

When Long Lost Siblings Reunite: Populism, Conservatism and the Discontents of Progress

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Abstract: *Although in recent years populism has emerged from within mainstream conservative parties around the world, populism and conservatism are still rarely studied together. Connecting them may appear paradoxical, given their opposing ideational content, as populism mobilizes the people against the elites while conservatism defends established hierarchies and traditions. This article argues however that we can identify many more similarities and overlaps between populism and conservatism if we adopt a broader conceptualization of political ideologies that includes not only their ideational content, but also their discursive, strategic, organizational and structural dimensions. On this basis, the article views populism and conservatism as modes of politics that mobilize followers primarily on the basis of idealized visions of the political community and state-society relations. Although populism puts forth an antagonistic vision of these relations and conservatism a deferential one, both are otherwise quite similar as strategies aimed at defining the boundaries and character of the political community on the basis of its relationship with political authority. The article conducts an empirical probe demonstrating how its theoretical argument can be applied in comparative research.*

Keywords: populism; conservatism; strategy; discourse; mobilization

Introduction

The rise of right-wing populism in recent decades has been analyzed primarily through the lens of the debate about the return of the far right.¹ But while most successful recent cases of right-wing populism in Western democracies have indeed emerged from parties, movements and ideological milieux with roots in the far right, this is not the case with all of them. Populism has appeared from within ostensibly mainstream conservative parties as well. In fact, for all the preoccupation with the ‘rise of the far right’, populism’s rise in conservative parties from the US and Britain to Poland, Hungary and Turkey is arguably more consequential, since it allows populist ideas and practices to find a foothold in established political forces and through them gain governmental power.

Most scholars discuss this phenomenon as a process of conservative parties adapting and normalizing the ideas of the radical right.² But while radical right ideas e.g., on migration can be adopted and normalized even by the center-left (witness the recent policies of the social democratic government in Denmark), the adoption of *populism* as such – a posture and discourse pitting the ‘people’ against the ‘elites’ – is a separate issue. Logically, a mainstream party radicalizing its policy positions need not adopt populism as well. And inversely, adoption of populism by itself is not synonymous with joining the far right.³ In short, explaining why and how ostensibly mainstream political forces like conservative parties adopt populism is a different question from that of the adaptation to the policies of the far right.

This discussion points to a deeper question in the study of political ideologies, namely that of the relationship between populism and conservatism. This is a complex question for two reasons. First, populism and conservatism are conceptually and empirically loose phenomena. Exploring their relationship consistently would require, first and foremost, defining their ontological nature. Second, and to the issues discussed above, identifying links between populism and conservatism means accounting for the contradiction in their ideational content: that, differently to conservatism, populism opposes the elites and sees them as unrepresentative and even detrimental to the people.

This article argues that populism and conservatism do share fundamental similarities, which can explain why conservatives often successfully pivot to populism. These similarities however can be better appreciated if one moves beyond a strictly ideational perspective of populism and conservatism (and of political ideologies more generally). Drawing on recent works that have opened the debate about links between populism and conservatism, and Robert Barr’s framework that analyzed ideologies in terms of discursive appeals, location (vis-à-vis the political system)

and linkages (between leaders and followers),⁴ I argue, first, that populism and conservatism are most fruitfully understood as modes of politics mobilizing followers primarily around idealized visions of the relationship between political community and authority. Second, conservatism and populism construct broad-based political identities in a way very similar to each other. Third, and as corollary of the above, both aim at defining the totality of the political field on the basis of the political identities they represent: for populism this is the (real) people, while conservatism typically uses the (whole/one) nation.

It should be made clear that the argument here is not that populism and conservatism are synonymous or exclusively intertwined with each other. After all populism can co-exist with all ideologies across the political spectrum.⁵ What I argue rather is that, if understood as bundles of ideas, discourses, practices, mobilizational strategies and specific forms of political organization (what I call *modes of politics*), populism and conservatism share some unique but until now under-explored affinities. They both articulate ideal visions of state-society relations, which means that they are expected to emerge especially during times when these relations come under stress. They are both potent strategies for (re)drawing the lines of political conflict and defining the boundaries of the political community. And both can materialize in a variety of organizational forms, but these will always be top-driven and heteronomous and, most often, relatively thin.

