translators. This romantic assumption only helps to intensify our blind spots and discourages us from confronting the complexity of our positioning in society. If I were to opt for [another] metaphor that avoids this tendency to romanticize translation and that reflects the agency of the translator, I would go for translation as narration".

Baker (*ibid*: 15) defends her belief stating that mediation is a loose term that is hardly defined, which implies that intervention is inherent in the translation exercise. She raised the following questions: 'Does this mean we do not intervene in this 'mediation'? Do we just repeat the words we heard or read verbatim, or do we interpret them from a particular vantage point and report them (selectively, to varying degrees) in a manner that is sensitive to contextual factors, including our own sense of what is appropriate or inappropriate, and what is ethical or unethical?'.

#### **2.7.4 Reflection or Deflection (Refraction)?**

It perhaps goes without saying that translators in situations of conflicts encounter a variety of ideological constraints reflected by power or patronage; they find themselves driven by the force to adapt or rewrite the original text in response to social mores as well as ideological requirements of the receiving society- the target system. Venuti (2000: 468) notes that "translation never communicates in an untroubled fashion because the translator negotiates the linguistic and cultural differences of the foreign text by reducing them and supplying another set of differences, basically domestic, drawn from the receiving language and culture to enable the foreign to be received there". This study considers how the translator can operate under various constraints in the service of power dictated by her/his employer- (the patron, in Lefevere's words). It also expands its scope of view, leading on from the Skopostheorie, as to include the exploration of the influence of the 'seductive' offers that are inherited in situations of conflict. Therefore, it seems only natural that the translator is under the constraint of making sure that the TT does not offend this patron (commissioner) in any way to serve the conventions and points of view that match up with her/his belief systems and meet the clients' wants and needs. Hatim and Mason (1997: 11) argue that

"[T]ranslators' choices are constrained by the brief for the job which they have to perform, including the purpose and status of the translation and the likely readership and so on".

On the account of the target audience's respect for the rival parties (the Syria opposition or the regime in our case) and their sympathetic sentiments towards either of them, the translator, adopting 'TT expectation-fulfilling' repertoire, may deliberately rewrite, recycle or manipulate the ST by, say, down-grading the explicitness of its message in order to avoid offending the assumed readers in any way (see my intensive analyses in chapter five). In so doing, the ideo-cultural conventions of the host society are respected and the translation allows the target audience to maintain its respect towards them<sup>54</sup>. Sequel to this, it is apparent that "rewritings are inspired by ideological motivations, or produced under ideological constraints", (Lefevere 1992: 7) imposed by such constraints as power, patronage, readership, skopos, etc. In the attempt to serve various ideological constraints, the translator inevitably leaves her or his idiosyncratic signature on the translation. Lefevere's systematic approach to translation introduces the concept of rewriting as a form of reproducing a text. Lefevere (1982/ 2004: 234) states that "writers and their work are always understood and conceived against a certain background or, if you will, are refracted through a certain spectrum, just as their work itself can refract previous works through a certain spectrum". In this process, several social actors like translators, reviewers, patrons or publishers are involved in the re-creation of an ST into a TT which thus becomes refraction, a deflection rather than a reflection, of the original. He claims that translation is the most obvious form of refraction. Lefevere (*ibid*: 235) maintains that "refraction" refers to "the adaptation of a work of literature to a different audience, with the intention of influencing the way in which that audience reads/[receives] the work".

As has been illustrated in this section thus far, translation involves cultural and ideological transportation and that translations are often produced under various constraints to please specific

---

<sup>54</sup> See my justification on the incorporation of the Skopostheorie into this project above, on page: 33, under 2.4.2 How Does the Skopostheorie Inform This Study?

clients and serve certain purposes as they are a constituent of a complex literary, social or cultural system. Translation therefore takes the form of rewriting that is carried out within the framework of the target language, culture and ideology in the service of a control factor exerted by the patron or the receiving system at large. In this respect, the (wartime) translator can be seen (and often is) as a rewriter/ a re-creator of the original text as she or he, most notably in times of armed conflict, is engaged in the act of cultural and ideological transportation and disrupts the ST to accommodate it into the TT.

Although complete equivalence between ST and TT, or more precisely ‘neutrality’, may be close to impossible due to various constraints as sketched out earlier, rewriters/translators are, in some respects, traitors, (or are seen as such) since, to a certain extent, they violate the original by way of managing their readerships and steer their directions, in order “to remain within the boundaries of the target culture”, (Lefevere 1992: 13) and meet its ideological demands and propagandistic dictates, no matter what.

### **2.7.5 Cultural Turn & Ideology**

The question of ideology and translation has been a recurrent area of investigation that one can safely refer to the emergence of ‘the ideological turn’ in translation (Hatim and Mason 1990, 1997; Mason 1994; Hatim 1997; Venuti 1995; Hermans 2009; Tymoczko and Gentzler (2002b); Tymoczko 2003; amongst many others). Tymoczko (2003: 181) writes that ‘some of the most searching and revealing discussions of translation have focused on question of ideology from different perspectives’. This notion has been hotly debated, not least in the politically conflictual contexts with special reference to the role of the translator and her/his ethical liability to which the present study chiefly attends. This is the heart of the argument I am making in this thesis via holding systematic TT-ST comparisons: the role of the translator and her/his ideological engagement/involvement configured in pragma-linguistic constructions in the selected translated texts. Clearly, such aspects of translation dramatically increase in the context of globalisation, and

one of the most noticeable aspects of Translation Studies since the beginning of the Cultural Turn in the field in the late 1980s has been the exploration of the ideology of translation and the emphasis on and calls for translators' visibility/engagement in their final products.

Mason (1994: 23) demonstrates that 'ideology impinges on the translation process in subtle ways [where] text users 'bring their own assumptions, predispositions, and general world-view to bear on their processing of text at all levels'. He (*ibid*) underlines the elusiveness of the ideological bearings in the translated texts on all levels and, by implication, the need to possess full awareness of such potential bearings on the part of wartime translators, stressing that '[i]ndividual lexical choices, cohesive relations, syntactic organisation and theme/rheme progression, text structure and text type are all involved'. In a purely additive sense, Shunnaq (1994: 106) refers to this subtlety and camouflaging tactics which translators of ideologically laden contexts often utilise to relay their own agendas. He writes: '[t]o appear disinterested, people often disguise their managings and monitorings [sic] by talking as if the things they want are happening in the natural course of events'. It is the main concern of the present endeavour to uncover this disguise, explain and interpret it; that is to say, neither am I commanding/defending nor condemning/offending the translation (or more precisely the translator) but rather identifying and explaining her/his translational conduct. Translators of the selected texts remain innocent until proven guilty (of being biased through scrutinising investigations of their outputs)- not the other way around.

According to many sociolinguists and (media) discourse analysts, 'ideology' is a fuzzy term and is notoriously difficult to define. Translation aside, ideology in discourse has remained a main concern in Critical Linguistics and Critical Discourse Analysis (Fowler et al 1979, van Dijk 1998a, Fairclough 1989, Hodge and Kress 1993). Van Dijk (1998a: 1) notes that "[d]efinitions generally are hardly adequate to capture all the complexities" and "the critical element of the notion of ideology in this tradition is usually associated with various notions of power and dominance", (*ibid*: 2). According to van Dijk, "ideologies are usually defined as political or social systems of ideas,

values or prescriptions of groups or other collectivities, and have the function of organizing or legitimating the actions of the group”, (*ibid*: 3). Hodge & Kress (1993: 1) place special emphasis on the notion of subjectivity; they view ideology as ‘a systematic body of ideas organized from a particular point of view’. Within the field of translation studies, Venuti (1995) sees ideology through the prism of manipulation; he believes that translations are a rewriting of original texts. All rewritings, whatever their intention, reflect a certain ideological tendency in some way. For Venuti, rewriting is a manipulative practice undertaken in the service of power and hegemony.

Hatim and Mason (1997: 148ff) realise how ideology and translation link up with each other; they distinguish between the ‘ideology of translation’ and ‘translation of ideology’. The former refers to the translator’s filtration, seen as texts’ processor, to the ST through her/his own world thoughts or ideological system and thus producing varying TTs, the latter examines the degree of mediation<sup>55</sup> offered by the translator of a politically sensitive text. Through looking at features of cohesion, transitivity, over-lexicalisation, etc. in different texts, they differentiate between minimal mediation, maximal mediation and partial mediation.

Ideology in journalese and the world of politics, from the first sight, implies ‘deviations from posited norm’ according to Hatim and Mason (1997: 144) who follow Simpson’s definition (1993: 5) from a purely linguistic/discoursal point of view as “the taken-for-granted assumptions, beliefs and value systems which are shared collectively by social groups”. The study of translation within ideological bounds has been detailed in various ways within the Cultural Turn (Hermans 1985; Bassnett and Lefevere 1990; Hatim and Mason 1990, 1997; Hatim 1997; Venuti 1995; Munday 2007a & b<sup>56</sup>). Hatim and Mason 1990, 1997; Shunnaq 1986, 1992, 1994; Farghal 1993, 2008, 2012, etc.) can probably be seen to have advanced this issue, in most detail, within the world of

---

<sup>55</sup> Translator’s mediation is defined by Hatim & Mason (1997: 143f) as ‘the extent to which translators intervene in the transfer process, feeding their own knowledge and beliefs into their processing of a text’, (also cited in Hatim & Munday (2004: 102f).

<sup>56</sup> Munday (2007) guest-edited (with Cunico) a special issue of *The Translator*, 13(2), entitled *Translation and Ideology: Encounters and clashes*. In this co-edited volume, Munday contributed an article under the heading ‘Translation and Ideology: A Textual Approach’ in which he (2007: 195) “investigates essential questions regarding ideology and language from a translation studies perspective... [and] examines what is meant by ‘ideology’ and how it is treated in translation studies, where it has primarily been linked to manipulation and power relations”. Following Simpson and Van Dijk, he considers how ideology is “constructed from the [translators’] knowledge, beliefs and value systems... and the society in which he or she operates”.

journalism and media particularly in politically sensitive contexts which, in part, explains my heavy reliance on their thinking in question. With rich illustrative authentic examples, they draw on the interplay between ideological imports in a given text on the one hand and the linguistic (syntactic and lexical) strategies supported by contextual signifiers employed to that effect. From a translation point of view, and within the ‘Cultural Turn’ context, ideology is not only manifested in the TT, but also involves extra-textual elements. As Tymoczko (2003: 183) puts it: ‘the ideology of translation resides not simply in the text translated, but in the voicing and stance of the translator [motivated by her/his cultural, socio-political and ideological affiliations], and in its relevance to the receiving audience’.

Hatim and Mason (and other scholars who are engaged particularly in translation and discourse) are not alone in appreciating the intimate linkage between language and ideology. Discourse Analysts (Fairclough 1989, Wodak 1989, Van Dijk 1998a, etc.) draw on this interrelation. Van Dijk (1998a: 13), for example, maintains that ‘many contemporary approaches to ideology associate (or even identify) the concept with language use or discourse, if only to account for the way ideologies are typically expressed and reproduced in society’. Concealment, legitimisation, manipulation and related notions that are seen as the prime functions of ideologies in society are mostly discursive (or more broadly semiotic) social practices.

The interface between translation and ideology precisely within the world of journalism in times of armed conflict largely instruct the present research. The recurring ideological shifts are discerned, examined and explained through a systematically-devised method of analysis (as will be shown in chapter four, on page: 135fff). It traces what happens during the process of text production and reception: textual and extra-textual pressures and dictates such as, amongst many others, context, meaning potential postulates, rhetorical purposes, readers’ expectations, skopi as well as discursive history (defined by Mason 1994: 25) as language users’ own ‘previous experience of discourse which, in turn, shapes their own perception and use of discursal features’ and states of affairs).

It should be reiterated in this respect that the present study is exclusively concerned with the occurrences of ‘distranslation’ (Darwish 2011) not those of mistranslation. Distranslation is a term branded by translation scholar Ali Darwish and is widely used in ideologically-driven translational analyses. Darwish (2011: 33) defines distranslation as “the result of intentional interference with the source text’s information content, informative intent and communicative intent”. He notes that this term “is akin to disinformation in the source text, where false or fallacious information is provided with the aim to mislead [as opposed to] mistranslation, which may be the result of inadvertent interference” or the translator’s incompetence, (*ibid*). That said, the study is not concerned with obligatorily stylistic interferences either (what Nida 1964a termed as “Obligatory Equivalents” as opposed to “Optional Equivalents”<sup>57</sup>; it primarily traces the optionally conscious<sup>58</sup> instances that bear significant ideological stamp<sup>59</sup>.

## 2.8 Managing vs. Monitoring in Translation

"If the dominant function of a text is to provide a reasonably unmediated account of the situation model, *situation monitoring* is being performed. If the dominant function is to guide the situation in a manner favourable to the text producer's goals, *situation management* is being carried out", Beaugrande and Dressler (1981: 163); [emphasis theirs].

The dichotomy of “managing” and “monitoring” has been incorporated into the realm of Text Linguistics in general and Text Pragmatics in particular in 1981 by text linguists Beaugrande and Dressler as the above summarising epitaph shows<sup>60</sup>. Their incorporation was, however, text-type oriented and exclusively confined to the process of discoursing rather than that of translating. Farghal (1993: 257) notes that they see managing vs. monitoring ‘as a discoursal parameter contingent on the text-type, i.e. argumentative vs. expository texts’ when they view managing as ‘an inherent manifestation of argumentation in discourse where *situation managing* is intended to steer

<sup>57</sup> Quoting Nida (1964: 173), Shuttleworth and Cowie (1997: 114) note that Nida used the term to describe the features of TL which the translator must of necessity employ obviously to maintain the principle of naturalness (natural effect) that he strongly adopts. The first requirement of any translation “that it conform [sic] to the obligatory formal features of the receptor language”.

<sup>58</sup> Farahzad (1998: 4), who endeavours to explore the issue of unconscious manipulation in translation, maintains that critical translation analysts “have no direct access” to the translator’s unconsciousness “to what probably goes on in the mind of the translator”. In this spirit, Hatim & Mason ((1997: 71) mention that “verifiable evidence as to what goes on in the translator’s mind is not readily obtainable”.

<sup>59</sup> Ideological stamp, according to Darwish (2011) refers to ‘the impact of ideology on the output of translation mainly in political discourse. News media products are stamped by ideology in order to make it legitimate and acceptable’.

<sup>60</sup> See also Beaugrande’s *Text Production: Toward a Science of Composition* (1984). He notes that “monitoring occurs when the text serves mainly to give an account of the situation; managing occurs when the text serves mainly to guide the evolution of the situation towards one’s goals” (1984: 39).

the text in a way that serves the text producer's goals by commanding, criticizing, substantiating, rebutting, etc. a given state of affairs in a text [whereas] exposition, where the text writer describes, analyzes, recounts, etc., exhibits *monitoring the situation* in which a reasonably detached account of a state of affairs is provided', (Farghal 2012: 63); [original emphasis].

The dichotomy was first introduced into the field of Translation Studies by Shunnaq and Farghal in the late eighties who have, perhaps single-handedly, expanded it in most detail theoretically and practically particularly in the world of media within politically charged contexts and ideologically laden situations (Shunnaq 1986, 1992, 1994; Farghal 1992, 1993, 1994, 2008, 2012)<sup>61</sup>. Farghal (2012: 68) points out that 'Shunnaq (1986) borrows the dichotomy of *managing* and *monitoring* from Beaugrande and Dressler (1981) and applies it to the process of translating' where the translator is accorded prime prominence as interventionist (text manager) or mediator (text monitor)<sup>62</sup>. Thus, both scholars imported the main theoretical grounds that underpin this text-linguistic notion and introduced it into the world of translation with copious English-Arabic authentic and concocted exemplification in an attempt to illustrate their epistemological footings and reduce the then-prevailing "fuzziness of the term managing in the translation literature and circles [and] tighten this notion by spelling out what can be meant by it when talking about translation", Farghal (1993: 258). For me, 'managing' and 'monitoring' very much correlate with the Venutian bipolar oppositions of domestication vs. foreignisation and visibility vs. invisibility (1995): if the translator intrudes in the ST message, she or he is visible, domesticating, thus managing, whereas if the translator renders it disinterestedly, she or he is invisible, foreignising, thus monitoring<sup>63</sup>.

These two antithetic notions, which may intersect at some junctures, manifest themselves on different levels: local (syntactic, lexical, textual) and global (pragmatic, contextual and cultural) as the analyses in chapter five of this thesis will amply show. They particularly pervade journalese that

---

<sup>61</sup> The works of Hatim and Mason (1990, 1997; Hatim 1997) should also be acknowledged.

<sup>62</sup> See shortly below a thorough discussion under section 2.10 Mediation & Intervention in Wartime, on page: 70.

<sup>63</sup> One can safely argue that these two opposites closely resonate with other binary oppositions which were proposed by translation scholars in an attempt to define equivalence: Nida's "formal vs. "dynamic", Newmark's "semantic vs. communicative", etc., which hark back to the centuries-old debatable dichotomy of literal (word-for-word) vs. free (sense-for-sense).

has a politically sensitive nature which predominately constitutes the corpus of the present study. Shunnaq (1994: 104) supports this claim when he underlines the usefulness of “describing the process of translating the discourses of broadcasting and newspapers” in his previous research in question (i.e. 1986, 1992). Shunnaq (*ibid*: 105) notes that “Arabic [media-oriented] political discourse is charged with highly emotive connotations that English broadcasters would shun” which, argues Shunnaq, may pose hurdles and stumbling blocks during the translating process and, as a result, full awareness is much needed on the part of the translator. For example, the sweeping events that have taken place in the MENA zone (particularly Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen and Syria) and come to be known as the Arab “*Spring*”, have been extrinsically managed in various (positive and negative) lights to serve specific agendas of the combatant (pro- and anti-regime) rivals: revolution(s), revolt(s), uprising(s), Intifada(s), popular movement(s), etc. vs. autumn, upheavals, youthquake, earthquake, tsunami, etc. (See more in the background chapter three under 3.1 Phraseology, on page: 89). A bulk of related illustrative examples are examined in this study (chapter five) in accordance with text-linguistic strategies and explained descriptively and interpretively (chapter six).

It is not surprising that argumentation, as a matter of course, pervades opinion articles (which exclusively constitute my corpus), where managing is utilised, and that exposition predominates the news reports where monitoring is employed, (Hatim and Mason 1990, 1997; Hatim 1997, etc.). The present research is concerned with whether or not the ST overall rhetorical purpose is managed<sup>64</sup> (significantly altered), what text strategies are employed to fulfill this managing and what happens when exposition/argumentation are 'discoursally' manipulated and, in effect, present differently impactful narratives. Pursuant to this, I shall mainly focus on the notion of managing (rather than monitoring) in view of its intimate connection with the main concern of my study: the ideologically significant intervention in the translating process resulting from the translator's own prejudiced normative behaviour.

---

<sup>64</sup> It is important to note that the strategy of managing, so this study hypothesises, should start before the translatorial processing actually commences: the (de)selection stage- or what Toury (1995a) terms as ‘Preliminary Norms’-, that is, before translators produce their finished products for public consumption.

## 2. 8.1 Managing in Translation

As its name clearly suggests, ‘managing’ subsumes discoursal power asymmetric relations and hegemonic dispositions. Farghal is seen by many translation theorists (Shunnaq 1994, Mason 1994, etc.) to have detailed the notion of managing in translation where he tightens it up and proposes, with various invented and authentic illustrative examples, two types of managing: intrinsic managing<sup>65</sup> and extrinsic managing or what I term as ‘inevitable managing’ vs. ‘evitable managing’ which respectively indicate unavoidable and necessary text strategies (mainly for the TT stylistic/naturalising restrictions) and avoidable and harmful ones which signify ideologically (potentially premeditated) intrusion. Scholars in the field, therefore, constantly describe the former type of managing as ‘commendable’ and the latter one as ‘condemnable’, (Farghal 1993: 257, also 2012: 133; Hatim 1997: 129, etc.). Farghal (1993: 257), who branded these notions in the early nineties, aptly draws the distinctive line between both types as follows:

"Intrinsic managing, on the one hand, is entailed by the numerous asymmetries existing between the SL and TL, thus aiming to bring about natural naturalisations [sic]. Extrinsic managing, on the other hand, is the translator's ideological superimposition on the SL text, thus steering it in a way as to meet his own goals"<sup>66</sup>.

### 2. 8.1.1 Intrinsic Managing (Monitoring)

Farghal (2012: 65) justifies the inevitability (and necessity) of intrinsic managing which he sees as an inescapably integral component in the process of translating owing to the ST-TT mismatches or disparities on all local and global levels<sup>67</sup>. His justification is based on a recognition of cross-lingual and cross-cultural discrepancies claiming that if translators choose to be sincere to the ST, unnatural or deviant renditions<sup>68</sup> will emerge contending that “[t]he appropriate managing of these disparities is a prerequisite in the process of translation, for leaving them unmanaged would produce unintelligible and/or awkward translations, which, in many cases, cause communication

---

<sup>65</sup> It is argued that Farghal’s ‘intrinsic managing’ is similar to Beaugrande and Dressler’s ‘monitoring’ (c.f. Shunnaq 1994).

<sup>66</sup> Recently, Farghal (2013: 3) translates the former (intrinsic managing) into Arabic as (تطويع النص): [text naturalisation] whereas the latter (extrinsic managing), which is the chief concern of the present study, as (تحريف النص): [text deviation/manipulation]; [my back-translation].

<sup>67</sup> I have found out that translation theory acknowledges the major concepts that underpin Farghal’s ‘intrinsic managing’ (or monitoring) such as: naturalisation (التطويع); normalisation (التنطيط), domestication, familiarisation/localisation (التلقيف), accommodation (التوطين), etc.

<sup>68</sup> Also known in the literature as variances, divergences, incongruities and closely associate with the notion of equivalence.

breakdowns in the TL”, (*ibid*). In this restriction, the translator is at a dilemma of choice oscillating between preserving the principles of naturalness and faithfulness- of what I term as “natural faithlessness” or “faithless naturalness”; the “faithless beauty” vs. the “faithful ugliness”<sup>69</sup>. It is not easy for the translation theory to decide which strategy should win out in the final process of the translatorial practice. In view of the main concern of this study, however, natural faithlessness in instances of intrinsic managing (monitoring) should be opted for provided this preserves the ST original proposition: its predominant rhetorical purpose and overall pragmatic import. Otherwise proven, an issue crops up; the study’s (declared *a priori*) assumptions vis-à-vis prejudiced renderings come to the fore, detected, examined and explained.

In this connection, Schleiermacher argued that, as a translator, one “[e]ither [...] leaves the writer alone as much as possible and moves the reader towards the writer” or “leaves the reader alone as much as possible and moves the writer towards the reader”, (Schleiermacher 1918). More recently, Venuti (1995), drawing on Schleiermacher’s aforementioned views, has introduced into the field of translation the dichotomy: domestication vs. foreignisation<sup>70</sup>. To put it differently, translators have to take a decision as to whether their translation should be as close as possible to the ST, thereby adding foreign flavour to the TT, or whether it should clearly announce its divergence from the ST, familiarising the text to the targeted reader.

Leading on from de Beaugrande’s views on the importance of intertextuality and dissatisfaction over formal correspondences (1980), Farghal (1993) views intrinsic managing as an act that is constituted by mediation either with a commendatory ‘good side’ (intrinsic) or a condemnatory ‘bad’ one (extrinsic) which is my main concern in the study at hand and which, I believe, is worthy of elaboration.

---

<sup>69</sup> As the Russian essayist: Yevgeny Yevtushenko funnily (yet meaningfully) put it: ‘Translation is like a woman. If it is beautiful, it is not faithful. If it is faithful, it is most certainly not beautiful’.

<sup>70</sup> For Venuti, the former strategy follows fluent style to minimise the ‘foreignness’ of the original, whereas the latter one preserves ‘alien’ features of a ST in order to convey the ‘foreignness’ of the original.

## 2. 8.1.2 Extrinsic Managing<sup>71</sup>

Extrinsic managing is seen as condemnable as it constitutes the dirty side of the coin of managing and reflects the translator's propagandistic goals and premediated ideological imprints by 'superimposing a certain directionality on the text in order to approximate it to, if not have it meet, his own goals', Farghal (2012: 132). Elsewhere earlier, (Farghal 2008: 2) sees that this type of managing reflects the 'translatorial ideological moves' which function as an important tool to achieve ideological ends. In this respect, extrinsic managing primarily intends to disorient the targeted audience, lure them and lead them towards a different world. In other words, 'extrinsic managers' tend to attenuate or exaggerate (-+evaluativeness) the impact of the message in the TL in such a way that feeds into their own belief systems or the *skopi* of their commissioners, regardless of whether or not they are congruent with the intended content of the original message.

Unlike intrinsic managing, extrinsic managing, which can manifest itself at all linguistic and extra-linguistic levels as the focal part of this thesis will show (chapter five), is an immoral practice, thus condemnable because it aims at gearing the TL text's message toward meeting the translator's own goals or those of her/his readership, i.e. 'to reorient and/or delude the TL reader by presenting thought-worlds that are different at varying degrees from those expounded in the Source Language (SL) text', Farghal (2008: 3)<sup>72</sup>. Hatim and Mason (1997: 129) argue that '[i]n the actual process of text production and reception, then, a focus cumulatively emerges and defines the type of the text. At a very general level, this may be identified in terms of a tendency to 'monitor' or 'manage' a given communicative situation'. Given that the present study traces the deviant/improper normative behaviour of the translators, especially those operating in situations of sensitive character, it accords due attention to the interface between text-type and the strategies of managing/monitoring to which I turn next.

---

<sup>71</sup> Extrinsic (rather than intrinsic) managing is the main concern of this research. Therefore, whenever the term 'managing' appears thenceforth, it exclusively refers to extrinsic managing unless indicated otherwise.

<sup>72</sup> See more on my discussion below under: 2.11 Translation & Ethics, on page: 73.

## 2.9 Managing/Monitoring & Text Typology

The typology of texts within the boundaries of Translation Studies has been widely considered owing to its significance in TT critical analysis that lends support to understand translators' normative behaviour especially within heavily sensitive contexts (Reiss 1971<sup>73</sup>, Beaugrande 1980, 1984; Beaugrande & Dressler 1981<sup>74</sup>; Hatim 1984, 1989, 1991, 1997, 2001, 2004; Hatim and Mason 1990, 1997; Shunnaq 1994, etc.). Shunnaq, a fervent advocate of the notions of "monitoring" and "managing", affluently elaborates on them when they were at their infancy: (e.g. 1986, 1992, 1994), not least in the sensitive media discourse, and stresses the importance of text type in figuring out such behaviour noting that we "need to take account of different text types with their respective communicative goals", Shunnaq (1994: 104). Thus, in the world of translation, text typology has occupied translation theorists in view of its role in the process of decision-making and the way text is organised/ developed to constitute a coherent and cohesive unitary whole.

Hatim and Mason have set up a typology of texts from the translator's point of view bringing together various discoursal strands: 'communicative, pragmatic and contextual' due to their role in determining the overall communicative plan and discoursal strategy, and, in effect, shaping texts and, more precisely, governing the focus of a given communicatory situation. They (1990: 140) view the notion of text type as 'a conceptual framework which enables us to classify texts in terms of communicative intentions serving an overall rhetorical purpose' which they see as 'the hallmark of all texts [that is] not something inherent in a stretch of language but rather a property we assign to it in the light of a complex set of [predominant] contextual factors' (*ibid*: 145). Pursuant to this, and given that translators should be cautious in rendering the ST purpose, it is the very purpose of the present endeavour to detect how they manipulate the ST rhetorical focus (its overall tone) (chapter five), and explain them from a descriptive and interpretive perspective (chapter six).

---

<sup>73</sup> According to Snell-Hornby (1997: 278), cited in Anna Trosborg 1997 *Text Typology and Translation* (ed.), "it was Katharina Reiss (1971) who first investigated the intricate relationships between text-type and translation".

<sup>74</sup> Beaugrande and Dressler (181: 186) views text type as 'a set of heuristics for producing, predicting and processing textual occurrences, and hence acts as a prominent determiner of efficiency, effectiveness and appropriateness', cited in Hatim (1997: 42); [my emphasis].

Text linguists (Reiss 1971, Beaugrande and Dressler 1981, Hatim and Mason 1990, 1997, Hatim 1997, etc.) have engaged in classifying texts and by and large distinguish between five different “types” namely descriptive, narrative, instructional, expository, and argumentative. However, only the last two types will be considered for the very purpose of the present study for reasons related to the way they liaise with its hypotheses and assumptions- detailed in the previous chapter.

### **2.9.1 Expository Texts**

As noted earlier, this type of text is closely relatable to the discoursal notion of ‘monitoring’ (intrinsic managing) to import Farghal’s term) wherein events are drawn upon in a non-evaluative fashion, that is, as its name tells, it exhibits a detached account on a given state of affairs. In this type of text, the text producer exposes the situation neutrally and away from her/his belief systems or other dictates vis-à-vis text production or reception. In other words, the text producer (writer or translator) communicates the overall rhetorical purpose of a text event straightforwardly and performs a *monitoring* act of informing. A good example in the world of media can be news reports which conventionally draw on the events disinterestedly, i.e. without getting involved in the given text. Hatim and Mason (1997: 217) distinguish between three basic forms of **exposition**: ‘description (focusing on objects spatially viewed), **narration** (focusing on events temporally viewed) and **conceptual exposition** (focusing on detached analysis of concepts); [emphasis theirs]. With reference to such features as passivisation, transitivity, lexical density, modality, etc., they (1990: 156) argue that translators can grasp this type of text in the occurrence of ‘more basic and less marked syntactic and semantic structures’ in the given text which are quintessentially examined in this project.

### **2.9.2 Argumentative Texts**

Unlike the expository type of text, this type is predominantly evaluative where the text producer’s voice is visible and can, to varying degrees, be discernable. Hatim and Mason (1990: 115) argue that monitoring signals non-evaluative bias-free account while managing ‘occurs when there is

evidence that the discourse is manipulative'. A good example on this type of text in media discourse is newspaper opinion articles (features) which constitute the bulk of my selected corpus: argumentative translated Arabic articles produced in times of struggle. Abbadi (2014: 724) concludes that "there is a significant difference between English and Arabic argumentative texts in the tendency to employ the linguistic features", which is going to be tested through the analyses of the selected texts carried out in chapter five. Evaluativeness, according to Farghal (1991), is seen as a determining factor that helps to draw the line between exposition and argumentation. Hatim (1997: 113) lends Farghal support when he maintains that 'the degree of evaluativeness is therefore bound to vary in response to whether and how far the text is intended to 'manage' or to 'monitor' a given situation'. As Hatim & Mason rightly put it '[e]valuativeness predominates in argumentative texts, realised by cohesive devices of emphasis such as recurrence or parallelism', (*ibid*).

For their part, Beaugrande and Dressler (1981: 184) define argumentative texts within the confines of 'discourse' in general, as 'those utilised to promote the acceptance or evaluation of certain beliefs or ideas as true vs. false, or positive vs. negative'. In the translational practice, especially that copes with media opinion articles of politically sensitive nature, this type of text pervades according to many researchers who have richly engaged in exploring ideologically-motivated divergences creeping into the politically-charged media discourse (Al Mahmoud 1986<sup>75</sup>; Shunnaq 1992; Hatim and Mason 1990, 1997; Hatim 1997; Farghal 2012; to name only a few). According to them, argumentation extrinsically manages the intended content of the ST message to convince the text consumers and take them to a different world by gearing them, implicitly or explicitly, towards accepting her/his world experience in such a way that agrees with her/his own agendas.

Argumentativeness starts off by citing a thesis and getting the text receiver steered (managed) (directly or indirectly) towards accepting the intended point of view (ideology). Hatim and Mason (1997: 127) distinguish between two basic forms of argumentation '**counter-argumentation** in

---

<sup>75</sup> Al Mahmoud refers to Shunnaq- currently a professor of Translation Studies. When he got his MA in Translation from Salford in 1986, he was known as Al Mahmoud- (Personal communication in 2015).

which a thesis is cited, then opposed (rebuted); and **through argumentation** in which a thesis is cited, then extensively defended'; [emphasis theirs]. The present study sets out to follow the progressive line of argumentation of the newly-produced text (TT) and discern to what extent and in what way (i.e. in what pragma-linguistic form) the overall rhetorical purpose is truncated/weakened (-evaluative) or amplified/strengthened (+evaluative) with a view to relaying idiosyncratic imprints stamped by the translators in the TT world.

The notion of text types in translation is essential and has remained a debatable issue in Translation Studies; owing to the fact that each type of texts has its own textual characteristics and conventions, is produced within different environments (contexts) and, as a result, requires different demands, or put in a translational context, strategies and techniques). Text type focus may pose some hurdles and stumbling blocks before and during the text-processing stage (the act of translating), and the distinction between them should be given prime importance on the part of the translators due to their 'hybrid nature' and the 'different demands' they place on them. It is a given (see, for example Hatim and Mason 1990; Reiss 1976) that each text is organised/arranged in accordance with (or in response to) a number of determinants (the in-built belief system, ideological attitudes and sentiments of individuals, groups, community, ethnicity, parties, nation, etc.). This factor (text type focus) is considered in the present study because shifting text type focus presumably involves manipulating the overall rhetorical purpose of the ST force by relaying different narratives, recycled and reframed. Hatim (2001: 119) states that 'monitoring' *per se* may subtly, or less probably expressly, 'be shifted to serve a managing function (e.g. to argue a point through, to promote certain beliefs' [locally or globally] as the copious examples in chapter five will show. Consequently, I set out to examine the 'persuasive' strategies utilised by text producers, how the discoursal line of argumentation is manipulatively shifted as the course of the ST proposition progresses and, in effect, what pragmatic implications can, as a result, be borne. This examination shall be carried out via employing a model that consists of scores of pragma-linguistic categories within the confines of the important factor of context.

Hatim and Mason (1990: 160) stress the need to capture the ‘internalised norms’ between both types (expository-argumentative); following Reiss’ claims (1976), they note that ‘each type calls on different sets of skills from the translator’. This follows on from the fact that every text type has its own textual, contextual and pragmatic focus (plan/strategy) which, in turn, caters for fulfilling different rhetorical purposes. Therefore, unless the translator is aware of the text-type focus and appreciates this challenging distinction, mis-communicating the original message is almost certain, or more precisely, manipulation could be resorted to at both local and global discoursal levels.

Although Hatim and Mason (1990: 155) acknowledge that ‘the difference between these two types can sometimes be subtle and therefore difficult to perceive’, they propose two textual strategies as a ‘checklist’ of the basic features of ‘exposition’ and ‘argumentation’ namely ‘monitoring’ and ‘managing’ delineated earlier. Beaugrande and Dressler (1981/ c.f. Hatim 1997) establish a direct linkage between ‘managing/monitoring’ and ‘argumentation/exposition’ respectively. Hatim (1997: 50) argues that while expository texts ‘set the scene’ disinterestedly, argumentation ‘starts off with an evaluative thesis whose function is to ‘set the tone’ for an unfolding argument’ adding that ‘while exposition is intended simply to monitor a situation, argumentation engages text users in situation managing, guiding the receiver in a manner favourable to the text producer’s goals’.

However, this research is not concerned with this interfacing in the first place based on its disbelief that managing predominates in argumentative type of text and monitoring in that of expository. A translated text may veer towards more or less evaluative directions depending on a wide range of factors including the translator’s point of departure, preferences, TT expectations, brief, commissioner, skopos, etc. My disbelief in this respect leads on from Farghal (1993) who does not acknowledge that managing and monitoring are strictly conditional upon the type of text at hand because it examines the professionals rather than the profession proper. In other words, it traces the translator’s regular patterns (i.e. her/his distranslations) and identifies her/his fingerprints (ideological, emotional, etc.) on the output, debunk its effect on the TT world and explain why.

Hence, I am more concerned with explaining how manipulating the type of a ‘translated’ text at hand can(not) adversely affect the intended original message and its ‘thought-worlds’, at what discoursal level and why.

An expository text, for example, may acquire, or be altered into, an argumentative nature if it is extrinsically managed. Conversely, an argumentative text may undergo a threefold process of alteration: it can remain argumentative (if the translator maintains the ST argumentative outlook) or become over-argumentative (if the translator’s political or emotional involvement permeates), or alternatively turn into expository if, as Farghal (2012: 64) puts it ‘the thread of argumentation is obliterated’ in the service of the her/his agendas or those of her/his readership. (See the illustrative examples in chapter five and their descriptive/interpretive accounts in chapter six). In this spirit, Farghal (2012) believes that translators’ managing is not exclusively restricted to argumentative texts or, put differently, managing should not be commendatory in argumentative texts and condemnatory in expository texts. He claims that this contextual strategy is not text-type-oriented in that ‘managing in the process of translation will alter the text to serve the translator’s purposes regardless of whether it is argumentative or expository’, Farghal (2012: 63f).

### **2.9.3 Translation, Text Typology & Ideology**

Hatim and Mason (1990, also 1997; Mason 1994; Hatim 1997, etc.) largely discuss text type in the context of translation and highlight how it ‘impinges upon the work of the translator’, Hatim (1997: 142). They maintain that the text typology adduces ideological implications and thus texts should be perceived within the ideological embedding that spawns them. Language, for them, is a channel of ideological thrust at different levels: syntactic and lexical. Following (Kress 1985a, Fairclough 1989, etc.), they note that ‘the analysis of linguistic forms is enriched by the analysis of those ideological structures which underpin the use of language [in that] behind the systematic linguistic choices we make; there is inevitably a prior classification of reality in ideological terms’. They clearly state that ‘ideology finds its clearest expression in language’ (1997: 161). Sequel to the fact

that text type [genre], if manipulated, can be utilised to obfuscate or camouflage the text's overall rhetorical purpose, awareness of text-type focus on the part of the translator is badly needed in detecting significant instances of ideological orientations. This study traces this demand and seeks how absence of such awareness can alter the original purpose and, as a consequence, create different discursal world-thoughts.

## **2.10 Mediation & Intervention in Wartime**

The role of translators in mediating conflicts has increasingly drawn much attention in the translation and intercultural studies (e.g. Munday's 2007a *Translation as Intervention*, Maier's (2007) 'The translator as an intervening being', etc.). Translation acknowledges a wide range of differences cross-linguistically and cross-culturally. That is to say, it is essentially studied with reference to both linguistic and cultural considerations- as discussed at length above under 2.7 Cultural Turn in Translation Studies, on pages: 43fff. Hence, not only should translators be bilingual but also bicultural in order to mediate the gap, inter-lingual and inter-cultural gap, that normally arises by virtue of discrepancies between any two linguistic and cultural systems in order to secure the principle of 'acceptability' in the middle of the targeted readership.

Due to the fact the language is an integral part of culture, a translator (seen as an intercultural communicator) must be competent in both languages and cultures. This explains why translators are often seen as 'bridge builders' and 'mediators' between different communities and cultures across the globe. Baker (1992/2011: 7f) aptly outlines their role in enhancing inter-lingual and inter-cultural dialogue. She holds that translation today, more than ever before, is an important exercise. She writes: "Even in these days of aggressive globalization and pervasive violent conflicts, it has brought and continues to bring people of different cultural and linguistic backgrounds closer together, has enabled many to share a more harmonious view of the world, and has built bridges of understanding and appreciation among different societies"<sup>76</sup>.

---

<sup>76</sup> As I have stated earlier under 2.7.3 Manipulation & Rewriting, particularly on page: 52, Baker has recently begun to have some reservations on this metaphor and criticise the romanticism that surrounds it. Baker, who does not exclude herself from the list of its users (e.g. 1992: 8f), prefers 're-narration' instead. (See her interview with Chesterman 2008).

What ideally lies at the heart of translators' job as intermediaries is upholding the principle of neutrality, i.e. ideological charges and any other similar subjective nuances have to be mediated *virgin* and biased-free as they stand in the original text. Newmark (1982: 389f) writes that a translator should 'render the original as objectively as he can, rigorously suppressing his own natural feelings; a text with which he passionately agrees must be treated similarly to a text with which he passionately disagrees'. But to what extent, one may argue, this transparency can hold in translating politically sensitive texts constituted by conflictive contexts. Tymoczko (2009) casts her doubts on this ideality assuming that '[t]ranslation does not stand in a neutral space'. By similar token, in his forward to Farghal's volume (2012: 4), Yasir Suleiman, a scholar of translation and intercultural communication, argues that '[t]he translator is not a neutral channel through which meanings and information move from one language and culture to another, but he or she also acts as a filter that **monitors** [mediates] ideological bias in the ST and **manages** [intervenes in] it in a way that is consistent with the understanding of translation as a form of mediation and re-writing'; [emphasis mine].

Hatim and Mason (1990: 223) elaborate on the stereotypical 'liaising' view on the translator noting that 'the translator stands at the centre of [the] dynamic process of communication, as a mediator between the procedures of a source text and whoever are its TL receivers' with a view to bridging the gulf between two 'incompatible' lingua-cultural systems, thus dampening<sup>77</sup> socio-political hostility, promoting mutual understanding and negotiating peace<sup>78</sup>. Following Cronin's views on translation as a tool that 'negotiates meanings and thus creates an intermediary zone of mediation, Hermans (2009: 104) stresses the social necessity of the activity 'in densely populated multicultural

---

<sup>77</sup> It should be re-noted that they can also play the role of 'bridge breakers' rather than 'bridge builders' of the intercultural communication. See also Munday's 2007 edited volume "Translation as Intervention"; Maier's (2007) 'The translator as an *intervenient* being'; [my emphasis].

<sup>78</sup> Hermans (2009: 102) notes that etymologically speaking, the term translation is closely tied up with metaphor, being derived from a Latin calque of a Greek word meaning 'transfer'. Along the same line, Tymoczko (2003: 189) points out that 'the source of the English word *translation* is the Latin word *translatio*, which means 'carrying across'- a form of mediation- inter-lingual and inter-cultural by way of bridging the cross-lingual and cross-cultural barriers. See also her argument on her notion of 'in-betweenness' (2003) and the place of translators as an interventionist/intervenient factor in the text.

centres [without which] communities remain partitioned and shut up in their own mental worlds, and proximity will breed alienation and violent conflict'.

It is accepted in Translation Studies, as Jun Tang (2007: 135) argues, that translation is a trans-cultural enterprise that travels between languages and cultures and brings about encounters between different values, viewpoints and ideologies, which implies that translation can be a "site of conflicts" and misunderstanding as well as one of communication and understanding depending on the role played by the wartime translator. Dragovic-Drouet (2007: 34) investigates practical limitations of wartime translators' role as mediators especially when journalists reporting in hot spots are usually "assigned official translators [...] chosen by the local authorities precisely because of their allegiance", which turns them into mercenaries (seeking financial gains no matter how this may flout the professional norms of the exercise) and, as a consequence, makes their ethical commitment and axiological values more taxing. They do nothing but carry out whatever their employers prefer to include or exclude in pursuance of their own yardsticks and measurements of adequacy and acceptability that ultimately serve their own goals. (This issue is further expanded below under 2.12 TranslatORS & Conflict, on page: 77).

What concerns the present study is primarily how and to what extent translators operating in situations of conflicts engage (or disengage) themselves in the events concerned in favour of their own institutional and socio-political agendas: do they merely 'monitor' the TTs and provide detached accounts distancing themselves from those events and dropping off the subjective mask or do they 'manage' and mediate them negatively disrupting the ST intended message and derailing its direction into critical slopes.

Within the same context, Salama-Carr (2007b) draws on the conflict translator's intervention in varying degrees of intermediacy. She (2007b: 7) points out that translators "can be confronted with many different forms and varying degrees of intermediacy of conflict". Wartime translators deal with highly-charged texts that reflect on situations of conflicts. This will call for a degree of

intervention, which is inevitably linked up with ethical issues'. In this context, the role of the (wartime) translators can be seen through two different prisms: meditational and interventional- a bridge builder or a bridge breaker, in response to a variety of ideological motivations, which puts the question of neutrality, long debated, at stake, makes the practice more challenging, and, on top of that, more ethically taxing.

## **2.11 Translation & Ethics**

Growing investigations on the question of ideology in translation has given rise to ethical considerations in the translation activity in the nineties amidst a very critical juncture in history characterised by openness and interconnectedness amongst nations across the globe (Pym 1992; Venuti 1998, Baker 2008; Hermans 2009; Tymoczko 2009; Inghilleri and Harding 2010, etc.). Inghilleri and Harding (2010: 165f) state that current research on translation in violent conflicts has explored "significant divergences in the practice within "globally-political contexts". Inghilleri and Harding (*ibid*) highlight 'the ethical dilemmas they experience in responding simultaneously to the demands of employers, codes of ethics, and the real or perceived tensions between translators' personal/professional and local/global allegiances'. In the early 2000s, and in response to the academic demands of this very area of research in the field, a special issue of the translation journal *The Translator*, entitled "The Return to Ethics", edited by Anthony Pym (2001b) appeared and included a host of scholarly articles on this subject. Pym's introduction to the volume (2001a) stresses that ethics are concerned primarily with what particular individuals (translators included) do in the immediacy of concrete situations.

Inghilleri (2009: 12) stresses that, in situations of conflicts, ethical practice is a significant prerequisite for professional translators stating that "translators' ethical and political judgments become as central to their task as cultural or linguistic competence". Arguably, the moral paradoxes of war are by no means inherent in wartime. Ethical considerations are clear enough in conflicts being a fertile ground for political, ideological, social and cultural polarisation, ambivalence and contradictions. Inghilleri (2009: 19) accentuates that the "nature of violent and armed conflict offer

them [the translators] less time and space for ethical reflection” which is supported by Baker (2010: 218) when she states that “[t]he violence and hysteria of war leave no one untouched”.

Inghilleri (2010: 176) explores the bonds that may exist, as time goes on, between wartime translators<sup>79</sup> and their employers based on mutual trust. She refers to the ‘partnerships that emerge between translators and their interlocutors [patrons, commissioners] and the significant ethical turns these may generate for both’. It is, therefore, safe to assume that conflicts are replete with moral and ethical challenges that lie ahead in the way of conflict translators who often find themselves in a ‘conflicting’ situation: a tension between their in-built moral instincts and those exerted by their employers’ socio-cultural and political adherences which puts them into an ethical threefold dilemma: whether to adhere to their personal allegiances, conform with the core ethical values of the profession such as faithfulness, truthfulness and responsibility or respond to the dictates of their ‘disciplinary’ employers and meet their demands and ‘codes of ethics’. As Baker aptly (2006: 105) puts it, ‘translators and interpreters face a basic ethical choice with every assignment: to reproduce existing ideologies as encoded in the narratives elaborated in the text or utterance, or to dissociate themselves from those ideologies, if necessary by refusing to translate the text or interpret in a particular context at all’. Some scholars (Chesterman 2008: 21) raise their concerns on the possibility of this option on the basis that translators, just like other ‘underpaid’ professionals, seek to eke out good living to their own families.

### **2.11.1 Translators or ‘Proxy’ Soldiers?**

The label ‘fixers’ has become a *dirty* job title ascribed to translators in times of conflict. It has recurrently appeared in research on translation and conflict especially within the ambit of ethical considerations (Palmer 2007; Baker 2010; Dragovic-Drouet 2007; Jun Tang 2007; Inghilleri 2009; Inghilleri and Harding 2010, etc.). It is defined by Palmer (2007), professor in journalism<sup>80</sup>, as someone who does a variety of jobs for a journalist far beyond the boundaries of the linguistic

---

<sup>79</sup> See Prefatory Note no. (3), on page: vii, which discusses the overlaps between (wartime) translation and (wartime) interpreting, on the one hand, and the scope of this study on the other.

<sup>80</sup> He is Professor of International Media and Journalism based in London Metropolitan University. His influential book *Media at War* 2004 (co-authored with Tumber) has drawn on narrating conflict in wartime within the context of the US-Iraq war in 2003.

intermediary that is traditionally vested in them. Palmer discusses the interactions/negotiations that take place between the news provider/institution, or to import the translatorial term the patron/commissioner) on the one hand and the translator on the other. He (2007: 25) concludes that ‘indeed, [conflict] translation does not figure as the major competence sought; the main competences are a good network of contacts and the capacity to see things through the prism of journalism’. Similarly, Inghilleri and Harding (2010: 166) write that those hired ‘fixers’ working with and for international journalists and military/security units ‘operate in a dual capacity’ as translators and soldiers and ‘are directly involved in the quotidian events and outcomes of war’.

Providing a detailed list of their non-translational tasks as pre-requisites to their recruitments, Palmer (2007: 18f) maintains that the job of the translators in wartime exceeds the boundaries of translating the respective conflict including ‘[successful] negotiations with kidnappers’ in view of their understanding the locals’ mindset and socio-cultural outlook and their ‘links with local social networks of influence’ and ‘spying on other journalists’ which can be seen as an amoral exercise, that creates a trust crisis and impairs the confidence between the producer and the customer. Palmer (*ibid*: 20) examines the reliability and believability of those ‘hired fixers’ and their adherence to the core values of the translation practice. He stresses that they sail away from those norms, sabotage the original message, provide distorted narratives and ‘do not meet the normal standards of professional competence’ which lends support to my study’s *a priori* assumptions and proposed hypotheses declared in the previous chapter, on page: 8fff.

Similarly, Baker (2010: 214) points out that ‘fixers’ contribute to the shape of the narrative when they select and deselect renderings in line with their recruiters. They, maintains Baker, ‘engage in a multitude of vital tasks that have little to do with the type of linguistic mediation they are ostensibly hired to undertake’. Not for nothing are wartime translators, like any other military and security element, targeted before, during and after the conflict. The trustworthiness of those ‘betraying’ translators comes into question due to the duplicitous attitude they demonstrate, wholeheartedly

rather than grudgingly. This accepted role on the part of many wartime fixers has passively pictured their professional status and made them seen as perpetrators who are involved in the conflict.

Thus, translation in times of conflict has become far from a linguistic exercise which brings to the fore such values as credibility and fidelity and, more precisely, makes the role of the translator more ethically taxing, to say the least. Wartime translators are trained to follow orders and be loyal to the dogmatism and indoctrination of their commissioners (a newspaper, a political party, a government, etc.). Of course, this does not shield or absolve them from any moral responsibility or relieve them of legal obligation and future pursuits for their direct (and willing) involvement in the conflict and the blind obedience they demonstrate as soon as the drums of war are rung.

Baker (1992/ 2011) raises her concerns on how to take the right decision when we have an ethical issue in our translational (and of course general) actions. She (1992/ 2011: 276<sup>81</sup>) proposes that we draw ‘a broad distinction between teleological and deontological approaches to the issue of ethical decision-making. Deontological models, argues Baker, are ‘rule-based’ and ‘define what is ethical by reference to what is right in and of itself, irrespective of consequences [whereas] teleological approaches define what is ethical by reference to what produces the best results’, irrespective of the means that leads to these results- which intimately resonates with the amoral Machiavellian consequentialist ‘motto’: ‘the end justifies the means’ and, to a lesser extent, intersects with, utilitarianism: (the doctrine that actions are right if they are useful or for the benefit of a majority).

In a purely similar sense, Pym (1996: 338) voices his worries about these theories warning against producing “mercenary experts, able to fight under the flag of any purpose able to pay them” showing that their practice is governed by and conditional upon customers’ satisfaction and financial gains, come what may: you must not do what you think is right neither whatever pleases your clients. Advocates of this claim believe that translators are made loyal ‘servant’ or *slaves* to

---

<sup>81</sup> See an interesting discussion in Baker (2011: 276ff), a revised edition of the 1992 breakthrough course book on translation. She imports important concepts from the realm of axiology (such as teleology, deontology, consequentialism, utilitarianism, etc.) and succinctly applies them to the act of translating.

their commissioners who govern the translation activity and dictate what and how to translate. Baker (2008: 14) contends that ‘[j]ust because the client is paying doesn’t mean they are entitled to more loyalty or respect from the translator – translators, in my view [Baker’s], should not behave like mercenaries’.

Thus, Ethical responsibility/accountability (together with the resultant consequences thereafter) caused by wartime translators’ decisions have come into a fuller play in the literature, (Inghilleri 2010). On many occasions, Baker (e.g. 2008, 2009) indicates that translators should make their choice turning assignments that raise ethical concerns and cater for material gains to accept to detach themselves from or work for organisations that have unethically ‘suspect agendas’ like some defense/intelligence departments.

## **2.12 TranslatORS & Conflict**

Historically, translators have been accorded low status and viewed in a negative light. In times of conflict, this status becomes clearer owing to the tacit, unacknowledged links they erect and subtle allegiances they show towards their employers. Hence, they are seen as collaborators who fraternise with the enemy and mercenaries who trade off their moral values of credibility, truthfulness and impartiality for financial gains irrespective of their congruity with the conventional ethical demands of the profession. The longstanding accusation of translators represented in the aphorism: translators are traitors “*traduttore traditore*”: [Arabic: المترجم خائنٌ خوان] has persisted for millennia. In this respect, we need, for the very purpose of the present study, to be alert and draw the line between translation and translator. This low status, seen through the lens of this study, is not inherited in the practice *per se* but in the practitioners themselves- termed by Beebe (2010: 304) as ‘Transtraitors’ and ‘prodigal figures’ as in (Inghilleri: 2009: 1). More pejoratively, Beebe (*ibid*) argues the wartime translator as *homo sacer* which, he maintains, represents ‘the primal form of ‘outlaw’, i.e. someone ‘outside the law’ who the law neither protects nor punishes’, thus can be killed/shot by anyone without consequences or legal pursuits!

Inghilleri and Harding (2010: 165) mention that the role of translators ‘in relation to violent conflicts is a complex, dynamic and multi-faceted one’. This means that translators in the heart of conflicts are given various roles which go beyond the inherent task vested in them as inter-lingual and intercultural mediators. Journalist translators in particular may be enlisted to act on a ‘proxy’ capacity; not in the name of translating but on behalf of frontline reporting as ‘proxy journalists’ that exclusively match up with their ‘propagandistic’ agendas and feed into their own belief systems. Their decisions to play this ‘dual role’, argues Inghilleri, (2010: 175), are motivated by a set of political, social and economic factors brought about by the conflict itself<sup>82</sup> showing that translators, ‘like combatants, function simultaneously as free agents and embedded conduits for the political and military institutions they agree to serve’.

Conflict translators may sometimes be isolated from their social surrounding<sup>83</sup>. Worse still, they can be prosecuted as traitors should they be found acting in such a way that disagrees with their commissioner’s dogmas and demands, which would make them mirror reality through the lens of these forces- never mind the practice’ ethical values. At best, they are put in a situation wherein they should work in tandem with each other which is far from ethical and sails away from the core values of the translation practice.

Translators in conflictual times are found to be demonstrating intervention in different ways to pursue an awful lot of agendas in favour of their employers or employing companies. Stahuljak (2009: 298), for example, maintains that conflict translators ‘refuse to be seen as mere linguistic intermediaries, as invisible go-betweens, ‘transmitters’ without voice’. Translators operating in the heart of the conflict, especially those hired locals are seen as ‘collaborators’- i.e. agents or figures that betray their people and nation. Conflicting loyalties due to the very nature of conflicts made them, sometimes, play the role of double-agency. As Tymoczko and Gentzler (2002a: xix) show, they are often caught in the impossible role of the ‘double agent’.

---

<sup>82</sup> See also Tymoczko and Gentzler (2002: xix); Baker (2010: 203); Inghilleri and Harding (2010: 166).

<sup>83</sup> In the intermediate aftermath of the Iraqi invasion 2004, I refused to enter into a ‘seductive’ contract to serve as a translator/interpreter in Iraq due to such (*and other*) strict, risky (and amoral) conditions.

## 2.13 Translation & Conflict

Until early nineties, translation and conflict had received scant attention in the field of translation studies and remained a relatively under-researched area of study. Baker (2010: 201) underlines the 'scarcity of data and dearth of research in the field'. Over the last two decades or so, the role of the translator in situations of conflicts, however, has been rapidly growing, significantly caught much research interest and approached from different theoretical and methodological perspectives: (Baker 2006, 2007, 2010; Salama-Carr 2007a; Palmer 2007; Tumber and Palmer 2004; Dragovic-Drouet 2007; Rafael 2010; Inghilleri 2008, 2009, 2010; Tymoczko 2009; Sue-Ann Harding 2010, Footitt et al 2012, etc.). Tymoczko (2009: 184) states that "it is time to begin to investigate the role of translation in promulgating discourses, asserting power, exciting conflict and perpetuating violence". This new attention for this subject coincided with the emergence (and supremacy) of descriptive, polysystem and target-oriented approaches (1980s) to translation as well as the so-called cultural and ideological turns including the Manipulation School and the notion of Rewriting (1990s)- as shown above-, which has increasingly made the role and positioning of the translator paramount.

Baker (2010: 197) refers to the emergence of the "Translation and Conflict" in Translation Studies particularly "the role and positioning" of translators and attributes it to "the spread and intensity of armed conflicts since the early 1990s and the increased visibility of translators". In her introduction to a specialised volume entitled *Translating and Interpreting Conflict*, Salama-Carr argues that this area of Translation Studies has become 'part and parcel of contemporary discourse on translation and interpreting', Salama-Carr (2007b: 1). The 1990s and 2000s have seen many short and long wars. In the 1990s, many successive wars of the former Yugoslavia broke out in many parts: Balkan, Chechnya, Serbia, Montenegro, Georgia, Caucasus, Bosnia, Croatia, etc.; the mounting tensions in the African continent: Algeria (*The Red Decade 1990-2000s*: العشريّة الحمراء)، Darfur, Congo, Rwanda, and a considerable number of similar civil and sectarian conflicts across every corner of the globe.

In 2000s, where the study of translation in times of conflict increasingly yielded greater attention, a huge number of events took place following the octopus expansion of Al Qaeda organisation across the globe. The 9/11 atrocious atrocities against the US (and similar subsequent attacks like London Bombings 2005, Madrid Bombings 2008, etc.), one can argue, have reshaped the world geopolitical map represented in the UN-brokered ‘Global War on Terror’. It started with two US-led grinding wars: in Afghanistan (2001) to oust the Taliban rule and in Iraq to topple the Baathist regime of Saddam Hussein following accusations of possessing Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMS) and erecting tacit ties with Al Qaeda.

These two wars, together with the wide expansion of Al Qaeda Organisation, have seen new ideologically-charged media and political discourses brought about by political, religious and cultural confrontations between the East and West rival poles fuelled by the rising prevalence of Globalisation, Informatics and new technologies which have made the world more vulnerable and, as Tymoczko (2009: 188) puts it, ‘increasingly interconnected [where] the potential for conflict and violence becomes more explosive’<sup>84</sup>. Also, the decade had seen the second Palestinian Intifada (2000) and four main Israel-Arab wars in the troubled Middle East: against Lebanon (2006), against Gaza Strip (2009), (2012) and (2014). Significantly, perhaps very significantly, it concluded with the so-called Arab “Spring”- unfurling popular ‘socio-political’ movements that have started late 2010 region-wide particularly in the MENA zone (Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Syria, etc.) and expanded, *silently and non-silently*, to some regional and international countries (see thorough details in the next chapter). This last event (particularly the four-year old Syrian scene that has not come to a close yet) is the subject matter of this study.

Lately, many scholars (Tymoczko 2009, Inghilleri 2009, 2010; Sue-Ann Harding; 2010; Farghal 2012, etc.) have explored the interplay between, on the one hand, conflict translation amidst a globalised ‘fragile’ world and power relations on the other together with how it intersects with

---

<sup>84</sup> Esperanca Bielsa (2005: 3) points out that ‘globalization is generally associated with the shrinking of our world and the possibility of instant communication across the globe, as is emphasised by widespread metaphors of accelerated mobility, such as those of flows and of the information super highway, which create an image of the world as a network of highly interconnected places in which space is overcome’.

power asymmetries, hegemonic dispositions and ideological orientations. For example, Tymoczko (2009: 187) writes: ‘As the world becomes ever smaller in terms of space and time, questions about conflict and translation become increasingly inescapable’. Commenting on the influence of globalisation on what I may call *the Translation-and-Conflict Turn*, she concludes: ‘[i]ts benefits notwithstanding, globalisation has become a vector for new sorts of political violence and for new sorts of violent reprisals’, (*ibid*).

Wartime translation of political discourse, perhaps more than any other time of production and any other type of discourse, involves a process of decision-making (Toury 1995a, Munday 2012, etc.), which is crucial not only on the linguistic-translational level, but also on the political one; the misinterpretation of the political context could lead to serious political implications. Words have admittedly become swords/weapons and pens have become guns in times of conflict. The triadic face of wartime propaganda (deception, persuasion, and seduction) is manifest in Sheldon Rampton and John Stauber’s *Weapons of Mass Deception* (2003), Paul Rutherford’s *Weapons of Mass Persuasion* (2004), and Nicholas O’Shaughnessy’s *Weapons of Mass Seduction* (2004). In this connection, the study assumes a priori that situations of conflicts are ‘fertile’ sites of bias and ideological orientations. According to many translation scholars (Hatim and Mason 1990, 1997; Schäffner 2004; Baker 2006; Inghilleri and Sue-Ann Harding 2010; Tymoczko 2009; to name only a few), translators, during conflicts, may opt for mollifying equivalents in a bid to legitimise their choices and promote their agendas or their commissioners’, and in effect, bring about adversely different narratives. Baker (2006) investigates the role of translation in constructing reality during conflictual times. She draws on the notion of narrative and shows the role of translation, being “part of the institution of war”, in forming and deforming reality which, according to her, no longer functions as a loyal broker and safety valve. She also sees the TT as a re-narrated account (2006) and examines the very many ways employed by translators to “*reframe* aspects of political conflicts, and hence participate in the construction of social and political reality”, Baker (2007); [my emphasis].

Drawing on the interplay between language and conflict, Chilton (1997), maintains that language “contribute[s] to or impede[s] conflict or its resolution”. In the same vein, Smith (1997) shows that “language, discourse and conflict appear to be intimately associated with each other”. Jun Tang (2007) explores the influences of conflict on the production of translation versions as regards the direction of translation and the asymmetrical power relations between cultures. Conflict translators have become part and parcel of conflicts, military operations and even national security. This is made clear by Rafael (2010) when he highlights the pivotal role played by translators in wartime commenting on US president G. W. Bush's call before university presidents early 2006 to qualify wartime translators in a bid to “shore up [America's] national security” under a federal programme called the National Security Language Initiative (NSLI).

Salama-Carr (2007b: 2) studies this relatively new phenomenon and states that “recent events have brought to the fore the challenges that are faced by the language mediator in situations of conflict” leaving her or him in a dilemma of choice: oscillating between mediating the original message disinterestedly or intervening in it in favour of specific ideological dictations. With this in mind, the present study is primarily concerned with how and why language is ‘*victimised*’ (via recycling/deforming its linguistic forms): by what strategies and, on top of that, what potential encroachment these adopted strategies may cause to the original message and the TT receivers<sup>85</sup>. Worded differently, it is quintessentially concerned with investigating how socio-political reality is constituted, framed and manipulated, for what reason, in what way and to what extent frontline translators are ideologically involved in such political and cultural confrontations amidst the explosively-fast and vast growth of mainstream and alternative media outlets.

Academically, the field of Translation Studies has, in various ways, responded to the new dynamics of the world. This young (though fast-growing) area of Translation Studies has seen scrutinising and various investigations of the phenomenon (theoretically and practically) based on coherent epistemological underpinnings and well-devised, attested methodological grounds. These

---

<sup>85</sup> See my article: Is Language Victimized in Wartime? (2013). Available at: <http://en.ammonnews.net/article.aspx?articleno=21300>

specialised investigations include authored books (e.g. Baker's *Translation and Conflict* 2006a, etc.); edited anthologies (e.g. Salama-Carr's *Translating and Interpreting Conflicts* 2007a, Footitt, et al *Language at War* 2012, etc.); issues of international journals (e.g. The Translator's *Translation and Violent Conflict* 2010, edited by Moira Inghilleri and Sue-Ann Harding) and a bountiful scholarly articles published in refereed internationally-recognised journals of translation, intercultural communication, socio-cultural politics and the Humanities.

Moreover, a number of PhD researchers have recently attempted to examine this research question in the field from different perspectives. Amongst many others, Waleed Al-Amri (2002) looks into the role of ideology in forming “bias encoded in [translated] news reporting” during political unrests. Similarly, Souhad Hijazi (2009) explores how the wartime translator “participates in shaping the struggle between rival ideologies”. Dean Hardman (2008) explores political ideologies in media discourse in times of tension emphasising how “close examination of how these texts are produced allows for greater understanding” of those ideologies’, among many others.

In parallel, a number of specialised international, transcontinental, workshops, symposia and conferences have also been held to this end. The University of Salford, to cite a few examples, hosted an international conference in November 2004 under the heading: Translation and Conflict I with a view to meeting the vital academic/research interest in this issue particularly nurtured in the wake of 9/11 and similar subsequent events as shown above. As there had been rapid developments ever after, two years later, three universities (Salford, Manchester, and Kent State, Ohio- USA) hosted its sequel under the “same” heading: Translation and Conflict II. One year later, a third symposium convened in Canada under Translation and Activism, whose proceedings are collected in specialised journal issues on this subject and its relevant themes like activism, ideology and power. Needless to say, this homogeneity expounds that the need to cover this area of research was still relentlessly *nagging*. Equally importantly, this theme has become part and parcel of under- and post-graduate module syllabi- often taking the name ‘Translation and Conflict’.

## 2.14 Relevance to Previous Research

The present project responds to the urgent need to investigate this debatable subject within the unfurling Arab Syrian “*Spring*”- which is discussed in detail in the next (background) chapter. It is located within the above-discussed various academic reflections on this relatively novel area of research within the field of Translation Studies<sup>86</sup>. It generally builds on the finished research in question and draws on its outcomes but confines its investigation to a topical event. Naturally enough, in-depth research on the Arab (Syrian) “*Spring*” *per se* has not yet been conducted due to the fact that it is a fresh and young happening which is still in its infancy and has not come to a close yet. Put precisely, it attempts to advance the proposition that wartime translators, in response to local (from within) and global (from above) pressures, tend to act in a biased, prejudiced fashion, which governs the translation methods and strategies adopted.

Research into the translation phenomenon under observation (ideological orientations in conflictual situations) has not thus far been accorded due attention (or needs more examination) considering the dramatic, accelerating socio-political shifts and dynamics we are witnessing today worldwide (socio-political transformations). In other words, current research discussed above still leaves some scope for further investigations into the interplay between language, ideology and power in exploring that relationship: particularly how social and political reality is configured (twisted, manipulated, re-cast, trans-created, etc.) in linguistic forms in sensitive settings.

Not only does this study consider the textual factors that spawn texts and govern their production, but also the extra-textual (cultural, contextual, pragmatic) ones, i.e. it sees text (the Arabic TT) as an interlinked series of thoughts (wholes rather than fragmentations) whose final shape is controlled by a set of socio-political and cultural factors and pressures. (See the conclusions provided after each text analysis in chapter five which mainly draw the translator’s thematic link she/he depicts via a number of pragma-linguistic formations and constructions).

---

<sup>86</sup> See detailed presentation on its original contribution to knowledge in chapter six, on page: 300.

The present research has provided new insights on the discursive practices precisely how camouflaged ideological orientations are encoded within media discourse particularly opinion articles (translated into Arabic). In its in-depth examination of norms, it has brought together major conceptual underpinnings from the realms of Critical Discourse Analysis, Text and Systemic Functional Linguistics; Reception Theory (Relevance) that have not been previously employed on a wide scale in the area of Descriptive Translation Studies, especially when it comes to English-Arabic translation traffic.

This research, it is hoped, has underlined the need to carry out more research in this area in the light of the important findings it has presented leaving some scope of further examinations for future research as shown at length in chapter six under 6.7 Limitations and Recommendations, on page: 310. It hopes to equip (wartime) translators with the proper ways of figuring out the extra-linguistic (cultural, contextual and pragmatic) implications, and render in the absence of ideological involvement or emotional engagement whether this matches up with their belief system or not. It also hopes to open new avenues that help translation analysts in detecting and explaining ideology in discourse when approaching texts of politically sensitive contexts and ideologically loaded situations in times of conflict. (See more in chapter six under 6.4 Original Contribution and 6.5 Significance, on pages: 300 & 305 respectively).

## CHAPTER THREE: THE ARAB “*SPRING*”- FROM INSIDE

### **3.0 Introduction**

To begin with, one should consider the fact that we are having an unstable present and any related analysis would be provisional and could veer its conclusions into different, unexpected directions. Therefore, we should not pass early judgments and draw too hasty deductions on the event unfolding whose future prospects are still foggy. As Ramadan (2012: ix), commenting on the on-going event, points out, “analysis in the heat of the action is never easy, especially as events unfold and their causes- and future itself- remain clouded with uncertainty”. That said, I do not intend, in this background chapter, to provide a final picture of what has been happening across some parts of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) amidst back-to-back, amazing and unexpected developments that change many political realities exceedingly fast. Much of what I hope to show is some critical reflections on the event in an attempt to help fathom the story from inside by way of linking it back with some “*Spring*”-like attempts towards democracy and political plurality in the 1950s until before the Arab “*Spring*” took place in 2011- as a prelude to arriving at sound judgments and reliable conclusions sought in the analysed texts in this study.

My chief concern in this background chapter is to provide an account that would offer helpful insights on the analyses carried out in this thesis. Ramadan (ibid: x) argues that analyses of unfurling events “will most certainly have to be revised, refined and perhaps challenged”. Much, I argue, has been left unseen (pending further future reflections) even when the event stabilises. At this stage and amidst this muddle, I shall refrain- as much as possible- from passing early judgments on the on-going events lest I throw inaccurate evaluations and miscalculations based on emotional grounds.

#### **3.0.1 A Story of an Hour has Reshaped the World**

Publicly harassed and humiliated, Mohammad Al Bouazizi, a 26-year-old humble jobless street vendor selling fruit at a roadside stand to make ends meet and eke out a living for his family, set

himself on fire on 17 December, 2010 in the Tunisian town of Sidi Bouzid in protest over unmannerly and abusive treatment. A municipal female inspector<sup>87</sup> gave him a slap in the face and insulted his late father in front of a mass crowd. When the confrontation between both of them escalated, she reportedly forced him to the ground and confiscated his wares and electronic weighing scales and tossed aside his produce, wooden cart accusing him of not holding a vendor's permit<sup>88</sup>. Al Bouazizi, who was a repressed entrepreneur, a victim of apprenticeship since he was 12, halted his studies in his teens to work fulltime in the field of street vending. On the first anniversary of the Tunisian Revolution- the cradle of the Arab "Spring"-, Foreign Policy reports that "his life was consumed by his role as the primary breadwinner for his family of seven- a role he had played, according to his mother, ever since he started working in the market at age 12". Soon after that, the irritated young man, whose expropriated merchandise had been bought on credit, "appealed to the authorities for the return of his property [his barrow and produce]. But he got nowhere"<sup>89</sup>.

Angered by this treatment, at around midday and within an hour of the initial altercation, Al Bouazizi returned to the local municipal headquarters, drenched himself in a flammable liquid and set himself ablaze in front of the governorate building just outside the local municipal office in Sidi Bouzid (See footnote no. 88 below). His setting himself alight has lit a fire across every corner of the globe and blazed to this day. Public outcry had dramatically grown over this act leading to massive protests amidst the iron-fisted response by the police that gunned down the tenacious protestors in the streets who had been for too long very thirsty for freedom, dignity and justice. This desperate act of self-immolation has become a catalyst for sweeping revolutions that have enlightened the way for tens of millions of resentful women and men across many parts of MENA (mainly Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Bahrain and Syria).

---

<sup>87</sup> A 36-year woman called Fadia Hamdi who denied all these accusations that she was being used as a scapegoat. Her brother (in an interview with the film maker Rodrigo Marcondes in 2011) sees the accusation against her as "the lie that toppled the dictator": <http://www.whathappenedinsidibouzid.com/home.php>. According to the Arabic culture (and in the Eastern hemisphere at large), slapping on the face is a *highly* humiliating act. When done by a female against a male, it becomes much more humiliating.

<sup>88</sup> CNN narrates the story on the 16<sup>th</sup> of January, 2011- a couple of days after President Ben Ali fled to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia under the pressure of across-the-country anger: <http://edition.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/africa/01/16/tunisia.fruit.seller.bouazizi/>

<sup>89</sup> 'The Real Mohamed Bouazizi' (December 16, 2011): <http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/12/16/the-real-mohamed-bouazizi/>

Amidst exceedingly accelerating developments, the state-run media and state's senior officials, taken by surprise and caught by bewilderment, had tried to conceal the story during the 18-day hospitalising saga of the fully-burnt young man. They manipulated it and downplayed its significance claiming that it was a condemned suicidal attempt made by a young man who was subsequently hospitalised. A few hours later, social media outlets (mainly Facebook, Twitter and YouTube) challenged the government's narrative and provided a different one: desperate self-immolation following a bad treatment by a local municipal official.

Confused still, concerned authorities kept on toning down the incident with a view to derailing the then-on-going across-the-country revolution. In an attempt to quell the unrest and thwart any chance for more escalation, then-president Zine el Abidine Ben Ali visited Al Bouazizi in the hospital on 28 December while he was in a coma and swathed in bandages that covered his severe burns. A week or so later (on January 4, 2011), Al Bouazizi passed away. The situation in the country escalated. People exploded. A "*Spring*" began. Only 10 days later, Ben Ali, long in office (for 23 years), was swept from power. He fled his country and has remained in his forced and strictly-conditional exile in Saudi Arabia following many refusals by his closest allies to land on their lands.

### **3.0.2 The People Want to Bring Down the Regime**

Al Bouazizi's death on 4 January 2011 awakened the pent-up anger of the long-suppressed crowds all over the country and provided the spark towards freedom, dignity and justice. He was seen as a heroic martyr and deservedly credited with galvanising the looming frustrations of the region's peoples against their regimes which has re-drawn the socio-political map. Ibrahim Abdul-Karim et al (2012: 1) maintain that "the Arab revolutions represent a strategic shift in the Arab states". They believe that this shift is twofold: "on the one hand, international policies and foreign relations have been reconsidered. On the other hand, a new phase of freedom and democracy is paving the way for an Arab, regional and global power on the political, economic and military levels, changing the entire life of the Arab nation". The uprisings brought together various groups, the popular strata and

the bourgeoisie, who are dissatisfied with the existing systems and who pertain to different social, political, academic and civil segments including many unemployed, political and human rights activists, unionists, students, professors, lawyers, judges and many others to begin the revolutions under almost one banner: (!ارحل: *Erhal!*) [Step down!]; (*Dégage!* / *Get out!*)<sup>90</sup>. A driving force that had remained the “Spring’s” motivating template of online and offline activists irrespective of their age, gender, profession, affiliation, social status or any other socio-political consideration.

Only a month after the Tunisian episode, a wave of turbulence ignited by the deceased ‘Burning Man’ struck the region; millions of resentful young women and men started to take to the streets and flooded the squares across many parts of MENA (mainly Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Bahrain and Syria). Protests broke out and spread so quickly and incredibly exponentially. These long-suppressed protesters, females and males, chanted, virtually and in the squares, the same slogan, the same ‘mantra’ (a braver one this time): the people want to bring down the regime (Arabic: / الشعب يريد إسقاط النظام / *Asha'b yurid iṣqāṭ annizām/*).

### 3.1 Phraseology

The stormy waves of turbulence that convulsed MENA in 2011 have, at their very onset, become politically and publicly known as the “Arab Spring” [الربيع العربي] as the most neutral term notwithstanding the utopia it, *prima facie*, embodies. Similar labels such as “Arab Awakening” [اليقظة العربية], “Arab Revolution(s)/ Revolt(s)/ Uprising(s)” [ثورة العرب/ الثورة العربية] have also appeared to qualify the event underway even though not all participants in the protests are Arab<sup>91</sup> and the event started in winter<sup>92</sup>. Some observers (Salman Masalha<sup>93</sup>) go a step further and assume that the Arab “Spring” is neither Arab nor a “Spring” on the account that it has become thunderous. Other observers (Jochen Heppler 2013: 1)<sup>94</sup> view it as “Arabellion” [التمرد العربي].

<sup>90</sup> Al Aswany, A. (2011) Police alone can't keep rulers in power. Egypt's battle is on (The Guardian): <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/jan/27/police-power-egypt-battle-protesters>

<sup>91</sup> There were sporadic moves in Israel (2011), Iran, and Mali (2012), and lately in Turkey (2013), but they fell short.

<sup>92</sup> December (Tunisia), January (Egypt), February (Yemen and Libya), March (Syria) and other ‘silent’, and short-lived *springs* in Jordan, Morocco, Iraq, etc. Tellingly, the month of December marks the heart of winter according to the Mediterranean climate.

<sup>93</sup> Masalha, S. (2011) Recent revolutions are neither Arab nor Spring (HAARETZ):

<http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/opinion/recent-revolutions-are-neither-arab-nor-spring-1.399552>

<sup>94</sup> Change in the Middle East- Between Democratization and Civil War.

However, as time went by and as some initial outcomes emerged (socio-political instability mainly in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen and Syria), the Event, positive in its very nature, generated opposite and even contradictory interpretations and its naming (phraseology) was sharply divided<sup>95</sup>: “Arab Autumn” [الإضطراب العربي\الاضطرابات العربية]; “Arab Upheaval(s) [الخريف العربي]; “Arab Catastrophe” [الكارثة العربية]; “Arab Anger” [الغضب العربي]; “Arab Frost” [الصقيع العربي]; “Arab Storm” [العواصف العربية]; “Arab Volcano” [البركان العربي]; “Arab Earthquake” [الزلزال العربي]; “Arab Tsunami” [تسونامي العرب], etc.

Some observers (Hatamleh 2012: 24, also personal communication- September 2013) prefer to use it in its singular form based on their belief that all Arab uprisings are many but one; they constitute a cohesive unitary whole and share similar socio-political dynamics and economic grievances. In exactly the same vein, Barton (2011: 104) believes that although they are geographically different, Arab revolutions are thematically similar in that they “stemmed from a shared past- a single underlying motif”. However, it is not easy to give these unfinished shockwaves that have shaken the world a name; they have not come to a close yet and the overall scene is still foggy. Ramadan (2012: ix) lends support to this claim noting that “we should be cautious about rushing to define them [the Arab Uprisings]. As little as we know exactly what the components of these non-violent, transitional mass movements are, we know even less about their eventual outcome”. Also, I hasten to add that it is unfair to put the whole Arab countries in one basket and attribute the connotations of the rosy term “*Spring*” (or thorny resultant outcomes) to all Arab countries because it is multi-coloured and this is very much conditional upon the eventual fruits people of every country reap. One may, for example, speak of a Yemeni “*Spring*”<sup>96</sup> and a Syrian Autumn, although they both fall under the same umbrella: Arab “*Spring*”. (See 3.4.4 Casualties of the Syrian “*Uprising*”- (So Far) below, on page: 106).

---

<sup>95</sup> I collected these labels from the literature produced so far on the Event in both English and Arabic languages: (authored books, edited volumes, journalistic articles and news reports). Interestingly, they sometimes appear as headings for some books, volumes and articles.

<sup>96</sup> The Yemeni revolution (February 2011- February 2012) ended when President Ali Abdullah Saleh finally signed the GCC-brokered power-transfer deal late November, 2011 to his deputy in exchange of immunity from prosecution for him and his family, where he officially stepped down following the 23 February, 2011 presidential elections. This smooth transfer was applauded by Yemeni protestors and seen as a peaceful means of power transfer.

In fact, the term “spring” *per se* was employed in the Arabic political context/discourse to label some massive movements prior to the Event in 2011. In 2000, to cite one example, when President Bashar Al Assad took power succeeding his father’s three-decade iron rule, a number of “too optimist” Syrian opposition figures rose up and issued a reform document called (*Rabī’ Dimashq*: (ربيع دمشق) [The Damascus Spring] followed by another spring-like attempt towards emancipation, equality and freedom in what was then known as (*E'lān Dimashq*: (اعلان دمشق) [The Damascus Declaration] in 2005<sup>97</sup>. Both movements towards political plurality and democratisation were seen as catalytic providing oxygen for the on-going four-year-old Arab “*Spring*”. Also, to cite another example, in the aftermath of the 2003 Iraq War, “*Spring*” was used by some commentators (such as Charles Krauthammer) following promises by America and its proxies in the immediate wake of the war<sup>98</sup>. In his article<sup>99</sup> published on the second anniversary of the war (March 21, 2005), Krauthammer, referring to Europe’s *Spring* in 1848, notes that “the democracy project is, of course, just beginning” and that “the Arab Spring of 2005 will be noted by history as a similar turning point for the Arab world”.

The metaphorical term “Arab Spring” could etymologically be seen to have sprung from the 1848 European Revolutions, which were known as “Spring of Nations and the Springtime of the People”, (Barton 2011: 104). In his article published late 2012, Weyland outlines the Similarities between the 2011 Arab Spring and the 1848 Revolutionary Wave across Europe. He (2012: 1) maintains that “both waves of contention swept with dramatic speed across whole regions, but ended up yielding rather limited advances toward political liberalism and democracy”. The first specific use of the term Arab “*Spring*” as used to denote the current events across MENA may have started with the director of the George Washington University’s Institute for Middle East Studies, Marc Lynch, in his article in Foreign Policy only a couple of days after the death of Al Bouazizi, the Event’s catalyst. Elsewhere, Lynch (2012: 9) states that “Arab Spring [is] a term I may have unintentionally

---

<sup>97</sup> See more detail on the (Damascus Spring & Damascus Declaration) under 3.4 The Syrian Scene, on page: 96fff.

<sup>98</sup> Other terms like “the New Middle East” also followed (introduced by then-U.S. Secretary of State C. Rice in 2006).

<sup>99</sup> ‘The Arab Spring of 2005’ (The Seattle Times): [http://seattletimes.com/html/opinion/2002214060\\_krauthammer21.html](http://seattletimes.com/html/opinion/2002214060_krauthammer21.html)

coined in a January 6, 2011 article”<sup>100</sup>. Some observers (Al Momani 2011: 1), dubbed it the Arab “*Youth-quake*” owing to its main players: “unemployed youth in Arab nations, whose political frustrations were aggravated by their inability to express themselves in a tightly controlled police state, political corruption, and the incapability of the state to deal with social and economic problems”.

In their edited volume *Mirage in the Desert: Reporting the Arab Spring*, John Mair and Richard L. Keeble (2011: 101) voice their caution on the term “*Spring*” declaring that “we have deliberately put it in inverted commas throughout this volume”. They state that “there are clearly several “*Springs*” wondering how we “define a movement still fermenting throughout so many Middle Eastern and North African countries in the autumn”, (*ibid*). Amidst this phraseological “dilemma”, and for the purpose of this study, I shall use the term Arab “*Spring*” because it is, thus far, the most frequently adopted label politically and publicly in the Arab and Western mainstream and alternative media circles, retaining some reservations on the term by way of *italicising* and placing it between inverted commas throughout the whole thesis.

The events in the Syria’s unfurling “*Spring*” have been worded (and reworded/translated) by many labels varying from the least resonant to the most. This various labeling (in both a positive and a negative light) means to pursue pre-planned agendas by the different conflicting parties- as my selected texts will show, (see the appendices at the end of the this thesis, on pages: 316-347), which in fact raises a translational concern<sup>101</sup>: “Popular Movement” [حرّاك شعبي]; “Protest Movement” [حركة احتجاج]; “Riots”: [أعمال شغب]; “Tension” [توتر]; “Dispute” [نزاع]; “Crisis” [أزمة]; “Awakening” [صراخ]; “Revolution/Uprising/Revolt” [ثورة]; “Intifada” [انتفاضة]; “Conflict” [صراع]; “Civil, Sectarian War” [حرب أهلية/طائفية], etc. or conversely, “Popular Rebel” [تمرد شعبي]; “Civil Disobedience” [عصيان مدني] “Chaos” [فوضى]; “Autumn/Fall” [خريف]; etc. All these phraseological variants appear in my selected texts (chapter five) which constitute the Study’s corpus.

<sup>100</sup> Lynch, M. (2011) Obama’s Arab Spring (Foreign Policy): [http://lynch.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/01/06/obamas\\_arab\\_spring](http://lynch.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/01/06/obamas_arab_spring)

<sup>101</sup> The historical progression of the events (2011-present) has influenced these labels as per the level of severity (etymology). Labels as ‘protest movement’ [حركة احتجاج], crisis: [ازمة] etc. have disappeared due to the new realities and dynamics on the ground.

### 3.2 Major Causes of the Arab “Spring”

"[The 1950s-1990s] reeled from the blast of war about once a decade. Following the war triggered by the creation of Israel in 1948, there was Suez in 1956, the disastrous 1967 war, when Israel seized the West Bank, the Sinai, and the Golan Heights, and the war of 1973, when Egypt and Syria tried and failed to win back the territory they had lost in 1967. These were followed by the Iran-Iraq War and the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in the 1980s, and the Gulf war in 1991... In the eleven years since I became King of Jordan [the 2000s], I have seen five conflicts: the Al Aqsa intifada in 2000, the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 2006, and the Israeli attack on Gaza in 2008-9. Every two or three years [during the 2000s], it seems, another conflict besets our troubled region". King Abdullah II Ibn Al Hussein (2011: xii)

In order to accurately understand the translator's ideological orientations represented in their choices of equivalence (their normative behaviour), and, in effect, guarantee solid evaluation in this research, we should holistically read out the recent past and its socio-political, geopolitical and economic realities. The on-going four-year-old waves of unrest did not come out of the blue. They did not happen spontaneously. To understand the story from inside, then, I think we should return to history since we cannot understand the current uprisings without looking at those that have come before- namely, the Arab Cold War of the 1950s and 1960s with all its movements of independence, Arab successive failures and defeats during the Arab-Israeli wars mainly in 1948, 1967 and 1973: (al Nakbah, Al Naksah and Al Kasrah<sup>102</sup>), Israeli continuous invasions against the Palestinians and Lebanon amidst some Arab regimes' reluctant stances, the 'civil' wars, sectarian conflicts and military (bloody and bloodless) coups, the aborted democratisation endeavours particularly in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and the dramatic changes of the 2000s, which eventually came to a close with divisions in the Arabic house, brutal military dictatorships (unqualified leaderships) and, above all, boiling streets and resentful publics.

Thus, in order to form a panoramic picture of the *pre-“Spring”* era and well read the scene (which must cast its shadow over our data analyses in chapter five), we should consider the various forms of stagnation in all walks of life across many parts of MENA: political feebleness, economic frailty and social fragility that brought huge influxes of long-repressed women and men into the streets

---

<sup>102</sup> "Yawm an- Naksah (Day of the Setback) is the 1967 Arab defeat before Israel during the Six-day War. It was preceded by another dark (perhaps the darkest) spot known as 'Yawn Al Nakbah- the Day of Catastrophe): the 1948 depopulation of the Palestinians with their villages damaged and the Israeli Declaration of Independence, and "Yawn al Kasrah" (Day of Failure) when Egypt and Syria failed to restore their land which Israel occupied in 1967.

(who had grown more resentful and impatient) and provided the spark for the current sweeping massive movements. Also, we should not overlook the leading role of new technologies and communications, fast-growing mainstream and (alternative) social media outlets in the 2000s including Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, blogs, internet forums, e. news sites and advanced mobile phones which have become ubiquitous not to mention the regional and international influence. All these factors had arguably a galvanising effect across the region in that they aroused the Arab public's pent-up anger which had built up in their collective awareness until the "*Spring*" broke out.

### **3.3 Outcomes of the Arab "*Spring*"**

The Arab "*Spring*" has had the power to change the balance of power and re-draw significant socio-political, military and economic maps: Islamic in the first place; Islamist movements have become far stronger today, and organised Arab nationalist parties far weaker. The biggest share of the on-going "*Spring's*" cake went, in the beginning (i.e. during the transitional period) to the Islamists (most notably in Egypt and Tunisia) following years of political alienation<sup>103</sup>. The Arab revolutions have witnessed a strikingly notable shrinkage of the secularist and Western allies' regimes, on the one hand, and the rise of the political Islam, on the other. That is to say, Islamists, especially at the start, had stayed in the driver's seat in most "*Spring*"-affected countries and other ones whose "*Spring*" has remained silent (like Morocco), which drives some commentators (Tariq Ramadan 2012, George Galloway<sup>104</sup>, Robert Fisk 2012<sup>105</sup>) to speak of the 'Islamic "*Spring*"'. Almost all transitional or elected presidents, prime ministers, speakers of parliaments, etc. had, before the Event started, been outside their countries in forced exile mostly to avoid death penalty or inside their countries as (political) prisoners, or under house confinement/arrest with binding travel bans.

Given that a revolution is a process rather than an event, it is important to point out again that the "*uprisings*" are still on-going which means only initial outcomes (up to the time of writing this

---

<sup>103</sup> See Atef Joulani's Map of Party and Political Powers (2012, pp. 44-47).

<sup>104</sup> Galloway, G. British Muslim politician George Galloway calls for Islamic awakening in the wake of the Arab Spring (Live Leak 2012): [http://www.livleak.com/view?i=a37\\_1380506807](http://www.livleak.com/view?i=a37_1380506807)

<sup>105</sup> Fisk, R. (2012) After the Arab Spring, an Islamic Awakening (The Independent):

<http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/commentators/fisk/robert-fisk-after-the-arab-spring-an-islamic-awakening-7685143.html>

thesis) can be analysed especially if we consider the counter-revolutions and the accelerating developments in the “Spring”-affected countries. Having said that, each regime was affected in different ways: some regimes were unseated and swept from power (Tunisia, Egypt/ twice<sup>106</sup>, Libya and Yemen), some made pre-emptive reforms and concessions (Jordan, Morocco, Saudi Arabia), some resisted (Bahrain, Algeria, Iraq, UAE, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Sudan, etc.), and some are arguably vulnerable and soon-to-be-falling (Syria) owing to some internal and external indicators: significant civil and military defections and more international sympathy with the opposition forces. Importantly, deeply-entrenched authoritarian regimes have been, to date, toppled where public presidential and parliamentarian elections were held: Tunisian President Zine el Abidine Ben Ali fled to Saudi Arabia on 14 January 2011 ending more than two decades of autocratic rule. In Egypt, President Hosni Mubarak was ousted on 11 February 2011 after 18 days of dramatically escalating protests, public turmoil and tempestuous clashes ending his 30-year presidency after paternalistically delivering three meandering addresses. The Libyan leader Colonel Muammar Qaddafi (long and strong in office for 42 years) was overthrown on the 23<sup>rd</sup> of August 2011, after the National Transitional Council (NTC) took control. He had disappeared until he was killed on the 20<sup>th</sup> of October 2011, in his hometown of Sirte, ending 42 years of iron-fisted control. In the wake of an assassination attempt where he was seriously burnt, Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh signed the Gulf Cooperation Council’s (GCC)-brokered power-transfer deal in which presidential elections were held, resulting in his successor, Abd Rabbo Mansur Hadi, formally replacing him as the president of Yemen in 2012, in exchange for immunity from prosecution ending over two decades of totalitarian rule. On the 22<sup>nd</sup> of January 2015, after the Houthis<sup>107</sup> “occupied” the presidential palace, (and a few weeks later, the capital), the former (President Hadi) tendered his resignation to the House of Representatives (so did his newly-formed government) but was refused.

---

<sup>106</sup> First Egyptian Revolution, broke out on 25 January, 2011 where president Mubarak was overthrown (and jailed), and the second one on the 30<sup>th</sup> of June instigated by public resentment with President Mohammad Morsi’s year-long “clumsy” administration. Muslim brotherhood leader, President Morsi, was dethroned on the 3<sup>rd</sup> of July (and has been jailed since then) through a white military coup with a relatively massive public support.

<sup>107</sup> The Houthis (*Arabic: جماعة الحوثي/الحوثيون*); also less commonly known as (*أنصار الله*): [Supporters of God]: A Zaidi Shai group which has had affected the Yemeni Socio-political scene especially after the 2012 power-transfer which came out of the Yemeni revolution. Currently (late 2014-now), they are largely running the political show (via a coup d'état they staged in collaboration with the deposed president, Ali Abdullah Saleh), particularly after their complete takeover of the capital, Sana'a.

The Houthis installed themselves as the interim government in the country and both of them (the President and the Cabinet) had remained under a strict house arrest for weeks until the 21<sup>st</sup> of February when Hadi could free himself from the weeks-long house arrest, leaving Sana'a towards his hometown of Aden and announcing himself as the elected President of the Republic of Yemen with Aden as its capital.

In the monarchical states, a lot of significant concessions including basic constitutional reforms took place. For examples, protests in Jordan caused the sacking of four successive governments by King Abdullah II of Jordan. The popular unrest in Kuwait also resulted in resignation of Prime Minister Sheikh Nasser Al-Sabah's cabinet several times. Political concessions by the Moroccan King Mohammad VI were many, referendum on constitutional reforms; respect to civil and human rights and an end to corruption where anti-corruption bureaus were formed to combat corruption and convince the masses that a new course of life (an era of social, economic and political reform) has begun. Some regimes (like Algeria, Morocco, Jordan) whose "*Spring*" has, thus far, remained 'silent', opted for proactive, preventive and pre-emptive measures like releasing political prisoners and ending the emergency laws under massive public indignation. Oil-rich Gulf countries, primarily based on tribal monarchies, pre-emptively opted for economic concessions and a few democratic openings towards holding legislative and municipal free elections to absorb the publics' rage and contain these uprisings. Qatari Emir Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani stepped down handing power to his young son, Sheikh Tamim, although this, I believe, may have no *direct* relationship with the Arab "*Spring*" as this oil-rich country has not been (and is far to be) affected by it; Qatari people (around two millions) are enjoying unique welfare and prosperity in all walks of life.