The article proceeds in the following way: The first section offers a short overview of the key perspectives on the content and nature of populism and conservatism. The subsequent sections discuss how populism and conservatism can be understood as modes of politics and delve deeper into overlaps between the two. An empirical probe follows, showing how this framework applies to historical and contemporary cases of conservative-populist fusions. The final section concludes.

Populism and conservatism: Ideological content and overlaps

In thinking about the relationship between populism and conservatism, their most obvious similarity is that their content is notoriously and continuously contested in literature and political debates.⁶ Both terms are used often in dismissive and combative ways in political discourse. Tellingly, few actors willingly accept the characterization of being populist. For conservatism the problem is rather the opposite: while quite a few actors claim the term, they are often unwilling to assign to it any ideological content, sometimes presenting it as a disposition towards pragmatism and moderation,⁷ and others defining it in highly idiosyncratic ways.

In the last decades there has been a convergence around a basic understanding of populism. While there is an ongoing debate as to whether populism should be understood as (thin-centered) ideology,⁸ style,⁹ discourse¹⁰ or political strategy,¹¹ all scholars associate with it some core characteristics: anti-elitism, the binary division of the political field between two fundamentally opposed camps of the people and the elites, and its highly contextual character. All populisms revolve around the polarity between people and elites; the precise content of who the people are and what the nature of their divide with the elites is depends on the effect of other ideologies, the historical context, the strategies and interests of the actors employing populism etc.

Conservatism on the other hand has received much less attention than populism.¹² There are two main approaches in its study. The one sees it as positional and relative, defined by the change which it opposes in a specific historical or social juncture.¹³ The second approach aims to identify certain universal conservative ideas, although even then it remains a fundamentally context-dependent phenomenon whose content reflects the conditions of a specific place and time. Conservatism is generally associated with traditional hierarchies, an aversion to radical and rapid change, and a philosophical preference for institutions and arrangements that have stood the test of time.¹⁴ What those values, institutions and hierarchies are however differs between countries and eras depending on their socioeconomic arrangements, shape of political institutions, cultural traditions endowing certain groups with higher status etc.

The above description begins to hint at similarities between populism and conservatism. Contrary to other modern ideologies like liberalism and socialism, populism and conservatism appear to eschew any claims to universality across time and place.¹⁵ Rather, they are partial and context-bound. As such, both are at odds with the optimism of the Enlightenment and its ideologies to realize a universally applicable project of rationality and progress.¹⁶ Earlier analyses of populism viewing it as a reaction to socioeconomic modernization had highlighted its nostalgic character for a past before the people were dispossessed.¹⁷ More recently, Taggart's argument that populism longs for a lost 'heartland'¹⁸ also hints at a mindset not far removed from conservatism's idealization of earlier social orders.

Viewed strictly in ideational terms of course, populism and conservatism *are* antithetical. Conservatism wants to preserve existing authorities and hierarchies. Populism opposes the privileges of elites. Yet, beyond their contextual nature, one can note two further affinities between them. First, both are associated with groups who perceive a threat from socioeconomic

modernization, from the traditional elites of *societas civilis* of the European Middle Ages for conservatism,¹⁹ to peasants and small farmers for populism.²⁰ Second, the nature of their expression and mobilization is often ambivalent, as both appear sometimes as purposive strategies of political actors from above and other times as mass sentiment from below. These affinities are important clues to explore further links between the two.

Populism and conservatism as modes of politics

The unexpected co-existence between conservatism and populism in recent years raises the question of how we think about ideologies. A focus on ideational content does not always take us far, especially with ideologies that are malleable and contested like conservatism and populism. This ideational focus neglects the fact that ideologies also produce as well as materialize and become embedded in distinct institutional and organizational expressions.²¹

The discussion about populism and conservatism also points to the need to assess political phenomena on the basis not only of their ideational outlook and organizational forms, but also their relationship with political power.²² Useful here is Barr's framework that incorporates ideational, structural and discursive dimensions in the study of ideologies: the nature of their appeals, the location of political actors, and the type of linkages with the masses they use. Such an understanding of ideologies – producing and then becoming embedded in distinct bundles of ideas, strategies, practices, discourses and organizational structures that I call *modes of politics*²³ – has rarely been applied consistently to the study of conservatism or populism.²⁴

When it comes to *location* of political actors, Barr focuses on their relative distance from the political elite. However, this inside/outside distinction with regards to the political system can be complemented with an additional differentiation along a vertical axis. Political ideologies may be expounded not only from within or around the political system, but also outside of it, from society at large. Differently to mobilization resulting from the strategies of leaders and ideologies at the top, modes of politics of a bottom-up character are initiated fully outside the political system.

The second and third dimension in Barr's analysis point to the question of the autonomy of mobilization. Concerning *appeals*, one can make the distinction between programs centered on well-defined sectional and material interests of specific groups or classes, versus appeals focusing on the relationship between the political community and political authority. In the former case, groups holding well-defined material and ideological preferences try to promote them politically.²⁵

In the latter case, the focus is on the relationship between political authority and the people, the values a system of government stands for, or the legitimacy of the representative process. Such appeals typically foreground questions like the democratization of a political system, the ideal form of political rule, the character and boundaries of the political community etc.²⁶

Barr also differentiates between ‘participatory’ and ‘plebiscitary’ *linkages* between the political system and the masses. In so doing, he extends earlier work in political sociology and party politics literature, such as Mouzelis’ distinction between ‘integration’ of autonomous societal interests and top-down ‘incorporation’ by political power (a case of which he considers to be populism);²⁷ or the one between the modern mass party with its ability to express the interests of specific groups or classes, versus forms of dependent political organization with low autonomy from a charismatic leader, a class of notables, traditional hierarchical elites etc.²⁸

These two distinctions together crystalize two ideal-types of modes of politics: the sectional mobilization of groups competing with each other horizontally to promote their material interests, in a pluralistic societal field; versus mobilization around appeals to an idealized form of the political community and its relationship with authority, usually resulting in thin forms of political organization. Although much of the classical literature on political parties idealized the ‘normal’ politics of class representation in ‘mature’ Western democracies,²⁹ in reality this distinction was always theoretical. In practice, ideologies and the strategies and mobilizations they bring about contain both ‘vertical’ and ‘horizontal’ elements. Social democracy for example always expressed, next to its class-specific programs, a broad-based and ideologically loose demand for political democratization and social modernization.

However mixed modes of politics are in practice however, it is still possible to identify some whose appeals and organizational forms tilt more towards or have more elements from one of the two ideal-types. As I will argue, populism and conservatism are two modes where ‘vertical’ elements are particularly strong relative to ‘horizontal’ ones, although the latter are also present and indeed crucial for the shape populism and conservatism take in specific contexts.³⁰

By applying the three dimensions Barr used to define populism – location, appeals and linkages – to the study of conservatism, we can begin to appreciate crucial similarities between the two. This does not mean that other ideologies do not exhibit these features as well. Rather, populism and conservatism uniquely have them all together. I identify three of those. In terms of location, both conservatism and populism can be expressed by actors at the level of the political system as

well as from fully outside and below it, in a bottom-up way.³¹ In terms of linkages, populism and conservatism have an ambivalent relationship with class and interest representation, emerging from specific social groups in certain historical junctures, but broadening to include cross-class coalitions usually bound in thin and top-driven political organizations. While all political strategies of course aim at increasing the following of ideologies, parties or movements, populism and conservatism are similar also, third, in that they do this chiefly by expressing idealized visions of the character of the political community and its relationship with authority.