### **3.4 The Syrian Scene**

Syria has seen a "*Spring*" a decade before the outbreak of the Arab 2011 "*Spring*". In 2000, the Damascus "*Spring*"<sup>108</sup> 'erupted' but it was not eventful and soon fell short. The thawing of this

---

<sup>108</sup>The Damascus "*Spring*" is the name given to period of intense opposition activism and tentative political liberalisation that followed the death of Hafez al-Assad in the year 2000. It was characterised by demands for political, legal, and economic reforms. A dream that was short-lived.

movement was doomed to failure as the regime opted for brutal security measures to abort it so that it clings to its accustomed power. The Damascus “*Spring*” was sparked by the death of President Hafez al-Assad on June 10, 2000 and the ‘fast unconstitutional’<sup>109</sup>, passing of the presidency down to his son, Bashar, who became president in a very quick succession which shows a patrimonial metamorphosis of power in a republican (non-monarchical) country. Soon after the death of his elder brother, Basil, in 1994, (then-heir apparent to a dying Hafez), President Hafez Al Assad made the decision to make Bashar the new heir-apparent. Over the next six years or so, until his death in 2000, he went about systematically preparing his son, Bashar, for taking over power politically, militarily and socially. In the last Syrian 2007 referendum, President Bashar Al Assad “expanded” his tenure via state-run referenda and reaped landslide victory by overwhelming majority; he won (97.62%) of the 12 million Syrian voters in a ballot in which he was the only candidate<sup>110</sup>.

A few months after this succession, a number of noted Damascene intellectuals established informal political forums or “salons” (*Arabic*: muntadayat seyaseyyah: منتديات سياسية) ushering new course of life in response to the newly-appointed modernised young president’s calls for openness, plurality and modernity. This new course of life was represented by a plethora of political, economic and judicial reforms including, *inter alia*, release of political prisoners, lifting the emergency and martial laws, improving living standards and ending the special status of the Baath Party as the sole leading party in society and state (political plurality). These demands were formally announced first in the “Statement of 99”<sup>111</sup>, in September 2000 (three months after President Bashar took power) and then in the “Statement of 1000” the following January (2001). The former statement was a petition signed by 99 prominent intellectuals demanding “political and intellectual pluralism” under a “rule

---

<sup>109</sup> Bashar Assad is seen as a political neophyte by many Syrians. Until the age of 28, he had quietly embarked on a career in medicine (as an ophthalmologist) and had had little or no knowledge (and appetite) on politics. When the elder Assad died on 10 June 2000, President Bashar was appointed leader of the Ba'ath Party and the Army and was elected president unopposed in what the government claimed to be a massive popular support (over 97% of the votes), after the Parliament swiftly voted to lower the minimum age for candidates from 40 to 34 (Assad's age when he was *elected*).

<sup>110</sup> BBC News (2007) Syria's Assad wins another term (Report): [http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle\\_east/6700021.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/6700021.stm)

<sup>111</sup> Statement by 99 Syrian Intellectuals (Middle East Intelligence Bulletin (September 27, 2000):

[http://www.meforum.org/meib/articles/0010\\_sdoc0927.htm](http://www.meforum.org/meib/articles/0010_sdoc0927.htm)

of law”. The latter, signed by 1000 of Syria’s intelligentsia, was a more insistent demand for a multi-party democracy and the lifting of the 1963 State of Emergency. The Movement never called for bringing the regime down nor challenged the “controversial” legitimacy of Bashar al-Assad’s “unlawful” succession to the presidency.

Although these declarations were not officially recognised by the government, the authorities announced a series of reformist measures in the months following Bashar al-Assad’s succession. Several amnesties (of public and private pardons) were declared, marked most notably by the release of hundreds of political prisoners after the closing of Mezze prison in November 2000. A multitude of human rights organisations re-came into the open or were established in order to urge the regime to continue its cautious steps towards reform, and the authorities did not prevent the rapid proliferation of civil society organisations as they had previously done. The “new” young, modernised Assad also took some steps toward diversifying authoritarian control in the autumn of 2000 by allowing the six constituent parties of the governing National Progressive Front to open provincial offices and to *freely* produce their own newspapers.

In the eyes of some observers, Syria is a late bloomer in the Arab “*Spring*” (Achcar 2013), yet the Syrian revolution began a decade earlier when after the release of some 600 political prisoners by President Bashar Al Assad, the Syrian intelligentsia openly called for political reform (the document). By January 2001, an announcement of the opening of a new civil society forum used to repeatedly appear (The Riad Seif Forum, The Jamal Al Atasi National Dialogue Forum, etc.). Hopes were vested in those early political stirrings in the possibility of replacing the existing hereditary autocracy with a participatory democracy. It was assumed that the young Western educated president would be more receptive to political change not only because the political reality at the time demanded it, but also because a fundamental reform was a safe way to ward off the threat of a revolution.

However, the Damascus “*Spring*”, which had seen an excruciating painful birth, was aborted and died upon arrival. These minor reforms were soon withdrawn and the opposition movement was crushed in the name of national unity and stability. Attempts at creating new political parties or moving toward any democratic opening were quickly suppressed: in February, the Forums were forcibly closed and their senior leaders were arrested. At a very young age, the Damascus “*Spring*” died, which as time went by, gave birth to a popular awakening after a lingering indignation.

Surprisingly, various members of the Damascus “*Spring*”, long in jail, happened to be amongst the signatories of the 2005 Damascus Declaration<sup>112</sup>- another “*Spring*”-like attempt towards multiparty democracy with particular emphasis on public freedoms: freedom of assembly, press and speech. This new declaration was a statement of unity by Syrian opposition figures issued in October 2005. It criticised the Syrian government as “authoritarian, totalitarian and cliquish”, and called for “peaceful, gradual” reform “founded on accord, and based on dialogue and recognition of the other”. Those signatories have also been active (and occupied senior and leading positions) in the on-going transitional period of the uprising like Burhan Ghalioun, Riad Seif, Suhair Al Atasi, to name only a few. The former was elected the first chairman of the Syrian Transitional National Council (TNC) in 2011, while the latter two were elected (in 2012) as vice presidents to its sequel: National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces: - as an umbrella under which all (military and political) opposition factions fall including the Free Syrian Army and Local Coordination Committees.

### **3.4.1 How was the Spark Kindled?**

Mistakenly, the Syrian regime used to believe that the country was extremely stable, unconquerable and invulnerable; no power (internal or external) can shake its well-cemented, immune political walls or split its social (diverse yet super-glued) ‘mosaic’. The regime’s media well fed this belief, constantly reiterating the assertion that Syria is a secure and stable country. In fact, however, this

---

<sup>112</sup>A five-page document, unveiled at an unauthorised press conference, launched by Syrian veteran political activist Michel Kilo and signed by more than 250 major opposition figures.

stability was merely a veneer. A long period of political instability was marked by systematic uncertainty and marred by frequent regime changes (short-lived coups-based governments which used to last for a few months in the 1950s and 1960s) which damaged the Syrian society, undermined its cohesion, and created numerous social problems, generating frustration and anger that grew to unbearable proportions amongst broad sections of the population.

February 15, 2011, amidst a perilously glowing climate across the Arab streets,<sup>113</sup> saw the first symptom of the actual revolution on March 17, 2011 after long decades of pent-up anger and frustration. It was not eventful; but could break the decades-old barrier of fear in the middle of the citizens created by fierce and suppressive governance. It made the Syrian people awaken from their long slumber of fear to gain (or re-gain) their rights of which the Ba'ath Party rule deprived them for several years. The spark was kindled on that day when a traffic policeman reprimanded the son of one of the traders in a crowded area in Damascus. The young man, supported by other fellow traders, reacted against the policeman. When the situation reached its limits, then-minister of Interior pushed himself to the limit to contain the situation and pacify the angry protestors. They unprecedently went on with protesting which caught the local authorities by surprise amidst strong indicators that Syria was next. As time went by, their furtive night demonstrations, whose main chants were (Peaceful... Peaceful [uprising]: (*Arabic: سلمية... سلمية* /Selmeyyeh... Selmeyyeh/); the people want to reform the regime: (*Arabic: الشعب يريد إصلاح النظام* /Asha'b yurid iṣlāḥ annizām/), became bolder and began to take place midday and everywhere including the very heart of the capital and major cities. Achcar (2013: 217, also personal communication on January 25, 2014) believes that “despite their fears, the Syrians were encouraged by the Tunisian and Egyptian victories as well as the Libyan example, and especially the worldwide attention that Libya attracted” referring to the NATO military intervention.

---

<sup>113</sup>Nearly a month before the actual Syrian uprising, two days after the Libyan revolution, five days after the Bahraini revolution, a week or so after the ouster of the Egyptian president and 8 days after the Yemeni revolution not to mention other forms of unrest in Algeria, Jordan, Morocco, etc.

At this very moment, the Libyan revolution was in its infancy (17-02-2011 until 20-10-2012)<sup>114</sup>.

The Syrian people expressed solidarity with then-fresh Libyans killed by the ruling political system. Such peaceful (and furtive) practices also recurred in sympathy of the ‘glad’ Egyptians who were in the liberation squares a few weeks after they had ousted their deep-seated president. The Syrian security forces had grown impatient and imposed the fiercest measures to disperse the increasing crowds of protestors and shatter their dream towards democracy, dignity and political engagement. They detained some of them for several hours or a few days (who later became senior officials in the opposition forces like Suhair Al Atasi, Mo'az Al Khateeb, Haitham Al Maleh, etc.).

The situation was ready to explode across the country, awaiting the spark that would bring women and men into the streets. The spark was kindled by young children through their graffiti on their school walls in the town of Dara'a in southern Syria- one of the peripheral poverty pockets which constituted the cradle of the actual revolution. Fifteen pupils scribbled the repeated utterance, the “lyrical” chants of freedom, justice and dignity, the Arab “*Spring’s*” ‘mantra’: the people want to bring down the regime (*Arabic*: الشعب يريد إسقاط النظام / *Asha'b yurid iṣqāṭ annizām/*) which they had heard from their fellow revolutionaries in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Bahrain and some other parts of MENA. The local governor of this underprivileged city decided to come down hard. The young children (all under 17) were thrown in jail and brutally tortured with the horrible use of electric shock devices that shocked the world and shook the conscience of the human community<sup>115</sup> garnering international sympathy and moral support. It increased tenfold when they were returned home with several horrific injuries that have mutilated their body, lacerations, bruises, burns, with their finger nails pulled out and eyes swollen and every other inch of their body puffed up. The incident spread through the country like wildfire and shocked the town, and suddenly, many Syrians, whose patience had reached its limits, rose up, conquered their lingering fear and got the

---

<sup>114</sup> See St. John, R. B. (2012- revised edition) *Libya: From Colony to Revolution* (pp. 262-295).

<sup>115</sup> Many popular ‘sympathetic’ demonstrations swept international cities and capitals (like Paris, London and New York). Also, UN’s Human Rights Organisations condemned this incident and asked for investigation that the people responsible face justice. Human Rights Watch issued a 54-page report (2011) on the Dara'a Massacres- based on 50 interviews with victims and eye-witnesses- entitled: We've Never Seen Such Horror- Crimes Against Humanity by Syria Security Forces: <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/syria0611webwcover.pdf>

first actual taste of rebellion after their country had plunged into the abyss and presently deeper into a grinding military confrontation surrounded by foreign intervention and extremist “organised” groups (like Da‘esh Organisation [Arabic: تنظيم داعش] and Al Nuṣra Front [Arabic: جبهة النصرة]).

### **3.4.2 The Regime’s Dogmas and Doctrines**

Global political and intelligence superpowers repeatedly miscalculated the fall of the Syrian regime. US President, Secretary of the State and several global proxies (UK, France, Arab League member states) stated on several occasions and only months after the "uprising", that the regime's days were counted. Some observers believe that the reason behind the long resistance of the Syrian regime in the face of inside and outside opposition forces is attributable to the unique political, security, military and economic structure architected, on sectarian bases, by late President Hafez Al Assad.

The late President constructed an autocratic all-Alawite regime, the ruling totalitarian clan, of which he controlled every detail for thirty years, with assistance from security force, Syrian army, and Ba’ath Party members who had been very loyal to him. He benefitted from his military background which brought him to power by a coup in the very late 1960s. His governments and security forces (of all kinds: Military and Air Forces Intelligence, the Republican Guards, the Special Forces, the Ground Forces, etc.) were chiefly based on a sectarian minority- the Alawites, a geographically inharmonious fractious bunch, which presently make up only a little over 10% of the total population of the country (roughly 22 million people) on the estimates of Courbage (2007: 189); Van Dam (2011), etc.

Batatu, a famous Palestinian-American Marxist, explices the military and security formations that had had exclusive authority over the whole country for decades. He (1999: 327) notes that “out of the thirty-one officers whom Assad singled out between 1970 and 1997 for prominent or key posts in the armed forces, the elite military units and the intelligence and security networks, no fewer than nineteen were drawn from his Alawite sect, including eight from his own tribe and four others from his wife’s tribe; and of the latter twelve, as many as seven from kinsmen closely linked to him by

ties of blood or marriage". Most of the country's economy is concentrated in the hands of an oligarchy (particularly the Makhlof family which possesses the lion's share of the country's economy). For example, the Makhlof-dominated company Al-Sham, according to Achcar (2013: 214-215) "controls 60 per cent of all Syrian economic activity". Rami Mohammad Makhlof, who is only 45 years old and the maternal cousin of the President, is regarded as one on the most economically powerful men and "Syria's wealthiest and most elusive man"- worth some \$5 billion<sup>116</sup>. The young man "owns and controls an impressive list of companies in a wide range of sectors: banking, insurance, oil, industry, real estate, tourism, media, and so on", Achcar (*ibid*: 214). According to Bhalla (2011) "four key pillars sustain Syria's minority Alawite-Baathist regime: power in the hands of the al Assad clan; Alawite unity; Alawite control over the military-intelligence apparatus<sup>117</sup> and the Baath Party's monopoly on the political system".

However, when his son, ophthalmologist Bashar, 34 and who had never desired for power or politics, assumed control, he lacked the qualifications to maintain his father's inherited structure, singlehandedly. Thus, and following his father's steps, he resorted to his kinsmen and the Alawites brass (together with a few associates who amassed a fortune via illicit and corrupt means inside and outside the country) bringing his family (maternal and paternal) members into centres of state power, thereby transforming the entire regime from an autocratic regime of individual domination to one of "mafia-like" familial domination<sup>118</sup>- which has exacerbated anger and fed indignation amongst the Syrians of whom "14.9% of the total are unemployed, with rates of 33.7% for those between 20 and 24 years of age and 39.3% for those between 15 and 19!", according to Achcar (2013: 216) who cites these figures from the Syrian Central Bureau of Statistics officially released on the eve of the revolution in 2011; [exclamation his own].

---

<sup>116</sup> <http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2012/03/07/meet-syrias-wealthiest-and-most-elusive-man/>

<sup>117</sup> Bhalla (2011) notes that "Syrian Alawites are stacked in the military from both the top and the bottom, keeping the army's mostly Sunni 2<sup>nd</sup> Division commanders in check. Of the 200,000 career soldiers in the Syrian army, roughly 70 per cent are Alawites. Some 80 per cent of officers in the army are also believed to be Alawites. The military's most elite division, the Republican Guard, led by the president's younger brother Maher al Assad, is an all-Alawite force":

<http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20110504-making-sense-syrian-crisis#axzz378cEFAX>

<sup>118</sup> It is useful to note that the president's sect (the Alawite) is a small minority in the overall social structure. For a thorough statistical analysis, see the fourth edition of Nikolaos Van Dam's *The Struggle for Power in Syria* (2011).

Thus, junior Assad has run the socio-political, economic show with loyal members of the presidium during his presence and absence. In a televised interview<sup>119</sup>, President Bashar confirmed this “doctrine” stating that the security solution (including the pro-regime mafia-like *Shabbiha* services<sup>120</sup>) is part and parcel of a political solution. The Syrian regime has miscalculated the fall of the neighboring regimes. It considered itself as immune to all kinds of popular challenges faced by Presidents Ben Ali, Mubarak, Qaddafi and Saleh. The initial protests were small, uneventful and unremarkable, receiving little media coverage and winning little applause. But a series of poor decisions, including the massive use of violence to crush their domestic opponents and the broken promises of socio-political and economic reforms by the regime, injected much livelihood into protests that soon rocked the country. This regime’s insistence on the security violent option, and turning its back to external and internal calls, led many countries (like United Kingdom, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, etc.) to push for international (military) intervention and (economic) pressures in order to, they claim, protect Syrian civilians.

It is useful here to refer to the “Friends of Syria (Syrian People) Group” (widely known in Arabic as (مجموعة أصدقاء سوريا): an international coalition that involves a big number of countries and bodies across the globe. It was established as a reaction to the Russia-China famous double veto on a UN Security Council resolution condemning the Syrian government. The global coalition meets periodically to discuss serious matters of the status quo and future of Syria. The group held its first meeting on 24 February 2012 in Tunisia, the second on 1 April 2012 in Istanbul, the third in Paris, 12 January 2014, and now Morocco is preparing to host the fourth one. Almost four years since the start of Syria’s uprising during which the regime is believed to have been dragging the country into chaos, slogans and voices are being raised to demand such (military) intervention in order to bring the regime’s violence to an end- which has not taken place yet (until the writing of this thesis).

---

<sup>119</sup> An Interview conducted with President Bashar Al Assad on the Syrian Arab TV, 21 August 2011:  
<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=C2e1FlPemw0>

<sup>120</sup> *Shabbiha* (North Levantine Arabic). They are mercenary pro-Assad gangs paid, on a daily basis, high wages by the regime. It is loosely translated as: “apparitions”. *Shabbiha* refers to groups of armed men in civilian clothing who act in support of the Ba’ath Party, led by the Al Assad family. They were first formed in the 1990s and engaged in all forms of local mafia-style violence and corruption, from intimidation and murder to trading in arms and drugs.

The Syrian army, which has seen increasing defectors who formed the pro-opposition Syrian Free Army, was carefully structured in a cohesive fashion. This may in part explain its four-year resistance in the face of all shocks, internal and external, that surrounded the regime from every corner. In order to cement the Syrian military construction, highly trained elements were staffed by carefully-selected personnel under the direct command of officers belonging to the President's own sect: the Fourth Division, headed by the President's brother, Maher, constitutes the hard core of the security apparatus, together with the Third Division and the Republican Guard let alone the *mukhabarat* (Intelligence services) and the *shabbiha* forces whose job is not exclusively confined to the military operations; it also (in addition to assisting in repressing demonstrators and sweeping the streets to panic them) extends to raids, arrests, and torture (and burglaries on the pretext of security raids). Indeed, some of the brutal acts of torture which they have committed against unarmed civilians in the country amount to cruelty unprecedented in the (human rights') annals of torture anywhere else in modern history<sup>121</sup>. The sectarianism-based regime has also used those *shabbiha* in "liquidation operations" against police and army members should they disobey their commanders' orders to open fire on peaceful, civilian demonstrators who have flooded many parts of the country.

### **3.4.3 Who Leads the “*Uprising*”?**

Like the Arab “*Spring*”, the Syrian “*revolution*” started headless. It consisted of ordinary people who have been harmed by the regime in different ways and wish for change. Significantly, there was no unified command centre that effectively planned or led the demonstrations from the outset. Even today, almost four years on from the start of the protests, a united centre has not been formed despite a number of attempts to gather the opposition's (military and political) voices under one umbrella. Amongst the differing affiliations of the people taking part in the on-going uprising, it is possible, however, to refer to some groups running the show in the country: groups of young men who are mainly university students or graduates with good command of technology and skillful

---

<sup>121</sup>It suffices here to refer to the abduction of the popular singer Ibrahim Qashoush, known for his spirit songs that spurred on hundreds of thousands of demonstrators in Hama, and the punishment that he was doled out by having his throat cut out after he was killed. There is also the abduction of world-renowned caricaturist Ali Farzat, and the attempt to smash his fingers for his “insolence” towards the President in a caricature that depicted Gaddafi fleeing in a car and al-Assad attempting to hitch a ride with him.

mastery of the new media (e.g. Khalid Abu Salah); groups of political independent human rights activists (e.g. Suhair Al Atasi, etc.), or members of various organisations (e.g. Communist Labor Party, the Marxist left movement and the Democratic People's Party) and groups of tribal figures (e.g. Ahmad Asi Al Jarba) as well as religious groups (e.g. Zuhair Salem)<sup>122</sup>. It is noteworthy that the weakness of the “fragmented” opposition, the mutual incompatibility of the various forces of the uprising, the faltering stance of the international community (and the Russian-Chinese continuous vetoes) not to mention the Iranian political and military ostentatious support are undoubtedly helping the regime to achieve its goals and hold.

### **3.4.4 Casualties of the Syrian “*Uprising*”- (So Far)**

“War, is a dirty choice and a losing business; at best a failure, at worst a disaster<sup>123</sup>. The only certainty about wars is the way they start; no one can know how they come to a close. Syria has for almost four years been paralysed socially, politically and economically; it has been undergoing tragically disastrous conditions, with no relief in sight. President Assad ignored calls for restraint by Syria's neighbours and stubbornly rejected the demands of the popular resistance. Al Assad deployed the military against pro-democracy peaceful protesters, leaving a devastating toll on the lives numbering in tens of thousands and escalating the crisis to a point of no return which explains Bashar Assad's unwavering determination to fight tooth and nail to retain political power for his Alawite sectarian minority.

As my selected texts show, horrible massacres have been repeatedly (and callously) orchestrated including chemical weapons triggering strong international reactions. Moreover, rebel-held towns have been showered with cluster bombs, scud missile attacks, thermobaric bombs let alone Al Nuṣra Front and Da'esh suicide bombings which have claimed numerous civilian casualties leaving awful human catastrophes.

---

<sup>122</sup> We cannot know whether or not they belong to the Muslim Brotherhood, as no one is prepared to divulge their membership in accordance with Law No. 49, which imposes a capital punishment on anyone found to belong to the movement. Most of them are young people who have been affected by the socio-political tide of Islam. They are generally adherents of political Islam, even if they do not share some of its dogmas.

<sup>123</sup> Ayasrah, B. (2013): Two Wrongs do (NOT) Make a Right! (Ammon News Agency). Available at: <http://en.ammonnews.net/article.aspx?articleNO=20626>

On the fourth anniversary of the Syrian uprising (mid-March 2015), the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) documented death of 215518 persons since March 18, 2011, one day after the eruption of the uprising, which witnessed the fall of the first "victim" in Dara'a. On March 15, 2015), SOHR announced that: "over 1.5 million Syrian civilians were seriously wounded or suffered from permanent disabilities, More than half of the Syrian people have been displaced, in addition to destroying the infrastructure of the country and the public and private properties during the past 47 months [i.e. until March 2015, while the number of casualties is increasingly escalating]".

The casualties, according to (SOHR: March 15, 2015) are broken down as follows<sup>124</sup>:

- "Civilians: 102831 civilians including 10808 children and 6907 women.
- Rebel and Islamic fighters: 36722.
- Defected soldiers and officers: 2505.
- Arab, European, Asian, American and Australian fighters from the ISIS [Islamic State in Iraq and Syria/ Da'esh], Al Nuṣra Front, Junoud al-Sham battalion, Jund Al-Aqṣa battalion, Jund al-Sham Movement and al-Khadra' battalion: 26834.
- Regular regime soldiers and officers: 46138.
- Combatants from Popular Defence Committees, National Defence Forces, al *Shabbiha*, pro-regime informers and the "Syrian resistance to liberate the Sanjak of Alexandretta": 30662.
- Pro-regime Shia militiamen from Arab and Asian nationalities, Al Quds Al Felastini Brigade and other pro-regime militiamen from different Arab nationalities: 2727.
- Fighters from Hezbollah: 674; and
- Unidentified dead people (documented by photos and footages): 3147".

The SOHR adds: "It is worth noting that the numbers do not include more than 20000 missed detainees inside the regime jails and other thousands of those who disappeared during regime raids and massacres. It does not include more than 7000 regular soldiers and pro-regime militants and hundreds of "regime supporters" captured by IS [Islamic State/ Da'esh], Islamic fighters, Al Nuṣra Front, rebel and Islamic battalions on charge of "dealing with the regime". The numbers also do not include more than 1500 fighters from the YPG [The Kurdish People's Protection Units], IS, Al

---

<sup>124</sup> All these statistics are derived from the official estimates of the London-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR): <http://syriahr.com/en/2015/03/15099/>. These statistics were discussed (in a personal communication) with its director Rami Abderrahman on March 2015.

Nuṣra Front, Islamic battalions and rebel battalions who were kidnapped during clashes among the mentioned parties. These statistics do not include the destiny of 4000 abductees from the civilians and fighters inside IS jails from Shaiṭaat tribe who were kidnapped by the Islamic State in the province of Deir Ezzor", (ibid).

### **3.5 Conclusion**

A revolution is an evolutionary process with lots of ebbs and tides. According to political analyst Jawad El Hamad (2011: 2), "it is too early to decide on the consequences [of the Arab revolutions] because the situation is still fluid even in those countries which have achieved revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya". Revolutions by and large are living entities and the on-going Arab ones are still in their beginning chapters; what we have so far seen in this four-year old event is only the very early manifestations of radical transformations in all walks of life region- and perhaps worldwide. As the Egyptian activist Wael Ghonain in his memoir *Revolution 2.0* (2012: 292)<sup>125</sup> succinctly puts it, "revolutions are processes not events and the next chapter of this story is only beginning to be written". Therefore, the question whether Arabs are better or worse off following their "Spring" may somehow look premature. Arab streets, however, do not regret what they have been doing; their "Spring" is yet to finish and MENA is not what it was a few years ago<sup>126</sup>.

It may be true that the current Arab massive mobilisations have not so far borne any fruit and their "Spring" has been complete fiasco nor made any appreciable move toward democratisation; they, at least, decisively cast aside the taboos that had controlled every detail of their public life for decades and remain fully aware of the extra miles left uncrossed with all ups and down that lie ahead on their way. In other words, they drew the attention of the ruling class to the existence of their discontent with the status quo and the possibility of organised action demanding change. Abdul-Hameed Al-Kayyali et al (2012: 1) draw on the Arab socio-political changes and argue that "the resulting political and strategic changes [so far] are foreshadowing radical structural changes on

---

<sup>125</sup> Ghonim founded the Facebook site *Kullena Khaled Said* ("We Are All Khaled Said") in sympathy with a 28-year old brutalised by police and called for the critical Tahrīr Square Jan. 25, 2011 day of protest.

<sup>126</sup> Personal communication with Judith Orr, chief editor of the London-based Socialist Worker weekly (November, 2013).

regional, and even global levels which have never expected such events to put an end to some regimes and threaten others". Those remarkable uprisings have made evident the strong will and determination of the Arab peoples.

What I am alluding to is the fact that the Arab "*Spring*" has caught everyone by surprise, not only region-wide but also across the globe. Although some observers (Ramadan 2012) believe (I agree) that we should not be impressed by the novelty of the on-going Arab event referring to a plethora of popular mobilisations in several corners of the region which were destined to failure. In his introduction to Toby Manhaire's edited volume *The Arab Spring* (2012), political analyst Ian Black describes the uprisings as "spontaneous, unforeseen and contagious" adding that "they seemed impossible beforehand and inevitable afterwards", Black (2012: vii). Nobody could foretell the ultimate consequences of the event unfolding even intelligence departments across the globe. Nobody could imagine that a simple person, a street vendor would be the trigger, the catalyst, the sparkle of revolutionary transformations the re-mapped the region and perhaps many parts in the world. Nobody knew when and where the spark of hope would come: neither could the global intelligence superpowers (USA, EU or Israel) nor their allies of the iron-fisted Arab ones. Arab "*Spring*", in the final analysis, has offered new narratives and icons, changing the stereotypical image about the Arab peoples and presenting them as qualified, unconquerable beings which can reject oppression and face repressive regimes.

### **3.6 How does this Background Account Inform this Study?**

The present investigation, which examines how socio-political reality is constituted in pragmalinguistic forms, reaches beyond the sheer linguistic boundaries to take on board extra-linguistic (socio-cultural, political, historical) factors that spawn texts and control their production, i.e. not only does this study view (wartime) translation as a linguistic exercise but also as a vehicle of ideological manipulation in different ways and on various levels which finds its "clearest articulation in language", (Kress 1985b: 29). It is concerned with both the semanticity and

pragmaticity involved in (translated/ re-created) texts. In other words, it does not see the act of translation as a mimetic process of replacing linguistic items in the ST by their assumed counterparts (as proposed by the structuralists and linguistic approaches, e.g. Catford 1965); it rather sees it as a decision-making process motivated by a set of choices which are, in turn, governed by ideo-cultural circumstances and professional, political pressures. Hence, the present study, which is essentially a critical translation analysis, does not limit its scope of analysis to linguistic comparisons between the English and Arabic text pairs.

Xuelian He (2012: 74) notes that "the studies of translation are no longer limited to linguistic analysis and rigid comparison between the source text and the target text only, but in social and cultural contexts" adding that "language comes into being during the process of the social practice of a certain group of people and develops in the social and historical settings", (ibid: 75). Many other scholars (Snell-Hornby 1988, Lefevere 1992, Bassnett 1998, Nord 2005, etc.) emphasise that the process of translating cannot simply be reduced to a mere linguistic exercise; there are also other contextual and situational factors as well as commercial and ideological pressures which govern this process. Bassnett (1998: 135) believes that translators (whom she sees as rewriters) are "the product of a particular culture, of a particular moment in time... Moreover, the material conditions in which the text is produced, sold, marketed and read also have a crucial role to play".

This broad scope of text analysis intimately links up with one major foundation of the present study; following (Fairclough 1989: 20) and (Halliday 1978: 12f), it sees "language as a form of social practice" and "social behaviour" that cannot be studied away from its socio-cultural, historical and contextual considerations. This chapter, which has provided background information on the Arab "*Spring*", means to offer socio-political insights on the analyses carried out later in this thesis. Not only is this socio-cultural, political, historical and contextual awareness important to facilitate the readers' understanding (and interpretation) of these analyses and bring possible misunderstanding to a minimum; it is also helpful in providing solid conclusions on the selected texts.

As I have shown on several occasions in the chapter, the 2011 "Spring" is not really the product of Al Bouazizi's self-immolation, but rather a response to pent-up anger, frustration, resentment and indignation that had flooded the Arab streets for several decades. The four-year-old unfolding sweeping waves of unrest in the region did not suddenly spring from nowhere. In other words, they were not a coincidence (although spontaneous) but rather the inevitable fallout of oodles of political, economic and social factors as well as regional and global influence fed by a technological 'explosion'. Al Bouazizi's self-immolation was just a response to all these factors on behalf of tens of millions of Arab massive crowds. His desperate act helped to awaken impending frustration, awaiting resentment and looming anger which had lingered for too long in the collective consciousness of the Arab masses.

Thus, the unfurling events in Syria, represented in the Study's selected texts, cannot be understood in isolation from their historical transformations (social, political, economic and security) that had taken place (in the region in general and in the country in particular) since the 1950s until the eruption of the Arab Spring in 2011. It is useful to shed light on the Event at large and the Syrian one in particular, to know how the "spark" was kindled; what people wanted from their ruling regime and political elites; why and how it had been named as it went on; what socio-political economic causes that made it happen; what regional and global factors that influenced the event; what role have different (social) media outlets played; how previous *abortive* mobilisations (and the 'limited' political/democratic openings) cast their shadow over the today's Arab scene (and the Syrian one in particular being our context<sup>127</sup>); what major political, security and military dogmas of the (Syrian) regime that run the show; who leads the "*uprising*", where the uprising unfolding is going; what resultant casualties that have so far come out, amongst many other questions that lend a helping hand in securing accurate analyses and, in effect, reliable conclusions on the selected texts as will be shown in chapter five in this research.

---

<sup>127</sup> In this spirit, it is useful to refer to a number of events, which we have discussed earlier in this chapter: The Corrective Movement (1970) (Arabic: الحركة التصحيحية /al ḥarakah attaṣḥīheyyah), Political Forums or "Salons" (2000s) (Arabic: muntadāyat seyaseyyah: منتديات سياسية), The Damascus Spring (2000) (Arabic: ربيع دمشق /Rabī' Dimashq), Statement of 99 (Late 2000), Statement of 1000 (Early 2001), "The Damascus Declaration (2005) (Arabic: علان دمشق /E'lān Dimashq, amongst other.

## CHAPTER FOUR: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY & METHOD

### 4.1 Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA)

#### 4.1.1 What is CDA?

It is important to note that CDA acknowledges a dialectical link between language and power and claims that both of them are intimately associated and integrally related (Fairclough 1989; Wodak 1989; van Dijk 1990, etc.). Fairclough (1989) highlights this inescapably united linkage and expands it within and behind discourse<sup>128</sup>. He (1989: 61) argues that ‘on the one hand, power is exercised and enacted in discourse, and on the other hand, there are relations of power behind discourse’. Seen through the lens of CDA, language *per se* is not powerful, however; it rather gains powerfulness from its users (i.e. power-holders). In other words, power finds its clearest expression in language via a variety of manipulative pragma-linguistic tools (linguistic forms)- as I will show in detail in this chapter under 4.8 Method of Analysis, on page: 135fff.

Like Fairclough, Wodak (2001a) states that CDA shows a particular interest in the interface between language and power. She (2001a: 11) indicates that ‘language is entwined in social power in a number of ways: language indexes power, expresses power, is involved where there is contention over and a challenge to power’ [adding that] power does not derive from language, but language can be used to challenge power, to subvert it, to alter distributions of power in the short and long term’. Van Leeuwen (1993) endorses this interplay between language and power in social hierachal structures. He (1993: 193) sees CDA as concerned ‘with discourse as the instrument of power and control as well as with discourse as the instrument of the social construction of reality’. This interplay is indisputably challenging as it involves people in society who obviously have different (and certainly opposing) background beliefs, power positions, hegemonic dispositions let alone ideological assumptions which are produced, reproduced and resisted through discourse (and, for the very purpose of the present study, mediated via translation, or, put more accurately, by translators).

---

<sup>128</sup> Discourse, according to Hatim and Munday (2004: 238), is “modes of speaking and writing which involve participants in adopting a particular attitude towards areas of socio-cultural activity (e.g. racist discourse, bureaucratese, etc.).

To further understand what CDA is, not only should we consider what CDA is but also what it is not, I believe. According to Wodak (2001b), CDA does not seek to draw a line between ‘rightness’ and ‘wrongness’. She rather believes that it is more concerned with showing the level of validity of certain judgments and conclusions over others. Wodak (2001b: 65) maintains that “CDA is not concerned with evaluating what is ‘right’ or ‘wrong’. CDA- in my view [Wodak’s] - should try to make these choices transparent. It should also justify theoretically why certain interpretations of discursive events seem more valid than others”. Sequel to this basic assumption, the approach is concerned with critically investigating instances of dominance and discrimination and other forms of social inequalities and asymmetric relationships which oftentimes find their clearest expression in linguistic structures or forms.

#### **4.1.2 Is CDA Critical?**

'Critical', argues Fairclough since the early stages of the approach, implies “showing connections and causes which are hidden; it also implies intervention, for example providing resources for those who may be disadvantaged through change”, (Fairclough 1992a: 9). A decade or so later, he notes that CDA is ‘critical’ in the sense that it is a form of analysis that is "committed to changing people's lives for the better", (Fairclough 2001a: 26)<sup>129</sup>. This clearly shows that the socio-political, moral “revelatory” constants adopted by previous critical linguists (Fowler, et al 1979) find their echoes in CDA. Like any other ‘critical’ theory, it closely attends to moral concerns and noble values which are evidenced through its declamatory moralising tone; it clearly discloses its revelatory and emancipatory values and bluntly proclaims itself as ‘safe harbour’ for the unequal segments in the society for whose sake it intervenes. CDA’s rallying cry is to detect the asymmetric interplay between language and power and side with the dominated groups against the dominating ones, which demonstrates the emancipatory concerns and moral role it adopts using the “weapon” of language. Wooffitt (2006: 139) argues that critical discourse analysts should adopt a clear

---

<sup>129</sup> See also his (2000a) Discourse, Social Theory, and Social Research: The Discourse of Welfare Reform, in Journal of Sociolinguistics 4, pp. 163-195. Notice how “Welfare Reform” appears in the heading of the article.

political attitude- a moral one- to uncover social injustices and improve the conditions of powerless agents, to introduce social change, by means of “identify[ing] injustice in the structure of society” and seeking to “ameliorate the conditions of those groups who suffer for them”.

In his 2000b *New Labour, New Language?*, Fairclough provides a number of examples on the powerful agents’ political discourse and their different manipulative ways of using language in the process of governing or governance in order to exert their power and hegemony. With special reference to the tension between ‘the normal person’ and ‘the public figure/the politician’, Fairclough unveils the schizophrenic attitude (disjunction) between the political discourse on the one hand and reality on the ground on the other. He traces the rhetorical style in the political discourse of British Prime Minister Tony Blair (1997-2007) highlighting the interface between “rhetoric” and “reality” in New Labour with particular reference to the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia (March 24, 1999 - June 10, 1999). Fairclough (2000b: 118) outlines the mismatch between his “discourse” and the socio-political reality noting that “Blair’s political [not normal] identity *gainsays* his claimed concern” on social and political issues linking this behaviour with “values and morality”; [my emphasis]. Fairclough concludes with the question: “Is the gap between what Blair claims to be and what he inevitably is consistent with his moral stance?”<sup>130</sup>.

Fairclough and Wodak (1997) also provide shrewd analyses of the political discourse of Margaret Thatcher’s radio interview with Michael Charlton on BBC Radio 3 on 17 December, 1985<sup>131</sup>. They attempt to decipher the opacity and power relations that lie underneath her discourse. Fairclough and Wodak (1997: 271) argue that "Thatcherism"<sup>132</sup> is nothing but a “new basis for winning popular consent... an ideological project for building a new hegemony [which] can be seen as an attempt to restructure political discourse by combining diverse existing discourses together in a new way...”.

---

<sup>130</sup> For a more thorough discussion, see Fairclough (2000b) Chapter 4: The Rhetorical Style of Tony Blair, (pp. 95-118).

<sup>131</sup> See also Fairclough’s earlier critical analysis of the same interview in his *Language and Power* (1989/ 2001 second edition) under “Creativity and struggle in discourse: the discourse of Thatcherism”.

<sup>132</sup> Thatcherism is the political ideology of the British Conservative politician Margaret Thatcher who had served as Prime Minister for 11 years (1975-1990) before she resigned. The term had also been used to describe the dogmas of the British governments of her two successors: John Major (Conservative 1990-1997) and Tony Blair (Labour 1997-2007).

They believe that Thatcher could *pull the wool over their eyes* and her interview provided the best example of the manipulative use of language by a powerful member of the ruling elite. As van Dijk (1995a: 19) puts it, “CDA is essentially dealing with an oppositional study of the structures and strategies of elite discourse and their cognitive and social conditions and consequences, as well as with the discourses of resistance against such domination”.

Fairclough (1995a: 231-232) aptly points out that “the founding motivation for critical analysis is emancipation”. Thus, the approach shows an interest in the human beings, not least the non-powerful agents who suffer from social inequality, subordination, discrimination, exclusion not to mention exceptionalism. It seeks to empower, enlighten and emancipate this societal group of humans to protect them against hegemonic groups and dominant elements of a given society, thus achieving its major noble value and founding motivation: emancipation.

According to Fairclough (face-to-face communication on March, 2013), CDA is critical in that it essentially sharpens collective societal awareness in individuals against deception and reveals the fallacy of dominant powers and their claims. In other words (he adds), it unlocks the delusions of the powerful ‘elites’ and impedes them to deceive the powerless and underprivileged segments in society. Fowler and Kress (1979: 186), two of four editors of *Language and Control*, state that “much of the commentary in this book<sup>133</sup> suggests the processes 'X manipulates Y through language' and 'X pulls the wool over Y's eyes through language'”.

For his part, Meyer (2001: 30) states that CDA is a critical theory in that it “aims to make transparent the discursive aspects of societal disparities and inequalities [and] takes the part of the underprivileged and tries to show up the linguistic means used by the privileged to stabilise or even to intensify inequities in society”. Thus, CDA is conventionally taken as an approach that helps, not only to unveil and explain asymmetric power relations in society, but also to head off these forms of domination and uproot practices of social inequality.

---

<sup>133</sup> This argument appears under their article entitled: 'Critical Linguistics' In *Language and Control* (1979)- a volume on CDA edited by Fowler, Hodge, Kress and Trew.

Two acronymous components of CDA, *prima facie*, come to one's mind: criticism and analysis which shows that CDA is a critical analysis in that it does not take things for granted but rather (unlike other approaches of analysis<sup>134</sup>) delves deep down into polemical and debatable texts as to fathom their invisible associations and unacknowledged agendas. Put more clearly, not only does CDA seek to dissect what is said in texts but also (and mainly) not what is not wanted to be said. By following DTS, via holding systematic TT-ST comparisons, we should be able to determine how (in what pragma-linguistic forms) and why (for what purposes) this is not said. In their Preface to *Language and Control* which draws on the interplay between language, ideology, power and social meaning, stylisticians Fowler, Hodge, Kress and Trew (1979: 2) state that their book is "not as yet another academic study in sociolinguistics so much as a contribution to the unveiling of linguistic practices which are instruments in social inequality and the concealment of truth". Fowler and his colleagues elaborate on their own critical approach to discourse analysis and highlight its distinctive moral, emancipatory and revelatory tones. They (*ibid*: 3) note that:

"We show how linguistic structures are used to explore, systematize, transform, and often obscure, analyses of reality; to regulate the ideas and behaviour of others; to classify and rank people, events and objects; to assert institutional or personal status...".

#### **4.1.3 Evolution of CDA**

In the late 1970s, Critical Linguistics (CL) was developed by a group of linguists at the University of East Anglia (Fowler et al 1979; Kress and Hodge 1979, etc.) which gave rise to a new form of analysis known as Critical Discourse Analysis. However, not until the very late 1980s and early 1990s did this form of analysis start to take shape independently of CL after "some practitioners of either CL or CDA [could] find arcane points on which they differ", (*Wodak 2001a: 12-13*). In the early 1990s, a two-day gathering of CDA disciples took place including, amongst others, Fairclough, Wodak and van Dijk, "who had the wonderful opportunity to discuss [albeit differing but not opposing] theories and methods of discourse analysis and specifically CDA", (*ibid*: 4).

---

<sup>134</sup> Monika Bednarek (2006: 11f) places special interest on the analysis of media discourse and lists eight analytical approaches namely: the critical approach, the narrative/pragmatic/stylistic approach, the corpus-linguistic approach, the practice-focused approach, the diachronic approach, the socio-linguistic approach, the cognitive approach and the conversationalist approach.

Thus, CDA's 'institutional beginning' was markedly launched, as a fully-fledged, autonomous, and 'sovereign' discipline, with Fairclough's seminal book *Language and Power* (1989), Wodak's edited volume *Language, Ideology and Power* (1989) and van Dijk's specialised journal *Discourse and Society* (1990). Interestingly, in 1990 (which saw the birth of CDA), Kress, who voluminously elaborated on the basic postulations of the endeavour, indicates that CDA was "emerging as a distinct theory of language, a radically different kind of linguistics", Kress (1990: 94)<sup>135</sup>.

Thus, CDA originally came into the open from CL to the extent that both of them had been used interchangeably until recently (Hatim and Munday 2004, Wodak 2001a, O'Halloran 2000). Hatim and Munday (2004: 337), for example, define them in the same way; they indicate that both CDA and CL are "the analysis of language use with the aim of discovering concealed ideological bias, and underlying power structures". Over the years, CL has effectively morphed into (and reunited with) CDA, with both enterprises occupying, according to Wodak (2001a: 12-13), "the same 'paradigmatic' space" on account that both of them are "broadly concerned with highlighting the traces of cultural and ideological meaning in... texts", O'Halloran (2000: 13). The foundations and building blocks of this approach were laid in the late 1970s which 'saw the emergence of a form of discourse and text analysis that recognised the role of language in structuring power relations in society...[where] attention to texts, their production and interpretation and their relation to societal impulses and structures, signalled a very different kind of interest', Wodak (2001a: 5).

#### **4.1.4 What does CDA Aim for?**

The aims of CDA should be understood in light of its criticality and, more precisely, moral, emancipatory and revelatory ends as demonstrated above under (4.1.2 Is CDA Critical?, on page: 113)<sup>136</sup>, which makes it different from other mainstream approaches of (political) discourse

---

<sup>135</sup>Although CDA has essentially become interdisciplinary in that it ties in with such disciplines as sociolinguistics, psycholinguistics, social psychology, literary criticism, etc.

<sup>136</sup>Fairclough (1995a: 132-133) states that CDA is a "discourse analysis which aims to systematically explore often opaque relationships of causality and determination between (a) discursive practices, events and texts, and (b) wider social and cultural structures, relations and processes; to investigate how such practices, events and texts arise out of and are ideologically shaped by relations of power and struggles over power; and to explore how the opacity of these relationships between discourse and society is itself a factor securing power and hegemony".

analysis. Van Dijk (1995a: 18) amply explains this difference claiming that CDA is a “special approach” of analysis “emerging from... a “socio-politically conscious and oppositional way of investigating language, discourse and communication”. He provides a number of distinctive features (1-7 below) of the approach that explains not only its being different but also unique<sup>137</sup>. They “provide the main traits of an approach that distinguishes it fairly well from other works on discourse”. These features, *inter alia*, claim that CDA:

1. is problem- or issue-oriented rather than paradigm-oriented in that it accords due attention to such social problems as sexism, racism, colonialism and other forms of social inequality.
2. pays attention to *all levels and dimensions of discourse* (grammatical, stylistic, rhetoric, speech acts, pragmatic strategies and those of interaction, etc.).
3. explores underlying *ideologies* that play a role in the reproduction of or resistance against dominance or inequality.
4. attempts [as part of its descriptive, explanatory and practical aims] to *uncover, reveal or disclose* what is implicit, hidden or otherwise not immediately obvious in relations of discursively enacted dominance or their underlying ideologies. That is, CDA specifically focuses on the strategies *of manipulation, legitimization and the manufacture of consent* and other discursive ways to influence the minds (and indirectly the actions) of people in the interest of the powerful.
5. implies a critical and appositional stance *against the powerful and the elites*, and especially those who abuse their power [through this attempt to uncover the discursive means of mental control and social influence].
6. sustains an overall perspective of *solidarity* with dominated groups, e.g. by formulating strategic proposals for the enactment and development of counter-power and counter-ideologies in practices of challenge and resistance; [original emphasis throughout (1-7)].

---

<sup>137</sup> See also Fairclough and Wodak (1997: 271-80) where they provide a comprehensive summary of CDA which makes it different from mainstream critical schools of political discourse analysis.

As Wodak (2001a: 2) overtly puts it, “CDA aims to investigate critically social inequality as it is expressed, signalled, constituted, legitimised and so on by language use (or in discourse)”. One of the central tenets of mainstream CDA, therefore, assumes that not only should texts be explained but they should also be interpreted, which, in part, explains why CDA is considered as (in addition to SFL & DTS) a theoretical framework of analysis in this study. Siegfried Jägar (2001: 37) indicates that discourses by and large “convey more knowledge than the individual subjects are aware of”. Hence, CDA sets out to discern what and how a text does not (or does not wish to) say. Put another way, it attempts, in the main, to unravel ideologically significant covert linguistic structures. It also goes a step further, far beyond merely revealing textual features, as to debunk potential discursive practices, unmask the unacknowledged agendas, invisible stances and non-obvious voices concealed inside texts within a given context- (the politically motivated context in our case).

Wodak (2001a: 3) elaborates on this assumption in view of ‘the insights that discourse is structured by dominance [...] and situated in time and space; and that dominance structures are legitimated by ideologies of powerful groups’. She points out that it is “possible to analyse pressures from above and possibilities of resistance<sup>138</sup> to unequal power relationships that appear as societal [stabilised and naturalised] conventions”, (ibid). Van Dijk (1996: 84) sees dominance as a “legally or morally illegitimate exercise of control over others in one's own interests” which leads according to CDA advocates to counter-hegemony or 'resistance' as indicated, for example, in Wodak (ibid) who sees it as "the breaking of conventions, of stable discursive practices" and in van Dijk (1993: 250) who notes that "an analysis of strategies of resistance and challenge is crucial for our understanding of actual power and dominance relations in society".

---

<sup>138</sup> Resistance, according to Wodak (2001a: 3) is defined as ‘the breaking of conventions, of stable discursive practices’ [when taken for granted].

#### **4.1.5 Major Tenets and Assumptions of CDA**

CDA sees discourse – language use in speech and writing – as a form of ‘social practice’. Describing discourse as social practice implies a dialectical relationship between a particular discursive event and the situation(s), institution(s) and social structure(s) which frame it: the discursive event is shaped by them, but it also shapes them. That is, discourse is socially constitutive as well as socially shaped. Fairclough and Wodak (1997: 258).

This epigraph summarises a great deal of what CDA hopes to say. It puts, in a nutshell, its main doctrines that have been adopted by its pioneering exponents (mainly Fairclough, Wodak and van Dijk). As a ‘systematically scientific’ approach, CDA sets a multitude of conceptual, theoretical, epistemological and philosophical assumptions that underpin what it is and what it is not. Meyer (2001: 14) maintains that CDA must be understood as an approach rather than merely a method. He argues that approaches to social research “can be understood as a certain set of explicitly or implicitly defined theoretical assumptions which are specifically linked with empirical data, permit specific ways of interpretation and thus reconnect the empirical with the theoretical field”.

CDA starts with the assumption that language use always inevitably constructs and is constructed by socio-cultural, political, and economic contexts. This is another reason why this study takes it on board as one of its theoretical frameworks of analysis. In addition to its focus on social problems and the (re)production of power asymmetric relations, it is also concerned with the investigation of the tension between the two assumptions about language use: that language is both socially constitutive and socially determined. According to Fairclough and Wodak (1997: 258), discourse “constitutes situations, objects of knowledge and the social identities of and relationships between people and groups of people”. It is constitutive both in the sense that it helps to sustain and reproduce the social status quo, and in the sense that it contributes to transforming it”.

CDA is a text-based approach and gives "text" paramount importance, (Fairclough 1989). Given that texts are produced purposefully rather than arbitrarily, it declares itself not only as an interpretive trend but also an explanatory one that texts need to be both explained and interpreted with a view to evincing concealed associations in a given context. As Fairclough and Wodak (*ibid*)

aptly puts it, “both the ideological loading of particular ways of using language and the relations of power which underlie them are often unclear to people. CDA aims to make more visible these opaque aspects of discourse”.

#### **4.1.6 Major Criticisms of CDA**

CDA argues that intentions can be inferred indirectly from given discourse. CDA is criticised for this claim and ‘accused’ of over-interpretation, guesswork, conjectures and the passing of early judgments. The main criticisms came from O’Halloran (2000), Hammersley (2002) and, perhaps more austerity, from Widdowson (1996 and 1998). Those criticisms, in my view, overlook the fact that CDA passes its judgments and derives its conclusions from the textual clues and contextual evidence in the first place. More importantly, we should not lose sight of the fact that CDA strongly acknowledges and benefits from the Hallidayan Systemic Functional Linguistics (which primarily accounts for language in use and sees it as a communicative act that operates within specific socio-cultural, ideological, etc. context... a “system of meaning potential”, Halliday 1978: 39) as my argument below (under 4.4 Hallidayan Model of Linguistic Analysis, on page: 126fff and 4.8 Method of Analysis, on page: 135fff) thoroughly shows. CDA highly considers context (whether synchronic or diachronic) and accords it supreme significance. It enforces a dialectical relationship and ‘catholic marriage’ between the text and its social, cultural and historical circumstances that shape them. CDA also claims that discourses are historical and should be seen in relation to their ‘historical’ context which closely finds its echoes in Wodak’s discourse-historical approach. Hence, the approach’s proponents (as I discuss in the next section and under 4.9.3.3 Relevance later in this chapter, on page: 146) believe that solid analyses and interpretations of texts should be based on contextual and situational considerations in order for analysts to be able to excavate invisible, inexplicit meaning which, as Chilton (2004: 61) succinctly puts it, ‘is not always expressed in explicit form, nor indeed is it always possible to do so. [...] Meaning is not ‘contained’ in words... rather meaning is constructed by human minds’.

#### **4.1.7 CDA and the Importance of Context**

The notion of context is crucial and a recurrent theme in the literature: (Fairclough 1995a; Fairclough and Wodak 1997; Fowler 1996; Hodge and Kress 1993; Rogers 2004a, 2004b; van Dijk 2001b). As Rogers (2004a: 2) reminds us, CDA is different from other discourse analysis methods because it includes, amongst other things, “a description and interpretation of discourse in context”. CDA believes that our interpretations, judgments and conclusions should be drawn from contextual evidence. It includes a more rigorous linguistic analysis which is more sensitive to the context in which texts are produced. Unless context is considered, meanings and their associations, it claims, will never be actualised. Fairclough (1995a: 89) remarks that “no instance of discursive practice can be interpreted without reference to its [macro] context”. Van Dijk, too, considers this significant element for better understanding of given events and situations. He (2001a: 356) extends the scope of context to include mental representations (goals, knowledge, opinions, attitudes, and ideologies). He claims that “[context] consists of such categories as the overall definition of the situation, setting (time, place), ongoing actions... participants in various communicative, social, or institutional roles, as well as their mental representations: goals, knowledge, opinions, attitudes, and ideologies”.

#### **4.2 Main Approaches of CDA (Adopted in this Study)**

##### **4.2.1 Norman Fairclough’s Socio-cultural Approach**

In spite of the many scholars of CDA and the numerous attempts made before him (Foucault, 1970s; van Dijk 1984, 1985, etc.), it is generally acknowledged that Norman Fairclough is the major exponent of CDA. He is seen to have single-handedly provided the corner stones of the endeavour (1989, 1992, 1992b, 1995a, 1995b, 1997 (with Wodak), 1999 (with Chouliaraki), 2000a, 2000b, 2000c, 2001a, 2001b, 2001c, 2003, 2004, 2009, 2012 (with Isabella Fairclough). Scholars of the field (like Wodak) declare that Fairclough, with affluent illustrative examples, ‘sets out the social theories underpinning CDA and, as in other early critical linguistic work, a variety of textual examples are analysed to illustrate the field, its aims and methods of analysis’, (Wodak 2001a: 6). In his *Language and Power* (1989), which sets up the major pillars of CDA in the way we know it

today, Fairclough provides a general method for analysis which involves three steps: description of the text, interpretation of the relationship between text and interaction, and explanation of the relationship between interaction and social context. These three steps are largely considered for the analysis of the study's selected corpus from a translation point of view- what Nord (1991) refers to as Target Text Analysis, or what the author sees as: Critical Translation Analysis (CTA) in congruence with Fairclough's Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA).

As already alluded to, Fairclough (1989), believes (and strongly stresses) that texts need to be both explained and interpreted with a view to examining underlying meanings. Fairclough (1989: 5) refers to his approach to language and discourse as "critical language study", exploring the connections between language use and unequal relations of power. The influence of the Foucauldian model on the Faircloughian CDA is most clearly seen in the emphasis on the importance of language-power relationships. Fairclough (mainly 1992a, 1995a and 1995b) posits a three-dimensional conception of discourse: text (later refashioned by Chouliariki and Fairclough (1999: 113) as "analysis of communicative interaction"), discourse practice (or "inter-discursive analysis"), and socio-cultural practice (or "sociologically informed analysis of the [relevant] social structures and socio-cultural practices"). In his later works (over the past decade or so), he articulates most of CDA's theoretical underpinnings which have been inspiring the most prominent protagonists of the enterprise especially Ruth Wodak and Teun Van Dijk.

#### **4.2.2 Ruth Wodak's Discourse-Historical Approach**

Wodak has worked closely with Fairclough for almost a decade in Lancaster. Since its very onset, she has written enormously on the approach from different points of view (1989, 1995, 1996, 1997, 2000, 2001a, 2001b, 2007, etc.). Wodak combines a discourse-historical approach with a socio-cognitive approach in what she called 'discourse sociolinguistics', (Wodak 1996: 3). Wodak's discourse sociolinguistics is 'explicitly dedicated to the study of the text in context' and 'accords both factors equal importance'- which highly inspires the present endeavour. This approach strives

to analyse ‘opaque structural relationships of dominance, discrimination, power and control’ (Wodak 2001a: 2) by way of “identifying and describing the underlying mechanisms that contribute to those disorders in discourse (one of the major influences Foucault (1984) has had on CDA) which are embedded in a particular context... and inevitably affect communication”, (Wodak 1996: 3). Perhaps Wodak’s major contribution to CDA is the development of the discourse-historical approach, aimed at integrating “systematically all available background information in the analysis and interpretation of the many layers of a written or spoken text”, (Wodak 1995: 209).

One of the features of the discourse-historical approach associated with Wodak is its emphasis on the importance of allusions. Indeed, one of the purposes of the discourse-historical approach, according to Fairclough and Wodak (1997: 266), is to 'enable the analysis of implicit prejudiced utterances, as well as to identify and expose the codes and allusions contained in prejudiced discourse'. This focused emphasis on the importance of the context, seen in terms of the historical dimension and background knowledge, in interpreting texts is useful and influential for critical discourse analyses (like the present one). Another aspect of CDA emphasised by Wodak (and of course Fairclough) is differential interpretation: readership (text consumers) may have different background knowledge and different stances, and can be expected to have different interpretations of the same communicative event (Relevance).

#### **4.2.3 Teun A. van Dijk's Socio-cognitive Approach**

In addition to his cognitive approach of CDA for explaining how meaning is constructed (and how it functions) on a societal level, van Dijk's major contribution is very manifest in his focus on media and political discourses which exclusively informs the corpus (and ipso facto) the theme of this study as its heading obviously shows<sup>139</sup>. Since the early stages of the inception of CDA, he places close attention on media discourses and the potential ideological thrust that may lurk behind them: how they are produced, reproduced, explained, interpreted, legitimised and resisted, (van Dijk 1985).

---

<sup>139</sup> The Role of Translation in Shaping *Media and Political Discourses* in Times of Conflict: The Syrian “Spring” in Context.

Van Dijk realises that instances of bias, ideology, prejudice, power, hegemony and similar aspects of discursive practices find their clearest expression in media discourse and, put more specifically, the language of the mass media, not least in conflictual settings (our current context). Newsmakers, propagandists and media surrogates oftentimes declare themselves as objective and impartial presenting the state of affairs flatly, transparently and disinterestedly (i.e. without any form of political, ideological or emotional involvement). Van Dijk (1984, 1998a), explores the main players that encode those aspects of discursive practices, challenges these claims and discloses their hallucinations, deliriums, illusions and delusions.

#### **4.3 Descriptivism of CDA**

It should be noted that CDA does not provide a homogeneous methodology of analysis but basic assumptions and general postulations, which reflects (and explains) its heterogeneity and multidisciplinary dimension. None of its adherents claims to have a specific method of analysis. Fairclough (2001c: 121) expresses his "reservations about the concept of 'method' and argues that 'it can too easily be taken as sort of 'transferable skill' if one understands a method to be a technique, a tool in a box of tools which can be resorted to when needed and then returned to the box". In a face-to-face communication with Fairclough (March, 2013), he claims that CDA can be both a method and a theory but it is as much theory as method, attributing the lack of a consistent method to the CDA's multi-disciplinary nature. When I asked him whether CDA is a direction or a destination, Fairclough replied that it is mainly a direction that leads to the destination: it only provides helpful insights on how to detect instances of unequal power relations, hegemonic dispositions and social asymmetries that lurk inside or behind the lines of given discourse. Therefore, adds Fairclough, we do not have the "right and final" interpretation of a given discourse but rather plausible and adequate explanation of text producers' discursive practices based on a scientific methodology. In this connection, Fairclough (2001b: 239-240) argues that "texts are written with particular readerships in mind, and are oriented to (*and anticipate*) particular sorts of reception and responses, and are therefore also interactive"; [my emphasis].

In a purely additive sense, van Dijk (2001: 95) highlights this non-prescriptivism of CDA noting that he provides only ‘principles’ and ‘practical guidelines’ rather than ‘a ready-made method van Dijk’ of doing CDA. I have no such method’, he declares. Van Dijk believes that this critical perspective of discourse analysis is ‘multidisciplinary’: nor is it a ‘method’ neither is it a ‘theory’ that can be simply applied to social problems. CDA can be conducted in, and combined with any approach and sub-discipline in the humanities and the social sciences’ (*ibid*: 96). Despite the lack of a specific and consistent CDA methodology, it can, however, be presented with reference to particular approaches and with regard to their specific theoretical backgrounds and epistemological assumptions. CDA believes that theory and methodology are eclectic. In other words, rather than presenting discourse analysts with a ready-made recipe on a silver plate, it helps them to understand the circumstances and background beliefs that shape them, thus enabling them to explore invisible associations and opaque implications of power and ideology.

#### **4.4 Hallidayan Model of Linguistic Analysis**

The second theoretical framework of analysis in this study is the Hallidayan SFL. The present study, which is centrally located within the boundaries of Text/Pragmatic Linguistics, benefits from the Hallidayan approach to linguistic analysis. Both of the Hallidayan SFL and Faircloughian CDA agree that language is a form of social practice/behaviour and that meaning is derived from social context. Fairclough (1989: 20) considers “language as a form of social practice” and similarly Halliday (1978: 12-13) sees it as a form of “social behaviour” that cannot be studied apart from its socio-cultural considerations. In this spirit, it is important to note that CDA exponents highly acknowledge this type of model and strongly believe in its validity for generalisable outcomes and reliable conclusions. Fairclough (1992a: 27) implies that he ‘draws heavily upon Halliday’s work’ for his textual analysis (his lexico-grammatical categories within the meta-functions of language: Ideational (transitivity, nominalisation); Interpersonal (modality, politeness) and Textual (texture, lexical cohesion)).

Meyer (2001: 16) asserts that one distinguishing feature of CDA from other analytical linguistic approaches to text and discourse analysis (e.g. the practice-focused approach, the cognitive approach, the diachronic approach, the conversationalist approach, etc.) is “the specific incorporation of linguistic categories into its analyses”. Fowler’s works during the early stages of the emergence of CDA as a framework of analysis (1991, 1996) also support these arguments; he indicates “how tools provided by standard linguistic theories (a 1995 version of Chomskyan grammar, and Halliday’s theory of Systemic Functional Grammar) can be used to uncover linguistic structures of power in texts [illustrating] that systematic grammatical devices function in establishing, manipulating and naturalizing social hierarchies”, quoted in Wodak (2001a: 6) who herself believes that “an understanding of the basic claims of Halliday’s grammar and his approach to linguistic analysis is essential for a proper understanding of CDA”, (ibid: 8). The importance of the Hallidayan linguistics<sup>140</sup> vis-à-vis the CDA lies in its three triangulatory inextricably-tangled meta-functions of language: ideational, interpersonal and textual which have inspired this enterprise’ analytical method.

Particularly worthy of mentioning in this concern is that the present study centrally draws upon three inseparably united dimensions of socio-political-linguistic nature, i.e. it traces a linguistic matter (translation- subject matter) through politically-motivated texts (corpus) within a given context (the Syrian revolution spanning the years 2011 to date). The method of analysis is multi-dimensional; it consists of a set of syntactic and lexical categories backed by other indicators/ signifiers (textual or contextual)- as will be discussed shortly below.

These pragma-linguistic categories are considered because they may shape up the socio-political realities configured in specific formations and structures. They are essential in discoursal analysis and instrumental in exploring hidden associations and *peeling* ideological layers that cover meaning. As noted earlier, they are accorded great attention by CDA advocates: Fowler (1991); Lee

---

<sup>140</sup> Hallidayan Linguistics is “a systematic functional theory of language advanced by M. A. K. Halliday in the latter part of the twentieth century. Halliday focuses on language in use, as a communicative act, and describes three strands of functional meaning co-occurring in a text: Ideational Meaning, Interpersonal Meaning and Textual”, Hatim and Munday (2004: 241).

(1992); Hodge and Kress (1993); Simpson (1993); Hartely (1993); Hatim and Mason 1990, 1997; Chilton and Schäffner (2002) not to mention Fairclough (mainly 1992a, 1995) who adopts Halliday's linguistic, functionalist and pragmatic approaches in his critical analyses of a variety of discourses. Fairclough (1992a) closely examines many features in relation to power and ideology<sup>141</sup>, such as the selection of particular grammar structures (e.g. Transitivity and Passivisation); Modality and Politeness, amongst others.

It is a given that translators usually face a plethora of hurdles and stumbling blocks (linguistic, stylistic, cultural, etc.) during the process of translating which hinders the achievement of equivalence with which translation shifts are predominantly concerned. Translation shifts are linguistic changes (alterations) occurring between two text pairs as a result of a variety of systematic differences between these pairs. Thus, their occurrence in any translational activity can be seen as inevitable given that translation is not a trans-coding (code switching) exercise but an act of communication that seeks to transfer meaning across different languages and different cultures. Blum-Kulka (1986) acknowledges this inevitability and claims that, “the process of translation necessarily entails shifts both in textual and discoursal relationships”; [emphasis added]. These different languages and different cultures doubtlessly involve different views and orientations. These views and orientations, as configured in pragma-linguistic forms, are the prime concern of this study which sets out to detect and explain.

#### **4.5 How are “Shifts” Identified in this Study?**

As noted in chapter two, translation shifts can be manifest in various constructions and at different levels in (translated) texts. They can also result in different consequences on the transferred message. It is important to keep in mind that the present research essentially draws upon ideology in media and political discourses in times of conflict; how it can be detected and interpreted. This study sets out to see how translators render English STs into Arabic: the way they adopt various

---

<sup>141</sup> Ideology, argue Hatim and Munday (2004: 342 & 346), “is a body of ideas that reflect the beliefs and interests of an individual, a group of individuals, a societal institution, etc., and that ultimately finds expression in language...” [whereas] power represents “the text producer’s ability to *impose* his or her plans at the expense of the text receiver’s plans”; [my Emphasis].

strategies to communicate new meaning(s) of ideological import that would affect the perception of reality of events. Schäffner and Bassnett (2010: 46) cast light on the interconnection between politics, media and translation highlighting that language is the tool through which politics communicates its message. Ayasrah (2013<sup>142</sup>), in his article entitled *Is Language Victimized in Wartime?*, states that “language in wartime is also<sup>143</sup> victimized in a variety of [manipulative and circumlocutory] ways to serve specific goals for the sake of specific individuals and groups” and believes that “the most notable form of this victimization is the act of translating precisely the translator’s conscious choices and preferences which are not obligatory, unnecessary and, in fact avoidable”, which refers to optional shifting that is indicative of intervention and bias.

To this end, an empirically practical method of text (and discourse) analysis is going to be followed in order to trace, identify and interpret the translator’s normative behaviour configured in certain constructions that may, seen through the CDA prism, bear ideological signification. More precisely, ten full (translated) texts are critically analysed in order to excavate instances of significant ideological orientations in English: how they are constructed and how they may affect the ST message and, ipso facto, its target audience. In so doing, I hope to sharpen the translator’s (and translation analysts’) awareness of politically-charged discourse produced in times of conflict by drawing their attention to how some pragma-linguistic ‘stratagems’ are configured in service of certain pre-planned agendas.

Text Linguistics (TL), Comparative Linguistics in particular, can lend translators (and translation analysts) a helping hand in identifying and explaining ideological views- as Hatim and Mason showed on many occasions (e.g. 1990, 1997; c.f. Shunnaq 1986, 1992, 1994; Farghal 1993, 2008, 2012; etc.). Following on from the DTS’ insights on the Comparative Model, this is mainly done by exploring (by way of systematic comparisons of two observable pairs) differences or, more precisely, the different relationships between the English ST and the Arabic TT based on the

---

<sup>142</sup> Available at: <http://en.ammonnews.net/article.aspx?articleno=21300#.U9d-0p1wbDc>

<sup>143</sup> I particularly refer to my previous thematically-linked article entitled Truth is the First Casualty in Times of Conflict (2013). Available at: <http://en.ammonnews.net/article.aspx?articleno=21058#.U9d-k51wbDc>

assumption that languages differ on *how* they communicate rather than on *what* they communicate, that is to say, what a translatOR does rather than what a translation says.

The present study imports concepts and principles of the Descriptive Translation Studies (DTS), not least those that relate to the Comparative Model which is essentially equivalence-based and product-oriented<sup>144</sup>, to trace potential differences across both text pairs: English and Arabic. Consequently, the Comparative Model, at whose heart the notion of norms lies, is applied in order to reveal whether or not shifts occur in the translated text, to deduce the translators' norms of behaviour that may regularly recur in their translations. To explain (and justify) this frequent occurrence (or more precisely recurrence), a descriptive model, based on comparative observations, is taken on board- as discussed under 4.16 Text Analysis (particularly stages 3 & 4, respectively on pages: 168 & 169) at the end of this chapter. Before moving on to the third theoretical framework of analysis (DTS), it is worth throwing some light on the forms of lexico-grammatical shifts which translators resort to, with reference to the form with which this research is primarily concerned.

#### **4.6 Obligatory vs. Optional Shifts**

Shifts are the result of the technique for which the translator opts during the process of translating. Shifts, as Bakker, Koster and Leuven-Zwart (1998: 228) see them, are either "obligatory" or "optional". Obligatory shifts aside, the present study, whose corpus is primarily made up of politically argumentative texts, is only concerned with detecting, describing and interpreting optional shifts (mainly on the syntactic and lexical levels) that may potentially bear significant ideological orientations. That is to say, it seeks to examine how (optional) translation shifts, which reflect the translator's decision/choice, preference, are employed and what consequences they may have on the TT message and its recipients. It attempts to explain and justify their occurrences (reiterations) during the process of translating by tracing the conditions that have motivated and

---

<sup>144</sup> See more under 4.7.1 Comparative Model within DTS (TT-ST Comparison) below, on page: 133.

influenced the translators' strategies and decisions before and during the process of translation (See Toury's three types/stages of norms: initial, preliminary and operational, 1995a: 56-59)<sup>145</sup>.

Based on this, and before I start my analysis, it is important to declare that the detailed thorough analyses carried out in the next chapter only examine pragma-linguistic instances of deviations that are indicative of ideological import. Worded differently, obligatory shifts that occur by virtue of cross-linguistic, stylistic constraints of the TT (to maintain a smooth flow or the Nida's 1964a principle of naturalness/ equivalence effect) or bear *no* ideological thrust will be ignored, and only those optional and unnecessary ones that reflect the translator's slanted stances and carry subjective imprints will be taken on board.

#### **4.7 Descriptive Translation Studies (Toury 1980a & 1995a)**

Given that the present research is predominantly based on descriptive, comparative and target-oriented claims, this study also applies, supplementary to CDA and SFL illuminated at length above in this chapter, the Theory of Norms (Toury 1980a, 1988, 1995a, etc.)<sup>146</sup> at whose heart the controversial "troubled" notion of equivalence lies<sup>147</sup>. This theory derives from Descriptive Translation Studies (DTS) which places special attention on the output (the finished product) and allows evaluative comparisons against its original: a procedure the present study follows at final stages of its analyses. Suffice it to note that advocates of DTS stress that they do not provide ready-made recipes or pass early judgments on existing translations; rather, their approach helps to identify the circumstances and pressures that shape them and steer their production as well as conception. As Hermans (1985: 13) puts it, DTS "takes the translated text as it is and tries to determine the various factors that may account for its particular nature".

---

<sup>145</sup> Toury (1980a, 1995a) proposes three types of norms. These, in short, are: Preliminary (the choice of the to-be-translated text); Initial ("adequacy" - ST-oriented and "acceptability"- TT-oriented) and Operational (Matricial and Textual-linguistic which govern the translator's decision-making process).

<sup>146</sup> See detailed discussion on this theory in chapter two, on pages: 35-43.

<sup>147</sup> This notion on equivalence is part of the thinking of some translation scholars who place much interest on the question of translation equivalence, (see, for example, Hermans 1995: 217). Commenting on the question of equivalence within DTS, Schäffner (1999a: 5), states that "Toury shifted the focus of attention by saying that a translation is every text that is regarded and accepted as a translation by a given community".

Drawing upon the concept of target orientation within DTS, Toury, its major proponent<sup>148</sup> who has offered insightful analyses within its boundaries, indicates that translation analysis is carried out from back to front with consideration of the context- what he calls the "socio-cultural environment", (1997: 289)- which governs their production maintaining that this analysis should be performed "INTO (from) rather than FROM (into)", Toury (1988: 83); [original emphasis]. This "descriptive" line of thinking is further explained shortly below under the section after next: (4.7.2), on page: 134.

It is worth pointing out that the current research is more concerned with the translator (her/his normativity) than the translation *per se*<sup>149</sup>. This is attributable to Toury's claim (2005) that norms themselves do not appear in translations, it is the resulting regularities of the translators' behaviour which indicate that they exist, and whether translators conform to them or not. As Toury rightly puts it, norms do not exist in translation but in the translators via their translatorial conduct (their translations). Toury (2005) says: 'Right from the start, the whole notion of norms was associated with translators not with the translations. There are no norms in the translations; the norms are in the translators<sup>150</sup>'. Citing some of the Touryan studies on the relevance of translation norms to socio-cultural contexts (Toury 1995a, 59, 62-64; 1999: 27-28), Ruokonen (2011: 75) states that "a community may have alternative or competing norms of varying prevalence", and with particular reference to (Chesterman 1997a: 64-65), she states that "translations [i.e. translators] may also conform to a norm to a varying degree, for reasons ranging from translators' individual preferences to larger literary and socio-cultural issues".

Given that norms are various, numerous, changeable and culture-oriented, they are not easily detectable. However, the present endeavour follows a method, based on a manually empirically-treated comparative processing as will be demonstrated in the next section, in an attempt to discern whether or not translators of politically sensitive texts produced within conflictual contexts violate

---

<sup>148</sup> It is widely acknowledged that Toury is incontestably the pioneering exponent of the Theory of Norms; he has voluminously developed it in most details theoretically and practically.

<sup>149</sup> It should be noted, however, that my analysis primarily relies on textual evidence, but texts after all are the (re)production of people. It is those people's (translators') normative attitude that is investigated in this study in the first place.

<sup>150</sup> An interview conducted by Anthony Pym with Toury on the 25<sup>th</sup> of January, 2005 on socio-cultural approaches to translation: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yr6MHzcmHFI>

prevailing (linguistic, cultural, etc.) norms, flout observed translational conventions or even breach established rules of the practice or, in Toury's words (1995: 278), 'laws' of given text pairs. Also, it sets out to examine and evaluate why these norms, conventions and rules are broken and what effect they have on the final product in the processing of the TT. In other words, it seeks to detect deviant normative behaviour of wartime translators in their decision-making process during the act of translating with a view to establishing steering guidelines for the practice in terms of faithfulness, impartiality and neutrality (as much as possible), thus minimising any potential damage done, particularly intentionally, by the misinterpretation of the media message in times of armed conflict.

The study's method of analysis benefits from the descriptive and applied branches of Translation Studies, which were presented in diagrammatic format by Holmes' basic map- (as I highlighted in chapter one under 1.3 The Dawn of a New Discipline, on page: 3). It imports basic conceptual and theoretical underpinnings in order to hold systematic comparisons between given text pairs. This is achieved by the application of the Theory of Norms at whose heart the Comparative Model lies, (which reflects the 'descriptive' branch of the discipline), and by the use of a manually-treated and empirically-approached corpus (which reflects the 'applied' face of the discipline) wherein possible instances of ideologically significant shifts that may reflect the translator's adopted stratagems) are revealed. Saldanha (2009: 3) notes that "translational norms, like any other social norms, are essentially probabilistic; they are dependent on genre, text function, register and so on; and in order to account for these effects, comparative study across texts is essential", which takes us to the next section.

#### **4.7.1 Comparative Model within DTS (TT-ST Comparison)<sup>151</sup>**

DTS suggests a comparative investigation of testing norms- the translators' behaviour. Toury strongly recommends holding systemic comparisons as, he believes, this should help to pinpoint similarities and differences between the coupled pairs and, as a result, understand the translator's choices and decisions she/he made during the process of translating. Toury (1997: 283) states:

---

<sup>151</sup> How TT-ST comparison/contrast, (i.e. similarities and differences) are performed is explained in detail in the very end of this chapter under 4.16 Text Analysis, on page: 162, particularly 4.16.4 Stage Four: Comparison (What?), on page: 170.

"Such a comparative analysis will enable the researcher to note differences and similarities, whereupon s/he can try to connect these findings with the constraints to which each translator seems to have subjected him/herself, especially the inter-subjective, culture-dependent constraint which have come to be known as translational norms".

As Saldanha (*ibid*) puts it, "in translation studies, cross-linguistic comparison has been the default method of analysis. However, the increasing availability of different types of corpora puts at our disposal more sophisticated ways of assessing whether the frequency of a linguistic feature in a particular text is part of a more general trend in similar texts or is actually a distinctive feature of that particular text". The comparison, carried out in this study, is based on ten different translations (and of course their original counterparts) performed by different translators (individuals and institutions). They are carefully selected in line with a number of well-devised criteria as shown in detail shortly below under 4.13 Corpus Selection Criteria, on pages: 156-162. Following on from Toury, the current research has devised a method of analysis of the selected texts, which takes, as a **point of departure**, the TT and compares it back with its correspondent ST.

#### **4.7.2 "INTO (from) rather than FROM (into)", Toury (1988)**

Descriptive Translation Studies, unlike "Prescriptive Translation Studies", examines and describes the translational conduct in the context of the receiver's/host culture in the first place. It takes the target text dynamics as the point of departure. Sequel to this claim, this research believes that manipulation, which the translators inject in their final product, occurs in their choice of the equivalent counterparts at lexico-grammatical (and pragmatic) level that conveys the intended meaning.

In his target-oriented approach, Toury (1995a) believes that the output (i.e. the translation) should be seen as facts of its host (the receiver's) culture adding that they do not share the same space as that of their originals. Toury (1995a: 27) explains this claim stressing that "the resulting entity, the one that would actually be incorporated into the target culture, is decisive here; it is one which never existed before". For critical translation analysts to detect, describe and explain the translator's regularities in behaviour, he (1985: 13) suggests that this "should start from empirical fact, i.e. from

the translated text itself, not the other way around: in a retrospective (backward-looking) rather than prospective (forward-looking) manner. Elsewhere later, Toury (1988: 83) openly points out that "it is performed INTO (from) rather than FROM (into)"; [emphasis is Toury's own] and that critical translation investigations should be conducted with consideration of their own "socio-cultural environment", Toury (1997: 289).

The current research, in analysing the selected Arabic translations, follows the DTS major tenets in comparing TTs against their respective STs where the line of analysis starts from back to front, i.e. with the recipient culture in the first place on the basis that the host culture casts its shadow over the formation of the translation strategies adopted/preferred during the process of translating. DTS, at whose centre the comparative/contrastive model lies, accords due regard the target orientation process which takes place in the TT. Saldanha (*ibid*) notes that this approach, which is intimately associated with corpus-based translation studies, "encouraged moving away from the traditional comparison of translations against source texts, which entailed evaluating degrees of equivalence and faithfulness, usually from a prescriptive perspective [adding that] the object of a descriptive approach is instead to explain translated texts in their own terms and not as mere reproductions of other works". This approach, supported by the partisans of the descriptive studies school, suggests that "translation is the result of a socially contextualised behavioural type of activity", (Toury 1980b: 180), which, as Hermans (1985: 11) sees it, implies "a degree of manipulation of the source text for a certain purpose". In the following, a detailed account of the Method of Analysis-referred to so far-is going to be provided.

#### **4.8 Method of Analysis**

To start with, it ought to be noted that much of what I wish to add is a construction of a workable method of analysis in the hope that it will provide a sound machinery to detect (and interpret) instances of bias that are allegedly concealed inside and behind politically-motivated texts and ideologically-loaded contexts in times of armed conflict. However, I do not intend to be exhaustive but attempt to introduce a practical methodology and apply a number of effective indicators that

best provide adequate answers to the question which the present study raises and lead to solid conclusions and sound judgments.

As delineated earlier, the present thesis traces the behavioural actions of translators. It provides a method through which the resulting translations produced in a conflictual setting are described, explained and interpreted. In other words, it examines pragma-linguistic shifts that exist in the resulting products of the translators of the selected texts, particularly their biased choices of equivalences, and presents explanations of why and how these shifts occur rather than *how they should occur*.

To this effect, the thesis provides an empirical study by employing a descriptively systematic approach where ten different translations are manually analysed, i.e. in a qualitative fashion in order to understand regular patterns or commonalities that may appear in the final product of the translators, to figure out the conditions, pressures and constraints which may govern their choices in relation to the translation of politically sensitive texts produced in times of conflict. In the subsequent sections, I will explain (in specific terms) the main (pragma-linguistic) aspects of the method of analysis, text selection (criteria) and analysis procedures (units and steps).

#### **4.9 Lexico-grammatical Categories**

- i. Syntax:** (Modality, Transitivity, Nominalisation).
- ii. Lexicon/ Lexis:** (Over-lexicalisation, Re-lexicalisation, Metaphor).

##### **4.9.1 Syntax**

Syntax is seen by many discourse/translation analysts as a vehicle of ideological orientation (Hatim & Mason 1990, 1997; Farghal 2012). Text (re)producers, within the context of this study, may articulate their ideological orientations in sheer syntactic forms and constructions. To this effect, I shall focus on some key grammatical categories to detect, interpret and explain translators' intervention/mediation in discourse. Farghal (2012: 72), for example, clearly states that syntactic asymmetries between STs and TTs are "so common in translation between English and Arabic".

This study sets out to explore this conclusion against three syntactic variables, *vis.: Modality, Transitivity and Nominalisation.*

#### **4.9.1.1 Modality**

Modality reflects the “*interpersonal*” function in Halliday’s lexico-grammatical tripartite meta-functions of language (1994). Hatim and Munday (2004: 344) hold that modality falls within the Hallidayan “*interpersonal meaning*” which shows “an attitude towards the state or event involved”. In his arguments on mood and modality, Halliday (1994) places special attention on the interpersonal function of language: meaning as interaction between the text producer and the text consumer. Palmer (1986: 16) claims that modality in language is subjective in the first place; it is “concerned with subjective characteristics of an utterance... of [text producers’] (subjective) attitudes and opinions”. He goes a step further as to argue that subjectivity is a defining property of modality. For him, it is “an essential criterion for modality”, (*ibid*).

It is crucial for discourse analysts to dissect how the text producer’s mood and modality scattered inside or behind her/his text feeds (or does not feed) into that of the consumer’s. Texts are not produced purposelessly, as Nord (1997); Hatim and Mason (1997, 1990); Hermans (1999a), etc. indicate on several occasions. Text producers usually tend to state their own beliefs in a variety of ways (judgments, promises, threats, recommendations, etc.) to propagate and propagandise their products, thus enacting their own power, inflame feelings against the ideological enemy, or win consent from the targeted audience. In other words, mood and modality unravel the text producer’s potential emotional involvement inside the text she/he is producing, instances of solidarity/enmity let alone her/his preferences (minimising/ maximising sympathy towards ‘in-groups and out-groups, or ‘worthy vs. unworthy victims’, or US vs. THEM, to import Van Dijk’s terms (1998a), which drives the reader to receive the event according to the mood created in the text and steer her/his understanding accordingly.

Modality, argues Fairclough (1992a), reflects text producers' positions and underpins their dominant made-legitimate ideology. It 'concerns the extent to which producers commit themselves to, or conversely, distance themselves from, propositions: the degree of "affinity" with the proposition', (1992a: 142). This claim closely resonates with Halliday's view in question, who notes that 'modality represents the speaker's angle, either on the validity of the assertion or on the rights and wrongs of the proposal', (Halliday 1994: 362). For his part, and in a similar vein, Fowler (1996: 166–167), argues that modality is 'the means by which people express their degree of commitment to the truth of the propositions they utter, and their views on the desirability or otherwise of the states of affairs referred to'.

Text producers tend to rely on modal expressions, markers and cues both in their positive and negative forms: modal auxiliaries (e.g. must, have to, ought to, may, might, can, could, will, would, etc.); adverbs (certainly, definitely, doubtlessly, probably, possibly, regrettably, etc.); and adjectives (e.g. necessary, unfortunate, certain, likely, etc.), modal adjunct<sup>152</sup> (must truly, should really, etc.); "scare-quoted" items such as: "violence" the so-called "shabbiha", or what Al Assad called "conspiracy", modal quantifiers such as (very, too, so, most, some, scores of, etc.) in order to impose their own attitudinal positions regarding certain (politically sensitive) events.

It is commonly acknowledged, in grammatical terms, that modality signifies subjectivity in that it reflects the text producers' own attitudes and judgements towards themselves and others (Fowler and Kress 1979; Lyons 1977 and 1981). Lyons (1977: 452) sees that modality is of particular relevance to subjectivity in that it is concerned with the text producer's "opinion and attitude towards the proposition that a sentence expresses or the situation that the proposition describes". This view shows that he intimately associates modality with the concept of subjectivity: with the different forms and ways for which text producers (translators included) opt in order to express their

---

<sup>152</sup> Halliday 1994: 82): notes that they 'are so called because they are most closely associated with the meanings constructed in the mood system: those of polarity, modality, temporality and mood'.

stances, attitudes and pass judgements over the intended message<sup>153</sup>. Lyons elsewhere later (1981: 237) points out that this act of intrusion- represented in the text producer's subjective modality-, i.e. her/his "own beliefs and attitudes, rather than reporting, as a neutral observer, the existence of this or that state of affairs [is] much more common than objective modality in most everyday uses of language".

Fairclough (1992a) sees modality through the lens of power and ideology. Following on from this view, the present research traces how these modal forms are rendered in the selected coupled pairs and describes the potential ideological implications which may come out as a result of syntactic text management: are their semantic functions diluted, exaggerated, reframed (recycled), omitted (deadened), whitened, blackened, etc.

#### **4.9.1.2 Transitivity**

Patterns of transitivity reflect the “Ideational” function in Halliday’s lexico-grammatical tripartite meta-functions of language. Transitivity is a syntactic feature which, according to Halliday 1985; Hatim and Mason 1997), can be used to express world-views and communicate ideological potentials. Transitivity has received a huge attention in critical discourse analysis (Fairclough 1992a; Fowler et al. 1979; Kress and Hodge 1979, etc.). In the present model, transitivity mainly involves the system of voice (active vs. passive) with reference to the type of agency (be it foregrounded/emphasised or back-grounded/ toned down) as well as cases of nominalisation (see more on Nominalisation in the next sub-section). Both linguistic devices, *inter alia*, conceal the doer of the action and may be utilised by wartime translators to reframe (re-narrate, Baker 2008) social and political reality in a way that feeds into their own agendas and in-built belief system. A close attention is going to comparatively be paid to the Arabic translated version in order to trace the translator’s choices and their potential effect on the targeted readership. This element of text

---

<sup>153</sup> Abdul-Fattah (2011: 63) notes that "there is no equivalence for the term 'modality' in Arabic language" adding that "his adopting the term (الموقنية) is El-Hassan's own rendition (1990). Abdul-Fattah (*ibid*: 39) states that (Modality: [الموقنية]) "refers to the speaker's attitude towards the judgment of/ or assessment of what he says". This can, in part, explain why modal constructions in Arabic in particular (with some exceptions like for example Aziz 1992) have received scant research attention, which is recommended in this study. (See 6.7 Limitations and Recommendations in chapter six, on page: 310).

strategy plays a pivotal role in creating meaning and represents the subjective ideas, beliefs and background knowledge of the text producers.

Simpson (1993: 88) states that transitivity reveals how text producers "encode in language their mental picture of reality and how they account for their experience in the world around them". This reminds us of Sapir and Whorf's "Linguistic Determinism Hypothesis". In his *The Language Instinct: The New Science of Language and Mind* (1994), Steven Pinker argues the interplay between language and thinking and how social factors can (or cannot) affect our ways of thinking and, as a result, ways of using language and reflecting reality. Pinker (1994: 58) rejects Sapir and Whorf's claims and contends that "there is no scientific evidence that languages dramatically shape [our] ways of thinking".

Transitivity is considered in my analysis to figure out who is considered to be causing what to whom in a given politically sensitive event. Investigation of the transitivity system should also unravel the authorial or editorial stance that tends to incriminate certain groups in a given conflict. The analysis of the syntactic feature of transitivity helps to understand how political reality is variously represented by different hegemonic groups and dominant ideologies. This study's method of analysis is aware of the interface between voice and meaning. In this concern, it focuses light over agentless passivised constructions which are seen through the concealment (or conversely revelation) of the agent or the doer of an action and, above all, identifies how their 'unfaithful' transference into the TT imply a form of intervention and bias. That is, what 'function' this unfaithful rendition will serve (See Baker (1992/ 2011) for more details). Baker (1992: 287/ 2011: 204) defines voice as 'a grammatical category which defines the relationship between a verb and its subject'.

#### **4.9.1.3 Nominalisation**

Fairclough 1992a: 179) defines nominalisation as 'the conversion of processes into nominals, which has the effect of back-grounding the process itself- its tense and modality are not indicated- and

usually not specifying its participants, so that who is doing what to whom is left implicit'. Hatim (1997: 114) believes that nominalisation is a tool for expressing implicit ideological implications and is "very effective in masking real intentions" of text producers, which lies at the heart of my concern in this study. Nominalisation, it is argued, involves manipulating the agency for specific rhetorical goals: concealment of the action doer (or its revelation in cases of "de-nominalisation"); it is an essential tool for syntactic text management that serves the text producers' (translators included) ideological instincts and affiliations. As Hatim and Munday (2004: 345) put it, "this is an important grammatical recourse for the expression of IDEOLOGY"; [original emphasis].

Fairclough (*ibid*: 27) lends Hatim and Munday (2004) (as well as many other discourse/translation analysts) support when he states that "such transformations [Passivisation and Nominalisation] may be associated with ideologically significant features of texts such as the systematic mystification of agency: both allow the agent of a clause to be deleted'. This can be (often is) exceedingly a helpful device to be employed in this method of textual and discoursal analysis as to decipher hidden associations and ideological orientations encoded in politically motivated texts; for the purpose of the present study, it examines how (and to what extent) the TT nominal constructions (altered and manipulated) may glorify (merit) or demean (demerit) the two main rival parties in Syria: the ruling regime and the opposition.

#### **4.9.2 Lexicon**

Lexical choices can provide fertile ground for the expression of ideology. Van Dijk, on several occasions (1995b: 28, 1998b: 21), who places special research interest on "the role of the media" in the constitution of the socio-political reality (1995b: 28) and explores the "complex relations between ideology, opinions and media discourse", (1998b: 21), stresses that opinions, views, beliefs, attitudes, etc. of text producers can find their clearest expression in lexicon, in a negative or a positive light. The choice of word, which intrinsically involves a process of decision making (selection and de-selection) can play a lead (and perilous) role in publishing and publicising pre-

planned political agendas in service of certain parties. Without further ado, lexicon in this study is manifest in three different forms: Over-lexicalisation, Re-lexicalisation and Metaphor which require some elaboration.

#### **4.9.2.1 Over-lexicalisation**

Hatim and Mason (1997: 151) argue that “over-lexicalisation is an instance of markedness which gives dynamism to the source text and confronts the translator with a choice: either to seek target language terms of similar semantic import but which are relatively familiar to target language readers or, conversely, to calque the source text terms, however unfamiliar the resulting target language terms may appear”. Over-lexicalisation (as termed by Halliday's SFL) or over-wording (in Fairclough's CDA) is one of the most ideologically motivated lexical devices utilised by (wartime) translators. Fairclough (1992b: 313) defines it as “using many ways of saying the same thing” to fulfil specific ideological ends. Fowler (1986) indicates that over-lexicalisation is using more than one word to express one thing in order to communicate the rhetorical/pragmatic goals of emphasis, exaggeration and persuasion. It ought to be noted that obligatory instances of over-lexicalisation that may occur in response to stylistic constraints<sup>154</sup> (of the Arabic TT) will be ignored in this research, as declared earlier. Only the significant ideological implications that over-lexicalisation (and any other strategies adopted in the present method) may have in steering text consumers' attitudes will be considered in this study (from a bilingual/translational) perspective.

#### **4.9.2.2 Re-lexicalisation**

Like over-lexicalisation, re-lexicalisation is one main device adopted by Halliday in his systemic functional analyses and by Fairclough in his critical discourse analyses. Both approaches view it as the use of alternative wording to communicate *new* different meaning, which is not ideologically unmotivated; it depends on the translatorial/authorial voice to express meanings of ideological

---

<sup>154</sup> Stylistic constraints of pertinence to over-lexicalisation fall under repetition in Arabic and may take such forms as twosome or threesome synonymous clusters). They can be decided on by, in addition to my nativity and mastery of Arabic language's pragmatic-linguistic system, the relevant resources on the Arabic linguistic systems: lexical (lexicological and lexicographic and syntactic). These resources can be authored books, scholarly articles, academic research (MA and PhD dissertations), as well as personal communication with specialists.

significance amongst rival parties to serve certain agendas (re-orienting the readership towards different directions). In this spirit, this study traces the translators' normativity, their behavioural choices precisely their frequent recourse to re-lexicalising (or re-wording in Fairclough's terms, 1992a) the ST lexical items that would offer a different content unintended in the original for the benefit of any of these two voices (pro-opposition & pro-regime in our case)- as will be shown in the next chapter.

#### **4.9.2.3 Metaphor**

Metaphor is also an important lexical device which critical discourse analysts, have extensively studied; it, they see, can be (made) a vehicle for ideological expression (Fairclough, 1992b: 194ff). Metaphor is not exclusively a feature of literary discourse; Fairclough (*ibid*, c.f. Lee (1992: x) argues that “[m]etaphors are pervasive in all sorts of language and in all sorts of discourse” and that “[w]hen we signify things through one metaphor rather than another, we are constructing our reality in one way rather than another”, (*ibid*). Thus, metaphors pervade media and political discourses and help to express ideological orientations. In this connection, this study seeks to identify the ST metaphor's renderings done by way of twisting, adding, omitting, strengthening, weakening, etc. (as will be illustrated in the next chapter), and explain their role in the construction/trans-creation of socio-political reality of events together with their potential influence on the TT readership.

#### **4.9.3 Ancillary Indicators**

The above-explained linguistic strategies employed by the translators are examined to identify, explain and interpret potential occurrences of shifts that bear significant ideological import. However, they do not stand alone in texts. Because this study endeavours to trace ideological manipulation on a textual and discoursal levels, these strategies are backed by other signifiers, textual or extra-textual (pragmatic), that strengthen the authorial stance represented in these strategies. These signifiers, which lend a helping hand to draw an overall picture of the translator's

behaviour on a discoursal level, include, inter alia, emphasis, pluralisation, relevance, euphemism, speech acts, face<sup>155</sup>, politeness, blasphemy, etc.)- as the analyses in chapter five will show.

Pragmatics is that branch of linguistics that studies language in use within a specific community. Baker (1992: 286) defines it as ‘the study of language in use: of meaning as generated by specific participants in specific communicative situations, rather than meaning generated by an abstract system of linguistic relation’. The previous section explains selected linguistic (syntactic and lexical) strategies that may be employed by the text producers and enact their own preferences. Far beyond the linguistic boundaries, there are also other prime players in representing socio-political reality and world experience. In this respect, it is important to remind that CDA looks inside and behind the lines and travels far towards the pragmatic, communicative and contextual forces that drive the construction of texts and govern their production, most notably, in times of tension and armed struggle.

Supplementary to those linguistic strategies, the present method of analysis traces and explains the most salient pragmatic devices that may be utilised by translators of politically sensitive texts in times of conflict. It benefits from respective models offered by Grice (1975); (Leech (1983) and Brown and Levinson (1987). Pragmatics quintessentially draws upon the interpersonal force of language. As Baker’s definition shows at the onset of this sub-section, it is basically concerned with associations of specific participants in specific social contexts together with the way they are perceived, explained and interpreted by text consumers. These associations, which are traced and examined by critical discourse analysts, may include various facets of speech acts, cooperation, solidarity or, conversely, their counterparts (*Face-threatening acts vs. Face-saving acts*) to fulfill specific communicative goals and overall rhetorical purposes.

---

<sup>155</sup> For the purpose of this study, the pragmatic notion of **FACE** is used here to refer to the (socio-political) reputation/honour (name and fame) of the person/thing in question. If the translator's choice of equivalence is demonising, then "negative face" (FTA) applies, if she or he is glorifying/ polishing one's image, then "positive face" (FSA) comes to the fore- as analyses carried out in chapter five will amply show.

#### **4.9.3.1 Speech Acts**

In the pragmatically-oriented approach to text/discourse analysis (e.g. Hatim & Mason 1990, 1997; Austin 1962; Searle 1969, etc.), it is of paramount importance to figure out how the text producer exercises power in a politically sensitive text to reflect relations of enmity, dominance, solidarity, bias, etc. Grice (1975) offers an influential model within the ambit of speech act theory: The Cooperative Principle. He implies that cooperation between the text producer and its receiver should also be investigated with a view to revealing implicit, unacknowledged communicative implications amongst them. In light of these theoretical claims, the present model of analysis seeks to see how the Cooperative Principle governs relations between the text (re)producers (i.e. the translators) and text receivers (i.e. the readership) within the specific context of this research, which obviously reflects on hot events that involve two opposing rivals which fight for power and dominance. Awareness of speech acts should help discourse analysts and translation critics to reveal functions of the communication together with its illocutionary, locutionary and perlocutionary force. Based on this, my analyses shall trace Face Threatening Acts (FTAs) and Face Saving Acts (FSAs), with speech acting strategies with close focus on the relevant participants (in our case the opposing parties in Syria: pro- and anti- regime) in terms of whose face is baldly threatened without redress or whose face is saved and via what redressive politeness strategy. It is useful to note that this pragmatic device that may be utilised by the translators correlates with the afore-explained lexico-grammatical categories; FTAs and FSAs may be configured in modalised, passivised, nominalised, over-, re-lexicalised and metaphorical forms, which explains why I consider it as an ancillary indicator of intervention and bias<sup>156</sup>.

#### **4.9.3.2 Politeness**

This is a pragmatic tool that is also considered by critical discourse/translation analysts, especially those involved in politically charged contexts. In this context, Brown and Levinson's model (1987)

---

<sup>156</sup> This limitation is recommended in this study; I recommend that (one, some or all of) these pragmatic strategies, utilised by the translators, be further (and deeply) examined in fellow future research. (See 6.7 Limitations and Recommendations in chapter six, on page: 310).

is mainly adopted in CDA. Fairclough (1992a: 162), for instance, states that it is ‘the most influential account’. Brown and Levinson introduce what they term “Face Threatening Acts (FTAs)” and “Face Saving Acts (FSAs)”. In the case of FTAs, face is demonised and disgraced. But in order to “save face” or “redress” the situation, redressive strategies can be resorted to such as showing deference, solidarity, sympathy, concern and deleting offensive references towards (and in favour of) the in-groups, or conversely, showing the negative face of the out-groups through, for example, negative naming strategies and dysphemism, amongst others- as analyses in chapter five will show. These "Face-related" pragmatic strategies under politeness are closely looked into (in the sense of fame and name) particularly within the Arabic translated versions to gauge and identify the translator’s intervention behaviour, appraisal attitude not to mention emotional involvement. This attitudinal burden of the text can be carried, as Munday (2012: 146) holds by “attitude-rich” words.

#### **4.9.3.3 Relevance**

Relevance here, developed in most detail (in the context of translation) by Ernst-August Gutt’s (1991 & 2000), is considered in the present method within the translational boundaries. Building on the work of Sperber and Wilson (1986, and Wilson and Sperber 1988), Gutt imported essential theoretical underpinnings of their relevance theory of communication and introduced them into the realm of translation in the 1990s<sup>157</sup>. Sperber and Wilson, who highlight the “interpretive use” of language as opposed to the “descriptive use”, define relevance as “an expectation on the part of the hearer that an attempt at interpretation will yield adequate contextual effects at minimal processing cost”, quoted in Hatim and Munday (2004: 247). Their Relevance argues the inferential nature of human communication within context which is defined by them as “the set of premises used in interpreting [it] … a psychological construct, a subset of the [text receiver’s] assumptions about the world”, Sperber and Wilson (1986: 15).

---

<sup>157</sup> Gutt’s initial insights on the Theory of Relevance started in the early eighties where he met Deirdre Wilson in University College London (UCL) who introduced him to the theory and supervised his MA (1982) and PhD (1989) which centred on the incorporation of this theory into the world of translation.

The Relevance Theory does not view context in light of the external circumstances of the communication (situation, culture, history, etc.) but rather through the communicators' presuppositions and assumptions. Sperber and Wilson (1986) highlight the inferential nature of communication and believe that "the crucial mental faculty that enables human beings to communicate with one another is the ability to draw inferences from people's behaviour [translators included]", quoted in Gutt (2000: 24). Relevance argues that meaning, in human communication, is not conveyed by only what a text directly says, but by the inferential combination of the text with a context. Behind (translated) text, there lies implicit information which can be detected by considering the historical context, world experience and background knowledge which are prerequisites for relevance. In other words, to be relevant, discourse must convey some implicit information or, to import Grice' (1975) term 'implicatures'. So far as this study is concerned, relevance pays attention to the readership's expectations, presuppositions, assumptions, background knowledge and similar pragmatic considerations (what Gutt 2000 calls "communicative cues" with which the text consumers will eventually interpret a translation as a finished product.

Fairclough 2001c; Simpson 1993; van Dijk 1988, who have underlined the concept of 'presuppositions' and 'assumptions' for text explanation and interpretation, believe that discourse analysts should consider the pragmatic tool of relevance in their analyses. For example, Fairclough (2001c: 128) points out that presuppositions "can also have ideological functions, when what they assume has the character of commonsense in the service of power". Sperber and Wilson 1986: 156) point out that the audience "will pay attention to a phenomenon only if it seems relevant to them". In other words, text receivers interpret the worldviews differently based on their own conventions, assumptions, presuppositions and built-in beliefs be they their own or those of their own patrons or commissioners. Hence, awareness of this important pragmatic notion can help to identify and explain the subjective dimensions of context.

Thus, and as may have been noticed, the method of analysis of the present study, which is based on critical language analysis within the translational boundaries, is not prescriptive but rather

descriptive; it is eclectic in that it does not provide ready-made recipes for analysis but rather directs analysts, translators and translation trainers/trainees towards potential places in translated texts that may instantiate bias. This should enable them to understand how texts of political nature are (re)produced (translated), thus providing assistance for interpreting them to unlock their opacity and mysteries. It also intends to introduce translation theorists and practitioners as well as linguistic and political analysts to ways of interpreting politically-charged texts. It, *inter alia*, hopes to provide them with a useable and useful model; a ‘microscope’ to see them by a third eye and look *non-superficially* far beyond the traditional relations between language and society towards the effect of the former on the latter and vice versa. (See more in Fairclough 1992a). It also attempts to open new horizons to understand what texts do not (or do not wish) to say, thus disclosing text producers’ tacit ideological preferences, discursive practices and hegemonic dispositions, which meets the key facets of this study’s frameworks of analysis.

#### **4.10 Units of Analysis (Comparison)**

What is of paramount importance in this research which caters for (target) text analysis is to determine the units adopted in the analysis. According to Snell-Hornby (1988: 31), there are two different models of text analysis, *viz.* Bottom-up: “from lower linguistic levels to higher linguistic levels”, and top-down: “from higher linguistic levels to lower linguistic levels”. Both approaches are valid but conditional upon a number of factors based on the nature, objective, corpus, analytical method of the phenomenon under investigation. In the following, I will explain and justify the unit of analysis adopted in this study.

Units of analysis of the present study, I should say, are seen through a number of factors: its overriding theme and objective; type of selected texts; theoretical frameworks and method of analysis which are explained at length in this chapter. In equivalence-oriented translation research which is based on descriptive and retrospective mechanisms, it is crucial to identify and justify what unit or units of analysis are deemed functional to hold TT-ST comparative evaluations and explore potential (optional rather than obligatory or stylistic) shifts amongst them.

This research predominately, but not exclusively, considers the text, as the major functional unit of analysis which has the “ultimate judicial authority” over the finished products when examined against their original counterparts. This follows on from some scholar’s belief (e.g. Reiss 1977: 113f) that the text as a whole is viewed as the appropriate level at which ‘message’ communication and intentions are achieved and at which equivalence must be sought. She strikes a linkage between the functional characteristics of text types and the translation methods employed during the process of translating. This inclusion of the text as a whole is justified by the very nature of the present project which basically sees the resultant outcome (i.e. the Arabic translation) from an overall textual/discoursal point of view; a unitary whole and a ‘full-package’ of thoughts motivated by a series of ‘social practices’ to serve specific communicative purposes. Put differently, it attends to factors/ingredients that govern text production and reception above and beyond the sheer linguistic boundaries to include socio-political and historical context, intention, purpose and similar circumstantial external players that constitute text and direct their production and consumption.

Nonetheless, this macro unit of analysis is considered as an end, as a ‘court of appeal’ and ‘ultimate judicial authority’ over the final conclusions, rather than a means which, I believe, cannot be realised independently of its constituent ‘smaller’ units at both meso- and micro levels. As Malmkjær (2001: 287) puts it, “it is NOT possible, in the process of creating a target text, to consider an entire source text at once and to render it as target text in one fell swoop”; [emphasis added]. More importantly, and given that my research is primarily product-oriented that partly operates within descriptive borders, exclusive entirety would impede the possibility of comparing the TTs against their respective STs. Malmkjær (*ibid*) maintains that it is not also possible to “compare source and target texts as wholes in one fell swoop”. Thus, the establishment of overall textual analysis requires that I ‘descend’ towards lower levels in order to be able to create a balanced hierarchical relation of interrelatedness amongst them and guarantee accurate analyses and substantial generalisations.

Thus, I initially ascend towards the top of the language *ladder* but before arriving there, I travel through those smaller units: words, phrases, sentences and paragraphs (whenever they prove to be functional) preserving the textual integrity/ organicity. My research believes that those smaller units are ‘qualified enough’ to be taken on board as minor units of analysis to back up the textual analysis at large and the resultant discoursal conclusions. Conversely, it also casts doubts over the achievability of a ‘full-text-for-full-text’ translation and considers this possibility as too idealistic. Translators usually transfer complete and meaningful messages via units at lower levels which largely steers the direction of analysis of this investigation. However, I should clearly state that decisions made at any of these lower levels will be reflected within the confines of the text, the end result of thought construction of discourse. The ‘text’, in the final analysis, constitutes the unit of comparison for examining any potential deviations or shifts, small or big, in the text pairs, thus drawing final conclusions in line with the *a priori* hypotheses and assumptions proposed.

#### **4.11 The Study’s Corpus**

To begin with, this is a corpus-based<sup>158</sup> investigation which partly explains its practical dimension. I have devised (explained and justified) a comprehensive set of selection criteria in line with the study’s nature in terms of: its main theme, text type, context, not to mention frameworks and method of analysis sketched out earlier in the present chapter. Generally, these criteria are text attribute and corpus attribute. Specifically, they are qualitative and, to a lesser extent, quantitative.

It is important to reiterate that the present study is predominately qualitative; it relies on samples of texts rather than series of statistics<sup>159</sup>. The qualitative selection criteria include fullness, thematicity, chronologicality, directionality and textuality. However, the study considers two quantitative criteria as part of the overall bag of corpus selection criteria: number of texts and their length. The study looks into an applied linguistic area (translation) within a socio-political context. Therefore, a

---

<sup>158</sup>See (under 1.6 Research Hypotheses in chapter one, on page: 8) how Tognini-Bonelli (2001: 17) distinguishes between corpus-based and corpus-driven research.

<sup>159</sup>“Content analysis” is often included under the general rubric of ‘qualitative analysis’, and used primarily in the social sciences and the Humanities as opposed to “Statistical analysis” which falls under ‘quantitative analysis’ and involves counting particular features of the textual data and then applying one or more mathematical transformations to arrive at the final outcome/finished product.

number of extra-textual criteria were also taken into account such as 4.15.1 Text Availability; 4.15.2 TT Producer's Competence; 4.15.3 TT Producer's Idiosyncrasy (The Translator's Stamp) and 4.15.4 TT/ST Producers and Experts, on pages: 160-162.

#### **4.11.1 What is Corpus?**

The term corpus (*pl. corpora or corpuses*) was defined by the EAGLES<sup>160</sup> authors (1996) as “a collection of pieces<sup>161</sup> of language that are selected and ordered according to explicit linguistic criteria in order to be used as a sample of the language”. McEnery and Wilson (1996: 87) define it, in light of the question of representativeness which centrally conditions and is conditioned by the purpose for which the corpus is used and the nature of the study in question, as “a body of text which is carefully sampled to be maximally representative of a language or language variety”.

#### **4.11.2 How has Corpus Fallen into Translation Studies?**

A few years before it started to be incorporated in translation studies, Lindquist (1984) drew the attention to use corpora in the field. Baker (1996: 175) states that “translated text has always had a very raw deal in corpus linguistics”. Not until the early nineties (i.e., in the course of the last two decades or so), however, did translation scholars take corpora on board and begin to gauge and judge the quality of selected translations against their original texts. On the very onset of the literature, Baker (1993), quoted in Baker (1995: 223)<sup>162</sup> “has argued that theoretical research into the nature of translation will receive a powerful impetus from corpus-based studies”. Referring to Baker (1993), Saldanha (2009: 2) notes that “the use of corpora in translation studies research was first proposed as particularly adapted to the purposes of empirical descriptive translation studies”.

---

<sup>160</sup> EAGLES, (Expert Advisory Group on Language Engineering Standards), is an initiative set up by the European Union to create common standards for research and development in speech and natural language processing. It basically provides recommendation on a variety of language matters. This definition appears in its preliminary recommendations on Corpus Typology, 1996.

<sup>161</sup> The word “pieces” is used as opposed to “texts” in order to include those corpora that are made up of text samples [incomplete texts or what I term ‘text excerpts’], that is fragments of texts of varying length selected according to arbitrary criteria”.

<sup>162</sup> Perhaps Baker's (1993) “promising” paper entitled Corpus Linguistics and Translation Studies: Implications and Applications could be considered as the first **systematic** attempt that draws the attention to Corpus-based Translation Studies and opens new horizons paving the way for later details on the trend- although she pays credits to the previous work of Lindquist particularly in ‘Translation Pedagogy’ in the mid-eighties: (The Use of Corpus-based Studies in the Preparation of Handbooks for Translators ‘1984’). She (1995:223) maintains that “[w]ithin translation studies proper, Lindquist (1984) has advocated the use of corpora for training translators.

However, corpus-based research in Translation Studies started to enter in the field on a large scale near the very late nineties. Baker (1999: 281) claims that “the application of corpus techniques and insights in the field of translation studies is still in its infancy”. From then onwards, this new wave of research has increasingly yielded huge interest, and “engaged the attention of leading theorists, whether or not they are involved in corpus-based research” (*ibid*). Nowadays, (Baker 2004, Beeby 2009, Zanettin 2012), corpus-based translation approach has seen a dawn of a new domain, a threshold of an autonomous trend; it has deservedly become a “fully-fledged paradigm” in its own right with well-established and widely-recognised methodology. According to Laviosa (2002: 5), “the two main sources of influence and inspiration to Corpus-based Translation Studies are Corpus Linguistics and Descriptive Translation Studies (DTS)” together with the rise of computerisation.

#### **4.11.3 Aims of Corpus-based Research in Translation**

Corpus-based research, based on well-devised selection criteria and a coherent methodology, as will be briefly shown in the subsequent sections, enables researchers to construct a *representative* textual profile and identify regular TT patterns (i.e. reiterations/recurrences/ frequently regular occurrences), or (put more precisely- for the purpose of this research), to reveal the translator's normative behaviour that can reflect silent agendas and unspoken ideological orientations. Saldanha (2009: 1) notes that one aim of corpora is to reveal “ideological stance in politically-sensitive texts”. The purpose of the present study's selected corpus is primarily to detect instances of bias concealed inside and behind media texts of political sensitivity via comparing the translations against their respective STs. In so doing, it is hoped to come up with substantial findings and meaningful generalisations in light of its originally-proposed hypothesis: how instances of bias operate (in what pragma-linguistic forms they are configured) at a macro discoursal level in the first place, (see 4.10 Units of Analysis (Comparison) above, on page: 148), and what effect they may have on the original intended message and, as a consequence, on the text consumers' understanding of this “sabotaged” message.

Critical translation analysts, who show interest in the use of corpus in the translation analysis (Svartvik et al 1982; Lindquist 1984; Baker 1993, 1995, 1999; Lavoisa 2002, etc.), believe that corpus-based investigations (like the present one) lend a helping hand in holding systematic comparisons between the selected text pairs. Svartvik et al (1982), quoted in Lindquist (1984: 261), states that corpus-based analyses can help translation critics “to state a wide repertoire of uses to which language is put; make more objective statements than introspective analysis permits; achieve total accountability of linguistic features and state frequencies of occurrence in different uses of the language”. The present study acknowledges all these functions of corpus-based analysis but owes a debt to the last one as it, through the representative carefully-selected texts, endeavours to trace a number of lexico-grammatical and pragmatic occurrences in the translated texts that are bearers of ideological import: how constantly, frequently, systematically? In so doing, it hopes to establish, or contribute to the establishment of, a scientific method on how to detect and interpret occasions manifested in linguistic and extra-linguistic forms/structures that are indicative on biased, unethical and unprofessional translatorial practice, not least within politically-charged contexts and ideologically conflicting situations.

#### **4.12 Types of Corpora in Translation Research**

Translation scholars distinguish between three basic types of corpora designed for research in the field of translation studies: multilingual corpora, comparable corpora and parallel corpora. In what follows, I will very briefly define each type and demonstrate its main functions vis-à-vis target-oriented type of research. This should, it is hoped, help me to propose the right type for the purpose of this study as will be shortly shown.

##### **4.12.1 Multilingual Corpus**

A Multilingual corpus, as its name demonstrates, is that kind of corpus that involves a number of languages. Baker (1995: 232) defines it as “sets of two or more monolingual corpora in different languages, built up either in the same or different institutions on the basis of similar design criteria”. Multilingual corpora have important functions in the corpus-based translation investigations; they

provide important insights and help analysts to identify regularities and “study items and linguistic features in their home environment, rather than as they are used in translated text” (*ibid.*).

#### **4.12.2 Comparable Corpus**

A comparable corpus, coined by Baker (1995: 234)<sup>163</sup>, is also known as non-translation corpus. In other words, as opposed to (this study's) parallel corpus (discussed below) which is naturally bilingual, this type of corpus is monolingual that is composed of “two separate collections of texts in the same language: one corpus consists of original texts in the language in question and the other consists of translations in that language from a given source language or languages [which] “should cover a similar domain, variety of language and time span, and be of comparable length”. Comparable corpus' main contribution to the translation studies lies in the fact that it enables researchers to explore TT-specific items regardless the source or target language in question.

“What we would be comparing here is not, for instance, French originals with their English translations, nor original French texts with original English texts, but rather substantial amounts of original English texts with substantial amounts of translated English text (whatever the source language”). Baker (1995: 234).

#### **4.12.3 Parallel Corpus**

A parallel corpus, by its very nature, indicates pairing or *equivalent* text pairs and is also known as “translation corpus”. According to Baker (1995: 230), it “consists of original, source language-texts in language **A** and their translated versions in language **B**”. It is, I must declare, the type of corpus this study exclusively adopts for its analyses. The current study selects a corpus that is made up of English source texts and their correspondent Arabic translations. This type of corpus provides a space of comparability between the TT-ST pairs. It plays a pivotal role in TT-oriented translation research and descriptive analyses which mainly seek to investigate systematic linguistic (optional) shifts and explore the translator's normative behaviour within specific contexts. This is, in fact, a key endeavour of the present study. As Baker (1995: 231) points out “[Parallel corpora's] most important contribution to the discipline in general is that they support a shift of emphasis from

---

<sup>163</sup> Baker (1995: 234) argues that she coined it as such ‘for a lack of a better term’. In the early nineties, she ‘advocated setting up corpora of this type [‘which did not exist anywhere then’] and suggested a number of [relevant] research investigations’ (*ibid.*).

prescription to description" adding that they "have an important role to play in *exploring norms of translating in specific socio-cultural and historical contexts*"; [my emphasis].

As delineated earlier, the corpus of my study is exclusively a "translation corpus". It precisely consists of English source texts and their respective translations into Arabic. These English STs are newspapers opinion articles derived from a variety of leading sources, written by different text producers and translated by different translators (be they individuals or institutions). Their counterparts, i.e. their Arabic translations appear in a variety of Arabic and Western sources. They have been produced on the on-going Syrian revolution in particular. In this spirit, it ought to be noted that exclusive focus on the current events in Syria rather than examining the entirety of the Arab "Spring"-affected countries<sup>164</sup> must inevitably allow me to provide an in-depth analysis of the situation rather than superficial judgments. The Syrian scene is particularly chosen owing to its timeliness (freshness/hotness), length, intricacy and increasing complexity. Also, translation research within the chosen language pair (English and Arabic), relevant to media and political discourses, is worth doing as this reflects long-entrenched conflict between the East and the West.

Olohan (2004) rightly points out that texts must be "selected and compiled according to specific criteria". The present study's corpus is not arbitrarily or randomly selected. It rather consists of purposive sampling that is *representative* enough<sup>165</sup> in order to provide panoramic investigation to address the issue of the selection and answer the main question, a priori assumptions and hypotheses raised in this research. It is important to note that scholars engaged in this area of research (Baker 1995, Doorslaer 1995, Laviosa 1998, 2002, etc.) have acknowledged that there is no robust selection criteria and disagreed, albeit to varying degrees, on the possibility of well-established corpus design criteria on textual and extra-textual levels probably because it is still a relatively youthful area of research in the field and conditional upon the very nature of the relevant

---

<sup>164</sup> So far, the so-called Arab Spring countries involve five countries. These are in a chronological order: Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen and Syria. Other Arab countries which have also seen waves of protests are not viewed either. See Chapter three (Background Chapter) for more detail.

<sup>165</sup> Although many scholars are still skeptical about the achievement of representativeness and balanced corpus; Baker (1995: 240), for instance, rightly argues that "the question of representativeness of the corpus as a whole remains unsolved". In a purely additive sense, Laviosa (2002: 6) states that "the representativeness of a corpus is never absolute and complete".

area of investigation. The present study is an attempt to pave the way to well-established selection criteria especially for similar future qualitative type of translation research.

#### **4.13 Corpus Selection Criteria**

In this study, I have established a set of (mainly qualitative) selection criteria that are both text attribute and corpus attribute on the one hand; internal (textual) and external (extra-textual) on the other. Some light is thrown over a few quantitative criteria which concern the present research. All of these criteria are designed in close relation with the key question, assumptions and hypotheses raised in this study.

##### **4.13.1 Qualitative Selection Criteria**

###### **4.13.1.1 Wholeness (Whole Text Units)**

This criterion highly correlates with the *main* unit of analysis I am adopting in this research. Full text corpus is an essential selection criterion in Translation Studies in general and target-oriented descriptive studies in particular. Laviosa (1997: 296) argues that full text corpus is very useful because it “permits a greater variety of linguistic analyses [and enables researcher] to compare a particular translation with its source text by creating a parallel corpus alongside the initial comparable one”. This study selects unabridged full-text corpus rather than trimmed texts or text fragments in a bid to explore overall potential strengths and weaknesses and guarantee (on a macro/textual level) a panoramic identification of the predominant linguistic as well as extra-linguistic circumstances, constraints and pressures that spawn texts and govern their production.

Citing the main pitfalls of ‘text excerpts’, Baker (1995: 240) argues that “corpora which consist of whole texts are, on the whole, far more useful than those which consist of text fragments” claiming that “a corpus which consists of text fragments has obvious limitations in terms of studying larger text patterns, such as patterns of cohesion across chapters [...] and a corpus which consists of a set of sentences will not even allow a study of more modest patterns, such as paragraphing and inter-sentential cohesion”.

#### **4.13.1.2 Thematicity**

This is a synchronous rather than asynchronous study. It traces the translators' regularities within a specific period of time in present. Put more precisely, it is concerned with currently produced texts on the status quo of the Syrian revolution rather than the development of patterns over time. It is noteworthy that the selected ST-TT pairs date from the same period of time, i.e. the TT appears a few days after the production of the ST. Also, the selected texts reflect upon a relatively similar topic relevant to the unfurling events in Syria. This homogeneity is essential; it would provide solid ground to generate more substantial outcomes, reliable generalisations and meaningful conclusions.

#### **4.13.1.3 Chronologicality**

CDA claims that meanings are drawn from their contexts and acquire (or lose) new associations as time progresses, (Wodak 2001b). The study places special attention on the developments of the ongoing events in Syria which has not come to a close yet. As the study draws upon an event that naturally has a start and an end, the selected corpus covers various periods of the Revolution since its eruption on March 17, 2011 up to the date of this research.

#### **4.13.1.4 Directionality**

As stated earlier, this study selects a "translation" type of corpus. But this does not clearly specify the translation direction chosen: is it one- or two-way kind of direction? Do text initiators translate into or out of their mother tongue? Are texts directly rendered into their correspondent TLs? Are they back-, re-translated?, etc. Direction of the present corpus is exclusively from English (ST) into Arabic (TT). It is unidirectional<sup>166</sup> translation traffic, i.e. selected English source texts and their first-hand Arabic translation carried out by Arabic native speakers. (See more details under section 4.15 Extra-textual Considerations below, on page: 159).

---

<sup>166</sup> This one-way (English-Arabic) translation traffic leave scope for further future investigations to examine English (TTs) translated from Arabic. Also, it is recommendable that both translation traffics be considered to hold comparisons between both traffics and explore whether or not the translator's normative behaviour demonstrates different conclusions and generalisations. See more in chapter six under 6.7 Limitations and Recommendations, on page: 310.

#### **4.13.1.5 Textual Considerations (Genre, Register, Type)**

“Just as the translator must realize what kind of text he is translating before he begins working with it, the critic must also be clear as to the kind of text represented by the original if he is to avoid using inappropriate standards to judge the translation”

Katharina Reiss (2000: 16).

Discourse (Translation) analysts should, argues Reiss (*ibid*) be aware of the interface between “text types and the translation methods” utilised, believing that “it would be a mistake to use the same criteria” in passing her/his judgments. This criterion, no doubt, is crucial in corpus-based kind of study. Knowledge about textual considerations, I should say, is needed for the purpose of corpus selection of this research which, in the main, excavates linguistic and extra-linguistic patterning on a textual level and sees ‘texts’ as a reflection of socio-cultural realities rather than a specimen of language.

Seen through the translational prism, the TT genre, register and type should be considered in TT analysis as they may cast their shadow over the resultant text and govern its production, which entails translation analysts' full awareness to be able to reveal potential occurrences of biased and prejudiced judgements passed on by the translator. Well-founded selection criteria which accord due regard to the type and function of text would be useful for researchers to appreciate any subtleties, shifts, commonalities or regularities that translation texts in particular may have during the process of translating. Given that the choice of any study's collection involves, in its very essence, a process of decision making, special mention needs to be made vis-à-vis decisions of inclusion and exclusion. That said, I select texts of argumentative nature<sup>167</sup> which, as a matter of course, chimes with the *a priori* hypotheses the study proposes and intends to test<sup>168</sup>: the translators' normative behaviour including their leanings, ideological instincts, in-built beliefs; commissioner's pressures in addition to the reader's expectations and worldviews.

---

<sup>167</sup> See a detailed account on the argumentative type of text in chapter two under 2.9.2 Argumentative Texts, on page: 65.

<sup>168</sup> Although some linguists still link “text” to written form and “discourse” to the spoken one, this thesis draws no distinction, unless stated otherwise, between Text and Discourse. Moreover, reference to any of which involves the English source text (ST) and its Arabic counterpart (TT) based on the fact that the text producer and the translator are both seen as ‘authors’.

#### **4.14 Quantitative Selection Criteria**

It is necessary to reiterate that this is a predominately qualitative rather than quantitative proposal whose focus is mainly to trace patterns on quintessentially macro-structural level rather than statistical considerations. However, reference to the number of texts and text length (i.e. number of words in each one) must be made in the first instance although, as Pieter de Haan in his 'The Optimum Corpus Sample Size?' (1992: 3) argues, "the conclusion [over the best/optimal sample size] seems to be that the suitability of the sample depends on the specific study that is undertaken, and that there is no such thing as the best, or optimum sample size as such". The question of striking a coherent/rational balance between exhaustiveness and representativeness, which comes into fuller play in this centrally qualitative investigation, is considered in line with its main aim, question and hypothesis (as established in chapter one, sections 1.4, 1.5 & 1.6, on pages: 7-11).

Following on from all the above claims, I do not intend to be exhaustive; I have selected ten thematically-relevant TTs (which constitute my point of departure) together with their English counterparts (which are considered as backward-forward point of reference) for these Arabic TTs. The selected texts represent both the Syrian pro- and anti-regime's voice<sup>169</sup>. This choice (the number of texts and their length) is based on the assumption that it is presumably representative enough to provide a sound basis for generating accurate generalisations on the intended concerns of the current research: tracing the translators' recurrent regularities (norms) in given texts and examining their latent ideological potentials.

#### **4.15 Extra-textual Considerations**

Extra-textual considerations refer, in the main, to contextual-situational-circumstantial aspects of text production. Not only must pure linguistic/textual considerations be counted before selecting the corpus for analysis, extra-linguistic, extra-textual features, too, must be considered as they can influence the text producer's (the translator's- in our case) choice of equivalence during the process

---

<sup>169</sup> Hermans (1996) points out that 'voice' indicates intervention and involvement inside the translated texts. He maintains that it "refers to the underlying and potentially distorting presence of the translator's choices in the TT", quoted in Hatim and Munday 2004: 353).

of translating. In other words, a corpus selected entirely according to internal criteria overlooking the surrounding context of text production would yield no ‘solid’ conclusions. In this spirit, the EAGLES initiative (1996: 7) points out that [the] “classification of texts based purely on internal criteria does not give prominence to the sociological environment of the text, thus obscuring the relationship between the linguistic and non-linguistic criteria”. In like manner, Reiss (2000: 66) holds that analysts’ judgments of given TTs “will *inevitably be unsatisfactory* if the extra-linguistic determinants which radically affect both the form of the original and also the version in the target language are *not* considered”; [emphasis mine]. To this end, a number of four main extra-textual considerations have been taken on board as shown below respectively under: 4.15.1 Text Availability; 4.15.2 TT Producer’s Competence; 4.15.3 TT Producer’s Idiosyncrasy (The Translator’s Stamp) and 4.15.4 TT/ST Producers and Experts.

#### **4.15.1 Text Availability**

This criterion in corpus design is very ‘daunting’ as termed by Baker (1995) and involves a number of ‘limitations’ including level of availability in the public domain, forms of availability, copyright, access matters and similar publication issues. Corpus of the present study consists of published and publicly available sources in both electronic and non-electronic forms.

#### **4.15.2 TT Producer’s Competence**

By text producer (*re-producer*), I mean the translator who is seen in this study as an author. A number of questions in this respect pop up and should be regarded prior to the corpus collection: Are they ‘professional/amateur’ translators, journalist translators, hired or freelance translators, etc.? Do they translate into or out of their mother tongue? In this respect, I agree on the assumption that translators who translate into their mother tongue are more competent than those translating out of it. The present study considers this criterion because it believes in its potential influence on the TT final evaluation given that this study attempts to answer its main question and arrive at its conclusions by tracing the extent to which translators adhere or fail to adhere to the professional

standards and yardsticks of the practice known as *norms* (Toury 1980a and 1995a; Chesterman 1997). It should be made clear that both voices: (pro- and anti-regime in both texts) are taken into consideration to meet neutral standards and provide reliable analyses.

#### **4.15.3 TT Producer's Idiosyncrasy (The Translator's Stamp)**

Although it is not easy for researchers to guarantee this very crucial extra-textual criterion, translators' personal touches and forms of involvement (be they emotional, ideological or political) should, as much as possible, be taken into account even proposed professional code of conduct may not be enough to have a binding force for the practice- (Personal communication on April, 2013 with Kent Johansson (the Directorate General of the Translation at the European Parliament) and with Baker on September 5, 2013 who writes that:

"[wartime] translators, like other human beings, are neither outside individual cultures nor slaves to the cultures into which they were born. They negotiate their identities, beliefs and loyalties as we all do on the basis of various aspects of the context and their own developing judgement of the issues involved in any given interaction", Baker (2009: 2).

In an attempt to relatively guarantee this criterion, I varied my selections of the TT producers; I selected texts translated by individual translators (some of whom are Syrians operating from inside and outside the country) and by Eastern and Western institutions via their in-house translation units that also represent different socio-political and cultural affiliations (as shown before each text's analysis in chapter five).

#### **4.15.4 TT/ST Producers and Experts**

Translation analysts should justifiably have recourse to the translators and authors (together with their publishers) on the one hand, and experts/specialists in the fields of language engineering in general and Translation Studies in particular, on the other. While this demand may look relatively ideal to achieve, it should be possible, if only occasionally, should the need arise- as done on several occasions during my analytical journey in this research where I had recourse to both text's producers (especially the TT's, i.e. the translators) as well as specialists concerned. This is based on the fact that awareness of the extra-textual conditions and circumstances that have spawned the

selected texts may provide crucial clues and important indicators on the factors that have guided the text producers' practice, not least in target-oriented descriptive proposals (like the present one) to secure as accurate outcomes as possible. In the present study, I, directly and indirectly, contacted them (ST, TT producers and their publishing bodies) in addition to translation scholars who are involved in similar research interests as well as some experts in the field of media and Arabic language rhetoricians in order to fill a number of gaps that cropped up during the analytical process.

Upon completing the analyses, for example, I had a direct contact with one<sup>170</sup> of the translators of the selected texts and asked him about the causes/motivations behind the ST-TT mismatches in his own finished products. He confirmed that he never distorted any ST and was "keen" to provide unbiased renditions. When I gave him some examples in one of the texts of this study's corpus, he confirmed that this impartiality was not his, pointing his finger at the editorial board of his TT publisher: its in-built belief system and ideological orientations. Upon my request, the translator later sent me an official email re-affirming all that, i.e. that he usually distances himself from his translations and acts disinterestedly and that the editorial policy of his publisher manages his reproduced texts following their submission and prior to their publication; he wrote: "it pleases me to reaffirm once again that I carry out with honesty the translation work without any modification or addition, omission or the like. The editorial work is none of my duties".

#### 4.16 Text Analysis

To validate the proposed hypotheses of this study, answer its main question and achieve its objectives, I develop a manual method of analysis that follows a logically-ordered pattern to investigate the phenomenon of shifts occurrences in the translation by two main interdependent phases: firstly, I identify the pragma-linguistic asymmetries (optional shifts/deviations/differences) that involve significant ideological imports, then describe them by way of comparing the text pairs

---

<sup>170</sup> It should be noted here that this 'editorial intervention' which manages that TT prior to its publication (together with the claim that some translators of the selected texts may be stripped of the freedom/right to choose the to-be-translated texts- i.e. breaking Toury's "Preliminary Norms") does NOT apply to all of the translators studied in this thesis. This example provides just one explanatory aspect of the causes of TT-ST incongruities/shifts that make one conclusion as I will show in chapter six, on page: 268fff, under 6.3.3 Adequacy vs. Acceptability/ Norms' Violation.

(TT-ST), secondly, I explain/interpret/justify these shifts in depth demonstrating the conditions and constraints that have propelled the translators to do so together with their influence on the TT overall message. In the following, I will specifically show how the selected texts are analysed from the start until the conclusions are drawn and interpreted in line with the hypotheses and assumptions declared in this thesis.

#### **4.16.1 Stage One: Extra-Textual/ External Factors (Context)**

To begin with, my analysis operates within the communicative/functional Approach which sees meaning in terms of function in context and refuses to divorce the act of translating from the context of its production and reception. More precisely, the translation process is viewed as a communicative (rather than a linguistically trans-coding) activity- an action governed by a specific purpose, which reflects the circular debate between ‘equivalence’ (faithful conveyance of the message and ‘acceptability’ (message adaptation). Accordingly, I consider factors that affect language in use and relate text to context under the following formula: who says what in which channel to whom and with what effect? or what? when? where? why? and how?. Following Wodak’s Discourse-historical Approach (2001), I expand the scope of context as to consider the historical circumstances under which the text is produced. (See my discussion of this approach in this chapter, section (4.2.2) above, on page: 123).

First off, I consider the extra-textual factors that determine the communicative function of both texts with special focus on the target one<sup>171</sup>. Commenting on Nord's qualitative model of translation-oriented text analysis (1988/2005), Pym (1998<sup>172</sup>) notes that ‘if the main factor determining a translation is the target-text function as fixed by the initiator, why should any translator engage in extensive source-text analysis? Surely it would be enough to analyse the prospective target-text function and then take whatever elements are required from the source text’<sup>1</sup>.

---

<sup>171</sup> According to Nord (1997), the translation commission (also translation ‘brief’) should specify for both ST and TT. However, and for the purpose of this study which is a predominantly target-oriented, I shall apply Nord’s relevant thinking on the target text (the translation) in the first place.

<sup>172</sup> On Nord’s Text Analysis (1998): <http://usuaris.tinet.cat/apym/on-line/reviews/nordreview.html>

Of course, this does not mean that the ST and its production/reception environment is completely irrelevant and will not be considered. Every stage (and step) of analysis is carried out with the source text in mind as a reference but not as the point of departure. These external determinants of the text function mainly include<sup>173</sup>:

- 1. (Who?):** Author or sender of the text (a pro- or anti- regime translator or translation agency).
- 2. (What for?):** Sender's intention (to communicate a specific narrative in the service of her/his agendas or her/his commissioner's).
- 3. (To whom?)** (Tenor in Halliday's SFL): targeted audience's profile: their expectations and hypothetical knowledge about the text's event. (Arabic-speaking community: laypeople or the educated).
- 4. (By which channel?)**: (Mode in Halliday's SFL). Medium or channel through which the text is communicated. It is defined by Nord (1991: 56) as the “medium or vehicle which conveys the text to the reader”. (Written rather than oral), i.e. written-to-be read rather than spoken-to-be written.
- 5. (Where?)**: Place of text production and reception (published and publicly available newspapers and strategic research centres inside and outside the Republic of Syria).
- 6. (When?)**: Time of text production and reception (during the unfurling Syrian ‘revolution’ (March 2011- now). (This determinant and the previous one (Where?) are referred to as the situational coordinates. In this respect, I also consider the ‘lead time’ of text production and reception, i.e. the period between writing the original and translating it. This aspect ‘time’ is taken into account because it could give significant contextual clues on the translator’s behaviour.
- 7. (Why?)**: Motive for communication (authorial intended function: why the text is translated): to propagandise its position towards the events and convincingly legitimise its deeds).

Needless to say, knowledge of such external factors that surround the creation of the text is of paramount importance to fathom its overall factors and constraints, thus generating reliable outcomes. Clearly, all these factors imply analysing the impact of the skopos (purpose) on text

---

<sup>173</sup> Adapted from Nord's *Translation as a Purposeful Activity* (1997).

construction (The Skopos Theory is discussed at length in chapter two, mainly, on pages: 30-34). After considering these circumstances which constitute the text environment- its CONTEXT (See my discussion on CDA and context in this chapter, section 4.1.7 CDA and the Importance of Context, on page: 122), I move on closer towards the text *per se*- its CONTENT before the actual analysis is undertaken- as shown in ‘Stage Two’ below.

#### **4.16.2 Stage Two: Intra-Textual/Internal Factors (Content)<sup>174</sup>**

This stage involves skimming and then scanning the text several times for several purposes<sup>175</sup> to secure familiarity with its own content- not only ‘the what’ but also ‘the what not’. It is an important early stage of analysis in this study which is essentially a content-based qualitative (rather than a quantitative) investigation. From a functionalist point of view, content is seen as “the reference of the text to objects and phenomena in an extra-linguistic reality [which is] generally expressed by the semantics of the lexical and grammatical structures”<sup>176</sup>, (Nord 1991: 90). The following content-specific dimensions are looked into as a prelude to the third stage of analysis:

**1. (On what?):** (The Subject Matter/ ‘Field’-in Halliday’s SFL). At this point of the analytical processing, I try to figure out the overriding topic which the TT tackles. This can offer a hint about the content and terminology used. I also place special attention on how the headline, sub-headlines, images and their captions are rendered because they typically provide the main topic (the gist) of the text event.

**2. (What?):** After I grasp the subject matter of the text, I make sure that the main idea and a general overview are understood. This usually resides in the introductory paragraph known as ‘Lead’ paragraph because it leads the text reader to the argument in question. According to Hatim and Mason (1997), one main distinctive feature of argumentative texts is that the 'topic sentence' sets 'the tone' of the text and must be substantiated as it progresses.

---

<sup>174</sup> Adapted from Nord’s *Text Analysis in Translation* (1988/ 1991 and (2005: 87-142) the English version).

<sup>175</sup> Skimming and scanning are two different speed-reading techniques. They are similar in process but different in purpose. The former: ‘Skimming’ means looking at a text quickly in order to obtain a general idea of the contents whereas the latter: ‘scanning’ involves reading through a text to find some particular information.

<sup>176</sup> My analysis follows a method which takes on board a well-devised set of lexico-grammatical and pragmatic structures to help form a panoramically coherent picture of the translator’s attitudinal stance towards the situation/ event in question.

**3. (What not?):** This well lies at the heart of CDA, whose basic tenet is to debunk underlying ideologies, unlock unacknowledged agendas and demystify the opacity that may engulf a given discourse, thus revealing asymmetric power relation and hegemonic dispositions. After understanding the main topic and the main idea of the text (referential information), I embark upon an inferential phase, with the above-discussed Theory of Relevance in mind, reading through the text more carefully in order to pinpoint instances which the ST does not, or more significantly, does not wish to say.

**4. (In what order?):** This content-specific dimension refers to the composition or construction of the text not only at the micro- but also at the macro levels. Both the micro- and macro-structures are of great importance for translation-oriented analysis because, firstly, a text can be comprised of smaller text segments with different functions which may thus require different translation methods and strategies. Secondly, the beginning and the end of a text may play special part in its comprehension, and they thus deserve to be analysed in greater detail. In any case, the target text's sequential patterning, when manipulated, should be indicative of its producer's line of thinking and attitudinal position towards the event concerned.

**5. (Which non-verbal elements):** These involve the non-linguistic or paralinguistic signs in the text such as illustrations, *italics*, “scare-quoted” items, emblems, special types of print, etc. I am concerned with finding and revealing the intended function(s) of such non-linguistic signs because their absence/presence in the TT should mark a degree of manipulation that may impinge on the ST intended message and drive the targeted audience into different directions. By using them, the text producer (the translator), argues Nord (1991: 108), ‘aims to illustrate, disambiguate, or even intensify the message contained in a text or a discourse’.

**6. (In which words?):** Lexis (specific terminology, word choice, etc.). This is a very important factor on which I pay much attention in this stage of analysis (owing to its intimate relevance to the three lexical categories considered in the method of analysis: (Over-lexicalisation, Re-lexicalisation and Metaphor). Given that translation is an act of (re)production, lexical choices on the part of the

translator are closely investigated and examined as will be shown in the next stage: Shifts Observation (Identification).

**7. (In what kind of sentences):** This involves sentence structure and syntactic order (arrangement) and whether the sentence structure is paratactic or hypotactic? I observe the type of sentences used (simple, compound, complex, compound-complex?) and the way they are glued together. Stylistic differences attributed to the linguistic systems of the text pairs (English and Arabic) are also taken into account when this factor is observed and will occupy good space during the interpretive stage of the analyses.

**8. (In which tone?):** This includes the presence or absence of supra-segmental features in the target text: 'stylistic punctuation' like the various degrees of exclamation (!, !!, !!!, etc.) or interrogative exclamation (?!, ?!!, ?!!!, parentheses, CAPITALISATION, etc.) which are undeniably indicative of ideological intervention in argumentative type of text of political nature produced in times of conflict.

It is important to note that after these two stages of analysis (Context & Content), text-type focus is considered; throughout the subsequent stages, it remains in mind until I arrive to stage five (Description). This is an essential consideration when descriptive translation analyses are carried out. Trosborg (1997: vii-viii) attempts to demonstrate the value of text typology for translation purposes [with emphasis] on the importance of genre analysis, analysis of communicative functions and text types in a broad sense as a means of studying spoken and written discourse". In the same vein, Shunnaq (1994: 104) stresses the "need to take account of different text types with their respective communicative goals" or in Hatim and Mason's words (1990: 140), "communicative intentions serving an overall rhetorical purpose". As delineated earlier, when wartime translators manipulate the overall rhetorical/pragmatic function of the ST via opting for various textual strategies in the process of discoursing (translating) on different micro and macro levels, then issues related to text-type focus are most likely to emerge: an expositional account may be managed

(altered) into an argumentative one and vice versa depending on the source text's point of departure, translator's agendas, her/his readership's or other pressures (of text production and reception) like censorship, brief, context, culture, etc. Hatim (1997) illustrates, on several occasions, how expository is turned into evaluative by the translator's recourse to extrinsic managing which could ultimately change the ST world.

This study is concerned with showing how pro- and anti-regime translators alter the whole course of direction that relates to socio-political reality of given events via manipulating the text-type focus thus the ST intended message. It, in this connection, sets out to examine how awareness of text type focus can help translation analysts to fathom the translation methods chosen/preferred during the process of translating; whether or not the outputs (the TTs) are affected by text type, and if so, in what way(s); the similarities and differences (deviations/changes) which can be observed in texts types between the coupled pairs and, above all, how these text type differences may infringe the ST content of the intended message: what different (new) communication purposes and rhetorical goals they come to convey.

#### **4.16.3 Stage Three: Shifts Observation (Identification)**

As can be noticed, the first two stages respectively facilitate the understanding of context and content of the text under analysis. In this stage, I begin to systematically answer the main question of the study, test its hypothesis and validate its assumptions as follows:

1. I read through the target text independently from its original counterpart and underline all instances of the syntactic (modality, transitivity, normalisation) as well as lexical features (over-lexicalisation, re-lexicalisation and metaphor) and their ideologically-significant neighbouring pragmatic markers which primarily constitute my method of analysis.
2. I question mark those items that initially imply a degree of markedness and categorise them under their respective label: mainly syntactic or lexical. This process of segmentation, which is going to be tested back against their ST counterparts, is based on four main reasons: first, my

previous knowledge on the texts' context and content (Comprehension phase/ stages 1 & 2), second, their level of overtness (i.e. when a certain syntactic or lexical item noticeably demonstrates weirdness/oddness), third, my years of experience in teaching university courses on Critical Text Linguistics (CTL) with particular reference to ideological shifts in conflictual media and political discourses and finally my mastery of Arabic language's lexico-grammatical and pragmatic systems. This can include structural or semantic clumsiness that run counter to the Arabic language conventions, systematic frequency of lexico-grammatical items, exaggerations and powerful choices of linguistic items, cohesion-threatening structures such as unnatural forms that are not inherited in (or tolerated by) the Arabic language, amongst others.

**3.** From a translation point of view, I start to carry out an examination of these items (one by one) with reference to their respective occurrence in the original (on both syntactic and lexical levels as per the six lexico-grammatical categories and their pragmatic markers proposed in the method), locating them within their complete context to observe the way they are rendered and excavate potential ideological signification(s) out of them. At this point, I de-select the ones whose rendition bears ST-TT equal value and those ones whose degree of difference (deviation) can arguably be attributed to cross-linguistic and/or cross-cultural discrepancies (obligatory, unavoidable shifts) or does not reflect a significant ideological import. Afterwards, the selected items undergo a scrutinising retrospective comparative process<sup>177</sup> (Stage 4) followed by a descriptive account (Stage 5) then concluded with a critically interpretive reading of the resultant outcome (Stage six). The sixth stage of interpretation will be expanded to constitute the bulk of next chapter.

#### **4.16.4 Stage Four: Comparison (What?)**

Sequel to stage three, I adopt the Comparative Model (CM) in my analysis mainly for the identification of instances of shifts that have occurred during the act of translating to compare the text pairs: the TT against its respective ST. This method of comparison has proved its validity in

---

<sup>177</sup> Retrospective comparison is backward-forward process. Unlike prospective comparison, retrospective processing looks back and examines the factors in relation to the outcome- not the other way around.

revealing significant shifts between them and provided various avenues on their explanation. This process of TT-ST comparison, which I regularly follow in this qualitative, target-oriented and corpus-based research, is based on an empirical methodology adopted by the partisans of DTS. According to Toury (1985: 16), the empirical approach is “initially devised to study, describe and explain” a specific phenomenon, which clearly summarises the current and next two stages of analysis: (shifts identification, description as well as explanation/interpretation). The underlying assumption in this research is that the TT processing, in times of conflict, is governed by a set of normative behaviour which function as constraints on this behaviour and would, as a result, affect the process and product of translation distorting the ST intended message and driving the targeted readers into different directions. The process of comparing between the given text pairs allows me to identify *general patterns or regularities*, Toury (1991) which appear in the target text pending their description, explanation and interpretation<sup>178</sup>.

#### **4.16.5 Stage Five: Description (How?)**

After the identification of syntactic and lexical asymmetries (and their pragmatic markers) in the ST-TT “coupled pairs” (Toury 1995a: 77), I embark on explaining the occurrence of these shifts in an empirical, qualitative fashion (observation). This stage is carried out in line with the units of analysis (or precisely units of comparison) which are established earlier in this chapter. The aim of adopting this Descriptive Model (DM) is to show whether the ST message has been communicated in the TT impartially or, alternatively, de- or re-contextualised/manipulated). In other words, I set out to explore how the ST message is managed by the translator syntactically and lexically to pursue specific ideologically-motivated agendas and predict the consequences of this managing on the TT audience.

---

<sup>178</sup> At this moment of analysis, it is good to remind of how text pairs are chosen which is detailed under 4.13 Corpus Selection Criteria on page: 156fff above and of units of comparison which are discussed under 4.10 Units of Analysis (Comparison) on page: 148fff and specified in the previous section under 4.16.4 Stage 4: Comparison (What?) on page: 169f as well as of how potential shifts are observed (and identified) which is explained under 4.16.3 Stage 3: Shifts Observation (Identification) on page: 168f.

To this end, I choose the TT textual feature that configures a strategy adopted by the translator within its full context (modality, transitivity, normalisation; over-lexicalisation, re-lexicalisation and metaphor), and then take its counterpart off the ST followed by a back-translation [BT]<sup>179</sup>. The three texts (ST, TT and BT) are put in a sequential order and given the symbols that show their relevant margin-lined appendix and their line in order to ease reference. For example, (A3, L12) stands for appendix three, line 12.

#### **4.16.5.1 Back-translations**

The back-translated text, provided by the author, is concerned with the associations and implications of the TT content in the first place with special focus on occurrences of "distranslations" not those of "mistranslations"- as I have noted under Prefatory Note no. (4), on page: vii. In congruence with the main theme of the present study, the overriding principle is to preserve a TT-BT equal value without subtracting from it or adding to it. Despite the fact that back-translations are by nature literal, I do not resort to literal back-translation but rather to conceptual equivalents of a word or phrase under analysis in order to explicate the TT message for exploratory and comparative purposes: to detect shifts as a prelude to their description and interpretation. Neither do I intend to judge the accuracy/quality nor to point out errors in the translation or aspects of incompetence in the translator. My prime aim is to re-render The TT message (the forward translation) and its ideological implications/ deviations preserving the attitudinal position of the translator (negative or positive).

For this purpose, I choose the relevant ST statement that embodies the relevant linguistic feature under analysis (and put it in *italics*), followed by its forward- and back-translation. The forward-translation (the TT) is also selected to reflect no more or less than its correspondent ST does. Therefore, order of items (i.e. syntactic correspondence) may not be followed in some instances if it seems to betray the significance of the TT message or its overall intended communicative function.

---

<sup>179</sup> A 'back-translation' (also reverse translation) is a translation of a translated text back into the language of the original text. It is done without reference to the original text.

These instances, though very few, will be footnoted or \*asterisked (starred). Also, words, acronyms, cultural-bound terms that I feel non-Arab readership would fail to understand (like, for example, Fitna, Naksah, Nakbah, Intifada, Shabbiha which all, among others, appear in the selected texts), are explained, as may be the case, with brief reference to their diachronic or synchronic contexts, not least when they essentially contribute to the discussion in question. The null sign [Ø] indicates missing items (i.e. translation by omission) which can bear some signification in some way.

One last remark on the back-translations relates to the other supplementary items in the chosen text that are not primarily the direct point of argumentation. These items are also back-translated and underlined. Only the item in question will be **boldfaced** and analysed in detail. This is done in order to enable the targeted audience of this research (the non-Arab readers) to form a complete image of TT excerpt. By way of illustration, the following example shows how selected excerpts are ordered (ST-TT-BT) and numbered (e.g. (A5, L1-2) and how the back-translation is done:

### **Metaphor**

1. *The Geneva II talks on the crisis in Syria, caused by the west and its Middle Eastern minions playing political games [...] by arming and financing terrorist groups to spread chaos.* (A5, L1-2)  
 إن محادثات جنيف الثانية بشأن الأزمة في سوريا كان الغرب وأتباعه في الشرق الأوسط سبباً لها وما زالوا حتى الحين يلعبون دوراً فعالاً في تأجيج نار الفتنة عبر تسليحهم وتمويلهم للمجموعات الإرهابية بغية تمكينها من نشر الفوضى والاضطراب في هذا البلد. (A6, L1-3)

BT: [Verily the Geneva II talks on the crisis in Syria which the west and its Middle Eastern followers have caused and have still been playing an efficient role **in igniting the fire of Fitna** [socio-political strife] by arming and financing terrorist groups in a bid to enable them to spread chaos and instability in this country].

This excerpt predominantly argues how the ST message is significantly manipulated (and altered) via the translator's resort to adding a metaphoric expression which is **boldfaced**: (**في تأجيج نار الفتنة**): [**in igniting the fire of Fitna**]. However, the excerpt also involves other syntactic and lexical features: "Transitivity" with a foregrounded agent: (*caused by the west and its Middle Eastern minions*: ([كان الغرب وأتباعه في الشرق الأوسط سبباً لها]) [which the west and its Middle Eastern followers have caused]; "Over-lexicalisation": *to spread chaos* ([in a bid to enable them to spread chaos and instability] besides an added emphatic marker (**إن**) [*Verily*] and a

sympathetic signifier (في هذا البلد) [in this country] which closely link together to support the expressive attitudinal stance represented in the translator's invented metaphor (igniting the fire of Fitna). The originally Arabic word 'Fitna', which has been introduced in the English socio-political dictionary and lost its foreignness, is also back-translated into English: [socio-political strife] to cater for the non-Arabic community. This sample example, which applies to all other examples, illustrates how the study's back-translations proceed in pursuance of the predominant translational phenomenon it investigates: identifying, describing and interpreting occurrences of shifts that bear impactful ideological signification.

#### **4.16.5.2 Thematic Overall Linkage**

The fundamental lexico-grammatical features which constitute the method of analysis do not stand alone in communicating the translator's stance toward the relevant event; a number of other pragmatic signifiers (mainly speech acts, politeness and relevance)<sup>180</sup> are also considered with a view to giving a macro picture of the translator's prejudiced normative behaviour, thus validating my hypothesis. The reason for considering these pragmatic features is that because this research sees the text (the TT) not as a specimen of language but as a social act that has a purposeful communicative function as it involves a human action. Therefore, these pragmatic markers intimately link text with context in various ways and further strengthen my conclusions drawn from the application of the method's main features.

In a purely additive sense, and to further shape a more comprehensive, coherent and thematically-connected picture of the translator's attitude, other textual signifiers, only when they show a degree of ideological signification, are also taken into consideration including, but not confined to, euphemism, emphasis, intensifiers, emotive epithets, evaluative adverbs, pluralisation, collocation, disorderliness of conjunctives, etc. As the analyses carried out in the next chapter show, these two

---

<sup>180</sup> See above in this chapter, under 4.9.3 Ancillary Indicators on page: 143fff, a detailed discussion on these pragmatic factors (provided separately on each one) together with their justification of inclusion, and their key role in the construction of socio-political reality.

complementary pragma-contextual factors, owing to their interconnectedness and interdependence, would allow a transition towards a macro-textual analysis that would facilitate the establishment of a coherent textual/discoursal picture, thus revealing the translator's conduct and intended communicative message. This microscopic-macroscopic direction of analysis is adopted in order to guarantee reliable conclusions on the translational phenomenon under observation.

#### **4.16.6 Stage Six: Explanation/ Interpretation (Why?/ What else?)**

Thus far, I have identified lexico-grammatical shifts in the TT (what?) and described them with reference to their original counterparts (How?) reflecting on well-established translation theories imported from the realm of Text Linguistics and Critical Language Studies. Now, a phase of explanation (the why?) and interpretation (the what else?) commences. These inextricably-tangled stages, taken together, agree with Toury's three-fold set of objectives concerning the investigation of shifts in given translations by way of empiricism whose main endeavour is "initially devised to **study [what]**, **describe [how]** and **explain [why]**" a specific phenomenon [Emphasis & additions are mine]. At this stage, and after navigating through this in-depth exploratory analysis, I attempt to demonstrate why these various shifts take place, what their root causes are within the context of cross-linguistic variances and cross-cultural divergences between English and Arabic (two different languages pertaining to two different families); as well as how awareness of these shifts can help translators in general and those who operate under conflictual conditions and hot spots to provide bias-free renditions by trans-creating socio-political reality away from any form of ideological intervention or emotional involvement<sup>181</sup>. Of course, and based on the fact that there is no final and complete interpretation, the present study leaves scope for further (readers') interpretation(s)- (the what else). This observation-based explanatory/interpretive stage will constitute the bulk of chapter six: (Summary, Conclusion and Recommendations).

---

<sup>181</sup> See more details of relevant implications in chapter six under 6.5 Significance, on page: 305.

## CHAPTER FIVE: DATA ANALYSIS

### **Text 1: Why Can't the Syrian Opposition Get along (Appendix 1)**

**لماذا تعجز المعارضة السورية عن التوافق؟ (ملحق ٢)**

#### **Context & Content**

This text was written and translated at the time where the many opposition forces (be they political or military) were splintered amidst international calls for uniting them under one banner- which came true, a year or so later, when the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces met up in Qatar in November 2012<sup>182</sup>. The Coalition has increasingly won international recognition and could form an interim government with a full cabinet as the only legitimate representative of the Republic of Syria. The text in particular casts light over the root causes that hinder unity in the middle of the opposition spectrums.

The source text producer is Kate Seelye. She is senior vice president of the Middle East Institute. Seelye places special interest on the Mideast affairs, not least the Syrian ones. She is an American journalist descending from a family which has been interested in (and passionate about) the Middle East socio-political scene since the 1950s. Her father Talcott Williams Seelye, who wrote '*U.S.-Arab Relations: The Syrian Dimension*' in 1985, served as the US ambassador to Syria between 1979 and 1981<sup>183</sup>.

Foreign Policy is an international magazine founded in 1970 and published in Washington, D.C. by the Foreign Policy Group, a division of the Washington Post Company. It is viewed, and views itself, as "serious without being pompous... an essential modern guide to global politics, economics and ideas for people who want to know what's really happening in an increasingly complicated world. It both simplifies and clarifies complex topics with crisp, insightful writing and clear design... and draws on the world's leading journalists, thinkers and professionals to analyse the most

---

<sup>182</sup> Christian Science Monitor (By Arthur Bright on 12-11-2012): <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Security-Watch/terrorism-security/2012/1112/What-is-The-National-Coalition-for-Syrian-Revolutionary-and-Opposition-Forces-video>

<sup>183</sup> For more information about the ST producer, visit: <https://www.mei.edu/profile/kate-seelye>

significant international trends and events of our times, without regard to ideology or political bias"<sup>184</sup>.

The translator is a Jordanian citizen. He is a full-time translator in Al Ghad independent paper. He has been critical of the Arab political systems for years<sup>185</sup>. Al Ghad (literally Tomorrow/ Future) is a relatively young (yet fast-growing) daily Amman-based newspaper founded in 2004 "on the vision that professionalism is the key to success... Al Ghad has placed for itself a number of professional ethics – multiplicity, neutrality and tolerance [and] strives to deliver truth and entertainment in a presentation that is based on honesty, respect for the reader's intelligence and their right to truth<sup>186</sup>".

## I. Syntax

### 1. Nominalisation

*These protesters, who have organized themselves into local coordination committees, have largely remained anonymous to avoid arrest.* (A1, L60-61)

ويظل هؤلاء المحتجون الذين نظموا أنفسهم في لجان تنسيق محلية مجهولين في جزئهم الضخم، من أجل تفادى تعرضهم للاعتقال من جانب سلطات النظام. (A2, L50-51)

BT: [These protesters, who have organized themselves into local coordination committees, have largely remained anonymous **in a bid to avoid exposure to arrest by the regime's authorities**].

This is a very clear example of nominalisation. It is an ‘expectation-fulfilling’ translation strategy for the TT Arab audience (Hatim 2001: 118) in that it caters for the ideological expectations of its readership. The example displays how the subordinate agentless clause in the ST (to avoid arrest), which leaves the attribution of causality unspecified and indicates no explicit agency relationship, i.e. not showing who is arresting who (perhaps deliberately). This agentless clause has been transformed to an overloaded three-fold nominal structure in the target text (تفادى تعرضهم للاعتقال) with clear agentivity relationship exhibited through the addition of the doer of the action (arrest). Such a grammatical shift (verbal to nominal) together with declaring who does what against whom,

---

<sup>184</sup> [www.foreignPolicy.com](http://www.foreignPolicy.com) (For more information about the Magazine, visit: <http://fpgroup.foreignpolicy.com/about/history/>

<sup>185</sup> Personal communication with him in Amman in 2014.

<sup>186</sup> Off its own website: <http://www.alghad.com/about-us.php>

it can be argued, is ideology-bearing technique; it introduces an ideological transformation and discloses an attitudinal position which was meant by the Arabic translator to be critical of the unmannerly practices of the Syrian regime and sympathetic with the Opposition.

The Arabic translator has, with much intrusion, magnified the ideological meaning of the ST to suit his own ideological affiliation. Such a syntactic shift encroaches and reshapes the ST message and opts for a TT of a high level of markedness that is not pragmatically motivated by the ST rhetorical purpose. The ideological manifestations resulting from the verbal-nominal shift in this example were supported by other ideological signifiers which further contribute to the communicativeness of the target text and its consumers. Markedly, notice how the adverb (largely), which is according to Fairclough, (1992a, 1992b) a form of expressive modality, is rendered into (في جزئهم الضخم) [hugely], let alone its unnaturalness (in the collocation of this Arabic TT), which enlarges the number of organised protesters whose identity remain anonymous to avoid arrest. Between 'largeness' and 'hugeness', an alternative equivalence like, for example (إلى حد كبير، في جزئهم الأكبر) could possibly offer a neutral and natural rendition.

More markedly, the couplet form of the added agent represented in: (سلطات النظام) makes the action doer (the arrest of protesters) explicit. Notice how the translator puts (سلطات) [authorities] in its plural form which also maximises the intended proposition, thus disseminating his ideological affiliation. In the same vein, the politically pejorative associations embedded in his use of (النظام); [the regime] instead of, for example (الادارة / الحكومة): [the government / the administration] should not be overlooked. You should have noticed that, within his resort to nominalisation, the translator also opts for the syntactic strategy of transitivity; he converts the ST passive construction into an active one concealing the agent (the opposition) in a bid to draw attention away from being held accountable for its divide or disunity. A clearer instantiation of extrinsic syntactic management configured in transitivity is discussed below.

## 2. Transitivity

*A united opposition is also urgently needed to challenge the growing call for armed resistance by some protesters in cities like Homs, where the Syrian government's crackdown has been especially harsh.* (A1, L74-75)

وتنس الحاجة، بشكل ملح، إلى تحدي الدعوة المتنامية إلى المقاومة المسلحة من جانب بعض المحتجين في مدن مثل حمص، حيث ما تزال حملة الحكومة السورية قاسية بشكل خاص. (A2, L62-63)

BT: [The need desperately urges to challenge the growing call for armed resistance by some protesters in cities like Homs, where the Syrian government's crackdown has been especially harsh].

This is a clear example of converting a passivised form into an active one with some manipulation (for a pragmatic purpose: avoidance to determine accountability for the fragmentation of the opposition parties). Translation scholars (El-Yasin 1996; Khafaji 1996; Farghal and Al-Shorafat 1996) investigate the passive-active discrepancies/mismatches between English and Arabic and show that they do not behave similarly. Despite the fact that Arabic language "tends to use less passive than English" (El-Yasin 1996: 18, c.f. Farghal and Al-Shorafat 1996), the category of voice (active and passive) exists in both languages and has the same function: to conceal or reveal the doer of the action in question however frequent. Khafaji (1996: 37) holds that Arabic language tends to use passive constructions but in a different fashion compared to English concluding that "[H]ence Arabic... does not avoid passivity [sic] but only expresses it differently". As Baker (1992/2011: 113) aptly argues, "rendering a passive structure by an active structure, or conversely an active structure by a passive structure in translation can have implications for the amount of information given in the clause, and the focus of the message", which are well fulfilled in the TT.

Therefore, the translator's act of transitivity is not justified and reflects a question of choice: it enabled him to camouflage the ST original message (which indirectly holds the opposition responsible for its split unlike the TT which skips any mention of 'the united opposition'). As it can clearly be seen, the passive pattern in the ST (A united opposition is also urgently needed) is changed (or more precisely recycled) in the TT into an active construction with the ST foregrounded agent suppressed: (وتنس الحاجة، بشكل ملح،) [And the need desperately urges] to serve this agenda: (avoidance to hold responsibility for this wrongdoing- the fragmentation of the

opposition parties). Farghal (2012) sees agency, if manipulated, as one aspect of the translator's syntactic extrinsic managing that bears ideological moves. For him, "agency refers to whether the agent or doer of an action is mentioned or suppressed in the translation", Farghal (2012: 145).

Notice the over-lexicalisation of the TT (redundant, odd) construction, which breaks the TT linguistic norms and stylistic conventions and further maximises the (urgency) suggested in the ST (والحاجة ماسة) or (وتبرّز الحاجة), (وتتمسّ الحاجة) & (يشكل ملحّ). Such Arabic renditions as (إلى معارضةٍ موحَّدةٍ) would suffice and convey a similar content and a "natural effect". Put more precisely, the translator, a pro-opposition, should not conceal the mention of (the united opposition), which is unjustifiably done, perhaps to draw attention away from the ST implication and disguise its intended message that the Opposition is fragmented and, as a result, this fragmentation hinders "to challenge the growing call for armed resistance". He could render the ST text into a natural TT preserving the ST important item (A united opposition) as follows:

والحاجة ماسةً إلى معارضةٍ موحَّدةٍ لتحدي الدعوة المتنامية إلى المقاومة المسلحة من جانب بعض المحتجين في مدن مثل حمص، حيث ما تزال حملة الحكومة السورية قاسية بشكل خاص.

BT: [A **united opposition** is also urgently needed to challenge the growing call for armed resistance by some protesters in cities like Homs, where the Syrian government's crackdown has been especially harsh]. (Accurate translation- "*similar*" to the ST).

Observe how the ST clearly declares the agent of the passive structure (A united opposition) and accords it a prominent position and how the TT chooses to suppress the agent altogether for an apparently rhetorical purpose. The ideological implication behind such manoeuvring on the part of the translator is evident as particularly configured in deleting the agent ('mystification of agency' in Fairclough's words (1992: 27) in the target text, which is semantically important and pragmatically functional: to befog the direct responsibility of the opposition's state of disunity (as implied in the ST) and failure to challenge the growing call for armed resistance.

## II. Lexicon

### 1. Over-lexicalisation

*1. Although dismayed, the opposition's divisions and sniping are hardly surprising. Most activists grew up under the Assad family's authoritarian rule, and their differences reflect the many divisions inside Syrian society, which is split by sect and ethnicity as well as ideology.* (A1, L50-52)

ورغم تسببها باليأس والقنوط، فإن انقسامات المعارضة وتنافسها بالكاد تكون مداعة للدهشة. فمعظم الناشطين نموا وترعرعوا في ظل الحكم السلطوي لعائلة الأسد، فيما تعكس خلافاتها الانقسامات العديدة داخل المجتمع السوري الممزق بالطائفية والإثنية، كما وبالأيديولوجية. (A2, L41-43)

BT: [Although caused dismayed and hopeless, the opposition's divisions and competition hardly entail surprise. Most activists grew up and matured under the Assad family's authoritarian rule, and their differences reflect the many divisions inside Syrian society, which is split by sect and ethnicity as well as ideology].

This small stretch involves two ideologically significant instantiations of over-lexicalisation configured in (نموا وترعرعوا) & (ورغم تسببها باليأس والقنوط) which respectively render: (Although dismayed & grew up) where there are no TT stylistic constraints that could justify their existence. Although both of them are interdependent, each one is worth a separate discussion as in (1A & 1B below).

**1A:** *Although dismayed, the opposition's divisions and sniping are hardly surprising.* (A1, L50)

ورغم تسببها باليأس والقنوط، فإن انقسامات المعارضة وتنافسها بالكاد تكون مداعة للدهشة. (A2, L41)

BT: [Although caused dismayed and hopeless, the opposition's divisions and competition hardly entail surprise].

To strengthen his intended message concerning the opposition's despair and divide, the translator (whose pro-oppositional attitude is made more evident by the coming examples) opted for the strategy of over-lexicalisation by way of a synonymous cluster to throw the blame of such divides over the decades-old Assads rule. To this effect, a synonymous meaningful pattern has been added in the TT: (and hopelessness) [والقنوط].

**1B.** *Most activists grew up under the Assad family's authoritarian rule, and their differences reflect the many divisions inside Syrian society, which is split by sect and ethnicity as well as ideology.* (A1, L50-52)

فمعظم الناشطين نموا وترعرعوا في ظل الحكم السلطوي لعائلة الأسد، فيما تعكس خلافاتها الانقسامات العديدة داخل المجتمع السوري الممزق بالطائفية والإثنية، كما وبالأيديولوجية. (A2, L41-43)

BT: [Most activists grew up and matured under the Assad family's authoritarian rule, and their differences reflect the many divisions inside Syrian society, which is split by sect and ethnicity as well as ideology].

By the same token, observe the rendition of the action verb ‘grew up’ by the synonymous pattern (نموا وترعرعوا): [grew up and matured] whose rhetorical and pragmatic value has been substantially intensified through the use of over-lexicalisation in the Arabic text to perform the pragmatic function in favour of the opposition: it clearly attributes responsibility to the *Assad family's authoritarian rule* and holds it accountable for this stark division amongst the opposition: the added active verb (وترعرعوا): [and matured] justifies the opposition’s *snipping* as it inherently signifies dynamism and indicates a longer period of living under the Assad family's authoritarian rule as well as the sectarian ethnic and ideological splits. Modern Arabic lexicography refers that this verb occurs in various contexts. As far as ours is concerned (growing up), it indicates ‘extended period of time (ten or more years) and a high level of maturity’, Al Waseet (1972: 104). In so doing, the translator may have intended to say that the opposition's “divisions”, “sniping” and “differences” are the resultant outcome of “the Assad family's authoritarian rule” under which it had lived for decades.

## 2. Re-lexicalisation

*1. Five months after the start of an uprising against President Bashar al-Assad that has left more than 2,200 people dead, dissidents are still struggling to forge a united front that could duplicate the role played by Libya's National Transitional Council (NTC).* (A1, L3-5)

فبعد خمسة شهور من اندلاع انتفاضة ضد الرئيس بشار الأسد، والتي أفضت إلى مقتل أكثر من ٢٠٠٠ شخص، ما زال المنشقون يعدون الخطى لتشكيل جبهة موحدة قد تستطيع إعادة لعب الدور نفسه الذي قام به المجلس الانتقالي المؤقت في ليبيا. (A2, L2-4)

BT: [Five months after the **outbreak**<sup>187</sup> of an **intifada** against President Bashar al-Assad that has left more than 2,200 people dead, dissidents are still struggling to forge a united front that could duplicate the role played by Libya's National Transitional Council (NTC)].

This excerpt involves a twosome occurrence of re-lexicalisation: (start and uprising) (اندلاع انتفاضة): [outbreak of an intifada], which forms an emotive collocational pattern. The ST word ‘start’ is reworded in the TT and rendered as (اندلاع): [outbreak] which connotes more semantic loads than ‘start’. This Arabic rendition is arguably ideologically motivated and fulfils the pragmatic requirements of the receivers of the target text (Arab popular masses) and observes its overall

<sup>187</sup> According to *Al Monjed in Modern Arabic Language* (2008: 478) which indicates that the term can match up with different collocates: (fire, war). Interestingly, it adds, it can metaphorically be used with ‘fire’ in modern standard Arabic: (اندلاع نيران الحرب): [the outbreak of the fire(s) of war]. Within the context of wars, the dictionary associates this term with the sudden occurrence and rapid spread- as the translator probably wishes to convey.

rhetorical purpose (demonising President Bashar al-Assad) in view of the emotiveness it involves as shown below. Before proceeding further, it is worth noting that the text (ST and TT) was produced while the Syrian ‘uprising’ was in its infancy. Until then, the events were referred to under such names as *crisis* (الأزمة); *popular movement* (الحركة الشعبية); *protest movement* (which occurs twice in the present ST and rendered as حركة الإحتجاج).

This well reminds us of the role the factor of time [historical context: Wodak 2001b] can play in shaping meaning(s), trans-creating reality and as a result analysing (explaining and interpreting) discourse. De Marco (2006: 13) concludes that people's perception of meanings of words and their social associations change over time which, she sees, should be considered in any translation practice. She maintains that "in this ever-changing time, we should try to foster changes in language as well, taking into account that the meanings of words may have changed, and so have people's connotations of the social values that these meanings assume". De Marco elaborates on this contextual consideration and points out that "expressions and nuances that some years ago sounded neutral or proper in a particular historical context, may today have taken on different meanings and be perceived in a different way" (*ibid*).

So far as the historical context of the Syrian uprising is concerned, during the first few months, Syrian people in some (not all) cities or parts of these cities had sporadically taken to the streets. Peacefully. They had demanded regime reform rather than ouster. Rather than chanting the Arab “*Spring’s*” ‘mantra’: ‘The people want to *oust* the regime’, they chanted: ‘The people want to reform the regime’. Thus, the word (انتفاضة): [Intifada] here should be perceived and interpreted within its socio-political world and historical context to well fathom the ideological implications it enforces in the Arabic translation<sup>188</sup>. In the Arabic socio-political context, it does more than ‘uprising’ and implies a sweeping and large-scale social mobilisation against oppression and tyranny. What is of importance here is the potential ideologically-driven implications of this lexical

---

<sup>188</sup> The term literally means ‘shaking off’. It was born in Palestine on December 8, 1987, added to the international lexicon and subsequently has lost its foreignness worldwide. It is the Palestinian “uprising” against Israeli occupation of mainly the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The first intifada lasted from 1987 to 1993, and the second began in 2000 until 2002.

strategy adopted by the translator. It could be argued that the translator prefers to use the word "Intifada" rather than ثورة<sup>189</sup> due to the historically socio-political associations in the collective psyche of his text receivers: the Arab people. Throughout the whole text, it constantly appeared three times as equivalent to 'the start of the uprising'. A neutral ideology-free rendition could possibly be:

فبعد خمسة شهور من بدء ثورة ضد الرئيس بشار الأسد.

[Five months after the start of an uprising against President Bashar al-Assad].

(Accurate translation- "similar" to the ST).

In a nutshell, the difference in the ideological content between 'start' and 'outbreak'; 'uprising' and 'Intifada' needs no emphasising. Reverting to the contextual interpretation of 'the start of an uprising' in the original text, it can be argued that the pattern, taken together, has a very important pragmatic function in the text as it conveys the discoursal value of neutrality and objectivity on the text producer's side, compared with the ideologically motivated meaning embedded in the translation (اندلاع انتفاضة) [the outbreak of an Intifada]. The response on the TL audience may therefore be completely different from that on the recipients of the original text due to the sentiments and dramatic values triggered by the word 'Intifada' and its etymological, circumstantial profile.

Another form of re-lexicalisation utilised by the translator (allegedly to serve his goals) exists in the same text that is worth dwelling on. It is manifested in the rendition of (snipping):

*2. Although dismaying, the opposition's divisions and sniping are hardly surprising. Most activists grew up under the Assad family's authoritarian rule, and their differences reflect the many divisions inside Syrian society, which is split by sect and ethnicity as well as ideology.* (A1, L50-52)

ورغم تسببها باليأس والقنوط، فإن انقسامات المعارضة وتنافسها بالكاد تكون مدخلاً للدهشة. فمعظم الناشطين نموا وترعرعوا في ظل الحكم السلطوي لعائلة الأسد، فيما تعكس خلافاتها الانقسامات العديدة داخل المجتمع السوري الممزق بالطائفية والإثنية، كما وبالأيديولوجية. (A2, L41-43)

BT: [Although caused dismayed and hopeless, the opposition's divisions and competition hardly entail surprise. Most activists grew up and matured under the Assad family's authoritarian rule, and their differences reflect the many divisions inside Syrian society, which is split by sect and ethnicity as well as ideology].

---

<sup>189</sup> See more discussion on these two (and other relevant) terms in chapter three under 3.1 Phraseology, on page: 89.

Following Halliday's 'over-lexicalisation' or Fairclough's 'over-wording', it could conversely be possible to respectively name this translatorial lexical strategy as *under-lexicalisation* or *under-wording*. As can be seen, the TT producer declined to give the direct translation of 'sniping'<sup>190</sup>: (a sly verbal attack- according to Oxford) because, one may assume, he may not wish to sound critical and further threaten the face of the anti-regime opposition- as evident through his pro-opposition attitudinal stance configured in the numerous strategies throughout the TT. Consequently, he fine-tuned the term and opted for a positive one (competition) which has less pejorative connotations and can, therefore, be more acceptable from an ideological perspective. In so doing, he attempts to show deference and avoid creating a repulsive image of the opposition by indicating that the act of 'competing' in the middle of the opposition members is a natural political practice that would hold fruitful- which the source text producer does not (perhaps wish to) indicate. The intensity and strength of ST discoursal values manifested in (snipping: (camouflaged, snide offense and anonymous criticism) should have been efficiently maintained in the TT not toned down: instead of positively diluting its values into 'competition', the translator could have rendered it with its equivalence within the ambits of 'disguised belligerence and hostility'. (المشاحنة والمناكفة الخفيّتان):

Discoursally, the target text is in fact affluent with similar instances of ideologically-driven re-lexicalisation; it includes bulky examples that instantiate this lexical feature. For example, the following lexical items are re-lexicalised/reworded in the TT with heavier semantic loads that further adduce ideology-motivated bearings for the interest of the Opposition:

3. *It was an attempt by young revolutionaries, upset over the lack of progress.* (A1, L33)  
وقال آخرون إن المجلس كان بمثابة محاولة من جانب ثورويين شباب امتعضوا [enraged] بسبب الفقر إلى إبراز تقدم.  
(A2, L27)

4. *"It has been five months since the uprising started, and we don't yet have a U.N. Security Council resolution condemning Assad and his cohorts for their massacres," said Tabbara".* (A1, L38-39)

<sup>190</sup> The word ‘sniping’ is derived from the verb ‘snipe’ which originally means: to shoot at someone from a hidden place (c.f. Webster, 11<sup>th</sup> edition; Collins, Oxford). Remarkably, it associates with the ‘snipe’: a bird that has a brown camouflaged plumage and a long straight beak to be able to hunt its preys. Camouflage plumage enables it to remain undetected by hunters which gave rise to the term ‘sniper: a skilled sharpshooter. The ST writer arguably employs the term within these associations which well fit his intended overall message. In a purely additive sense, it can be argued that the translator realises these associations and chooses to manipulate (downplay) the term to serve specific goals.

وقال[طباره]: "لقد مضى على اندلاع الانتفاضة خمسة شهور ولم تر بعد صدور قرار عن مجلس الأمن الدولي يدين الأسد و عصابته على المذابح التي ارتكبوها" (A2, L31-33) [and his gang for their massacres they have committed]:

5. *The reasons for the Syrian opposition's inability to organize an umbrella group may be understandable, but the costs of failing to do so remain real.* (A1, L68-69)

قد يكون السبب وراء عدم قدرة المعارضة السورية على الانظام في مجموعة مظلة مفهوماً، لكن كلفة البقاء على هذه الحال تبقى باهظة (A2, L57-58). [costly]

These takes (1-5) exhibit how the translator heavily utilises the lexical strategy of re-lexicalisation to communicate intended rhetorical purposes and pragmatic goals. They represent obvious instantiation on this strategy. The translator resorts to 'expectation-fulfilling' renderings (Hatim 2001: 118) to please the TL audience and meet his patron's demands; he caters for their ideological expectations and in-built belief systems (commissioning forces). The words that appear in the TT in the examples above (باهظة عصابته امتعضوا، تنافسها، اندلاع انتفاضة) say more (or less as in 'snipping') than their counterparts in the ST do (start of an uprising, snipping, upset, cohorts and real respectively) in that they trigger stronger resonance in the TT culture and socio-political context. The translator, based on these many occurrences, manipulates the ST message and attends to the host culture as the yardstick for gauging the appropriateness of the translating process. This stance of loyalty to the receiving culture "acceptability", by definition, nullifies the objective handling of the ST because it gives priority to the TL social, cultural, political and other norms.

### 3. Metaphor

*The four-day Istanbul gathering, according to organizers, sought to unite all the efforts of previous opposition efforts [Ø] under one banner. Few of the groups or individuals from previous opposition gatherings attended the meeting, however.* (A1, L42-44)

وكان تجمع إسطنبول الذي استمر أربعة أيام قد سعى، وفق منظمين، إلى توحيد كل جهود المعارضة السابقة، وصهرها في بوتقة واحدة تحت راية واحدة. وكانت قلة من المجموعات أو الأشخاص من تجمعات المعارضة السابقة قد حضروا التجمع مع ذلك. (A2, L35-36)

BT: [The four-day Istanbul gathering, according to organizers, sought to unite all the efforts of previous opposition efforts [and fusing them in one crucible] under one banner]. Few of the groups or individuals from previous opposition gatherings attended the meeting, however.

The TT inserts an expressive metaphor that is familiar to the Arabic readership. By this metaphorical addition into the TT, the translator's emotional involvement can be noticed. Not only has this metaphor (which does not exist in the ST) reinforced the ST proposition on the aim of the

four-day Istanbul gathering to unite all the efforts exerted by previous opposition, it has also magnified the translator's pro-opposition attitudinal stance. Those efforts are likened to metals that are melted in one melting pot to produce one unitary inextricably-tangled whole, which eventually conveys a wish towards solid unity and strong integration amongst the opposition members.

Observe the distortion in meaning and awkwardness (infelicity) in structure the conjunction 'however' has caused to the TT which does not sound natural in Arabic: it is delayed, i.e. backgrounded and clumsily placed in a final position in the TT (مع ذلك) perhaps to tone down or disguise the semantic load imbedded in this meaningful, conjunctive (and cohesive) device whose main function is to introduce a statement that contrasts with or seems to contradict something that has been said previously. This positioning runs counter to Arabic language stylistics; it usually prefers initial positions, unlike English.

This delay of the conjunction being pushed to a final position, may, one can assume, be a mere inaccuracy or a syntactic unawareness on the part of the translator. However, this assumption aside, syntactic disorder results in consequential ideological implications; through this subtlety, the translator's ideological content wins over the conventional linguistic forms to achieve a rhetorical goal: concealing the absence of the opposition members from the unifying Istanbul gathering, thus saving their face. As can be seen, all the above-examined takes have sought to fulfill the rhetorical purpose of the translated text which aims to achieve a certain ideological goal, i.e. encode the translator's own ideology into the text in such a way that feeds into his and/or his patron's demands, readership's presuppositions, background knowledge and world experience.

## **Conclusion**

As the examples above have shown, the translator displays 'affinity' with the Syrian opposition (and, by way of inference, stands against the 'regime'). He expresses this feeling on several occasions by several means, syntactic and lexical, backed by a variety of pragmatic signifiers that are indicative of meaning intensification.

Syntactically, the translator resorts to an intensified form of nominalisation coupled with the insertion of the doer of the negative action manifested in the verb ‘arrest’ in order to reveal an attitudinal position on the event: to be critical of the ill-mannered practices of the Syrian ruling regime and sympathetic with its rival opposition. In order to lend more support to this stance, he also opts for another syntactic strategy namely "Transitivity". He rendered the ST passive into an active form obfuscating the agent (the opposition) in order to turn attention away from being held accountable for its fragmentation. Notice carefully how the translator thematically unmasks the action doer: (من جانب سلطات النظام) [by the **regime's** authorities] as exemplified in the syntactic strategy of "Nominalisation" on the one hand, and how he suppresses the action doer (**A united opposition**) as exemplified in the syntactic strategy of "Transitivity", on the other- which pursues the same agenda(s) and serves the same goal(s).

Lexically, the same line of argumentation that reflects his attitudinal stance towards these two rival parties of the conflict follows on. This is made explicit by his heavy recourse to over- and re-lexicalisation and metaphor that imbue much ideological thrust in support of his own thesis. The first example of over-lexicalisation clearly throws the blame of the opposition’s dismay, despair and ‘sniping’ over the ‘Assads rule’. This instantiation is directly followed by another significant over-lexicalised pattern which determines the same responsibility of the opposition’s hopelessness and divides to the “Assad family’s authoritarian [long] rule”.

To communicate the same rhetorical purposes, the translator affluently re-lexicalises ST items in various ways. As we have noticed, he sometimes amplifies the ST meaning to threaten the face of the regime (start and uprising) (اندلاع انتفاضة): [outbreak of an intifada], and in some other times dilutes other items (sniping): (تنافسها) [competition]), in an attempt to save the face of the Opposition, display deference and avoid creating a negative image, amongst many other similar examples as we have seen. The translator’s (pro-opposition) emotional presence over the same stance is easily discernible through his unnecessary insertion of a highly-emotive metaphor (وصهرها في بونقة واحدة): [and fusing them in one crucible] that serves the opposition’s state of

fragmentation which he was keen to hide- as we have seen under "Transitivity". This addition represented in an emotive metaphor indirectly challenges the ST headline which is wondering about the inability of the opposition parties to unite under one banner. Thus, the above takes, taken together, demonstrate his sympathetic position with the opposition and his unsympathetic one with the Syrian 'regime', which indexes his intention (purpose) to de-contextualise the ST message in answering the question that forms its headline: Why Can't the Syrian Opposition Get Along?, or hold the regime accountable for failure to unite under one umbrella, "in one (*political*) crucible".

## **Text 2: "Wag the Dog" – The Sequel Set in Syria (Appendix 3)**

أسباب استخدام المتمردين في سوريا الأسلحة الكيميائية (ملحق ٤)

### **Context & Content**

This text was written and translated only a few days after the Ghouta chemical massacre (21-08-2013) which had topped world news for long. It, in the main, criticises the international community's reluctance in revealing the perpetrators of the attack and draws attention to the chemical arsenal used on some occasions by the US, Israel, the writer's own country (UK) as well as the Gulf states.). Importantly, the writer initiated his argument with reference to a recent similar event that took place in Egypt on August 14, 2013 following the ouster of President Mohammad Morsi in July 3, 2013 after one year in office. The Egyptian event, known as "*Rab'ah Massacre*" (Arabic: مجزرة رابعة) and had remained topical for months, resulted in killing around six hundreds and injuring more than four thousands (almost all of them were civilians)<sup>191</sup> when the coup's forces carried out an extensive and “expensive” military operation to end the weeks-long Muslim brotherhood sweeping protests.

George Galloway<sup>192</sup>, the ST producer, is the current leader of the Respect Party (and formerly a member in the Labour Party in the UK). He is a veteran British parliamentarian, politician and

---

<sup>191</sup> CNN on August 16, 2013 entitled: 680 Martyrs and more than 5000 injured in Rabaa Al-Adaweya Massacre (video included): <http://ireport.cnn.com/docs/DOC-1021554>

<sup>192</sup> Adapted from: [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George\\_Galloway](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_Galloway) and his page on the British Parliament: <http://www.parliament.uk/biographies/commons/mr-george-galloway/609> (see more on his own webpage): <http://www.georgegalloway.net/>

journalist contributing regular articles on a variety of socio-political issues which create much controversy. Galloway is a socialist campaigner who is famously critical to the UK, US, Israeli and Gulf policies especially in the Mideast Israeli-Palestinian conflict as his text clearly shows. His text appears in Information Clearing House<sup>193</sup>- an anti-US independent media source. It is based in America and was launched in 2001 “to correct the distorted perceptions provided by commercial media... a source of unreported or underreported news from around the globe” and operates under the banner: “Not for Profit- For Global Justice”<sup>194</sup>.

The translator is a Syrian citizen who works under a full-time capacity for the pro-regime Al-Thawrah Damascus-based newspaper (literally *The Revolution*) which is named after the revolutionary coup d'état staged by former President late Hafez al-Assad and his Baathist cohorts in 1970 under the banner of the Corrective Movement (Arabic: الحركة التصحيحية /al ḥarakah attaṣḥīḥiyah) which brought the elder Assad (then-defence minister) to office for three decades. She is a member in a big team of full-time translators who literally follow Al-Thawrah's political line and editorial control as the text's analysis will show below.

## I. Syntax

### 1. Modality

1. [Ø] Israel regularly shares its own chemical weapons stockpile with their neighbours in Gaza [...]. (A3, L24)

من المؤكد بأن لدى إسرائيل كميات كبيرة من مخزون الأسلحة الكيميائية وقد سبق لها وأن استخدمتها ضد جيرانها في غزة. (A4, L20)

BT: [It is certain that Israel has large amounts of chemical weapons stockpile and it has already used them against its neighbours in Gaza].

2. [Ø] Britain introduced chemical weapons to the middle east [sic] in the first place. (A3, L27)

من المعلوم بأن أول من استخدم الأسلحة الكيميائية في منطقة الشرق الأوسط كانت بريطانيا. (A4, L23)

BT: [It is a given that the first country which used chemical weapons in the Middle East was Britain].