Populism and conservatism as party strategy and popular reaction

The prevalence of populism in party systems around the world in the last decades has ingrained the idea that populism is fundamentally an organized phenomenon, associated with personalistic or charismatic leadership,³² relatively institutionalized (albeit leader-centric) parties,³³ and distinctive communication styles.³⁴ Despite populism's emancipatory logic, these features of populism actually exhibit a distinctly hierarchical character.³⁵ Understood this way, populism is a top-driven mode of politics that encompasses anti-establishment discourses and plebiscitary linkages used strategically by insurgent, maverick or peripheral-elite politicians.³⁶

The preoccupation with this top-down form of populism has led to the relative neglect of the study of populism as a phenomenon emerging outside of, and indeed against the whole political system, as a bottom-up mass mobilization, usually catalyzed by acute political and/or economic crisis. Despite this relative neglect, it is this bottom-up version that arguably is the paradigmatic form of populism.³⁷ Near-total popular mobilizations that led to democratization of authoritarian regimes in Eastern Europe, Asia and Africa in the last 40 years can be considered examples of this. Populist ruptures may also engulf significant parts of society, although not its totality or even its majority, as long as the sense exists that social and economic malaise is attributable to a severe rupture of political trust, like in Occupy Wall Street and the South European Indignados.³⁸

There have been very few attempts to consistently analyze conservatism as a mode of politics encompassing ideas, practices, strategies and organizational models. The closest such recent analysis is Ziblatt's book that sees conservatism as a political strategy of the aristocracy, authoritarian state bureaucracies, monarchies and the church when faced with demands for democratization in Europe in the 19th century. Conservatism emerged when actors linked to these elites created parties to contest elections against their progressive challengers. This was done by

introducing dimensions of competition that cut across the material considerations of progressive parties, like appeals to religion, royalism and nationalism, and attracted support from strata beyond the core of conservative elites.³⁹

Next to this top-down character however, conservatism also exhibits often a bottom-up logic, similar to the bifurcation of populism between bottom-up movement and top-down led party.⁴⁰ Important traits of the conservative mindset are after all an aversion to change and an appreciation for the local, the rooted, the particular and the contextual. Müller's discussion of four core characteristics of conservatism is telling. Of these – defense of the privileges of elites, gradualism, affinity for the local and particular, and a hierarchical and inegalitarian philosophy – the middle two can be said to express this defensive, bottom-up attitude of conservatism.⁴¹

Müller argues that a party or movement needs to exhibit at least two of these characteristics to be considered conservative. Extending this, we can say that different combinations of Müller's features yield different types of conservatism. Top-down conservatism combines defense of established privileges with authoritarian projects of imposed socioeconomic modernization legitimized by reference to traditional hierarchies like the monarchy and the military.⁴² This top-down conservative-authoritarian pressure may in turn encounter particularistic and localistic resistance against external impingements on traditional hierarchies or local cultures.⁴³ In certain periods, this conflict between authoritarian-hierarchical projects of top-down modernization and defense of local particularisms and hierarchical institutions will make political competition amount essentially to a struggle of two conservatisms.⁴⁴

In sum, both conservatism and populism can appear as bottom-up resistance, usually against perceived imposed modernization. Top-down conservatism and populism on the other hand generate mass mobilization from above, typically embodied in thin, heteronomous organizational structures.⁴⁵ In either form, both conservatism and populism problematize the question of the relationship between political community and authority. For this reason, I expect that their emergence usually results from deep crises in state-society relations.

Classes, interests and their linkage

Populism and conservatism have an ambivalent relationship with social stratification and class. Indeed, both can be associated with specific socioeconomic groups in certain historical periods and junctures, but both are also able to reach out from their original socioeconomic core support

to wider groups in society. While this is not typical only of populism and conservatism, the specific way these two ideologies relate and build upon social and class differences is very similar.