---

<sup>193</sup> Adapted from its own website: <http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/who.htm>

<sup>194</sup> See more detailed information at: <http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/intent.htm>

As we have just shown, the ST producer has affinity with the Arab affairs especially the Palestinian question and is critical of Israel, US and the West including his own country (Britain). The translator, too, and the pro-government newspaper she works for, shares the same feelings. In these two excerpts, the translator introduced the ST statements by (new) modal structures that do not exist in the ST: [من المؤكد] (It is certain that) and [من المعلوم] (It is a given that) respectively and in two subsequently adjacent paragraphs in order to express those feelings and pursue her rhetorical purposes of emphasis and persuasion. Notice how the ST verb (shares) is rendered into [:لدى] ([has]) as well as the addition of [:كميات كبيرة من] ([large amounts of]) in the first example and how the verb (introduced) is re-lexicalised into [:أول من استخدم] ([the first country which used]) in the second example, which supports the rhetorical purposes of emphasis, exaggeration and persuasion included in the two instances of modality.

## II. Lexicon

### 1. Over-lexicalisation

1. *The west confined itself to disapproving words and calls for “restraint” on “both sides” – even though the victims were unarmed.* (A3, L4-5)

لكن الغرب وسائل إعلامه اكتفوا بإطلاق التصريحات الخجولة للتعبير عن رفضهم للأحداث التي يتعرض لها ذلك البلد في هذه المرحلة وأعربوا عن دعوتهم إلى ضرورة الالتزام بضبط النفس من الجانبين على الرغم من أن غالبية من لقوا حتفهم كانوا من المدنيين العزل. (A4, L3-4)

BT: [But the West and its media outlets confined themselves to **shy** disapproving words **to express their rejection of the on-going events in this country**, and calls for restraint on both sides although the majority of those who were killed was unarmed **civilians**].

The translator goes on with her pejorative stance towards the West and their media outlets. The source text expectedly (considering the background information provided above on its producer: George Galloway) shows criticism of the Western media concerning the chemical weapon heinous incident and neutral attitude towards its victims (unarmed). The translator, however, intensifies these two attitudes when she adds the ideologically motivated epithet (الخجولة): [shy] to the Western press statements with a lengthy wording which only renders the ST one-word item (disapproving): [للتعبير عن رفضهم للأحداث التي يتعرض لها ذلك البلد في هذه المرحلة] [to express their rejection of the on-going

events in this country]). She also emotionally engaged herself in the event when she added (المدنيين): [civilians] to the ST item (unarmed): [العزل] which functions to reap more sympathy from the intended targeted readership.

*2. It is entirely implausible that the Syrian regime chose the moment of the arrival of a UN chemical weapons inspection team to launch a chemical attack on an insurgency already suffering reverse after reverse.* (A3, L12-13)

هل يقبل عاقل أو من لديه القليل من القدرة على التفكير بأن القوات الحكومية السورية قد اختارت موعد وصول فريق الأمم المتحدة للتفتيش عن الأسلحة الكيميائية للقيام بشن هجوم كيميائي على متمردين يعيشون حالة من التراجع والانهيار يوماً إثر يوم ويغادرون من نكسة إثر أخرى. (A4, L9-10)

BT: [Does anyone with a sound mind or little ability to think accept that the Syrian governmental forces chose the moment of the arrival of a UN chemical weapons inspection team to launch a chemical attack on an insurgency already living reverse and collapse day after day and suffering Naksah after another].

In order to discredit the pro-opposition ‘insurgency’, the translator over-lexicalises the continuous defeats suggested in the ST by adding a synonymous cluster: [reverse and collapse].

Importantly, the TT word نكسة (setback and also synonymous to اخفاق) [failure], (هزيمة) [defeat] and انكسار [breaking], according to Al Ma'any Online Dictionary<sup>195</sup>) which renders the ST (reverse): [backwardness] should not be overlooked, and its historical context together with its impactful resonances in the Arab collective psyche should be considered. The term, available as an Naksah in English, is derived from the verb (نكّس) which associates with shame, disrepute and disappointment (Al Maany Online Dictionary: ibid). Arab Naksah (Day of the Setback June 5, 1967) (also known as the Six-day War (Arabic: حرب الأيام الستة), the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, the Third Arab-Israeli War, the June War) was fought between Israel and its Arab direct neighbours (Egypt, Jordan, and Syria) which were supported (by troops and arms) from Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Algeria. It marked the Arab defeat before Israel during the War and hammered the last nail in the nation’s coffin: in six days of a grinding war, Israel had gained control of the Palestinian Gaza Strip and the West Bank, the Egyptian Sinai Peninsula and the Syrian Golan Heights, which has affected the Arab (publics and elites') collective awareness and redrawn geopolitical map of the region until today. The translator's recourse to this term is not, therefore, ideologically insignificant: it means to

<sup>195</sup> <http://www.almaany.com/ar/dict/ar-ar/%D9%86%D9%83%D8%B3%D8%A9/>

further demonise the insurgent groups which fight the Syrian government which she (and her newspaper) unfalteringly supports.

## 2. Re-lexicalisation

*1. In the absence of conclusive evidence one would have to believe that the Assad regime was mad as well as bad to have launched such a chemical attack at a time when it is in less danger than it has been for almost a year. I do not believe that Bashar is mad. (A3, L16-18)*

في الحالة التي تغيب بها الأدلة القاطعة، يتعين علينا أن نعلم بأن النظام السوري ليس بالنظام الأحمق أو المتهور ليعدم إلى شن هجوم كيميائي في الوقت الذي أخذ الخطر بالانحسار مما كان عليه عليه منذ سنة ولا اعتقاده بأن الحكم في سوريا قد فقد قدرته على التفكير المتوازن ليلاجأ لهذا الأسلوب. (A4, L13-15)

BT: [In the absence of conclusive evidence, we must know that the Syrian regime is not mad as well as reckless to have launched such a chemical attack at a time when it is in less danger than it has been for almost a year. I do not believe at all that the **rule** in Syria **has lost its ability of balanced thinking** to opt for this option].

This excerpt is replete with a systematic occurrence of re-lexicalisation in service of the Syrian President in the first place. Notice how the translator re-lexicalises the ST (the Assad regime) into (يتعين علينا أن: (النظام السوري)) [the Syrian regime] introduced by stronger modality (one would have to: we must know that) clearly to show that the rule of the country is institutionalised rather than individualistic, thus driving away any indications of totalitarianism, unilateralism and absolutism<sup>196</sup>. In exactly similar vein, consider how the translator re-lexicalises the ST reference (Bashar) into (الحكم): [the rule] and (mad) into (قد فقد قدرته على التفكير المتوازن) [has lost its ability of balanced thinking] introducing both of them with an emphatic marker (البته): [surely/ at all] on her disbelief that the rule in Syria under President Bashar Al Assad is unbalanced.

*2. It is entirely implausible that the Syrian regime chose the moment of the arrival of a UN chemical weapons inspection team to launch a chemical attack on an insurgency already suffering reverse after reverse. (A3, L12-13)*

هل يقبل عاقل أو من لديه القليل من القدرة على التفكير بأن القوات الحكومية السورية قد اختارت موعد وصول فريق الأمم المتحدة للتفتيش عن الأسلحة الكيميائية للقيام بشن هجوم كيميائي على متربدين يعيشون حالة من التراجع والانهيار يوماً إثر يوم ويغادرون من نكسة إثر أخرى. (A4, L9-10)

BT: [Does anyone with a sound mind or little ability to think accept that **the Syrian governmental forces** chose the moment of the arrival of a UN chemical weapons inspection team to launch a chemical attack on an insurgency already living reverse and collapse day after day and suffering Naksah after another].

<sup>196</sup> Tellingly, this has been the case in Syria under the 4-decade Assads Baathist party dominated by the Alawite minority sect (11% of the Syrian people)- as I have shown in chapter three.

In continuation with her attitudinal position towards the Syrian government, the translator again relexicalises the ST (the Syrian **regime**) into (القوات الحكومية السورية): [the Syrian **governmental forces**] with a view to glamorising its image in the middle of the TT audience and adding more legitimacy to it (which has lost much respect since the start of the event in 2011).

### 3. Metaphor

*In Syria hundreds of people have just been slaughtered in circumstances which are entirely unclear.* (A3, L6)

أما في سوريا فقد قتل مئات من البشر في ظروف مبهمة لم يكشف النقاب عنها بعد، و قبل التوصل إلى وقائع مؤكدة تدين مرتكب تلك الجريمة النكراء وكشف الستار عن واقعها. (A4, L5-6)

BT: [In Syria hundreds of people have just been killed in circumstances which are unclear and whose veil has not been uncovered yet before arriving at confirmed evidence convicting those who committed this heinous crime and uncovering its veil].

In this excerpt, the Syrian people are the casualties of the famous chemical attack of August 21, 2013) only very few days after the massacre, which killed around 1500 persons and left thousands injured. This critical date of text production had seen mutual accusations between the government and the opposition for this crime. The Syrian government, although fingers of accusation had been pointed at them across the globe<sup>197</sup>, denied its responsibility. In order to add more (doses of) denial and draw international community's attention off the Syrian government, the translator altered the ST item (entirely: بالكامل) into a meaningful metaphorical expression which is not ideologically unmotivated: (لم يكشف النقاب عنها بعد): [whose veil has not been uncovered yet] and invented a similar one towards the end of the statement: (وكشف الستار عن واقعها): [and uncovering its veil] introduced with relevant items (underlined), which, taken together, strengthens the mystery around the event (of slaughtering hundreds of the Syrian people) and indirectly exonerates "her" government of this "heinous crime". Her pro-regime (or anti-opposition) "instincts" are also obvious in the headline which she hugely manipulates to serve specific pre-planned agendas, as I will show next in the conclusion.

---

<sup>197</sup> See stages one (context) and two (content) of text nine below: Geneva II talks: A test for diplomacy, on pages: 229-230.

## Conclusion

The translator of this text noticeably begins her managing the ST content very early when she re-writes the headline in service of the regime this time and de facto to disgrace its rival opposition. Notice how the translator chooses (or decides) to reframe the ST headline: “*Wag the Dog*<sup>198</sup>” – *The Sequel Set in Syria* into ([أسباب استخدام المتمردين في سوريا الأسلحة الكيميائية) [Reasons for Rebels’ Use of Chemical Weapons in Syria] which, by implication, exclusively (and unquestionably) holds the opposition’s rebels responsible for the use of chemical weapons and acquits the regime. The translator then goes on with supporting this early-declared position via a considerable number of syntactic and lexical strategies. She opts for Modality where she inserted two modal constructions (of her own and in a small chunk) to make more apparent the historically brutal usage of chemical arsenal by Israel and Britain, two historical enemies of the Syrian Ba’athist government which she (and her institution) staunchly supports.

Over-lexicalisation was heavily employed to achieve rhetorical purposes: sometimes to further blacken the image of the West and their media outlets that they shy away and do not lift a finger concerning the deaths of unarmed civilians in her country. In some other times, it is used to belittle the opposition and downplay its power. Re-lexicalisation was chiefly devoted to polish the face of the Syrian President. On all occasions, direct reference to the President or his government in the ST was re-lexicalised and bedewed creating a rosy image with much added emphasis. Metaphor was also resorted to in order to fulfill a key pragmatic goal and meet her ideological affiliations, amidst the muddle and confusion that engulfed the responsibility/accountability of the chemical attacks. In order to draw attention away from the Syrian government, the translator altered the ST straightforward item into a metaphorical expression and added a similar one within the same statement, which, by way of inference, presents the Syrian government guiltless.

---

<sup>198</sup> "Wag the dog" is a metaphor for the power of media and the naïve nature of people. It is usually used in contexts when things are done in completely the opposite, reverse manner in order to divert attention from an important matter towards a peripheral one: the tail is wagging the dog not the other way around.

### Text 3: Aleppo: What's Left Behind (Appendix 5)

حلب «مدينة رعب».. والنظام يمطر سكانها بـ«البراميل المتفجرة» (ملحق ٦)

#### Context & Content

This text was written and translated more than three years after the start of the uprising. It comes in the context of the Syrian government brutal attitude and uncalculated military operations, not least the overuse of Scud missiles and the recurrent recourse to the lethal barrel bombs tossed from helicopters on civilian-populated areas not only in Aleppo but also nationwide.

The source text producer, Hannah Lucinda Smith, is a British human right activist and a freelance conflict journalist who is currently reporting from the Syrian lands for ASharq Al-Awasat (literally The Middle East) and The Majalla (literally The Magazine)- both based in London. Smith “has worked on a number of high-profile investigations for Channel 4 and the BBC”<sup>199</sup>. Upon a phone conversation with ASharq Al-Awasat and The Majalla, I was told that the source text is prepared inside Syria, sent off to The Majalla to be translated by its team and disseminated in Asharq Al-Awsat<sup>200</sup>.

Asharq Al-Awsat describes itself as “the leading Arabic international paper... the world’s premier pan-Arab daily newspaper, printed simultaneously each day on four continents in 14 cities. Launched in London in 1978, Asharq Al-Awsat has established itself as the decisive publication on pan-Arab and international affairs, offering its readers in-depth analysis and exclusive editorials, as well as the most comprehensive coverage of the entire Arab world... Balanced and comprehensive, Asharq Al-Awsat is the preferred daily Arabic-language newspaper, with its readership penetrating all socio-economic groups. It is famous for conducting in-depth interviews with prominent and influential personalities. Asharq Al-Awsat’s news team provides its readers around the world with objective and impartial news coverage, cementing the journalistic integrity of the newspaper. Asharq Al-Awsat success and popularity can be attributed to its dedicated and experienced team of

<sup>199</sup> Adapted from her cutline provided by Asharq Al-Awsat daily underneath her article:

<http://www.aawsat.net/2014/04/article55330826>

<sup>200</sup> With Mr. Molhem Sabbagh: [m.sabbagh@asharqlawsat.com](mailto:m.sabbagh@asharqlawsat.com)

skilled journalists, editors and columnists, who have editorial talent and years of journalistic experience, as well as the motivation to report the news impartially<sup>201</sup>.

The Majalla (first appeared in London in 1980) publishes online in three languages: English, Arabic and Persian and is also available in an Arabic monthly print edition and an English bi-monthly digital one. According to its editor-in-chief Adel Al-Toraifi, it is “a current affairs magazine that brings the Arab World into focus for its international readership”. It “offers a wide array of articles addressing the most significant political, economic, and social issues facing the Middle East today, as well as the evolving cultural scene in the region [reflecting] on events unfolding in this often-misinterpreted part of the world”<sup>202</sup>.

## I. Lexicon

### 1. Over-lexicalisation

*“If one [barrel bomb] falls on an area that has one- or two-story buildings, it will destroy the whole street...,” said Khaled Hajou.* (A5, L52-26)

يقول خالد حجو «إذا سقط برميل متوجر في إحدى المناطق التي تضم مباني ذات طابق واحد أو طابقين، يدمّر هذا البرميل الشارع عن بكرة أبيه.

(A6, L23-24)

BT: [“If one [barrel bomb] falls on an area that has one- or two-story buildings, it will destroy street completely **one after another**...,” said Khaled Hajou].

From the very beginning (the headline), the translator has manifested her/his<sup>203</sup> attitudinal position towards the brutality of the Syrian government by focusing on the barrel bombs thrown from the helicopters on inhabited areas (as we will see under "Metaphor" shortly). In order to intensify the wholeness of the effects caused by those barrels and heighten their force, she/he renders the ST item (the whole) with some added exaggeration by an old famous Arab proverb (\*عن بكرة أبيه<sup>204</sup>). There is no question that proverbs are exceedingly impactful in human communication, i.e. they have strong effect/resonance on (text) receivers, perhaps especially in the Arab community's socio-political context. The TT proverb at hand, according to Arab rhetoricians (e.g. Azzamakh-shari (1987: 46; Al

<sup>201</sup> Off its own website: <http://www.aawsat.net/about-us>

<sup>202</sup> Off its own website: <http://www.majalla.com/eng/about-us>

<sup>203</sup> The translator is not specified; the translation is carried out by one of the Majalla's translation crew.

<sup>204</sup> As stated earlier under Prefatory Notes no. (4 & 5), on page: vii, this study does not trace linguistic errors in the translation (mistranslations) but rather normative behaviour of the translator (distranslations), it should be noted that the right (more accurate) wording of this famous Arabic proverb is (على بكرة أبيه) not (عن بكرة أبيه). See, for example, Al 'amely (1983: 151).

'amely (1983: 151), indicates systematic, complete, similar and consecutive movement (as in a pulley: [بكرة], i.e. something taking place similarly and completely- one after another and, in effect, connotes stronger implications of the content in question: the full destruction (one building after another in the street) triggered by the government's barrel bombs. Al 'amely (1983: 151) adds one more connotation of the proverb when he points out that it is used in the context of "all-inclusiveness, comprehensiveness" wherein each and every thing/one is included. This "perpetual cyclic and rotational" sense is reflected in the main constituent of the proverb (بكرة): [literally: pulley] which adds strong metaphorical tones to the proverb and, in effect, unnecessarily strengthens the meaning intended in the ST.

## 2. Re-lexicalisation

1. *Assad's forces have retaken the Norkareen neighborhood and pushed into Sheikh Najjar.*  
(A5, L62)

فقد استعادت قوات الأسد سيطرتها على حي نوركرين وتوغلت في حي الشيخ نجار. (A6, L55-56)

BT: [Assad's forces **have restored their dominance** of the Norkareen neighborhood and **penetrated** Sheikh Najjar].

The translator here re-lexicalises the ST action verb (pushed into) into another one that indicates an advanced stage of the action. According to (Al Maani Dictionary & Modern Arabic Language Dictionary), the verb (pushed into): which can possibly be back-translated into: [اندفعت إلى], is a verb used within the military context to refer to the beginning of entering a state to impose a hold over it whereas the verb (توغلت): [penetrated] refers to an advanced stage of the act of 'pushing into', (ibid). Thus, the TT action verb (توغلت): [penetrated] says more than the ST one (pushed into) intends to say, which is not ideologically unmotivated; it discredits the Assad's forces particularly their penetration into (and dominance' restoration of) the Norkareen neighborhood. In the same spirit, notice how the ST verb (retaken) [استعادت] is re-lexicalised, by adding a meaningful item (underlined) into (استعادت سيطرتها على) [restored their dominance over]; the TT could sound faithful without this added item (سيطرتها على) [their dominance over]. In other words, the source text's item: (*Assad's forces have retaken the Norkareen neighbourhood*) could possibly be rendered into Arabic

as (فقد استعادت قوات الأسد حي نوركرين) [Assad's forces have retaken the Norkareen neighbourhood], which is "similar" to the original text and, as a matter of course, bias-free.

*2. The city's doctors say they have no exact figures on the number of people who **have been killed** and injured by barrel bombs in Aleppo over the past four months. "We have no documentation, and many people **have died** in the streets without coming to hospital," one doctor told us. (A5, L70-72)*

يقول أطباء المدينة إنهم ليست لديهم إحصائيات دقيقة عن عدد الأشخاص الذين **لقوا مصرعهم** أو أصيبوا بجروح جراء قصف حلب بالبراميل المتفجرة على مدى الأشهر الأربعة الماضية. يقول أحد الأطباء «ليست لدينا أي عمليات توثيق للإصابات، وكثير من الناس **للقوا حتفهم في الشوارع** بسبب عدم نقاومهم إلى المستشفيات». (A6, L63-65)

BT: [The city's doctors say they have no exact figures on the number of people who **have faced their destiny** and injured by barrel bombs in Aleppo over the past four months. "We have no documentation, and many people **have faced their death** in the streets without coming to hospital," one doctor told us].

The translator re-lexicalises the ST items by way of euphemism<sup>205</sup>. S/he euphemises two verbs adding a positive reference to them: 'killing' and 'dying'. In so doing, s/he re-lexicalises both of them with two euphemistic terms respectively (لـ**للقوا حتفهم**) and (لـ**للقوا مصرعهم**) [facing their destiny/death] under the regime's 'showers of barrel bombs', which is added in the TT twice: in the headline and in the body of the text (A6, L16) as illustrated at length below under "Metaphor".

Farghal (1995: 369ff) in-depth investigates euphemism in both standard and dialectical forms in Arabic language from a sheer pragmatic prism. Deriving evidence from ample examples in Arabic, he traces how Arab translators process euphemistic/dysphemistic items when translated from English. He believes that lexical choices of language users are governed by social, cultural and contextual factors and that the Gricean maxims of the Cooperative principle (with that of 'quality' as the most adopted) and his Theory of Politeness influence the euphemistic expression in the Arabic communities. Farghal's pragmatic study concludes that Arab speakers opt for four main strategies when they tend to euphemism: figurative expressions, circumlocutions, remodellings and antonyms. The two re-lexicalised items in the present TT (لـ**للقوا حتفهم**) and (لـ**للقوا مصرعهم**) [facing their destiny/death] fall under death euphemisms in Arabic which have widely been investigated from a translational perspective, (Farghal 1995, Al-Shawi 2013, Shehab et al 2014, Ghounane 2014, etc.).

<sup>205</sup> Farghal (2012: 253) defines euphemism as: "[T]he act of replacing offensive words/expressions with favorable ones in communication in observance of the norms of politeness in a certain culture".

<sup>206</sup> Al Maani dictionary sees that both structures have the same semantic significance and euphemistic connotations: finding death.

Farghal and Shunnaq (1999: 107) state that "a lexical item could be pleasant to a certain receiver but unpleasant to another", which means that meaning of words is determined by socio-cultural context. Farghal (1995: 369) observes that reference to death/dying is the most frequently used euphemistic item in Arabic<sup>207</sup> arguing that "most native speakers of Arabic frequently shun the neutral lexical verb (مات) [to die] when making reference to the occurrence of death, in favour of one of a multitude of figurative euphemisms referring to the same thing" stripping the term of its dysphemism<sup>208</sup>. He (ibid: 370) holds that death euphemisms in Arabic "flout the maxim of quality, thus conversationally implicating that death in question is for the good of the deceased because he will go to heaven". Farghal (ibid) elaborates on this verb- particularly its euphemistic Arabic rendering (انقل إلى رحمة الله) [He transferred to the mercy of God], and concludes that euphemistic figurative expressions (produced in origins or re-produced/translated) are governed by context depending on how near and dear the deceased is.

The translator of the present text reflects some conformity with the TT cultural norms/conventions, which results in euphemising the two ST death expressions (by way of rewording the acts of killing and dying) for a pragmatic and ideologically-driven purpose: dramatising/sensationalising the ST item in order to garner more sympathy towards the 'victims' of the regime's showers of barrel bombs- that, one may argue, resides in the back of the translator's mind owing to her/his recurrently regular stance towards the Syrian regime- which can further be supported by the two instances under "Metaphor".

<sup>207</sup> Shehab et al (2014: 195) explanatorily elaborate on this frequent usage on socio-religious grounds/norms. They write: "In Arab culture, when a person dies, people should not speak negatively about them even if they were bad, and the common [colloquial] Arabic proverb (ما ينجوز عالميت إلا الرحمة) (i.e. never say anything bad about the deceased but wish them mercy [supports that]... In Islam, Muslims are instructed to always mention the good deeds of the dead, and never mention their bad deeds. This matter has, therefore, encouraged people in Arab and Muslim societies to introduce more euphemisms to express death. That is why a reader might find Arabic abounding in death euphemisms". However, this does not justify the translator's re-lexicalising the ST terms above: (have been killed) and (have died), and there are no stylistic constraints required by the Arabic TT, that is, she/he could respectively render them simply as: (ماتوا) and (مات) without adding the unnecessary sympathy-drawing euphemistic flavour embedded in: (لقوا حتفهم) (لدوا مصرعهم) and (لدوا مصرع).

<sup>208</sup> Death dysphemisms in Arabic are few and often colloquial: (نفق, هلك, فني, قُطس) whereas death euphemisms are many such as: (لقي حتفه, لقي مصرعه, أردى قتيلا, غاب, رحل, ذهب, غير, مضن, همس, توقي, توفاه الله, وفاة الأجل, وافته المنية, غيبة الموت, اختطفه هايم اللذات اختطفته يد المنون, مضى, قضى, قضى نحبه, أطعك عمره, اشتهي أجله, فارق الحياة, انطلق إلى الرفيق الأعلى, انطلق إلى رحمة الله, انطلق إلى جواره, ربه, لقي ربه, لفظ أنفاسه الأخيرة, وصل إلى الرمق الأخير, استلمت روحه لبارئها, أحضر, أحضر, حضره الموت).

### 3. Metaphor

Noticeably, the translator's recourse to metaphor marks the starker example on her/his ideological intervention. Strikingly, she/he opts for it twice: in the headline (which constitutes the *head* of the topic) and in the body of the TT (A16, L16-17) with a significantly meaningful addition: (وابل) [huge amounts/ overflow/ amplitude/ enormity]. Consider both examples below:

#### 1. Aleppo: *What's Left Behind* (The Headline (A5)

حلب «مدينة رعب».. والنظام يمطر سكانها بـ«البراميل المتفجرة» (A6)

BT: [Aleppo “a city of horror”.. **and the regime is showering its inhabitants with “barrel bombs”.**]

As it is clear, the translator reframes the headline and recycles it into a metaphorical construction which bears a significantly ideological overtones that can clearly be deduced from each constituent of the metaphorical construction: the verb (يمطر): [is showering]; the object: (سكانها): [its inhabitants] as well as the ‘proxy’ subject (البراميل المتفجرة): [barrel bombs]. Notice how s/he refers to the doer of this sordid, horrible deed as (النظام): [the regime]- a "dirty" term in today's socio-political dictionary-and introduced the added metaphor by a sympathy-drawing description of the Syrian city of Aleppo which is not suggested in the headline: (حلب «مدينة رعب»): [Aleppo “a city of horror”].

#### 2. Since December, President Bashar Al-Assad's forces have *littered* the city with barrel bombs-crude incendiaries filled with TNT and shrapnel. (A5, L18-19)

ومذ شهر ديسمبر (قانون الأول)، ما برح قوات الأسد تمطر المدينة بوابل من البراميل المتفجرة والقنابل الحارقة المليئة بمادة «تي إن تي» والأدوات المتفجرة المتشظية. (A6, L16-17)

BT: [Since December, Al-Assad's forces **have been showering** the city with **huge amounts of** barrel bombs -crude incendiaries filled with TNT and shrapnel].

Sequel to the recycled headline into an emotively metaphorical fashion, the translator re-opted for the same metaphor ([ما برح قوات الأسد تمطر المدينة ببابل من البراميل المتفجرة...]): Al-Assad's forces have been showering the city with huge amounts of barrel bombs...] with an addition that makes it more emotionally motivated: the word (وابل): [huge amounts/ overflow/ amplitude/ enormity] which also, according to a Quranic verse' interpretation (Ibn Katheer), indicates continuity and fastness (see the

footnote below<sup>209</sup>). Needless to say, these two metaphorical expressions (which are not originally suggested in the ST) distort the ST message, causing it to lose its intended meaning and, in effect, detour readers into different ideologically motivated directions. Importantly, notice how the ST honorific (President Bashar) is skipped in the TT which further reflects the translator's position towards him represented in lack of deference.

## Conclusion

Perhaps, the TT metaphorical constructions say most of the translator's intended message. This started in the headline as I have just shown under "Metaphor". The same metaphor, which impregnates an ideologically significant weight, was introduced again in the body of the TT with an addition that 'swells' the derogatory implicature it originally involves. By the same token and for the same purpose, the translation institution lexically managed the ST content by way of employing over- and re-lexicalisation which eventually link together to heighten the degree of cruelty orchestrated by the Syrian military apparatus (showering the Aleppo's unarmed civilians with huge amounts of barrel bombs) and draw more sympathy towards those unarmed civilians and the opposition's just cause.

## Texts 4 & 5<sup>210</sup>: Is Syria Finished? (Appendix 7)

هل انتهت سوريا؟ [TT1] (ملحق ٨)

هل انتهى أمر سوريا؟ [TT2] (ملحق ٩)

### Context & Content

This text was produced (and reproduced/translated) within the context of the international fears about then-likely intentions of the Syrian government to use, on a wide scale, chemical weapons against opposition-controlled areas. It was written in July 2013- a few weeks before the regime

<sup>209</sup> The term is famously used in the Holy Qur'an when God likens those who render their charity (Sadaqah) in vain by reminders of their generosity as a smooth rock on whose surface there is soil; on it falls heavy, fast and non-stopping rain (rainstorm) to become hard and soilless: (فَمِثْلُهُ كَمَثْلٍ صَفْوَانٍ عَلَيْهِ تُرَابٌ فَأَصَابَهُ وَابْلَقَ فَرَزَّهُ صَلْدٌ) [“His likeness is as the likeness of a rock whereon a dust of earth; a rainstorm smiteth it, leaving it smooth and bare” Al Baqarah 264] (Pickthal’s translation). In Standard Modern Arabic, the term (وابل) is metaphorically used in several contexts to mean enormity and fastness as in the following collocational pattern:

[أَمْطَرَ بُوَابِلَ مِنَ الشَّتَامِ الرَّصَاصِ النَّبْرَانِ].

<sup>210</sup> There are two translations of this text which will be referred to as (TT1 & TT2). This allows holding TT1-TT2 comparisons in line with the purpose of this study.

allegedly used the chemical arsenal in several parts in the country, most serious of which was the Ghouta massacre on August 21, 2013 which killed nearly 1,500 unarmed civilians, many of them elderly, women and children<sup>211</sup>. The Syrian government and the opposition have accused each other of using chemical weapons, and both have denied it. UN reports did not initially specify whether the government or opposition groups were responsible for the alleged attacks. However, in September 2013, The U.N. Security Council adopted a resolution to enforce the deal, brokered by the United States and Russia, which requires the State of Syria to account fully for its chemical weapons and for the arsenal to be removed and destroyed by mid-2014.<sup>212</sup> The Hague-based Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons had been charged with supervising the elimination of Syria's chemical arsenal. In December 2013, investigations of the UN's Facts Finding Committee emphasised, in an 82-page report, that "the deadly nerve gas sarin was used" irrespective of the perpetrator(s)<sup>213</sup>.

The Source text and the second translation (TT2) appear in The Washington Institute- a pro-US administration strategic research centre whose mission, according to its own website footnoted below, is "to advance a balanced and realistic understanding of American interests in the Middle East and to promote the policies that secure them". The Institute argues that "in addition to an ongoing focus on our traditional research areas, [it] is dedicating new resources to assist the U.S. government in understanding and countering the destructive elixir of Islamist extremism, terrorism, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction- particularly nuclear weapons"<sup>214</sup>.

The source text producer is Ambassador Dennis Ross- a famous American political figure. He is counsellor and William Davidson Distinguished Fellow at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Prior to returning to the Institute in 2011, he served two years as special assistant to President Obama and National Security Council senior director for the Central Region, and a year

---

<sup>211</sup> Washington Post (30-08-2013): [http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nearly-1500-killed-in-syrian-chemical-weapons-attack-us-says/2013/08/30/b2864662-1196-11e3-85b6-d27422650fd5\\_story.html](http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nearly-1500-killed-in-syrian-chemical-weapons-attack-us-says/2013/08/30/b2864662-1196-11e3-85b6-d27422650fd5_story.html)

<sup>212</sup> Watch the confirmation of their use by the UN Secretary General:

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XoyEmIArWhE> .

<sup>213</sup> BBC News on 13-12-2013/ (Middle East Page): <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-25360088>

<sup>214</sup> Off its website: <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/about/mission-and-history> .

as special advisor to Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton. For more than twelve years, Ambassador Ross played a leading role in shaping U.S. involvement in the Middle East peace process and dealing directly with the parties in negotiations under both the George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton administrations (respectively as director of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff and Special Middle East Coordinator), in addition to several senior positions in the US diplomacy for more than two decades. Ross is the author of several influential books on the peace process, most recently *Myths, Illusions, and Peace: Finding a New Direction for America in the Middle East* (2009), co-authored with David Makovsky; *The Missing Peace: The Inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace* (2004) as well as *Statecraft, and How to Restore America's Standing in the World* (2007)<sup>215</sup>.

The first translation (TT1) was carried out and published by the translation unit in The Arab Orient Centre- for Strategic and Civilization Studies which is based in London. The Centre presents itself as “an alternative to the Arabic and Islamic modern political discourse with special focus on the human element in society and asymmetric power relations”<sup>216</sup>. It has almost exclusively reflected on the on-going events in Syria. Its director, Zuhair Salem, a senior leader of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria and one ‘saved’ victim of the 1982 government-brotherhood crisis- the Hama massacre where at least 20, 000 civilians lost their lives) is an anti-regime thinker who described President Bashar Al Assad as “war criminal... [who] should be subjected to a fair trial”<sup>217</sup>. For our context, Salem was critical of the US stance on the chemical weapons continuous use in his country (March-August 2013)<sup>218</sup>. The translator (whom I anonymise for ethical (security and safety) reasons), is also a “victim of the Hama massacre orchestrated by Assad senior- during which his father was arrested for two years (1980-1982) and was brutally tortured to death in 1982”, (Personal conversation with him and the director of the Centre).

---

<sup>215</sup> Off his personal page: <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/experts/view/ross-dennis> .

<sup>216</sup> Adapted from its website [my translation]: <http://www.ashraqalarabi.org.uk/about.aspx> .

<sup>217</sup> Middle East Monitor (07-01-203): <https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/news/middle-east/4942-muslim-brotherhood-brands-assad-as-a-qwar-criminal>

<sup>218</sup> Syria's Muslim Brotherhood criticises Washington's stance on 'chemical weapons':

<https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/news/middle-east/5855-syrias-muslim-brotherhood-criticises-washingtons-stance-on-chemical-weapons> .

Before I embark on both texts' comparative analysis, it is useful to note that both TTs (i.e. TT1 & TT2) are taken on board to validate, inter alia, the fact that a translation (as an output- a finished product) is a reflection of a wide range of personal, political, socio-cultural and professional norms- which spawn it and govern its production. As you will see, all instantiations in TT1 are externally managed on both syntactic and lexical levels to pursue certain agendas that serve the Opposition to which the translator and the publisher pertain. This is not the case in TT2 which provides a bias-free account and justifiably remains faithful to the ST (and the US interests) given that it is written by a pro-American and a veteran official in a number of consecutive US administrations and published in a pro-American media outlet- as I have just shown.

## I. Syntax

### 1. Modality

*Its [US] hesitancy to take more direct action is understandable given the fractious nature of the opposition, but the cost of failing to influence the balance of power between the opposition and the Syrian regime could be high. (A7, L8-10)*

ترددها في اتخاذ إجراءات مباشرةً أمر مفهوم بالنظر إلى انقسام المعارضة، ولكن كلفة الفشل في التأثير على توازن القوة ما بين المعارضة والنظام السوري سوف تكون مكلفة. (TT1/ A8, L5-7)

BT: [Its hesitancy to take direct actions is understandable given the fraction of the opposition, but the cost of failing to influence the balance of power between the opposition and the Syrian regime will be costly].

ورغم أن ترددتها في اتخاذ إجراءات أكثر مباشرةً أمراً مفهوماً نظراً للطبيعة المنقسمة للمعارضة، إلا أن تكلفة العجز عن التأثير على توازن القوى بين المعارضة والنظام السوري قد يكون مرتفعاً. (TT2/ A9, L6-7)

BT: [Despite its hesitancy to take more direct actions is understandable given the fractious nature of the opposition, but the cost of failing to influence the balance of power between the opposition and the Syrian regime could be high]. (Accurate translation- "similar" to the ST).

A quick glance at TT1 will show the translator's position towards the US. The ST's producer, who is loyal to the US administration- as I have shown in the first stage of analysis- justifies America's unwillingness to settle the conflict in Syria and warns against the price of failing to do so. He communicates this message by resorting to a modal construction (could be) which connotes probability and uncertainty. These connotations are manipulated in TT1 and altered into a state of factualness, definiteness and certainty: (سوف تكون) [will be]) that entails no further possible

interpretations. This alteration is not ideologically insignificant; it indisputably ascertains America's reluctance in striking a balance of power between both conflicting parties which the ST does not really intend to display. To further cement his rhetorical purpose, the translator does three other things: first, notice how he skips the intensifier (more) and renders the ST's (more direct action), into [اجراءات مباشرة] (direct actions). Clearly, the ST item indicates that America already takes direct actions but they only need to be '*more* direct' while the TT (TT1) rendering implies that US only takes indirect actions which rise to the level of indecisiveness, reluctance and irresolution. Second, it is likely that the translator, a pro-opposition as shown above, does not wish to show the depth of fragmentation in the opposition when he renders the ST's "the fractious *nature* of the opposition" into simply [النقسام المعارضة] (the fraction of the opposition) skipping the word 'nature' to partially cover the severity of divide in the middle of the opposition and save part of its face. Third, observe how he rewords the ST epithet (high) into [مكلفة] (costly) for the same rhetorical purpose he wishes to communicate via his emphatic modal structure, which may fall under the lexical strategy of Re-lexicalisation.

By way of comparison, notice the bias-free account offered by The Washington Institute (TT2), where the ST originally appears (i.e. both ST and TT2 are published in the same source, (to which the ST producer is a counselor and which is keen to polish the US foreign policy's image). All manipulated items in the TT1, provided by an anti-America translator and an anti-America institution as shown earlier, are rendered faithfully in the second (pro-American) one and exactly convey the same ST content. In addition to providing an exact version for the ST modal (could be) which carries the same semantic value: (قد يكون): [could be], the ST quantifier (more) and (nature) are not skipped neither is the epithet (high) reworded; it is rendered as [مرتفعاً] (high)- unlike the case in the biased TT1: [مكلفة] (costly)- as TT2 and its [back-translation] under this example above clearly show.

## **2. At this stage, it might appear almost too late for the United States to have an influence on the Syrian crisis. (A7, L15-16)**

في هذه المرحلة، ربما يبدو أن الوقت فات لكي يكون للولايات المتحدة أي تأثير على الأزمة السورية (TT1/ A8, L10)

BT: [At this stage, **it might appear too late** for the United States to have any influence on the Syrian crisis].

وفي هذه المرحلة، ربما يبدو وكان الوقت قد فات بحيث لا تستطيع الولايات المتحدة أن تؤثر على الأزمة السورية.  
 (TT2/ A9, L10)

BT: [At this stage, **it might appear almost too late** for the United States to have an influence on the Syrian crisis]. (Accurate translation- "similar" to the ST).

In continuation with his extrinsic syntactic managing of the ST modality configured in example one above, the translator (of TT1) here has gone on with depicting a negative image of the US influence in bridging the gap between the two rival parties in the Syrian crisis. While the ST signifies a room for optimism concerning this ‘influence’, the TT (TT1) presents a gloomy, hopeless and pessimistic picture. Observe carefully how the translator omits the expressive intensifier (almost) which, as a consequence, misrepresents the ST content involved in the US “lateness” in marching towards resolving the crisis in Syria: (ربما يبدو أن الوقت فات): [it might appear too late]. Despite the existence of (ربما يبدو) [it might appear] in the text (TT1), this translator’s annulment of any chance on the part of the US, introduced by the emphatic marker (أن) not the less emphatic one (كأن) as in TT2), is also strengthened by rendering (an influence) into (أي تأثير): [any influence]) which similarly zeroes America’s possible (positive) role in the crisis.

Contrastively, consider how TT2 offers a disinterestedly impartial account of the ST message, without adding to it or distracting from it. Together with its English counterpart, it tends to demonstrate a relatively non-negative image of the American administration vis-à-vis its positive role in the international political affairs, as I have shown above. The maintenance of the ST (almost: [وكان] and of (an influence: [أن تؤثر]) no longer shows absoluteness or hopelessness concerning that role but rather indicates some optimism- as TT2 and its [back-translation] under this example above clearly show.

Interestingly, and within the same paragraph, reference to the topic word ‘influence’ in TT1, unlike TT2, is minimised to the absolute. For instance, the ST (much impact) which indicates a sizeable level of impacting is brought down to the absolute minimum (ذلك الآخر): [that/any impact]) implying

that there is ‘little or no impact’ whereas TT2 communicates exactly the same semantic weight included in the ST when it renders it as (تأثير كبير): [much impact] implying that there exists ‘an impact’ but it is not ‘much’:

**ST:** *To be sure, providing small amounts of lethal assistance will not have much impact on the situation.* (A7, L16-17)

(**TT1:**) ولمزيد من التأكيد فإن تقديم عدد قليل من الأسلحة الفتاكـة لن يكون له ذلك الأثر [that/any impact] على الوضع هناك. (A8, L10-11)

(**TT2:**) ويقيناً, إن تزويد كميات صغيرة من المساعدات الفتاكـة سوف لن يكون لها تأثير كبير [much impact] على الوضع. (A9, L10-11)

## II. Lexicon

### 1. Over-lexicalisation

*The once-peaceful opposition to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's deeply entrenched and powerful Ba'ath Party regime has escalated into armed resistance and, finally, a brutal civil war-one that has now claimed close to 100,000 lives.* (A7, L2-4)

المعارضة التي كانت سلمية يوما ما لنظام حزب البعث الراسخ والقوى برئاسة بشار الأسد تطورت إلى مقاومة مسلحة، وفي النهاية إلى حرب أهلية بشعة، وصل عدد ضحاياها إلى ما يقرب من ١٠٠٠٠ قتيل. (**TT1:** A8, L2-3)

BT: [The once-peaceful opposition under [...] Bashar al-Assad's deeply entrenched and powerful Ba'ath Party regime has escalated into armed resistance and, finally, a brutal civil war- whose **victims'** number has almost reached 100000 (\*killed persons: deaths)].

فقد تصاعدت حدة المعارضة - التي كانت سلمية في يوم من الأيام - ضد نظام حزب البعث الراسخ والقوى تحت قيادة الرئيس السوري بشار الأسد إلى أن أصبحت مقاومة مسلحة، وأخيراً إلى حرب أهلية وحشية حصدت حتى الآن ما يقرب من 100,000 شخص. (**TT2:** A9, L2-3)

BT: [The once-peaceful opposition under the leadership of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's deeply entrenched and powerful Ba'ath Party regime has escalated into armed resistance and, finally, a brutal civil war- one that has now claimed close to 100,000 **person**]. (Accurate translation- "similar" to the ST).

First of all, you might have observed how the English ST natural syntactic order (SVO) is presented in the Arabic TT1 whose syntactic order naturally follows the VSO pattern. The translator's foregrounding of the ‘opposition’, which is not the case in TT2, could mean to highlight its peaceful character and, by way of inference, disgrace “Bashar al-Assad's deeply entrenched and powerful Ba'ath Party regime” which has driven the opposition towards “armed resistance” and, a “brutal civil war”. This, one can assume, is a pro-opposition slanted rendition where there are no TT stylistic requirements: it involves much empathy and sympathy in that not only does the translator

voice his compassion for those (100, 000) victims killed by the regime, but also he indirectly invites his readers to exhibit their emotional involvement, unlike TT2 which offers a highly neutral account (شخص: [person]). Not only can this emotional engagement (and invitation) be evidenced through the insertion of a highly emotive term in a pluralised form (ضحاياها): [its victims], but also, perhaps more significantly, by the exaggerative emotional weight of (قتيل) [(is) killed] in Arabic which has no one-to-one correspondence in English. Therefore, some explanation for this ideologically significant term is needed.

The word (قتيل) is one of the many exaggeration forms (صيغة المبالغة) in Arabic morphology and is considered by Arabic morphologists as one of the highest forms of exaggeration. Unlike its ‘twin form’ (مقتول): [(is) killed], it is context-oriented and its function only describes the act of killing and may not necessarily mean it has actually taken place. According to the Arabic rhetoric<sup>219</sup>, the functional significance of (قتيل): [(is) killed] is mainly two-fold: it over-magnifies the meaning embodied in the epithet in question making it sound more dramatic, on the one hand, and actualised, on the other, which can be back-translated verbatim as [\*certainly and regrettably killed]<sup>220</sup>. In so doing, the translator, together with the addition of (ضحاياها): [victims] and (بِرُّتَّه): [as a whole] in the end of the paragraph (A8, L4), highlights the range of the repercussions of the escalatory state and over-exaggerates, with much sympathy, the meaning of the ‘human casualties’ caused by the Syrian government. Notice how the translator explicates this attitudinal position towards President Bashar Al Assad when he skipped the ST “Syrian President” and reframed it as simply (برئاسة بشار الأسد): [under the presidency of Bashar Al Assad] which shows less deference than that intended in ST, unlike the case in TT2 which renders it in a more positive fashion giving the President similar credits: (تحت قيادة الرئيس السوري بشار الأسد): [under the leadership of the Syrian President Bashar al-Assad) - as TT2 and its [back-translation] under this example above clearly show.

---

<sup>219</sup> Arabic historical records narrate a famous story between Abdullah Ibn Azzobair and his mother which reveals this difference between both terms (قتيل & مقتول). On the eve of a battle, the son concluded a long conversation with his mother before seeing her off saying: (أماه إبني مقتول من يومي هذا): [Oh mother, I am going to be likely killed as of today] which took place in that battle days later.

<sup>220</sup> Watch this (Arabic) video on the main difference between (قتيل & مقتول): <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eHm0dPbZsUs>

## 2. Re-lexicalisation

1. To be sure, providing small amounts of **lethal assistance** will not have much impact on the situation. Iran and Hezbollah are determined to keep Assad in power, even to the point of using their own forces. As such, the U.S. will need to do more to make sure that the provision of **lethal assistance** can affect the balance of power. (A7, L16-19)

ولمزيد من التأكيد فإن تقديم عدد قليل من الأسلحة الفتاكه لن يكون له ذلك الأثر على الوضع هناك. إيران وحزب الله مصممون على إبقاء الأسد في السلطة، حتى لو تطلب الأمر استخدام قواتهم. على هذا النحو، على الولايات المتحدة القيام بالمزيد لضمان أن تقديم الأسلحة الفتاكه يمكن أن يكون له أثر على توازن القوى. (TT1/ A8, L10-12)

BT: [For further assertion, providing a small number of **lethal weapons** will not have that impact on the situation. Iran and Hezbollah are determined to keep Assad in power, even to the point of using their own forces. As such, the U.S. will need to do more to make sure that the provision of **lethal weapons** can affect the balance of power].

ويقيناً، إن تزويـد كميات صغيرة من المساعـدات الفتاكـة [سوف لن<sup>٢٢١</sup>] يـكون لها تأثير كبير على الوضـع. فـإـیران و «ـحـزـبـالـلهـ» عازـمـانـ عـلـىـ إـبـقاءـ الأـسـدـ فـيـ السـلـطـةـ، حتـىـ إـلـىـ حدـ استـخـدـامـ قـوـاتـهـماـ الـخـاصـةـ. وـ عـلـىـ هـذـاـ النـوـحـ، سـوفـ تـحـتـاجـ الـوـلـاـتـ الـمـتـحـدـةـ إـلـىـ بـذـلـ المـزـيدـ مـنـ الجـهـدـ لـلـتـأـكـيدـ مـنـ أـنـ توـفـيرـ الـمـسـاعـدـاتـ الـفـتـاكـةـ يـمـكـنـ أـنـ يـؤـثـرـ عـلـىـ تـواـزـنـ الـقـوـىـ. (TT2/ A9, L10-13)

BT: [To be sure, providing small amounts of **lethal assistance** will not have much impact on the situation. Iran and “Hezbollah” are determined to keep Assad in power, even to the point of using their own forces. As such, the U.S. will need to do more to make sure that the provision of **lethal assistance** can affect the balance of power]. (Accurate translation- "similar" to the ST).

In this excerpt, the translator of TT1 alters the ST proposition in such a way that possibly feeds into his own pragmatic goals; the word ‘assistance’, which occurs twice in collocation with a strong epithet ‘lethal’, is re-lexicalised into ‘weapons’, which adds powerful associations and, to some extent, discredits America: (the ST producer, the senior American official, uses US "assistance" not "weapons" as offered in TT1, not TT2 which transfers the ST content impartially). This recurrent re-lexicalisation in TT1 (twice in a small chunk), given the translator’s ideological affiliations and the pro-opposition stance of his agency he works for, could be attributable to an intention to divert attention towards the necessity to arm the opposition fighting troops and strike a balance of power between the opposition and the regime. See how he introduces the relevant statement with added emphasis (ولمزيد من التأكيد) [For further assertion] followed by two other minimising signifiers: (عدد قليل sing.): [a small number of]) and (ذلك الأثر) [that impact]) which, conversely, implies that only a big number of lethal weapons is needed to have much impact on the situation. On the other hand,

<sup>221</sup>According to Abu Al ‘ainain’s Dictionary of Common Syntactic, Linguistic and Morphological Mistakes (2011: 375), this structure **\*سوف لن**): [will not] is not accurate in Arabic language, i.e. there is no need for the future marker (**سوف**) because it cannot precede negative constructions but exclusively positive ones, that is, the negative future tense in Arabic is only achieved by (**لن**): [not]. Nonetheless, quality/accuracy (linguistic error identification) of the translation *per se* is not the concern of the present study.

observe how TT2 remains loyal to the ST and provides an undistorted message - as TT2 and its [back-translation] under this example above clearly show.

*2. Not only must the opposition become more credible and less divided.* (A7, L42-43)

ليس على المعارضة أن تكون أكثر مصداقية و[أكثـر] توحدـاً فقط. (TT1/ A8, L26)

BT: [Not only must the opposition be more credible and '**more**' unified].

فليـس فقط يـجب أن تـصبح المـعـارـضـة أـكـثـر مـصـدـاقـيـة وـأـقـل انـقـسـاماـ. (TT2/ A9, L28)

BT: [Not only must the opposition become more credible and **less divided**].  
(Accurate translation- "similar" to the ST).

This is new conclusive evidence on the (TT1) translator's pro-opposition tendencies shown so far on several occasions in his text. Appreciate the way he re-lexicalises the apparent negativity impregnated in the ST (less divided) and offers an inherently positive structure ([and 'more' unified] instead, thus drawing attention off the opposition's divide. A comparison with TT2 will show an exact reproduction of the ST intended content in question. This, like all other examples, may in part be justifiably attributed to the fact that both ST and TT2 pertain to the same institution/publisher- the Washington Institute, where a similar version is expected to be retained:

فليـس فقط يـجب أن تـصبح المـعـارـضـة أـكـثـر مـصـدـاقـيـة وـأـقـل انـقـسـاماـ. (TT2/ A9, L28)

BT: [Not only must the opposition become more credible and **less divided**].  
(Accurate translation- "similar" to the ST).

*3. But the loss of control over Syria's chemical weapons could have catastrophic implications for everyone.* (A7, L52-53)

ولـكـن فقدـان السيـطـرة عـلـى السـلاح الكـيـماـيـيـ في سورـيا يـمـكـن أن يـكـون لـه تـداـعـيـات كـارـثـيـة عـلـى الجـمـيع. (TT1/ A8, L32)

BT: [But the loss of control over chemical weapons in Syria could have catastrophic **repercussions** for everyone].

ولـكـن فقدـان السيـطـرة عـلـى الأـسـلـحة الـكـيـمـيـائـيـة في سورـيا يـمـكـن أن يـكـون لـه آـثـار كـارـثـيـة عـلـى الجـمـيع (TT2/ A9, L34-35)

BT: [But the loss of control over chemical weapons in Syria could have catastrophic **implications** for everyone]. (Accurate translation- "similar" to the ST).

As can be seen, the ST item (implications), which suggests a probable result (notice the modal that directly precedes it (could have), is re-lexicalised in TT1 by a stronger term- which often occurs in a

pluralised form and is negative in its own face value in Arabic language- (تداعيات) [repercussions], which also occurs in a plural form in English "(usu. repercussions)"- according to Concise Oxford English Dictionary (2002: 712). This TT1 term readily suggests unintended or unwelcome consequences of an action or event and connotes more complicated aftereffects (complications) than the ST term (implications: [آثار])<sup>222</sup>. Concise Oxford English Dictionary (*ibid*) defines ‘implication’ as “the implicit conclusion that can be drawn from something- a likely consequence”, and provides three interrelated definitions for ‘repercussion’. These are: “1. (usu. repercussions) a consequence of an event or action. 2. (*archaic*) the recoil of something after impact. 3. (*archaic*) an echo or reverberation” (*ibid*: 1213)<sup>223</sup>. In so doing, the translator re-lexicalises the ST term loading it with semantic overabundances in order to serve the rhetorical purpose that resides in the back of his mind from the start of his argumentation: to blacken the image of the Syrian government precisely within the context of the potential ramifications of using chemical weapons<sup>224</sup>. By way of comparison, notice the unbiased account provided in TT2:

ولكن فقدان السيطرة على الأسلحة الكيميائية في سوريا يمكن أن تكون له آثار كارثية على الجميع. (TT2/ A9, L34-35)

BT: [But the loss of control over chemical weapons in Syria could have catastrophic **implications** for everyone]. (Accurate translation- "similar" to the ST).

## Conclusion

To begin with, I should remind you that the focus of this analysis has dominantly been placed on TT1; TT2 has been taken on board for comparative purposes between two different stances concerning a subject of the current events in Syria: a pro-opposition (TT1) and a pro-American (and, by implication, anti-regime: TT2). This is because TT2 ‘institutionally’ renders an ‘in-house’ text written by a "heavyweight" top official of the institution: the Washington Post, which means,

<sup>222</sup> Etymologically, the term develops from the realm of Medicine meaning ‘repressing of infection’- according to Concise Oxford English Dictionary (2002: 1213).

<sup>223</sup> One can safely argue that these senses, and their relevant run-ons, intimately resonate with such ‘similar’ terms to the TT term: (تداعيات)، (عواقب، تبعات، ارتدادات، انعكاسات)، (etc.)”.

<sup>224</sup> See how a similar construction which occurs within the same context (Potential dangers of Syria's chemical arsenal) in text 10: "Assad's Chemical Romance" is also re-lexicalised by the translator, which adds a heavier weight to the ST intended message:

- (ST: disastrous *outcomes*) A18, L32.
- TT: (عواقب كارثية) /A19, L26.
- BT: [disastrous consequences].

one can conclude, an impartial, bias-free rendition is most certainly likely: the ST intended message should be "faithfully" conveyed without adding to it or deducting from it. This, however, does not prevent the translator (of TT2) to manage her/his product on some occasions in such a way that serves the US national/strategic interests and save its own face. For instance, consider how she/he adds (‘أو انطباعات خاطئة’ / TT2/ A9, L17): [or flawed impressions] to pursue such an ideologically significant purpose. Notice also her/his reference to America as ([الادارة الامريكية / The American administration], often positive, unlike regime, in the line that follows (TT2/ A9, L18) as well as in a few lines thereafter (TT2/ A9, L22), and then compare it with the TT1 reference: ([الادارة / administration] and ([الولايات المتحدة / The United States]) in lines (TT1/ A8, L17 & 20) respectively.

In a similar vein, theme-rheme structure has been utilised to serve the same agenda; while TT1 foregrounds (The United States) in the context of accusing it of reluctance to settle the conflict (TT1/ A8, L5), TT2 back-grounds it (TT2/ A9, L5) to cover direct reference to it. Conversely, TT1 places the Syrian president in an initial position two times, *viz.*, (TT1/ A8, L8 ‘within the same paragraph; and L30), which is not the case in TT2 (A9, L8 & 32 respectively)- arguably because it is not as concerned with President Bashar’s rule as TT1 being produced by a pro-opposition translator whose father was tortured to death by Assad senior in 1982, and published by an institution run by a Muslim brotherhood senior leader who was “hit by the same stick” and forcibly exiled by the regime in 1982- as shown during the external stage of analysis. Thus, it has been found that every translation acts in line with different set of (personal, socio-political, professional) norms and provides its own account in such a way that glamorises its position, legitimises its options or, conversely, conceals the ugly side of its sordid conduct in relation to the main topic of the text.

Thus, the translator of TT1 has manipulated the tactfulness of the ST producer, veteran ambassador Dennis Ross, which resulted in a deformation of the diplomatic overtones of his text. In other words, he, as afore-exemplified, has syntactically and lexically managed the ST overall content, backed by a number of other textual markers such as pluralisation and content organisation, and

geared his readership towards his own world experience. More precisely, the TT1 translator has operated on many fronts within three interdependent directions that could meet his recurrent rhetorical purposes and pragmatic goals he shows throughout the whole text: a. glorifying the opposition (Re-lexicalisation; 'examples 1 & 2'); b. dishonouring the US (Modality; 'examples 1 & 2', Re-lexicalisation; example 1) as well as c. devaluing the Syrian leadership (Over-lexicalisation; example 1, Re-lexicalisation; example 3') - as I have explained at length above.

## **TEXT 6: How Obama Chose War Over Peace in Syria (Appendix 10)**

**عندما اختار أوباما الحرب بدل السلام في سوريا!! (ملحق ١١)**

### **Context & Content**

This text reflects on the role which President Obama's administration has played in the Syrian 'uprising'. It precisely argues Obama's 'war lust' (A10, L75) manifested in his administration's different forms of involvement in Syria, not least by "funneling and distributing massive shipments of weapons to the rebels" (A10, L9) which has 'plunged' the country into chaos and left it awash with blood for four years now. The text at hand should be read within two main contexts to which reference by its producer is heavily made: it was written (and translated) in the immediate wake of the Arab summit held in Qatar on March 26-27, 2013, which had involved much wrangling on the representation of the Arab Republic of Syria whose seat was suspended a few months after the uprising (November, 2011) "over its failure to end the bloodshed caused by brutal government crackdowns on pro-democracy protests"<sup>225</sup>, and given to the opposition, which angered the government and its supporters<sup>226</sup>. Another resultant context within which the text should be received is the Syrian leadership's consistent allegations of an US-led, Arab-endorsed global conspiracy that seeks to downfall the "sovereign nation" of Syria, especially those claimed by President Bashar himself in 2012<sup>227</sup>.

---

<sup>225</sup> The Guardian (12-11-2011): <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/nov/12/syria-suspended-arab-league>

<sup>226</sup> BBC NEWS (on the day of the summit- video & report: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-21936731>

<sup>227</sup>President Assad's 2-hour third televised address since the eruption of the uprising in March 2011, broadcast live from Damascus University: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-16483548>

The source text writer, Shamus Cooke is an American social service worker, trade unionist, and writer for Workers Action<sup>228</sup>. His opinion articles noticeably reflect an overtly opposing position against the Obama's administration<sup>229</sup>- which may explain the translator's (and her agency's) inclusion/exclusion policy, or, put in translational terms, 'Preliminary Norms'<sup>230</sup>: nominating the to-be-translated texts that feed into their rhetorical/pragmatic purposes and ideological affiliations. The text's translator is a Syrian citizen who works for the pro-regime Al-Thawrah Damascus-based newspaper, which is a staunch ally to the decades-old (Assads') Ba'thist rule in the country.

Counter Punch Magazine (1996-present) is a monthly 28-page investigative and scandal mongering publication based in California, America. Its founders, Cockburn and St. Clair (2007: 383) wrote that in founding Counter Punch, we "had wanted it to be the best *muckraking* newsletter in the country [USA]<sup>231</sup>"; [my emphasis]. The Magazine, available both in print form and as a digital edition, is critical to the American successive administrations' foreign policies.

## I. Syntax

### Nominalisation

*With Syria on the brink of national genocide, outside nations have only two options: help reverse the catastrophe or plunge this torn nation deeper into the abyss.* (A10, L1-2)

الشعب السوري على شفا إبادة وطنية جماعية والأمم الدولية تملك خيارين: إما تقديم المساعدة لحظر الكارثة ، أو إغراق هذا البلد، الذي عملت على تمزيقه أعمق، نحو الهاوية. (A11, L1-2)

BT: [With the Syrian people on the brink of national genocide, outside nations have only two options: help reverse the catastrophe or plunge this country, **which it has torn** deeper, into the abyss].

This instance exhibits a reverse form of nominalisation: while the ST includes agent concealment of the emotive action of ('deep' tearing), the TT includes agent revelation arguably for a specific rhetorical goal: responsibility determination of a wrongdoing (destabilising Syria). As can be seen, 'who does what' is not suggested in the ST (this **torn** nation), that is, it does not attribute responsibility to any party (national or international) for the catastrophic situation which has torn

<sup>228</sup> According to his by-line provided in the end of the source text.

<sup>229</sup> See, for example, this one, below which four articles on this critical stance against the Obama's administration are cited: <http://original.antiwar.com/shamus-cooke-2/2013/11/22/are-obamas-middle-east-peace-talks-sincere/>

<sup>230</sup> Branded by Toury (1995a) with the provision of other two types. See footnote no. 145, on page: 131.

<sup>231</sup>Cockburn, A., Clair, J (2007) End times: the death of the fourth estate, Counter Punch and AK Press.

Syria apart. The TT, however, points its fingers towards the international community and clearly holds it accountable for that deterioration: (الذى عملت على تمزيقه): [which it has torn]. Notice how she re-lexicalises the ST item (Syria) into: (الشعب السوري) [the Syrian people], which, one may infer, means to garner added sympathy for it.

Given that this attitudinal stance appears at the very beginning of the text, it is safe to claim that the translator wishes to inject her own subjective voice and imprint her ideological stamp at a very early stage of the argumentation then ‘through-argues’ it, i.e. she, as further shown below, “cites” her thesis, then extensively “defends” it<sup>232</sup>, especially if we consider the conditions that constituted the text and governed its reception (international conspiracy and Syria’s deprivation of its seat in the 2013 Arab Summit)- as shown above in the initial stage of this text's analysis.

## II. Lexicon

### 1. Over-lexicalisation

*Obama also recently pressured the Arab League- composed of regimes loyal to the United States- to install as a member the hand-picked National Coalition of Syrian Revolution as the official government of Syria. The appointment didn't give as much credibility to the opposition as much as it degraded the Arab League's legitimacy [...].* (A10, L52-55)

أوباما أيضاً مارس ضغوطه مؤخراً على جامعة الدول العربية- المكونة من أنظمة موالية للولايات المتحدة- لتنبيه من اختيارهم في الائتلاف الوطني للثورة السورية حكومة رسمية في سوريا. وإعطاء المعارضة مصداقية إلى حد كبير بقدر شرعية الجامعة العربية المتدهورة. (A11, L26-28)

BT: [Obama also recently pressured the Arab League- composed of regimes loyal to the United States- to install as a member the hand-picked National Coalition of Syrian Revolution as the official government of Syria and to largely give as much credibility to the opposition as much as the Arab League's **deteriorating** legitimacy].

Again, this TT should precisely be seen with the consideration of two main decisions made by the Arab League against Syria: membership suspension and, as a result, deprivation of taking part in the Doha 2013 Arab Summit. The ST does not particularly judge the status of the Arab League as ‘declining’, but rather outlines Obama’s pressures on it to consider his nominated opposition figures as member of the anti-regime government and its role in ‘degrading’ the Arab League. In other words, it meant to say that creating another government for a sovereign member-state ‘de-graded’ the Arab League and brought its image down. But the translator, who works for a pro-government

---

<sup>232</sup>See more on the “through” type of argumentation in Hatim and Mason (1997: 127 & 213).

newspaper as stated above (Al Thawrah daily), and in order to demean the Arab League which deprived Syria of its seat, over-lexicalises this message, with some reframing (underlined) and with an overtly satirical tone by passing an established judgement of deterioration over the Arab League: (وإعطاء المعارضة مصداقية الى حد كبير بقدر شرعية الجامعة العربية المتدهورة) and to largely give as much credibility to the opposition as much as the Arab League's deteriorating legitimacy.

## 2. Re-lexicalisation.

1. *So while Obama has repeatedly lied about “non-lethal” military aid, he has been personally involved in overseeing a multi-country flood of weapons into Syria, many of which are given to terrorist organizations.* (A10, L20-22)

في حين تحدث أوباما مراراً وتكراراً عن المساعدات العسكرية «غير قاتلة»، يشارك شخصياً في الإشراف على فيضانات الأسلحة من بلدان متعددة إلى سوريا، وتحديداً إلى منظمات إرهابية. (A11, L13-14)

BT: [So while Obama has over and over talked about “non-lethal” military aid, he has been personally involved in overseeing multi-country floods of weapons into Syria, **particularly** to terrorist organizations].

This stretch correlates with the basic theme of the whole text as its heading demonstrates: Obama's ‘war lust’ (A10, L75) and unremitting support to the ‘Obama's rebels’, (A10, L71 & 92-93) “who've committed a slew of atrocities against the Syrian population”. The TT communicates the ST intended content with a significantly ideological import in that it re-lexicalises the generic quantifying reference suggested in the ST (many of which) concerning huge amounts of international weapons, overseen by Obama, into an exclusively specific one (وتحديداً): [particularly]. It can be argued that not only does this exclusivity/specificity disgrace Obama, his allies and the “terrorist organizations” which receive these weapons, it also replaces the ST (many of which) into (all of which) and ultimately serves the translator's intentions (holding Obama and his allies more responsible and, by way of deduction, drawing more sympathy towards the Syrian government). Importantly, observe how such intentions on the part of the translator can be further evidenced by the pluralisation of (flood): فيضانات: [floods] which doubtlessly indexes the pragmatic purpose of exaggeration- (i.e. magnifying the US military support to the "terrorist organizations" in her country).

2. Of course most Syrians want to immediately end the **conflict** in Syria, since it threatens an Iraq-like destruction of the country. (A10, L39-40)

«بينما معظم السوريين يريدون وضع حد فوري للنزاع في سوريا، لأنّه يهدّد بحدوث تدمير للبلاد يشبه الذي حدث في العراق.» (A11, L.25)

BT: [While most Syrians want to immediately end the **dispute** in Syria, since it threatens an Iraq-like destruction of the country].

This instance constitutes a basic phraseological dilemma that is open to all sorts of interpretation and, ipso facto, manipulation in the service of specific goals. The events in the Syria's "Spring" have been worded (and reworded/translated) by many labels to pursue pre-planned agendas by the different conflicting parties, which raises a translational concern<sup>233</sup>: movement [حرّاك]; tension [توتر]; **dispute** [نزاع]; crisis [ازمة]; awakening [هبة نهضة/يقظة/صحوة]; revolution/uprising/revolt [ثورة]; Intifada [انتفاضة]; **conflict** [صراع]; "civil, sectarian" war ["أهلية/طائفية"]; or conversely, rebel [عصيان/تمرد]; chaos [فوضى]; autumn [خريف], etc.<sup>234</sup>. To save the face of the regime, the translator downplays the connotations of the source text word (conflict) and re-lexicalises it into a far less expressive term (نزاع): [dispute]. As it is clear, 'conflict' is a key word in the present thesis as it appears in its heading *twice*, which necessitates some elaboration reaped from modern general-purpose and specialised lexicography of both languages: English and Arabic.

*Collins Cobuild English Dictionary for Advanced Learners* (2001: 442; 314) draw the distinctive line between both terms. It defines 'dispute' as an argument or disagreement between people or groups' (cf. *Concise Oxford English Dictionary* 2002: 414) and 'conflict' as a 'serious disagreement and argument *about something important*' (cf. *Concise Oxford English Dictionary* (2002: 299) which adds: 'a prolonged armed struggle'). *Collins English Dictionary* (1995: 453; 337) sees 'dispute as 'an argument or quarrel' and 'conflict' as a 'struggle or clash between opposing forces, battle'. *Webster's New Dictionary of Synonyms* (1973: 176; 259) provides (argument, controversy) as direct synonyms for 'dispute' and (combat, fight, contest, affray, fray) for 'conflict'. Modern Arabic lexicography in the fields of politics and diplomacy makes the same

<sup>233</sup> As I have indicated in chapter three, the historical progression of the events (2011-present) has influenced these labels as per the level of severity (etymology). For instance, labels as 'protest movement [حركة احتجاج]', crisis: [ازمة], etc. have disappeared due to the new realities and dynamics on the ground.

<sup>234</sup>Without further ado, see thorough details in chapter three under 3.1 Phraseology, on page: 89.

distinctions. For example, *Modern Arabic Language Dictionary* (2008: 2194; 1289), defines (النزاع): [dispute] as “an argument between individuals or groups which may only involve mutual squabble that may develop to quarrel or even war” indicating that it can be managed/settled peacefully using political and legal means rather than force”, and (الصراع): [conflict] as a “fight between two powers where each one seeks to win over its opponent or overthrow it”; [my translation].

English diplomatic lexicography similarly acknowledges these denotative distinctions. John Burton (1990)<sup>235</sup>, points out that the difference between both terms lies in the fact that “a dispute is a short-term disagreement that can result in the disputants reaching some sort of resolution; it involves issues that are negotiable. Conflict, in contrast, is long-term with deeply rooted issues that are seen as “non-negotiable”<sup>236</sup>”. In like manner, Arabic diplomatic literature<sup>237</sup> considers (dispute): [نزاع] as an early stage of conflict. According to Ibrahim Bolemkahel (2003)<sup>238</sup>, “a dispute starts with tension and then escalates to crises, then conflict and finally confrontation (war)”; [my translation]. Arab political thinker, Shafiq al-Hout (1932-2009) shows that “the term ‘conflict’ describes a conflicting relationship between two oppositions where coexistence between them is impossible; every party seeks to downfall the other... whereas the term ‘dispute’ describes a relationship between two oppositions with the possibility of compromise without toppling one another”<sup>239</sup>; [my translation].

Given that the text was produced two years after the Event started (02-04-2013), the rendition by (النزاع): [dispute] does not communicate the severity of the events on the ground which the ST may wish to communicate in using (conflict): [صراع] rather than (dispute): [نزاع]. The translator, who is loyal to the Syrian government working for the pro-government Al Thawrah newspaper as I have shown in the initial stage of this text's analysis, tones down the 'advanced' connotations embedded in the ST term (conflict) [صراع] to render it as (النزاع) [dispute], which serves to play down the impact of the on-going events, thus adding currency to the Syrian regime and polishing its face.

<sup>235</sup> Burton, J. (1990) *Conflict: Resolution and prevention*. New York: St Martin's Press.

<sup>236</sup> Quoted in Timothy D. Keator's Conflict vs. dispute? (2011): <http://www.mediate.com/pdf/ConflictvsDisputeKeator2.pdf>

<sup>237</sup> For more on their order, see Jarad, A. (1992: 95) 'International Relations', National Press Institution', Algeria.

<sup>238</sup> Conceptual Framework to Studying International Disputes.

<sup>239</sup> An article entitled Difference Between Dispute and Conflict on (06-09-2000). It appeared in the UAE-based Al Ittihad daily: <http://shafiqalhout.info/seventeen/?p=879>

## Conclusion

This text centrally draws on the international community's negative interference in Syria<sup>240</sup> especially the US and the Arab League. The translator, in the main, voices her resentment over President Obama for his flagrant intervention in her country's internal affairs and the Arab League for its decision to suspend her country's membership which, as a consequence, deprived it of participating in its 2013 Doha Summit- the most significant Arab-Arab economic and political occasion. Noticeably, she starts her thorough-argument in a very early stage. She exhibited her attitudinal position in the headline when she offers it in an emphatic manner by rendering its first word (How) into (عندما: [When]) which indicates more explicitness of the 'Obaman' illegitimate intrusiveness in the Syrian internal affairs and his recourse to the option of war not peace, which has made the country plunge into deep abyss at the "cost of incredible human suffering", (A10, L100). More significantly, she ended up (her) headline by *two* (not even one) exclamation marks (!! ) which, according to Ahmed Moutaouakil<sup>241</sup> marks "emotive emphasis (Exclamation)" in Arabic. This emotional engagement also reoccurred in the text (A11, L20) and within exactly the same context: (فأي سلام هذا!): [so what peace is this!] which renders the ST item: (then Obama is by definition choosing war, 'A10, L32').

It ought to be reminded that ST headlines, which constitute a significant part of text intended content, are sometimes manipulated with much ideological intrusion in wartime translation. In addition to the headline of this text (which serves the regime), see also the above-explained headlines of texts: 2 (which serves the regime as well) and 3 (which besmirches the reputation of the regime). These various accounts which reflect different voices validate one of my main hypotheses that norms, following Toury (2005), exist in the translator not the translation *per se*; i.e.

---

<sup>240</sup> It is important to remind of the "Friends of Syria (Syrian People) Group": an international coalition that involves a big number of countries and organisations across the globe: (Arab League, Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, UN, EU, USA, and Turkey). It was established as a reaction to the Russia-China famous double veto on a UN Security Council resolution condemning the Syrian government. Although American president Barack Obama claims he has the upper hand in creating this global coalition which meets periodically to discuss serious matters of the status quo and future of Syria, the international Group was actually initiated by then-French president Nicolas Sarkozy.

<sup>241</sup> Moutaouakil, A.' Emphasis and Emphatic Marking in Arabic: A Functional Discourse Grammar Approach': [http://home.hum.uva.nl/fdg/working\\_papers/WP-FDG-85.pdf](http://home.hum.uva.nl/fdg/working_papers/WP-FDG-85.pdf)

translators' normative behaviours are not similar and, by way of inference, they should not be taught but rather observably, detectably caught (as I will show in the next concluding chapter). They essentially crop up in response to a wide range of local and global pressures including, but not confined to, the skopos, commissioner/patron/publisher/, personal attitudinal stances, socio-political affiliations, cultural conventions let alone readership's expectations and pre-suppositions.

Afterwards, the translator reveals the negative role of the international community in destabilising the country and tearing it apart. She pointed the fingers of accusation to the perpetrators of this sordid action when she made explicit its doer as I have explained under "Nominalisation". Then she moves on to defame the Arab League, which responds to Obama's pressures and dictates in arming the 'terrorists' and appointing anti-regime government- as we have seen under "Over-lexicalisation". The very same theme (agenda) was pursued by way of specifying the ST generic reference concerning his 'floods of weapons' to the 'terrorist organisations'- as I have shown under "Re-lexicalisation". Utilising the same lexical strategy, the translator brought the semantic significance of the ST term 'conflict [صراع]' down to (نزاع): [dispute] probably to undermine its resonances that would threaten the Syrian government and garner more international enmity towards it and, de facto, support towards its rival opposition.

Apart from those basic lexico-grammatical strategies and the emotional engagement manifested in the two exclamations, there are a number of other instances on several occasions throughout the TT which reflect ideological imports that cannot be left unnoticeable. These instances, which contribute to an overall textual overview, can be labelled under "skipping" which can enforce significant ideological implications that would impinge on the ST and serve her position. She skipped some ST elements that could glorify the opposition (A10, L41-51) or, alternatively, pose threats against the government (A10, L86-91). Observe how these two rhetorical goals are attained (in service of the translator's world experience) in the skipped items and imagine how a faithful, prejudice-free rendition of these items could run counter to her ideological thrust.

## Text 7: Can the Syrian regime crush the uprising? Yes, suggests history (Appendix 12)

**هل يستطيع النظام السوري سحق الانتفاضة؟... التاريخ يقول: نعم! (ملحق ١٣)**

### **Context & Content**

The source text is written with reference to the historical brutal crackdowns carried out by despotic Arab regimes including the Syrian one under late president Hafez al-Assad. It was produced (and translated) a year after the start of the events when the opposition could form a competitive military wing on the ground. This wing is represented by the Free Syrian Army (FSA) which was formed eight months before the date of the text and had changed the balance of power to some extent, thanks to the (financial and military) support it had received from regional and international powers: mainly the *FUKUS* axis<sup>242</sup> (France, United Kingdom, United States) and their Gulf allies (KSA and Qatar, UAE, etc.). In light of this, the Syrian government adopted the military option to savagely quell the explosively-growing revolution and foil the opposition's increasing power.

The source text producer, Chris Phillips, is an academic and a journalist placing special interest on the MENA affairs. He is a “lecturer in the International Relations of the Middle East at Queen Mary, University of London and Associate Fellow at the Chatham House Middle East and North Africa programme. He has a PhD in International Relations from the London School of Economics (LSE) specialising in contemporary Syria and Jordan. His first book, *Everyday Arab Identity*, was published by Routledge in 2012”<sup>243</sup>.

The Guardian, which publishes the source text, is a leading British daily newspaper founded in 1821 in Manchester, UK. It declares itself as an investigative publication that draws on the events disinterestedly and uncovers significant “sleaze revelations” on socio-political and economic matters. In 2011, the year of the Arab “Spring”, the paper “was named Newspaper of the Year for

<sup>242</sup> (FUKUS) is an acronym mockingly coined by Timothy Bancroft-Hinchey in 2012 to refer to France, United Kingdom and United States for their flagrant, unashamed intervention in the Syrian internal affairs. See how he uses it in his June 2013 article: ‘The evil empire: the FUKUS Axis’: [http://english.pravda.ru/opinion/columnists/16-06-2013/124848-fukus\\_evil-0/](http://english.pravda.ru/opinion/columnists/16-06-2013/124848-fukus_evil-0/) and in (text 9 in this study produced on January 2014), appendix 16, lines 5-8. This acronym, together with its phonological (vulgar) implications is going to be amply discussed in text 9: “Geneva II talks: A test for diplomacy”, under Re-lexicalisation, on pages: 239-241.

<sup>243</sup> Off his own website: <http://cjophillips.wordpress.com/>

its partnership with WikiLeaks<sup>244</sup>. (See under text 1 above (Context & Content) background information about the translator and the TT source (the Jordan-based Al Ghad daily, on page: 176).

*1. There is an assumption that Bashar al-Assad's military solution to the current crisis in Syria is hopeless- that no matter how many centres of resistance like Baba Amr **he** brutally crushes, **the opposition won't be quelled** and the fall of his regime, whether it takes months or years, is inevitable.* (A12, L1-4)

ثمة افتراض بأن الحل العسكري للأزمة السورية الراهنة، والذي ينتهي بشار الأسد لا أمل فيه - وبأنه بغض النظر عن عدد مراكز المقاومة، مثل بابا عمرو التي يسحقها نظامه بوحشية، فإن المقاومة لن تهدأ، وأن سقوط نظامه، سواء استغرق شهوراً أم سنوات، هو أمر محتم لا محالة. (A13, L1-3)

BT: [There is an assumption that the military solution to the current crisis in Syria followed by Bashar al-Assad is hopeless- that no matter how many centres of resistance like Baba Amr **his regime** brutally crushes, **the opposition won't calm down** and the fall of his regime, whether it takes months or years, is **inescapably** inevitable].

This introductory ‘lead’ paragraph, which is seen as a significant part of newspaper opinion articles (as I have shown in the previous chapter), involves a number of lexico-grammatical translatorial strategies, *viz.*, Transitivity, Re-lexicalisation and Over-lexicalisation bearing a significant modal tendency that help to shape up the translator’s position concerning the event in question. By way of illustration, consider all these instances below:

## I. Syntax

### 1. Transitivity

The source text passive construction (the opposition won't be quelled) is rendered in an active one in the TT (فإن المقاومة لن تهدأ): [the opposition won't calm down], with the action of quelling reframed into (calming down), which credits the opposition with added currency (dynamism) and positions it in an active rather than a passive state.

## II. Lexicon

### 1. Over-lexicalisation

Associated with this syntactic managing is the strategy of over-lexicalisation; the translator presumably wishes to strengthen his position towards the opposition’s insistence to hold on in the face of the many brutal crackdowns followed by the regime whose fall according to the translator is

---

<sup>244</sup> Off its own website: <http://www.theguardian.com/gnm-archive/2002/jun/06/1>

(inescapably: [لا محالة]) inevitable, sooner or later. His addition of the emphatic marker (لا محالة): [inescapably], which is not demanded by TT stylistic constraints, is ideologically motivated; it further amplifies the certainty and emphasis involved in the ST epithet (inevitable).

## 2. Re-lexicalisation

Sequel to his position towards the Syrian President and in order to dishonour him, the translator re-lexicalises the subject pronoun (he) which refers to the President, into (نظامه: [his regime]) which inherently carries negative connotations in the context of the act of multiple brutal suppressions it adopts against the opposition. In the political world (not exclusively English and Arabic), the word "regime" indicates "illegal ruling obtained via unfair procedures. *Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary* (1948: 1273) defines regime as "a method or system of government especially one that has not been elected in a fair way". The TT will look neutral (and faithful to the ST) if the whole added item (نظامه: [his regime]) is deleted:

(وبأنه بغض النظر عن عدد مراكز المقاومة، مثل بابا عمرو التي يسحقها بوحشية...).

*BT: [... that no matter how many centres of resistance like Baba Amr he brutally crushes...]* (Accurate translation- "similar" to the ST).

1. Assad already has one **template** to follow: his father's crushing of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1976-82. Other successful violent strategies in the region, such as Saddam Hussein's suppression of the Iraqi Shia rebellion in 1991 and the Algerian government's victory in the civil war of 1991-2000, may also persuade the regime it can hold on [...]. (A12, L8-11)

ولدى الأسد أصلاً سابقة واحدة عليه انتهاجها: سحق والده (الرئيس الراحل حافظ الأسد) للإخوان المسلمين في الأعوام ١٩٧٦ - ١٩٨٢ . وقد تقع استراتيجيات عنيف أخرى كانت المنطقة قد شهدتها، كقمع (الرئيس العراقي الراحل) صدام حسين للثورة الشيعية في جنوب العراق في العام ١٩٩١ ، والانتصار الذي كانت الحكومة الجزائرية قد حققته في الحرب الأهلية ١٩٩١ - ٢٠٠٠ ، قد تقع النظام السوري بالاستمرار في نهجه (القمعي). (A13, L6-9)

*BT: [Assad already has one **precedent** to follow: (his late father Hafez al-Assad's) crushing of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1976-82. Other successful violent strategies in the region, such as (late Iraqi president's) Saddam Hussein's suppression of the Iraqi Shia rebellion in 1991 and the Algerian government's victory in the civil war of 1991-2000, may also persuade the Syrian regime it can hold on via its (suppressive) doctrine].*

Here again, this excerpt also includes two main lexical strategies that similarly demonstrate the translator's ideological bias and reveal his stance towards President Bashar's violent approaches to thwart the *uprising*. These strategies are over-lexicalisation and re-lexicalisation:

## Over-lexicalisation

The ST refers to how three previous (ready-made) patterns/strategies may persuade the Syrian President to go on with crushing popular protests in his country: his father's (1976-1982), Saddam Hussein's (1991) and the Algerian government's *Red* (also *black*) *Decade* between (1991-2000) [العشرية الحمراء|السوداء]. Although implied, the ST does not specify the violent approach of the regime unlike the TT which provides (في نهجه (القمعي)) [via its (suppressive) doctrine] to explicate the negative face of the regime. Moreover, notice how the translator post-modifies the ST word "regime" with (السوري): [the Syrian] to serve the same rhetorical purpose (explicating the negative face of the Syrian regime- not that of anyone else).

## Re-lexicalisation

Within the same context, the translator precedes this ideologically-significant over-lexicalised strategy by a re-lexicalised item to further disclose his attitudinal stance towards the Syrian President in particular. The ST item (template) which means (a ready-made pattern/ an example: [نموذج سابق]) is rendered as [precedent] which connotes criminal associations in Arabic (legal) lexicography (Anees, et al 1972) and which indicates the translator's full awareness of the uncomplimentary implications of the text overall context. A close scrutiny into the text will show that this term mainly connects with the Syrian President's father, particularly his "*crushing of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1976-82*", which directly defames the father and indirectly the son. Observe how the other two examples, provided thereafter, reflect criminal acts committed against civilians in Iraq and Algeria which makes (perhaps justifies) the criminal context intended by the TT (or, more precisely, by the translator) and less so by the ST or its producer. Also, observe how the ST uses the word (examples) to refer to these three (templates): "*the past Algerian, Iraqi and Syrian examples*" (A12, L74), i.e. it equates the latter (examples) with the former (templates) and does not wish, it is arguable, to highlight criminal overtones as is the case in the TT's item (سابقة): [precedent].

## 3. Metaphor

*For those wondering about Assad's next move, however, policymakers could do worse than look at the past Algerian, Iraqi and Syrian examples for a dictator's handbook on how to survive an uprising.* (A12, L73-75)

ولأولئك الذين يتساءلون عن خطوة الأسد التالية، مع ذلك، فإن صانعي السياسة سيسيئون صنعاً إن هم اكتفوا بالنظر إلى الأمثلة الجزائرية والعراقية والسويسرية السابقة بحثاً عن كتاب دليل الدكتاتور في الإفلات من سوط الإنقاضة. (A13, L65-66)

BT: [For those wondering about Assad's next move, however, policymakers could do worse than look at the past Algerian, Iraqi and Syrian examples for a dictator's handbook on how **to escape the whip of the intifada**].

In this excerpt, the ST presents a straightforward proposition whereas the TT alters it in an ideologically significant metaphor. The translator's rendering of the ST (to survive an uprising), with some emotionally charged re-lexicalisation (an uprising [الإنقاضة : the Intifada]), into the metaphor: (في الإفلات من سوط الإنقاضة): [to escape the whip of the Intifada] adds more currency to the Opposition's Intifada which he commends at the onset his argument as I have shown under "Transitivity".

## Conclusion

The translator's emotional engagement is indisputably evident. He passes a confident judgement over the soon-to-fall 'regime' whose 'suppressive doctrine' is 'inescapably' coming to an end pinning hope on the non-ceasing opposition which he introduces in a non-passive fashion via the syntactic strategy of Transitivity and the lexical one of Metaphor when he presents the unfurling Intifada with a 'relentless whip' that will not cease unless 'the regime' is overthrown. Somewhere in the middle, many occurrences of Over- and Re-lexicalisation took place (as I have just shown) clearly for one main premeditated pragmatic goal: to commend the opposition's tireless resistance and condemn the 'regime's' tyrannical measures.

## Text 8: Syria's middle class can defeat Bashar al-Assad (Appendix 14)

يمكن أن الطبقة الوسطى في سوريا هزيمة بشار الأسد (ملحق ١٥)

### Context & Content

This text was written (and translated) early May, 2011 when the popular protests were in their infancy. More precisely (and significantly), it was produced a few weeks after a crucial press conference held by the President's consultant for political and media affairs, Bothainah Sha'ban, during which she aired President Assad's promises of revolutionary reforms in all walks of life in

an attempt to pacify then-boiling streets and contain then-peaceful protests<sup>245</sup>. Thus, the text chiefly argues the prospects of those movements towards reform, democracy and human rights, on the one hand, and the feasibility of Syria's security apparatus as well as media machine in quelling those movements, on the other.

The ST is written by the Syrian human right activist Ahmad Hussein. In fact, this is a pseudonym for security and safety reasons- as the newspaper announces. On its website, The Guardian provides a very short by-line of the writer with his picture unrevealed: "Ahmed Hussein is the pen-name of a human rights activist based in Damascus"<sup>246</sup>. His text appears in and is "commissioned and translated"<sup>247</sup> by the London-based The Guardian<sup>248</sup> "in collaboration with Meedan"- as the TT notes on its top (see appendix 15). Meedan is an America-based "nonprofit social technology company [whose] mission is to forward cross-cultural understanding and collaboration by providing people, partners and communities with advanced technologies to exchange ideas, information and knowledge across languages, focusing primarily on English and Arabic. Meedan provides digital gathering places, building tools and spaces to connect communities in a variety of contexts [and covers] the following fields:

1. Media: Meedan Check desk is a platform for professional newsrooms across MENA to work with citizen journalists to validate, translate, and contextualize social media content
2. Translation: building tools and community to bridge diverse linguistic communities online<sup>249</sup>, amongst others.

## I. Lexicon

### 1. Over-lexicalisation and Metaphor

*The security apparatus is quite used to **eliminating** anyone who dares to even **whisper a word** about reform or human rights. (A14, L39-40)*

---

<sup>245</sup> BBC report on March 25, 2011 entitled: Syrian unrest: Government pledges political reforms:  
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12853634>

<sup>246</sup> <http://www.theguardian.com/profile/ahmed-hussein>

<sup>247</sup> The Guardian launched an Arabic page involving translations into Arabic for some selected opinion articles tackling the Arab "Spring" as a whole at its onset (Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen and Syria). This enterprise, however, and after carrying out 72 translations (which I retained in my own 'soft and hard' archive), was short-lived as its link shows:  
<http://www.theguardian.com/world/series/the-guardian-in-arabic>

<sup>248</sup> For background information on the Guardian, which publishes the ST, see page: 221f, under (Context & Content) of text 7 above.  
<sup>249</sup> Adapted from its own website: <http://meedan.org/about/>

كل من يفتح فمه ويهمس بكلمة عن الإصلاح وحقوق الإنسان يمحى من الوجود من قبل هذه الأجهزة. (A15, L17-18)

BT: [Whoever **opens his mouth** and **whispers a word** about reform and human rights **is erased from existence** by those security apparatuses].

A quick comparison between the English ST and its Arabic counterpart can unveil the density of the translator's extrinsic lexical managing which means to communicate a more derogatory image of the governmental security apparatuses in Syria. The TT magnifies the ST message via two strategies; it over-lexicalises the verbal construction 'whisper a word': [يهمس بكلمة] by introducing it with another item (يفتح فمه): [opens his mouth] for a pragmatic goal: to show the suppressive state under which the opposition lives or, conversely, further expose the regime's total grip over freedom of opinion and expression or any move towards democracy and human rights. The same pragmatic goal is attained by the translator's recycling of the ST verb (eliminating) into a metaphorical construction (يُمحى من الوجود): [is erased from existence] which has more resonance than the ST item does.

## 2. Re-lexicalisation and Over-lexicalisation

*The state media, who belong to a prehistoric era.* (A14, L42)

الإعلام الحكومي الذي ينتمي إلى حقبة متحجرة عفا عليها الزمان... (A15, L16)

BT: [The state media, which belong to **an out-dated, archaic era**].

This short example is affluent with extrinsic lexical managing that bears ideological signification, which may contribute to the translator's declared stance towards the Syrian government. Although the ST intends to draw a picture of 'obsoleteness' on the Syrian state-run media, the TT exaggerates this picture and attaches more negativity with it by way of re-lexicalising the ST word (prehistoric) into (عفا عليها الزمان): [archaic] and adding a somehow synonymous item (متحجرة): [out-dated] which marks an instantiation of over-lexicalisation.

## 3. Re-lexicalisation

*The government also recruited "thugs", pro-regime armed groups that are involved in trafficking of drugs and weapons, to spread chaos and create sectarian strife.* (A14, L35-37)

كما قامت الحكومة بتجنيد الشبيحة وهي عصابات مسلحة موالية للنظام تقوم بعمليات التهريب وتجارة المخدرات والأسلحة لإثارة الفوضى وإثارة النعرات الطائفية. (A15, L25-26)

BT: [The government also recruited **shabbiha**, pro-regime armed **gangs** that are involved in smuggling operations and trading in drugs and weapons, to spread chaos and create sectarian strife].

This excerpt represents an obvious sign on the translator's catering for her/his targeted audience's expectations, assumptions and world thoughts. She/he opts for domesticating/localising the ST terms: 'thugs' and 'groups' by re-lexicalising them in line with the TT socio-political norms as (الشبيحة: [shabbiha<sup>250</sup>] and عصابات: [gangs]). She/he opts to twist the original's thought-world by presenting one that is more congruent with the mainstream sentiment of her/his target audience characterised by vandalism, robbery and all sorts of savagery. This option very much correlates with the pragmatic notion of Relevance (Gutt 1991 & 2000) which I discussed in detail in the previous chapter, section 4.9.3.3 Relevance, on page: 146. That is, in using the terms (الشبيحة): [shabbiha] and عصابات: [gangs], the translator accounts for the pre-suppositions of the TT audience (the Arab-(speaking) community with a view to pleasing it and meeting its expectations. Notice how the translator adds (عمليات التهريب) [smuggling operations] (before the ST "*trafficking of drugs and weapons*"), which discredits the "pro-regime armed gangs". To further install the negative image of the government's recruited 'soldiers', the translator invents a story based on Salafism/fundamental Islam (A15, L27-32) and locates it within the context of the Shabbiha.

## Conclusion

Apart from the overall disorderliness of some TT items which were pushed (by the translator) forward and backward on some occasions, and her/his added items on others for intended purposes, it is noticeable that the TT is crammed with syntactic and lexical translation strategies; in a short chunk, it was found that there are more than one strategy which impregnate ideological imports: (Over-lexicalisation and Metaphor; Re-lexicalisation and Over-lexicalisation in addition to two occurrences of Re-lexicalisation). All were utilised by the translator (the US-based Meedan) in such

---

<sup>250</sup> Shabbiha, which has relatively lost its foreignness in English, can loosely be translated as: "apparitions". It has recently been introduced in the Arab "Spring" literature. Interestingly, it is exclusively confined to the Syrian situation, i.e. their counterparts are named differently in the Arab "Spring"-affected countries: Baltajeyyah: بلاطجة (Egypt), Balatejehah: بلطجية (Yemen), zo'ran زرعان (Jordan), etc. Shabbiha are groups of pro-Assad armed men in civilian clothing recruited by the Syrian government under the banner of 'Popular Committees for the National Defence' and act in support of the Ba'ath Party, led by the Al Assad family; they were first formed in the 1990s and engaged in all forms of local mafia-style violence and corruption, from intimidation and murder to smuggling, trading in arms and drugs.

a way that draws the most negative image about the Syrian *government's* management of the protests and communicates a pre-planned ideological content across two major rhetorical purposes: exaggeration and persuasion.

### **Text 9: Geneva II talks: A test for diplomacy (Appendix 16)**

**محادثات جنيف ٢ : اختبار للدبلوماسية (ملحق ١٧)**

#### **Context & Content**

Contextually, this text was written on the 7<sup>th</sup> of January 2014, almost three years after the Syrian events broke out. (See appendix 16 at the end of this thesis). Particularly, it was written on the eve of the Geneva II Conference on Syria: a United Nations-backed (long-awaited and then-controversial) international peace conference on the future of Syria with a view to putting a stop to the grinding civil war in the country between the Syrian government and its rival armed opposition<sup>251</sup>. It primarily sought to map out a peaceful process of power transfer and draw up a transitional stage thereafter. The conference, which was postponed several times for reasons related to an awful lot of preconditions set forth by both conflicting parties, convened on the 22<sup>nd</sup> of January 2014 in the Swiss city of Montreux where foreign ministers from around forty countries made statements and continued its marathon two-round discussions in Geneva for several days, which were eventually destined to failure.

The source text mainly condemns the unjustified foreign assistance (diplomatic, financial and military) and the flagrant ‘intervention in the internal affairs of a sovereign state’ following the ongoing Syrian armed conflict which, it sees, was caused by the West and their Gulf ‘proxies’: NATO, FUKUS-axis and GCC<sup>252</sup>. Reflecting on the Geneva II Conference, the source text criticises the biased diplomatic practice of those political bodies and contends who should decide on ruling a

---

<sup>251</sup> It is worth noting that the TT was published on the 16<sup>th</sup> of January, 2014- only a few days before the conference was planned to convene. This is to say that this ‘time factor’, which marked much regime-government division, must not be overlooked because, I hypothesise, it would gear the translator’s attitudinal stance and, as a result, cast its shadow on the overall TT message, as the analysis will expressly show.

<sup>252</sup> GCC refers to the Riyadh-based Gulf Cooperation Council (1981): a political, military and economic union boarding the Arab Gulf. It includes six states, *viz.*, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, The Emirates, Bahrain, Kuwait and Oman. The Council’s member states (especially Saudi Arabia and Qatar) have had the same condemnatory stance concerning the Syrian regime since the inception of the Event on March 17, 2011. The Syrian regime similarly demonstrates the harshest forms of enmity/hostility against the GCC.

soon-to-be post-Assad Syria. In parallel, the context of the political and diplomatic polarisation between those countries on the one hand and Russia on the other should be considered before drawing conclusions on the translated text. Russia has played a strategic role in the unfurling Syrian crisis whose severity has been on the increase for four years now. Equally, Russia and Syria have historically had strong bilateral ties in different fields: political, diplomatic, military and economic. These well-cemented ties made the latter veto significant UN-proposed resolutions that intended to push for peaceful solutions (at the very onset of the crisis) and impose sanctions against the Syrian government if it continued military actions against protesters.

The text producer is the British journalist and political analyst, Timothy Bancroft-Hinchey, who can understandably be seen (owing to his journalistic writings<sup>253</sup>) as staunch backer of the Russian foreign policy and critical to the West and US administrations for their intervention in affairs of sovereign states worldwide including the Middle East. He regularly writes for Pravda as an editorial writer and is a member of its editorial board. Pravda (1912-1991, restored in 1997), which publishes the source text at hand, is a popular political Moscow-based newspaper. The Paper, which means both ‘truth & justice’ in the Russian Language, is the mouthpiece of the Communist Party of Russian Federation, which was banned under the former Russian president Boris Yeltsin after the tilt of the Soviet Union in 1991 and regained its licence in 1997.

(For more background information about the pro-regime translator, see some detail under text 2 above, on page: 189).

## I. Syntax

### 1. Modality

The source text is noticeably rich with modal expressions, markers and clues which are employed in different ways and with various degrees. The paramount concern of this study, however, is how these forms of modality are rendered and what ideological significations are consequently borne

---

<sup>253</sup> See, for example, his article entitled Nobel Peace Prize: Joke of the Century (2012) whose introduction starts by a severe attack against Bush (US president 2000-2008) and Blair (UK premier 1997-2007): "What to expect of an institution whose founder invented dynamite, which seriously postulated the choice of Bush and Blair for the Peace Prize, which perpetuates its existence by pandering to the whims of its amoral overloads? What to expect when you give the keys of the kindergarten to a paedophile who is a serial rapist?: <http://www.voltairenet.org/article176251.html>

during the process of translating. As pointed out on several places in this thesis, I am more concerned with the target text: the way the source text is rendered, most particularly whether it is significantly manipulated and, as a consequence, its intended message is distorted, its readers are disoriented- as the following examples will show.

1. *[Those talks] will provide a telling test as to the state of international diplomacy and will serve as an indicator... .* (A16, L2 & 3).

فإن تلك المحادثات تُعد بمثابة اختبار لدور الدبلوماسية الدولية وتعطي مؤشراً ... (A17, L3)

BT: [Indeed, those talks are exclusively considered as a telling test as to the role of international diplomacy and give an indicator...].

This excerpt includes two recurrences on how the translator renders the modal construction which represents a future tense in the ST into an emphatically factual present; she skips the Arabic equivalence of (will: [سوف]) and presents both events in the simple present with much emphasis actuated by: [بمثابة، فإن]: [indeed & exclusively] respectively. This syntactic extrinsic managing of the ST message is supported by her adding a triplet synonymous over-lexicalised pattern concerning the US role in the talks, *viz.*, [on Washington's (degree of) transparency, credibility as well as its wish] (A16, L4): [مدى شفافية وصدقية واشنطن ورغبتها] (A17, L3) as I will discuss in detail under "Over-lexicalisation" below. In addition to these two examples of syntactic management (modality reframing), there are other similar examples in the text which further reflect ideologically-laden bearings and offer more conclusive evidence on the translator's impartial conduct. Examples two and three below should render this clearer.

2. *As the Geneva II talks on Syria draw nearer, the United States of America seems to be adopting a position [...].* (A16, L20)

مع اقتراب محادثات جنيف ٢ المقرر عقدها في ٢٢ الشهر الجاري بشأن سوريا نستطيع أن نؤكد أن الولايات المتحدة تتبنى موقفاً لا يخفى على أحد [A17, L19]

BT: [As the Geneva II talks on Syria draw nearer, planned to convene on the 22<sup>nd</sup> of this month on Syria, we can confirm that the United States is adopting a **very clear** position].

The source text producer is aloof from the events and offers a neutrally expository account by presenting a modal construction that is open to further interpretations (seems to be adopting)

whereas the translator insists to be part and parcel of the text she is translating (which is not originally her own) and renders the ST modality in a factual fashion with much emphasis, which adds more criticality to the American administration's diplomatic practice on the eve of the conference. In other words, the TT says more than what the ST intended to say vis-à-vis the US dictations over the then-coming Geneva II conference. You must have noticed how the translator concluded this maximised modal structure "نستطيع أن نؤكد" [we can confirm] with an added emphatic marker (لا يخفى على أحد): [very clear], which implies some degree of power/authority and closeness to the source of information, giving the impression that she acts as the spokesperson of the Syrian government.

**3. [Ø] Without aid, support, financing, weapons and training from abroad, the bands of terrorists committing murder, torture, rape... (A16, L9)**

لا شك أنه لو لا تقديم المساعدات والدعم والتمويل والتسلیح والتدريب من الخارج لما تمكن شرذم من العصابات الإرهابية من تنفيذ وارتكاب عمليات القتل، والتعذيب، والاعتصاب ... (A17, L8)

BT: [**There is no doubt that**, without aid, support, financing, weapons and training from abroad, the disunited gangs of terrorists could not be able to carry out and commit murder, torture, rape...].

As it can be seen, modality is utilised here on the part of the translator to exert her ideological thrust over the targeted readership (obviously the Syrian (and Arab public) and pursue her commissioner's agenda (understandably the pro-regime Al Thawrah daily and perhaps the State). The modal marker in the Arabic text (لا شك أنه) [There is no doubt that], which embodies emphasis and absoluteness, has no English counterpart in the ST; the translator adds it and places it in an initial position to further emphasise the role of the international community in enabling the 'disunited' terrorist gangs to commit such horrible crimes (by deduction with the assistance of the FUKUS evil axis and its Mideast allies). It is clear that she does not drop off her subjective mask and distance herself from the ST's content. She instead chooses to unjustifiably over-argue its message. The relevant added metaphor embodied in (شرذم) which lends support to the translator's modal position towards the anti-regime's insurgent bands, as will be discussed in-depth shortly below under Metaphor, should not be overlooked. Notice also other similar examples scattered throughout the TT (not the ST as

they are the translator's own addition) which draw upon the same issue, and pay special attention to her mood represented in the frequent use of first speaker in its plural form (*we*), which is indicative of inclusiveness, collectiveness and, to some degree, hegemony:

a. (Confidence & emphasis): (كل ذلك موثق بشكل كامل لمن لا يصدق ما نقوله ويرغب بالاطلاع) (A17, L12)

[All of this is very well-documented for the disbelievers **of what *we* say and wishes to be informed**].

b. (Obligation): (ثمة تساولات يتتعين علينا طرحها) (A17, L13)

[There are questions ***we* ought to ask**].

c. (Certainty and absoluteness): (والإجابة على ذلك التساؤل لم تعد خافية على أحد) (A17, L15)

[The answer to this question **has become obvious to everybody**].

d. (Categorical uncompromising possibility):

(هل يمكننا أن نطلق على هذا الواقع صفة الدبلوماسية؟ ذلك لأننا إن أردنا أن ننسن بالمنطق...) (A17, L23)

[Can *we* call this *status* diplomacy? Because if *we* want to [*we*] sound logical...].

## 2. Transitivity

1. *The Geneva II talks on the crisis in Syria, caused by the west and its Middle Eastern minions playing political games by arming and financing terrorist groups to spread chaos.* (A16, L1)

إن محادثات جنيف الثانية بشأن الأزمة في سوريا كان الغرب وأتباعه في الشرق الأوسط سبباً لها ومازالوا حتى الحين يلعبون دوراً فعالاً في تأجيج نار الفتنة عبر تسليحهم وتمويلهم للمجموعات الإرهابية بغية تمكينها من نشر الفوضى والاضطراب في هذا البلد. (A17, L1)

BT: [Verily the Geneva II talks on the crisis in Syria **which the west and its Middle Eastern followers have caused** and have still been playing an efficient role in igniting the fire of Fitna [socio-political strife] by arming and financing terrorist groups in a bid to spread chaos and instability in this country].

The translator zooms in on the cause of the chaotic situation in Syria by converting the ST passive structure, presented in a reduced relative clause, into an active voice foregrounding the agent (action doer) where ‘who does what to who is made more explicit’. A scrutinising look at the Arabic rendition will support her “intended plan”. Notice how the ST comma (,) is skipped in the Arabic version which alters the ST non-restricted relative clause into a subject-predicate structure and, in effect, results in an ideologically significant shift and directly holds the West and their Middle

Eastern proxies accountable for the Syrian crisis. In so doing, the translator (a pro-regime herself) polishes the face of the Syrian government and presents it as a victim, drawing some sympathy towards it. Notice her own sympathetic addition (في هذا البلد): [in this country], which serves this pragmatic goal. As you can see, this excerpt makes the introductory statement of the text which means she starts her argument early. According to the structure of opinion articles in the world of media, the first paragraph is called Lead<sup>254</sup> because it leads the text consumer to the argument being made. It conventionally involves the ‘five Ws and one H’<sup>255</sup> which introduces the argument in question.

To further fathom her attitudinal stance and early argument in favour of the Syrian government, observe the emphatic start she opts for: (إن: Verily, Indeed); the present perfect continuous manifested in: (ومازالوا حتى حين): (... and are still until the moment [playing], the concluding sympathetic addition (في هذا البلد): [in this country], her insertion of the expressive metaphorical construction (تأجيج نار الفتنة): [igniting the fire of Fitna] and the over-lexicalised synonymous cluster (الفوضى والاضطراب): [chaos and instability], which will be discussed at length below- each under its respective section.

## II. Lexicon

### 1. Over-lexicalisation

Unlike the source text, the target text is freighted with instances of over-lexicalisation in various occasions to serve different rhetorical functions, on top of which are emphasis and persuasion. Consider the following examples.

1. ... *to spread chaos*. (A16, L2)

... بغية تمكينها من نشر الفوضى والاضطراب في هذا البلد. (A17, L2)

BT: [... in a bid to enable them to spread chaos **and instability in this country**].

---

<sup>254</sup>(Also Lede and Leed): ‘The introductory section of a news story that is intended to entice the reader to read the full story’. Merriam-Webster Online: <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/lede>

<sup>255</sup>Who - is the story about? What - is it about? When - will it happen? Where - will it happen? How - will it take place? Why - is it happening? <http://www.owenspencer-thomas.com/journalism/media-tips/writing-a-press-release>

As it can be seen, the TT over-lexicalises the source text term 'chaos' by way of a synonymous cluster (الفوضى والاضطراب) which the TT stylistics does not necessitate; it rather, one may deduce, reflects an ideological thrust: magnifying the negative role of "the west and its Middle Eastern minions" in destabilising Syria via their military and financial assistance to the 'terrorist groups'. As this "Lead" paragraph progresses, her argument is further strengthened by adding another synonymous pattern attached to the stance of Washington vis-à-vis the same situation in Syria with much reframing of the whole message:

2. ... and will serve as an indicator as to whether Washington [...] uses diplomacy... (A16, L3)

وتعطي مؤشراً عن مدى شفافية وصدقية واسنطن ورغبتها باتباع الوسائل الدبلوماسية في معالجتها لتلك المعضلة. (A17, L4)

BT: [... and will serve as an indicator on Washington's (**degree of transparency, credibility as well as its wish** in following diplomatic means to deal with that calamity].

While the ST shows a relatively neutral reference to Washington's role in tackling the situation, the TT tends to challenge this role, blacken it and put it at stake. Throughout the TT, when reference to the US is made, the translator, it is noticed, does not convey it impartially; she reframes it in such a way that further demonises the face (the political honour) of America and exhibits a lack of deference to its officials. For example, in (A6, L20), she emphasises the non-disputatious stance of the US towards the 'crisis' in Syria when she adds some items to show it is "obvious to everybody" (لا يخفى على أحد) and, in effect, reinforces it in the readership's consciousness. Pay attention also to the way the TT exaggerates the ST modal structure (seems to be) when the translator renders it into (نستطيع أن نؤكد)- as I have shown above under "Modality":

*As the Geneva II talks on Syria draw nearer, the United States of America seems to be adopting a position [...] (A16, L20).*

مع اقتراب محادثات جنيف ٢ المقرر عقدها في ٢٢ الشهر الجاري بشأن سوريا نستطيع أن نؤكد أن الولايات المتحدة تتبني موقفاً لا يخفى على أحد. (A17, L19)

BT: [As the Geneva II talks on Syria draw nearer, planned to convene on the 22<sup>nd</sup> of this month on Syria, **we can confirm that** the United States of America **is** adopting a **very clear** position].

A similar (yet clearer) example on over-lexicalisation, backed by overall reframing and additions concerning the reluctance of the international media in revealing the perpetrating bodies in orchestrating horrible crimes in Syria, is manifest in the following added TT excerpt that does not exist in the ST:

ثمة تساؤلات يتعين علينا طرحها تتمحور حول الأسباب التي تدعو إلى التزام الصمت المطبق من قبل وسائل الإعلام الدولية بشأن فضح الجهات التي تقوم بذلك الجرائم المريرة والجهات التي تساندها وتمويلها وتؤازرها في ارتكاب تلك الأفعال المشينة.  
(A17, L13)

BT: [There are a number of questions we ought to ask which revolve around the reasons behind the eerie silence of the international media outlets in relation to unveiling the bodies which carry out these horrible crimes and those bodies which **support, fund and back them** to commit those sordid deeds].

This back translation readily reiterates the translator's recurrent resort to over-lexicalisation as a means to reinforce her attitudinal position (and of course that of her commissioner) towards the events in her own country. Significantly, she does not over-lexicalise an item that already exists in the ST, but she instead creates a threesome over-lexicalised structure (تساندها وتمويلها وتؤازرها) which functions to further lend support to her thesis she initiates at the onset of her text. Notice how she develops her argument by using: the expressive modality pre-modified by the inclusive third person (we must: يتعين علينا), the insertion of the collocational pattern (eerie silence: الصمت المطبق, horrible crimes: الأفعال المشينة, sordid deeds: الجرائم المريرة) let alone the lexical cohesion represented the use of powerful words (unveiling: فضح, committing: ارتكاب). Also, notice the meaningful parallel repetitions via the use of: (ارتكاب تلك الأفعال المشينة; تقوم بذلك الجرائم المريرة) and (الجهات...والجهات) which adduces ideological intrusion that means to denounce the heinous deeds committed by the opposition 'terrorist gangs' amidst an international complete/stunned silence: "the United States of America and its poodles in Europe and the Middle East".

*3. The same again from the [...] illegal attack against Libya, another State destroyed and left destitute by NATO imperialist warmongers.* (A16, L17-19)

وتنطبق الإجابة ذاتها على تلك الأطراف التي شنت وتشن هجمات غير شرعية على ليبيا تلك الدولة التي دُمرت وأصبح سكانها معدمين نتيجة لما قام به دعاة الحرب من الامرياليين في حلف شمال الأطلسي. (A17, L17-18)

BT: [The same answer applies to those parties which **have been launching** illegal attacks against Libya, another state which was destroyed and whose residents have become destitute by NATO imperialist warmongers].

This is an outspoken example on Over-lexicalisation that holds significant ideological meaning and intends to steer the text's receptor's perception in the direction that serves her in-built belief system and that of her institution she works for. This excerpt comes in the context of the NATO military intervention in the finished Libyan 'Revolution' (February, 2011 – October, 2012) when the then-National Transitional Council (NTC) declared a 'liberated Libya' following the killing of Colonel Qaddafi<sup>256</sup>. Another context that should be taken into consideration is the text's date of birth (January, 2014) - more than a year after the Libyan 'Revolution' was over.

With these two contexts in mind, notice how the translator over-lexicalises the ST simple past tense<sup>257</sup> (which indicates a completely finished action) into a present perfect continuous<sup>258</sup>, a past-to-future tense (شنت وتشن) [have been launching] which refers to a continuation of the action of launching. In so doing, she adds more dynamism (and much emphasis) to the act of 'launching' and, in effect, unveils her critical stance against the NATO imperialist warmongers'. Significantly, an in-depth investigation of the ST would reveal that it has no verb whatsoever; that is, the act of 'launching' (repeated twice in the Arabic version: (شنت وتشن) is not existent in the source text. To back her own message and intensify the negative face of the NATO 'intervention' illegal military forces, she pluralised the ST singular word (attack: [هجمات]). Observe her emotional involvement when she expressly associates the destituteness caused by the NATO with the Libyan inhabitants rather than the State *per se*, obviously to draw more sympathy from her readership.

The same translatorial normative behaviour also appears in the same paragraph (and within the same context of the foreign intervention in the affairs of sovereign states 'without a casus belli' (which results in horrible crimes). Right before this segment, the translator uses three 'compound constructions' that are indicative of the present progressive tense to maximise the negative image of

---

<sup>256</sup> BBC's report 'Libya's new rulers declare country liberated' (23 Oct. 2012). See the story and video with English simultaneous interpretation: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-15422262>

<sup>257</sup> As can be noticed, the ST has no verb whatsoever; the meaning of 'launching' is only embedded and understood through context.

<sup>258</sup> Arabic syntactic system has no direct 'present perfect continuous' tense. This is usually expressed by way of chain verb: the first one is past, the second is present. Thus, شنت وتشن [have been launching] can literally be re/back-translated as [launched and is still launching].

the NATO and its allies, or more precisely, to highlight their perpetual cycle of intervention and long-lasting atrocities. For illustration, take the following example:

4. *The same answer would arise from the question what happened to those who entered Iraq without a casus belli and wrecked the country and its society? (A16, L16 & 17)*

ولا تختلف الإجابة عن تساو لا تنا تلك **عما يحدث في هذه الأونة وما قامت به تلك المجموعات التي أخذت تتدخل دون سبب وتعمل على تدمير البلاد والمجتمع.** (A17, L16 & 17)

BT: [The answer to our question does not differ from **what is going on** in Iraq **at the moment**, and from what those groups did which **have begun to intervene** without a casus belli and **worked on wrecking** the country and society].

The reference here, to give my discussion context, is to the 2003 Anglo-American war against Iraq, which ran counter to the United Nations consent (without casus belli). The source text merely questions the way those who unilaterally entered Iraq in 2003 (US and its European and Gulf proxies) and destroyed it. The TT, on the other hand, manipulates this message which the ST does not say and takes its readership to a different world by over-lexicalising the three action verbs into: (وتعمل على تدمير; أخذت تتدخل; يحدث في هذه الأونة): [what is going on ... at the moment; have begun to intervene and *worked on wrecking*]. That is, it conveys the whole message with much implication that the situation in Iraq is still deteriorating and those troops are still intervening in Iraq and destroying it<sup>259</sup>, despite the fact that the last soldier left Iraq by the end of 2011<sup>260</sup>. Notice the way the translator re-lexicalises the action verb ‘enter’: [يدخل] into ‘intervene’: [يتدخل] which significantly de-contextualises the ST intended content. This translational stratagem will be elaborated on shortly below under the second example of Re-lexicalisation.

5. *Needless to say, if that is the position of Washington, it will be obediently repeated by London and Paris. (A16, L23)*

ولا شك بأنها ستجد دولاً تؤيد ما تذهب إليه بامثال **يكتفه الرضا** ومن تلك الدول فرنسا والمملكة المتحدة. (A17, L21)

BT: [There is no doubt that it will find countries that would support what it believes with obedience engulfed with consent such as France and UK].

---

<sup>259</sup> In fact, this, to some extent, can be true. Nonetheless, I am only concerned with the fact that the source text does not say that.

<sup>260</sup> USA TODAY reports on the 21<sup>st</sup> of October, 2011 under the heading: ‘Obama announces full withdrawal from Iraq’: <http://content.usatoday.com/communities/theoval/post/2011/10/obama-to-speak-on-iraq-at-1245-pm/>

In order to show the unquestionable blind obedience of France and UK to the US, the translator over-lexicalises this attitude by adding (يكتنفه الرضا) [engulfed with (their) consent], which could function to serve her skopos (or skopi) and reflect the stance of her pro-regime institution- Al Thawrah state-run, state-funded and state-censored newspaper. In this context, it should be noted that the Syrian government, at the start of the events, expelled the ‘FUKUS’ ambassadors and severed all diplomatic links with them on reciprocal basis<sup>261</sup>. The translator's stance (on the FUKUS Axis) can further be made clearer if it is linked to several occasions throughout the TT, for example, see how she converted the passive into active and foregrounded the agents who have caused the Syrian crises (as discussed in detail under Transitivity above). More candidly, notice how she reworded the acronym ‘FUKUS Axis’ as (دول محور الشر) (the axis of evil countries), which falls under ‘Re-lexicalisation’ to which I turn next.

## 2. Re-lexicalisation

Re-lexicalisation was resorted to in the TT in many places and largely served the translator's agendas which she declared and fought for. In the main, this strategy was utilised to either distort the image of the anti-government parties (inside or outside the country) as example one and two show, or conversely, perhaps more strikingly, draw any supposedly threatening reference away from the Syrian leadership, as example three shows.

*1. The bottom line of the page entitled “Syria Crisis” is that without support from abroad, namely the west, more specifically NATO and more particularly the FUKUS Axis (France-UK-US), aided by the ever-willing Gulf Cooperation Council constituted by Saudi Arabia and Qatar (and to a lesser extent the United Arab Emirates), the Syrian crisis would not exist. (A16, L5-8)*

إن ما يحصل من أزمة في سوريا ما كان ليحدث بالتة لولا وجود دعم من الخارج وتحديداً الدول الغربية المشاركة بحلف شمال الأطلسي وعلى رأسها دول محور الشر المتمثلة بكل من فرنسا والمملكة المتحدة والولايات المتحدة التي تلقى الدعم والمساندة من مجلس التعاون الخليجي الذي تقوده المملكة العربية السعودية وقطر وبدرجة أقل الإمارات العربية المتحدة. (A17, L5-7)

BT: [Verily what is happening in Syria could not surely take place at all without support from abroad, namely the west, more specifically NATO and more particularly the states of evil-axis represented in France, United Kingdom and the United States].

---

<sup>261</sup> BBC news report on the 5<sup>th</sup> of June 2012 entitled ‘Syria declares Western ambassadors unwelcome’: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-18330403>

It is important to point out that the ST producer, Bancroft-Hinchey, has recently coined the acronym (FUKUS) in 2012 to refer to France, United Kingdom and United States precisely to their unjustified, negative intervention in the Syrian Arab Republic. Unsurprisingly, some observers question the way Bancroft-Hinchey wishes his acronym to be pronounced. Whatever the course, the translator may have benefited from the pun it includes particularly its phonological vulgar associations, and re-lexicalised it as (دول محور الشر) [the states of evil-axis]<sup>262</sup>: to demonise the Opposition and its proxies, to clearly threaten the face of those countries and, by way of inference, portray a glamorous image of the currently Syrian ruling party under President Assad. However, one may argue, perhaps less probably, that the translator opts for a readership-fulfilling strategy, i.e. she caters for her readership (presumably the Arabic-speaking communities) by euphemising<sup>263</sup> the potentially offensive associations that could be included in the phonology of the ST item 'FUKUS'. She chooses to replace the ST "unaccepted" term (FUKUS) with a less pejorative one befogging the vulgarity it contains, which functions to maintain the communication principle of the Gricean politeness in order to save the face of the (the conservative Arab) target audience, i.e. to observe its socio-cultural conventions and norms. Larson (1984: 116) notes that "euphemism is used to avoid an offensive expression or that is socially unacceptable, or one that is unpleasant".

Within the translation context, Baker (1992) sees this question of choice as a challenge facing the translator owing to cross-cultural discrepancies, which may drive her/him to alternate between a number of options during the process of translating which involves decision-making. Locating it within the boundaries of the "pragmatic equivalence" which should be established and usually entails full awareness on the part of the translator, She maintains that "politeness is a relativistic notion and different cultures therefore have different norms of 'polite' behaviour, [adding that] "in some translation contexts, being polite can be far more important than being accurate", Baker

---

<sup>262</sup> Possibly, the translator is aware of the way Bancroft-Hinchey usually describes the term he branded: 'The Evil Empire'. See his article 'The evil empire: the FUKUS Axis' (June 2013):

[http://english.pravda.ru/opinion/columnists/16-06-2013/124848-fukus\\_evil-0/](http://english.pravda.ru/opinion/columnists/16-06-2013/124848-fukus_evil-0/)

<sup>263</sup> Allan and Burridge (1991: 14) define euphemisms (*opp. dysphemism*) as "alternatives to dispreferred expressions, and are used in order to avoid possible loss of face. The dispreferred expression may be taboo, fearsome, distasteful or for some other reason have too many negative connotations to felicitously execute Speaker's communicative intention on a given occasion".

(1992: 234). So far as this study is concerned, it ought to be reiterated that its TTs' readership is the Arab community which is highly sensitive to such intolerable sexual (and similar taboo) associations and, as a result, makes this translation challenge more relevant. In this connection, Baker (*ibid*) explains and justifies this culture-specificity when she notes that "a translator may decide to omit or replace whole stretches of text which violate the reader's expectations of how a taboo subject should be handled- if at all- in order to avoid giving offense".

However, and to defy this possibility (of the translator's catering for her readership), we should consider the way she employed (in a very short chunk) three Arabic 'assertives' to establish, in the first place, the evilness of these countries in her readership's collective awareness. These additive emphatic devices, without which the Arabic text would read equivalently natural, are known in the Arabic language as (emphasis particles)<sup>264</sup>. Moutaouakil (2011: 14) calls this functional syntactic strategy in Arabic as 'multiple reinforcement' whereby 'emphatic constructions can contain more than one emphatic marker... to express different degrees of reinforcement'. Observe the translator's recourse to this phenomenon: ([إن ما يحصل من أزمة في سوريا ما كان ليحدث البنت]: [Verily what is happening in Syria **could not surely** take place **at all**]. Not only does the translator re-lexicalise nominal constructions, she also demonstrates it by manipulating verbal constructions in terms of their semantics and tense to serve a pre-planned pragmatic function, as shown in the following example:

2. ... who *entered* Iraq without a *casus belli*<sup>265</sup>... ? (A16, L16)

... التي أخذت تتدخل دون سبب. (A17, L16)

BT: [... who have begun to intervene without a cause].

Apart from the ideologically suggestive 'compound construction' in the TT created by the addition of an action verb (أخذت: [*have begun to*]) followed by another present action verb which, taken

<sup>264</sup> In his *Emphasis and Emphatic Marking in Arabic: A Functional Discourse Grammar Approach*, Ahmed Moutaouakil (2011: 1ff) explains those (and other) emphatic markers in Arabic and distinguishes between two kinds of emphasis: 'emotive emphasis' and 'argumentative emphasis' which function as intensifying devices, adding that the lexical means in Modern Standard Arabic (MSA) used as Reinforcement Markers are mainly modifiers such as *fi'lan* (فعلاً) 'indeed', *Haqqan* (حقاً) 'really, truly', *qaṭ'an* (قطعاً, البنت) 'not... at all', amongst others.

<sup>265</sup> Collins English Dictionary (2003) defines the term 'casus belli' as 'an event or act used to justify a war. It is a famous Latin expression that usually associates with warfare to mean the justification for the start of war as a last resort (*ultima ratio*) under the pretext of having an 'adequate and just cause' for this option.'

together, implies progressiveness, continuation and dynamism, the translator re-lexicalises the verb (entered), presented in the simple past in the ST, into a *totally different* verb in the present: [تدخل] which literally means ‘to intervene’. That is, the ST (entered) is not the TT (تدخل) ['has' intervened], which is not ideologically insignificant. This strategy of re-lexicalising, which the translator pursues, de-contextualises/re-contextualises the message intended in the original and, as a consequence, disrupts the readers’ understanding of that message and takes them to a different world (from the world of ‘entering’ to the world of ‘intervening’). This translator’s choice (the verb cluster (أخذت تتدخل) [have begun to intervene] as a whole) is unsurprisingly governed by the translator’s regular behaviour through the text precisely her attitudinal stance in favour of the Syrian leadership and against the Anglo-Americans and their European and Gulf followers, who joined them in their ‘illegal and unjustified’ war and facilitated its progression. The coming examples will further support her normativity (regularity in behaviour) of a biased translational conduct.

3. [...] *The United States of America seems to be adopting a position [...], predictably with strings attached, namely that the conference serves to rubber-stamp a post-Assad Syria, in which all parties must agree to a solution excluding the current President (Bashar al-Assad).* (A16, L20-23)

نستطيع أن نؤكد أن الولايات المتحدة تتبني موقفاً لا يخفى على أحد، ويقوم على فرض القيود والشروط وتحديداً دعوة المؤتمر إلى مناقشة ما ينبغي أن يكون عليه وضع الحكم في سوريا في المرحلة المقبلة وستحاول إملاء رغبتها على المؤتمر.  
(A17, L19-21)

BT: [We can confirm] that the United States is adopting a very clear position, based on imposing restrictions and conditions particularly directing the conference towards discussing how the status of ruling in Syria should be in the upcoming stage, \*and it will attempt to dictate its wish over the conference].

This comes in the context of the prescriptive role of America (one main architect of the Geneva II conference) in drawing up the post-Assad political roadmap in Syria following the conference. Observe carefully her negative attitude towards the United States which can be easily discernible as evidenced in her introductory declaration (نستطيع أن نؤكد): [We can confirm] which renders the ST item: (seems to be); her addition of (لا يخفى على أحد): [very clear] and her repetition of America’s hegemonic/interventionist conduct configured in two occurrences: the ST item (with strings

attached<sup>266</sup>: (ويقوم على فرض القيود والشروط): [based on imposing restrictions and conditions]) and (وستحاول إملاء رغبتها): [and it will attempt to dictate its wish over].

Post-Assad Syria readily indicates his being out of the forthcoming political scene in the country, i.e. the President is no longer entitled to run for presidential office should he wish to seek a third tenure. It ought to be noted that the Syrian government has not acknowledged deposing President Assad or his ruling aides from the future political life. Therefore, the translator could be seen aware of this fact and responds to her pro-governmental institution's brief, her ideological affiliations and political instincts. As can be clearly seen, she heavily opts for reframing specific references to "post-Assad Syria" and "the exclusion of the current president (Bashar al-Assad)" into one generic term: وضع الحكم ([the status of ruling]). In other words, while the ST implies an 'Assad-free' Syria in future, the TT indicates otherwise. Within the same context, observe how the translator in the paragraph that follows, which continually discusses the same theme, re-lexicalises reference to "Bashar al-Assad" and "their President" (A16, L29) as 'their leadership': (قيادته) (A17, L26). Moreover, notice how the ST verb (to rubber-stamp) is also re-lexicalised into (مناقشة): [discussing] with the omission of an ST item that indicates an act of discussing/negotiating: (in which all parties must agree to a solution) because this solution, as suggested in the ST, excludes President Assad. This translation behaviour, particularly re-lexicalising (to rubber-stamp) into (مناقشة): [discussing], twists the intended original message and makes explicit the inclusiveness of the regime into the coming political scene in the country; the ST verb (rubber-stamp) indicates a routine, automatic approval (endorsement) on ready-made resolutions/decisions and involves no room for discussing. *Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary* (2003: 1087) provides the following definition: "rubber-stamp *vt.* (1918): to approve, endorse, or dispose of as a matter of routine or at the command of another".

---

<sup>266</sup> "With strings attached" (provisionary, conditional) is an idiom meaning 'with limits, demands and conditions'. Usually used as "no strings attached": (unconditional, with no returns, provisos or contractual requirements). Both of them are attached with donations, interpersonal relationships, special offers, signing agreements, contracts, bank loans, assistance, etc.

The presence of the translator inside the TT (on the lexical level) is becoming starkly clear through her utilisation of Over- and Re-lexicalisation. A third lexical strategy she opts for, and which further unlocks her ideological discursive practice, is “Metaphor”, to which I turn next.

### 3. Metaphor

As we have seen in the previous analyses thus far in this chapter, metaphorical expressions which bear ideological signification are employed in a variety of ways to pursue the translator’s agenda. The translator of the present text opts for metaphorical constructions on several occasions to support her thesis which she sites throughout her text and strengthen her overall line of argumentation. So without any more ado, witness the following examples:

*1. The Geneva II talks on the crisis in Syria, caused by the west and its Middle Eastern minions playing political games [...] by arming and financing terrorist groups to spread chaos.* (A16, L1-2)

إن محادثات جنيف الثانية بشأن الأزمة في سوريا كان الغرب وأتباعه في الشرق الأوسط سبباً لها وما زالوا حتى حين يلعبون دوراً فعالاً في تأجيج نار الفتنة عبر تسليحهم وتمويلهم للمجموعات الإرهابية بغية تمكينها من نشر الفوضى والاضطراب في هذا البلد. (A17, L1-3)

BT: [Verily the Geneva II talks on the crisis in Syria which the west and its Middle Eastern followers have caused and have still been playing an efficient role in igniting the fire of Fitna [socio-political strife] by arming and financing terrorist groups in a bid to enable them to spread chaos and instability in this country].

This is part of the first paragraph which is affluent with manipulative translation strategies that are indicative of her attitudinal stance towards the role of the West its Mideast allies in the causation and escalation of the Syrian crisis. These strategies mainly include Transitivity and different forms of Over-lexicalisation as I have discussed above. Metaphor, seen through the lens of CDA and SFL, is an essential feature that text producers resort to in order to disseminate substantial ideological potential. Thus, the translator’s insertion of a ‘strong’ metaphor that does not exist in the source text (تأجيج نار الفتنة): [igniting the fire of Fitna] is another explicit indication of her ideological interference which serves to add more derogatory connotations to the West and its allies in the Middle East particularly in holding them responsible for what is happening in Syria, and by way of inference, acquitting the regime. Worthy of notice is the highly emotive associations included in

each constituent of the metaphor: the exaggerative form of (تأجيج): [igniting]; the connotative associations of (نار): [fire] and the historical context of (فتنة): [Fitna]<sup>267</sup>.

2. [...] Without aid, support, financing, weapons and training from abroad, the [...] bands of terrorists committing murder, torture, rape.... (A16, L9-10)

لا شَكَ أَنَّهُ لَوْلَا تَقْدِيمِ الْمَسَاعِدَاتِ وَالْدَّعْمِ وَالْتَّموِيلِ وَالتَّسْلِيْحِ وَالتَّدْرِيْبِ مِنَ الْخَارِجِ لَمَا تَمَكَّنْتُمُ شَرَادِمَ مِنَ الْعَصَابَاتِ الإِرْهَابِيَّةِ مِنْ تَنْفِيذِ وَارْتِكَابِ عَمَلَيَّاتِ الْقَتْلِ، وَالْعَذَابِ، وَالْأَغْتِصَابِ.... (A17, L8-9)

BT: [There is no doubt that, without aid, support, financing, weapons and training from abroad, the disunited gangs of terrorists could not be able to carry out and commit murder, torture, rape....].

Here again, the translator brings about an expressive metaphor represented in the word (شرادم). In classical Arabic, the word (شرادم) evokes such meanings as weakness, fragility, defenselessness as well as vulnerability (See *Tahdhīb Alloghah* 2001: 1852). For example, in the Glorious Quran, we read: “إِنَّ هُولَاءِ لَشَرِذَمَةٌ قَلِيلُونَ”<sup>268</sup>: [These are indeed a small band<sup>269</sup>] which is interpreted by Ibn 'ajeebeh (1161-1227) in his *Al Bahr Al Madid Fe Tafsīr Al Quran Al Majid*<sup>270</sup> as a ‘very small number of vulnerable people who can be overcome and defeated (1999: 1951fff). Wehr's *A Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic* (1976: 464) mentions the word is pluralised as (شراديم & شرادم) means a "small group, gang, party, troop; little band". In Modern Standard Arabic (MSA), this word associates with things (like clothes) to mean shabby and torn apart (*Dictionary of Modern Arabic Language* (2008: 1196, c.f. Waseet 1972: 503). According to *Mukhtar Aşşehâh* (1957: 141), (شرادم), *sing.* (شَرِذَمَة) means a “small piece of things or small group of people” indicating disunity and messiness, (c.f. *Dictionary of Modern Arabic Language* (2008: ibid).

*Al Monjed in Modern Arabic Language* (1908: 758), agrees with the *Dictionary of Modern Arabic Language* and interestingly adds reference to “a small group of defected soldiers/leftovers”, which very much suits our context in that what the text (and the Syrian government) refers to as “terrorist

<sup>267</sup> Fitna (also Fitnah) is originally an Arabic word that has been introduced into English (and other languages) and lost its foreignness. It is affluent with important historical implications in the Arab-Islamic history. It is frequently used in the Holy Quran (34 times) to mean different things such as ‘seduction’, ‘discord’, and the like. The term is used in both classical Arabic and MSA, not least the world of socio-politics (our context). Apart from its use in the Holy Qur'an which represents recorded classical Arabic, Fitna in modern political socio-discourse has come to acquire new meanings. In addition to meanings of enticement, temptation, etc., Wehr's *A Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic*/3<sup>rd</sup> ed., 1976: 696) includes reference to intrigue, [socio-political] strife, etc. which intimately link up with the present text's context.

<sup>268</sup> Chapter (Surah) 26. Al-Shu'ara- The Poets (54).

<sup>269</sup> Translated by: Maulana Muhammad Ali. Reference here is to the Israelites. See Ibn Katheer: undated: pp. 369 for context and detailed interpretation.

<sup>270</sup> Undated but a revised version (by Ahmad Abdullah Raslan) appeared in 1999.

gangs" are mainly defected soldiers (From the Syrian Arab Army) who have formed the bulk of the Syrian Free Army (SFR)- the military arm of the opposition in the country. By adding this metaphorical expression (in its plural form), the translator presumably intends to accord these anti-regime gangs: (العصابات) of terrorists (as suggested in the TT- not 'bands' as suggested in the ST) little currency (of disunity) and highlight their random savage attitude towards the text's list of monstrous crimes against unarmed civilians.

### **Conclusion**

As the analysis has shown, the overall message of the target text is not similar to that of the source text or, more precisely, provides a biased rendition in many ways as discussed above. It has been found that the translator, owing to her frequent recourse ideologically pragma-linguistic shifts, to operates under the injunctions of her commissioner (the pro-government Al Thawrah daily) and its established editorial line. Through the regular occurrences of the lexico-grammatical instantiations as shown above, her practice supports this study's hypothesis and confirms the basic long-established assumptions that underpin the Skopostheorie (translation is a purposeful activity, Nord 1997) and the Theory of Norms (Translation is a norm-governed activity, Toury 1995a) especially when this practice associates with media argumentative discourse represented in opinion articles produced during politically sensitive situations<sup>271</sup>. There is hefty evidence on the translator's biases and leanings in favour of the Syrian regime; she has opted for a number of lexico-grammatical strategies, more significantly in a systematic fashion represented in the regular occurrences of a number of syntactic and lexical features throughout the text backed by a number of pragmatic markers, often drawing on the same theme and subjects.

Put precisely, the target text producer (the translator) has constantly (and variously) supported the Syrian leadership and criticised its rival opponents inside and outside the country as we have seen in: [دول محور الشر] (شراذم من العصابات الإرهابية) [disunited small groups of terrorist gangs] and [the

---

<sup>271</sup> These elements (text type (argumentative), genre (media opinion articles), context of production (politically-charged) inter alia shape up my a priori hypothesis: translators in conflictual times do not provide bias-free accounts via the utilisation of a wide range of lexical, grammatical (and pragmatic) strategies.

states of evil axis' respectively]. More precisely, she chooses to eschew any reference that would threaten the ruling system's face, and hastens to besmirch the reputation of its rival parties through the regular and various utilisation of modality, transitivity, over- and re-lexicalisation and metaphor (all discussed below) in addition to a plethora of other linguistic and pragmatic sub-features that cohere in one way or another to constitute her message such as parallel repetition: (الصمت المطبق) (ارتكاب تلك الأفعال المشينة ... تقوم بتلك الجرائم المريعة، الجهات...والجهات); collocational patterns: (الأفعال المشينة، الجرائم المريعة); lexical cohesion ‘word choice’: (ارتكاب، فضح); emphatic markers/signifiers: (ويرغب بالاطلاع، لا يخفى على أحد، لم تعد خافية على أحد، البتة، إن); pluralisation (هجمات); (البلاد) not to mention the inclusive first speaker pronoun ‘we’ which appears in several instances in the text (See example 1 (a-d) and example 2 under Modality).

Her rendition of modality offers conclusive evidence on her emotional involvement and ideological intrusion. In the source text, there are around (23) occurrences in such a short opinion article<sup>272</sup>. Markedly, most of them represent Fairclough’s expressive type of modality which accords the text an argumentative character; for example, observe the heavy reliance on the ‘modal adjuncts’ in lines 25-28 only, together with the context in which they occur: Surely the talks should include; surely the talks should be a platform; surely this must be a question, are only a few examples from a multitude similar ones strewn throughout the text. Additionally, notice how some of these modal expressions are themselves preceded by the modal marker (Needless to say... it will be obediently (A16, L 23) which doubles up the text producer’s emotive voice. However, my main concern in this research is primarily to trace and explain how forms of modality are rendered (manipulated, camouflaged, exaggerated, diluted, added, etc.) and how this rendition may provide a newly significant message in the TT.

In this spirit, it has been observable that the translator has on several occasions rendered the ST modality in such a way that serves her attitudinal stance and pursues her commissioner’s agendas.

---

<sup>272</sup> These modal expressions occur in the following lines: 2, 3, 8, 13 (modal quantifier); 13, 15, 16, 20, 22, 23 (cluster: modal adjunct), 25 (cluster: modal adjunct), 27 (cluster: modal adjunct), 28 (cluster: modal adjunct), 29, 32 (cluster: modal adjunct), 33 and 34 (cluster: modal adjunct).

Sometimes, she converts the ST modal construction (will provide, will serve) into a simple present tense introduced by the emphatic marker (إنْ) as example one shows: (وَتُعْطِي؛ تُعْدُ بِمَثَابَةِ). In some other times, she maximises the signification of the ST modal (seems to be) with much emphasis added to it (لا يخفى على أحد) [we can confirm] reinforced by adding (نِسْطَبِيْعَ أَنْ يُؤْكَدْ) [very clear]) and the inclusive first speaker pronoun ‘we’ as example two shows. More significantly, sometimes she adds a ‘strong’ modality in an initial position (لَا شَكَ أَنْهَ) [Indeed there is no doubt that]), which does not already exist in the source text as example three argues. The three takes, viewed together, demonstrate an integrally-related interface and a significant ideological import concerning the same theme: illegitimate foreign intervention and its role in destroying Syria. This systematic recurrent frequency articulated via modality should offer clear evidence on an overall discursive practice and attitudinal stance the translator adopts to cement her thesis she cited early in the text. More, taken together at a textual/discursal level, the three examples would illustrate how an argumentative account is altered into an over-argumentative one for the pragmatic/rhetorical functions of emphasis and persuasion.

In continuation of her position on the conflict’s parties she proclaims through modality, the translator expressly identifies on whose shoulders blame should be thrown. To establish this message, she opts for the syntactic feature of transitivity where she converts the ST passive into an active with a foregrounded agent (كان الغرب وأتباعه في الشرق الأوسط سبباً لها). In so doing, ‘who caused what to who’ is made more explicit and, by implication, more sympathy towards the Syrian government is drawn, especially when she appends (في هذا البلد) to her reframed statement. More importantly, the translator strengthens that by a number of other text signifiers such as emphasis (إن): [verily/indeed]); metaphor (تأجيج نار الفتنة) let alone a twosome and threesome (الفوضى والاضطراب) synonymous patterns which underlie the lexical feature of over-lexicalisation. (شفافية وصدقية ورغبة)

The target text is noticeably replete with a regular recourse to over-lexicalisation (configured in twosome and threesome synonymous patterns). These patterns bear ideological signification and

accord the TT an over-argumentative and emotive flavour in order to alter the ST's message and, as a consequence, serve specific unacknowledged agendas. The ST, which represents an opinion article, is, it is safe to say, neutrally argumentative. The translator's persistent recourse to over-lexicalisation, however, veered the TT into a highly evaluative direction. These instantiations took various forms; in some contexts, she over-lexicalises the term that already exists in the source text: (الفوضى والاضطراب: chaos). In some other contexts, the translator unjustifiably adds her own emotive dyad: شنت وتشن [has been launching/ (literally: launched and is still launching)] and triad over-lexicalised patterns: شفافية وصدقية ورغبة [transparency, credibility and wish]); (تساندها وتمولها وتؤازرها): [support, fund and back]) that do not exist in the ST nor required by the TT linguistics/stylistics and, more significantly, she reinforces them by other pragma-linguistic signifiers, which reflects an overall attitudinal stance. (See the relevant discussion above).

In a purely additive sense, the target text producer made use of re-lexicalisation in various ways and with copious examples. In one instance, she rewords a newly-coined acronym in the world of politics (FUKUS) adding more pejorative image to its constituent states (دول محور الشر: [states of evil-axis]) as example one illustrates. Another essential instantiation on re-lexicalisation is manifest in her manipulating the verb tense (أخذت تتدخل): [have begun to intervene]) changing it from the past tense into a progressive one with much ideological import as example two demonstrates. In a similar vein, and in order to divert attention (or criticism) away from the Syrian leadership represented in President Bashar al-Assad, the translator avoids any mention to his direct name or job title 'President', although they are overtly stated in the ST several times: (*President (Bashar al-Assad); Bashar al-Assad; their President, Post-Assad, their (Syrian) ruler*). To serve specific rhetorical functions and pursue pre-planned pragmatic goals, she reframes all these ST references into three neutrally generic ones namely (قيادته؟ من يحكمه؟ وضع الحكم في سوريا في المرحلة المقبلة): [the status of ruling in Syria in the upcoming stage; who rules them; its leadership], as example three under Re-lexicalisation displays.

Finally, it can be argued that the translator has understood the influence of metaphorical expressions, not least in argumentative type of texts produced in situations of conflict. It came as no surprise for the translator to add two metaphors (شراذم؛ تأجيج نار الفتنة) that readily have strong signification in classical and modern Arabic owing to the historical context and etymological progression of their constituent units. Significantly, both of them derogatorily tie in with the domestic and foreign opposition.

Thus, the interconnectedness of the afore-discussed linguistic formations (structures) and their accompanying pragmatic signifiers, alongside with their recurrent frequency throughout the TT, validate the a priori hypothesis of this study: translators in times of armed conflict do not provide impartial accounts in order to serve certain agendas for the sake of their own in-built belief system or their commissioner/sponsor's dictations. This hypothesis rests on the major assumptions of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL) and Descriptive Translation Studies (DTS). Following Fairclough 1989; Halliday 1994, Hatim and Mason (1997: 161) rightly assume that 'the analysis of linguistic forms is enriched by the analysis of those ideological structures which underpin the use of language [in that] behind the systematic linguistic choices we make; there is inevitably a prior classification of reality in ideological terms... and that 'ideology finds its clearest expression in language'.

### **Text 10: Assad's Chemical Romance (Appendix 18)**

رومانسية الأسد الكيميائية (ملحق ١٩)

#### **Context & Content**

This text was produced by an internationally renowned specialist on Chemical Weapons (as I will show shortly below) exactly two years before the actual use of the chemical arsenal in Syria on August 21, 2013. It centrally foreshadows the potential consequences of these 'barbaric' weaponries if used and calls for the proper management and 'destruction' of "Assad's chemical weapons legacy... under control of international monitors from the Hague-based Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons", (A18, L63-64)- which won the 2013 Noble Prize. The source text producer is Leonard S. Spector: "Deputy

Director of the Monterey Institute of International Studies' James Martin Centre for Non-proliferation Studies (CNS), and leads the Centre's Washington D.C. Office. In addition, he serves as editor-in-chief of the Centre's publications. Mr. Spector joined CNS from the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), where he served as an Assistant Deputy Administrator for Arms Control and Non-proliferation at the National Nuclear Security Administration. Prior to his tenure at DOE, Mr. Spector served as Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Director of its Nuclear Non-proliferation Project... His many publications include: *Tracking Nuclear Proliferation 1995: A Guide in Maps and Charts* (with Mark McDonough and Evan Medeiros, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1995); *Nuclear Ambitions: The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, 1989-1990* (West view Press, 1990); *The Undeclared Bomb: The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, 1987-1988* (Harper Business 1990)".<sup>273</sup>.

(For background information about the ST source (Foreign Policy), the TT source (Jordan-based Al Ghad daily) and the translator, see the background information provided under my discussion of text 1 above, on pages: 175-176).

## I. Syntax

### Modality

*So despite their many faults and **deplorable** record on human rights, the Assads have treated their chemical arsenal with considerable care. But as the country potentially descends into chaos, will that hold true?* (A18, L19-21)

و عليه، وعلى الرغم من عديد أخطائهم و سجلهم في حقوق الإنسان **والذي يستوجب الإدانة**، فإن الأسدين تعاملوا مع ترانتهما الكيمائية بمنتهى الحذر. لكن، وفيما يحتمل أن ينزلق البلد إلى أتون الفوضى العارمة، هل سيصمد ذلك التعامل؟ (A19, L16-17)

BT: [So despite their many faults and record on human rights **which must now be deplored**, the Assads have treated their chemical arsenal with considerable care. But as the country potentially descends into the furnace of sweeping chaos, will that hold true?]

The TT introduces an expressive modality, according to Fairclough's dichotomy of modality shown in the previous chapter, and highlights an important issue from the writer's point of view: condemning the Assads' numerous faults and awful history on human rights (observe the satirical implications embedded in the headline: the chemical *romance* of the president). The compelling,

---

<sup>273</sup> Off the website of James Martin Centre for Non-proliferation Studies:  
[http://cns.miis.edu/staff/spector\\_leonard.htm](http://cns.miis.edu/staff/spector_leonard.htm)

authoritative and powerful modal auxiliary (يُسْتَوْجِب) [must now] which is not signalled in the ST's declarative pattern (despite their many faults and deplorable record on human rights), it is argued, entails a maximum degree obligation in Arabic on the one hand, and implies an emotional involvement on the part of the TT producer, on the other. In Arabic lexicography, the modal (يُسْتَوْجِب) is highly emphatic, assertive and demanding and indicates that the action in question is urgently due and cannot wait (Al Waseet (1972: 1055); Asas Al Bala3'ah (2001: 810). Al Monjed in Modern Arabic Language (2008: 1507) extends this semantic significance and states that this form of modality usually relates to actions that are worthy of condemnation'.

It is important to note that the TT producer, by way of addition and in a very short chunk, opted for the translation strategy of over-lexicalisation configured in both (أتون): [furnace] and (العارمة): [sweeping]) and presented it in a metaphorical construction: (أتون): [furnace], (as will be discussed shortly below under Over-lexicalisation and Metaphor respectively). This density in manipulating such a short item (chaos) in part explains the translator's resort to a strong modality (يُسْتَوْجِب). The original text, I should note, is already ideologically oriented (as configured in the negative associations of the evaluative epithet 'deplorable' which links up with the Assads: father and son), but the TT opts for 'recycling' this ideological orientation to magnify the derogatory meaning connoted in the ST. It adds more demanding need in the form of *inevitability* in view of its emotiveness and therefore rhetorical capability, to appeal to the reader, influence her/his reception of the product and ensure that his final product has achieved the maximum ideological effect.

## II. Lexicon

### 1. Over-lexicalisation

1. *So despite their many faults and deplorable record on human rights, the Assads have treated their chemical arsenal with considerable care. But as the country potentially descends into **chaos**, will that hold true? (A18, L19-21)*

عليه، وعلى الرغم من عديد أخطائهم وسجالهما في حقوق الإنسان والذي يُسْتَوْجِب الإدانة، فإن الأسدين تعاملوا مع ترسانتهما الكيميائية بمنتهى الحذر. لكن، وفيما يحتمل أن ينزلق البلد إلى أتون الفوضى العارمة، هل سيصمد ذلك التعامل؟ (A19, L16-17)

BT: [So despite their many faults and record on human rights which must now be deplored, the Assads have treated their chemical arsenal with considerable care. But as the country potentially descends into **the furnace of sweeping chaos**, will that hold true?]

The over-lexicalisation technique is quite obvious here and it reflects ideological signification that means to further demean both Syrian presidents: the late father and the presently-ruling son. The intended message in the source text on the chaotic situation in Syria that is likely to occur due to their black record in ruling the country for decades has been overloaded and given an extra ideological weight to communicate the ideological message and attitudinal values the translator wanted. This has been done by way of adding a meaningful metaphorical item (أتون): [furnace] before ‘chaos’ and post-modifying it by a strong epithet that is indicative of comprehensive annihilating destruction (العارمة): [sweeping]. In so doing, the translator could be seen to have disclosed his own ideology by making the source text producer say what he has not really said which could derail the text consumer and wreak havoc on the ST message decontextualising its intended content. Notice how the addition of the expressive (strong) modality (بستوجب) has served his biased stance which has been discussed in detail under Modality above.

*2. And let's imagine that Assad is eventually removed: What leaders would gain control of these weapons after he departed? (A18, L39-40)*

ولنتخيل أن الإطاحة بالأسد قد تمت في نهاية المطاف: فمن هم القادة الذين سيكسبون السيطرة على هذه الأسلحة بعد أن ينتهي ويغادر؟ (A19, L31-32)

BT: [And let's imagine that Assad is eventually toppled: What leaders would gain control of these weapons after he **steps down and leaves**?].

In this example, the term of the original text ‘departed’ has been unnecessarily over-lexicalised by a dual synonymous pattern (يتحى ويبادر): [steps down and leaves]) which, it can be argued, amplifies the ideological content of the ST for highlighting purposes. An accurate look into the lexical weight that the added word (يتحى): [step down] and its being foregrounded together with the dynamism its present tense generates, further explicates this exaggeration and reflects the main pragmatic function of this instance of over-lexicalisation concerning the President’s departure. The TT inflicts into discourse an anti-regime attitude which is displayed and reinforced through the lexical strategy of over-lexicalisation: articulating a desire towards the ‘departure’ of the Syrian president. The magnified lexical weight of (إطاحة): [toppled] which renders ‘removed’ in the ST along with placing it in initial position should also be considered to justify this rhetorical purpose of

exaggeration. In other words, the subjectivity and emotiveness of the text, as reflected through lexico-grammatical practices in the TT (word choice and syntactic order) are arguably maximised.

The ST producer, it can be argued, takes a kind of neutral (or less emotive) position on President Assad's 'departure' and casts his doubts vis-à-vis the ability of his rivals- the anti-regime newcomers- in 'maintain[ing] strict security measures at the chemical sites'. This neutrality is also evidenced by describing the Assads' doctrine as *cautious* (in the line that follows: A18, L41) which is omitted in the Arabic text perhaps to conceal the credit that the source text may intend to imply towards them (the Assads: senior and junior). The use of over-lexicalisation in the TT is unjustified. That is, it clearly indicates that the ST has been ideologically manipulated which is not necessitated. Thus, the Arabic translator has adapted the original text to meet his personal ideological requirements and probably the pressures/instructions of his publisher as well as the ideological expectations of the target audience.

## 2. Metaphor

1. *The continued unrest in Syria, coupled with President Barack Obama's call for President Bashar al-Assad to leave power, has thrown the future of the country into flux.* (A18, L1-2)

**ألقت القلاقل المستمرة في سوريا سوية مع دعوة الرئيس باراك أوباما للرئيس بشار الأسد للتنحي بمستقبل البلد في أتون الصهر والتقلب.** (A19, L1-2)

BT: [The continued unrest in Syria, coupled with President Barack Obama's call for President Bashar al-Assad to leave power, **have thrown the future of the country into the furnace of fusion and fluctuation**].

In this example, a straightforward metaphor in the ST has been recycled and presented metaphorically with clear intensification in the TT: *into flux*: ([*into the furnace of fusion and fluctuation*] which bears ideological signification. Notably, this is not a non-meaningful practice. It is rather done as such (most likely purposefully as the metaphorical item occurs/ is added twice in the TT: Lines 1 & 17) in service of the translator's own in-built belief systems, assumptions and expectations of the targeted audience and/or those of his commissioner (the newspaper that publishes the TT). The translator's presence inside his re-produced TT can be easily noticed; he tends to re-/trans-create the original text world in line with these production-

governing factors. This process of 're-creating/trans-creating' evokes a pragmatic function (a rhetorical value/effect): exaggerating the negative role of the Syrian President in the continued disturbances in the country whose choice to cling to power and refusal of Obama's calls have made the situation engulfed with much uncertainty and would probably add more fuel to fire especially if the regime's chemical weaponry is not "properly protected".

The TT metaphor (recycled and remoulded as the back-translation shows) has given more ideological implication to the originally simple and straightforward utterance to match up with the translator's own intentions and lure the target audience to accept the (exaggerated) ideologically-driven message included in the TT. This 'heavy' representation of the ST metaphor (has thrown the future of the country into flux) rendered as: [أَلْقَتْ بِمُسْتَقْبَلِ الْبَلَدِ فِي أَنْوَنِ الصَّهْرِ وَالتَّلَبْبِ] (has thrown the future of the country into the furnace of fusion and fluctuation], has been heightened by some other techniques, not least the pluralisation of the ST 'unrest' (line 1) which is rendered here (and elsewhere later in the text/) in a pluralised form as 'القلاقل' (line 1 & 22): [unrestS] instead of opting for such neutral equivalents as (الاضطراب، الفوضى...). Observe: (وَتَعْدُ الْلَاذِقِيَّةُ مَرْكَزًا آخَرَ لِلْقَلَاقِلِ) Line 22- whose ST counterpart is: (*Latakia is another center of unrest*- Line 27).

Discoursally, and to cement his intended ideological message in question, the translator has also resorted to some other techniques which could impinge on the ST intended message, manage the TT audience and steer them in a different direction. In the paragraph that follows, to cite just a couple of examples, he made use of the negative context of its proposition (concerning the regime's alleged use of this kind of controversial internationally-prohibited armaments in orchestrating horrible massacres against unarmed civilians in the country) and attributed the arsenal to the Syrian regime, which is not suggested in the original text:

The arsenal is thought to be massive. (A18, L6-7):

(A19, L5) TT: ويعتقد بأن الترسانة الكيميائية السورية ضخمة.

BT: [The chemical Syrian arsenal is thought to be massive...].

More, perhaps more significantly, he provided a dictionary definition of the lethal 'blister gases' as **boldfaced** below and [back-translated] thereafter. This explanation could probably be seen as a credit on the part of the translator who wishes to present a more comprehensible, "friendly" and mystery-free rendition to his readership which is by and large not unadvisable in the translational practice, but the nature of the defined term 'blister gases', coupled with the overall ideologically laden context and geopolitical circumstances that spawned the text and governed its production, should invalidate this probability and outlaw its rationale.

*The arsenal is thought to be massive involving thousands of munitions and many tons of chemical agents, which range, according to CIA annual reports to Congress, from the blister gases [Ø] of World War I -- such as mustard gas -- to advanced nerve agents such as sarin and possibly persistent nerve agents, such as VX gas.*

(A18, L6-10)

يعتقد بأن الترسانة الكيميائية السورية ضخمة، وتشتمل على ذخائر والعديد من أطنان العناصر الكيميائية التي تتفاوت، وفق التقارير السنوية المعرفة من وكالة الاستخبارات المركزية الأمريكية (السي أي أيه) للكونغرس، بين الغازات المنفطة (التي تستخدم في الحروب الكيماوية)، والتي تحرق أنسجة الجسم أو تحدث فيها بثوراً طبقاً لقاموس المورد) والعائدة إلى الحرب العالمية الأولى - مثل غاز الخردل - وبين غازات الأعصاب المتطرفة، مثل السارين، وربما عناصر الأعصاب الملازمة مثل غاز "في أكس.

"(A19, L5-9).

BT: [The arsenal is thought to be massive involving thousands of munitions and many tons of chemical agents, which range, according to CIA annual reports to Congress, from the blister gases which are used in chemical wars, and burn body tissues or cause scares onto it, according to Al Mawred) of World War I -- such as mustard gas -- to advanced nerve agents such as sarin and possibly persistent nerve agents, such as VX gas].

2. *In the hands of Assad- and his father Hafez before him- these weapons have been an ace-in-the-hole deterrent against Israel's nuclear capability.* (A18, L 11-12)

وما تزال هذه الأسلحة تشكل رادعاً، **مثل الشوكة في حلق القدرة النووية الإسرائيلية**، في أيدي بشار الأسد - ووالده حافظ من قبله.

(A19, L 10)

BT: [These weapons have been a deterrent, **like a thorn in the fauces of Israel's nuclear capability**, in the hands of Bashar Assad- and his father Hafez before him].

To maximise the message suggested in the ST or make his own more prominent (concerning the role of the Syrian regime's chemical arsenal in paralysing Israel's nuclear ambitions- as a winning card "ace-in-the-hole" in the hands of the Assads- who have shown continuous enmity against Israel for decades), the translator adds into his TT or (more accurately) reframes the ST item (against) into a familiar metaphor in Arabic introduced by way of simile: (**مثل الشوكة في حلق القدرة النووية الإسرائيلية**): [like a thorn in the *fauces* of Israel's nuclear capability], which has a strong discoursal value

amongst the Arabic readership; he likens the regimes chemical weaponries to a thorn in the *fauces* of Israel's nuclear capability, which indicates slumber, stagnation and similar sclerotic associations. The manipulated thematic structure (theme-rheme re-arrangement) cannot be left unnoticeable as it explicates the translator's thought organization and makes more evident his attitudinal stance. Theme, in the linguistic construction, conventionally occupies an initial position and communicates less important information (or "given information" to import Halliday's wording) while rheme assumes a final position of the text producer's thought arrangement and communicates more important information ("new information" to import Halliday's term)<sup>274</sup>. As can be seen, the ST theme is shifted to rheme position in the TT, while the ST rheme has been given a thematic position which might not be free from attitudinal or ideological values. Compared with the ST, the thematic progression in the Arabic translation is reversed in that the translator pushes the ST theme to rheme position (by shifting it to the furthest position) thus disempowering it of its contextual weight and discoursal significance to serve an overall pragmatic goal: he wanted to accord it more prominence and highlight, in the first place, the deterring function of the Assads' chemical arsenal against Israel's nuclear capability and draw more attention for it. As Fairclough puts it, "it is always worth attending to what is placed initially in clauses and sentences because that can give insight into assumptions and strategies which may at no point be made explicit". (1992b: 184). Notice how he skipped the ST positive epithet (*ace-in-the-hole*<sup>275</sup>) which links up with the current Syrian president and his father.

Ideally, the translator should have handled the original text world properly by keeping the theme and rheme in their original positions, and in doing so, sustains the pragma-semiotic momentum without allowing his and his readers' ideological affiliation and emotional involvement to creep into the translated text especially that there is no stylistic constraints imposed by Arabic language.

---

<sup>274</sup> For more information on the textual feature of thematisation, see Halliday (1985: 271-286).

<sup>275</sup> (*Ace-in-the-hole*) is an idiom meaning a winning card: "a hidden advantage or resource kept in reserve until needed".

## Conclusion

Markedly, the whole lexico-grammatical features above expressly draw upon the Assads' Syrian leadership; every example associates with direct reference to the Assads' ruling family (the senior and the junior), which automatically entails an investigation into the translator's stance towards the Syrian leadership and, by implication, its rival opposition.

The translator resorts to an occurrence of a suggestive modality which, strikingly, is not conveyed in the source text. He converts the adjectival clause represented in the epithet (deplorable) into a strong form of expressive modality (يُستوجب): [must now be] that connotes much emphasis and demands the action in question (the denunciation of the Assads' numerous faults and awful history on human rights) be urgently carried out as I explained earlier. In a similar vein, the translator opted for over-lexicalising the single word (chaos) that appears in this same context when he renders it into (أتون الفوضى العارمة): [the furnace of sweeping chaos], which in part explains his recourse to a strong modality as I have explained. This translatorial normative attitude is not random; it is ideologically significant as it serves to further demonise both Syrian presidents: the late father and the presently-ruling son concerning their unsound rule and black record on human rights in Syria. Thus, both strategies (metaphor and over-lexicalisation) occur in a neighbouring place and within the same thematic space, which offers a cohesive link of his attitudinal stance vis-à-vis the Assads' decades-old ruling policies in running the socio-political scene in the country.

As his 'through argumentation' goes on, the translator re-opted for another instance of over-lexicalisation that shows additional negative attitude towards the current Syrian President's cling to office. The ST term 'departed' has been needlessly over-lexicalised by a twosome synonymous pattern (يتحى ويغادر): [steps down and leaves]) which reflects a wish towards the 'departure' of the Syrian President from office. The added, and foregrounded dynamic verb (يتحى): [step down], further illuminates this stance which can also be evidenced by the lexical cohesion he includes in (إطاحه): [toppling] which renders 'removed' in the ST, along with placing it in initial position. More significantly, the ST reference to the Assads' doctrine as 'cautious' in the same paragraph was

skipped by the translator, which results in hiding credit which the ST may have meant to convey towards both "Assads", thus communicating his pragmatic goals and ascertaining that he has achieved the maximum ideological effect.

Not only did the translator opt for modality, over- and re-lexicalisations to communicate the same pejorative picture of the Syrian president, he also recycled the ST metaphor and loaded it with much ideological import: *into flux*: (في أتون الصهر والتقلب): [into the furnace of fusion and fluctuation]. In so doing, he arguably intensifies the chaotic state and ‘unrests’ caused by the negative role of the Syrian President whose choice to cling to power and refusal of Obama’s advice to leave office have made the situation worse off. Remarkably, the super-expressive Arabic word (أتون): [furnace], (defined by the *Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary* (2003: 508) as "an enclosed structure in which heat is produced"), occurs twice in the TT: it is associated with over-lexicalisation (*into chaos*: (إلى أتون الفوضى العارمة) [into the furnace of sweeping chaos], as well as with metaphor (*into flux*: (في أتون الصهر والتقلب: [into the furnace of fusion and fluctuation]). To stick this picture (and his rhetorical purpose) in the reader’s mind, the translator did two other main things: he attributed the chemical arsenal used against the unarmed civilians to the Syrian government which is absent in the ST, and added a detailed dictionary definition of the lethal ‘blister gases’ used by the ‘regime’. Thus, these linguistic (syntactic and lexical) strategies, together with their neighbouring textual and pragmatic signifiers coherently combine together to constitute a significantly ideological view on the part of the translator in relation with the “Assad’s chemical *romance*” vis-à-vis his people and the events in the country.

## CHAPTER SIX: SUMMARY, CONCLUSION & RECOMMENDATIONS

### 6.0 Introduction

This chapter is centrally concerned with the interpretation of the findings arrived at in the previous chapter. It starts with a re-visit to the Study's questions and hypotheses set in chapter one (on pages: 7 & 8 respectively) which are offered below under eight sub-headings of general concluding observations. The chapter moves on to show in detail the original contribution of the present study to its area of investigation; significance; challenges; limitations and recommendations that follow from these conclusions and concludes with a last word.

### 6.1 Research Questions- Re-visited

Translation activity (not least in times of conflict) appears to be perspectival; it is governed by the translators' own perspectives and other control factors be they those of the target/host (receiving) systems wielded by the readership's expectations or those of their commissioners/patrons, which can be a publisher, a political party, a ruling system, etc., or even the translators' own belief systems (socio-political affiliations or ideological orientations). This study looks into how social and political reality is constructed by tracing wartime translators' normative behaviour as manifested in pragma-linguistic formations. It sets out to unmask their latent ideological orientations encoded (by wartime translators) inside and behind media and political discourses by way of discerning potential shifts of the selected text pairs that may instantiate bias and, on top of that, their impact of the text receivers' perception of the respective events.

One basic question of the present study was to examine and explain the motives behind the translators' faltering in rendering impartially and offering slanted and prejudiced accounts (skopos, brief, commission, readership's expectation, in-built beliefs or personal, political and ideological affiliations) as well as the manipulative tools they utilise to do so together with the pragmatic goals they wish to serve. Besides, it questions how this investigation can further the established objectives of the Study's frameworks of analysis: Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), Systemic Functional

Linguistics (SFL) and Descriptive Translation Studies (DTS), thus providing new research avenues from different perspectives on the one hand, and, as a result, setting helpful pedagogical guidelines on translation in general and translation in times of conflict in particular, on the other. Answers to all these questions are detailed in the subsequent sections in this chapter mainly under the following eight sub-headings of section 6.3 entitled General Concluding Observations: 6.3.1 CDA, SFL & DTS Harmoniously Hybridised; 6.3.2 (Context): Language as "A System of Meaning Potential"; 6.3.3 Adequacy vs. Acceptability/ Norms' Violation; 6.3.4 Evitable vs. Inevitable Shifts; 6.3.5 Cross-linguistic and Cross-cultural Asymmetries; 6.3.6 Pressures of the Skopos are not a Licence; 6.3.7 Translation is a Norm-governed and Purposeful Activity; 6.3.8 Managing (Intervention) vs. Monitoring (Mediation) as well as section 6.5 under Significance.

## **6.2 Research Hypotheses- Re-visited**

In order to see how *far* they have been answered/ achieved, I shall now return to the specific research hypotheses stated in chapter one under Research hypotheses. As hypothesised *a priori*, it has been found, through a systematic investigation of authentic examples, that translators in times of conflict dealing with argumentative type of texts in politically sensitive contexts and ideologically loaded situations tend to filter the ST intended message and acclimatise it in such a way that feeds into specific purposes in a bid to glamorise/demonise, legitimise/delegitimise and propagandise specific agendas. This follows on from many claims and conclusions that (politically charged) texts, when translated, most likely take the form of "rewriting" and that "[o]n every level of the translation process, it can be shown that, if linguistic considerations enter into conflict with considerations of an ideological or poetological nature, the latter tend to win out", Lefevere (1992: 39). This also finds its echoes in Hatim and Mason's (1997: 161) claims that ideology is explicitly configured in lexico-grammatical constructions and that "behind the *systematic linguistic choices* we make, there is inevitably a prior classification of reality in ideological terms. The content of what we do with language reflects ideology at different levels: at the lexical-semantic level, and at the grammatical-syntactic level"; [my emphasis].

Translators of the selected texts have been found to act against the norms and conventions demanded by the host language in order to serve certain agendas. For example<sup>276</sup>, they flout the Arabic passivisation rule; they choose (or decide) to conceal the action doer, or conversely, reveal her/him in line with their own (or their patron's/ reader's) demands. Observe, for example, how the translator in text one opts for a "thick" form of nominalisation followed by the action doer in a pluralised form: (من جانب سلطات النظام) [by the regime's authorities], which are all absent in the ST, to be critical of a wrongdoing (arresting protestors) committed by the Syrian regime and, by way of inference, to be sympathetic with the opposition parties in the country. On the other hand, and within the same text, he opts for another syntactic form of managing: (Transitivity) rendering the ST passive structure (A united opposition **is also urgently needed** to challenge...) into an active one (وتمس الحاجة، بشكل ملح، إلى تحدي...) [The need desperately urges to challenge...] hiding the action doer- the opposition this time- in order to turn attention away from it, thus acquitting it from responsibility for its disunity. In a nutshell, the translator unveils the action doer (the regime's authorities) as exemplified in the strategy of Nominalisation on the one hand, and veils the action doer (A united opposition) as exemplified in the strategy of Transitivity, on the other- more significantly within the same text- which reflects his own normativity (regularity in behaviour that resides in his mind) in such a way that matches up with specific agendas.

Thus, translators in times of conflict- in the manner expected- have shown a regular tendency towards impregnating, to varying degrees, their translations with ideologically significant subjective and biased “fingerprints” as they act according to a number of pressures and dictations (local and global) including, *inter alia*, TT translational and cultural norms, clients’ requirements, readers’ expectations and ideological affiliations who have assumptions and presupposition which they expect to see fulfilled in the finished product and to which the translators of the selected texts

---

<sup>276</sup>All other numerous instantiations on all lexico-grammatical strategies (Modality, Nominalisation, Transitivity; Over-lexicalisation, Re-lexicalisation, Metaphor) together with their pragmatic markers and cues (pluralisation, relevance, euphemism, speech acts, face (reputation/honour), politeness, blasphemy, etc), utilised by the translators of the selected texts in this thesis and discussed in the previous chapter, do apply here and provide similar evidence. These strategies (stratagems) will be summarised under their respective headings shortly below under 6.3.8 Managing (Intervention) vs. Monitoring (Mediation).

respond. These pressures and dictations are, this study has found as will be summarised in section 6.3.8 Managing (Intervention) vs. Monitoring (Mediation), bound to govern their strategies and steer the direction of their decision-making process (their syntactic, lexical and pragmatic choices) vis-à-vis the constitution of socio-political reality during the act of translating, thus indicating occasions of "harmful, unnecessary" intervention, which runs counter to the core values of the practice and places its ethical conventions (faithfulness, fidelity, impartiality, etc.) at stake.

### **6.3 General Concluding Observations**

Ideological orientations in politically motivated media discourse are not expressed in an explicit manner. Van Dijk (1991: 181), who places special research interest on tacit ideological bearings in media discourse, aptly likens media text to "an iceberg of information of which only the tip is actually expressed in words and sentences" adding that "the rest is assumed to be supplied by the knowledge scripts and models of the media users, and therefore usually left unsaid". The remainder of the iceberg has been the major job of the present endeavour: detecting potential ideological subtexts and instantiations of bias which may lurk underneath written messages encoded in given politically sensitive opinion articles (what and how the TT does not (or does not wish to) say).

Generally, language, through the various analyses carried out in the previous chapter, has been found to facilitate the expression/articulation of ideology; it plays a lead role in "ideologising" discourse/text (أدلة الخطاب / النص) and, as a consequence, influencing our perceptions and attitudes towards events, which dominates our mind and perception of reality of the relevant situations. We have observed through the analysed examples that translators do not only tend to impart the ST intended message, but also manipulate the readership and steer them to interpret it in such a way that agrees with their own (or their commissioners') agendas- via a number of stratagems (configured in a variety of pragma-linguistic constructions and represented in an implicit, covert manner). As text (re)producers, translators (in wartime in particular), do not act purposelessly; their texts are infused with a variety of underlying ideologies towards which they are acting in order to

legitimise their choices. Various occurrences of significant emotional engagement and ideological involvement have appeared.

The translators in this study, who are pro-regime and pro-opposition, have been found to opt for a multitude of ways to reflect and refract attitudinal positions and viewpoints; they develop a tendency to adapt the ST message in order to polish the image of their affiliates and eschew any negative, pejorative, derogatory reference to them in order to glorify them, give them more credence and save their face, or alternatively, hasten to sully their rival opponents, dishonor them and threaten their face. Motivated by socio-cultural and political requirements, they are keen to manipulate the discursal values in their TTs by, as may be the case, diluting/deadening or magnifying/intensifying them. In other words, they choose to hedge or even enshroud depreciatory, deprecatory and condemnatory associations which the ST intends to show on the one hand, or lionise their allies in service of their reader's goals and world-thoughts (expectations and presuppositions), on the other.

In the following, I shall present a panoramic concluding account in an attempt to pinpoint and explain the root causes of the (wartime) translators' prejudiced normativity (recurrences/reiterations/ regular reappearances in behavior) in terms of their conformity (or non-conformity) to translational, cultural, etc. norms) which I hypothesised, questioned and tested in the previous chapter. Before doing that, it is noteworthy that, by doing so, I only seek to describe, explain and interpret this deviant/improper conduct which lies at the heart of CDA, SFL let alone DTS.

### **6.3.1 CDA, SFL & DTS Harmoniously Hybridised**

This study by and large casts light on ideology in discourse from a text linguistic (translational) point of view; how it can be detected and interpreted through a scrutinising study of the stratagems adopted and adapted by the translators in wartime to communicate new ideologically-inflicted meaning(s) that would trigger a different impact on the target audience. More specifically, the main purpose of the present study has been to investigate potential instances of ideological bias in

politically-charged argumentative media discourse (newspaper opinion articles text-forms) within the context of the on-going Syrian "*Spring*". It is a descriptive account that chiefly looks into the complexities of the translation process from a variety of methodological angles (CDA, SFL and DTS) with a view to exploring, in a systematic fashion, accumulative patterns of shifts in a selected set of translated texts according to well-devised selection criteria as shown in the previous chapter.

To achieve these objectives and validate the Study's questions and hypotheses, a well-devised methodology has been developed in such a way to facilitate the identification, description and interpretation of selected Arabic translations of newspapers argumentative opinion articles. This methodology consists of two different aspects which feed each other: practical (comparative) and theoretical (descriptive). The former is concerned with holding TT-ST comparisons in a bid to dust off potential tacit instances of shifts that may have ideological imports which the translator wishes to communicate. The latter makes use of the needed theoretical underpinnings that would help to justify and interpret these instances which may reflect the translators' normative behaviour (leanings and preferences).

The results of the analyses show that the hybridisation of Fairclough's CDA, Halliday's SFL, and Toury's DTS, within a translational boundary, prove to be a *well-devised*, methodological and useful tool in carrying out a critical analysis of a translated material. They are found to possess a cross-language validity providing an effective means of showing the differences (shifts) between the two observable pairs, especially by way of the use of translation which, too, appears to be a serviceable tool to facilitate the understanding of the ideological thrusts that lie beneath politically-charged media discourse in the first place, enhance awareness of the cross-stylistic discrepancies (similarities 'and more importantly' differences) that feature English and Arabic political discourse produced in times of conflict as well as unravel the over-emotiveness of Arabic political discourse in comparison with that of English. The three integrated approaches have proved to be a potent tool to uncover the translators' stratagems which they adopt to deceive their readers, impact them

differently and take them to a different world (positioning them to take a negative or a positive stance towards the text event in question) in service of specific goals and in response to (local and global) pressures.

Toury (1999: 13) voices his dissatisfaction over the previous unworkable, ineffectual and impractical reasoning on the notion of norms characterised by too much theorisation. He calls for more practical applications... for "more than the mere introduction of WORD such as 'norm' into the theoretical arsenal ... It had to be made *operable*" claiming that he "therefore invested time and effort in theoretical and methodological elaborations on the NOTION of norm, especially in relation to its possible application to translation"; [emphasis his]. This descriptive-explanatory study, side by side with some studies since then, has offered "justifiable, non-arbitrary" accounts, thus responding to his calls, promoting the applied branch of the discipline of translation studies and garnering more (research) awareness to it in general. It hopes to have fulfilled (or contributed to the fulfillment of) Toury's optimisms, (the "beyond" in his *Descriptive Translation Studies- and Beyond*) that tangible findings of descriptive target-oriented, product-oriented investigations (at whose heart the Theory of Norms and Comparative Model lie) would lead to the establishment of "general laws of translational behaviour", Toury (1995a: 69), based on regularly cumulative observations of a systematic descriptive investigation of given text coupled pairs<sup>277</sup>. My method of analysis is based on Systemic Functional Linguistics within the ambit of Critical Text/Discourse Analysis in the hope to further the aims, objectives (and validity) of the Touryan Descriptive Translation Studies. As a descriptive-explanatory method, it has attempted to identify, explain and justify the occurrence of ideologically inflicted shifts in the given text pairs by considering the translators' strategies/choices and the factors that motivate them, alongside with the consequences of these shifts on the translated texts and, as a consequence, the readers' perceptions.

---

<sup>277</sup> Toury (1995a: 9) points out that "in the long run, the cumulative findings of descriptive studies should make it possible to formulate a series of coherent *laws* which would state the inherent relations between all the variables that will have been found to be relevant in translation"; [his emphasis]. (See Toury 1995a: 295fff: Beyond Descriptive Studies: Towards some laws of translational behaviour).

### **6.3.2 (Context): Language as "A System of Meaning Potential"**

Language, as Halliday (1978: 39) sees it, is “a system of meaning potential”. That is, words draw their meanings in, and only in, contexts. Discourse can therefore be regarded as a purposeful reproduction of social power and a form of mediated intercultural communication. As De Marco (2006: 13-14) succinctly puts it within a translational context: “I do not think that language simply reflects facts. Facts are the result of conscious, human actions. Language is *socially constructed, it is not independent of its users*”; [my emphasis]. Following on from these claims, the present study sees the selected texts from a pragma-linguistic prism; it seeks to explore both the semanticity and pragmaticity that lie inside and behind given TTs, and provide critical explanations for them.

Being a form of language use, the translations of the selected texts are (made) vulnerable to ideological signification which leads to the conclusion that translators, and translation critical analysts, should be aware of contextual considerations of all forms and at all levels which influence both the conditions of text production and reception. As the analysed examples in the previous chapter show, the pragma-linguistic formations in the Arabic texts, translated from English, can facilitate the expression of attitudinal and ideological meanings partly through their association with contextual implications.

More, it has been observed through the examined examples that not only can language reflect ideology; it can also, via the act of translation, re-produce it, which supports Hatim & Mason’s claim (1990: 161) that “ideologies find their clearest expression in language”. Worded differently, not only can ideological clues be expressed within linguistic boundaries, extra-linguistic (contextual/pragmatic) aspects should also be taken into consideration- which also contributes to the production and reception (interpretation) of texts.

As it is taken as a given (in the middle of critical discourse analysts, systemic-functional linguists and descriptivists), it is not possible, for research seeking to detect and interpret latent ideological potential, to consider aspects of language (as representation of socio-political reality) without

considering aspects of language as a form of social practice, behaviour and action. This requires considering aspects of the pragmatic theory, reception theory, Theory of Relevance together with such context-oriented concepts as (Grice' 1975) implicature (*pl.* implicatures, known as 'attalwīh' (التأويل in Arabic)<sup>278</sup>, inference and the relationship between language structure and language use in order to dissect the relationship between discourse and ideology. It has been observed throughout the thesis that ideological bearings are (re)-produced by and in context, rather than by sheer linguistic units. Veron (1971: 68) holds that "ideology is a system of coding reality and not a determined set of coded messages".

### **6.3.3 Adequacy vs. Acceptability/ Norms' Violation**

This thesis is aware of the fact that the TT audience does not have the same worldviews as the ST audience and that translators are members of a society and culture; they are governed by a wide range of socio-cultural factors including values, rules, conventions, mores, beliefs, etc. This means that (wartime) translators, as hypothesised, most likely tend to offer a different account by adapting the TT in such a way that agrees with these social factors with the intention to meet their readers' expectations (the second<sup>279</sup> pole of Toury's "Initial Norms": (acceptability), i.e. adherence/loyalty to host culture norms) (1995a: 58f), or what Chesterman (1997a: 64fff & 81fff) refers to as "expectancy norms", which, according to Ruokonen (2011: 73, c.f. Osers 1995: 59<sup>280</sup>) "play a major role in interpreting texts" adding that "readers' expectations may exert a normative influence on translators' solutions, and, conversely, norms give rise to various expectations concerning translations", (*ibid*: 74).

That said, the study has been concerned with how (in what pragma-linguistic forms) are these normative behaviours tacitly configured, why (for what reason) and, above all, what effect they may have on the ST message and ipso facto on the TT audience' perception of that message. The analyses carried out in the previous chapter have led to the conclusion that translators (most

---

<sup>278</sup> For more information, see footnote no. 26, on page: 21.

<sup>279</sup> The first one in his "Initial Norms" is 'adequacy', which indicates adherence/loyalty to the source culture norms.

<sup>280</sup> Osers (1995: 59) supports this claim concluding that "[audience] expectation has a bearing on a translator's strategy".

probably purposefully owing to their systematic, recurrent and frequent attitude) develop a tendency towards the norm of “acceptability” (message adaptation) adhering to the TT and its host culture rather than the norm of “adequacy” which adheres (and shows sincerity) to the ST. Through a series of systematically accumulative shifts which have been found to be indexical of significant intervention, they opt for twisting the original’s content by presenting one that is more congruent with the sentiments and presuppositions of their target audience (as shown in the examples under Relevance and Euphemism below, on pages: 291 & 293 respectively).

Instead of following what Munday (2012: 18) calls “expectation-defying” and “norm-flouting” line, the translators of the analysed texts in this study have been keen to operate in line with “expectation-fulfilling” and “norm-conforming” procedures (which, to some degrees, find echoes in the Venutian “Domestication” vs. “Foreignisation”, “Visibility” vs. “Invisibility” (1995); Shunnaq’s 1986, 1992, 1994; Farghal’s 1993, 2012, etc.; “Managing” vs. “Monitoring” as I have shown at length in chapter two). This rhetorical goal has been achieved by their utilising a variety of (subtle and unsubtle) pragma-linguistic formations, markers, clues and structures which come to form a biased picture in the audiences’ mind and create a different (ideologically significant) impact on them that is not suggested in the source text. This regular normative behaviour, which the translators of the selected texts adopt has governed the production of text and makes one assume (by way of inference) that they are aware of the consequences of their translational decisions on the ST intended message and, in effect, on the reception of the text in the host culture, which brings to the fore the presently-investigated translation-ideology debate.

In this respect, it can also be concluded that some translators of the selected texts do not conform to (Toury's) "Preliminary Norms" either. They are arguably stripped of the freedom to choose what texts to include and what texts to exclude<sup>281</sup>. That is to say, the inclusion/exclusion policy of the STs, which are intended to be translated, could be exerted upon some of them chiefly by their commissioners/ clients, or perhaps readers' requirements, and other similar extra-textual pressures

---

<sup>281</sup> See footnote no. 170, on page: 162 above.

which, one can argue, act as constraints on the selection process before their embarking on the actual translation. This little or no freedom can be justified by the sensitivity of the context of their (argumentative) texts' (re)-production: politically motivated circumstances which are readily ideologically loaded. Not only do translators of the selected texts flout the initial and preliminary norms, they have also been found to break what Toury terms "operational norms" which govern the different (small or big) aspects of the decision-making process that takes place during the act of translating.

The analyses have shown several interesting observations which validate key aspects of my proposed hypotheses. Generally, there appears to be a significant relationship between language, power and ideology which has been given considerable circulation by many scholars of translation and intercultural communication: (Suleiman 2003, 2004, 2011, 2013; Fairclough 1989; Wodak 1989/2000, 2012; Simpson, 1993; van Dijk 1998a; amongst many others). It has been found that (wartime) translation by and large does not simply reflect a faithful (re)production of the ST content but a biased and selective presentation that tends to falsify, fabricate and sabotage the ST intended message (c.f. Schäffner and Bassnett 2010; Tymoczko and Gentzler 2002a: xxi). In this connection, it could generally be argued that Translation Studies today no longer places much interest of faithfulness on the ST; more attention is instead given to the socio-cultural, communicative factors with a noticeable response to a plethora of centripetal (local/textual) and centrifugal (global/extratextual) pressures<sup>282</sup> that spawn the final output (the finished product) and govern their reception as shown below.

#### **6.3.4 Evitable vs. Inevitable Shifts**

To begin with, the present study has distinguished between the translators' obligatory (mandatory) shifts which the translator is compelled to apply in order to overcome the unavoidable cross-linguistic and cross-cultural asymmetries (intrinsic managing/monitoring), and which are entirely

---

<sup>282</sup> Ali (2006: 89f) notes that "whenever we translate a text, we find ourselves pulled by two equal forces: an inward or centripetal force, one the result of which we become completely infatuated with the text, and an outward or centrifugal, one with which we try to take our attractions of the text to their 'furthest' ends [...]".

disregarded in this study. The reason behind this disregard is that their monitoring does not infringe the intended ST content. In other words, they are luxurious items bearing no significant ideological orientation or, in DTS terms, do not reflect translator's normative behaviour (operational norms adopted by the translators during the act of translating). In translatorial circles, this action of lexicogrammatical/cultural approximation is considered inevitable, necessary, unavoidable, and thus commendable; it falls under the TT stylistic variation- to embellish the TT, maintain its naturalness (Nida 1964a) and smoothen its communication, else infelicitous and inapt rendition is most likely to occur. As Farghal (2012: 64) puts it, "the appropriate managing of these disparities is a prerequisite in the process of translation, for leaving them unmanaged would produce unintelligible and/or awkward translations, which, in many cases, cause communication breakdowns in the TL adding that "naturalizing lexical items, collocations and idiomatic expressions via intrinsic managing between Arabic and English in translation activity is of utmost importance... as failure to do so would adversely affect the naturalness, as well as the comprehensibility, of discourse in translation practice", (ibid: 97). Notice these couple of illustrative examples on this form of shifts represented in (repetitive) twosome synonymous clusters) and necessitated by the Arabic language to offer a more natural, smoothed account:

- ST: The Opposition parties must be **vigilant**.  
وينعين على أطراف المعارضة توخي الحيطة والحذر
- TT: [The Opposition parties must be **vigilant and cautious**].
- ST: The Syrian president cast his **doubts** over the fruits of the Geneva conference.  
القى الرئيس السوري بظلال الشك والريبة على شمار مؤتمر جنيف
- TT: [The Syrian president cast his **doubts and suspicions** over the fruits of the Geneva conference].

The second form of shifts is that of optional (intentional) whose adoption depends on the translator's own preference and reflects her/his decision taken during the process of translating, i.e. they are avertable and not controlled by the TT stylistic restrictions but rather reflect an ideological thrust and, more precisely, the translator's idiosyncratic signature: (choices, preferences and leanings), thus condemnable. This latter form of shift is the main concern which the present study

has sought to identify, explain and justify. Based on this, it has been observed that optional shifts are, although evitable, opted for in wartime translation in the service of specific agendas. That said, the occurrence of the optional shifts that exist between the text pairs as a result of the translator's prejudiced conduct, I conclude, is an unwelcome, unnecessary and problem-creating attitude which, in various degrees, blurs the original message and results in significant alterations of its intended meaning. This act of purposeful shifting may reflect the translator's full awareness of his choices and her/his intention to achieve specific rhetorical/pragmatic goals.

### **6.3.5 Cross-linguistic and Cross-cultural Asymmetries**

One can hardly imagine two languages (and cultures) behaving in an exactly similar manner. Many scholars ((Nida 1964a; Culler 1976; Hatim and Mason 1990, 1997; Baker 1992; Farghal 1993, 2012; etc.) explicitly demonstrate that no two languages can reflect 'similar' systems. That is, one-to-one correspondence on all levels, they argue, does not exist amongst languages. Culler (1976: 21-22), for example, openly states that languages are not "a nomenclature for a set of universal concepts" [and that] "each language articulates or organizes the world differently". Farghal (2012: 65), to cite another example, maintains that "[t]he fact that human languages phonologize, morphologize, syntacticize, lexicalize, phraseologize, pragmaticize, textualize and culturalize differently makes intrinsic managing inevitable in the process of translating". However, and while the current study acknowledges these two facts, translation should be (made) qualified to bridge this gap on all (local or global) levels and mediate "equal" inter-cultural and inter-lingual communication (Hatim 1997) by way of intrinsically managing a given text, i.e. smoothening the flow of its counterpart (TT) thus preserving its naturalness. This explains its commendatory tones because it facilitates and contributes to the communicativeness of the intended original message with natural, non-foreign flow and, above all, undamaging, non-sabotaging fashion.

Arabic and English languages have different linguistic/stylistic systems and pertain to completely different cultures; both of them are linguistically and culturally distant: Arabic is a member of the Semitic family of languages whereas English is a member of the Indo-European language family.