Although early analyses identified populism with specific classes (peasants, the urban poor),⁴⁶ in practice most successful populist movements construct broad cross-class coalitions.⁴⁷ The thin nature of populist ideas means that the social profile of its support ends up varying widely thanks its ability to attract various groups on the basis of opposition to official power. Thus, populism is different from the representation of some 'concrete social interests' in a pluralistic field of competition.⁴⁸ Similarly, conservatism was for long associated with groups at the top of social stratification.⁴⁹ Yet it has long been clear that conservative parties have the ability to grow beyond their aristocratic or upper-middle class base and attract broader support among middle and even working classes, usually on the basis of appeals to hierarchical values like the nation or religion.⁵⁰

One way that populism and conservatism are similar in building their cross-class coalitions is how they embed them organizationally. Contrary to the representation of societal preferences through sectional mass parties where groups promote and defend their independently formed material interests, in populism and conservatism societal demands are typically incorporated from above.⁵¹ Even when they acquire the trappings of the mass party, populist and conservative organizations are usually thinner and rely much more on the authority at the top in mobilizing followers, whether it is charisma or personalistic leadership in the case of populism⁵² or the authority of traditional elites and notables in conservatism.⁵³

For all the cross-class strategies and appeals of populism and conservatism however, in practice they do attract some constituencies more than others, and remain marked by the character of the social groups from where they originate. Indeed, there is a close relationship between the real-world materiality and lived experiences of certain groups, and their propensity to define themselves politically around concerns with the nature and legitimacy of political authority. Such groups have often been, in the case of populism, the independent small farmer who idealizes an autonomous life and is suspicious of remote political and economic power; and in conservatism, strata whose existence is intertwined with a specific value and status hierarchy.⁵⁴

In other words, the cross-class character of populism and conservatism should not overshadow the fact that both originate from a distinct social materiality. And viewed this way, their origins may not be as different as their antithetical ideational content suggests. While the groups that give rise or are primarily attracted to populism and conservatism differ, they usually share a sense of

threat from socioeconomic modernization and especially the prospect of concurrent material, political and cultural marginalization.⁵⁵ In both populism and conservatism, the common denominator is the demand for *autonomy*: from political power, uncontrolled socioeconomic change or from both if these are perceived as intertwined.

A way to appreciate how conservatism is adjacent to populism in this respect is to revisit but also nuance the question of its aristocratic origins. Of particular relevance here is the intriguing work of Kondylis, which sadly remains understudied in the English-speaking literature.⁵⁶ Kondylis makes the point that, while conservatism emerged from the early modern European aristocracy and clergy threatened by the end of feudalism, this was understood as reaction to the impinging of the centralizing and increasingly authoritarian modern state. Although at first glance similar to what Huntington calls the narrow ‘aristocratic’ perspective,⁵⁷ a rereading of Kondylis contributes to a more general definition of conservatism as (among other things) reaction to imposed modernization. Before becoming a strategy of traditional elites then, conservatism can also appear, indeed it often begins as a defence of society’s autonomy from political power and modernization, a sentiment that can resonate well beyond the elites who originally espouse it.⁵⁸ Thought this way, conservatism comes surprisingly close to the prototypical form of populism-from-below, from US farmers in the late 19th century⁵⁹ to the industrial ‘left-behind’ working class today.⁶⁰

Populism, conservatism and the construction of political identities

The discussion above highlights one more similarity between populism and conservatism, namely how they differ from conventional ideologies and modes of politics emerging from the sectional mobilization of groups with clear material interests. These interests are *ontologically prior* to political competition, in other words these actors enter politics having already formed conceptions of their objectives and preferences.⁶¹ In these cases, ideologies reflect pre-existing societal interests, although they certainly also articulate these sectional demands in broader political programs in order to attract wider support.