Starting from such a fact that Arabic and English belong to different cultures and two different language systems, one could strongly argue that translators have faced a great number of difficulties at syntactic, lexical, pragmatic not to mention the cultural level. However, the translators of the selected texts, instead of applying strategies of ST-TT approximation (such as rendering by the closest equivalence, cultural substitution, etc.), they have been found vulnerable (and not “immune”) to ideological intrusion and emotional involvement configured in a multitude of pragma-linguistic formations- as amply evidenced in the examples shortly below under section 6.3.8 Managing (Intervention) vs. Monitoring (Mediation).

### **6.3.6 Pressures of the Skopos are not a Licence**

As delineated on several occasions earlier, the present study believes that “there are cases where extrinsic [rather than intrinsic] managing may be necessary for practical considerations, which include commissioners’ dictates and readers’ expectations”, (Farghal 2012: 10). However, it does not endorse extrinsic managing which involves the translator’s “ideological moves”- her/his signature and stamp- that would infringe the ST message. Munday (2012: 38) is convincing when he writes that “translation is clearly an example of a text that is produced for a *new* communicative purpose, or at least that is normally directed at an audience *different* from that envisaged by the source”; [my emphasis], which again brings to the fore the dilemma of translation as a purposeful/faithful activity.

In this respect, this study, following Newmark's claim that translation is a truth-seeking activity which is "concerned with moral and with factual truth", (1991: 1, also 1993: 36)<sup>283</sup>, disbelieves in the Machiavellian schemata: “the end justifies the means” (as stated in Reiss and Vermeer (1984: 101) which characterises the Skopostheorie. It concludes that two wrongs do not make a right; that is to say, in any human action that caters for specific clients (translation included), one should not, if only ethically, please these clients at the expense of such moral and professional values as fidelity, impartiality and faithfulness on the ground that the rightness or the wrongness of our action

---

<sup>283</sup> This claim appears in the beginning of his *About Translation* (1991) under 'Translation as Means or End- As Imitation or Creation' and in *Paragraphs on Translation* (1993) under 'A Sidelight on Translation'.

is gauged and judged by the leading means rather than the resultant outcomes: the translators of the selected texts have been found to be keen to please their clients and meet their desires whatever the means; they achieve this end goal by regularly resorting to a number of lexico-grammatical configurations: (Modality, Nominalization, Transitivity; Over-lexicalisation, Re-lexicalisation, Metaphor) supported by a number of pragmatic and contextual clues and markers (politeness, euphemisation, speech acts, relevance, emphasis, pluralisation, etc.) as I have illustrated in the previous chapter.

The line between “deontology” and “teleology”<sup>284</sup>, as the analyses of the selected texts have shown, was not drawn on the part of the translators. In other words, pleasing specific customers rather than others, fulfilling socio-political requirements, response to a set of pressures or any other materialistic purposes (gains) wielded by the commissioner (arguably a client, a sponsor, an agent, a translation project manager, a publisher or even a readership) are not a licence, a permit given to translators to disrupt the ST intended content owing to the fact that an ST is not their own property but rather somebody else’s and that translation, like any other profession, is (and should be) an ethical practice, a “faithful reproduction of TT no matter whether he/she is in agreement with the source or not”, Munday (2012: 39). Newmark (1982: 389f) also lends support to this conclusion when he writes that a translator should “render the original as objectively as he can, rigorously suppressing his own natural feelings; a text with which he passionately agrees must be treated similarly to a text with which he passionately disagrees”.

Translators of the selected texts have been found loyal to the skopi, briefs, recipes and instructions of their supreme (military, security, political, economic, etc.) officials and operate under their prescriptivism and commands; they tend to sail away from the linguistic boundaries reaching far

---

<sup>284</sup> Merriam Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (2003: 334) defines 'deontology' as: "the theory or study of moral obligation" and 'teleology' as "a doctrine explaining phenomena by final causes", (ibid: 1284). In the context of translation, Baker (2011: 276) draws on these two concepts arguing that "**deontological** models define what is ethical by reference to what is right in and of itself, irrespective of consequences, and are rule based" adding that "a deontological approach would justify an action on the basis of principles such as duty, loyalty or respect for human dignity; hence: 'I refrain from intervening because it is my duty as a translator to remain impartial' whereas "**teleological** approaches [such as Utilitarianism (النفعية), Consequentialism (الغائية), Machiavellism (المكفيانية)] define what is ethical by reference to what produces the best results". They are "more concerned with consequences than with what is morally right *per se*"; [emphasis hers].

above, beyond and behind these boundaries and, so it has been observed in this study which primarily sets out to identify, describe and justify instances of shifting, act as “proxy soldiers” who are armed with the weapon of language and fight for their (and their commissioners') values and beliefs via a multitude of linguistic and extra-linguistic tools.

It has recurrently appeared that translators of the selected texts are “hired fixers” rendering a variety of services for their patrons/publishers and reaching far beyond the “boundaries of the linguistic intermediary” that is inherently vested in them which validates Palmer's (2007: 18f) claims and those of Inghilleri and Harding (2010: 166) that those fixers “operate in a dual capacity” as translators and soldiers and “are directly involved in the quotidian events and outcomes of war” as well as those of Baker's (2010: 214) that they contribute to the constitution of the socio-political reality embedded in given narratives and “engage in a multitude of vital [military, security, intelligent, etc.] tasks that have little to do with the type of linguistic mediation they are ostensibly hired to undertake”, which very much resonates with the study's proposed hypotheses.

Based on the fact that critical text analysts are not just concerned with what language is, but *why* language is; not just what language means, but *how* language means, it ought to be reminded that the present thesis is predominantly concerned, on the one hand, with detecting choices of equivalence which are potentially prejudiced by the translators and with providing interpretations and justifications for those choices, which may in fact need the readers' own interpretations, on the other. As Fairclough (2001b: 239-240) argues, "texts are written with particular readerships in mind, and are oriented to (*and anticipate*) particular sorts of reception and responses, and are therefore also *interactive*"; [emphases mine].

### **6.3.7 Translation is a Norm-governed and Purposeful Activity**

Translators, most notably in times of war, are decision makers; during the process of translating, a variety of selections (and de-selections) usually appears before they hand in their finished products. Analyses of the selected texts have revealed that socio-cultural and political norms have governed the translators' decision-making process, evidenced in the regularity in their translational behaviour,

in favour of the party they support, patron they work for, or even their own belief systems and worldviews. As we have seen, for example<sup>285</sup>, the translator of text nine: *Geneva II talks: A test for diplomacy*, was governed by a set of norms cultural, political and professional: the cultural norms which governed her translational behaviour are clear, for example, when she shunned the vulgar associations included in the ST acronyms item FUKUS, and re-lexicalised it as (دول محور الشر) [the states of evil-axis] opting for a readership-fulfilling strategy, (presumably the Arabic-speaking community) by euphemising the taboo implications that may be imbued in the phonology of the word ‘FUKUS’ in order to conform to the requirements of politeness observed in the conservative Arab culture and avoid offering obscenity to the Arab readers. The translator, who works for the pro-regime Al Thawrah daily, has also been governed by the political norms; she was keen to eschew any reference that would threaten the ruling system’s face, and hastened to demonise its rival opposition parties and their (FUKUS) supporters through her frequently regular resort to modality, transitivity, over- and re-lexicalisation in addition to metaphor as I detailed with ample examples in the previous chapter.

Thus, this normative behaviour or choice of equivalences which they prejudice shows that the act of translation is controlled by socio-cultural, professional and political constraints and that norms have an enormous effect on the translators' choice during the act of translating affecting their decision-making process by regulating decisions of selecting one alternative from a set of potential alternatives. This resonates with Toury's claims that “every act of translating, every instance of decision-making in the translation process is governed by certain norms”, (Toury 1980a: 57). In this context, Baker (1992/ 2011: 239) argues that the translator's behaviour is governed by such constraints as "the structure of the target language, the nature of the target audience and the conventions of the target culture".

---

<sup>285</sup> This conclusion (the translators' behaviour being governed by a variety of norms) applies to all other texts analysed in chapter five, but I provide examples to support this conclusion from one text in order to show, as the study declares, a thematic linkage of the translator's thought system, i.e. to display the translator's attitude on a macro (textual/discoursal) rather micro level represented in text fragments. In this spirit, it is useful to refer you back to an anti-regime translational voice (see for example my discussion of texts 1 & 10 in the previous chapter– both translated by the same translator) and observe how this pro-regime translator supports the opposition via a variety of pragma-linguistic forms and camouflages any negative reference to it.

Following on from this conclusion, the translators of the selected texts are found to show little or no respect to the source text (infidelity) where their loyalty lies with the TT culture which answers Mason's question (1994: 23-24) "where do the translators' loyalties lie? with the letter of the source text or with the expectations of the readers of the target text?". Investigating the relationship between the expectations/requirements of the readership and the socio-cultural contexts has been a point of scrutiny in the field of critical (translated) discourse analysis. In her "Target Readers' Expectations and Reality: Conformity or Conflict?", Minna Ruokonen, by way of a descriptive/critical analysis of text pairs, explores "to what extent translators meet target readers' expectations and what causes underlie possible conformity or conflict [...]: the relationship between expectations and norms and also possible causes for deviating from expectations", (2011: 73). She provides a clear answer to Mason's question on where the translators' loyalties lie: with "target readers' expectations" which she, (following Toury 1995a: 55 & Chesterman 1997a: 54), sees as "closely related to translation norms, the ways of behaviour that a community finds correct or acceptable in a particular translational situation", (*ibid*: 74). They tend to flout observed norms of the practice: impartiality, faithfulness and fidelity (what I may call "professional constants") by means of utilising a variety of pragma-linguistic strategies in response to a number of pressures (from within 'textual' and from above 'extra-textual') no matter how much encroachment this leaves on the ST intention. Qualitative analyses carried out in this research have led to the conclusion (or, more precisely, validated the 'Nordian' conclusion) that translation is a purposeful and intentional practice.

To further expand this conclusion, translators of the selected texts, which have qualitatively been analysed following an empirical manner (observation), do not appear to conform to the same set of norms (translational, cultural, political, etc.). According to Toury (1999: 19), norms "are made in an individual's brain", which casts its shadow on their decisions and choices they made during the processing of the TT. Put differently, norms, as I have shown in chapter two under (2.6.4 Where do Norms Exist?, on page: 41), lie in the translator not in the translation itself and can be as many as

the translators, are situational/circumstantial and reflect individual attitudes, specific situations or commissioning institutions inasmuch as this feeds into (and does not run counter to) their own sentiments and belief systems<sup>286</sup>. For example:

### **Text 7: Can the Syrian regime crush the uprising? Yes, suggests history**

- ST: ...*he brutally crushes*  
 TT: ...التي يسحقها نظامه بوحشية  
 BT: [...which **his regime** *brutally crushes*]

This is a pro-opposition voice. See the opposite voice of the same term in text two where "regime" was altered into "government":

### **Text 2 "Wag the Dog" – The Sequel Set in Syria**

- ST: the Syrian *regime*  
 TT: القوات الحكومية السورية  
 BT: [the Syrian **governmental forces**]

It is important to remind you of the two different translations of text 4, *Is Syria Finished*, which were carried out by two different translators: The Arab Orient Centre- for Strategic and Civilization Studies (TT1) and The Washington Institute (TT2). Considering the background information (on the ST and both TTs' producers) provided in the first stage of analysis, observe all the various examples of both target texts (TT1 & TT2) discussed in chapter five (on pages: 204-211) and pay special attention to the two different translational normative attitudes adopted in both accounts.

More precisely, this conclusion (that translators particularly in times of violent conflict) do not conform to the same set of norms and that norms exist in the translators rather than the translation *per se*) invalidates the proposal that (wartime) translators should be taught a certain set of translational norms and instructed to follow them. This can be justified by Toury's constant reiterations that norms, which largely govern the translator's decision-making process, are created and reflect a human (individualistic) action; that is, they are not inherent in the translations themselves; it is the systematic frequent regularities in (individual) translators' behaviour which

---

<sup>286</sup> As I declare on many occasions in this thesis (see, for example, Prefatory Note no. (4), on page: vii), I am primarily concerned with instances of "distranslation": the resultant intentional interference, NOT those of "mistranslation": the result of unintentional interference or the translator's lack of incompetence.

indicate that they exist. As Toury (2005<sup>287</sup>) clearly puts it: "Right from the start, the whole notion of norms was associated with translators not with the translations. There are no norms in the translations; the norms are in the translators". Tymoczko (2003: 181) argues that "the ideology of a translation resides not simply in the text translated, but in the voicing and stance of the translator, and in its relevance to the receiving audience..." stressing that translations "are motivated and determined by the translator's cultural and ideological affiliations", (ibid: 183). In this spirit, Farghal (1993: 257-258; 2012: 63-64; 2013: 2) stresses that the stratagem of ideological managing is exclusively the translators' own, going a step further as to assume that text type is not a determining factor of managing; it is rather the prejudiced normative behaviour of the translator: "the translator may either manage or monitor a text independently of its being argumentative or expository".

### **6.3.8 Managing (Intervention) vs. Monitoring (Mediation)**

We have observed that extrinsic managing (intervention) pervades politically sensitive media discourse, not least that of pertinence to opinion articles (which exclusively constitute my corpus). In service of specific goals and in response to local and global dictates, translators of the selected texts, pro-opposition and pro-regime, have been found to opt for extrinsic managing at various levels via their recurrent recourse to syntactic (modality, transitivity, nominalisation) and lexical (over-lexicalisation, re-lexicalisation, metaphor) constructions backed by pragma-linguistic (subsidiary yet suggestive) ideological clues which help to determine the full ideological potential of the text under analysis: (emphasis, pluralisation, relevance, euphemism, speech acts, face, politeness, blasphemy, etc.) as I have shown in the previous chapter and will summarise shortly below in this section. This form of managing (extrinsic), which has been my major concern in this study, implies intervention and is seen by many scholars (Farghal 1993: 257, also 2012:133; Hatim 1997: 129, etc.) as 'condemnable' rather than 'commendable', as it derails the original message, lures the text consumer and detours her/him towards a different world that does not exist in the ST. Unlike "monitoring" (*Arabic*: الأمانة/النقل) which involves "faithful transference/conveyance of the ST

---

<sup>287</sup>An interview conducted by Anthony Pym with Gideon Toury in 2005 on socio-cultural approaches to translation: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yr6MHzcmHFI>

content", managing (*Arabic*: الخيانة/التصرُّف), which is the main concern in this study, involves "the translator's ideological intervention in the ST intended message (deviations and alterations) to serve her/his own goals, her/his patron's or any other local (textual) or global (contextual) pressures and dictations", Farghal (2013: 2-3)<sup>288</sup>; [my translation].

It has been observed that the target texts in this translation study are affluent with instantiations of over-lexicalisation and re-lexicalisation employed in a variety of ways; they were two recurrent forms of lexical stratagems (lexical extrinsic managing) utililised to disguise their readers, re-disorient them and, in effect, communicate their intended message. Lexicalisation (word choice), it should be reiterated, has proved to be one of the effective linguistic tools for textual analysis. (Re)producers of the selected texts have heavily (sometimes in a small chunk of text) resorted to over-lexicalisation and re-lexicalisation (sometimes combined) to convey positive or pejorative ideologically-oriented images for or against the Syrian regime and its allies (lexical density). The ST single word has been over-lexicalised (over-worded) and configured in twosome and threesome synonymous patterns, and perhaps more significantly invented, which the TT stylistics does not necessitate; it rather seeks to serve pre-planned pragmatic functions and rhetorical goals mainly emphasis, exaggeration and persuasion.

Metaphor, although less frequently employed, proved to play a significant role in disseminating substantial ideological potential and pursuing the translator's agenda resulting in the readership's different interpretation of the event in question. So far as the syntactic bag is concerned, I have found out that modality, an essential vehicle of subjective expression, is a noticeably recurrent recourse as a syntactic extrinsic managing bearing significant ideological potentials compared with transitivity and nominalisation which have seen, notwithstanding their ideological signification, less recurrent instantiations. Without further ado, I will provide some examples on such general concluding observations from the texts analysed in the previous chapter.

---

<sup>288</sup> This appears in his article 'Ideological Managing: A Theoretical Concept' in his co-edited 2013 volume (with Manna'): *Translation between Creativity of Language and Dynamism of Culture* (in Arabic).

**N.B.** (See the detailed discussion of all the below-stated instantiations (and the tacit cues which support them) in their respective place in the previous chapter, the conclusions provided after each analysis as well as the context of each text and background information on the ST and TT producers offered in the first stage of analysis under Context & Content).

## I. OVER-LEXICALISATION

### Text 1: Why Can't the Syrian Opposition Get along?

- ST: *dismay*; TT: (اليأس والقوط); BT: [dismay and hopelessness]
- ST: *grew up*; TT: (نموا وترعرعوا); BT: [grew up and matured]

### Text 2: "Wag the Dog" – The Sequel Set in Syria

- ST: *disapproving words*  
 التصريحات الجحولة للتعبير عن رفضهم للأحداث التي يتعرض لها ذلك البلد  
 TT: [shy words to express their rejection of the on-going events in this country]
- ST: *unarmed* [Ø]; TT: (المدنيين العزل); BT: [unarmed civilians]
- ST: *suffering reverse after reverse* [Ø]  
 يعيشون حالة من التراجع والانهيار يوماً إثر يوم ويغادرون من نكسة إثر أخرى  
 TT (added by the translator):  
 BT: [living reverse and collapse day after day and suffering Naksah after another]

### Text 3: Aleppo: What's Left Behind

- ST: *the whole*; TT: (عن بكرة أبيه); BT: [completely one after another]

### Texts 4 & 5: Is Syria Finished?

- ST: has now claimed close to 100,000 *lives*; TT1: (وصل عدد ضحاياها إلى ما يقرب من ١٠٠٠٠ قتيل)  
 BT (TT1): [whose **victims'** number has almost reached 100000 (\*killed persons: deaths)]  
 (A combination of over- and re-lexicalisation)

Compare this biased account with the *neutral* one provided by TT2:

- ST: has now claimed close to 100,000 *lives*; TT2: (حصدت حتى الآن ما يقرب من 100,000 شخص)  
 BT: [one that has now claimed close to 100,000 person]  
 (Accurate translation- "similar" to the ST).

### Text 6: How Obama Chose War Over Peace in Syria

- ST: *degraded* the Arab League's legitimacy  
 شرعية الجامعة العربية المتدورة  
 TT: [the Arab League's deteriorating legitimacy]

### Text 7: Can the Syrian regime crush the uprising? Yes, suggests history

- ST: [Ø]; TT (invented) (في نهجه (القمعي)); BT: [via its (pressive) doctrine]
- ST: is *inevitable*; TT: (هو أمر محتم لا محالة); BT: [is inescapably inevitable]

### Text 8: Syria's middle class can defeat Bashar al-Assad

- ST: *whisper a word*; TT: [يُفتح فمه ويهمس بكلمة] (opens his mouth and whispers a word)
- ST: a *prehistoric era*; TT: [حقبة متحجرة عفا عليها الزمان] (an out-dated / archaic era)

### Text 9: Geneva II talks: A test for diplomacy

- ST: *Chaos*; TT: [الفوضى والاضطراب في هذا البلد] (chaos and instability in this country)
- ST: *happened*; TT: [عما يحدث في هذه الاونة] (what is going on at the moment)
- ST: *entered*; TT: [أخذت \تدخل] (has begun / to intervene) (A combination of over- and re-lexicalisation)
- ST: [Ø]; TT (invented by the translator): [مدى شفافية وصدقية ورغبة (واشنطن)] (Washington's degree of transparency, credibility as well as its wish)
- ST: [Ø]; TT (invented): [تساندها وتمولها وتؤازرها] (support, fund and back them)
- ST: [Ø]; TT (invented): [شتت وتشن] (has been launching/ launched and is still launching)

### Text 10: Assad's Chemical Romance

- ST: *chaos*; TT: [أتون الفوضى العارمة] (the furnace of sweeping chaos)
- ST: *departed*; TT: [يتختى ويغادر] (steps down and leaves)

## II. RE-LEXICALISATION

### Text 1: Why Can't the Syrian Opposition Get along?

- ST: the *start* of an *uprising*; TT: [اندلاع انتفاضة] (the outbreak of an intifada)
- ST: *Sniping* (of the opposition); TT: [تنافسها] (competition) (of the opposition)
- ST: *upset*; TT: [امتعضوا] (enraged)
- ST: his *cohorts* for their massacres; TT: [وعصابته على المذابح التي ارتكبوها] (and his gang for their massacres they have committed)
- ST: *real*; TT: [باهظة] (costly).

### Text 2: "Wag the Dog" – The Sequel Set in Syria

- ST: *the Assad regime*; TT: [the Syrian regime]
- ST: I do not believe that *Bashar* is *mad*.  
TT: [ولا اعتقد البتة بأن الحكم في سوريا قد فقد قدرته على التفكير المتأزن]  
BT: [I do not believe at all that the rule in Syria has lost its ability of balanced thinking]
- ST: *the Syrian regime*; TT: [القوات الحكومية السورية] (the Syrian governmental forces)

### Text 3: Aleppo: What's Left Behind

- ST: Assad's forces *have retaken* the Norkareen neighborhood and *pushed into* Sheikh Najjar.  
TT: [فقد استعادت قوات الأسد سيطرتها على حي نوركرين وتوغلت في حي الشيخ نجار]  
BT: [Assad's forces have restored their dominance of the Norkareen neighborhood and penetrated Sheikh Najjar]

- ST: *have been killed*; TT: (لَفْوا مُصْرِعَهُمْ); BT: [\***have faced their destiny**]
- ST: *have died*; TT: (لَفْوا حَتْنَهُمْ); BT: [\***have faced their death**]

#### Texts 4 & 5: Is Syria Finished?

- ST: has now claimed close to 100,000 *lives*  
 (وصل عدد ضحاياها إلى ما يقرب من ١٠٠٠٠ قتيل)  
 TT1: [whose **victims'** number has almost reached 100000 (\***killed persons: deaths**)]  
 (A combination of over- and re-lexicalisation)

Compare this biased account with the *neutral* one provided by TT2:

- ST: has now claimed close to 100,000 *lives*; TT2: (١٠٠,٠٠٠ شخص)  
 BT: [one that has now claimed close to 100,000 **person**]  
 (Accurate translation- "similar" to the ST).

- ST: lethal *assistance* (twice); TT1: (الأسلحة الفتاكـة); BT: [lethal **weapons**]  
 Compare this biased account with the neutral one provided by TT2:

- ST: lethal *assistance* (twice); TT2: (المساعدـات الفتاكـة); BT: [lethal **assistance**]  
 (Accurate translation- "similar" to the ST).

- ST: Not only must the opposition become more credible and less divided.  
 (ليس على المعارضة أن تكون أكثر مصداقية وتوحداً فقط)  
 TT1:  
 BT: [Not only must the opposition be more credible and '**more**' unified]

Compare this biased account with the neutral one provided by TT2:

- ST: Not only must the opposition become more credible and less divided.  
 (فليـس فقط يـجب أن تـصبح المـعارـضـة أـكـثـر مـصـدـاقـيـة وـأـقـل اـنـقـسـامـاـ)  
 TT2:  
 BT: [Not only must the opposition become more credible and less divided].  
 (Accurate translation- "similar" to the ST).

- ST: But the loss of control over Syria's chemical weapons could have catastrophic *implications*.  
 (ولـكـن فقدـان السيـطـرـة عـلـى السـلاح الكـيـماـيـيـ في سورـيـا يـمـكـن أـن يـكـون لـه تـدـاعـيـات كـارـثـيـة)  
 TT1:  
 BT: [But the loss of control over chemical weapons in Syria could have catastrophic **repercussions**]

Compare this biased account with the neutral one provided by TT2:

- ST: But the loss of control over Syria's chemical weapons could have catastrophic *implications*.  
 (ولـكـن فقدـان السيـطـرـة عـلـى الأـسـلـحـة الـكـيـمـيـائـيـة في سورـيـا يـمـكـن أـن يـكـون لـه آـثـار كـارـثـيـة)  
 TT2:  
 BT: [But the loss of control over chemical weapons in Syria could have catastrophic **implications**] (Accurate translation- "similar" to the ST).

#### Text 6: How Obama Chose War Over Peace in Syria

- ST: *many of which*; TT: (وتحـديـداـ); BT: [**particularly**]

- ST: *conflict*; TT: (النزـاعـ); BT: [**dispute**]

#### Text 7: Can the Syrian regime crush the uprising? Yes, suggests history

- ST: *he brutally crushes*; TT: (الـتـي يـسـحقـهـا نـظـامـه بـوحـشـيـةـ); BT: [which **his regime brutally crushes**]

- ST: *template*; TT: (سابقة); BT: [precedent]

### Text 8: Syria's middle class can defeat Bashar al-Assad

- ST: *a prehistoric era*; TT: (حقبة متحجرة عفا عليها الزمان) BT: [an out-dated / archaic era] (A combination of over- and re-lexicalisation)
- ST: *thugs*; TT: (الشبيحة); BT: [shabbiha]
- ST: *groups*; TT: (عصابات); BT: [gangs]

### Text 9: Geneva II talks: A test for diplomacy

- ST: *the FUKUS Axis*; TT: (دول محور الشر); BT: [the states of evil-axis]
- ST: *entered*; TT: (أخذت \ تتدخل); BT: [has begun to / intervene] (A combination of over- and re-lexicalisation)
- ST: to *rubber-stamp a post-Assad Syria*  
TT: (مناقشة ما ينبغي أن يكون عليه وضع الحكم في سوريا)  
BT: [discussing how the status of ruling in Syria should be]
- ST: “*post-Assad Syria*” and “*the exclusion of the current president (Bashar al-Assad)*”  
TT: Both of them are re-lexicalised as: (وضع الحكم); BT: [the status of ruling])
- ST: “*Bashar al-Assad*” and “*their President*”  
TT: Both of them are re-lexicalised as: (قيادته); BT: [their leadership]

Within the same context, some headlines are re-lexicalised in a variety of ways (See thorough discussion in their respective places in the previous chapter), which is indicative of starting the thorough-argument (attitudinal position and emotional engagement) in a very early stage. There is no question that headlines, particularly in argumentative type of opinion articles, are of paramount significance as they show much of what a text is saying- of which translators of the selected texts are presumably aware:

#### ► Text 2:

- ST: “*Wag the Dog*” – The Sequel Set in Syria  
أسباب استخدام المتمردين في سورية الأسلحة الكيميائية  
BT: [Reasons for Rebels’ Use of Chemical Weapons in Syria]

#### ► Text 3:

- ST: *Aleppo: What’s Left Behind*  
حلب «مدينة رعب».. والنظام يمطر سكانها بـ«البراميل المتفجرة»  
BT: [Aleppo «A City of Horror».. and the regime is showering its inhabitants with «barrel bombs»]

#### ► Text 6:

- ST: *How Obama Chose War Over Peace in Syria [Ø]*  
عندما اختار أوباما الحرب بدل السلام في سوريا!!)  
BT: [When Obama Chose War over Peace in Syria!!]

### III. METAPHOR

So far as metaphor is concerned, translators of the selected texts manipulate their TT in various ways: sometimes, they have a tendency to recycle (reframe) a straightforward statement in the ST into an ideologically oriented metaphorical construction, and in some other times, they invent new metaphors in order to delude their readers and serve specific rhetorical purposes:

#### Text 1: Why Can't the Syrian Opposition Get along?

► ST: [Ø]; TT (invented): (وصهرها في بوتقة واحدة); BT: [**and fusing them in one crucible**]

#### Text 2: "Wag the Dog" – The Sequel Set in Syria

► ST: ...hundreds of people have just been slaughtered in circumstances which are *entirely* unclear.  
 أما في سوريا فقد قتل مئات من البشر في ظروف مبهمة لم يكشف النقاب عنها بعد:  
 TT: [...hundreds of people have just been killed in circumstances which are entirely unclear and  
**whose veil has not been uncovered yet**]  
 (with an added one in the end of the statement): (وَكَشَفَ السُّتُّارَ عَنْ وَاقْعَهَا): [**and uncovering its veil**].

#### Text 3: Aleppo: What's Left Behind

► ST: *Aleppo: What's Left Behind* (The Headline)  
 TT: (invented): (حلب «مدينة رعب».. والنظام يمطر سكانها بـ«البراميل المتفجرة»)  
 BT: [Aleppo “a city of horror”.. and the regime **is showering** its inhabitants with “barrel bombs”].  
 ► ST: President Bashar Al-Assad’s forces have *littered* the city with barrel bombs.  
 ما برحت قوات الأسد **تمطر** المدينة **بوايل** من البراميل المتفجرة)  
 TT: [Al-Assad’s forces have been **showering** the city with **huge amounts of** barrel bombs...]

#### Text 7: Can the Syrian regime crush the uprising? Yes, suggests history

► ST: *to survive* [Ø] *an uprising*; TT: (في الإفلات من سوط الإنقاضة)  
 BT: [to escape **the whip of the Intifada**]

#### Text 8: Syria's middle class can defeat Bashar al-Assad

► ST: *eliminating*; TT: (يُمحى من الوجود); BT: [**is erased from existence**]

#### Text 9: Geneva II talks: A test for diplomacy

► ST: [Ø]; TT (invented): (تأجيج نار الفتنة); BT: [**igniting the fire of Fitna**]

► ST: [Ø]; TT (invented): (شرادم من العصابات الإرهابية)  
 BT: [**the disunited/(fragmented)** gangs of terrorists]

#### Text 10: Assad's Chemical Romance

► ST: (*flux*); TT: (أتون الصهر والتقلب); BT: [**the furnace of fusion and fluctuation**]

► ST: In the hands of Assad- and his father Hafez before him- these weapons have been *an ace-in-the-hole deterrent* against Israel's nuclear capability.

TT: (وما تزال هذه الأسلحة تشكل رادعاً، مثل الشوكة في حلقة القدرة النووية الإسرائيلية، في أيدي بشار الأسد. ووالده حافظ من قبله).

BT: [These weapons have been a deterrent, **like a thorn in the fauces of Israel's nuclear capability**, in the hands of Bashar Assad- and his father Hafez before him].

#### IV. MODALITY

Like metaphor, translators of the selected texts sometimes opt for mainly three stratagems to *extrinsically* manage the ST straightforward non-modalised item (offered in an adjectival form) altering it into a modalised one or, conversely, changing the simple present structure into a functional modal construction, which bears ideological import. In some other times, they recycle (magnify/dilute) the modal construction (which already exists in the ST) into a stronger/weaker modal construction in accordance with their own in-built belief systems, patron's pressure and/or readership's requirements. More strikingly, sometimes, they invent their own meaningful modal forms and place them in an initial position- as shown below:

#### Text 2: “Wag the Dog” – The Sequel Set in Syria

► ST: [Ø] Israel regularly shares its own chemical weapons stockpile.

TT (invented): (من المؤكد بأن لدى إسرائيل كميات كبيرة من مخزون الأسلحة الكيميائية)

BT: [**It is certain that** Israel has large amounts of chemical weapons stockpile]

► ST: [Ø] Britain introduced chemical weapons to the middle east [sic] in the first place.

TT (invented): (من المعلوم بأن أول من استخدم الأسلحة الكيميائية في منطقة الشرق الأوسط كانت بريطانيا)

BT: [**It is a given that** the first country which used chemical weapons in the Middle East was Britain]

#### Texts 4 & 5: Is Syria Finished?

► ST: but the cost of failing to influence the balance of power between the opposition and the Syrian regime could be high.

TT1: (ولكن كلفة الفشل في التأثير على توازن القوة ما بين المعارضة والنظام السوري سوف تكون مكلفة)

BT: [but the cost of failing to influence the balance of power between the opposition and the Syrian regime will be costly]

Compare this biased account with the neutral one provided by TT2:

► ST: but the cost of failing to influence the balance of power between the opposition and the Syrian regime could be high.

TT2: (إلا أن تكلفة العجز عن التأثير على توازن القوى بين المعارضة والنظام السوري قد يكون مرتفعاً)

BT: [but the cost of failing to influence the balance of power between the opposition and the Syrian regime could be high] (Accurate translation- "similar" to the ST).

► ST: *It might appear almost too late* for the United States to have *an influence* on the Syrian crisis.

(ربما يبدو أن الوقت فات لكي يكون للولايات المتحدة أى تأثير على الأزمة السورية)

TT1: [It might appear [ $\emptyset$ ] too late for the United States to have **any** influence on the Syrian crisis]

BT: [At this stage, **it might appear almost too late** for the United States to have **an** influence on the Syrian crisis] (Accurate translation- "similar" to the ST).

Compare this biased account with the neutral one provided by TT2:

► ST: *It might appear almost too late* for the United States to have *an influence* on the Syrian crisis.

(ربما يبدو وكان الوقت قد فات بحيث لا تستطيع الولايات المتحدة أن تؤثر على الأزمة السورية)

TT2: [At this stage, **it might appear almost too late** for the United States to have **an** influence on the Syrian crisis] (Accurate translation- "similar" to the ST).

► ST: providing small amounts of lethal assistance will not have *much impact* on the situation.

(فإن تقدير عدد قليل من الأسلحة الفتاكـة لن يكون له ذلك الأثر على الوضع هناك)

TT1: [providing small amounts of lethal weapons will not have **that/any impact** on the situation]

Compare this biased account with the neutral one provided by TT2:

► ST: providing small amounts of lethal assistance will not have *much impact* on the situation.

(إن تزويد كميات صغيرة من المساعدات الفتاكـة سوف لن يكون لها تأثير كبير على الوضع)

TT2: [providing small amounts of lethal assistance will not have **much impact** on the situation]. (Accurate translation- "similar" to the ST).

### Text 9: Geneva II talks: A test for diplomacy

► ST: [Those talks] *will provide* a telling test as to the state of international diplomacy and *will serve* as an indicator....

(فإن تلك المحادثات تعد بمثابة اختبار لدور الدبلوماسية الدولية وتعطي مؤشرًا)

TT1: [Those talks **are indeed considered** as a telling test as to the role of international diplomacy and **give** an indicator...]

► ST: *the United States of America seems to be* adopting a position [ $\emptyset$ ].

TT: (invented) (نستطيع أن نؤكد أن الولايات المتحدة تتبنى موقفاً لا يخفى على أحد)

BT: [**we can confirm that** the United States is adopting a **very clear** position].

► ST: [ $\emptyset$ ] Without aid, support, financing, weapons and training from abroad...

TT (invented): (لا شك أنه لو لا تقديم المساعدات والدعم والتمويل والتسلیح والتدريب من الخارج...)

BT: [**There is no doubt that**, without aid, support, financing, weapons and training from Abroad...]

### Text 10: Assad's Chemical Romance

► ST: *deplorable*; TT: (والذي يستوجب الإدانة); BT: which [**must now**] be deplored.

## V. NOMINALISATION

### Text 1: Why Can't the Syrian Opposition Get along?

► ST: *to avoid arrest*; TT: ('doer added' من جانب سلطات النظام)

BT: [in a bid to avoid exposure to arrest by the regime's authorities]

## Text 6: How Obama Chose War Over Peace in Syria

- ST: ...or plunge this *torn* nation deeper into the abyss  
 أو إغراق هذا البلد، الذي عملت على تعميقه أعمق، نحو الهاوية (...)  
 TT: [...or plunge this country, **which it has torn**, deeper into the abyss].  
 BT: [...or plunge this country, **which it has torn**, deeper into the abyss].

## VI. TRANSITIVITY

### Text 1: Why Can't the Syrian Opposition Get along?

- ST: A *united opposition is also urgently needed* to challenge the growing call...  
 وتنس الحاجة، بشكل ملح، إلى تحدي الدعوة المتنامية (...)  
 TT: [...]  
 BT: [**the need desperately urges** to challenge the growing call...]

### Text 7: Can the Syrian regime crush the uprising? Yes, suggests history

- ST: (*the opposition won't be quelled*)  
 فإن المقاومة لن تهدأ (فإن)  
 TT: [...]  
 BT: [**the opposition won't calm down**]

(Notice how the action of quelling is re-lexicalised and given an active flavor: (calm down).

### Text 9: Geneva II talks: A test for diplomacy

- ST: , caused by the west and its Middle Eastern minions  
 كان الغرب وأتباعه في الشرق الأوسط سبباً لها (كان)  
 TT: [...]  
 BT: [**which the west and its Middle Eastern followers have caused**]

The above-explained lexico-grammatical parameters of ideological signification do not exist in isolation; they are backed by other functional pragma-linguistic signifiers (clues) including, in the main, emphasis, pluralisation, relevance, euphemism, speech acts, face (honour/reputation), politeness, blasphemy, etc. Taking them on board could help me to strengthen my understanding of the main concern of this study: how reality of events is constructed (or more precisely trans-created) in pragma-linguistic forms, which allows a panoramic image of the translator's normative behaviour and constructs a unitary discoursal whole.

## A. EMPHASIS

Emphasis in the analysed texts was configured in many ways: i. emphatic particles such as (ن!: [verily], البٰتِة: [at all], the emphatic (L): [surely]<sup>289</sup>, etc.); ii. Modality Addition; iii. Metaphor Insertion, etc.

---

<sup>289</sup> This emphatic particle (meaning (surely)) is known in Arabic as ("اللام المزحلقة" Allam Al mozaħlaqah).

### i. Emphatic Particles

#### Text 2: “Wag the Dog” – The Sequel Set in Syria

► ST: *I do not believe [Ø] that Bashar is mad.*

و لا اعتقد **البنتة** بأن الحكم في سوريا قد فقد قدرته على التفكير المتوازن (ان ما يحصل من أزمة في سوريا ما كان ليحدث **البنتة** لو لا وجود دعم من الخارج ...)

TT: [I do not believe **at all** that the rule in Syria has lost its ability of balanced thinking]

#### Text 9: Geneva II talks: A test for diplomacy

► ST: *The bottom line of the page entitled “Syria Crisis” is that without support from abroad...*

ان ما يحصل من أزمة في سوريا ما كان ليحدث **البنتة** لو لا وجود دعم من الخارج (...)

BT: [**Verily** what is happening in Syria could not **surely** take place **at all** without support from abroad...]

Notice the added "emphatic density" represented in three functional assertives in this short chunk- a syntactic phenomenon which Arabic Linguistics calls "multiple reinforcement" whereby 'emphatic constructions can contain more than one emphatic marker... to express different degrees of reinforcement', (Moutaouakil 2011: 14). This is not an ornamental or luxurious addition that is ideologically insignificant; it rather serves significant pragmatic functions (assertion, exaggeration, persuasion). More, it presumably meets the pressures of the pro-regime's Al Thawrah newspaper and serves to install a devilish image of these foreign countries amidst the translator's readership.

### ii. Modality Addition

#### Text 2: “Wag the Dog” – The Sequel Set in Syria

► ST: *[Ø] Israel regularly shares its own chemical weapons stockpile.*

من المؤكد بأن لدى إسرائيل كميات كبيرة من مخزون الأسلحة الكيميائية (من المعلوم بأن أول من استخدم الأسلحة الكيميائية في منطقة الشرق الأوسط كانت بريطانيا)

BT: [**It is certain that** Israel has large amounts of chemical weapons stockpile]

► ST: *[Ø] Britain introduced chemical weapons to the middle east [sic] in the first place.*

من المعلوم بأن أول من استخدم الأسلحة الكيميائية في منطقة الشرق الأوسط كانت بريطانيا

BT: [**It is a given that** the first country which used chemical weapons in the Middle East was Britain].

#### Text 9: Geneva II talks: A test for diplomacy

► ST: *[Those talks] will provide a telling test as to the state of international diplomacy and will serve as an indicator... .*

فإن تلك المحادثات تُعد بمثابة اختبار لدور الدبلوماسية الدولية و**تُعطي** مؤشرًا (...)

TT: [Those talks are **indeed considered** as a telling test as to the role of international diplomacy and **give** an indicator...]

► ST: *[Ø] Without aid, support, financing, weapons and training from abroad...*

لا شك أنه لو لا تقديم المساعدات والدعم والتمويل والتسلیح والتدريب من الخارج ...)

BT: [**There is no doubt that**, without aid, support, financing, weapons and training from abroad...]

### iii. Metaphor Insertion

#### Text 1: Why Can't the Syrian Opposition Get along?

- ST: [Ø]; TT (invented); BT: [وصرها في بوتقة واحدة] (and fusing them in one crucible)

#### Text 9: Geneva II talks: A test for diplomacy

- ST: [Ø]; TT (invented): (تأجيج نار الفتنة) (igniting the fire of Fitna)

- ST: [Ø]; TT (invented): (شرادم من العصابات الإرهابية) (disunited/fragmented gangs of terrorists)

#### Text 3: Aleppo: What's Left Behind

- ST: *Aleppo: What's Left Behind* (The Headline)

TT: (حلب «مدينة رعب».. والنظام يمطر سكانها بـ«البراميل المتفجرة»)

BT: [Aleppo “a city of horror”.. and **the regime is showering** its inhabitants with “barrel bombs”]. Notice the TT's use of (النظام): [the regime].

- ST: *President Bashar Al-Assad's forces have littered the city with barrel bombs*

TT: (ما براحت قوات الأسد تمطر المدينة بـوايل من البراميل المتفجرة)

BT: [*Al-Assad's forces have been showering the city with huge amounts of* barrel bombs...]

\*Notice the skipping of the ST (President Bashar).

## B. PLURALISATION

#### Text 1: Why Can't the Syrian Opposition Get along?

- ST: [Ø]; TT: (invented): سلطات النظام; BT: [the regime's authorities]

#### Text 10: Assad's Chemical Romance

- ST: *The continued unrest in Syria... has thrown the future of the country into flux.*

TT: (أفت القلاقل المستمرة في سوريا... بمستقبل البلد في أتون الصهر والتقلب)

BT: [The continued unrestS in Syria... have thrown the future of the country into the furnace of fusion and fluctuation]

(This ST singularised word was also elsewhere pluralised by the translator in the same text: L.22: (وتعد اللاذقية مركزاً آخر للقلاقل) whose ST counterpart is: (Latakia is another center of **unrest**- L. 27).

#### Text 9: Geneva II talks: A test for diplomacy

- ST: [Ø]; TT (invented): (شرادم من العصابات الإرهابية)

BT: [the disunited/fragmented gangs of terrorists]

- ST: *illegal attack*; (هجمات غير شرعية); [illegal attacks]/ (Notice that there is no verb in the ST)

- ST: *He [Obama] has been personally involved in overseeing a multi-country flood of weapons into Syria, many of which are given to terrorist organizations.* (A10, L20-22)

TT: (يشارك (أوباما) شخصياً في الإشراف على فيضانات الأسلحة من بلدان متعددة إلى سوريا، وتحديداً إلى منظمات إرهابية)

BT: [He (Obama) has been personally involved in overseeing multi-country **floods** of weapons into Syria, particularly to terrorist organizations]

## C. RELEVANCE

The notion of relevance relates to external factors that spawn text and govern its production and interpretation, it accounts for text and (socio-political world and historical context). These factors are seen as expectation-fulfilling and include the host culture's socio-political world and historical context: (readership's expectations, presuppositions, background knowledge and similar pragmatic considerations ("communicative cues" in Gutt's 2000 terms).

### Text 1: Why Can't the Syrian Opposition Get along?

► ST: *Five months after the start of an uprising against President Bashar al-Assad*

TT: (فبعد خمسة شهور من انطلاقة انتفاضة ضد الرئيس بشار الأسد)

BT: [Five months after the outbreak of an **intifada** against President Bashar al-Assad

The TT word (انتفاضة): [intifada] should be interpreted within its historical context in the Arabic socio-political awareness considering its overloads of ideological imports (as I have discussed in chapter three and five): it says more than 'uprising' and implies a sweeping and large-scale social mobilisation in the face of aggression, oppression and tyranny. This may explain why the translator recurrently prefers the word intifada rather than (ثورة) [uprising]: throughout the whole text, the translator opted for (انتفاضة): [Intifada] three times as equivalent to 'uprising', which could exhibit the translator's awareness of the readership's sentiments and presuppositions.

### Text 2: "Wag the Dog" – The Sequel Set in Syria

► ST: *suffering reverse after reverse*

TT (invented): (يعيشون حالة من التراجع والانهيار يوماً إثر يوم ويغبون من نكسة إثر أخرى)

BT: [living reverse and collapse day after day and suffering **Naksah** after another]

Unlike the case in the previous example, this example (on Relevance) reflects a clearly pro-regime voice which attempts to demonise the pro-opposition insurgent groups which fight the Syrian government, after exaggerating its continuous defeats suggested in the ST by adding a synonymous cluster (التراجع والانهيار): [reverse and collapse]. The translator resorts to an expectation-fulfilling counterpart (نكسة / setback) which renders the ST (reverse): [backwardness]. The term, within its historical and socio-political context in the Arabic culture associates with shame, disgrace

and defeat, which gives the impression that this translator's choice is ideologically significant. (See my detailed discussion of this newly-introduced term in the Arabic (and universal) dictionary) in the previous chapter).

### **Text 7: Can the Syrian regime crush the uprising? Yes, suggests history**

► ST: *he brutally crushes*; TT: (التي يسحقها نظامه بوحشية); BT: [which **his regime** *brutally crushes*]

The word regime [نظام] in the world political context has become a dirty term. In positive political contexts, such terms as (administration, government, etc. e.g. the American, the U.S./ the Obama Administration: ([الادارة الأمريكية/ إدارة أوباما]) are used. For example, in text 10: *Assad's Chemical Romance*, reference to the Syrian president was (several times) associated with regime (the Assad regime: lines 12, 30, 44 (ST) and 11, 24, 35 (TT) whereas the term 'administration' was, in the same text, associated with president Obama (the Obama administration, line 60 (ST) and 48 (TT)).

This example: (*he brutally crushes*; (التي يسحقها نظامه بوحشية); [which **his regime** *brutally crushes*]) instantiates a pro-opposition voice. See the opposite voice of the same term in text 2 "Wag the Dog" – *The Sequel Set in Syria* where regime was altered into government:

► ST: *the Syrian regime*; TT: (القوات الحكومية السورية) BT: [**the Syrian governmental forces**]

This variety further validates my conclusion on the situationality of "translation norms"- that translators (particularly in times of conflict) do not conform to the same set of norms and that norms exist in the translators rather than the translation *per se*.

### **Text 8: Syria's middle class can defeat Bashar al-Assad**

► ST: *The government also recruited "thugs", pro-regime armed groups that are involved in trafficking of drugs and weapons, to spread chaos and create sectarian strife.* (A14, L35-37)

TT: كما قامت الحكومة بتجنيد الشبيحة - وهي عصابات مسلحة موالية للنظام تقوم بعمليات التهريب وتجارة المخدرات والأسلحة - لإثارة الفوضى وإثارة النعرات الطائفية. (A15, L25-26)

BT: [The government also recruited **shabbiha**, pro-regime armed **gangs** that are involved in trafficking of drugs and weapons, to spread chaos and create sectarian strife].

This is an anti-regime voice. To fulfill her/his audience' expectations, the translator here domesticates (localises) the ST terms: 'thugs' and 'groups' which respectively become (الشبيحة):

[*shabbiha*]- characterised by robbery and all sorts of savage deeds as I have explained in the previous chapter and (عصابات: [gangs]) which has derogatory resonances in Arabic language and culture. It is likely that the translator is aware of the TT requirements and provides *equivalents* she/he deems more congruent with the pre-suppositions of her/his target audience.

#### D. EUPHEMISM

##### Text 9: Geneva II talks: A test for diplomacy

► ST: *the FUKUS Axis*; TT: (دول محور الشر); BT: [**the states of evil-axis**]

As this example shows, the translator eschews the vulgarism included in the ST acronymous term FUKUS rendering it as (دول محور الشر) [the states of evil-axis] with a view to conforming to the requirements of politeness observed in the conservative Arab culture and avoiding offering offense (face loss) to the Arab readers, thus saving her audience's face. She does so by euphemising the intolerable taboo implications that may be imbued in the phonology of the word 'FUKUS'.

##### Text 3: Aleppo: What's Left Behind

► ST: *have been killed*; TT: (لقوا مصرعهم) BT: [\***have faced their destiny**]

► ST: *have died*; TT: (لقوا حتفهم) BT: [\***have faced their death**]

Here again, the translator, in conformity with the TT cultural norms/conventions and to garner more sympathy towards the 'victims' of the regime's showers of barrel bombs, euphemises two verbs and presents them in a sympathy-drawing positive light: 'killing' and 'dying' respectively (لقوا مصرعهم) and (لقوا حتفهم) - [literally facing their death/ destiny] under these 'showers of barrel bombs' which is added twice (by way of two metaphorical constructions): in the headline and in the body of the text (A17, L16).

#### E. SPEECH ACTS ('IM'POLITENESS: FTAs, FSAs)

Translators of the selected texts are found to have a tendency to glorify or blaspheme the parties they support in a number of various ways, most noticeable of which are i. Re-lexicalisation, ii. Omission and iii. Addition.

i. **Re-lexicalisation** (N.B. All other examples discussed in the previous chapter under this strategy, which are too numerous to count, are relevant here. In the following, I shall only provide some thematically-linked examples; those of pertinence to the Syrian President in particular):

### Text 2: “Wag the Dog” – The Sequel Set in Syria

- ST: *the Assad regime*; TT: (النظام السوري); BT: [the Syrian regime]
- ST: I do not believe [ $\emptyset$ ] that *Bashar* is *mad*.  
 ولا اعتقد البنة بأن الحكم في سوريا قد فقد قدرته على التفكير المتوزن)  
 TT: [I do not believe at all that the rule in Syria has lost its ability of balanced thinking]
- ST: *the Syrian regime*; TT: (القوات الحكومية السورية) BT: [the Syrian governmental forces]

### Text 9: Geneva II talks: A test for diplomacy

- ST: to rubber-stamp a *post-Assad* Syria  
 مناقشة ما ينبغي أن يكون عليه وضع الحكم في سوريا  
 TT: [discussing how the status of ruling in Syria should be]
- ST: “*post-Assad* Syria” and “the exclusion of the current president (*Bashar al-Assad*)”.  
 TT: (وضع الحكم): BT: [the status of ruling])
- ST: “*Bashar al-Assad*” and “*their President*”; TT: (قيادته); BT: [their leadership]

### ii. Omission

Translators of the selected texts are found to have a tendency to skip micro or macro parts suggested in the original in order to serve specific agendas and meet certain requirements.

### Text 1: Why Can’t the Syrian Opposition Get along?

- ST: A united opposition *is also urgently needed* to challenge the growing call for armed resistance...  
 (وتتسـ الحاجـة، بـ شـكـلـ مـلحـ، إـلـىـ تـحـديـ الدـعـوـةـ المـتـنـامـيـةـ إـلـىـ الـمـقاـوـمـةـ الـمـسلـحةـ...).  
 TT: [The need desperately urges to challenge the growing call for armed resistance...].

As can be seen, the ST (A united opposition) does not appear in the TT. It is not, one can assume, luxuriously skipped; it is done for a pragmatic purpose: avoidance to determine accountability for the fragmentation of the opposition parties, to obfuscate the ST original message (which (albeit indirectly) holds the opposition responsible for its fragmentation. A neutral and faithful rendition could instead be:

(والـحـاجـةـ مـاسـةـ إـلـىـ مـعـارـضـةـ مـوـحـدـةـ لـتـحـديـ الدـعـوـةـ المـتـنـامـيـةـ إـلـىـ الـمـقاـوـمـةـ الـمـسلـحةـ...).

(See further discussion of this syntactic managing that manipulates the ST content, mainly the process of "mystification of agency", (under Transitivity in text one in the previous chapter).

### Text 3: Aleppo: What's Left Behind

►ST: Since December, **President** Bashar Al-Assad's forces have littered the city with barrel bombs-crude incendiaries filled with TNT and shrapnel.

TT : (منذ شهر ديسمبر (كانون الأول)، ما برجت قوات [Ø] الأسد تمطر المدينة بوابل من البراميل المقمرة والقنابل الحارقة المليئة بمادة «تي إن تي» والأدوات المتفجرة المتنفسية)

BT: [Since December, **Al-Assad**'s forces have been showering the city with huge amounts of barrel bombs-crude incendiaries filled with TNT and shrapnel].

Like the following examples, in which naming-strategy prevails, will show, observe how the ST honorific item (President Bashar) is skipped in this text adding a humilific image in the TT, which further reflects the translator's position towards him represented in lack of deference that can be heightened by the (added) emotive metaphor as discussed earlier.

### Texts 4 & 5: Is Syria Finished?

►ST: *The once-peaceful opposition to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's deeply entrenched and powerful Ba'ath Party regime...*

TT1: (المعارضة التي كانت سلمية يوماً ما لنظام حزب البعث الراسخ والقوى برئاسة بشار الأسد...)

BT: [The once-peaceful opposition under [...] Bashar al-Assad's deeply entrenched and powerful Ba'ath Party regime...]

This blasphemous attitude is done by the first translator of the original which provides a subjective rendition. Notice how the translator explicates his attitudinal position towards President Bashar Al Assad when he skipped “Syrian President” and recycled it as simply [under Bashar Al Assad] unlike the case in TT2 where the translator offers a neutral account and renders it in a more positive fashion as [under the leadership of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad], viz.:

►ST: *The once-peaceful opposition to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's deeply entrenched and powerful Ba'ath Party regime...*

TT2: فقد تصاعدت حدة المعارضة - التي كانت سلمية في يوم من الأيام - ضد نظام حزب البعث الراسخ والقوى تحت قيادة الرئيس السوري بشار الأسد.

BT: [The once-peaceful opposition **under the leadership of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's** deeply entrenched and powerful Ba'ath Party regime...]

►ST: Its [US] hesitancy to take *more* direct action is understandable given the fractious *nature* of the opposition, but the cost of failing to influence the balance of power between the opposition and the Syrian regime could be high.

TT1: (ترددوا في اتخاذ إجراءات[Ø] مباشرةً أمر مفهوم بالنظر إلى [Ø] انقسام المعارضة، ولكن كلفة الفشل في التأثير على توازن القوة ما بين المعارضة والنظام السوري سوف تكون مكافحة).

BT: [Its hesitancy to take [ $\emptyset$ ] direct actions is understandable given the fractious [ $\emptyset$ ] of the opposition, but the cost of failing to influence the balance of power between the opposition and the Syrian regime will be costly]

There are two important omissions here whose producer and publisher are not loyal to the US administration as shown in the first stage of the text's analysis in the previous chapter, on page: 203. These two neighbouring omissions, one can assume, offer evidence on the translator's normativity (regularity in behaviour) vis-à-vis her/his stance towards his country's reluctance to settle the conflict in Syria. By way of comparison, notice the bias-free account offered by The Washington Institute (TT2); all deleted items in TT1 are rendered and exactly communicate the same ST message:

TT2: ورغم أن ترددتها في اتخاذ إجراءات أكثر مباشرةً أمراً مفهوماً نظراً للطبيعة المنقسمة للمعارضة، إلا أن تكلفة العجز عن التأثير على توازن القوى بين المعارضة والنظام السوري قد يكون مرتفعاً.

BT: [Despite its hesitancy to take **more** direct actions is understandable given the fractious **nature** of the opposition, but the cost of failing to influence the balance of power between the opposition and the Syrian regime could be high] (Accurate translation- "similar" to the ST).

► ST: It might appear *almost* too late for the United States to have *an* influence on the Syrian crisis.

(ربما يبدو أن الوقت فات لكي يكون للولايات المتحدة/إي تأثير على الأزمة السورية):

BT: [It might appear [ $\emptyset$ ] too late for the United States to have any influence on the Syrian crisis.

As can be seen, the ST involves some optimism concerning the US influence in putting a stop to the Syrian crisis, TT1, omits the intensifier (almost) to offer a less optimistic image concerning the settlement of the crisis in Syria: (ربما يبدو أن الوقت فات): [it might appear too late]. This translator's attitude is also backed by rendering (an influence) into (أي تأثير) [any influence]) which similarly annuls America's possible role in the crisis. This is not the case in the pro-America TT2 wherein both ST items (almost: [وكان]) and (an influence: [أن تؤثر]) are considered and faithfully transferred:

► ST: It might appear *almost* too late for the United States to have *an* influence on the Syrian crisis.

(وفي هذه المرحلة، ربما يبدو وكان الوقت قد فات بحيث لا تستطيع الولايات المتحدة أن تؤثر على الأزمة السورية):

BT: [At this stage, **it might appear almost too late** for the United States to have an influence on the Syrian crisis. (Accurate translation- "similar" to the ST).

#### Text 9: Geneva II talks: A test for diplomacy

► ST: The Geneva II talks on the crisis in Syria, caused by the west and its Middle Eastern minions...

... لها سبباً الأوسط في الشرق وأتباعه الغرب كان [Ø] سورياً في الأزمة شأن الثانية جنيف إن محادثات:

BT: [Verily the Geneva II talks on the crisis in Syria [Ø] which the west and its Middle Eastern followers have caused ...

In the TT, which converts the ST passive voice into an active one, "who does what to who" is made more explicit. (See a detailed discussion of this syntactic stratagem under Transitivity/ text nine in the previous chapter). The TT omits the ST comma (,) altering the ST non-restricted relative clause into a subject-predicate construction which, as a consequence, more clearly holds the West and their proxies accountable for the Syrian crisis.

In the following example, observe how the ST positive epithet (cautious), which is associated with the Assads' doctrine and adds currency to it, is omitted in the TT, thus stripping them of this merit:

#### **Text 10: Assad's Chemical Romance**

►ST: ... it is unclear that the newcomers would follow the Assads' *cautious-use* doctrine and refusal to share chemical weapons with non-state groups.

فإن من غير الواضح ما إذا كان القادمون الجدد سيتبعون نهج مبدأ الأسد [Ø] ورفضه مشاركة مجموعات لا تنتمي للدولة في الأسلحة الكيميائية).

BT: [... it is unclear that the newcomers would follow the Assads' [Ø] doctrine and refusal to share chemical weapons with non-state groups]

#### **iii. Addition**

Adding some ideologically significant items to the TT was also unjustifiably utilised on several occasions to serve specific goals. Examples on this translator's behaviour are many. As we have seen above, these additions involve twosome and threesome synonymous patterns (which marks instantiations of over-lexicalisation); metaphors (sometimes in the headline which indicates an early argumentation and injects more ideological loads into the text), modal constructions (sometimes in a small chunk), etc. That said, the following examples show a different form of addition.

#### **Texts 4 & 5: Is Syria Finished?**

►ST: There should be no illusions [Ø].

(ولا ينبغي أن تكون هناك أية أوهام أو انطباعات خاطئة)

BT: [There should be no illusions or flawed impressions]

To serve the US interests and save its face, the translator here, commissioned by the pro-America Washington Post, adds: أو انطباعات خاطئة) [or flawed impressions] (which is unexpectedly absent in TT1) to further reinforce the US ability in taking over "the management of the assistance effort" concerning the "international" provision of weapons to Syria.

- ST: There should be no illusions.  
 TT1: (ينبغي أن لا يكون أمناً أية أو هام)  
 BT: [There should be no illusions [Ø]]

Unlike the word (نظام): [regime] which is always associated with the Syrian government/leadership in this text, the translator, a pro-America institution, refers to America as [The American administration], often positive, in the line that follows (TT2/ A9, L18) as well as in a few lines thereafter (TT2/ A9, L22), which is not the case in TT1, an anti-America institution; its references to it are: الولايات المتحدة & (الادارة): [administration] & [The United States]- lines (TT1/ A8, L17 & 20) respectively.

In the following text, the translator brings about two items, which were not suggested in the ST, and which injects doses of ideological bearings in order to strengthen his intended ideological message in question, thus impinging on the ST intended content and taking the readership to a different world. In the context of talking about the regime's alleged use of the internationally-prohibited chemical arsenal in orchestrating hideous massacres against unarmed civilians in the country, the translator makes use of this negative context and attributed the arsenal to the Syrian regime, which is absent in the ST:

#### **Text 10: Assad's Chemical Romance**

- ST: The [Ø] [Ø] arsenal is thought to be massive.  
 TT: (ويعتقد بأن الترسانة الكيميائية السورية ضخمة)  
 BT: [The chemical Syrian arsenal is thought to be massive]

More, perhaps more significantly, the translator (in the same paragraph) adds a dictionary definition of the lethal 'blister gases', which adds a more pejorative picture to the Syrian regime:

- ST: The arsenal is thought to be massive involving thousands of munitions and many tons of chemical agents, which range, according to CIA annual reports to Congress, from the blister gases [Ø].

TT: (ويعتقد بأن الترسانة الكيميائية السورية ضخمة، وتشتمل على ذخائر والعديد من أطنان العناصر الكيميائية التي تتفاوت، وفق القالير السنوية المرفوعة من وكالة الاستخبارات المركزية الأميركية (السي أي أيه) للكونغرس، بين الغازات المنفطة (التي تستخدم في الحروب الكيماوية، والتي تحرق أنسجة الجسم أو تحدث فيها بثوراً طبقاً لقاموس المورد).

BT: [... from the blister gases **which are used in chemical wars, and burn body tissues or cause scares onto it, according to Al Mawred**].

In conclusion, it is observable that there is a tendency among translators of various ideological and cultural backgrounds to exhibit a variable level of intervention which is ideological in itself, depending on their respective ideological affiliation, societal conventions as well as TL linguistic/stylistic norms, which runs counter to the basic canon of the translational practice. The translators of the selected texts have been keen to be present in their (re-produced) texts without dropping their subjective mask. More surprisingly, and by way of inference, they tend to invite their readers to also be present in their (re-created) texts.

In such cases of intervention, it has been made clear that the translators (seen as communicators, Hatim and Mason 1997) filter the ST message then reshape/recycle it inasmuch as it agrees with their own value system and in-built beliefs. Hence, one can conclude that the role of the translator in terms of mediation/intervention in times of conflict can be viewed in many possible ways. At one end on a continuum of possibilities, s/he can be seen in a positive light as a bridge builder or, at the other end of the continuum of possibilities in a negative light as a bridge breaker, which inevitably requires a universal professional code of conduct to regulate the profession (or more precisely the professionals) and bring ideological intrusion to a minimum (See section 6.8 Last Word below, on page: 313).

Finally, given that the main focus of this translation study has been placed on the Arabic output, it ought to be emphasised that the above-discussed conclusions of ideological intervention (pragmalinguistic deformations: dishonesty, impartiality and unfaithfulness), should NOT necessarily be viewed as characteristics/features of Arabic language *per se*. These conclusions come out of the translators' OWN prejudiced normativity (regularity in behaviour) rather than the pragmalinguistic system of the Arabic language itself. In other words, they may apply to other languages, or more precisely, to other translators working on other translation traffics.

#### **6.4 Original Contribution**

This area of translation research (Translation in Times of Violent Conflict) necessitates more researching in view of the dramatically accelerating shifts in the socio-political scene across the globe<sup>290</sup>. This comes in time of implausibly explosively-fast and vast growth in the new technologies and media which have cast their shadow over different aspects on all walks of life and driven the world's socio-politics into different directions, where the first real casualty is truth which is mostly articulated in language (via, *inter alia*, the act of translation). Research into Translation and Conflict in general and Translation, Ethics and Ideology in particular has so far been given scant attention and remained a relatively under-researched area of study compared with the accelerating and revolutionary socio-political transformations we are witnessing today in every corner of the globe. This scantiness of research becomes more relevant when it comes to examining this linguistic phenomenon in the whole text not merely text fragmentations.

The “scarcity of data and dearth of research in the field”, as Baker (2010: 201) sees it, have recently been acknowledged by towering figures of this particular research interest in the field (c.f. Salama-Carr 2007b: 1, Tymoczko 2009: 184). Baker states that translation scholars “have begun to engage with various aspects of the role and positioning of translators and interpreters in war zone” (*ibid*). She highlights how wartime translators shape up the “public narratives of the conflict” and, in effect, “influence the course of the war in ways that are subtle, often invisible, but nevertheless extremely significant”. In a purely additive sense, Tymoczko (2009: 184) states that “it is time to begin to investigate the role of translation in promulgating discourses, asserting power, exciting conflict and perpetuating violence”. In her introduction to a specialised volume entitled *Translating and Interpreting Conflict* (2007a), Salama-Carr (2007b: 1) confirms that this area of Translation Studies has become “part and parcel of contemporary discourse on translation and interpreting”.

This acknowledgement mirrors the debatable role and positioning ('in'-visibility) of the translator in wartime amidst a vulnerable fragmented globe pervaded by a multitude of armed conflicts which

---

<sup>290</sup> Baker, a famous figure in this area of translation research (Translation and Conflict), sees that translation today, more than ever before, has become an important exercise amidst "aggressive globalization and pervasive violent conflicts", Baker (1992/2011: 7).

have created ideologically-loaded media and political discourses brought about by political, religious and cultural confrontations between the East and West rival poles. These new discourses have been fuelled by the rising prevalence of Globalisation, Informatics and new technologies over the past couple of decades or so, which have increasingly caught much research interest<sup>291</sup>. The present study responds to this nagging research interest and falls within its heart. It is particularly motivated by the so-called Arab “Spring”- unfurling popular ‘socio-political’ movements that have started late 2010 region-wide particularly in the MENA zone (Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Bahrain, etc.) and expanded, *silently and non-silently*, to some regional and international countries (See thorough details in chapter three).

The present study, which builds on existing research and draws on its outcomes, is original and is expected to contribute to knowledge in the sense that it draws on a *topical, timely* and *novel* area of research which is still in its infancy and has not come to a close yet. The Arab “Spring”, I should add, has also been inspiring many other countries across the globe (as the third chapter has thoroughly argued), which makes the need to fathom it, not least from a discursal/translatorial angle of point) more urgent; it has reshaped the Arabic socio-political map and cast its shadow on many aspects of life.

In this context, my study is worth researching because current research, despite some recent endeavours in question, still requires further investigations into the interface between language, ideology and power, not least in times of tension. My enthusiasm to undertake this project springs from, in addition to my belief in the validity of the techniques of CDA, SFL and DTS (integrated), my own decade-old academic and professional profiles and special interest in how socio-political reality is configured (trans-created) in pragma-linguistic constructions in sensitive settings.

Main aspects of the originality of the present thesis connect with the adopted method of analysis, units of analysis and corpus selection criteria. The study’s method of analysis operates on three different, yet interrelated, fronts: discourse, language function and descriptivism (comparison)

---

<sup>291</sup>This new attention, I should add, coincides with the emergence of functionalist and descriptive target-oriented approaches to translation critical analysis as well as the so-called cultural and ideological turns, which has made the role of the translator much more paramount.

which intimately (and respectively) tie in with the three theoretical frameworks of analysis (CDA, SFL and DTS) and which finished research in question has *relatively* lacked or has not been well-scrutinised, not least in relation to Arabic TTs<sup>292</sup>. This new trend in Critical Translation Analysis applies the Hallidayan model of text analysis (SFL) from a bilingual perspective. It views language as a communicative act that involves a set of situational factors which control the use of linguistic constructions. Halliday's model which is based on Text Linguistics in the first place, influenced the proponent of CDA, Fairclough, in the 1990s who applied it to his analyses in order to decipher and interpret ideological orientations, power relations and hegemonic dispositions in a given text. Recently, some approaches have begun to import basic theoretical underpinnings of CDA and apply them (bi-lingually not mono-lingually) to translation analysis, but to relatively unsatisfactory levels (See Schäffner 2002: 53). The present study, however, builds on existing outcomes in question and hopes to fill some spaces in this gap by opening up new horizons for fellow future research in order to establish a (more) coherent methodology of analysis marrying a number of interrelated text-linguistic approaches and applying them to finished products.

Having believed that the hybridisation of these three frameworks of analysis can be a helpful implement in carrying out critical translation analyses of politically-sensitive texts produced in times of conflict, the present study, amidst relatively inadequate, unsatisfactory accounts, integrates these three analytical approaches and applies them (bilingually) to the realm of translation studies. In this spirit, it is important to note that (with the exception of the Touryean DTS/ the Comparative Model), the Faircloughian CDA and the Hallidayan SFL analyse text from a monolingual perspective. The present research, which builds on the theoretical insights that underpin both of them, examines selected (target) texts from a bilingual prism by way of comparing Arabic TTs with their English STs with a view to unmasking tacit ideological orientations that may be embedded in politically motivated contexts and configured in pragma-linguistic formations.

---

<sup>292</sup> The scholarly work of such critical translation analysts as (Hatim and Mason 1990, 1997; Shunnaq 1986, 1992, 1994; Farghal 1993, 1995, 2008, 2012, 2013; can be seen as exceptions in this regard. Other a few exceptions of such incorporation between English and other languages (other than Arabic), can be seen in Christina Schäffner (1997, 2002, 2003, 2004; Jeremy Munday 2001; Maria Calzade Pérez (2003) and Robert Valdeón (2007).

This study also considers units of analysis on an overall textual and discoursal level as it attends not only to textual but also extra-textual (contextual, pragmatic, etc.) factors that shape texts and dictate their production/reception. In other words, it sees equivalence relations (the translators' regular choices/ norms) on a textual, contextual/pragmatic level- and also travels beyond that to take on board ethical considerations of the translation (translator's) practice, which responds to Baker's (1992/2011: 8) hopes and optimisms "to think of the impact of their decisions on others and to avoid being implicated in unethical practices". In its final analysis, and owing to its very nature which sees the resultant outcome (i.e. the Arabic translation) from an overall textual point of view, it considers the text as a whole, seen as combined of a series of thoughts motivated by a series of "social practices/behaviours" to serve specific communicative purposes, as "ultimate judicial authority" over the producers' (translators') choices, purposes and intentions. (See the conclusions provided after each analysis in chapter five on the thoughts' interconnectedness configured in pragma-linguistic structures). Besides the "hybridised" analytical method and the "discursal" units, this study develops a "panoramic" set of corpus selection criteria amidst a relative lack of well-devised criteria that are mainly qualitative, text attribute, corpus attribute, internal (textual) and external (extra-textual).

The work at hand is an attempt to open the way for other researchers and students for further investigation and discernment of discursive practices that instantiate ideological shifts from different perspectives, (as shown shortly below under 6.7 Limitations and Recommendations, on page: 310), in order to establish a *reliable* linguistic model that can guide translation critics (analysts) and provide them with a structured apparatus to follow in detecting, describing, explaining and interpreting ideology in a given discourse with reference to the social, political and ideological constraints of text production and reception. The Study's method of analysis hopes to have provided a reliably workable and generalisable method for identifying and explaining ideological signification in politically sensitive contexts, to enable translators to distance themselves from their text and render disinterestedly whether this feeds into their belief values or not. It hopes

to have offered them with new ways to capture the cultural, contextual and pragmatic implications of the text at hand and render them to the target audience as impartially as possible. The present account, it believes, has introduced some theoretical and practical insights on how to fathom concealed ideological thrusts in politically-charged translated texts in times of conflict.

Having said that, and in view of the urgent need to establish the translators' neutrality and provide them with means to recognise significant ideological imports imbued in pragma-linguistic forms and signs in the TT, the present study hopes to have contributed, on the one hand, to the dynamisation of the hotly-debated notion of equivalence locating it within more functional, descriptive and communicative boundaries with much regard to the extra-linguistic, contextual considerations that control text production, and to the objectivisation/neutralisation of the translator's prejudiced behaviour (long-awaited and long aspired for), thus establishing more solid ethical background for the practice, on the other. Also, to a lesser extent and to hope for the least, it also hopes to have drawn more research attention for the need of *standardising* the intricate notion of equivalence of political and media discourses produced in times of struggle. It becomes more pressing than ever before that these imports necessitate further explorations in view of the present study's significance for both the theoretical and practical domains of the discipline. It hopes to have underscored the need to do more investigations in this area of research.

Finally, this study, to the best of my knowledge, can be regarded as one of a relatively few studies that have in-depth addressed this very translation phenomenon (translation shifts bearing ideological thrusts) in this way combining together the critical (CDA), functional (SFL) and descriptive (DTS) approaches of text analysis. Also, most previous endeavours have studied this issue on literary texts (rather than media/political ones produced in times of conflict) with focus on Indo-European languages (rather than English and Arabic). The present study hopes or have opened new horizons, furnished alternative avenues in this relatively under-researched area of investigation in the field of Translation Studies and paved the way for further future research from different perspectives.

## 6.5 Significance

This study hopes to have alerted translators and translation analysts to pay special attention to the lexico-grammatical choices as well as contextual/situational influences, which would enable them to discern the underlying power relations and ideological orientations encoded in politically charged texts. The above takes (discussed in the previous chapter) are hoped to have sharpened their awareness of textual and contextual asymmetries ("regularities in the observable results of a particular kind of behaviour", Toury 1999: 16) and, more specifically, highlighted key aspects of how to identify, describe, explain and interpret latent ideological orientations in a (translated) media and political discourses. The study, having identified where and in what forms underlying ideologies lie, directs translation analysts towards the revelation and interpretation of those ideologies, on the one hand, and emphasises that translators, who are found to be vulnerable to ideological signification, should be fully cautious (and honest) when approaching texts that have ideological nature, on the other, in order to avoid emotional engagement or ideological intervention, thus maintaining the long-awaited ethical values of the practice.

The present study is particularly significant owing to its timeliness and accelerating socio-political dynamics worldwide, thanks to the explosively-fast growth of mainstream and alternative media outlets, which have made the world more interconnected yet, paradoxically, fragmented with much hostility, antagonism and incoherence. The new challenges that are lately emanating from the so-called "War on Terror" following 9/11 attacks and similar atrocities are undoubtedly nurturing an awareness of the importance of detecting instances of TT-ST divergences that embody significant ideological bearings. Today, there is a vital need for understanding the ideological content, "the overall text plan" (Hatim and Mason 1990: 18) and the communication agendas that lie beneath the media translated (re-produced/re-written) content.

This study hopes to be mainly significant for many segments: translators particularly those who translate from English into Arabic, be they theorists or practitioners (careerists); media text producers, political observers, analysts, editors and researchers; lexicologists and lexicographers

especially those who are concerned with political and media texts; translation teachers and coursebook writers; designers of translation syllabi and training courses in the fields of politics and media in particular; discourse analysis enthusiasts and specialists in ideological studies and intercultural communication; zealous independent organisations and centres of strategic studies let alone (novice) students of translation.

Novice students of translation may unconsciously be misguided or misapprehend critical aspects of the ST due to a lack in awareness of textual, cultural and contextual specifications which shape up texts and govern their interpretation. The findings of the present study hopes to have promoted the role of CDA, SFL and DTS in the process of translators' training/teaching and drawn their attention to how pragma-linguistic choices are (re-/ trans-) created to communicate new ideologies and points of view especially that these choices do not only lie inside texts but also outside and behind them. Likewise, it also hopes to have made them aware of the probable consequences of these choices, to produce, as much as possible, unbiased, prejudice-free outputs. Therefore, the study believes its findings to build (or contribute to the building of) translators' competence and hopes for some significant pedagogical implications:

1. Translation trainees (translators-to-be) need to be taught, in such courses as Translation Criticism, Comparative Textology, Contrastive Linguistics, to cite a few examples) how to be aware of the subtle manifestations of ideology, hegemony, power relations in language and pay special attention to the local and global factors (the interlinked networks of text and context that constitute (politically-sensitive) texts and determine their reception: (skopi, commission, readership's expectations, etc.).
2. The findings of this study hope to have developed reliable frameworks for critical text/translation analysis which would help translation students to discern, describe, explain and interpret prejudiced pragma-linguistic constructions that are indexical of subtextual, ideological orientations and concealed, unacknowledged agendas. More importantly, this acquired skill, it is hoped, would help them to be able to *sift the wheat from the chaff*, i.e. to draw the line between factual knowledge and

hegemonic attitudes/dispositions and to enable them to take a decision of inclusion or exclusion in their final products detaching themselves from any form of ideological intervention, whether it agrees or disagrees with their world thought, thus reflecting an ethically professional image of the practice.

3. Sequel to the previous implication, trainee translators are hoped to be able to choose (and develop) effectively proper strategies of ideologically significant shifts to overcome potential pitfalls, shortcomings, hurdles and stumbling blocks (cultural or otherwise) that may be posed in their way during the process of translating, especially when they approach politically-motivated texts and ideologically inflicted contexts. When trainee translators are (made) aware of (or committed with) a set of "discursal guidelines", they would most likely be able to defeat these obstacles and produce as impartial and bias-free accounts as possible.

4. The present study does not primarily intend to judge or gauge the quality of the resultant text (TT) *per se*; it predominantly examines the translators' resulting regularities, deviant normative behaviour and choices/decisions of equivalence which they make during the process of translating (norms). However, this can, in turn, provide useful insights in assessing the quality of the finished product (i.e. the translation), which may be pedagogically promising. Norms, argues Hermans (1999: 79) and personal communication on November 28, 2013), provide "the first step towards an explanation of the choices and decisions which translators make". He emphasises, I agree, that norms do not only function as constraints on the translator's behaviour, but also "as templates in offering ready-made solutions to particular types of problem", (*ibid*). For him, *tight shoes do not only help one to walk straight, they also help her/him to dance better*.

Significance of the findings of the present endeavour travels beyond the boundaries of the pedagogical spectrum (the classroom settings); My investigation of the interdependence between language and ideology and the interlinked web of relations in between must sharpen political analysts and media elites' awareness to figure out how hegemony and power relations are arranged (manipulated, recycled) in sensitive political and media discourses, not least the translated

(reproduced) ones. Thompson (1984: 146) calls for an enquiry into the ways in which language sustains asymmetrical relations of domination, power and control. He draws on this interface between language and ideology and commends the role of Critical Discourse Analysis in discerning the relationship between them within the framework of a general social theory maintaining that “to study ideology, within such a framework, is to study the ways in which meaning (signification) serves to sustain relations of domination”. This study, which responds to this call, hopes to have laid additional grounds for further applications in question taking on board other philosophical, conceptual, theoretical and epistemological aspects that underpin CDA, SFL and DTS.

## **6.6 Challenges**

Like any other (analytical) work, the present study was subject to a number of challenges which were in fact challenging yet useful as they paradoxically provided various ways of my researching on the one hand, and may draw attention for further research in relevant areas of research in future (as can be seen under the next section: 6.7 Limitations and Recommendations).

It was not easy, especially at the onset of the on-going event, to find Arabic translations that meet the corpus selection criteria which I have devised in this research in chapter four. For example, there were a considerable number of machine translations which reflected a mismatch between the STs and their correspondent TTs. Such texts, which could work for another quality-based type of research, were naturally excluded as this study traces the normative behaviour of translators (their choices, preferences, fingerprints, touches, stamps, imprints) as a result of the their accumulative decisions rather than the accuracy of translations or pitfalls of machine/ computer-assisted translation. A similar ST-TT mismatch was also found in non-machine translations which were, as a matter of course, not taken on board either. The mismatch included, *inter alia*, overt shifts and explicit representations of ideological intervention let alone added/deleted items (sometimes a whole paragraph). In this context, it ought to be re-noted<sup>293</sup> that this is a critical translation analysis

---

<sup>293</sup> For more explanation, see Prefatory Notes no. (1 & 2), on page: vi.

that looks into (covert rather than overt) associations and unacknowledged agendas in given TTs with a view to debunking their opacity and opaqueness.

Another relevant challenge links up with the translators of the selected texts. I was keen to choose competent translators rather than novice ones or amateurs as background information provided under the initial stage of each analysis (in chapter five) shows. (I directly and indirectly met most of them). The challenge lies in the fact that their competence requires scrutinising examination and excellent command of English and (particularly) Arabic cross-linguistic and pragmatic systems in order to dig deep down into the text and excavate opaque, non-transparent occurrences (reiterations) that instantiate bias and intrusion.

A third challenge had to do with finding the correspondent TT, not least that of pertinence to the texts representing the Syrian regime's voice; some of the Arabic translated texts do not include the ST headline (perhaps intentionally; to prevent access that would reveal the manipulations in the TT), which had made it difficult to "win" their respective English originals. Translators of those texts (and their publishers), unlike most of other selected texts, tend to disappear or befog the ST headline and its Lead paragraph by reframing them using different phraseology and style. For example, the ST headline of text two ("Wag the Dog" – The Sequel Set in Syria), which was written and translated only a few days after the Ghouta chemical massacre (21-08-2013), is not included at all in the TT<sup>294</sup> and is totally twisted by the pro-regime translator whose TT appears in the pro-regime Al Thawrah daily as I have shown during the initial stages of the Text analysis above. Her Arabic rendition reads [أسباب استخدام المتمردين في سوريا الأسلحة الكيميائية] [Reasons for Rebels' Use of Chemical Weapons in Syria], which is not ideologically insignificant on the part of the translator who chose to demonstrate her anti-opposition attitudinal stance early (demonising the opposition holding it responsible for the use of such weapons against the unarmed civilians and (by implication) glorifying the regime and confirming its acquittal from their use.

---

<sup>294</sup> See (under the Appendices in the end of this thesis) the link of the TT, on page: 321, and observe how the translator skips reference to the headline which she also manipulates (reframes and deforms) presumably to disallow access to the numerous biases she offers in her TT in order to serve the regime, polish its image and save its face (reputation and honour).

Nonetheless, this tactic is considered in this research as one form of "initial/preliminary" manipulation- the translator's manoeuvring- that is indicative of ideological import. To defeat this challenging limitation, I had, with the hints provided on top and bottom of the resultant TT, to follow the strategy of back-translating the Arabic "distorted/deformed" headline in various ways in the hope I could get the ST (which sometimes took several hours).

### **6.7 Limitations and Recommendations**

Throughout this study of the ideological orientations in politically sensitive contexts in English-Arabic translation, a number of significant points have been touched, several others are left untouched and therefore need to be further investigated.

The present research had been far too ambitious at the start in many ways; it intended to cover the entirety of the then-known five "spring-affected" countries (Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen and Syria). With constant consultation with and guidance of my supervisory team members to attain in-depth conclusions of the analyses, I narrowed the focus down to the then-young Syrian scene with consideration of both voices: the pro- and anti-government (the previous four scenes came to a close early as I have shown in detail in chapter three under 3.3 Outcomes of the Arab "*Spring*", on page: 94). This was in fact a necessary limitation; the new shift of focus concerning the broadness of research, as was originally planned, should, I believed, properly answer the research's questions and *a priori* assumptions in that it would provide profound analysis of the situation rather than general findings generated by a wider range of situations. At the same time, this narrowness of the scope of investigation should leave possible areas for further relevant research in future. Thus, the present study positions itself within the growing body of relevant literature on this investigated phenomenon (Translation and Conflict) and operates within a collaborative remit; notwithstanding its originality, it builds on previous endeavours, offers its conclusions and leaves some scope of possible areas for further research in future, as I will show shortly below in this section. In this spirit, it is recommendable that this phenomenon, which I have investigated from a primarily translational point of view under the big umbrella of Translation and Conflict, be approached from a

purely interpreting point of view as a prelude to embarking on more research on this noticeably under-researched area in the field: Interpreting and Conflict.

It is axiomatic in the academic circles that one thesis cannot give resolutions to all issues it raises nor can it claim to examine all aspects of the phenomenon under investigation. Given that my area of investigation has relatively remained under-researched, I am aware that there are a number of issues which this thesis has not been able to address in detail, and which will no doubt require further elaboration by fellow researchers on the one hand, and that others need new investigation, on the other. I believe that only one (or a couple) of the six main linguistic categories or their pragmatic supporters discussed in this study can be taken on board and similarly undergoes a scrutinising examination.

In this connection, one limitation I have faced in this study is that the corpus is not large enough and therefore the findings may need further research to expand them in order to obtain more conclusive results. The study, which predominantly undergoes qualitative techniques of analysis to analyse both the texts and the social context has demonstrated an empirical approach to exploring the potential instances of shifts in translating argumentative texts from English into Arabic. However, the findings of the current study need to be confirmed and advanced by future research. Translators' normative attitude configured in linguistic forms has concentrically been traced, examined and explained from unconscious perspectives leaving scope for future studies to look into this attitude from a conscious standpoint perhaps by considering the interplay between psychology and language (psycholinguistics), (meta)-cognitive linguistics, and the like.

The present study has exclusively examined Arabic texts translated from English. I only adopted a unidirectional (English-Arabic) translational traffic with exclusive focus on newspapers opinion articles (rather than, e.g. editorials, news reporting, etc.). It is therefore advisable that this translation traffic be reversed, i.e. significant ideological shifts are traced, identified, interpreted and justified inside selected texts translated from Arabic into English, and/or both translation traffics

can be taken into consideration where results can be compared and contrasted particularly to see whether or not it makes a difference vis-à-vis the translators' normative behaviour from or into either of which. Special reference (or point of examining) could be whether or not nativity (in language and culture) can be indexical of such differences through empirical/manual examination of authentic examples. By the same token, it would be useful to apply the method developed in this research to other language pairs in a bid to explore similarities and/or differences along the same line in languages other than English and Arabic.

As far as the method of analysis is concerned, it is not all-encompassing and can be applied by considering other features that may demonstrate language-power-ideology debate, not least the relationship between them and, in effect, help to detect significant shifts that bear meaningful ideological potentials. Therefore, I am not (and I have not decided to be) exhaustive owing to space settings and under my conviction that the main themes: (aims, questions and hypotheses set a priori) can adequately be realised through the adopted pragma-linguistic parameters. I predominantly confined my focus to six various linguistic parameters; three syntactic (Modality, Nominalisation and Transitivity) and three lexical (Over-lexicalisation, Re-lexicalisation and Metaphor) supported by other three pragmatic signifiers which can function as symptoms of ideological orientations (Speech Acting, Politeness and Relevance) as well as clues (mainly Emphasis, Pluralisation, Euphemism, Face: (reputation/honour) and Blasphemy).

Owing to limitations of space, and under the conviction that the adopted parameters in the present study are adequate to validate my hypotheses and provide generalisable conclusions, this research could not examine other pragma-linguistic features (such as subordination, synonymy, thematic patterns, collocational cohesion, parallelism and the like). Another way forward would be to do further research with consideration of (one or more of) such features or expanding one or more of the ones investigated in this work. Comparing the number of comparative/contrastive studies which have been done on other languages, I have observed that there are many areas in the Arabic language that remain relatively untouched such as modality and transitivity, to cite a couple of

examples. This proposed investigation is recommended to undergo a quantitative method of analysis to count recurrences of those features in a huge corpus (perhaps by a computer-aided processing/ corpus linguistics) and pass concluding judgements, which can be quite possible in view of today's rapid advancements in new technologies and various computer easy-to-use applications.

Importantly, perhaps more importantly, it may prove beneficial to explore other ways of deciphering ideological implications in argumentative text translated into Arabic through different textual standards; it could be useful to include textual features (text-building devices) like, for instance, repetition, recurrence, parallelism, theme/rheme constructions, etc. which are (or can be) indicative of ideological force owing to their rhetorical/pragmatic functions of persuasion, emphasis and exaggeration. Likewise, it may be worthwhile for future research to look into different registers (other than media and politics) and/or genres (other than opinion articles) and text types (other than argumentative). I advise future fellow researchers to look, for instance, into the register of legal/diplomatic discourse that is distinctively sensitive (international disputatious treaties, religious/cultural texts, politically-charged texts in literary translations, etc.; the genres of news reports, editorials, commercial advertisements, etc. or such text types as expository texts, narrative texts, etc. I believe that this recommended possibility, if pursued within the methods of analysis proposed in this research, would further validate my conclusions and offer new others, perhaps differently.

## **6.8 Last Word**

Words in times of conflict have increasingly become swords. The use of a word (an equivalence) with a positive or a negative light (rather than a neutral one) can affect the intended message, form a biased picture in the audience's mind and take them to a different world. It is how words are rendered that makes a translator truthful and credible or fabricate, falsify vital facts or present partial truths. The Middle East, a volatile region where naming is so problematic, has given rise to media bias.

Translation, as Newmark (1991) sees it, is a truth-seeking activity that is "concerned with moral and with factual truth", (1991: 1, also 1993: 36). Therefore, I feel that there is a perennial need today, more than ever before, to control the practice (and more precisely the practitioners). Many scholars have been engaged in proposing a professional code of ethics (or a set of guidelines, to hope for the least<sup>295</sup>) to regulate it (Baker 2006, Tymoczko 2007, 2009, Inghilleri 2009, etc.). Inghilleri (2009: 2f) notes that "Baker (2006) proposes an approach to ethics that encourages translators to become fully conscious of their role in the circulation or resistance of the narratives which serve to legitimize legal or moral standpoints or violent action in conflict situations, leading to a more active or activist stance on the part of translators themselves". Commenting on this approach, Baker (2008) points out that the professional code of ethics is not dogmatic; she states that it is not prescriptive but rather descriptive in that it consists of a set of rules and guidelines to be implemented, as may be the case, when one embarks on a translatorial assignment succinctly adding that we cannot prescribe behaviour, we can describe it<sup>296</sup>: "Unlike the work of scholars like Berman and Venuti, in using Fisher's work, my priority [Baker's] has not been to prescribe what is ethical *per se*, but rather to find a way of reflecting on how one arrives at deciding what is ethical in any given situation, translational or otherwise", Baker (*ibid*: 12).

Tymoczko (2009: 173) suggests that the complexities of the roles translators play in cultural interface associated with political violence in an age of globalization require a reconsideration of ethics and ideology in the work of translators. In like manner, Inghilleri (2009: 7) demonstrates how ethical issues in wartime transcend language boundaries and conditions of exactness between the ST and the TT holding that "[t]he question of ethics under these [conflictual] conditions reaches beyond the issues of linguistic accuracy and neutrality that are considered central to most professional codes of ethics".

---

<sup>295</sup> As far as this study sees it, and following on from the previous conclusion, it can be safely assumed that it is too ideal to establish a prescriptive account (a recipe) on what norms to employ in order to end up with impartial renditions, but rather provide generalisable guidelines that would steer the translators towards bias-free products.

<sup>296</sup> Watch how she convincingly summarises this in her interview with Morven Beaton-Thome, Manchester (2010): <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8XzImIaV8iA>

Unfortunately, and unlike many professions, the ethicality of the practice has so far received limited attention and sadly occupied little or no regard by political policy makers (and decision takers) not only locally but also internationally, which requires proposing not only a professional code of ethics/conduct but also a Universal Declaration for Professional Translation (UDPT), I feel. In light of the birth and rapid growth of new technologies and (social) media outlets, dramatic transformations in the world's socio-political map not to mention unprecedented cultural interconnectedness, there has been a rising demand for translation activities, which necessitates the establishment of such a declaration as a step forward to (in addition to regulating the profession and, more importantly, the professionals) change the low status accorded to translators who have been seen as (double) agents, collaborators, mercenaries, traitors, prodigal figures, and more offensively, *homo sacer* which represents 'the primal form of 'outlaw', i.e. someone 'outside the law' who the law neither protects nor punishes', thus can be killed/shot by anyone without consequences or legal pursuits! Translation community should, therefore, nip it in the bud pushing towards establishing different stereotypical images, thus garnering more regard and respect to its young growing discipline.

## APPENDICES

### (1) Why Can't the Syrian Opposition Get Along?

Persistent divisions and a brutal crackdown have prevented Syria's dissidents from presenting a united front against the Assad regime.

**Foreign Policy/ By Kate Seelye/ September 1, 2011**

<http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/09/01/why-cant-the-syrian-opposition-get-along/>

The buoyant images of Libya's rebels, who are currently tearing down the last vestiges of Muammar al-Qaddafi's regime, have also underscored the challenges facing the fragmented opposition in another Arab country -- Syria. Five months after the start of an uprising against President Bashar al-Assad that has left more than 2,200 people dead, dissidents are still struggling to forge a united front that could duplicate the role played by Libya's National Transitional Council (NTC).

The NTC was created just 12 days after the start of the Libyan uprising, quickly organizing resistance to Qaddafi within the country and lobbying for support on the international stage. By contrast, the opponents of Assad's regime have held gatherings in Antalya, Turkey; Brussels; Istanbul; and even Damascus, the Syrian capital, to shape the opposition's leadership and articulate a road map toward a democratic Syria. But as of yet, Syrian activists in the diaspora have failed to establish an umbrella group that has earned the endorsement of the only body that can confer legitimacy- the protest organizers inside Syria. Although Assad's brutal crackdown has undoubtedly made this a difficult task, the absence of a united front has hindered the opposition's ability to effectively communicate to regime-change skeptics that there is a credible alternative to the Assad government.

The disarray in the anti-Assad camp is recognized all too well in Washington. "I think the [international] pressure requires an organized opposition, and there isn't one," said Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, when asked on Aug. 11 why the United States didn't throw more weight behind the protest movement. "There's no address for the opposition. There is no place that any of us who wish to assist can go."

Given the lack of a recognized leadership, different Syrian groups -- mainly based in the diaspora -- have been jockeying to assert themselves. Most recently, on Aug. 29 young dissidents speaking on behalf of a revolutionary youth group inside Syria named a 94-person council to represent the Syrian opposition. At a news conference in Ankara, Turkey, Syrian dissident Ziyaeddin Dolmus announced that the respected Paris-based academic Burhan Ghalioun would head the so-called Syrian National Council, which would also comprise the crème de la crème of Syria's traditional opposition.

Dolmus said the council would include many of the traditional opposition figures based in Damascus, such as former parliamentarian Riad Seif, activist Suhair Atassi, and economist Aref Dalila. "Delays [in forming a council] return our people to bloodshed," he said at the news conference, which was broadcast by Al Jazeera.

But no sooner had the council been announced than it started to unravel. When contacted by the media, Ghalioun and the others quickly distanced themselves from the announcement, claiming they had no prior knowledge of it, according to reports in the Arabic press. Later, Ghalioun denied any association with the group on his Facebook page. One Washington-based Syrian activist, Mohammad al-Abdallah -- whose father, Ali al-Abdallah was named to the council -- dismissed it as a joke.

Others said it was an attempt by young revolutionaries, upset over the lack of progress, to put forward a wish list of opposition members. U.S.-based Syrian activist Yaser Tabbara, who had helped organize a gathering of anti-government Syrians a week before in Istanbul, called it "an earnest attempt by youth to reach out and demand that we move faster than we have been."

According to Tabbara, the Istanbul conference that concluded on Aug. 23, was motivated by a similar sense of urgency. "It has been five months since the uprising started, and we don't yet have a U.N. Security Council resolution condemning Assad and his cohorts for their massacres," said Tabbara. "Part of the reason is that some in the international community, like India, Brazil, and South Africa, do not see a viable alternative to this regime."

The four-day Istanbul gathering, according to organizers, sought to unite all the efforts of previous opposition efforts under one banner. Few of the groups or individuals from previous opposition gatherings

45 attended the meeting, however. Members representing a consultative committee that came into the open from a June opposition gathering in Antalya withdrew at the last minute, claiming, according to Reuters, that it "did not build on earlier efforts to unite the opposition."

The conference was further handicapped by what Syrian journalist Tammam al-Barazi called "the perception that it was held under an American umbrella." Its organizers included members of a grassroots community group based in Illinois, the Syrian American Council.

50 Although dismaying, the opposition's divisions and sniping are hardly surprising. Most activists grew up under the Assad family's authoritarian rule, and their differences reflect the many divisions inside Syrian society, which is split by sect and ethnicity as well as ideology. The opposition includes Arab nationalists and liberals with little trust for the Muslim Brotherhood, whose supporters were accused of dominating the first Istanbul conference organized in July by a leading human rights lawyer, Haitham al-Maleh.

55 The many Kurdish parties that have participated have also been unhappy with some dissidents' attempts to define a future Syria as "Arab." Most are also highly suspicious of the West and any support it might offer.

60 The other challenge has been linking the diaspora opposition, which has been leading lobbying efforts abroad, with the political activists inside Syria. Although the diaspora has contacts among the traditional Syrian opposition based in Damascus, such as writers Michel Kilo and Louay Hussein, it has struggled to familiarize itself with the young activists who have led the protest movement. These protesters, who have organized themselves into local coordination committees, have largely remained anonymous to avoid arrest.

65 Signs are growing that some of the protest leaders are unhappy with the recent flurry of gatherings abroad. According to Washington-based dissident Ammar Abdulhamid, a group calling itself the "Syrian Revolution General Commission," which he says represents up to 70 percent of the local coordination committees, reacted to the Istanbul meeting. In an Aug. 21 Facebook message, it supported efforts by the opposition to coordinate activities meant to support the revolution, but advised against forming any kind of representative body to speak on behalf of the revolution.

70 The reasons for the Syrian opposition's inability to organize an umbrella group may be understandable, but the costs of failing to do so remain real. It will take a unified effort to communicate the opposition's vision for their country's future and convince those Syrians still sitting on the fence that a viable alternative to Assad's rule exists. The opposition must also coordinate its message to encourage defections among the main supporters of the regime -- informing them that their rights will be guaranteed under a democratic Syria, but that they will eventually face justice if they continue to support the government's crackdown.

75 A united opposition is also urgently needed to challenge the growing call for armed resistance by some protesters in cities like Homs, where the Syrian government's crackdown has been especially harsh. Some protest leaders have suggested that the Assad regime's crackdown can only be effectively opposed at this point through force, while other protesters have held banners calling for a no-fly zone.

80 Just across Syria's border in Antakya, Turkey, two groups of renegade Syrian army officers -- the Free Officers of Syria and the Free Syrian Army (sometimes known as the Free Officers Movement) -- are arming, according to Abdulhamid. A YouTube video uploaded on Aug. 18 shows an announcement by the Free Officers Movement declaring itself to be an armed group committed to protecting "the peaceful revolution and protesters." Just last week, the Free Officers of Syria published a statement claiming that the defections of a significant number of soldiers were reported in a Damascus suburb.

85 The dissidents gathering in the many meetings outside Syria say they remain committed to a peaceful revolution free of outside intervention. The local coordination committees in Syria also released a statement condemning the use of force as "unacceptable politically, nationally, and ethically."

90 But clearly, the many Syrians who have not yet abandoned support for Assad's regime fear what will follow its collapse. If they are to be convinced otherwise, they will need to see the establishment of a broad-based opposition leadership whose public face is comprised of respected dissidents living in exile, like Ghalioun, who reject armed struggle to achieve their aims.

Such a unified coalition has the opportunity to help Syria make a peaceful transition to a democratic, pluralistic form of government. Until that happens, a storybook ending to Syria's uprising remains little more than a distant hope.

## (2) لماذا تعجز المعارضة السورية عن التوافق؟

نشر : ٢٠١١/٩/١٢

ترجمة: صحيفة "الغد" الأردنية

(فورين بوليسي) ٢٠١١/٩/١

<http://www.alghad.com/articles/633253-%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B0%D8%A7-%D8%AA%D8%B9%D8%AC%D8%B2-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%B6%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%B9%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%81%D9%82%D8%9F?s=1440c8773a57ad28c2bbfbc5a6090319>

أبرزت الصور المبتهجة لثوار ليبيا الذين يهدمون الآن الآثار الأخيرة لنظام العقيد معمر القذافي، أبرزت التحديات التي تواجه المعارضة المنشطة في بلد عربي آخر -سوريا. وبعد خمسة شهور من اندلاع انتفاضة ضد الرئيس بشار الأسد، والتي أفضت إلى مقتل أكثر من ٢٠٠ شخص، ما يزال المنشقون يغدون الخطى لتشكيل جبهة موحدة قد تستطيع إعادة لعب الدور نفسه الذي قام به المجلس الانتقالي المؤقت في ليبيا.

وكان المجلس الانتقالي الليبي قد تشكل بعد ١٢ يوماً وحسب من اندلاع الانتفاضة الليبية، منظماً على وجه السرعة المقاومة للقذافي داخل البلاد، وحاشدآ الدعم لها على الصعيد الدولي. وعلى العكس من ذلك، عقد المعارضون لنظام الأسد تجمعات في أنطاليا في تركيا، وبروكسل وإسطنبول، وحتى في العاصمة السورية دمشق من أجل تشكيل قيادة المعارضة ووضع خريطة طريق نحو خلق سوريا ديمقراطية. لكن وللآن، فشل الناشطون السوريون في الشتات في تأسيس مجموعة مطلة تستطيع أن تكسب رضا وقبول الجهة الوحيدة التي يمكن أن تمنح الشرعية -منظمي الاحتجاجات في داخل سوريا. ورغم أن حملة الأسد الوحشية قد جعلت هذه المهمة صعبة من دون شك، فإن غياب وجود جهة موحدة أ Hague قدرة المعارضة على إبلاغ المتشكّفين إزاء تغيير النظم بأن هناك بدلاً معمولاً لحكومة الأسد.

ثمة إدراك كبير جداً في واشنطن لحالة التشوش والفوضى التي تعم المعسكر المعادي للأسد. فقد قالت وزيرة الخارجية الأمريكية هيلاري كلينتون: "اعتقد بأن الضغط (الدولي) يتطلب وجود معارضة منظمة، وليس هناك معارضة كهذه". وأضافت في معرض إجابتها عن سؤال يوم ١١ آب (أغسطس) الماضي حول السبب في أن الولايات المتحدة لم تضع ثقلها وراء حركة الاحتجاج في سوريا: "ليس هناك عنوان للمعارضة. ولا يوجد مكان يستطيع أيٌّ من يرغب في المساعدة الذهاب إليه".

وعلى ضوء الافتقار إلى قيادة معروفة، فإن المجموعات السورية المختلفة -والمتركزة على نحو رئيسي في الشتات- ما فتئت تتنافس من أجل إثبات نفسها. وكان أحدث ما في الأمر أنه في يوم ٢٩ آب (أغسطس)، سمى منشقون شباب كانوا يتحدون نيابة عن مجموعة من الثوار الشباب من داخل سوريا مجلساً مكوناً من ٩٤ شخصاً لتمثيل المعارضة السورية. وفي مؤتمر صحفي في أنقرة، أعلن زياد الدين دلمس أن الأكاديمي المرموق برهان غليون المقيم في باريس سيترأس ما يسمى المجلس الوطني السوري الذي سيضم أيضاً صفة المعارضة التقليدية في سوريا. وقال دلمس إن المجلس سيضم أيضاً العديد من شخصيات المعارضة التقليدية المتمركزة في دمشق، مثل البرلماني السابق رياض سيف والناشطة سهير الأنصاري والاقتصادي عارف دليلة. وقال في مؤتمر صحفي نقلت وقائعه فضائية الجزيرة التي تبث من قطر: "إن التأخير (في تشكيل مجلس) يعيث شعبنا إلى سفك الدماء".

لكنه ما إن تم الإعلان عن قيام المجلس حتى بدأ في التحلل. وعندما اتصلت بهم وسائل الإعلام، سارع غليون وآخرون إلى النأي بأنفسهم عن الإعلان، قائلين إنهم لم يكونوا على معرفة مسبقة بالمجلس، وفقاً لما ذكرته الصحافة العربية. وفي وقت لاحق، نفى غليون أن تكون له أي صلة مع المجموعة على صفحة التواصل الاجتماعي "فيسبوك". ومن جهةه، اعتبر ناشط سوري يتخذ من واشنطن مقرًا له هو محمد العبد الله -الذي سمي والده علي العبد الله في عضوية المجلس- أن المجلس هو مجرد نكتة. وقال آخرون إن المجلس كان بمثابة محاولة من جانب ثورويين شباب امتصروا بسبب الافتقار إلى إثارة تقدم، للتقدم بقائمة مقترنة من أعضاء المعارضة. ومن جهةه، قال الناشط السوري ياسر طبرة الذي يقيم في الولايات المتحدة، والذي كان قد ساعد على تنظيم تجمع للسوريين المعادين للحكومة في إسطنبول قبل أسبوع، "إن المجلس محاولة جادة من جانب الشباب للوصول والمطالبة بأن نتحرك على نحو أسرع قياساً مع ما نحن عليه".

ووفقاً لطبارة، فإن مؤتمر إسطنبول الذي كان قد اختتم في ٢٣ آب (أغسطس) قد انعقد بسبب شعور مماثل بالضرورة. وقال: "لقد مضى على اندلاع الانتفاضة خمسة شهور ولم نر بعد صدور قرار عن مجلس الأمن الدولي يدين الأسد وعصابته على المذابح التي ارتكبوها". وأضاف: "إن جزءاً من السبب في ذلك هو أن البعض في المجموعة الدولية، مثل الهند والبرازيل وجنوب أفريقيا، لا يرى وجود بديل حيوي لهذا النظام".

وكان تجمع إسطنبول الذي استمر أربعة أيام قد سعى، وفق منظمين، إلى توحيد كل جهود المعارضة السابقة، وصهرها في بوتقة واحدة تحت راية واحدة. وكانت قلة من المجموعات أو الأشخاص من تجمعات المعارضة السابقة قد حضروا التجمع مع ذلك. لكن أعضاء يمثلون اللجنة الاستشارية التي انبعثت عن تجمع المعارضة الذي انعقد في أنطاليا في حزيران (يونيو) الماضي، انسحبوا في آخر دقيقة قاتلة. ووفق روبيتز، فإن التجمع "لم يكن على جهود سابقة بذلك لتوحيد المعارضة". وواجه المؤتمر إعاقات أخرى أيضاً

٤ بسبب ما وصفه الصحفي السوري تمام البارازى بأنه "الشعور بأنه عقد تحت مظلة أميركية". إذ ضم منظموه مجموعة شعبية متمركزة في ولاية "ألينوي"، هي المجلس السوري الأميركي.

ورغم تسيبها باليأس والقوط، فإن انقسامات المعارضة وتناقضها بالكاد تكون مداعاة للدهشة. فمعظم الناشطين نموا وترعرعوا في ظل الحكم السلطوي لعائلة الأسد، فيما تعكس خلافاتها الانقسامات العديدة داخل المجتمع السوري الممزق بالطائفية والإثنية، كما وبالايديولوجية. وتضم المعارضة بين ثناياها قوميين ولiberاليين عرباً، مع القليل من الثقة في الإخوان المسلمين الذين اتهموا محامي الحقوق المدنية هيثم الملاح مؤديها بالسيطرة على مؤتمر إسطنبول الأول الذي نظم في تموز (يوليو).

إلى ذلك، تشعر الأحزاب التركية العديدة التي شاركت في المؤتمر بعدم الارتياح لمحاولات بعض المنشقين تعريف سوريا المستقبلية بأنها "عربية". كما أن المعضم يبدي تشكيكاً كبيراً في الغرب وبأي دعم قد يقدمه.

أما التحدي الآخر، فيمكن في ربط المعارضة في الشتات، والتي ما فتئت تقود جهود تجيش بارزة في الخارج، بالناشطين السياسيين في داخل سوريا. ورغم أن المعارضة في الشتات تتوافق على اتصالات مع المعارضة السورية التقليدية المتمركزة في دمشق، مثل الكاتبين ميشيل كيلو ولوبي حسين، فإنها ما تزال تتناضل من أجل التفاهم مع الناشطين الشباب الذين يقودون حركة الاحتجاج. ويظل هؤلاء المحتجون الذين نظمو أنفسهم في لجان تنسيق محلية مجھولين في جزئهم الضخم، من أجل تفادي تعرضهم للاعتقال من جانب سلطات النظام.

وثمة إمارات متزايدة إلى أن بعض قادة الاحتجاج يشعرون بعدم الرضا من توالي التجمعات في الخارج. وطبقاً للمنشق عمار عبد الحميد المتمركز في واسطنطن، فإن هناك مجموعة تطلق على نفسها اسم "اللجنة العامة للثورة السورية"، والتي يقول إنها تمثل ما يصل إلى ٧٠٪ من لجان التنسيق المحلية، قد أصدرت رد فعل على اجتماع إسطنبول. وفي رسالة على صفحة التواصل الاجتماعي "الفيسبوك" في ٢١ آب (أغسطس)، دعمت اللجنة جهوداً من جانب المعارضة للتنسيق بين النشاطات التي تستهدف دعم الثورة، لكنها نصحت بعدم تشكيل أي نوع من جسم تمثيلي للتحدى نيابة عن الثورة.

قد يكون السبب وراء عدم قدرة المعارضة السورية على الانتظام في مجموعة مظلة مفهوماً، لكن كلفة البقاء على هذه الحال تبقى باهظة. وستتضمن جهداً موحداً لنقل رؤية المعارضة عن مستقبل البلد، وإقناع أولئك السوريين الذين ما زالون قابعين عند السياج بأن ثمة بدلاً حيوياً موجوداً لحكم الأسد. وفي الآثناء، يجب على المعارضة أيضاً تنسيق رسالتها لتشجيع الانشقاق في صفوف الداعمين الرئيسيين للنظام -والقول لهم إن حقوقهم ستكون مضمونة في ظل سوريا ديمقراطية، لكنهم سيواجهون العدالة في نهاية المطاف في حال استقرروا في دعم حملة الحكومة.

وتمنس الحاجة، بشكل ملح، إلى تحدي الدعوة المتنامية إلى المقاومة المسلحة من جانب بعض المحتجين في مدن مثل حمص، حيث ما تزال حملة الحكومة السورية قاسية بشكل خاص. وكان بعض قادة الاحتجاج قد أشاروا إلى أنها لا تمكن مواجهة حملة نظام الأسد بشكل فعال في هذه المرحلة إلا من خلال القراءة، فيما رفع محتجون آخرون لافتات تدعوا إلى فرض منطقة حظر طيران. وفي الآثناء، هناك مجموعتان منشقتان من ضباط الجيش السوري قبلة الحدود السورية التركية عند بلدة أنطاكيا التركية - الضباط الأحرار في سوريا، والجيش السوري الحر (أحياناً يعرف باسم حركة الضباط الأحرار). - قد حملنا السلاح، وفق عبد الحميد.

ويظهر شريط فيديو يوتيوب نشر يوم ١٨ آب (أغسطس) إعلاناً لحركة الضباط الأحرار تعلن عن نفسها فيه بأنها مجموعة مسلحة ملتزمة بحماية "الثورة والمحتجين المسلمين". وكان الضباط الأحرار في سوريا قد نشروا بياناً في الأسبوع الماضي وحسب، أدعوا فيه أنه تم تسجيل انشقاق عدد كبير من الجنود في ضاحية من ضواحي دمشق.

يقول المنشقون المتجمعون في العديد من اللقاءات خارج سوريا إنهم يظلون ملتزمين بثورة سلمية خالية من أي تدخل خارجي. كما أصدرت لجان التنسيق المحلية في سوريا بياناً دانت فيه استخدام القوة باعتباره "غير مقبول سياسياً وقومياً وأخلاقياً". ومن الواضح أن العديد من السوريين الذين لم يتخلوا بعد عن دعم نظام الأسد يخشون مما سيلي انهيار النظام. لكنه إذا كان ليتم إقناعهم بغير ذلك، فإنهم سيحتاجون لرؤية تأسיס قيادة معارضة عريضة القاعدة، يتكون وجهها العام من منشقين محترمين يعيشون في المنفى، مثل غليون، والذين يرفضون النزاعسلح لنتحقق غاياتهم.

ويحظى مثل هذا الائتلاف الموحد بالفرصة لمساعدة سوريا على الإقدام على انتقال سلمي إلى شكل حكم ديمقراطي تعددي. وإلى أن يتم ذلك، فإن خاتمة كتاب قصة اتفاقية سوريا تبقى أكثر قليلاً من أمل بعيد.

\*نشر هذا التقرير تحت عنوان:

**Why Can't the Syrian Opposition Get Along?**

### (3) "Wag the Dog" – The Sequel Set in Syria

**By: George Galloway**

<http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article35970.htm>

August 25, 2013 "Information Clearing House - Over the last couple of weeks a western-backed (and armed) military junta slaughtered many hundreds of Egyptians in broad daylight live on television. The death toll, still concealed, may have been thousands.

5 The west confined itself to disapproving words and calls for "restraint" on "both sides" – even though the victims were unarmed.

In Syria hundreds of people have just been slaughtered in circumstances which are entirely unclear, and the west is about to launch (in our case without parliamentary approval with the prime minister acting from a beach in Cornwall) a military attack with entirely unforeseen consequences on Damascus.

10 There is a "Wag the Dog" element about this, and indeed the war of President Clinton's penis satirised in that masterful award-winning movie has already proved a handy diversion from Egypt before its even started.

15 It is entirely implausible that the Syrian regime chose the moment of the arrival of a UN chemical weapons inspection team to launch a chemical attack on an insurgency already suffering reverse after reverse on the battlefield and steadily losing international support with each new video showing them eating the hearts of slain soldiery and sawing of the heads of Christian priests with bread knives.

In the absence of conclusive evidence one would have to believe that the Assad regime was mad as well as bad to have launched such a chemical attack at a time when it is in less danger than it has been for almost a year. I do not believe that Bashar is mad.

20 There is ample evidence that the Syrian rag-tag-and-bobtail insurgency, dominated by the most extreme fanatic franchises of Al Qaeda, has access to chemical weapons, indeed any weapons the rag-tag-and-bobtail coalition behind them can get to them.

The US has a long history of using such weapons – and worse – and not just in SE Asia. In the destruction of Fallujah in next door Iraq they slaughtered thousands with the same kind of cocktails.

25 Israel regularly shares its own chemical weapons stockpile with their neighbours in Gaza. Check the pictures of phosphorous gas raining down upon the UN schools and hospitals in Operation Cast Lead if you don't believe me.

Britain introduced chemical weapons to the middle east in the first place, dropping gas on the "uncivilised tribes" of Iraq in the 1920s and wondering in parliament "what all the fuss was about".

30 Does anyone believe that the foul dictatorships of the Gulf – like Saudi Arabia – wouldn't give the Syrian rebels some of their chemical weapons? Especially if the purpose was to draw the big powers into the war?

Does anyone believe that a Syrian rebel army whose vile atrocities abound on YouTube wouldn't use them, for the same purpose?

35 So now we wait for the summer-surprise attack on yet another Arab country by the former colonial powers. Another summer, another Muslim country under murderous bombardment by the last people on the planet whose motives are trusted by anyone in the Muslim world.

Meanwhile, the money, and the weapons, keep on flowing to the Egyptian junta. The blood of some people, as always, turning out to be of far greater consequence than the blood of others...

## (4) أسباب استخدام المتمردين في سوريا الأسلحة الكيميائية

عن: Information clearing house

الأربعاء ٢٨-٨-٢٠١٣

بقلم: جورج غالاوي

ترجمة: صحيفة "الثورة" السورية

[http://thawra.sy/\\_print\\_veiw.asp?FileName=59036648720130827154021](http://thawra.sy/_print_veiw.asp?FileName=59036648720130827154021)

عرضت شاشات التلفزة مشاهد عن مصرع العديد من المصريين برصاص أطلق عليهم في وضح النهار حيث قدر البعض أعدادهم بالآلاف بينما قدرتهم الجهات الرسمية بالمئات.

لكن الغرب ووسائل إعلامه اكتفوا بإطلاق التصريحات الخجولة للتعبير عن رفضهم للأحداث التي يتعرض لها ذلك البلد في هذه المرحلة وأعربوا عن دعوتهم إلى ضرورة الالتزام بضبط النفس من الجانبين على الرغم من أن غالبية من لقوا حتفهم كانوا من المدنيين العزل.

أما في سوريا فقد قتل مئات من البشر في ظروف مبهمة لم يكشف النقاب عنها بعد، وقبل التوصل إلى وقائع مؤكدة تدين مرتكب تلك الجريمة التكرياء وكشف الستار عن واقعها، عمد الغربـ دوننـا تبصرـ إلى تحديد مسارهـ والتلميحـ إلى أنهـ علىـ وشكـ شـنـ هجومـ علىـ المـوقـعـ العسكريـةـ والـسيـادـيـةـ دونـ أنـ يـأخذـ باـعتـبارـ ماـ قدـ يـنـجمـ عنـ ذـلـكـ منـ نـتـائـجـ لاـ تـحـمـدـ عـقـابـهاـ قدـ تـنـخـضـ عـنـ الـهـجـومـ عـلـىـ الـعـاصـمـةـ السـوـرـيـةـ دمشقـ (حيـثـ أخذـتـ الـحـكـوـمـةـ الـبـرـيـطـانـيـةـ تـلـمـحـ عـنـ اـسـتـعـادـاـهـ لـارـتكـابـ هـذـاـ الفـعـلـ دونـ حـصـولـهـ عـلـىـ موـافـقـةـ مـنـ الـبرـلـانـمـانـ الـبـرـيـطـانـيـ).

هل يقبل عاقل أو من لديه القليل من القراءة على التفكير بأن القوات الحكومية السورية قد اختارت موعد وصول فريق الأمم المتحدة للتفتيش عن الأسلحة الكيميائية للقيام بشن هجوم كيميائي على متمردين يعيشون حالة من التراجع والانهيار يوماً إثر يوم ويغادرون من نكسة إثر أخرى في شتي ساحات القتال ويسيرون بشكل مضطرب نحو قدان التعاطف الدولي تجاههم جراء ما شهد العالم أجمع من أشرطة للفيديو تظهر لهم وهم يأكلون قلوب الجنود المقتولين ويقطعون رؤوس الكهنة المسيحيين بسكاكين المطبخ؟.

في الحالة التي تغيب بها الأدلة القاطعة، يتبعين علينا أن نعلم بأن النظام السوري ليس بالنظام الأحمق أو المتهور ليعدم إلى شن هجوم كيميائي في الوقت الذي أخذ الخطر بالانحسار مما كان عليه منذ سنة ولا اعتقاد البنتة بأن الحكم في سوريا قد فقد قدرته على التفكير المتوازن ليلاجأ لهذا الأسلوب.

ثمة دلائل ومؤشرات تؤكد بأن حركات التمرد القرفة التي تسيطر عليها الفصائل الأكثر تعصباً وتطرفًا في تنظيم القاعدة لديها أسبابها لاستخدام الأسلحة الكيميائية. وفي واقع الأمر فإن من يقف وراء تلك المجموعات لن يتوانى عن توفير كل ما تحتاجه لتحقيق أهدافها.

لدى الولايات المتحدة تاريخ طويل في اللجوء إلى أفعال مماثلة بل وأسوأ منها ليس في جنوب شرق آسيا فحسب بل في العراق المجاور إبان عمليات القصف الفلوجة حيث تم قتل الآلاف جراء استخدام أنواع متعددة من الأسلحة الكيميائية.

من المؤكد بأن لدى إسرائيل كميات كبيرة من مخزون الأسلحة الكيميائية وقد سبق لها وأن استخدمتها ضد جيرانها في غزة وما على الغرب سوى العودة إلى صور غاز الفوسفور المنبعث في أجواء مدارس الأمم المتحدة والمستشفيات إبان عملية الرصاص المصوب وذلك جراء إطلاق قذائف تحمل ذلك النوع من المواد الكيميائية ومع ذلك لم نقف على شجب واستنكار امتلاكها تلك الأنواع من الأسلحة واستخدامها.

من المعلوم بأن أول من استخدم الأسلحة الكيميائية في منطقة الشرق الأوسط كانت بريطانيا التي اسقطت قذائف الغاز على قبائل عراقية في عشرينات القرن الماضي ثم عبرت حكومتها عن استغرابها وتساؤلها في البرلمان عن الأسباب الداعية لكل تلك الصدمة الهائلة إزاء هذا الأمر!

هل يعتقد أي فرد عاقل بأن الأنظمة الديكتاتورية في الخليج التي تملك النفط مثل المملكة العربية السعودية تتورع عن تقديم الأسلحة الكيميائية لمتمردين في سوريا؟ لاسيما إذا كان الهدف منها إيجاد المبررات لقوى الكبرى لشن حرب على هذا البلد.

هل ثمة من يعتقد بأن المسلحين المتمردين في سوريا الذين ظهرت فظائعهم البشعة بشكل كثير وكبير على اليوتيوب يتورعون عن استخدام تلك الأسلحة بغية تحقيق ذات الهدف؟

حتى الآن مازلنا نترقب بحذر قيام هجوم مباغت في هذا الصيف على دولة عربية أخرى من قبل قوى الاستعمار القديم ونعتقد بأنه في غضون صيف آخر ستتعرض دول إسلامية أيضاً لشن هجوم إجرامي من قبل شعوب أخرى تعيش على هذا الكوكب بتحريض من دول أخرى في العالم الإسلامي.

في حين الذي تُقدم به الأسلحة والأموال إلى حكومات يدعمها ويناصرها الغرب لأنها تسير في ركابه، نشاهد دماء تسيل مدراراً من شعوب دول أخرى جراء تدفق الأموال والأسلحة من ذات المصدر إلى الفئات المتمردة في تلك الدول نتيجة رفضها الانصياع لرغبات ومطالب الغرب.

## (5) Aleppo: What's Left Behind

*All but the poorest and most dedicated Aleppines have fled the city after three years of war. This is the story of those who stayed.*

Written by: Hannah Lucinda Smith

On: Saturday, 5 Apr, 2014

<http://www.aawsat.net/2014/04/article55330826>

Aleppo, *Asharq Al-Awsat*—There were so many things that felt wrong on the road into Aleppo. We sped along the highway, swerving to avoid the potholes and then swerving again to avoid the oncoming cars, past the scorched date palms and the vehicle carcasses that were a reminder of what might happen if you didn't go fast enough, or if it was just your unlucky day. Past the underfed cats that picked through the rubble of

5 apartment blocks that had had their facades blasted off and now spilled their innards onto the streets, showing patches of gaudy wallpaper and the remnants of tea sets and furniture. Past the street stalls that had been blasted into bizarre twisted skeletons, and past the piles of garbage that smoldered in the weak afternoon sunshine. But when, finally, we spotted a few scattered groups of people on the streets, that was the most disturbing sight of all. All of them tilted their heads upwards and shielded their eyes from the glare 10 of the sun, helplessly watching the path of the helicopters and the fluffy trails of the MiG jets tracing across the sky.

Foreign journalists and opposition activists have been unable to enter Aleppo since last autumn due to a campaign of kidnapping and intimidation by a hardline Al-Qaeda-inspired group called the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). But in recent weeks the group has been pushed out of the city and the area of 15 countryside that stretches west to the Turkish border by a new rebel alliance called the Islamic Front. We were among the first journalists to re-enter Aleppo.

The people who had been terrorizing the city have gone, but there is barely a city left to terrorize any more. Since December, President Bashar Al-Assad's forces have littered the city with barrel bombs—crude incendiaries filled with TNT and shrapnel. They fall daily and indiscriminately from the helicopters that 20 hover above the city on civilian areas held by the rebels. Most of the people have now fled Aleppo, and many of those who have stayed have moved to the neighborhoods nearest the frontlines. Those districts have now, ironically, become the safest places in the city, because the barrel bombs are so inaccurate that the frontline areas are rarely targeted for fear that one should land on the regime-held side.

At the height of the bombardment, as representatives from Assad's regime attended the Geneva II peace 25 talks, around 30 barrel bombs were dropping on Aleppo every single day. “If one falls on an area that has one- or two-story buildings, it will destroy the whole street. If the buildings are high, eight floors for example, it can destroy two buildings, completely,” said Khaled Hajou. He is one of thirty volunteers in the city’s Civilian Defense Team, the only people in Aleppo on hand to attend the scenes of the bombings and dig the wounded out of the rubble.

30 The sum of their meager equipment fits onto a sofa. The team has no heavy diggers, and no communications equipment. When the bombs fall they have to find their way to the scene by following the sound and the column of smoke, and once they get there they have to dig with their hands. It can take up to a week just to search through the rubble of a single building. “There are a lot of people who are just missing. We have never been able to find them,” said Khaled.

35 As the city has emptied out the bombing has become less frequent, but up to 20 barrel bombs a day are still being dropped on Aleppo. Meanwhile, the jet attacks and shelling that have haunted the embattled residents of this city for the past 18 months are continuing unabated.

The people who have stayed in the rebel-controlled areas of the city are the very poorest: the people who 40 have no money to get out and no other places to go. The Aleppo Local Council estimates that around 20,000 families have lost their homes since the start of the barrel-bombing campaign. Some have escaped to regime-held areas of the city, but it is thought that around 7,500 families are still living under bombardment in the rebel-held districts. “They are completely poor,” a volunteer at a clothing handout told us. “We have around

500 families coming here every day to get new clothes. Most of them escaped from their homes without anything, just the clothes they were wearing.”

- 45 Um Mustafa, a mother of three who is living in the Fakdous neighborhood, explained why her family had stayed. “There are no other places to go to,” she said. “All the schools were closed two months ago because the regime started targeting them. The electricity is off and we can’t afford fuel for the generators.”

50 At the Bustan Al-Qasr crossing point, once a busy marketplace and the only place where families could cross between the rebel- and regime-held sides of the city, the street is deserted and echoing. The rebels controlling the area stopped letting people over the crossing point one month ago. “We banned people from crossing because of the snipers,” said Abu Yakoub, an 18-year-old rebel who works at a medical point near the crossing. “The regime allows people to cross here, but when they do they target them directly.” Just a few hours before we visited, a mother had ignored the rebels and tried to cross Bustan Al-Qasr with her young child. She was shot in her hip and her hand.

- 55 Food is still reaching the rebel-controlled areas of the city from the countryside to the west of the city, but medicines are in short supply. “There is nothing here, in the field hospitals or the pharmacies,” Abu Yakoub told us. “A lot of patients who need special medicines or treatments try to cross to the regime areas. But then the snipers shoot at them, and they have to come back.” The only way to cross between the two sides of this divided city is to take a bus that takes a nearby route, but it costs 2,000 pounds (around 14 US dollars) each way, making it far too expensive for most of the people here to use.

60 Although the frontlines in the dense residential neighborhoods in the center of the city have barely moved, Assad’s forces have retaken the Norkareen neighborhood and pushed into Sheikh Najjar, the vast industrial district on the northern outskirts of the city. That has left the rebels almost entirely encircled, with just two roads into the city—one from the west towards the Bab Al-Hawa border crossing and one to the north towards Bab As-Salaam—still under their control.

65 The regime forces are shelling the road daily, making the route into and out of the city deadly. Doctors at one of the city’s field clinics told us that they have no option but to move the most seriously injured patients out into Turkey, but that their ambulances often come under attack on the way. “It is not easy to get them to the border, the streets are not safe,” said one. “The road into Aleppo is always being targeted by the jet fighters.”

- 70 The city’s doctors say they have no exact figures on the number of people who have been killed and injured by barrel bombs in Aleppo over the past four months. “We have no documentation, and many people have died in the streets without coming to hospital,” one doctor told us. A recent report by Human Rights Watch estimated that 2,321 civilians have been killed in the campaign, but taking into account the people who are still missing, that figure is likely to be much higher.

75 Those who have escaped the city have found that most of the refugee camps that line the Turkish border are full to capacity. In Marea, a village close to Tel Rifat on the road that runs between Aleppo and the Bab As-Salaam crossing, more than a thousand people are living in a hastily constructed camp that has been funded by the local relief council and private donors. “I won’t go back to Aleppo; I have lost two children already and I won’t lose any more,” said Nesrin, a young mother of four. She said she was struggling to keep her children clean and her husband was finding it impossible to get work, but she could not foresee them moving anywhere else in the near future. There are just four bathrooms in the camp and no electricity, and the local volunteers working there told us they fear diseases could spread as the summer approaches.

80 Many of the people *Asharq Al-Awsat* spoke to in Aleppo expressed anger, not only towards the regime but also towards the Syrian National Coalition’s humanitarian wing, the Aid Co-ordination Unit, and the international aid organizations for failing to send assistance to those affected by the bombing. While the large NGOs pour money and manpower into the camps along the border, few are willing to enter into the country to help the people who are still trapped inside. The daunting task of dealing with Aleppo’s huge and continuing humanitarian crisis has largely been left to private donors and local volunteers.

90 “Nobody is supporting the people who are working inside Syria, they only support the people who are working in Turkey,” said Abdul Aziz, the leader of the Aleppo Local Council. “We need medicines, and equipment for the Civil Defense Team and to clean the streets, especially with the summer coming.”

## (٦) حلب «مدينة رعب».. والنظام يمطر سكانها بـ«البراميل المتفجرة»

«الشرق الأوسط» تدخل المدينة المقسمة بعد طرد «داعش» \* المجلس المحلي أكد أن أكثر من ٢٠ ألفاً فقدوا منازلهم

ترجمة: مجلة المجلة (لندن) بالتعاون مع صحيفة الشرق الأوسط اللندنية. (٥-٠٤-٢٠١٤)

<http://www.aawsat.com/details.asp?section=4&issueno=12912&article=767285&search=%D9%87%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%A7%20%D9%84%D9%88%D8%B3%D9%8A%D9%86%D8%AF%D8%A7%20%D8%B3%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%AB&state=true#.U05zOvldXtm>

كان هناك الكثير من الأشياء التي شعرنا بأنها تسير على نحو خاطئ طوال الطريق إلى حلب. كانت السيارة التي تقلا تسير بأقصى سرعة على ذلك الطريق، وكانت كثيرة ما تحرف لتجنب الحفر التي انتشرت على الطريق، ثم تحرف مرة أخرى لتفادي السيارة المقبلة في الاتجاه المعاكس، حيث تمر بجانب أشجار التينيل المحروقة وهياكل السيارات الأخرى التي تذكر السيارات التي تستخدم هذا الطريق بالصورة التي ربما تفاه إذا لم تسر بالسرعة المطلوبة، أو كان الأمر يتعلق فقط بسوء الحظ في هذا اليوم.

٥  
كانت السيارة تمر بجانب بعض القطط هزيلة الجسم التي تعثت في أنقاض المباني السكنية، التي دمرت واجهاتها فبرقت أحشاؤها إلى شوارع المدينة، ولويظهر ما بداخل الشقق من ورق حائط ذي اللوان زاهية وبقايا أواتي الشاي والأثاث. كما مررنا بجانب الأكشاك، المقاومة في الشوارع، والتي تحولت بسبب القصف إلى مجرد هيكل ملتوية، وأكوام القمامات التي تتضاعد منها الأدخنة بسبب شمس ما بعد الظهرة. غير أنه وعندما رصدنا أخيراً مجموعات قليلة من الناس في الشوارع، كان مرآهم هو ما أحدث الاختلاف في ذلك المشهد. كانوا جميعاً يمليون برؤوسهم لأعلى ويستعملون أكفهم لحماية عيونهم من وهج أشعة الشمس، ويشاهدون، وهو لا حول لهم ولا قوة، أسراب الطائرات المروحية وطائرات مigung وهي تخر عباب السماء.

١٠  
لم يكن باستطاعة الصحافيون الأجانب أو نشطاء المعارضة دخول حلب منذ الخريف الماضي بسبب حملة الاختطاف والترهيب التي كان يمارسها تنظيم الدولة الإسلامية في العراق والشام (داعش) المتشدد التابع لتنظيم القاعدة. غير أنه خلال الأسبوع الأخير، استطاع تحالف جديد من المتمردين يسمى «الجبهة الإسلامية» طرد تنظيم داعش من المدينة والمناطق الريفية التي تمتد غرباً حتى الحدود السورية - التركية. وعليه، كنا من بين أولئك الصحافيين الذين استطاعوا دخول حلب مرة أخرى.

١٥  
لقد ذهب أولئك الذين كانوا ينشرون الرعب والإرهاب في المدينة، غير أنه لم تبق مدينة واحدة لا تختر الرعب في أنحاء سوريا. ومنذ شهر ديسمبر (كانون الأول)، ما برحت قوات الأسد تمطر المدينة بوابل من البراميل المتفجرة والقنابل الحارقة المليئة بمادة «تي إن تي» والأدوات المتفجرة المتشظية. وتقوم المروحيات، التي تحلق بشكل دائم في سماء المدينة، بإلقاء تلك البراميل والقنابل بشكل يومي وعشوائي على المناطق المدنية التي يسيطر عليها المتمردون. وقد فر معظم السكان من مدينة حلب، وانتقل الذين بقوا هناك إلى المناطق القرية من خطوط المواجهة الأمامية. وعليه، فقد أصبحت تلك الأحياء الآن، ويا للسخرية، هي المناطق الأكثر أماناً في المدينة، حيث إن عملية إلقاء القنابل والبراميل لا تتم بشكل دقيق، بحيث نادراً ما يجري استهداف خطوط المواجهة الأمامية خوفاً من أن تسقط تلك البراميل على المدن التي تسقط عليها قوات النظام.

٢٥  
في ذروة عمليات القصف التي كانت تتم في نفس الوقت الذي كان يحضر فيه ممثلون عن نظام الأسد مؤتمر جنيف ٢، كانت المروحيات تلقي نحو ٣٠ برميلاً متقدراً يومياً على مدينة حلب. يقول خالد حجو «إذا سقط برميل متقدراً في إحدى المناطق التي تضم مبني ذات طابق واحد أو طابقين، يدمّر هذا البرميل الشارع عن بكرة أبيه. أما إذا سقط البرميل على مبني سكني يتالف من ثمانية طوابق، فسيلحق الضرار بمبنيين آخرين». وخالد هو عضو في فريق الدفاع المدني، الذي يضم ثلاثين شخصاً ويعتبر الجهة الوحيدة التي تستطيع الحصول إلى مسرح التفجيرات لتساعد الضحايا وتستخرج الجرحى من تحت الانقاض.

٣٠  
يضع فريق خالد معداته القليلة على أريكة صغيرة. لا يمتلك الفريق معدات ثقيلة للحفر أو أجهزة اتصالات. وعندما تسقط البراميل المقبلة، يتوجب على أعضاء الفريق أن يذهبوا إلى مسرح الأحداث من خلال اتباع الأصوات وأعمدة الدخان المنبعثة من مكان الحادث، وبمجرد وصولهم إلى هناك يبدأون في الحفر باستخدام أدبيتهم حتى ينقذوا ما يمكن إنقاذه. وبسبب نقص المعدات اللازمة، يمكن أن يستغرق الأمر أسبوعاً كاملاً للبحث في أنقاض مبني واحد. يقول خالد «هناك الكثيرون يفقدون ببساطة تحت الأنقاض، لأننا لا نستطيع الوصول إليهم».

٤٥  
ومع أن خلت المدينة من سكانها، قلت عمليات إلقاء البراميل المقبلة، غير أن قوات النظام ما زالت تقصف حلب بما يقرب من ٢٠ برميلاً يومياً. وفي الوقت نفسه، ما زالت الغارات، التي تشنها الطائرات، وعمليات القصف، التي حاصرت سكان المدينة خلال الأشهر التالية عشرة الماضية، مستمرة بلا هوادة. أما الذين بقوا في المناطق، التي يسيطر عليها المتمردون في حلب، فهم أشد الناس فقراً، حيث لا يملكون المال للخروج من المدينة، كما أنه ليست هناك أي أماكن أخرى يمكنهم الفرار إليها. ويقدر المجلس المحلي لمدينة حلب عدد الأسر، التي فقدت منازلها منذ بداية إلقاء البراميل المقبلة، بـ٢٠ ألف أسرة. وقد هرب البعض إلى المناطق التي تقع تحت سيطرة نظام الأسد، غير أنه يعتقد أن نحو ٧ آلاف و٥٠٠ أسرة ما زالوا يعيشون تحت نيران القصف في المناطق التي يسيطر عليها المتمردون. يقول أحد المتطوعين، الذي يقوم بتوزيع الملابس «هناك نحو ٥٠٠ أسرة تأتي إلى هنا كل

٤٠ يوم للحصول على ملابس جديدة. هرب معظم السكان من منازلهم من دون أن يحملوا أي شيء معهم، باستثناء الملابس التي كانوا يرتدونها».

أم مصطفى، أم لثلاثة أولاد يعيشون في حي فكوس، تشرح لماذا بقىت أسرتها في حلب. تقول أم مصطفى «ليست هناك أماكن أخرى نذهب إليها، فقد جرى إغلاق جميع المدارس قبل شهرين عندما بدأت قوات النظام في استهدافها. لا توجد كهرباء، ولا يمكننا تحمل نفقات الوقود لتشغيل مولدات الطاقة». عند معبر حي بستان القصر، الذي كان في يوم من الأيام سوقاً مزدحمة والمكان الوحيد الذي يمكن أن تعبّر الأسر من خلاله بين مناطق المتمردين والنظام في المدينة، يبدو الشارع مهجوراً وخالياً تماماً. توقف المتمردون، الذين يسيطرون على المنطقة، عن السماح للناس بعبور المعبر منذ شهر مضى. يقول أبو يعقوب (١٨ عاماً)، أحد المتمردين الذين يعملون في النقطة الطبية قرب المعبر «منعنا الناس من العبور بسبب القاصفة، حيث يسمح النظام للناس بالعبور من هنا، غير أن قواته تبدأ في استهدافهم بعدما يمرون مباشرة. وقبل زيارتنا للمدينة بساعات قليلة تجاهلت إحدى الأمهات المتمردة وحاولت عبور بستان القصر مع أطفالها الثلاثة، لكنها أصيبت بطريق ناري في قدمها ويدها».

٥٠ ولا يزال الطعام يصل إلى المناطق، التي تقع تحت سيطرة المتمردين، من المناطق الريفية الواقعة غرب حلب، لكن المدينة تعاني نقصاً في الأدوية. يضيف أبو يعقوب «لا توجد أي أدوية هنا، سواء في المستشفيات الميدانية أو الصيدليات. ويحاول الكثير من المرضى، الذين يحتاجون إلى علاجات خاصة، العبور إلى المناطق التي يسيطر عليها النظام، لكن سرعان ما يستهدفهم القاصفة ويقتلون نيرانهم عليهم، وعليه يتوجب عليهم العودة مرة أخرى». أما السبيل الوحيد للعبور بين شطري المدينة المقسمة فهو عن طريق ركوب حافة تسير في طريق قريبة من هنا، لكن الأمر يتطلب ألفي ليرة في كل اتجاه، مما يجعل الأمر مكلفاً للغاية بالنسبة لمعظم الناس هنا».

٥٥ وعلى الرغم من أن خطوط المواجهة الأمامية في الأحياء كثيفة السكان تغيرت مواقعها قليلاً، فقد استعادت قوات الأسد سيطرتها على حي نوركرين وتغلبت في حي الشيخ نجار، وهو حي صناعي كبير يقع الضواحي الشمالية للمدينة. وقد أدى ذلك إلى تطويق قوات الأسد لمناطق المتمردين، الذين لم يتبق لهم سوى طريقين تحت سيطرتهم يؤديان إلى المدينة، أحدهما يقع في الغرب باتجاه معبر باب الهوى الحدودي والآخر إلى الشمال باتجاه معبر باب السلامة.

٦٠ وتقوم قوات النظام بتصفيف الطريقين يومياً، مما يجعل الطريقين من وإلى المدينة سبيلاً سهلاً للموت. وقد أخبرنا الأطباء العاملون في أحد المستشفيات الميدانية بأنهم ليس لديهم خيار سوى نقل المرضى ذوي الإصابات الأشد خطورة إلى تركيا، لكن سيارات الإسعاف تتعرض أيضاً لتصفيف في طريقها إلى الحدود. يقول أحد الأطباء «ليس من السهل إيصال الجرحى إلى الحدود، فالشوارع ليست آمنة بما فيه الكفاية. كما أن الطريق المؤدي إلى حلب غالباً ما يجري استهدافه من قبل مقاتلات النظام».

٦٥ يقول أطباء المدينة إنهم ليست لديهم إحصائيات دقيقة عن عدد الأشخاص الذين لقوا مصرعهم أو أصيبوا بجروح قصوى حلب بالبراميل المتفجرة على مدى الأشهر الأربعة الماضية. يقول أحد الأطباء «ليست لدينا أي عمليات توثيق للإصابات، وكثير من الناس لقوا حتفهم في الشوارع بسبب عدم نقاومهم إلى المستشفيات». غير أن تقريراً حديثاً صدر عن منظمة «هيومان رايتس ووتش» قدر عدد المدنيين الذين قتلوا حتى الآن بسبب البراميل المتفجرة بنحو ٢٣٢١ مدنياً، غير أنه ومع الوضع في الاعتبار الأشخاص الذين ما زالوا في عداد المفقودين، فمن المرجح أن يكون عدد المصابين أعلى بكثير من هذا الرقم.

٧٠ وقد وجد الذين استطاعوا الهروب من المدينة أن غالبية مخيمات اللاجئين، التي تقع على الحدود مع تركيا، ممتلئة عن آخرها. ففي بلدة مارع، وهي قرية قريبة من تل رفعت على الطريق الذي يمتد بين حلب ومعبر باب السلامة، هناك أكثر من ألف شخص يعيشون في مخيم جرت إقامته على وجه السرعة بتمويل من مجلس الإغاثة المحلي والمتربي عن من القطاع الخاص. تقول نسرين، وهي أم شابة لأربعة أطفال «لن أعود إلى حلب، لقد فقد اثنان من أبنائي بالفعل ولا أريد أن أفقد الباقين». وتضيف نسرين أنها تكافح من أجل الحفاظ على النظافة الشخصية لأطفالها، وأن زوجها يجد من الصعوبة الحصول على عمل، لكنها لا تستطيع أن تتنبأ بما إذا كانوا سينتقلون إلى أي مكان آخر في المستقبل القريب أم لا، مضيفة «يضم المخيم أربعة حمامات فقط، كما لا توجد كهرباء. وقد أخبرنا المتطوعون المحليون، الذين يعيشون في المخيم، بأنهم يخشون من انتشار الأمراض مع اقتراب فصل الصيف».

٧٥ وأعرب العديد من الأشخاص، الذين تحدثنا إليهم في حلب، عن غضبهم، ليس فقط تجاه النظام، لكن أيضاً تجاه وحدة تنسيق الدعم (الجهة الإنسانية التابعة للائتلاف الوطني السوري) وكذلك منظمات الإغاثة الدولية، بسبب فشلها في إرسال المساعدات للمتضاربين من عمليات القصف. وفي الوقت الذي تقوم فيه المنظمات غير الحكومية بضخ الأموال والقوى العاملة في مخيمات اللاجئين، المقادمة على طول الحدود، قليلون هم الذين على استعداد للدخول إلى المدينة لتقديم المساعدة لسكانها، الذين ما زالوا محاصرين هناك. وقد تركت المهمة الشاقة في التعامل مع الأزمة الإنسانية الصخمة والمستمرة في حلب للمتربي عن من القطاع الخاص والمتطوعين المحليين. يقول عبد العزيز، رئيس المجلس المحلي في حلب «لا أحد يدعم الذين يعملون في سوريا، فالدعم يتوافر فقط لمن يعملون في مخيمات اللاجئين في تركيا. إننا بحاجة إلى أدوية ومعدات لفريق الدفاع المدني من أجل تنظيف الشوارع، لا سيما مع اقتراب فصل الصيف».

## (7) Is Syria Finished?

Also reproduced with permission in REAL CLEAR WORLD: ([http://www.realclearworld.com/static/about\\_us.html](http://www.realclearworld.com/static/about_us.html)) on July 18, 2013: [http://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2013/07/18/is\\_syria\\_finished\\_105326.html](http://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2013/07/18/is_syria_finished_105326.html)

**If Washington doesn't help contain Syria's civil war, the whole region could plunge into chaos.**

**By Dennis Ross**

**July 18, 2013**

<https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/is-syria-finished>

What was supposed to be the Syrian phase of the so-called "Arab Spring" has evolved into one of the greatest tragedies of the 21st century. The once-peaceful opposition to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's deeply entrenched and powerful Ba'ath Party regime has escalated into armed resistance and, finally, a brutal civil war -- one that has now claimed close to 100,000 lives. This escalation

5 poses a serious threat, not just to Syria's neighbors, but -- given the existence of chemical weapons in Syria -- to the international community as well.

The United States, like other nations supportive of the Syrian opposition, has chosen to act, but to do so primarily through diplomatic and economic means. Its hesitancy to take more direct action is understandable given the fractious nature of the opposition, but the cost of failing to influence the

10 balance of power between the opposition and the Syrian regime could be high. I say this not only because of the horrific humanitarian toll that is being exacted, but also because the conflict is almost certain to spread to all of Syria's neighbors. Meanwhile, Assad, confident of his military strength and with support from Iran and Hezbollah, continues to wage war on his own people in what has now become an overtly sectarian conflict.

15 At this stage, it might appear almost too late for the United States to have an influence on the Syrian crisis. To be sure, providing small amounts of lethal assistance will not have much impact on the situation. Iran and Hezbollah are determined to keep Assad in power, even to the point of using their own forces. As such, the U.S. will need to do more to make sure that the provision of lethal assistance can affect the balance of power. This will require actually assuming responsibility for

20 managing the whole assistance effort to the opposition.

This will not be easy. It will require coordinating all the disparate sources of support on the outside -- from Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, Britain, and France -- and ensuring that all money, training, weapons, and non-lethal and humanitarian assistance are channeled in a complementary and cooperative fashion.

25 There should be no illusions: Should the U.S. take over the management of the assistance effort -- something that will require a serious investment of time and political capital on the part of the administration -- transforming the situation and the balance of power will take time, and is not a given at this point.

Top of Form

30 Bottom of Form

After all, the Syrian opposition remains fragmented despite the formation of a Syrian National Coalition last year. Moreover, the Jihadist elements, having received the most money and arms, retain the upper hand within the opposition, at least at this juncture. To help influence a positive outcome, then, the U.S. administration would need to ensure that all assistance is going only to those who are committed to a non-sectarian, inclusive Syria. These groups are at a disadvantage now, and, even if they are given the kind of assistance and training that they need, it will take time before they are able to exploit it.

The larger point here is that the U.S., and others that support the opposition, need to have a clear objective. Providing more material assistance, including weapons, in a more systematic and coordinated fashion is a means to altering the balance of power on the ground, and that is the only way a politically negotiated transition can become possible.

That is the hope, and it remains a long shot at the moment. Not only must the opposition become more credible and less divided, but the international coalition that supports the opposition must itself become more unified and provide determined and consistent support to those fighting the Assad regime. Even if some sort of political agreement became possible, it would need to be enforced by an international peacekeeping presence.

If a political resolution to the situation seems like an increasingly forlorn objective, how can the United States respond to the ever more probable outcome that Syria will simply fall apart? Assad, whatever he believes, is not going to succeed. He may continue to control certain areas within Syria for a while, but a fragmentation of the country is more likely. Such a deterioration would pose a threat to the international community as a whole: Not only might al-Qaeda embed itself in what would effectively be a failed state, but the loss of control over Syria's chemical weapons could have catastrophic implications for everyone. If the situation does worsen along these lines, Syria as we have known it for decades will cease to exist.

At a minimum, assuming that a political solution proves impossible, we need to have a fallback strategy of containment that aims to build a buffer zone in and around Syria. While this is not a very satisfactory approach, the fragmentation of Syria cannot be allowed to destabilize the whole region.

*Dennis Ross is counselor at The Washington Institute.*

## (8) هل انتهت سورية؟

دين روس. ريال كلير بوليتكس: ٢٠١٣/٧/١٨

ترجمة: قسم الترجمة في مركز الشرق العربي (لندن): ٢٠١٣/٧/٢٤

[ad-id!3605.ks](http://www.asharqalarabi.org.uk/ad-id!3605.ks)

ما كان من المفترض أن يكون مرحلة سورية من مراحل ما يطلق عليه "الربيع العربي" انتهى به المطاف إلى أن يكون أحد أعظم مأساة القرن العشرين. المعارضة التي كانت سلية يوماً ما لنظام حزب البعث الراسخ والقوى برئاسة بشار الأسد تطورت إلى مقاومة مسلحة، وفي النهاية إلى حرب أهلية بشعة، وصل عدد ضحاياها إلى ما يقرب من ١٠٠٠٠٠ قتيل. هذا التصعيد يفرض خطراً داهماً، ليس لجيران سوريا فقط، ولكن - وبالنظر إلى وجود الأسلحة الكيماوية في سوريا - للمجتمع الدولي برمته أيضاً.

الولايات المتحدة، مثل الدول الأخرى الداعمة للمعارضة السورية، اختارت أن تعمل، من خلال الوسائل الدبلوماسية والاقتصادية. ترددتها في اتخاذ إجراءات مباشرة أمر مفهوم بالنظر إلى انقسام المعارضة، ولكن كلفة الفشل في التأثير على توازن القوة ما بين المعارضة والنظام السوري سوف تكون مكلفة. أقول هذا ليس بسبب الحسائر البشرية المروعة فقط، ولكن لأن الصراع سوف يتمتد إلى جميع جيران سوريا على الأرجح. في هذه الأثناء، الأسد، وانقا بقدرته العسكرية ودعم إيران وحزب الله سوف يستمر في شن الحرب على شعبه فيما انقلب الآن إلى صراع طائفى.

في هذه المرحلة، ربما يبدو أن الوقت فات لكي يكون للولايات المتحدة أي تأثير على الأزمة السورية. ولمزيد من التأكيد فإن تقديم عدد قليل من الأسلحة الفتاكـة لن يكون له ذلك الأثر على الوضع هناك. إيران وحزب الله مصممون على إبقاء الأسد في السلطة، حتى لو تطلب الأمر استخدام قواتهم. على هذا النحو، على الولايات المتحدة القيام بالمزيد لضمان أن تقديم الأسلحة الفتاكـة يمكن أن يكون له أثر على توازن القوى. وهذا يتطلب في الواقع تحمل مسؤولية إدارة جميع جهود المساعدة المقدمة للمعارضة.

هذا الأمر لن يكون سهلاً. إذ سوف يتطلب تنسيق جميع مصادر الدعم المختلفة من الخارج - من السعودية وقطر وتركيا والإمارات وبريطانيا وفرنسا - وضمان أن جميع الأموال والتدريب والسلاح والمساعدات الإنسانية غير الفتاكـة توجه بطريقة تكمالية وتعاونية. ينبغي أن لا يكون أمامنا أية أوهام، إذا كانت الولايات المتحدة تريد تحمل مسؤولية جهود المساعدة - وهو أمر يتطلب استثماراً جاداً في الوقت ورأس المال السياسي من جانب الإدارة. فإن تغيير الوضع وتوازن القوى حاجة إلى وقت، وهو ليس بالأمر المسلم به في الوقت الحالي.

بعد كل شيء، المعارضة السورية لا زالت منقسمة على الرغم من تشكيل التحالف الوطني السوري العام الماضي. علاوة على ذلك، العناصر الجهادية، التي تتلقى معظم المال والسلاح، هي التي تملك اليد العليا بين صفوف المعارضة، على الأقل في هذه المرحلة. المساعدة على التأثير في الحصول على نتيجة إيجابية، فإن الولايات المتحدة بحاجة إلى ضمان أن جميع المساعدات تتجه إلى الجهات غير الطائفية في سوريا. هذه الجماعات في وضع غير جيد حالياً، وحتى لو أعطوا المساعدات والتدريب الذي يحتاجونه، فإن ذلك يتطلب وقتاً قبل أن يكونوا قادرين على استغلال ذلك.

النقطة الأهم هنا هي أن الولايات المتحدة والأخرين الذين يدعمون المعارضة، بحاجة إلى أن يكون لديهم هدف واضح. تقديم المزيد من المساعدات المادية بما فيها السلاح، بطريقة أكثر منهجة وتنسيق أكبر تعتمد بمثابة وسائل لتغيير توازن القوى على الأرض، وهذه الطريقة الوحيدة التي يمكن من خلالها الوصول إلى مرحلة انتقالية تفاوضية.

هذا هو الأمل، ولكنه لا زال بعيد المنال حالياً. ليس على المعارضة أن تكون أكثر مصداقية وتوحداً فقط، ولكن على التحالف الدولي الذي يدعم المعارضة نفسه أن يتوحد بصورة أفضل وأن يقوم دعماً أكثر اتساقاً لأولئك الذين يقاتلون نظام الأسد. حتى لو أصبح نوع ما من الاتفاق السياسي أمر محتمل، فإنه سوف يكون بحاجة إلى أن يعزز بوجود قوات حفظ سلام دولية.

إذا بدا الوصول إلى حل سياسي هدفاً بعيد المنال، فكيف يمكن للولايات المتحدة أن تتعامل مع النتيجة الأكثر احتمالاً وهي أن سوريا سوف تنقسم إلى أجزاء؟ الأسد، بغض النظر مما يعتقد، لن ينجح. قد يستمر في السيطرة على مناطق معينة داخل سوريا لوقت ما، ولكن تجزأ البلاد أصبح أمراً محتملاً. من شأن مثل هذا التدهور أن يشكل خطاً على المجتمع الدولي برمته؛ ليس وجود القاعدة فقط هو ما سيجعل سوريا دولة فاشلة، ولكن فقدان السيطرة على السلاح الكيماوي في سوريا يمكن أن يكون له تداعيات كارثية على الجميع. إذا ساء الوضع على طول هذه الخطوط، فإن سوريا التي كنا نعرفها منذ عقود لن تعود موجودة.

على الأقل، وعلى افتراض استحالة الوصول إلى حل سياسي، يجب أن يكون لدى الولايات المتحدة إستراتيجية احتواء بديلة تهدف إلى إنشاء منطقة عازلة في حول سوريا. في حين أن هذا الأسلوب لا يحوز على الرضا الكافي، إلا أنه لا يمكن السماح بتفتت سوريا وبالتالي زعزعة استقرار جميع أنحاء المنطقة.

(٩) هل انتهى أمر سوريا؟  
ترجمة: معهد واشنطن (الولايات المتحدة)

<https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/ar/policy-analysis/view/is-syria-finished>

دينيس روس. ذي مارك نيوز. ١٥ تموز/يوليو ٢٠١٣

إن ما كان من المفترض أن يكون الوجه السوري لما يسمى بـ "الربيع العربي" قد تحول إلى واحدة من أكثر المأساة في القرن الحادي والعشرين. فقد تصاعدت حدة المعارضة - التي كانت سلية في يوم من الأيام - ضد نظام حزب البعث الراسخ والقوى تحت قيادة الرئيس السوري بشار الأسد إلى أن أصبحت مقاومة مسلحة، وأخيراً إلى حرب أهلية وحشية حصدت حتى الآن ما يقرب من 100,000 شخص. ويشكل هذا التصعيد تهديداً خطيراً، ليس لجيران سوريا فحسب، بل - نظراً لوجود الأسلحة الكيميائية في سوريا - إلى المجتمع الدولي أيضاً.

وقد اختارت الولايات المتحدة، مثلها مثل الدول الأخرى التي تدعم المعارضة السورية، التحرك، لكن بصفة أساسية من خلال وسائل دبلوماسية واقتصادية. ورغم أن ترددتها في اتخاذ إجراءات أكثر مباشرة أمراً مفهوماً نظراً للطبيعة المنقسمة للمعارضة، إلا أن تكفة العجز عن التأثير على توازن القوى بين المعارضة والنظام السوري قد يكون مرتفعاً. وأقول هذا ليس بسبب الخسائر البشرية المرهقة التي يجري حصدها، ولكن أيضاً لأنه بات من شبه المؤكد أن يتنتشر الصراع إلى جميع الدول المجاورة لسوريا. وفي الوقت نفسه، يواصل الأسد - الواثق من قوته العسكرية والدعم الذي يحصل عليه من إيران و «حزب الله» - شن حرب على شعبه فيما أصبح صراعاً طائفياً واضحاً.

وفي هذه المرحلة، ربما يبدو وكأن الوقت قد فات بحيث لا تستطيع الولايات المتحدة أن تؤثر على الأزمة السورية. وبقينا، إن تزويده كميات صغيرة من المساعدات الفتاكة سوف لن يكون لها تأثير كبير على الوضع. في إيران و «حزب الله» عازمان على إبقاء الأسد في السلطة، حتى إلى حد استخدام قواتهما الخاصة. وعلى هذا النحو، سوف تحتاج الولايات المتحدة إلى بذل المزيد من الجهد للتأكد من أن توفير المساعدات الفتاكة يمكن أن يؤثر على توازن القوى. وسوف يتطلب هذا فعلياً تحمل مسؤولية إدارة مساعي تقديم المساعدات بصورة كلية إلى المعارضة.

ولن يكون هذا سهلاً؛ إذ سوف يتطلب الأمر تنسيق كافة مصادر الدعم المتباينة في الخارج - من المملكة العربية السعودية وقطر وتركيا والإمارات العربية المتحدة وبريطانيا وفرنسا - والتأكد من تحويل كافة المساعدات المالية والتدريبات والأسلحة والمساعدات غير الفتاكة والإنسانية بطريقة تكاملية وتعاونية.

ولا ينبغي أن تكون هناك أية أوهام أو انتظارات خاطئة: إذ لو تولت الولايات المتحدة إدارة مساعي تقديم المساعدات - الأمر الذي سيتطلب استئجاراً جدياً من الوقت ورأس المال السياسي من جانب الإدارة الأمريكية - فإن تحويل الوضع وميزان القوى سوف يستغرق بعض الوقت، وهذا أمراً ليس مسلماً به في هذه المرحلة.

وفي النهاية، لا تزال المعارضة السورية منقسمة رغم تشكيل "الائتلاف الوطني لقوى المعارضة والثورة السورية" العام الماضي. وعلاوة على ذلك، تختنق العناصر الجهادية، بعد تلقيها أكبر قدر من المال والسلاح، باليد العليا داخل المعارضة، على الأقل في هذه المرحلة. وفي سبيل المساعدة في إحداث نتيجة إيجابية، سوف تحتاج الإدارة الأمريكية إلى ضمان ذهاب جميع المساعدات - فقط إلى من هم ملتزمون ببناء سوريا غير طائفية ومتعددة للجميع. وهذه الجماعات هي في وضع غير مواتٍ الآن، وحتى إذا ما أتيح لها ذلك النوع من المساعدات والتدريبات التي تحتاجها، فسوف يستغرق الأمر وقتاً طويلاً قبل أن تكون قادرة على استغلالها.

والنقطة الأهم هنا هي أن الولايات المتحدة، وغيرها من الجهات التي تدعم المعارضة، تحتاج إلى تحديد هدف واضح. إن توفير المزيد من المساعدات المادية - بما في ذلك الأسلحة - بطريقة أكثر منهجية وتنسقاً هو وسيلة لتغيير ميزان القوى على الأرض، وهذا هو السبيل الوحيد الذي يصبح من خلاله التحول السياسي التفاوضي أمراً ممكناً.

إن هذا هو الأمل، لكنه يبقى أمراً بعيد المنال في الوقت الراهن. فليس فقط يجب أن تصبح المعارضة أكثر مصداقية وأقل انقساماً، بل يجب على التحالف الدولي الذي يدعم المعارضة أن يصبح نفسه أكثر توحداً ويوفر دعماً متواصلاً لأولئك الذين يحاربون نظام الأسد. وحتى لو أمكن الوصول إلى نوع من الاتفاق السياسي، فسوف يلزم تفيذه توافق قوات دولية لحفظ السلام.

ولو بدا أن التوصل إلى حل سياسي للأزمة أصبح هدفاً مeworthyاً منه بشكل متزايد، فكيف يمكن للولايات المتحدة أن تستجيب للنتيجة الأكثر احتمالاً وهي تصدع سوريا وأنهيارها؟ وبغض النظر عما يعتقده الأسد [حول إمكانية سيطرته على الأوضاع بصورة كاملة] فلن ينجح بذلك. وربما يواصل السيطرة على مناطق معينة داخل سوريا لفترة من الزمن، إلا أن تقسيم البلاد أصبح أمراً أكثر احتمالاً. ومثل هذا التدهور سوف يشكل تهديداً للمجتمع الدولي بأسره: فلن يسعى تنظيم «القاعدة» إلى إيجاد موطئ قدم له فيما قد تصبح فعلياً دولة فاشلة فحسب، ولكن فقدان السيطرة على الأسلحة الكيميائية في سوريا يمكن أن تكون له آثار كارثية على الجميع. وإذا ازداد الوضع سوءاً بصورة مماثلة، فلن تكون هناك دولة اسمها سوريا كما نعرفها منذ عقود. وعلى أقل تقدير، إذا افترض أنه سيكون من المستحيل قيام حل سياسي، فستحتاج الولايات المتحدة إلى اتباع استراتيجية احتواء بديلة تهدف إلى إقامة منطقة عازلة في سوريا وحولها. وفي حين أن ذلك ليس نموذجاً مرضياً للغاية، إلا أنه لا يمكن السماح لسوريا المشرذمة أن تزعزع استقرار المنطقة بأسرها.

دينيس روس هو مستشار في معهد واشنطن.

A "Smarter" War?

## (10) How Obama Chose War Over Peace in Syria

By SHAMUS COOKE

Counter Punch Weekend Edition March 29-31, 2013

<http://www.counterpunch.org/2013/03/29/how-obama-chose-war-over-peace-in-syria/>

With Syria on the brink of national genocide, outside nations have only two options: help reverse the catastrophe or plunge this torn nation deeper into the abyss. Countries can either work towards a peaceful political solution or they can continue to pour money, guns, and fighters into the country to ensure a steady gushing into the bloodbath.

- 5 President Obama will have no talk of peace. He has chosen war since the very start and he's sticking to it. A recent New York Times article revealed that President Obama has been lying through his teeth about the level of U.S. involvement in the Syrian conflict since the beginning.

- 10 The President recently said that the U.S. government continues to give only "non-lethal" military aid to the rebels, but The New York Times revealed that the CIA has been actively funneling and distributing massive shipments of weapons to the rebels over the borders of Jordan and Turkey.

This "arms pipeline" of illegal gun trafficking has been overseen by the U.S. government since January 2012. It has literally been the lifeblood of the Syrian "rebels," and thus the cause of the immense bloodshed in Syria.

The New York Times reports:

- 15 "The C.I.A. role in facilitating the [weapons] shipments... gave the United States a degree of influence over the process [of weapon distribution]...American officials have confirmed that senior White House officials were regularly briefed on the [weapons] shipments."

The article also explains that a "conservative estimate" of the weapons shipment to date is "3,500 tons."

- 20 So while Obama has repeatedly lied about "non-lethal" military aid, he has been personally involved in overseeing a multi-country flood of weapons into Syria, many of which are given to terrorist organizations. The only effective fighting force for the Syrian rebels has been the terrorist grouping the Al Nusra Front, and now we know exactly where they got their guns.

- 25 If not for this U.S.-sponsored flood of guns, the Syrian rebels — many of them from Saudi Arabia and other countries — would have been militarily defeated long ago. Tens of thousands of lives would thus have been spared and a million refugees could have remained in their homes in Syria. The large scale ethnic-religious cleansing initiated by the rebels would have been preventable.

- 30 But Obama is so intent on war that he will not even discuss peace with the Syrian government. He has repeatedly stated that there are "preconditions" for peace negotiations, the most important one being the downfall of the Syrian government, i.e., regime change. If a toppling of a nation's government is Obama's precondition for peace, then Obama is by definition choosing war.

Never mind that Syria is a sovereign nation that should not have to worry about a foreign country making demands as to who is in power. Obama doesn't seem to think this relevant. In fact, his administration has been very busy determining who the "legitimate" government of Syria is, by hand picking the "National Coalition of Syrian Revolution," the prime minister of which is a U.S. citizen.

One of the preconditions for being on Obama's National Coalition of Syrian Revolution is that there be no peace negotiations with the Syrian government. Of course most Syrians want to immediately end the conflict in Syria, since it threatens an Iraq-like destruction of the country.

The most popular leader of the National Coalition of Syrian Revolution, Moaz al-Khatib, recently quit in protest because he was prohibited from pursuing peace negotiations by the U.S.-appointed opposition Prime Minister, Ghassan Hitto, a U.S. citizen who had lived in the U.S. for the previous 30 years.

45 The Guardian reports:

"Immediately after his nomination as interim [Prime Minister], Ghassan Hitto [U.S. citizen], had distanced himself from Al-Khatib's willingness to negotiate with elements of the Assad regime in a bid to bring an end to the civil war."

50 By appointing Hitto as the leader of the opposition, Obama has splintered the already-splintered opposition while making "no peace negotiations" the official policy of the U.S.-backed opposition, the so-called "legitimate" government of Syria.

55 Obama also recently pressured the Arab League — composed of regimes loyal to the United States — to install as a member the hand-picked National Coalition of Syrian Revolution as the official government of Syria. The appointment didn't give as much credibility to the opposition as much as it degraded the Arab League's legitimacy.

The rebel's seat in the Arab league implies, again, that the U.S. and its allies are fully intent on "regime change," no matter how many people die, no matter the existing political alternatives. They will not reverse course.

60 The Russian government called the Arab League membership decision "... an open encouragement of the [rebel] forces which, unfortunately, continue to bet on a military solution in Syria, not looking at multiplying day by day the pain and suffering of the Syrians.... Moscow is convinced that only a political settlement and not encouraging destructive military scenarios, can stop the bloodshed and bring peace and security to all Syrians in their country."

65 Obama has rejected both Russian and Syrian calls for peace negotiations in recent months, as he has greatly increased the frequency of the weapons trafficking plan. Reuters reports on the Obama Administration's reaction to peace proposals from Russia and Syria:

"...[Syria's Foreign Minister's] offer of [peace] talks drew a dismissive response from U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, who was starting a nine-nation tour of European and Arab capitals in London [to help organize support for the Syrian rebels]."

70 Obama rejects peace because he cannot dictate its outcomes. When it comes to war the more powerful party decides what the peace looks like, and Obama's rebels are — after two years — still in a poor position to bargain a favorable peace to the United States, no matter how many tons of

guns the U.S. has dumped into Syria. This is because the Syrian government still enjoys a large social base of support, something you'll seldom read about in the U.S. media.

- 75 Another sign of war lust from the Obama administration came after the Syrian government accused the rebels of a chemical weapons attack. The U.S. government initially dismissed the accusation, until the rebels later accused the Syrian government of the attack.

80 But even Syria's rebels have admitted that the chemical weapons attack took place in a government controlled territory, and that 16 Syrian government soldiers died in the attack along with 10 civilians plus a hundred more injured. But the rebels make the absurd claim that the government accidentally bombed themselves with the chemical weapons.

85 No matter who is responsible, the Obama administration plans to hold the Syrian Government responsible for crossing the "red line" of a chemical weapons attack (Obama's version of Bush's infamous "weapons of mass destruction"). The red line refers to a direct military invasion, versus the prolonged blood-letting that has been U.S. policy so far.

Obama's envoy for the United Nations, Susan Rice, issued a statement about the chemical weapons attack that, according to The New York Times, "... repeated previous American warnings that there would be "consequences" if the Assad government used or failed to secure chemical weapons."

90 So, if the Syrian rebels get hold of chemical weapons and use them on the Syrian government — as seems to be the case — the Syrian government should be held responsible, according to the Obama Administration, "for not securing chemical weapons."

There is zero room for truth with logic like this. But the perverse logic serves to protect Obama's prized rebels, who've committed a slew of atrocities against the Syrian population, and who gain key political and media protection from the U.S.

95 Ultimately, the entire Syrian war was born amid the big lie that the battle began — and continues — as a popular armed struggle. But the real revolutionaries in Syria like the National Coordination Committee, have long ago declared that they want a peaceful end to this conflict.

100 Obama's Bush-like determination to overthrow the Syrian government has led him down the same path as his predecessor, though Obama is fighting a "smarter" war, i.e., he's employing more deceptive means to achieve the same ends, at the exact same cost of incredible human suffering.

*Shamus Cooke is a social service worker, trade unionist, and writer for Workers Action (www.workerscompass.org). He can be reached at shamuscooke@gmail.com*

## (11) عندما اختار أوباما الحرب بدل السلام في سوريا!!

[http://thawra.alwehda.gov.sy/\\_archive.asp?FileName=20562171320130401203536](http://thawra.alwehda.gov.sy/_archive.asp?FileName=20562171320130401203536)

الثلاثاء ٢٠١٣-٤-٢  
ترجمة: صحيفة "الثورة" السورية

Al Thawrah daily (02-04-2013).

الشعب السوري على شفا إبادة وطنية جماعية والأمم الدولية تملك خيارين :إما تقديم المساعدة لحظر الكارثة ، أو إغراق هذا البلد، الذي عملت على تمزيقه أعمق ، نحو الهاوية. و الحل هو سياسي سلمي ، بينما الدول تستمر في صب الأموال، والبنادق، والمقاتلين إلى داخل البلاد لضمان تحقق ثابت في حمام الدم .

والرئيس أوباما لا حديث له عن السلام، وقد اختار الحرب منذ البداية والتزم بهذا الخيار . وفق ما كشفه مؤخراً مقال في نيويورك تايمز «الرئيس أوباما كتب في حديثه عن درجة التدخل الأميركي في الصراع السوري منذ البداية».

و كان الرئيس قد أعلن مؤخراً أن الحكومة الأمريكية لا تزال تقدم مساعدات عسكرية «غير قاتلة» للمتمردين، ولكن صحيفة نيويورك تايمز كشفت أن وكالة المخابرات المركزية تضخ وتوزع شحنات أسلحة بكميات ضخمة إلى المتمردين عبر الحدود الأردنية والتركية إلى سوريا .

وقد كان «خط أنابيب الأسلحة» هذا، إتجاراً غير مشروع من قبل الحكومة الأمريكية منذ كانون الثاني عام ٢٠١٢ . وهو شريلان الحياة بالنسبة لـ«المتمردين»، وبالتالي سبب إراقة هائلة للدماء في سوريا .

في تقرير لنيويورك تايمز أن السعي إلى لعب دوراً في تسهيل شحن و توزيع الأسلحة، وأكد أن مسؤولين أميركيين أطلعوا بانتظام على عمليات الشحن و التوزيع. كما أوضحت المقالة أن» التقدير «لشحنة الأسلحة وصل إلى ثلاثة آلاف و خمسة طن .

في حين تحدث أوباما مراراً وتكراراً عن المساعدات العسكرية «غير قاتلة»، يشارك شخصياً في الإشراف على فيضانات الأسلحة من بلدان متعددة إلى سوريا ، و تحديداً إلى منظمات إرهابية . وكانت قوة الدعم الفعالة لمتمردين سوريا والجماعات الإرهابية: قاعدة جبهة النصرة، ونحن الآن نعرف بالضبط ما هو مصدر بنادقهم .

ولو تم هزيمته عسكرياً، هذا الدفع الذي ترعاه الولايات المتحدة من أسلحة و متمردين لسوريا - وكثير منهم من المملكة العربية السعودية وغيرها من الدول، لكن تم ادخال عشرات الآلاف من الأرواح، وال مليون لاجئ بقوا في منازلهم. و لكن حجم التطهير العرقي الذي بدأ المتمردون الآن، بعيداً عن أيديهم .

لكن أوباما عازم على الحرب ، حتى انه لم يناقش أي سلام مع الدولة السورية. وذكر مراراً وتكراراً أن هناك «شروطًا مسبقة» لمفاوضات السلام، وأهمها سقوط الحكومة السورية، أي تغيير النظام. فإذا كان إسقاط حكومة أمة هو شرط مسبق للسلام فأي سلام هذا !

ناهيك عن أن سوريا دولة ذات سيادة ، و لا داعي لتفاقق حول مطالب أي بلد أجنبى فيما يتعلق بمن هو في موقع السلطة . لكن على ما يبدو أن إدارة أوباما كانت مشغولة جداً بتحديد أعضاء» مشروع» الحكومة السورية الجديدة ، واختيار أعضاء «الائتلاف الوطني للثورة السورية . «بينما معظم السوريين يريدون وضع حد فوري للنزاع في سوريا ، لأنهم يهدد بحدوث تدمير للبلاد يشبه التي حدث في العراق .

أوباما أيضاً مارس ضغوطه مؤخراً على جامعة الدول العربية - المكونة من أنظمة موالية للولايات المتحدة - لتبنيت من اختارهم في الائتلاف الوطني للثورة السورية حكومة رسمية في سوريا. و إعطاء المعارضة مصداقية إلى حد كبير بقدر شرعية الجامعة العربية المتدهرة.

مقد المتمردين في الجامعة العربية يعني، مرة أخرى، أن الولايات المتحدة وحلفاءها عازمون تماماً على» تغيير النظام»، بغض النظر عن عدد الناس الذين يموتون، و بعيداً عن البدائل السياسية القائمة.

من جهة ثانية اعتبرت الحكومة الروسية أن قرار عضوية المعارضة في جامعة الدول العربية «... تشجيعاً مفتوحاً لقوى «المتمردين» التي، للأسف، لا تزال تراهن على الحل العسكري في سوريا، وهي تبدي يوماً بعد يوم قلة الاهتمام بألم ومعاناة

السوريين، موسكو مقتنة بتسوية سياسية فقط وغير مشجعة للسيناريوهات العسكرية المدمرة، بما يمكن أن يوقف إراقة الدماء وتحقيق السلام والأمن لجميع السوريين في مناطقهم .

٣٥ ورفض أوباما الدعوات الروسية والسويسرية لمفاوضات السلام في الأشهر الأخيرة، كما ازدادت وتيرة خطة تهريب الأسلحة إلى حد كبير وفق ما أشارت إليه تقارير روبيتز كرد فعل لإدارة أوباما على مقررات السلام الروسية السورية .

إن عرض السلام الذي اقترحه وزير الخارجية السوري أثار رد فعل رافض من جون كيري وزير الخارجية الأمريكية، الذي يبدأ جولة تضمن زيارة تسع دول من عواصم أوروبية وعربية للمساعدة في تنظيم الدعم للمتمردين السوريين .

أوباما يرفض السلام لأنه لا يضمن نتائجها خاصة عندما يتعلق الأمر بالطرف الأقوى الذي يقرر شروط السلام ، والمتمردون السوريون - و بعد عامين - لا يزالون في وضع ضعيف للساوامة في عملية سلام مواثية للولايات المتحدة، بغض النظر عن عدد طن من البنادق للولايات المتحدة تصب في سوريا. وذلك لأن الحكومة السورية لا تزال تتمتع بقاعدة كبيرة من الدعم الاجتماعي، وهو أمر نادر ما نقرأ عنه في وسائل الإعلام الأمريكية .

٤٠ هناك دليل جديد على شهوة الحرب من جانب إدارة أوباما ، جاء بعد اتهام الحكومة السورية للمتمردين بهجوم الأسلحة الكيميائية. حكومة الولايات المتحدة رفضت في البداية الاتهام، واتهم المتمردون الحكومة السورية في وقت لاحق بالقيام بهذا الهجوم .

٤١ اعترف المتمردون السوريون أن هجوم الأسلحة الكيميائية وقع في الأراضي التي تسسيطر عليها الحكومة، وأن 16 جندياً من الجيش النظامي قتل في الهجوم جنباً إلى جنب إصابة مدنيين. لكنهم لا يزالون يزعمون بسفح أن الحكومة قصفت بطريق الخطأ نفسها.

بعض النظر عن هو المسؤول، فإن إدارة أوباما تعتمد تحميل الحكومة السورية مسؤولية تخطي «الخط الأحمر» لهجوم بالأسلحة الكيميائية . الخط الأحمر يشير إلى الغزو العسكري المباشر ، سياسة الولايات المتحدة حتى الآن .

٤٢ هذا المنطق الغريب يعمل على حماية المتمردين ، الذين قد ارتكبت عدداً كبيراً من الأعمال الوحشية ضد الشعب السوري، والذين كسبوا مفتاح الحماية السياسية ووسائل الإعلام الأمريكية.

في نهاية المطاف، ولدت الحرب السورية بكمالها وسط كذبة كبيرة أن المعركة بدأت - وما زالت - نضالاً شعبياً مسلحاً. لكن الثوريين الحقيقيين في سوريا مثل لجنة التنسيق الوطنية، ومنذ فترة طويلة أعلنت أنها تريد نهاية سلمية لهذا الصراع .

أوباما يشبه بتصميمه على إسقاط الحكومة السورية سابقه بوش الذي أدى به إلى أسفل الدرب، بالرغم أن أوباما «بنكاء أكبر» يخوض الحرب، أي أنه يستخدم وسائل أكثر خداعاً لتحقيق الغاية نفسها .

## (12) Can the Syrian regime crush the uprising? Yes, suggests history

Bashar al-Assad's fall is far from inevitable: past Middle Eastern uprisings have failed more often than succeeded.

**Chris Phillips, Tuesday 6 March 2012**

<http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/mar/06/can-syrian-regime-survive>

There is an assumption that Bashar al-Assad's military solution to the current crisis in Syria is hopeless – that no matter how many centres of resistance like Baba Amr he brutally crushes, the opposition won't be quelled and the fall of his regime, whether it takes months or years, is inevitable.

- 5 Yet there are recent examples where Arab governments have repressed uprisings and won. With the exception of Libya, when rebels toppled the incumbent regime only with the aid of Nato support, almost all insurgencies have ended in failure.

- 10 Assad already has one template to follow: his father's crushing of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1976-82. Other successful violent strategies in the region, such as Saddam Hussein's suppression of the Iraqi Shia rebellion in 1991 and the Algerian government's victory in the civil war of 1991-2000, may also persuade the regime it can hold on.

Are the conditions that allowed those regimes to survive different enough from contemporary Syria to give the opposition hope, or would Assad be right to believe that history is on his side?

- 15 The strength of the security forces compared with a weak opposition is one reason why embattled regimes favour the military option. For a long time the demonstrators in Syria resembled the Shia uprising against Saddam in 1991: a spontaneous, uncoordinated rebellion against the regime.

The Iraqi Shia were, in fact, in a stronger position than Syria's demonstrators today as they successfully liberated great swaths of southern Iraq for a time. In spite of this, a loyal core of Saddam's Republican Guard reconquered all lost territory within weeks, killing tens of thousands.

- 20 Cultivating loyal units was a tactic utilised by Hafez Assad as well, using his brother Rifaat's Defence Companies throughout 1976-82. Today, President Bashar has regularly utilised loyal fourth armoured division troops (headed by his own brother, Maher) in Baba Amr and elsewhere – suggesting that this survival technique has been noted.

- 25 Even when facing armed opposition, which the Assad regime now does, past Arab governments have overcome far greater threats than that currently posed by the Free Syrian Army (FSA). It took the Algerian government nine years and up to 200,000 deaths to overcome Islamist militia in its civil war, while it took Hafez al-Assad's regime six years and up to 60,000 deaths, but both regimes eventually held.

- 30 Even with the prospect of Qatar and Saudi Arabia arming the FSA, the Syrian rebels are unlikely to reach the parity with regime forces needed for a military victory unless they persuade sizeable chunks to defect with equipment. Without major external support, as with Libya, precedent would suggest either a regime victory or at best a civil war stalemate.

- 35 Importantly, in all three past cases the core of the regime held together under the pressure of an uprising. In Iraq, where Saddam faced a simultaneous rebellion from Kurds in the north, his core Sunni constituency, key members of his inner circle and the security forces all stayed loyal.

The same was true in Hafez's Syria during the Muslim Brothers' uprising, particularly because of the loyalty of the Damascus merchant class.

In Algeria, the military took power in a coup in 1992 and retained enough establishment support for the state to function throughout the civil war.

- 40 For now, the Syrian regime also shares these traits. Its social base has shrunk but its core support, particularly members of Syria's religious minorities led by Assad's Alawi sect, has stayed loyal or neutral. The military has not splintered, with conscripts rather than officers or whole units defecting, and the merchant and middle classes of Aleppo and Damascus have remained quiet. Unlike Gaddafi's Libya, which disintegrated very quickly, the Ba'athist state continues to function.
- 45 Assad may, therefore, equate his regime with those of Algeria, Iraq and his father's that survived an uprising.

However, key differences may yet undo Assad. For one, the international and regional community are more mobilised against Assad than they were against either the Algerian government or that of Assad's father. In the past, too, tight control on the press ensured only piecemeal media coverage, 50 unlike the constant stream of brutal YouTube footage outraging international public opinion today.

At present, the regime seems to believe that such pressure can be weathered, perhaps hoping that the international community will repeat the climbdown that was seen in Iraq in 1991: calling for an uprising against Saddam but limiting action to a no-fly zone over Iraqi Kurdistan and economic sanctions that hurt the people more than the regime.

- 55 However, both the global and regional stance may change if the slaughter continues, confronting the regime with either direct military intervention or a concerted attempt to arm the rebels.

The second question is whether Assad can continue to keep a critical mass of public opinion on his side or, at least, not actively against him. The Algerian government and Hafez both faced a credible Islamist threat, whose atrocities rallied support for the regime.

- 60 Contrary to regime propaganda, the majority of FSA fighters are not Islamists, and atrocities are being committed by the regime rather than the opposition. Even if the regime's minority core stays loyal, fearing retribution and a loss of privilege, will the silent majority of Syrians, particularly in central Damascus and Aleppo, accept many more Baba Amrs?

65 The more the regime kill, the more they risk affecting extended families in other cities, widening the opposition. Recent demonstrations in the previously loyal middle-class district of Mezze in Damascus suggest the tide of public support may yet turn, particularly if the economy continues to decline under the weight of sanctions and unrest.

For now, however, as with Algeria, Iraq and his father before him, the pillars of Bashar's regime remain in place. Recent historical examples in the region illustrate how difficult it is to unseat a 70 ruling regime without the assistance of western firepower. In its absence, those seeking to topple Assad must thus consider how best to erode those pillars in a manner least damaging to Syria in the long run.

75 For those wondering about Assad's next move, however, policymakers could do worse than look at the past Algerian, Iraqi and Syrian examples for a dictator's handbook on how to survive an uprising.

## (13) هل يستطيع النظام السوري سحق الانتفاضة؟... التاريخ يقول: نعم!

نشر : ٢٠١٢/٣/١٢

كريس فيليبس - (الغارديان) ٢٠١٢/٣/٦

ترجمة: صحيفة "الغد" الأردنية

<http://alqhad.com/articles/620999-%D9%87%D9%84-%D9%8A%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%B7%D9%8A%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D8%B8%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A-%D8%B3%D8%AD%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%B6%D8%A9%D8%9F-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%AE-%D9%8A%D9%82%D9%88%D9%84-%D9%86%D8%B9%D9%85!>

ثمة افتراض بأن الحل العسكري للأزمة السورية الراهنة، والذي ينتهجه بشار الأسد لا أمل فيه - وبأنه بغض النظر عن عدد مراكز المقاومة، مثل بابا عمرو التي يسحقها نظامه بوحشية، فإن المقاومة لن تهأء، وأن سقوط نظامه، سواء استغرق شهوراً أم سنوات، هو أمر محتم لا محالة.

لكن هناك أمثلة حديثة تجلت فيها عمليات قاتمة فيها حكومات عربية بقمع الانتفاضات في بلدانها وكسبت الجولة. وباستثناء ليبيا، حيث نجح الثوار في إسقاط النظام القائم - فقط من خلال مساعدة ودعم الناتو، فإن معظم حركات التمرد قد انتهت إلى الفشل.

ولدى الأسد أصلاً سابقة واحدة عليه انتهاجها: سحق والده (الرئيس الراحل حافظ الأسد) للإخوان المسلمين في الأعوام ١٩٧٦ - ١٩٨٢. وقد تقنع استراتيجيات عنة أخرى كانت المنطقة قد شهدتها، كقمع (الرئيس العراقي الراحل) صدام حسين للثورة الشيعية في جنوب العراق في العام ١٩٩١، والانتصار الذي كانت الحكومة الجزائرية قد حققته في الحرب الأهلية ١٩٩١ - ٢٠٠٠، قد تقنع النظام السوري بالاستمرار في نهجه (القمعي).

فهل تعد الظروف التي سمحت لتلك الأنظمة بالاستدامة مختلفة، على نحو كاف، عن سوريا المعاصرة بحيث تعطي المعارضة الأمل؟ أم هل يكون الأسد محقاً حين يعتقد بأن التاريخ سيقف إلى جانبه؟

تعد قوة القوات الأمنية السورية، مقارنة مع ضعف المعارضة، مسوغاً واحداً يوضح السبب في تفضيل الأنظمة المحاربة انتهاج الخيار العسكري. ولبعض الوقت، شابه المتظاهرون في سوريا الانتفاضة الشيعية ضد صدام حسين في العام ١٩٩١: تمرد عفوياً وغير منسق ضد النظام.

وفي الحقيقة، كان الشيعة العراقيون يتمتعون بموقف أقوى من المتظاهرين السوريين راهناً، حيث حرروا وبنجاح مساحات شاسعة من جنوب العراق لبعض الوقت. وعلى الرغم من ذلك، فقد تمكنت وحدة موالية تابعة للحرس الجمهوري لصدام حسين من اجتياح كل الأراضي التي تمت خسارتها خلال أسبوع، وقتل عشرات الآلاف.

وكان تشذيب الوحدات الموالية تكتيكياً وظفه حافظ الأسد أيضاً، حين عمد إلى استخدام "سرايا الدفاع" التي كانت تتأمر بأمر أخيه، رفعت، في الأعوام ما بين ١٩٧٦ - ١٩٨٢. واليوم، نرى الرئيس بشار وهو يستخدم بشك منتظم قوات الفرقه الرابعة المدرعة الموالية (والتي يقودها شقيقه ماهر لا غير)، في بابا عمرو، كما وفي أمكنة أخرى - ما يوحى بأن هذا التكتيك المستديم قد أخذ بعين الاعتبار.

وحتى عند مواجهة معارضة مسلحة، وهو ما يفعله نظام الأسد راهناً، فقد استطاعت حكومات عربية سابقة التغلب على تهديدات أكبر بكثير من تلك التي ينطوي عليها الجيش السوري الحر. وقد استغرق الأمر من الحكومة الجزائرية تسعة أعوام، وما وصل إلى ٢٠٠٠ قتيل للتغلب على الميليشيات الإسلامية في حربها الأهلية، بينما استغرق الأمر نظام حافظ الأسد ستة أعوام وما وصل إلى ٦٠٠٠ قتيل، لكن كلا النظامين خرجا سالمين في نهاية المطاف.

وحتى مع احتمال تسليم قطر والمملكة العربية السعودية للجيش السوري الحر، فإن من غير المرجح أن يرتقي الثوار السوريون إلى القوة اللازمة لموازاة قوات النظام وتحقيق انتصار عسكري، ما لم يقعوا قطاعات كبيرة في الجيش النظامي بالانشقاق مع معداتها. ومن دون دعم خارجي، كما حدث في ليبيا، فإن السوابق تشير، إما إلى انتصار النظام، أو في أفضل الحالات الدخول في جمود حرب أهلية.

٣٠ ولعل من المهم الإشارة إلى أنه في كل الحالات الثلاث السابقة، فإن محور النظام تماست تحت ضغط الانتفاضة. ففي العراق حيث واجه صدام حسين ثورة متزامنة قام بها الأكراد في الشمال، ظلت دائرة السنوية المحورية والأعضاء الرئيسيون في دائرة الداخلية والقوات الأمنية مواليين ومخلصين.

٣٥ وقد انطبق الأمر نفسه على سوريا حافظ الأسد خلال انتفاضة الإخوان المسلمين، فيما يعود الفضل فيه على نحو خاص لولاء طبقة التجار في دمشق. وفي الجزائر، استولى العسكريون على السلطة في انقلاب في العام ١٩٩٢، واحتفظوا بدعم مؤسسي كافٍ للدولة لكي تبقى عاملة طيلة فترة الحرب الأهلية.