Modes of politics concerned primarily with the relationship between the political community and official power like populism and conservatism have the inverse relationship with societal interests. Rather than represent pre-existing material and ideational preferences, they seek to enlist those in support of specific visions of state-society relations. In such ‘vertical’ modes of politics,⁶² political identities are formed endogenously to politics, articulated and delineated by political

actors and bearers of these ideologies on the basis of an ideal relationship with political authority. Thus, these actors mold and articulate the very interests they claim to represent.

Much of the literature on populism agrees that populism is just such a constructivist mode of politics. Approaches that view populism as a strategy or style explicitly accept that it reflects the conscious agency of actors seeking to generate a mass following and ride it to power.⁶³ Perspectives that view populism as a discourse explicitly identify the intention of populist actors to construct agonistic identities of the people by assembling multiple frustrated and unrepresented demands and discursively rearranging the political field in terms of a frontal opposition between the people and the system.⁶⁴ And even mainstream ideational approaches that view populism as a set of objectively existing and measurable attitudes accept its conditional nature, as it is not a permanent fixture but rather becomes energized by political agency in specific moments of crisis.⁶⁵

In sum, in populism the ‘people’ comes into being by the very actors claiming to represent it.⁶⁶ Understood in such discursive terms,⁶⁷ populism articulates the relationship between political community and authority as a binary people-elite opposition, but at the same time defines who the ‘people’ are. While it builds upon a specific materiality, populism articulates it as binary opposition between the people and the system.⁶⁸ Conservatism can equally be understood in such constructivist terms, as it also articulates and constructs the political identity it seeks to mobilize: a political community overcoming class divides and espousing a set of hierarchical values.⁶⁹ Like populism, conservatism also arises at times of crisis in state-society relations, although holding a very different view of traditional authority.

Populist and conservative appeals contain similar discursive logics: they aim at identifying the partiality of the socioeconomic forces that they initially represent with the totality of the political community. This *articulation of the part as the whole* fundamentally wants to delineate the boundaries and character of the political community on the basis of its relationship with authority. Within this logic, the signifiers populism and conservatism use are of course very different.

The discursive move of populism is to claim that the excluded members of the community are themselves the *legitimate whole* community.⁷⁰ Populism weaves together multiple frustrated demands in a collective identity of the ‘real people’ which is held together by its self-perception as downtrodden. In this way, the partial identity of the excluded ‘people’ redefines the content and character of the entire political community to its own image.⁷¹ If populism divides the political field internally, conservatism has the opposite goal: to neutralize economic and class divides by

preserving internal unity of political community under traditional authority. Since the mid-19th century, the mass identity that conservatism has most frequently employed is the nation. Conservatives typically present their core constituencies and their values as the ‘whole/one nation’, juxtaposing them to the partiality and divisiveness of progressive class-based appeals.⁷² While the ‘nation’ seeks to depoliticize societal divides whereas the ‘people’ to radicalize them, both express a similar logic and political strategy of presenting the part – the values, interests and identities of the groups originally giving rise to populism or conservatism – as the whole.⁷³

From populism to conservatism and back: A model of populist-conservative fusions

As discussed above, all modes of politics contain ‘vertical’ and ‘horizontal’ elements, although often they maintain a predominant character of one or the other. Similarly, a party, movement or leader may at some point strategically enhance elements of one or the other type. On the one hand, severing links with specific societal groups and interests, reducing the institutional independence of mass organizations and, most importantly, focusing appeals on general questions of political authority and the wishes of the ‘people’ may allow parties and movements to attract support beyond their existing audience. On the other hand, heterogeneous movements that emerge from mobilization around questions of political authority may in time seek to establish more sophisticated political organizations, institute closer relations with some societal interests and formulate more detailed programs in order to institutionalize their presence.