٤٠ وحتى الآن، يتمتع النظام السوري بهذه الامتيازات. صحيح أن قاعدته الاجتماعية قد انكمشت، لكن الدعم المحوري له، وخاصة من جانب أعضاء الأقليات الدينية السورية بقيادة الطائفة العلوية التي ينتمي إليها الأسد، يظل موالياً أو محايداً. ولم ينشق العسكريون على الرغم من انشقاق المجندين، وليس الضباط والوحدات العسكرية بأكملها، فيما ظلت طبقة التجار والطبقة الوسطى في حلب ودمشق هادتين. وعلى عكس ليبيا القذافي، التي تفككت بسرعة كبيرة جداً، تستمر دولة البعثيين في أداء مهامها. وتبعاً لذلك، فإننا قد نشهد الأسد وهو يساوي بين نظامه وبين أنظمة الجزائر والعراق ونظام والده، والتي أفلت كل منها من انتفاضة.

٤٥ ومع ذلك، قد تحطم الخلافات الرئيسية أمام الأسد، لأن المجموعة الدولية والإقليمية تبقيان أكثر تجيشاً ضد الأسد الابن، مقارنة مع ما كانتا عليه ضد الحكومة الجزائرية أو ضد حكومة الأسد الأب.

كما لا يغيب عن البال أيضاً أن الرقابة الصارمة المفروضة على الصحافة ضمنت فقط تغطية إعلامية متقطعة، على العكس من السيل المتدفع من التعطية الدائمة الشرسة التي يمكنها أن تثير حفيظة الرأي العام الدولي اليوم.

٤٥ وبيدو النظام في الوقت الحاضر وأنه يؤمن بأن هذا الضغط يمكن تجنبه، ربما على أمل أن المجموعة الدولية سوف تكرر الانسحاب الذي كان قد شوهد في العراق في العام ١٩٩١: حين دعت إلى الانتفاضة ضد صدام حسين، لكن عملها اقتصر على منطقة حظر الطيران فوق منطقة كردستان العراقية، بالإضافة إلى فرض عقوبات اقتصادية أحقت الضرار بالشعب أكثر مما أحقت بالنظام.

٥٠ ومع ذلك، قد يتغير الموقف الكوني والإقليمي إذا استمرت المذابح، بحيث يقف في مواجهة النظام -إما عبر تدخل عسكري مباشر أو عبر محاولة منسقة لتسلیح الثوار.

والسؤال الثاني هو ما إذا كان الأسد يستطيع الاستمرار في الاحتفاظ بحشود حاسمة من الرأي العام إلى جانبه، أو، على الأقل، في غير صفة بفعالية. ومن الجدير بالإشارة أن الحكومة الجزائرية والأسد واجها كلاهما تهديداً إسلامياً كبيراً أفضت أعماله العدائية إلى حشد الدعم لصالح النظمتين.

٥٥ وفي تضاد مع الدعاية التي يسيرها النظام، فإن معظم مقاتلي الجيش السوري الحر ليسوا إسلاميين، كما أن الأعمال العدائية يرتكبها النظام الآن وليس المعارضة. وحتى لو ظل جوهر أقليه النظام مخلصاً، فثمة الخشية من الانتقام وفقدان المزايا. وهل ستستكمل الأغلبية الصامدة من السوريين، وعلى نحو خاص في وسط دمشق وحلب، وتقبل بالمزيد والمزيد من بابا عمرو؟

٦٠ كلما أمعن النظام في القتل، فإن المجازفة في التأثير على امتدادات العائلات تزداد في المدن الأخرى، وهو ما سيتوسع قاعدة المعارضة. وتشير المظاهرات الأخيرة التي قامت في منطقة "المزة" في أطراف دمشق، التي تنتهي للطبقة الوسطى والتي كانت تعرف بأنها موالية للنظام في السابق، إلى أن مد الدعم الشعبي قد ينقلب مع ذلك، خاصة إذا استمر الاقتصاد في التراجع تحت وطأة العقوبات والقلاقل.

وللآن مع ذلك، وكما في الجزائر والعراق وسوريا الأب (حافظ) من قبله، تظل أركان نظام بشار في مكانها. وتوضح الأمثلة التاريخية الحديثة في المنطقة الصعوبة التي تعيشها عملية إسقاط نظام حاكم من دون مساعدة قوة نيران غريبة. وفي ظل غياب هذه القوة، يجب على أولئك الذين يسعون لإسقاط الأسد أن يتذكروا الآن في أفضل الطرق التي تقضي إلى تأكل تلك الأركان في طريقة تلحق أدنى الضرر في سورية على المدى البعيد.

٦٥ ولأولئك الذين يتساءلون عن خطوة الأسد التالية، مع ذلك، فإن صانعي السياسة سيسألون صنعاً إن هم اكتفوا بالنظر إلى الأمثلة الجزائرية والعراقية وسوريا السابقة بحثاً عن كتاب دليل الدكتاتور في الإفلات من سوط الانتفاضة.

## (14) Syria's middle class can defeat Bashar al-Assad

By joining with the discontented poor, middle-class Syrians will tip the balance against Bashar al-Assad's wealthy supporters.

- Ahmed Hussein
- guardian.co.uk, Friday 6 May 2011 12.30 BST

<http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/may/06/syria-middle-class-bashar-al-assad>

In an interview with the Wall Street Journal at the end of January, Syrian president Bashar al-Assad claimed he was immune from the pressures of the pro-democracy revolutions sweeping the Middle East because his regime was "very closely linked to the beliefs of the people". How mistaken he was. The beliefs of the regime and the Syrian people could not be further apart.

5 Assad thought his people would never take to the streets to demand freedom because his entourage of cronies, those officials around him who benefit from the regime, convinced him that the overwhelming majority of the people supported the president and his government. This was evident in Assad's beaming face when, during his speech to parliament on 30 March, members gave him a standing ovation, recited poems and showered him with praise. He also thought that the opposition  
 10 to his rule represented nothing but a tiny minority that, as the state security tightened its grip on the people in Syria, would never take action for fear of the hordes of intelligence officers who are stationed all over the country.

But despite the towering wall of fear the regime has been building throughout the past four decades,  
 15 Assad has lost his bet and has been stripped of his legitimacy by the protesters calling for freedom.  
 And he is fast losing the battle for the people he needs most – the middle class.

From the early days of the uprising, a major split came into the open within Syrian society pitting loyalists and revolutionaries against one another, sometimes even dividing families. Those who have supported the revolution with great enthusiasm have done so out of sheer desperation with the state of their daily lives in Syria today. This is the majority of Syrians – poor and oppressed. Those  
 20 who have supported the regime have done so because the privileges they enjoy depend on the regime surviving. In this camp you have officials close to Assad, senior security and military officers, and their families.

But there is a third group who so far have also supported the regime for fear of an unknown future. These are the middle classes, the people who own businesses and trade. This third group is affected  
 25 by scenes of Syrian cities turning into military cantons for the first time in our modern history. They have been led to think the demonstrations are a prelude for civil war – another Libya.

Nevertheless, the continual mistakes of the regime have led the middle classes to shift position with each passing day from being silent supporters of the regime to supporters of the revolution. The Syrian government is fumbling, like all governments that faced and are still facing Arab revolutions  
 30 have done, as they continue to escalate the situation to the extent of waging war on an unarmed population. Think Deraa, al-Rastan, Banias.

The Syrian government imitated the tactics used by other governments to suppress the demonstrations, particularly the methods of the Libyan regime. They used professional snipers who targeted the heads of the demonstrators, using bullets that explode inside the victim's head leaving  
 35 horrible mutilations, in order to terrorise people. The government also recruited "thugs", pro-regime armed groups that are involved in trafficking of drugs and weapons, to spread chaos and create

sectarian strife. Those thugs opened fire on people from speeding cars and motorcycles. They also infiltrated demonstrations to spread provocative sectarian slogans.

- 40 The security apparatus is quite used to eliminating anyone who dares to even whisper a word about reform or human rights. Now they see large demonstrations calling for the overthrow of the regime, so they react by attacking hospitals and mosques, killing protesters everywhere and terrorising the entire population. This mess is made worse by the state media, who belong to a prehistoric era. They spread lies that are deeply provocative even to those supporting the regime and they still cannot comprehend what's happening now.
- 45 Perhaps some people might wonder what drives demonstrators to the streets despite the threat of death at the hands of security forces. The reason is simply that the Syrian people have come out to tell the world that they will never again be silent about the massacres committed in Deraa or the regime's efforts to starve and terrorise its own people. Syrians will never again be silent about the regime's atrocities committed against its own Syrian brothers. The age of silence is over and the age of freedom has just begun.
- 50

This is true citizenship in its noblest form. The western world used to spend millions of dollars in an attempt to promote citizenship – today they ought to learn the values of citizenship from the Syrians and from all the Arabs who sacrificed their lives for the sake of citizenship and humanity.

## (15) يمكن أن الطبقة الوسطى في سوريا هزيمة بشار الأسد

بإنضمام الطبقة الوسطى في سوريا للثورة بإمكانها ترجيح كفة الميزان ضد مؤيدي بشار.

Ahmed Hussein °

Friday 6 May 2011 14.45 BST guardian.co.uk °

- This article was commissioned and translated in collaboration with Meedan

<http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/may/06/syria-middle-class-bashir-al-assad-arabic-translation>

لربما اعتقد النظام السوري فعلاً أنه منبع عن هجمة الثورات المطالبة بالديمقراطية ولكن هذا ليس بسبب التقارب بين الشعب والسياسات الحكومية كما ادعى الرئيس بشار الأسد في مقابلته مع الـ*Wall Street Journal* في مطلع السنة، ولكن بسبب التباعد التام بينهما. فبشار الأسد قدر بأن الشعب فعلاً لن يخرج مطالباً بالحرية لسبعين أساسيين، أولئك لأن تملق حاشية الأسد والمستفدين من النظام جعله يعتقد أن الشعب مع رئيسه وحكومته بأغلبيته الساحقة وهذا بدا جلياً في الخطبة التي بدأ في تغيير وجه الأسد بينما كان يصفق له مجلس الشعب ويقومون بإلقاء الشعر وتزييف شعارات المديح. السبب الثاني هو أن إحكام القبضة الأمنية في سوريا على الشعب جعله يعتقد بأن الأقلية التي هي ضد حكمه سوف لن تتحرك لخوفها من بطش مكاتب الاستخبارات المنتشرة في كل أنحاء سوريا. ولكن رغم حاجز الخوف الهائل الذي قام ببنائه النظام على مدى أكثر من أربعة عقود، إلا أن الأسد قد خسر رهنه، وتمت تعریته من قبل المتظاهرين في سبيل الحرية أمام الذين دائماً اعتقدوا أنه الشخص الأنسب لقيادة سوريا.

ولكن منذ بدء المظاهرات يظهر جلياً انقسام كبير في المجتمع السوري، فحتى ضمن العائلة الواحدة هناك انقسامات وتجاذبات مبنية على الولاء للنظام أو معارضته. وينقسم السوريين في ولائهم إلى ثلاثة انقسامات فمنهم من يدعم الثورة بحماس كبير بسبب يأسهم واحتاطهم من الواقع السوري، ومنهم من يدعم النظام بسبب استفاداته المباشرة من هذا النظام وخصوصاً المقربين من بشار الأسد وكبار ضباط الأمن والجيش وعائلاتهم. أما الفئة الثالثة فهم من يدعم النظام بسبب خوفهم من المستقبل المجهول ومنهم كبار رجال الأعمال ومعظم الطبقة الوسطى التي تدعم النظام، وترى هذه الفئة الثالثة المدن السورية تستحيل كانتونات عسكرية لأول مرة في تاريخ سوريا الحديث، وترى في المظاهرات مقدمة لحرب أهلية أو سيناريو ليبي آخر.

ولكن أخطاء النظام المستمرة تؤدي إلى تحول الكثير من الفئة الثالثة من مناصريه إلى معارضين له كل يوم، حيث عدا عن أن الإعلام الحكومي الذي ينتمي إلى حقبة متحجرة عفا عنها الزمان يقوم بنشر أكاذيب بطريقة تستفز مؤيدي النظام أكثر من معارضيه، هناك أجهزة للأمن الوحشية التي حكمت البلد لعقود والتي يصعب عليها تصور ما يحدث بعد أن كانت ترى كل من يفتح فمه وبهمس بكلمة عن الإصلاح وحقوق الإنسان يمحى من الوجود من قبل هذه الأجهزة حيث يسجن لسنوات طويلة ويُغضطهد ويُعذب والآن ترى نظائرات تطالب بإسقاط النظام، فتقوم هذه الأجهزة الأمنية باقتحام المشافي والجوانع وقتل المتظاهرين وإرهاب الشعب. وتختلط الحكومة كما تخبطت كل الحكومات التي واجهت وتواجه الثورات من قبلها وتتصعد الأمور إلى حد شن الحرب على الشعب كما فعلت الحكومة في درعا والرستن وأماكن أخرى.

وقادت الحكومة السورية بمحاكاة التكتيكات التي استخدمت من قبل الحكومات الأخرى لقمع المظاهرات، وقادت خصوصاً بتقليد الأسلوب الليبي مع التطوير فيه. حيث قامت الحكومة باستخدام قناصة محترفين وقام هؤلاء القناصة باستهداف المتظاهرين في رؤوسهم وقتلهم الفوري حيث استخدم الرصاص المتفجر الذي ينفجر داخل الرأس ويحدث تشوهات عنيفة لإرهاب المتظاهرين. كما قامت الحكومة بتجنيد الشبيحة وهي عصابات مسلحة موالية للنظام تقوم بعمليات التهريب وتجارة المخدرات والأسلحة لإثارة الفوضى وإثارة النعرات الطائفية، حيث تقوم فرق الشبيحة بفتح النار على الناس من سيارات ودارات نارية مسرعة، كما تقوم بالإندساس بين المتظاهرين وإطلاق هتافات طائفية. وقادت الحكومة أيضاً باستخدام التمثيلية السلفية، وتم تجنيد أئمٍ يرتدون الكلاسيك البيضاء وذوو لحى طويلة ليذهب هؤلاء وبطريق الرصاص المطاطي على عناصر الأمن والشرطة ويطلق شعارات طائفية وتكرر ذات السيناريو في ثلاث مواقع بدمشق وريفيها، وعندما قام المتظاهرين برشق هؤلاء المتتكرين بزي إسلامي بالحجارة في منطقة حرستا في ريف دمشق التجأوا للاختباء في مخفر الشرطة، واتضح للمتظاهرين بعدئذ أن الشرطة قامت بحماية هؤلاء. وما يؤكد أن هذا كان تمثيلية حكومية هو أنه في كل السيناريوهات المشابهة استسلم هؤلاء السلفيون لعناصر الأمن دون وقوع أي إصابة لا بين صفوف الأمن ولا السلفي.

ولربما يتتساع البعض ما الذي يدفع المتظاهرين إلى الخروج إلى الشارع مع أنهم يعلمون أن هذا من الممكن أن يعني مقناتهم على أيدي رجال الأمن، والسبب بكل بساطة هو أن الشعب السوري خرج لبيان للعالم أنه لن يسكن عن مجازر درعا وعن تجويح وإرهاب أهل درعا، ولن يسكن عن إجرام الحكومة ضد أخوته السوريين فزمن الصمت انتهى، وزمن الحرية بدأ. وهذه هي المواطنة الحقيقة في أسمى قيمها ومعانيها، المواطنة التي يصرف الغرب الملايين على بناءها، و التي على الغرب اليوم أن يحتذيها من السوريين ومن كل العرب الذين يقدمون حياتهم فداءً للمواطنة وللإنسانية اليوم.

## (16) Geneva II talks: A test for diplomacy

**Timothy Bancroft-Hinchey (Pravda.Ru)**

**07.01.2014**

[http://english.pravda.ru/opinion/columnists/07-01-2014/126555-geneva\\_two-0/](http://english.pravda.ru/opinion/columnists/07-01-2014/126555-geneva_two-0/)

The Geneva II talks on the crisis in Syria, caused by the west and its Middle Eastern minions playing political games by arming and financing terrorist groups to spread chaos, will provide a telling test as to the state of international diplomacy and will serve as an indicator as to whether Washington uses diplomacy or blackmail to underpin its foreign policy.

- 5 The bottom line of the page entitled "Syria Crisis" is that without support from abroad, namely the west, more specifically NATO and more particularly the FUKUS Axis (France-UK-US), aided by the ever-willing Gulf Cooperation Council constituted by Saudi Arabia and Qatar (and to a lesser extent the United Arab Emirates), the Syrian crisis would not exist.
- 10 Without aid, support, financing, weapons and training from abroad, the bands of terrorists committing murder, torture, rape, desecration of bodies, decapitating children, slicing the breasts off women, roasting people alive in ovens, cutting off ears and noses, impaling children on poles, raping young girls before or after they are beheaded, playing soccer with the heads of victims, all of this very well documented for the disbelievers, would not exist.
- 15 Why nobody in the international media has asked the question who is responsible for this, where is the accountability and who is going to be prosecuted for intervention in the internal affairs of a sovereign state, is obvious. The same answer would arise from the question what happened to those who entered Iraq without a casus belli and wrecked the country and its society? The same again from the illegal attack against Libya, another State destroyed and left destitute by NATO imperialist warmongers.
- 20 As the Geneva II talks on Syria draw nearer, the United States of America seems to be adopting a position, predictably with strings attached, namely that the conference serves to rubber-stamp a post-Assad Syria, in which all parties must agree to a solution excluding the current President (Bashar al-Assad). Needless to say, if that is the position of Washington, it will be obediently repeated by London and Paris.
- 25 Is this diplomacy? Surely the talks should include all Syrian parties to the conflict, excluding the foreign-backed terrorist forces and logically, also excluding the foreign countries sponsoring terrorism inside Syria, surely the talks should be a platform for the Syrians themselves to discuss the way forward and surely this must be a question for the Syrian people themselves to resolve. If the majority want Bashar al-Assad as their President, then logic dictates he should remain. Or are 30 the USA and its allies planning to invite al-Qaeda along to Geneva?
- 35 So who is John Kerry, who is Barack Obama, who is the United States of America and its poodles in Europe and the Middle East to dictate over the will of the Syrian people who should be their (Syrian) ruler? Following Washington's logic, perhaps the UNO should place President Putin as the President of the United States, surely his popularity rating there would be higher than Obama's. The difference is that President Putin fights terrorists, he does not support, aid, finance and equip them.

## (17) محادثات جنيف ٢ : اختبار للدبلوماسية

[http://thawra.alwehda.gov.sy/print\\_veiw.asp?FileName=88427228720140115162020](http://thawra.alwehda.gov.sy/print_veiw.asp?FileName=88427228720140115162020)

[https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?id=240701902638357&story\\_fbid=642777365764140](https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?id=240701902638357&story_fbid=642777365764140)

عن Pravda  
شؤون سياسية  
الخميس ١٦-٤-٢٠١٤  
ترجمة: صحيفة "الثورة" السورية

إن محادثات جنيف الثانية بشأن الأزمة في سوريا كان الغرب وأتباعه في الشرق الأوسط سبباً لها وما زالوا حتى الحين يلعبون دوراً فعالاً في تأجيج نار الفتنة عبر تسليمهم وتمويلهم للمجموعات الإرهابية بغية تمكينها من نشر الفوضى والاضطراب في هذا البلد لذلك فإن تلك المحادثات تعد بمثابة اختبار لدور الدبلوماسية الدولية وتعطي مؤشراً عن مدى شفافية وصدقية واسنطن ورغبتها بابتاع الوسائل الدبلوماسية في معالجتها لتلك المعطلة أو أنها لا تشكل في واقعها سوى عملية ابتزاز لتعزيز سياستها الخارجية .

إن ما يحصل منازمة في سوريا ما كان ليحدث البتة لولا وجود دعم من الخارج وتحديداً الدول الغربية المشاركة بحلف شمال الأطلسي وعلى رأسها دول محور الشر المتمثلة بكل من فرنسا والمملكة المتحدة والولايات المتحدة التي تأقى الدعم والمساندة من مجلس التعاون الخليجي الذي تقوده المملكة العربية السعودية وقطر وبدرجة أقل الإمارات العربية المتحدة.

لا شك أنه لولا تقديم المساعدات والدعم والتسلیح والتمویل والتدریب من الخارج لما تمكنت شرذم من العصابات الإرهابية من تنفيذ وارتكاب عمليات القتل، والتعذيب، والإغتصاب، والتّمثيل بالجثث، وقطع رقاب الأطفال، وشق بطون النساء، وحرق أشخاص في الأفران وهم على قيد الحياة، وقطع الآذان والأذوف، ووضع الأطفال على أعمدة معدنية لخنقهم، واغتصاب النساء من صغيرات السن قبل أو بعد قطع رؤوسهن، ولعب كرة القدم برؤوس الضحايا، كذلك موثق بشكل كامل لمن لا يصدق ما نقوله ويرغب بالاطلاع.

ثمة تساؤلاً تبيّن علينا طرحها تتمحور حول الأسباب التي تدعو إلى التزام الصمت المطبق من قبل وسائل الإعلام الدولية بشأن فضح الجهات التي تقوم بذلك الجرائم المريرة والجهات التي تساندها وتؤازرها في ارتكاب تلك الأفعال المشينة، وتنساعل أيضاً عن يجب محاكمة جراء تدخله في الشؤون الداخلية لدولة ذات سيادة، والإجابة على ذلك التساؤل لم تعد خافية على أحد. ولا تختلف الإجابة عن تساؤلاتنا تلك عما يحدث في العراق في هذه الأونة وما قامت به تلك المجموعات التي أخذت تتدخل دون سبب وتعلّم على تدمير البلاد والمجتمع. وتطبق الإجابة ذاتها على تلك الأطراف التي شنت وشنّ هجمات غير شرعية على ليبيا تلك الدولة التي دُمرت وأصبح سكانها معدمين نتيجة لما قام به دعاة الحرب من الأميركيين في حلف شمال الأطلسي.

مع اقتراب محادثات جنيف ٢ المقرر عقدها في ٢٢ الشهر الجاري بشأن سوريا نستطيع أن نؤكد أن الولايات المتحدة تتبنى موقفاً لا يخفى على أحد، ويقوم على فرض القيود والشروط وتحديداً دعوة المؤتمر إلى مناقشة ما ينبغي أن يكون عليه وضع الحكم في سوريا في المرحلة المقبلة وستحاول إملاء رغباتها على المؤتمر ولا شك بأنها ستجد دولاً تؤيد ماذذهب إليه بامتثال يكتفي الرضا ومن تلك الدول فرنسا والمملكة المتحدة.

هل يمكننا أن نطلق على هذا الواقع صفة الدبلوماسية؟ ذلك لأننا إن أردنا أن نتساءل بالمنطق فإن المحادثات يجب أن تشمل جميع الأطراف السورية الضالعة بالصراع باستثناء القوى الإرهابية المدعومة من الخارج وبالتالي تتبنى الدول الأجنبية الراعية للإرهاب القائم في سوريا وبالتالي يتعين أن تكون المحادثات منصة للسوريين أنفسهم بغية مناقشة سبل المضي قدماً في إيجاد حل للمعضلات القائمة ولا شك بأنه يجب أن يسأل الشعب السوري ذاته عن الحلول التي يقترحها لأنه صاحب في قراره بالاختيار قيادته. أم إنه ثمة توجّه لدى الولايات المتحدة وحلفائها بدعاوة الفئات الإرهابية المرتبطة بالقاعدة إلى مؤتمر جنيف؟

ما علاقة وصفة كل من جون كيري وباراك أوباما والولايات المتحدة وكلابها في أوروبا والشرق الأوسط كي يعطوا لأنفسهم الحق بإملاء رغباتهم على الشعب السوري ومن ينبغي أن يحكمه؟ لا شك بأن شعبية بوتين في الولايات المتحدة ستكون أعلى من شعبية أوباما ذلك لأن الاختلاف واضح بين القائدين، فالرئيس بوتين يحارب الإرهابيين ولا يدعمهم أو يؤيدهم أو يجهزهم.

٥

١٠

١٥

٢٠

٢٥

٣٠

## (18) Assad's Chemical Romance

As Syria descends into chaos, its stockpiles of chemical weaponry could turn into a proliferation nightmare.

[http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/08/23/assads\\_chemical\\_romance](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/08/23/assads_chemical_romance)

BY LEONARD SPECTOR /AUGUST 23, 2011

The continued unrest in Syria, coupled with President Barack Obama's call for President Bashar al-Assad to leave power, has thrown the future of the country into flux. Among the most troubling uncertainties is the fate of Syria's chemical weapons arsenal, which, if not protected properly, could fall into the wrong hands, with catastrophic results.

- 5 Syria is one of a handful of states that the U.S. government believes possess large stocks of chemical agents in militarized form -- that is, ready for use in artillery shells and bombs. The arsenal is thought to be massive, involving thousands of munitions and many tons of chemical agents, which range, according to CIA annual reports to Congress, from the blister gases of World War I -- such as mustard gas -- to advanced nerve agents such as sarin and possibly persistent nerve
- 10 agents, such as VX gas.

In the hands of Assad -- and his father Hafez before him -- these weapons have been an ace-in-the-hole deterrent against Israel's nuclear capability. The Assad regime, however, has never openly brandished this capability: It did not employ chemical weapons in the 1982 Lebanon War against Israel, even after Israeli warplanes decimated the Syrian Air Force. Nor have they been deployed, or

15 their use threatened, in attempting to bring Assad's current domestic antagonists to heel. And although Syria is accused of providing powerful missiles to Hezbollah, including some of a type that carried chemical warfare agents in the Soviet arsenal, Assad has not reportedly transferred lethal chemical capabilities to the Lebanon-based Shiite organization.

So despite their many faults and deplorable record on human rights, the Assads have treated their

20 chemical arsenal with considerable care. But as the country potentially descends into chaos, will that hold true?

Let's start with the possibility of civil war. According to researchers at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, open sources indicate that there are at least four, and potentially five, chemical weapons production facilities in Syria. One or two are located near Damascus, the other

25 three situated in Hama, Latakia, and al-Safir village, near the city of Aleppo. Hama is one of the hotbeds of the Syrian revolt, which Assad's tanks attacked in early August and where, more recently, fighting has severely damaged the city's hospitals. Latakia is another center of unrest; it was shelled by the Syrian Navy in mid-August. Aleppo, Syria's second-largest city, has also seen significant demonstrations.

30 If anti-Assad insurgents take up arms, the chemical sites, as symbols of the regime's authority, could become strategic targets. And, if mass defections occur from the Syrian army, there may be no one left to defend the sites against seizure. This could lead to disastrous outcomes, including confiscation of the chemical weapons by a radical new national government or sale of the weapons as war booty to organized non-state actors or criminal groups.

35 In such chaos, no one can predict who might control the weapons or where they might be taken. With these chemical weapons in the hands of those engaged in a possible civil war, the risks that they would be used would increase substantially. The problem would be worsened further if some possessors were not fully aware of the extent of the weapons' deadly effects.

40 And let's imagine that Assad is eventually removed: What leaders would gain control of these weapons after he departed? Saudi-backed Sunni groups? Iranian-backed Shiite organizations? Whoever they might be, it is unclear that the newcomers would follow the Assads' cautious-use doctrine and refusal to share chemical weapons with non-state groups, or that the new leaders would be able to maintain strict security measures at the chemical sites.

45 Meanwhile, it's possible that an existential threat will cause the Assad regime to abandon its previous policy of restraint regarding chemical weapons. It is not a huge leap from attacking civilians with tank fire, machine guns, and naval artillery to deploying poison gas, and the shock effect and sense of dread engendered by even limited use could quash a citywide uprising within an hour.

50 The options available to the United States to minimize these risks are limited at best. Washington has certainly warned Assad against using the weapons domestically. But with Assad already at risk of indictment for crimes against humanity, and given his likely belief that the United States will not intervene militarily due to its commitments elsewhere -- including its politically unpopular and still opaque involvement in Libya -U.S. warnings may have little deterrent effect.

55 A pre-emptive Israeli military strike to destroy the weapons does not appear technically feasible: Even if Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu were ready to change the status quo, Assad is believed to have stored bulk chemical agents and filled (or quickly filled) shells and bombs in underground bunkers at multiple sites throughout the country. Moreover, even if Israel used incendiary bombs in an attempt to incinerate the chemical agents, the risk of dispersing large quantities of poisonous liquids would remain, with the potential to cause large-scale casualties.

60 The Obama administration needs to start planning now to manage Assad's chemical weapons legacy. If a new government replaces Assad -- or even if different groups compete for international recognition -- a U.S.-led coalition, including Turkey and the leading Arab states, should demand as a condition of support that the weapons immediately be placed under control of international monitors from the Hague-based Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and plans developed for their destruction. Hopefully, Syria's new leaders will have genuine legitimacy and will not need to prop up their credibility at home by clinging to these barbaric weapons.

65

## (19) رومانسيّة الأسد الكيميائيّة

نشر: ٢٠١١/٩/٩

ليونارد سبكتر — (فورين بوليسي) ٢٠١١/٨/٢٣

ترجمة: صحيحة "الغد" الأردنية

<http://alghad.com/articles/633448-%D8%B1%D9%88%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%B3%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D9%8A%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%8A%D8%A9>

أُلقت القلاقل المستمرة في سورية سوية مع دعوة الرئيس باراك أوباما للرئيس بشار الأسد للتحي بمستقبل البلد في أتون الصهر والقلب. ومن بين حالات عدم اليقين الأكثر إزعاجاً، يقع مصير الترسانة السورية من الأسلحة الكيميائية التي، إن لم تتم حمايتها وصيانتها، فإن من الممكن أن تؤول إلى الأيدي الخطأ مع احتمال إحداث نتائج كارثية.

وسرية هي واحدة من حفنة من الدول التي تعتقد الولايات المتحدة بأنها تمتلك مخزونات ضخمة من العناصر الكيميائية في شكل عسكري - أي جاهزة للاستخدام في قذائف وقنابل مدفعية. ويعتقد بأن الترسانة الكيميائية السورية ضخمة، وتشتمل على ذخائر والعديد من أطنان العناصر الكيميائية التي تتلقى، وفق التقارير السنوية المرفوعة من وكالة الاستخبارات المركزية الأميركيّة (السي أي أيه) لكونغرس، بين الغازات المنفطة (التي تستخدم في الحروب الكيماوية، والتي تحرق أنسجة الجسم أو تحدث فيها بثوراً طبقاً لقاموس المورد) والعايدة إلى الحرب العالمية الأولى - مثل غاز الخردل - وبين غازات الأعصاب المتطرفة، مثل السارين، وربما عناصر الأعصاب الملازمة مثل غاز "في أكس".

وما تزال هذه الأسلحة تشكل رادعاً، مثل الشوكة في حلقة القردة التوروية الإسرائيليّة، في أيدي بشار الأسد - وهو الده حافظ من قبله. ومع ذلك، لم يشهر نظام الأسد أبداً هذه القردة، كما أنه لم يستخدم الأسلحة الكيميائية في حرب لبنان في العام ١٩٨٢ ضد إسرائيل، وحتى بعد أن حطمت الطائرات الحربية الإسرائيليّة سلاح الجو السوري. كما أن هذه الأسلحة لم توظف، أو لم يتم التهديد بتوظيفها في محاولة إخضاع المعادين المحليين الحاليين للأسد. وعلى الرغم من توجيهاته لاتهام سوريا بتزويد صواريخ مدمرة لحزب الله، بما فيها نوع يحمل عناصر حرب كيميائية من الترسانة التوروية، فإن الأسد لم يقدم، استناداً إلى ما ذكر، على تحويل قدرات كيميائية مميتة إلى التنظيم الشيعي المتمرد في لبنان.

وعليه، وعلى الرغم من عديد أخطائهم وسجلهما في حقوق الإنسان والذي يستوجب الإدانة، فإن الأسد بن تعامل مع ترسانتهما الكيميائية بمنتهى الحذر. لكن، وفيما يحتمل أن يتزلق البلد إلى أتون الفوضى العارمة، هل سيقصد ذلك التعامل؟

ولنبدأ باحتمال نشوب حرب أهلية. فوفقاً للباحثة في مركز جيمس مارتن لدراسات عدم الانتشار، تشير مصادر مفتوحة إلى أن ثمة أربعة مرافق، مع احتمال وجود الخامس، لإنتاج الأسلحة الكيميائية في سورية. ويوجد واحد أو اثنان من هذه المرافق بالقرب من دمشق. أما الثلاثة الأخرى، فتقع في حماة واللاذقية وقرية السفير بالقرب من حلب. وتعد حماة من الأماكن الساخنة في الثورة السورية، والتي كانت قوات الأسد قد هاجمتها في أوائل آب (أغسطس)، وحيث أفضى القتال الأكثر حداً إلى إلحاق أضرار جسيمة بمستشفيات المدينة. وتعد اللاذقية مركزاً آخر للقلق، وقد قصفتها البحرية السورية في منتصف آب (أغسطس). كما شهدت مدينة حلب التي تعد ثاني أكبر مدينة سورية مظاهرات كبيرة.

وإذا ما حمل المتمردون المعادون للأسد الأسلحة، في سيكون من الممكن أن تصبح المواقع الكيميائية، والتي ترمز إلى سلطة النظام، أهدافاً استراتيجية. وإذا ما وقعت انشقاقات كبيرة في الجيش السوري، ربما لن يبقى هناك من يحمي المواقع من السقوط. ومن الممكن أن يفضي هذا إلى عواقب كارثية، بما في ذلك مصادر الأسلحة الكيميائية من جانب حكومة قومية راديكالية جديدة، أو إلى بيع الأسلحة كغنيمة حرب للاعبين منظمين من غير الدول أو إلى مجموعات إجرامية.

وفي خضم هذه الفوضى لا يستطيع أحد التنبؤ بمن سيسيطر على الأسلحة أو الجهة التي ستؤول لها. وعندما تقع هذه الأسلحة في أيدي أولئك المنخرطين في حرب أهلية محتملة، فستزداد المخاطر على نحو كبير باحتمال استخدامها. وستفاقم المشكلة أكثر إذا كان بعض من ستقع في أيديهم لا يعون تماماً مدى الآثار المميتة لهذه الأسلحة.

ولنتخيل أن الإطاحة بالأسد قد تمت في نهاية المطاف: فمن هم القادة الذين سيكتبون السيطرة على هذه الأسلحة بعد أن يتحلى ويغادر؟ هل هي المجموعات السنّية المدعومة من السعودية؟ أم الميليشيات الشيعية المدعومة من إيران؟ أيًا كان المسيطر، فإن من غير الواضح ما إذا كان القادمون الجدد سيتبعون نهج مبدأ الأسد ورفضه مشاركة مجموعات لا تنتمي للدولة في الأسلحة الكيميائية، أو هل سيكون القادة الجدد قادرين على الحفاظ على إجراءات أمنية صارمة في المواقع الكيميائية.

في الأثناء، من الممكن أن يفضي توجيه تهديد وجودي إلى تخلي نظام الأسد عن سياساته السابقة بضبط النفس فيما يتعلق بالأسلحة الكيميائية. وعموماً، فهي لن تكون فزعة ضخمة عن مهاجمة المدنيين ببنيران الدبابات وبالأسلحة الرشاشة وبمدفعية البحرية، وعن

استخدام الغاز السام وأثر الصدمة والإحساس بالخوف الكامن، حتى في استخدام محدود قد يحمد انتفاضة تعم المدينة خلال ساعة وحسب.

لكن الخيارات المتاحة أمام الولايات المتحدة لتقليل هذه المخاطر إلى الحد الأدنى تعد محدودة في أفضل الحالات. وكانت واشنطن قد حذرت الأسد من مغبة استخدام الأسلحة محليةً. لكن، ونظراً لأن الأسد يواجه أصلاً خطر توجيهاته له بارتكاب جرائم ضد الإنسانية، وفي ضوء اعتقاده المرجح بأن الولايات المتحدة لن تتدخل عسكرياً بسبب التزاماتها في أمثلة أخرى - بما في ذلك انحرافها الذي لا يحظى بشعبية سياسية والذي ما يزال مبهماً في ليبيا-. فقد يكون للتحذيرات الأمريكية تأثير ردع ضئيل.

ومن جهة أخرى، لا يبدو توجيه ضربة عسكرية إسرائيلية لتدمر الأسلحة ذا جدوى من الناحية الفنية. وحتى لو كان رئيس الوزراء الإسرائيلي بنيامين نتنياهو مستعداً للتغيير الراهن، فإن الاعتقاد السائد هو أن الأسد قد خزن عناصر كيميائية بالجملة، وعما (أو عما على نحو سريع) قد اتفق وقابل في دشم تحت الأرض في موقع عديدة في طول البلاد وعرضها. وبالإضافة إلى ذلك، وحتى لو استخدمت إسرائيل قنابل حارقة في محاولة لإحراق العناصر الكيميائية، فإن خطورة انتشار كميات ضخمة من السوائل السمية ستبقى قائمة، مع احتمال التسبب في وقوع خسائر واسعة المدى.

قد تحتاج إدارة أوباما إلى الشروع في التخطيط راهناً لإدارة إرث أسلحة الأسد الكيميائية. وإذا ما حلت حكومة جديدة محل الأسد - أو حتى إذا تناقضت مجموعات مختلفة من أجل الاستئثار باعتراف دولي-. فإن انتلافاً تقوده الولايات المتحدة، ويضم تركيا والبلدان العربية البارزة، يجب أن يطالب - كأحد شروط تقدم الدعم- بأن توضع الأسلحة الكيميائية في الحال تحت سيطرة مراقبين دوليين تابعين لمنظمة منع الأسلحة الكيميائية التي تتخذ من لاهاي مقراً لها، بالإضافة إلى وضع خطط لتدمرها. ويؤمل أن يتوافر قادة سوريا الجدد على إرث أصيل بحيث لا يحتاجون إلى تبديد مصداقتهم في الوطن عبر التمسك بهذه الأسلحة البربرية.

\*نشر هذا التقرير تحت عنوان: Assad's Chemical Romance

## Bibliography

The Holy Qur'an (القرآن العظيم).

- Abbadi, R. (2014) 'The Construction of Arguments in English and Arabic: A Comparison of the Linguistic Strategies Employed in Editorials', *Argumentum* 10, pp. 724-746.
- Abdul-Fattah, H. (2011) 'A Formal-Functional Analysis of the English Modal Auxiliaries', *Jordan Journal of Modern Languages and Literature (JJMLL)* Vol. 3, No.1, pp. 39-63.
- Abdul-Karim, I. et al. (2012) *Position Paper of Arab Revolutions*, Middle East Studies Centre, (MESC), Amman.
- Abu Al 'ainain, K. (2011) *Dictionary of Common Syntactic, Linguistic and Morphological Mistakes (in Arabic)*, Dar Osama for Publishing & Distribution, Amman.
- Achcar, G. (2013) *The People Want: A Radical Exploration of the Arab Uprising*, Saqi Books, United Kingdom.
- Al-Amri, W. (2002) *Semiotics, Translation, and the Press*, Unpublished PHD thesis, Manchester University.
- Al 'amely, B. (1983/ Part II) *Al Koshkool*, Al A'lamy Publishing House, Beirut, Lebanon.
- Al Azhari, M. (2001 '1<sup>st</sup> edition') *Tahdhīb Alloghah*, Dar El Ma'refah for Publishing & Distributing, Bierut, Lebanon.
- Ali, K. (2006) *Reader Response and Translation Quality Assessment: A survey of the responses of proficient non-Arab readers of English to translations of modern Arabic poetry*. Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Basra, Iraq.
- Al Joulani, A. (2012) 'Map of Party and Political Powers', in Al-Anbari, H. et al. (2012) *Political Map of the Arab World after the Arab Revolutions*, Middle East Studies Centre, (MESC), Amman.
- Allan, K. & Burridge, K. (1991) *Euphemism and Dysphemism, Language Used as Shield and Weapon*. Oxford-New York: Oxford University Press.
- Allison, B., Inés, P. R. and Sánchez-Gijón, P. (2009) *Corpus Use and Translating: Corpus use for learning to translate and learning corpus use to translate* (eds.), John Benjamins, Amsterdam, Philadelphia.
- Al Mahmoud, A. (1986) *Reporting on Argument in the Language of Broadcasting and Newspapers with Reference to English-Arabic Translation*, Unpublished MA Thesis, University of Salford.
- Al-Momani, M. (2011) 'The Arab "Youth Quake": Implications on Democratization and Stability', *Middle East Law and Governance*, Volume 3, Numbers 1-2, BRILL, pp. 159-170.
- Al Razi, M. (1957) *Mukhtar Aṣṣehāh*, BolaK Press, Cairo (Revised edition by Ahmad 'atṭar 1957).
- Al-Shawi, M. (2013) 'Translating Euphemisms: Theory and Application'. AMARABAC, *Journal of American Arabic Academy for Sciences and Technology*, Vol. 4, (8), pp. 123-132.
- Al Shehari, K. (2007) 'Semiotics and the translation of news headlines: Making an image of the other', *Translation Studies in the New Millennium*, 5, pp. 1-12.
- Al-Zoubi, M. Q. and Al-Hassnawi, A. R. (2001) 'Constructing a Model for Shift Analysis in Translation', *Translation Journal*, 5: 4, pp. 1-37.

- Anees, I. et al. (1972, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition) *Al Mo'djam Al Waseet*, Dar al Maaref, Cairo, Egypt.
- Austin, J. L. (1962) *How to Do Things with Words?*, Oxford: OUP.
- Aziz, Y. (1992) 'Modality in English and Arabic', *Turjuman*, 1 (1), pp. 101-115.
- Azzamakh-shari, M. (1987, Part II) *Al Mostaqṣa fe Amthal Al 'arab*, Dar al Kotob Al 'elmeyyeh, Beirut, Lebanon.
- Azzamakh-shari, M. (2001, 1<sup>st</sup> edition) *Asaso Al Bala3'ah*, Dar eHya' Attorath Al'araby, Beirut, Lebanon.
- Baker, M. (1992/ revised edition 2011) *In Other Words: A Course book on Translation*, London and New York: Routledge.
- Baker, M. (1993) 'Corpus Linguistics and Translation Studies: Implications and Applications' In M. Baker, G. Francis and E. Tognini-Bonelli (eds.), *Text and Technology: In Honour of John Sinclair*, Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins, pp. 233-250.
- Baker, M. (1995) 'Corpora in Translation Studies: An Overview and Some Suggestions for Future Research', *Target*, 7: 2, pp. 223-243.
- Baker, M. (1996) 'Corpus-Based Translation Studies: The Challenges that Lie Ahead'. In Somers, H. (ed.) *Terminology, LSP and Translation: Studies in Language Engineering, in Honour of Juan C. Sager*. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing, pp. 175-186.
- Baker, M. (1998) 'Introduction' In M. Baker (ed.) *Routledge Encyclopedia of Translation Studies*, London and New York: Routledge.
- Baker, M. (1999) 'The Role of Corpora in Investigating the Linguistic Behaviour of Professional Translators', *International Journal of Corpus Linguistics*, 4, pp. 281-298.
- Baker, M. (2001) 'The Pragmatics of Cross-Cultural Contact and Some False Dichotomies in Translation Studies'. In M. Olohan, *CTIS Occasional Papers*. Vol. 1, UMIST, Manchester: Centre for Translation and Intercultural Studies, pp. 7-20.
- Baker, M. (2004) 'A Corpus-based View of Similarity and Difference in Translation', *International Journal of Corpus Linguistics*, 9 (2), pp. 167-193.
- Baker, M. (2006a) *Translation and Conflict: A Narrative Account*. Routledge.
- Baker, M. (2006b) 'Contextualization in Translator- and Interpreter-Mediated Events', *Journal of Pragmatics* 38, (3), pp. 321-337.
- Baker, M. (2007) 'Reframing Conflict in Translation', *Social Semiotics*, 17 (2), pp. 151-169.
- Baker, M. (2008) 'Ethics of Renarration: Mona Baker is interviewed by Andrew Chesterman'. *Cultus1* (1), pp. 10-33.
- Baker, M. (2009) Resisting State Terror: Theorising Communities of Activist Translators and Interpreters'. In E. Bielsa and C. Hughes (eds.) *Globalisation, Political Violence and Translation*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 222-242.
- Baker, M. (2010) 'Interpreters and translators in the war zone: Narrated and narrators'. In M. Inghilleri and S. Harding (eds.). *The Translator*, 16 (2), Special Issue: *Translation and Violent Conflict*, pp. 197-222.

- Baker, M. and Maier, C. (2011) 'Ethics in Interpreter and Translator Training: Critical Perspectives'. *The Interpreter and Translator Trainer* 5 (1), pp. 1-14.
- Bakker, M., Koster, C. and Van Leuven-Zwart, K. (1998) 'Shifts of Translation'. In M. Baker and K. Malmakjaer, (eds.). *Routledge Encyclopaedia of Translation Studies*, London, New York: Routledge, pp. 226- 231.
- Barton, W. (2011) 'Whose "Spring" is it Anyway?'. In J. Mair and R. L. Keeble (eds.) *Mirage in the Desert: Reporting the Arab Spring*. Abramis Academic Publishing.
- Bartsch, R. (1987) *Norms of Language*, London: Longman.
- Bassnett-McGuire, S. (1980, revised edition 2002) *Translation Studies*, London and New York: Routledge.
- Bassnett, S. (1998) 'The Translation Turn in Cultural Studies', in S. Bassnett and A. Lefevere: *Constructing Cultures: Essays on literary translation*, Clevedon: Multilingual Matters, pp. 123-140.
- Bassnett, S. and Lefevere, A. (1990) *Translation, History and Culture* (eds.), London: Pinter Publishers.
- Bassnett, S. and Lefevere, A. (1998) *Constructing Cultures: Essays on literary translation*, Clevedon: Multilingual Matters.
- Bassnett, S. and Bush, P. (2006) *The Translator as Writer* (eds.), London: Continuum.
- Batatu, H. (1999) *Syria's Peasantry, the Descendants of its Lesser Rural Notables, and their Politics*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, USA.
- Beaugrande, R. (1980) *Text, Discourse and Process*, London, Longman.
- Beaugrande, R. (1984) *Text Production: Toward a Science of Composition*, New Jersey: Ablex Publishing Corporation.
- Beaugrande, R. & Dressler, W. (1981) *Introduction to Text Linguistics*. London & New York: Longman.
- Bednarek, M. (2006) *Evaluation in Media Discourse: Analysis of a Newspaper Corpus*, London, Continuum.
- Beebe, T. (2010) 'Shoot the Transtraitor! The Translator as 'Homo Sacer' in Fiction and Reality'. In M. Inghilleri and S. Harding (eds.). *The Translator*, 16 (2), Special Issue: *Translation and Violent Conflict*, pp. 295-313.
- Bhalla, R. (2011) 'Making Sense of the Syrian Crisis'. Available at: <http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20110504-making-sense-syrian-crisis#axzz378rcEFAX>
- Bielsa, E. (2005) *Globalisation as Translation: An Approximation to the Key but Invisible Role of Translation in Globalisation*, Working papers series of the University of Warwick. Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation, Coventry, UK.
- Black, I. (2012) 'Introduction'. In T. Manhire (ed.) *The Arab Spring: Rebellion, Revolution and New World Order*, Guardian Books, pp. vii-xiv.
- Blum-Kulka, S. (1986/2000/ 2004) 'Shifts of cohesion and coherence in translation', in L. Venuti (ed.) *The Translation Studies Reader*, London and New York: Routledge, (2004), pp. 290-305.

- Brown, P. and Levinson, S. (1987) *Politeness: Some Universals in Language Usage*. Cambridge: CUP.
- Burton, J. (1990) *Conflict: Resolution and Prevention*. New York: St Martin's Press.
- Butt, D., Fahey, R., Spinks, S. and Yallop, C. (2000) *Using Functional Grammar: An Explorer's Guide*. Sydney: National Center for English Language Teaching and Research, Macquarie University.
- Catford, C. (1965) *A Linguistic Theory of Translation: An Essay in Applied Linguistics*. London: Oxford University Press.
- Chesterman, A. (1989) *Readings in Translation Theory* (ed.). Helsinki: Suomalainen Kirjakauppa.
- Chesterman, A. (1996) 'On Similarity', *Target*, vol. 8, pp. 159-64.
- Chesterman, A. (1997a) *Memes of Translation: The spread of ideas in translation theory*, Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
- Chesterman, A. (1997b) 'Ethics of translation'. In M. Snell-Hornby, Z. Jettmarova and K. Kaindl (eds.) *Translation as Intercultural Communication: Selected papers from the EST Congress*, Prague 1995, Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins, pp. 147-157.
- Chifane, C. (2012) 'Equivalence versus Non-equivalence in Economic Translation', *Management Strategies Journal*. 18 (4), pp. 74-82.
- Chilton, P. (1997) 'The role of language in human conflict', *Current Issues in Language & Society*. 4 (3), pp. 174-189.
- Chilton, P. (2004) *Analysing Political Discourse: Theory and Practice*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Chilton, P. and Schäffner, C. (2002) 'Introduction: Themes and Principles in the Analysis of Political Discourse'. In P. Chilton and C. Schäffner (eds.) *Politics as Text and Talk: Analytic Approaches to Political Discourse*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins, pp. 1-41.
- Chomsky, N. (1965) *Aspects of the Theory of Syntax*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Chouliarald, L. and Fairclough, N. (1999) *Discourse in Late Modernity: Rethinking Critical Discourse Analysis*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Collins English Dictionary* (1991) Glasgow: Harper Collins.
- Collins Cobuild English Dictionary for Advanced Learners* (2001, 3<sup>rd</sup> edition), Harper Collins, Canada, (chiefly edited by John Sinclair).
- Collins English Dictionary* (1995/2003), Collins.
- Concise Oxford English Dictionary* (2002), Oxford University Press (edited by Judy Pearsall).
- Courbage, Y. (2007) 'La population de Syrie, des réticences à la transition démographique'. In B. Dupret et al., *La Syrie au présent. Reflets d'une société*, Sindbad/Actes Sud & Ifpo, Paris.
- Crystal, J. (1994) 'Authoritarianism and its Adversaries in the Arab World'. *World Politics*, Vol. 46, No. 2. , pp. 262-289. <http://bhcourses.org/pdf/crystal-authoritarianism.pdf>
- Culler, J. (1976) *Saussure*, Glasgow: Fontana/Collins.
- Cunico, S. and J. Munday (2007) *Translation and Ideology: Encounters and clashes* (eds), Special Issue of *The Translator*, 13(2).

- Darwish, A. (2011) *An introduction to translation: A constraint-driven approach*. Melbourne: Writescope Pty Ltd.
- De Haan, P. (1992) 'The Optimum Corpus Sample Size?'. In G. Leitner, (ed.), *New Directions in English Language Corpora: Methodology, Results, Software Developments*. Berlin, New York: Mouton de Gruyter, pp. 3-19.
- De Marco, M. (2006) "Multiple portrayals of gender in cinematographic and audiovisual translation discourse". In the Proceedings of the Marie Curie Euroconferences *MuTra: Audiovisual Translation Scenarios*. Copenhagen 1-5 May 2006 edited by Carroll M.; H. Gerzymisch-Arbogast and S. Nauert.
- Doorslaer, L. van (1995) 'Quantitative and Qualitative Aspects of Corpus Selection in Translation Studies'. *Target*, 7: 2, pp. 245-260.
- Dragovic-Drouet, M. (2007) 'The Practice of Translating and Interpreting During the Conflicts in the Former Yugoslavia (1991-1999)'. In M. Salama-Carr (ed.) *Translating and Interpreting Conflict: Approaches to Translation Studies*. Amsterdam: Rodopi, pp. 29-40.
- EAGLES (Expert Advisory Group on Language Engineering Standards) (1996) *Preliminary recommendations on Corpus Typology*. Pisa: ILC- CNR.
- EAGLES (Expert Advisory Group on Language Engineering Standards) (1996) *Preliminary Recommendations on Text Typology*. Pisa: ILC- CNR.
- El-Hassan, S. (1990) 'Modality in English and Standard Arabic: Paraphrase and Equivalence'. *Journal of King Saud University*, 2, Arts (20), pp.149-166.
- El Hamad, J. (2011) *Arab Revolution Demands vs. Foreign Intervention*, (ed.), Middle East Studies Centre, (MESC), Amman.
- El-Yasin, M. (1996) 'The Passive Voice: A Problem for the English-Arabic Translator', *Babel*, Vol. 42, (1), pp. 18-26.
- Even-Zohar, I. (1978a) 'Papers in historical poetics'. In B. Hrushovski and I. Even- Zohar (eds.) *Papers on Poetics and Semiotics*, Vol. 8, Tel Aviv: University Publishing Projects.
- Even-Zohar, I. (1978b) 'The Position of Translated Literature within the Literary Polysystem'. In J. Holmes, J. Lambert & R. Broeck (eds.), pp. 117-127. (Also in L. Venuti (2004) *The Translation Studies Reader* (ed.), pp. 199-204).
- Fairclough, N. (1989, second edition 2001) *Language and Power*. London: Longman.
- Fairclough, N. (1992a) *Discourse and Social Change*: Polity Press.
- Fairclough, N. (1992b) *Critical Language Awareness* (ed.): Longman.
- Fairclough, N. (1995a) *Critical Discourse Analysis: The Critical Study of Language*, London: Longman.
- Fairclough, N. (1995b) *Media Discourse*, London: Edward Arnold.
- Fairclough, N. (2000a) 'Discourse, Social Theory, and Social Research: The Discourse of Welfare Reform'. In *Journal of Sociolinguistics*, 4, pp. 163-195.
- Fairclough, N. (2000b) *New Labour, New Language?*, London and New York: Routledge.
- Fairclough, N. (2000c) 'Language and Neo-liberalism'. *Discourse & Society*, 11, pp. 147-148.

- Fairclough, N. (2001a) 'Critical discourse analysis'. In A. McHoul and M. Rapley (eds.): *How to Analyse Talk in Institutional Settings*, London: Continuum, pp. 25-38.
- Fairclough, N. (2001b) 'The Discourse of New Labour: Critical Discourse Analysis'. In M. Wetherell, S. Taylor and S. Yates (eds.): *Discourse as Data: A Guide for Analysis*, London: Sage, pp. 229-266.
- Fairclough, N. (2001c) 'Critical Discourse Analysis as a Method in Social Scientific Research'. In R. Wodak and M. Meyer (eds.): *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis*, London: Sage. pp. 121-138.
- Fairclough, N. (2003) *Analysing Discourse: Textual Analysis for Social Research*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Fairclough, N. (2004) *Discourse and Social Change*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
- Fairclough, N. (2009) 'Language, Reality and Power'. In J. Culpeper et al. (eds.): *English Language: Description, Variation and Context*. Palgrave, pp. 512-522.
- Fairclough, N. and Wodak, R. (1997) 'Critical Discourse Analysis'. In T. A. Van Dijk (ed.) *Discourse Studies: A Multidisciplinary Introduction*. Vol. 2: London: Sage, pp. 258-284.
- Fairclough, I. and Fairclough, N. (2012) *Political Discourse Analysis: A Method for Advanced Students*, Routledge.
- Farahzad, F. (1998) 'A Gestalt Approach to Text Manipulation in Translation'. Available (pp. 1-16) at: <http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED429437.pdf>. (Also published in: *Perspectives: Studies in Translatology*, volume 6 (2), pp. 153-158.
- Farghal, M. (1991) 'Evaluativeness Parameter and the Translator from English to Arabic and Vice-versa', *Babel* (37): pp. 138-151.
- Farghal, M. (1993) 'Managing in Translation: a theoretical model'. *Meta*, Vol. XKVIII, No. 2, pp. 257-267.
- Farghal, M. (1994) 'Ideational equivalence in translation'. In R. Beaugrande de, et al, *Language, Discourse and Translation in the West and Middle East*, John Benjamins Publishing Company, Amsterdam, pp. 55-63.
- Farghal, M. (1995) 'Euphemism in Arabic: A Gricean Interpretation'. *Anthropological Linguistics*, 37(3), pp. 366-378.
- Farghal, M. (2008) 'Extrinsic Managing: An Epitaph to Translatorial Ideological Moves', Sayyab Translation Journal (STJ), London. Volume 1, pp. 1-26.
- Farghal, M. (2012) *Advanced Issues in Arabic-English Translation Studies*, Sayyab Books Series, London & Kuwait Publication Council, Kuwait.
- Farghal, M. (2013) 'Ideological Managing: A Theoretical Concept'. In M. Farghal and A. Manna', *Translation between Creativity of Language and Dynamism of Culture* (in Arabic), Sayyab Books Series, London.
- Farghal, M. and Al-Shorafat, M. (1996) 'The Translation of English Passives into Arabic: An Empirical Perspective'. *Target* 8 (1), pp. 97-118.
- Farghal, M., and Shunnaq, A. (1999) *Translation with reference to English and Arabic: A practical guide*, Dar Al-Hilal, Irbid. Jordan.

- Farhoud, W. (2009) *Ideology in the Language of the Press from the Perspective of Critical Discourse Analysis*, unpublished MA thesis, the American University of Sharjah, UAE.
- Footitt, H. and Michael, K. (2012) *Languages at War - Policies and Practices of Language Contacts in Conflict* (ed.), Palgrave Macmillan.
- Foucault, M. (1984) 'The Order of Discourse'. In M. Shapiro (ed.), *Langue and Politics*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Fowler, R. (1986) *Linguistic Criticism*, London: Oxford University Press.
- Fowler, R. (1991) *Language in the News*, London: Routledge.
- Fowler, R. (1996) 'On Critical Linguistics', in C. Caldas-Coulthard and M. Coulthard (eds.): *Texts and Practices: Readings in Critical Discourse Analysis*, London: Routledge, pp. 3-14.
- Fowler, R. and Kress, G. (1979) 'Critical Linguistics', in R. Fowler, R. Hodge, G. Kress and T. Trew (eds.), *Language and Control*, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, pp. 185-213.
- Fowler, R., Hodge, R., Kress, G. and Trew, T. (1979) *Language and Control* (eds.), London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- Gentzler, E. (1993) *Contemporary Translation Theories*, London and New York: Routledge. (Also (2001). Clevedon: Multilingual Matters).
- Gentzler, E. (1998) 'Foreword'. In S. Bassnett, and A. Lefevere (eds.): *Constructing Cultures: Essays on literary translation*, Clevedon: Multilingual Matters, pp. ix-xxii.
- Ghonim, W. (2012) *Revolution 2.0*. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt.
- Ghounane, N. (2014) 'A Sociolinguistic View of Linguistic Taboos and Euphemistic Strategies in the Algerian Society: Attitudes and Beliefs in Tlemcen Speech Community'. *IMPACT: International Journal of Research in Applied, Natural and Social Sciences*. Vol. 2, Issue 3, pp. 73-88.
- Grice, H.P. (1975) 'Logic and Conversation'. In P. Cole and J. Morgan (eds.), *Syntax and Semantics*, Vol. 3, *Speech Acts*. New York: Academic Press, pp. 41-58.
- Gutt, E. (1991) *Translation and Relevance: Cognition and Context*, Oxford: Blackwell. (Also 2000), Manchester: St. Jerome.
- Hagelstein, R. (2008) 'Explaining the Violence Pattern of the Algerian Civil War' (Households in Conflict Network HiCN/ *Working Paper 43*), The Institute of Development Studies- the University of Sussex: <http://www.hicn.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/wp43.pdf>
- Halliday, M. A. K. (1978) *Language as Social Semiotic: The social interpretation of language and meaning*. London and New York: Edward Arnold.
- Halliday, M. A. K. (1985/ 1994) *An Introduction to Functional Grammar*. London: Edward Arnold.
- Halverson, S. (1997) 'The Concept of Equivalence in Translation Studies: Much Ado About Something'. *Target*, 9: (2), pp. 207-233.
- Hamawy, S., et al (2008, 3<sup>rd</sup> edition) *Al Monjed in Modern Arabic Language*, Dar Al Mashrek, Beirut, Lebanon.
- Hammersley, M. (1997) 'On the foundations of critical discourse analysis'. *Language & Communication*, 17 (3), pp. 237-248.

- Hardman, D. (2008) *Political Ideology and Identity in British Newspaper Discourse*. Unpublished PHD thesis, University of Nottingham.
- Hartley, J. (1993) *Understanding News*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Hatamleh, M. E. (2012) *The Arab Uprising*, The National Library: Amman-Jordan.
- Hatim, B. (1990) 'A Model of Argumentation from Arabic Rhetoric: Insights for a Theory of Text Types'. *British Society for Middle Eastern Studies Bulletin*, vol. 17, No. 1, pp. 47-54.
- Hatim, B. (1997) *Communication Across Cultures: Translation Theory and Contrastive Textlinguistics*. Exeter: University of Exeter.
- Hatim, B. (1998) 'Discourse Analysis and Translation', in M. Baker & K. Malmakjaer (ed.), *Routledge Encyclopaedia of Translation Studies*, London and New York: Routledge, pp. 67-71.
- Hatim, B. (2001) *Teaching and researching translation*, (Applied Linguistics in Action), London: Longman.
- Hatim, B. and Mason, I. (1990) *Discourse and the Translator*, London and New York: Longman.
- Hatim, B. and Mason, I. (1997) *The Translator as Communicator*, London and New York, Routledge.
- Hatim. B. and Munday, J. (2004) *Translation: An Advanced Resource Book*, London and New York: Routledge.
- He, X. (2012) 'Cultural Awareness and Translation Teaching at Higher Vocational College: Problems and Solutions'. Academy Publisher, *Journal of Language Teaching and Research*, Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 74-83.
- Hermans, T. (1985a) *The Manipulation of Literature Studies in Literary Translation* (ed.), London & Sydney: Croom Helm.
- Hermans, T. (1985b) 'Introduction: Translation Studies and a New Paradigm'. In T. Hermans (ed.) *The Manipulation of Literature Studies in Literary Translation*. London & Sydney: Croom Helm, pp.7-15.
- Hermans, T. (1996) 'The Translator's Voice in Translated Narrative', *Target*, 8 (2), pp. 23-48.
- Hermans, T. (1999a) 'Translation in Systems: Descriptive and System-oriented Approaches Explained', Manchester, St. Jerome Publishing.
- Hermans, T. (1999b) 'Translation and Normativity', in C. Schäffner, *Translation and Norms*, Clevedon and Philadelphia: Multilingual Matters, pp. 50-71.
- Hijazi, S. (2009) *Translation in the Service of Advocacy: Narrating Palestine and Palestinian Women in Translations by the Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI)*. Unpublished PHD thesis, Manchester University.
- Hodge, R. and Kress, G. (1993) *Language as Ideology* (2<sup>nd</sup> edition). London & New York: Routledge.
- Hönig, H. G. (1997) 'Positions, Power and Practice: Functional approaches and translation quality assessment', *Current Issues in Language and Society*, 4, pp. 6-34. (Also in C. Schäffner (ed.), *Translation and Quality* (1998). Philadelphia: Multilingual Matters, pp. 6-34.

- Holmes, J. (1988) *Translated!: Papers on Literary Translation and Translation Studies*. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
- Hölz-Mänttäri, J. (1984) *Translatorisches Handeln: Theorie und Methode (Translatorial Action: Theory and Method)*. Helsinki: Suomalainen Tiedeakatemia.
- House, J. (1977) *A Model for Translation Quality Assessment*, Tübingen: Gunter Narr.
- House, J. (1997) *Translation Quality Assessment: A Model Revisited*, Tübingen: Niemeyer.
- Ibn Al Hussein, A. II. (King of Jordan) (2011) *Our Last Best Chance: the Pursuit of Peace in a Time of Peril*, New York, Viking.
- Ibn 'ajeebeh, undated (but a revised version by Ahmad Abdullah Raslan appeared in 1999) *Al Baḥr Al Mađid Fe Tafsīr Al Quran Al Mađid*.
- Inghilleri, M. (2009) 'Translators in War Zones: Ethics under Fire in Iraq'. In E. Bielsa and C. Hughes: *Globalisation, Political Violence and Translation*, Hounds mills (eds.), Palgrave Macmillan.
- Inghilleri, M. (2010) 'You Don't Make War Without Knowing Why: The Decision to Interpret in Iraq'. In M. Inghilleri and S. Harding (eds.). *The Translator*, 16 (2), Special Issue: *Translation and Violent Conflict*, pp. 175-196.
- Inghilleri, M. and Harding, S. (2010) 'Translating Violent Conflict'. In M. Inghilleri and S. Harding (eds.). *The Translator*, 16 (2), Special Issue: *Translation and Violent Conflict*, pp. 165-173.
- Jägar, S. (2001) 'Discourse and Knowledge: Theoretical and Methodological Aspects of a Critical Discourse and Dispositive Analysis'. In R. Wodak and M. Meyer (eds.) *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis*, London: Sage. pp. 32-62.
- Jarad, A. (1992) *International Relations*, National Press Institution, Algeria.
- Johnstone, B. (1991) *Repetition in Arabic Discourse: Paradigms, Syntagms, and the Ecology of Language*, Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company.
- Kayyali, A. et al (2012) *US and Israeli Strategic Stance on Arab Political Changes*, Middle East Studies Centre (MESC), Amman.
- Khafaji, R. (1996) 'Arabic translation Alternatives for the Passive in English'. *Papers and Studies in Contrastive Linguistics*, 31, pp. 19-37.
- Kress, G. (1985a) *Linguistic Processes in Sociocultural Practice*, Victoria: Deakin University Press. (Also 1989: 2<sup>nd</sup> edition- Oxford University Press).
- Kress, G. (1985b) 'Ideological Structures in Discourse'. In van Dijk *Handbook of Discourse Analysis*, vol. (4) *Discourse Analysis in Society* (ed.), London: Academic Press, pp. 27-42.
- Kress, G. (1990) 'Critical discourse analysis', *Annual Review of Applied Linguistics*, 11, pp. 84-99.
- Kress, G. and Hodge, R. (1979) *Language as Ideology*, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- Kruger, H. (2013) *Postcolonial Polysystems: The Production and Reception of Translated Children's Literature in South Africa*, John Benjamins.
- Larson, M. (1984/1998, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition) *Meaning-based translation: A guide to cross-language equivalence*. Lanham, MD: University Press of America.

- Laviosa, S. (1997) 'How comparable can comparable corpus be?', *Target* 9: pp. 289-319.
- Laviosa, S. (1998) *L'Approche Basée sur le Corpus. (The Corpus-based Approach)* (ed.), *Meta*, 43: 4.
- Laviosa, S. (2002) *Corpus-based Translation Studies: Theory, Findings, Applications*. Amsterdam, New York: Rodopi.
- Lee, D. (1992) *Competing Discourses: Perspective and Ideology in Language*, London and New York: Longman.
- Leech, G. (1983) *Principles of Pragmatics*, London and New York: Longman.
- Lefevere, A. (1982/2004) 'Mother Courage's cucumbers: Text, system and refraction in a theory of Literature'. In L. Venuti (ed.) (2004) *The Translation Studies Reader*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, London and New York: Routledge, pp. 233-249.
- Lefevere, A. (1992) *Translation, Rewriting and the Manipulation of Literary Fame*, London and New York: Routledge.
- Lefevere, A. (1993) *Translating Literature: Practice and Theory in a Comparative Literature Context*. New York: The Modern Language Association of America.
- Lindquist, H. (1984) 'The Use of Corpus-based Studies in the Preparation of Handbooks for Translators', in W. Wolfram and G. Thome (eds.) *Translation Theory and its Implementation in the Teaching of Translating and Interpreting*, Tübingen: Narr Verlag, pp. 260-270.
- Lotman, J. & Uspensky, B. (1978) 'On the Semiotic Mechanism of Culture', *New Literary History*, IX (2), pp. 211-232.
- Lyons, J. (1977) *Semantics* (Volume 1), London: Cambridge University Press.
- Lyons, J. (1981) *Language, Meaning and Context*, London: Fontana.
- Maier, C. (2007) 'The translator as an intervening being', in J. Munday (ed.), *Translation as Intervention*: London, Continuum, pp. 1-17.
- Mair, J. and Keeble, R. L. (2011) *Mirage in the Desert: Reporting the Arab Spring* (eds.), Abramis Academic Publishing.
- Malkawi, R. (2012) *The Ideological Stamp: Translation of Political Discourse in News Media*, Writescope Publishers, Australia.
- Malmkjær, K. (2001) 'Unit of Translation'. In M. Baker (ed.), *Routledge Encyclopedia of Translation Studies*, Routledge, pp. 286-288.
- Manna', A. (2012) 'Introduction'. In M. Farghal *Advanced Issues in Arabic-English Translation Studies*, Sayyab Books Series, London & Kuwait Publication Council, Kuwait.
- Mason, I. (1994) 'Discourse, Ideology and Translation'. In R. Beaugrande de, et al. (eds.), *Discourse and Translation in the West and Middle East*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins, pp. 23-34. (Also reprinted in Baker (2009) *Critical Readings in Translation Studies* (ed.), pp. 83-95- with an added 'Postscript', pp. 92ff).
- McEnery, T. and Wilson A. (1996) *Corpus Linguistics*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Meyer, M. (2001) 'Between Theory, Method and Politics: Positioning of the Approaches to CDA'. In R. Wodak and M. Meyer (eds.) *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis*, London: Sage, pp. 14-31.

- Mish, F., et al (2003/11<sup>th</sup> edition) *Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary*, Merriam-Webster's Incorporated, Springfield, Massachusetts, USA.
- Moutaouakil, A. (2011) *Emphasis and Emphatic Marking in Arabic: A Functional Discourse Grammar Approach*, Mohammed V University, Rabat, Morocco.
- Munday, J. (2001/2008/2011) *Introducing Translation Studies*, London and New York: Routledge.
- Munday, J. (2007a) *Translation as Intervention* (ed.), London: Continuum.
- Munday, J. (2007b) 'Translation and Ideology: A Textual Approach'. In S. Cunico and J. Munday *Translation and Ideology: Encounters and Clashes* (eds.), *The Translator*, Volume 13, Number 2, pp. 195-217.
- Munday, J. (2012) *Evaluation in Translation: A Study of critical points in translator decision-making*, Routledge.
- Nahrkhalaji, S. (2009) 'Translation: Ideology and Power in Political Discourse', in H. C. Omar, H. Haroon and A. A. Ghani (eds.) *The Sustainability of the Translation Field*. The 12<sup>th</sup> International Conference on Translation, Kuala Lumpur: Malaysian Translators Association, pp. 493-508.
- Niranjana, T. (1992) *Siting Translation: History, Post-Structuralism, and the Colonial Context*. Berkeley, Los Angeles, Oxford: University of California Press.
- Neubert, A. & Shreve, G. (1992) *Translation as Text*, Kent, OH: Kent State University Press.
- Newmark, P. (1981) *Approaches to Translation*, Oxford and New York: Pergamon.
- Newmark, P. (1982) 'The Translation of Authoritative Statements: A discussion'. *Meta* 27 (4), pp. 375-391.
- Newmark, P. (1988) *A Textbook of Translation*, New York and London: Prentice-Hall.
- Newmark, P. (1990) 'The Curse of Dogma in Translation Studies', *Lebende Sprachen* 35 (3), pp. 105-108.
- Newmark, P. (1991) *About Translation*, Clevedon: Multilingual Matters.
- Newmark, P. (1993) *Paragraphs on Translation*, Clevedon: Multilingual Matters.
- Nida, E. A. (1964a) *Toward a Science of Translating: with Special Reference to Principles and Procedures Involved in Bible Translating*, Leiden: E. J. Brill.
- Nida, E. A. (1964b/ 2004) 'Principles of correspondence', in L. Venuti (ed.) *The Translation Studies Reader/ 2<sup>nd</sup> edition*, (2004), pp. 153-167.
- Nord, C. (1988: 'German version' /1991: 'First English translated version, 2005: 2<sup>nd</sup> edition of the English version): *Text Analysis in Translation: Theory, Methodology and Didactic Application of a Model for Translation-Oriented text Analysis*, Amsterdam: Rodopi.
- Nord, C. (1997, also 2007) *Translating as a Purposeful Activity: Functionalist Approaches Explained*, St Jerome Publishing, Manchester.
- O'Halloran, K. (2000) *Mystifying Discourse: a Critique of Current Assumptions and an Alternative Framework for Analysis*, unpublished PhD thesis, University of London (Institute of Education).
- Olk, H. (2002) 'Critical Discourse Awareness in Translation'. *The Translator*, 8 (1), pp. 101-116.
- Olohan, M. (2004) *Introducing Corpora in Translation Studies*, London: Routledge.

- Omar, A. et al (2008) *Modern Arabic Language Dictionary*, 'alam Al Kotob, Cairo.
- Osers, E. (1995) 'Translation Norms: Do they Really Exist?', In A. Beylard-Ozeroff, et.al: *Translator's Strategies and Creativity: Selected Papers from the 9th International Conference on Translation and Interpreting*. Prague, September 1995. In honour of Jiří Levý and Anton Popovič, Manchester: St. Jerome, pp. 53-62.
- O'Shaughnessy, N. (2004) *Politics and Propaganda: Weapons of Mass Seduction*, Manchester University Press, UK.
- Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary* (7<sup>th</sup> edition), (1948), Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Palmer, F. (1986) *Mood and Modality*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Palmer, J. (2007) 'Interpreting and Translation for Western Media in Iraq'. In M. Salama-Carr (ed.) *Translating and Interpreting Conflict: Approaches to Translation Studies*, Amsterdam: Rodopi, pp. 13-28.
- Pérez, M. (2007) 'Translating Conflict: Advertising in a Globalised Era'. In M. Salama-Carr (ed.) *Translating and Interpreting Conflict: Approaches to Translation Studies*, Amsterdam: Rodopi, pp. 149-168.
- Pinker, S. (1994) *The Language Instinct: The New Science of Language and Mind*, Penguin Adult.
- Popovič, A. (1970) 'The Concept 'Shift of Expression' in Translation Analysis'. In J. Holmes, F. de Haan and A. Popovič (eds.) *The Nature of Translation*, The Hague and Paris, Mouton and Bratislava: The Slovak Academy of Sciences, pp. 78-87.
- Pym, A. (1992) *Translation and Text Transfer: An Essay on the Principles of Intercultural Communication*, Frankfurt, Berlin, Bern, New York, Paris, Wien: Peter Lang International Academic Publishers.
- Pym, A. (1996) 'Material text transfer as a key to the purposes of translation'. In A. Neubert, G. Shreve and K. Gommlich (eds.), *Basic Issues in Translation Studies*. Proceedings of the Fifth international Conference Kent Forum on Translation Studies II, Kent/Ohio and Leipzig: Kent State University: Institute of Applied Linguistics, pp. 337-346.
- Pym, A. (1998) *Methods in Translation History*, Manchester: St. Jerome.
- Pym, A. (2001a) 'Introduction', *The Return to Ethics in Translation Studies* (ed.), Special Issue, *The Translator*. Vol. 7, No. 2, 129-138.
- Pym, A. (2001b) *The Return to Ethics in Translation Studies* (ed.), Special Issue of *The Translator*. Vol. 7, No. 2.
- Rafael, V. (2010) 'Translation in wartime', in M. Baker (ed.) *Critical Readings in Translation Studies*, pp. 383-390.
- Ramadan, T. (2012) *The Arab Awakening: Islam and the New Middle East*. Penguin Group.
- Rampton, S. & Stauber, J. (2003) *Weapons of Mass Deception: The Uses of Propaganda in Bush's War on Iraq*, Jeremy P. Tarcher/Penguin.
- Reiss, K. (1971/2004) 'Type, kind and individuality of text: Decision making in translation'. In L. Venuti (ed.) *The Translation Studies Reader*. 2<sup>nd</sup> edition. New York: Routledge, pp. 168-179.
- Reiss, K. (1976) *Texttyp und Übersetzungsmethode: Der operative Text*, Kronberg, Germany: Scriptor Verlag.

- Reiss, K. (1977 German version/ 1989 English version translated by Chesterman) 'Text-types, Translation Types and Translation Assessment'. In Andrew Chesterman (ed.) *Readings in Translation Theory*. Finland: Oy Finn Lectura. Ab, pp. 105-115.
- Reiss, K. (2000) *Translation Criticism- The Potentials and Limitations: Categories and Criteria for Translation Quality Assessment*, St. Jerome publishing, Manchester, UK.
- Reiss, K. and Vermeer, H. (1984, 1991 2<sup>nd</sup> edition) *Groundwork for a General Theory of Translation*. Tübingen: Niemeyer.
- Richardson, J. (2007) *Analyzing newspapers: an approach from critical discourse analysis*, Basingstoke: Palgrave.
- Rogers, R. (2004a/2011) 'An introduction to Critical Discourse Analysis in Education', in R. Rogers: *An Introduction to Critical Discourse Analysis in Education* (ed.), Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, pp. 1- 18. (Also 2011/ 2<sup>nd</sup> edition: New York, Routledge).
- Rogers, R. (2004b) 'A Critical Discourse Analysis of Literate Identities across Contexts: Alignment and Conflict', in R. Rogers: *An Introduction to Critical Discourse Analysis in Education* (ed.), Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, pp. 51-78.
- Ruokonen, M. (2011) 'Target Readers' Expectations and Reality: Conformity or Conflict?', In P. Kujamäki, L. Kolehmainen, E. Penttilä and H. Kemppanen, *Beyond Borders: Translations Moving Languages, Literatures and Cultures* (eds.), Frank & Timme GmbH, pp. 73-100.
- Rutherford, P. (2004) *Weapons of Mass Persuasion: Marketing the War Against Iraq*. University of Toronto Press.
- Salama-Carr, M. (2007a) *Translating and Interpreting Conflict: Approaches to Translation Studies* (ed.). Amsterdam: Rodopi.
- Salama-Carr, M. (2007b) 'Introduction'. In M. Salama-Carr, *Translating and Interpreting Conflict: Approaches to Translation Studies* (ed.). Amsterdam: Rodopi, pp. 1-12.
- Saldanha, G. (2009) 'Principles of corpus linguistics and their application to translation studies research', *Tradumática*, 7. Centre for English Language Studies, University of Birmingham.
- Samovar, L. et al (2000/ 3<sup>rd</sup> edition) *Communication Between Cultures*, Beijing: Foreign Language Teaching and Research Press.
- Searle, J. R. (1969) *Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language*. Cambridge: CUP.
- Schleiermacher, F. (1813/1992) 'On the Different Methods of Translating', in R. Schutte and J. Biguenet (eds.), (1992) *Theories of Translation: An Anthology of Essays from Dryden to Derrida*, Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, pp. 36-54.
- Schäffner, C. (1997) Strategies of Translating Political Texts, Benjamins Publishing Company, 26, pp. 119-144.
- Schäffner, C. (1998a) 'Action (theory of 'translatorial action')', in M. Baker (ed.) *Routledge Encyclopedia of Translation Studies*. London and New York: Routledge, pp. 3-5.
- Schäffner, C. (1998b) 'Skopos Theory', in M. Baker (ed.) *Routledge Encyclopedia of Translation Studies*. London and New York: Routledge, pp. 235-238.
- Schäffner, C. (1999a) 'Introduction'. In C. Schäffner *Translation and Norms* (ed.), Clevendon: Multilingual Matters, pp.1-8.

- Schäffner, C. (1999b) *Translation and Norms* (ed.), Clevendon: Multilingual Matters.
- Schäffner, C. (2002) The Role of Discourse Analysis for Translation and in Translation Training. UK: Multilingual Matters Ltd.
- Schäffner, C. (2003) Third Ways and New Centers: Ideological Unity or Difference? In M. Calzade-Pérez. *Apropos of Ideology: Translation Studies on Ideology- Ideology in Translation Studies*, Manchester: St. Jerome, pp. 23-41.
- Schäffner, C. (2004) 'Political discourse analysis from the point of view of translation studies', *Journal of Language and Politics*: 3 (1), John Benjamins Publishing Company, pp. 117-150.
- Schäffner, C. and Bassnett, S. (2010) *Political Discourse, Media and Translation* (eds.), Cambridge Scholars Publishing, UK.
- Shehab, E., Abdul-Rahman, Q., & Hussein, M. (2014) 'Translating Contextualized Arabic Euphemisms into English: Socio-Cultural Perspective'. *Cross-Cultural Communication*, 10 (5), pp. 189-198.
- Shunnaq, A. (1986) 'Reporting on argument in the language of broadcasting and newspapers with reference to problems in English-Arabic Translation'. Unpublished MA Thesis. Salford: University of Salford- UK.
- Shunnaq, A. (1992) *Monitoring and Managing in Language of Broadcasting and Newspapers*, Irbid: Dar Al- Amal, Jordan.
- Shunnaq, A. (1994) "Monitoring' and 'Managing' in Radio News Reports'. In R. Beaugrande de, et al. (eds.), *Language, Discourse and Translation in the West and Middle East*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins, pp. 103-114.
- Shuttleworth, M. and Cowie, M. (1997) *Dictionary of Translation Studies*, St Jerome Publishing, Manchester.
- Simpson, P. (1993) *Language, Ideology and Point of View*, London and New York: Routledge.
- Snell-Hornby, M. (1988) *Translation Studies: An Integrated Approach*. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
- Snell-Hornby, M. (1988/1995, revised edition) *Translation Studies: An Integrated Approach*. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
- Snell-Hornby, M. (1990) 'Linguistic Transcoding or Cultural Transfer? A Critique of Translation Theory in Germany'. In S. Bassnett and A. Lefevere (eds.), *Translation, History and Culture*, London: Printer, pp. 79-86.
- Snell-Hornby, M. (1997) 'Written to be spoken: The audio-medial text in translation'. In A. Trosborg (ed.), *Text Typology and Translation*, John Benjamins, pp. 277-290.
- Snell-Hornby, M. (2006) *The Turns of Translation Studies, New Paradigms or Shifting Viewpoints?* Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
- Smith, D. (1997) 'Language and discourse in conflict and conflict resolution', *Current Issues in Language and Society*. 4 (3), pp. 190-214.
- Sperber, D. and Wilson, D. (1986) *Relevance: Communication and Cognition*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

- Spivak, G. C. (1987) *In Other Worlds: Essays in Cultural Politics*. Methuen, New York. (Also 1988, New York & London: Routledge).
- Stahuljak, Z. (2009) 'War, Translation, Translationism: Interpreters in and of the War (Croatia 1991-1992)', in M. Baker (ed.) *Critical Readings in Translation Studies*, pp. 391-414.
- St. John, R. B. (2012) *Libya: From Colony to Revolution*. Oneworld Publications.
- Suleiman, Y. (2003) *The Arabic Language and National Identity: A Study in Ideology*, Edinburgh University Press and Georgetown University Press.
- Suleiman, Y. (2004) *A War of Words: Language and Conflict in the Middle East*, Cambridge university Press.
- Suleiman, Y. (2011) *Arabic, Self and Identity: A Study in Conflict and Displacement*, Oxford University Press.
- Suleiman, Y. (2012) 'Foreword'. In M. Farghal *Advanced Issues in Arabic-English Translation Studies*, Sayyab Books Series, London & Kuwait Publication Council, Kuwait.
- Suleiman, Y. (2013) *Arabic in the Fray: Language Ideology and Cultural Politic*, Edinburgh University Press.
- Svetjcer, A. D. (1981) 'Levels of Equivalence or Translation Models?'. In W. Kühlwein, G. Thome, & W. Wilss (eds.). Miinch, Fink, pp. 320-323.
- Tang, J. (2007) 'Encounters with Cross-Cultural Conflicts in Translation'. In M. Salama-Carr (ed.) *Translating and Interpreting Conflict: Approaches to Translation Studies*, Amsterdam: Rodopi, pp. 135-148.
- The Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology* (1979), Oxford University Press, UK.
- Thompson, J. B. (1984) *Studies in the Theory of Ideology*, The University of California Press.
- Tognini-Bonelli, E. (2001) *Corpus Linguistics at Work*, Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
- Toury, G. (1980a) *In Search of a Theory of Translation*, Tel Aviv: The Porter Institute for Poetics and Semiotics, Tel Aviv University.
- Toury, G. (1980b) 'The Translator as a Non-conformist to be, or: How to Train Translators so as to Violate Translational Norms'. In S. Poulsen, & W. Wilss (eds.), pp. 180-194.
- Toury, G. (1985) 'A Rational for Descriptive Studies'. In T. Hermans *The Manipulation of Literature: Studies in Literary Translation*. London & Sydney: Croom Helm, pp. 16-41.
- Toury, G. (1988) 'Reflections on Translation, the Study of Translation and Translation Studies'. In J. Holz-Mänttäri (ed.), Tampere: Tampereen: Yliopisto, pp. 81-90.
- Toury, G. (1991) 'What Are Descriptive Studies In Translation Likely to Yield Apart From Isolated Description?'. In K. Leuven-Zwart, and T. Naaijkens (eds.) *Translation Studies: The State of Art*. Amsterdam: Rodopi, pp. 179-192.
- Toury, G. (1995a) *Descriptive Translation Studies and Beyond*, Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing.
- Toury, G. (1995b) 'The Notion of Assumed Translation: An Invitation to a New Discussion'. In H. Bloemen, E. Hertog & W. Segers (eds.): Fantom, pp. 135-147.

- Toury, G. (1997) What is that Renders a Spoonerism (un)translatable?. In D. Delabastita *Traduction: Essays on Punning and Translation*. Manchester: St. Jerome, pp. 271-291.
- Toury, G. (1999) 'A Handful of Paragraphs on "Translation" and "Norms"', in C. Schäffner (ed.) *Translation and Norms*, Clevendon: Multilingual Matters, pp. 10-32.
- Toury, G. (2000/2004) 'The Nature and Role of Norms in Translation', in L. Venuti *The Translation Studies Reader* (ed./ 1<sup>st</sup> & 2<sup>nd</sup> editions), pp. 198-211 & 205-218 respectively.
- Trosborg, A. (1997) *Text typology and Translation* (ed.), John Benjamins Publishing Company.
- Tumber, H. and Palmer, J. (2004) *Media at War: The Iraq Crisis*, SAGE Publications.
- Tymoczko, M. (1999) *Translation in a Postcolonial Context*. Manchester: St. Jerome Publishing.
- Tymoczko, M. (2003) 'Ideology and the Position of the Translator: In What Sense is a Translator 'In Between'?'. In M. Calzada Perez (ed.) *Apropos of Ideology – Translation Studies on Ideology-Ideologies in Translation Studies*, Manchester: St. Jerome Publishing, pp. 181-201.
- Tymoczko, M. (2007) *Enlarging Translation, Empowering Translators*, Manchester: St. Jerome Publishing.
- Tymoczko, M. (2009) 'Translation, Ethics and Ideology in a Violent Globalizing World'. In E. Bielsa and C. Hughes (eds.) *Globalisation, Political Violence and Translation*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Tymoczko, M. and Gentzler, E. (2002a) 'Introduction'. In M. Tymoczko and E. Gentzler *Translation and Power* (eds.), Amherst and Boston, MA: University of Massachusetts Press.
- Tymoczko, M. and E. Gentzler (2002b) *Translation and Power* (eds.), Amherst and Boston, MA: University of Massachusetts Press.
- Valdeon, R. (2007) 'Ideological Independence or Negative Mediation: BBC Mundo and CNN en Español's (translated) Reporting of Madrid's Terrorist Attacks'. In M. Salama-Carr, *Translating and Interpreting Conflict: Approaches to Translation Studies* (ed.). Amsterdam: Rodopi, pp. 99-198.
- Van Dam, N. (2011) *The Struggle for Power in Syria*. I.B. TAURIS.
- Van Dijk, T. A. (1984) *Prejudice in Discourse*. Amsterdam: Benjamins.
- Van Dijk, T. A. (1985) *Handbook of Discourse Analysis*, (ed.). Vol. 4, London: Academic Press.
- Van Dijk, T. A. (1988) *News as Discourse*. Hillsdale/ New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
- Van Dijk, T. A. (1990) *Discourse and Society*, (ed.) A Peer-reviewed Journal on Discourse Analysis, SAGE.
- Van Dijk, T. A. (1991) *Racism and the Press*, London and New York, Routledge.
- Van Dijk, T. A. (1993) 'Principles of Critical Discourse Analysis'. *Discourse and Society* 4, pp. 249-283.
- Van Dijk, T. A. (1995a) 'Aims of Critical Discourse Analysis', *Japanese Discourse*, volume 1, pp. 17-27.
- Van Dijk, T. A. (1995b) 'The Mass Media Today: Discourse of Domination or Diversity'? <http://www.discourses.org/OldArticles/The%20mass%20media%20today.pdf>

- Van Dijk, T. A. (1996) 'Discourse, Power and Access'. In C. Caldas-Coulthard and M. Coulthard (eds.) *Texts and Practices: Readings in Critical Discourse Analysis*, London: Routledge, pp. 84-104.
- Van Dijk, T. A. (1998a) *Ideology: A Multidisciplinary Approach*. London: Sage:  
<http://www.discourses.org/OldBooks/Teun%20A%20van%20Dijk%20-%20Ideology.pdf>
- Van Dijk, T.A. (1998b) 'Opinions and Ideologies in the Press'. In B. Allan & P. Garrett (eds.), *Approaches to Media Discourse*, Oxford: Blackwell:  
<http://www.discourses.org/OldArticles/Opinions%20and%20Ideologies%20in%20the%20Press.pdf>
- Van Dijk, T. A. (2001a) 'Critical Discourse Analysis'. In D. Schiffrin, D. Tannen and H. Hamilton (eds.) *The Handbook of Discourse Analysis*, Malden, MA: Blackwell, pp. 352-371.
- Van Dijk, T. A. (2001b) 'Multidisciplinary CDA: A Plea for Diversity'. In R. Wodak and M. Meyer (eds.) *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis*, London: Sage, pp. 95-120.
- Van Leeuwen, T. (1993) 'Genre and Field in Critical Discourse Analysis: A Synopsis'. *Discourse and Society*, 4 (2), pp. 193-223.
- Venuti, L. (1992) *Rethinking Translation: Discourse, subjectivity, ideology* (ed.), London and New York: Routledge.
- Venuti, L. (1995/ 2008) *The Translator's Invisibility: A History of Translation*, London and New York: Routledge.
- Venuti, L. (1998) *The Scandals of Translation: Towards an Ethics of Difference*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Venuti, L. (2000) *The Translation Studies Reader* (ed.), London and New York: Routledge, 1<sup>st</sup> edition.
- Venuti, L. (2004) *The Translation Studies Reader* (ed.), London and New York: Routledge, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition.
- Vermeer, H. (1987) 'What does it mean to translate?', *Indian Journal of Applied Linguistics*, 13 (2), pp. 25-33.
- Vermeer, H. (1989/2004) 'Skopos and commission in translational action'. Translated by (and in) A. Chesterman (1989) *Readings in Translation Theory* (ed.), pp. 173-187. (Also reprinted in L. Venuti (ed.): *The Translation Studies Reader*, 2004, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, pp. 227-238).
- Vermeer, H. (1996) *A skopos theory of translation: Some arguments for and against*. Heidelberg: TextconText Verlag.
- Veron, E. (1971) 'Ideology and the Social Sciences: A Communicational Approach'. In *SEMIOTICA* Vol. III, No. 2, Mouton, pp. 59-76.
- Vinay, J. and Darbelnet, J. (1958/1995 [English version]) *Comparative Stylistics of French and English: A Methodology for Translation*, John Benjamins.
- Webster's New Dictionary of Synonyms: a dictionary of discriminated synonyms with antonyms and analogous and contrasted words* (1973), Merriam, the University of Michigan.
- Wehr, H. (1976) *A Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic* (3<sup>rd</sup> revised edition). An Arabic-English dictionary edited by Cowan, J. Milton, Spoken Language Services, Inc, Ithaca, New York.

- Weyland, K. (2012) 'The Arab Spring: Why the Surprising Similarities with the Revolutionary Wave of 1848?' *Perspectives on Politics*, Volume 10, Issue 04, pp. 917-934.
- Widdowson, H. G. (1996) 'Reply to Fairclough: discourse and interpretation: conjectures and refutations'. *Language and Literature* 5, pp. 57-69.
- Widdowson, H. G. (1998) 'The theory and practice of critical discourse analysis', *Applied Linguistics* 19, pp. 136-151.
- Wilson, D. and Sperber, D. (1988) 'Representation and Relevance'. In R. M. Kempson (ed.) *Mental Representations: the interface between language and reality*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 133-153.
- Wodak, R. (1989) *Language, Power, and Ideology: Studies in Political Discourse* (ed.). Amesterdam: Benjamins Publications. Also (2000) London: John Benjamins Publishing.
- Wodak, R. (1995) 'Critical Linguistics and Critical Discourse Analysis'. In J. Verschueren, J. -O. Ostman and J. Bloomaert (eds.) *Handbook of Pragmatics*, Amsterdam: John Benjamins, pp. 204-210.
- Wodak, R. (1996) *Orders of Discourse*. New York: Addison Wesley Longman.
- Wodak, R. (2001a) 'What CDA is about- A Summary of its History, Important Concepts and its Developments'. In R. Wodak and M. Meyer (eds.) *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis*, London: Sage, pp. 1-13.
- Wodak, R. (2001b) 'The Discourse-historical Approach'. In R. Wodak and M. Meyer (eds.) *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis*, London: Sage, pp. 63-94.
- Wodak, R. (2012) 'Language, power and identity', *Language Teaching*, 45 (2), pp. 215-233.
- Wooffitt, R. (2006) *Conversation Analysis and Discourse Analysis* (2<sup>nd</sup> edition), Sage Publications, London.
- Zanettin, F. (2012) *Translation-Driven Corpora: Corpus Resources for Descriptive and Applied Translation Studies*, Manchester, St. Jerome Publishing.