The oscillation between different elements of modes of politics is of course not inherent to conservatism. Most famously, the prototypically sectional, ideological and organizationally structured ‘horizontal’ social democracy radically changed its profile in the 1990s. As Peter Mair argued, Third Way social democrats adopted appeals that presented political representation as the delivery of benefits to an impersonal citizenry, rather than participation and representation of concrete interests through mass parties. Provocatively, Mair called Third Way social democracy a form of ‘populism’, highlighting how it constituted essentially a new model of linkage between voters and politicians replacing the ‘outdated’ mass party.⁷⁴

The multiple points of contact between populism and conservatism make it particularly easy for political actors to move between the two. As it was shown, both engender relatively thin and hierarchical political organizations; articulate appeals around idealized visions of the political community and its relationship with political authority; and emerge from or appeal particularly to

groups concerned with their autonomy. Political actors seeking to increase their support, institutionalize their movements or outflank their opponents can shift between populism and conservatism by altering elements of their appeals (from deferential to anti-systemic and vice versa) without having to change their main organizational, discursive and structural features.

I identify three trajectories for such populist-conservative fusions:

1. Leaders of established conservative parties may decide to employ populist appeals by presenting the political system as non-representative in order to attract support from new constituencies. These conservative parties will re-articulate their appeal to the ‘whole nation’ as an appeal to a mobilized ‘people’.
2. Right-wing populists may decide to institutionalize their position by usurping the role of formerly dominant conservative parties. They will do so by adopting the trappings of ‘horizontal’ politics, like increasingly institutionalized party structures and technocratic discourses addressing the interests of various groups, while toning down their anti-systemic appeals and emphasizing the need to preserve (some) existing institutions that are under threat.
3. Finally, conservative mobilization from below may become the de facto populist challenge to a political system, especially if its ideas are picked up by actors aiming to mobilize voters as part of their political strategies.

When should one expect such fusions to emerge? As populism and conservatism are concerned with state-society relations, such junctures will be moments of severe social, economic or value change that challenge the legitimacy of these relations.⁷⁵ Especially where modernization is entwined with a deepening mismatch between the reach of political authority and the scope of social and market exchange – e.g. during the integration of a national economy into international markets, or the imposition of new rules and standards by modernizing states on their peripheries⁷⁶ – one expects reaction to take the form of increased calls for restitution of popular sovereignty, preservation of traditional structures of power or a combination of the two.

A second contributing factor is whether this modernization is (perceived to be) imposed by progressive or radical actors in power. Where socioeconomic change is articulated in terms of progress and emancipation, we can expect bottom-up mobilization against political power to be in defense of traditional customs and values, often led by figures invested with traditional authority such as members of a religious or royal establishment whose privileges are threatened. Similarly, in these cases populism can become an attractive strategy for conservative elites facing dislocation

from progressive ones. Conservative mavericks are well-placed to do this, as traditional elites appear to be running out of steam, while the political establishment has been penetrated sufficiently by liberals, radicals and progressives for a conservative anti-elite rhetoric to appear credible.

The third factor is, quite simply, political strategy and agency. The other two factors – modernization that causes a breakdown on state-society relations and representational institutions, and a progressive ascendancy in political power – are not deterministic but rather permissive for cross-fertilization between conservatism and populism. Whether and when this will happen will be conditional on the strategies, choices and abilities of political leaders during these junctures.

An empirical probe of the argument

This section provides an empirical probe of how the argument accounts for cases of joint expression of conservatism and populism. The probe will show that this theoretical framework can account for cases across historical periods and national and cultural contexts. The first way to appreciate the continuities between populism and conservatism is by examining the history of British conservatism, the prototypical historical case of conservatism in many respects.

The usurpation of populism by conservatism in Britain can well be traced to the 18th century Tories, who between 1715-60 were excluded from power by the new Hanoverian dynasty and the Whig establishment. The Tories (progenitors although not direct institutional descendants of the modern Conservative party) were then in the strange position of a conservative force, supportive of the institutions of the monarchy and the dominant Anglican church, yet also suspected of disloyalty to the regime. The Tory leader, Bolingbroke, formulated in response to this an opposition program that identified the ruling Whigs with corruption and the rise of the moneyed interest that threatened the virtue of the English constitution.

The 18th century was a time of rapid economic modernization, the rise of finance and merchant interests, and increasing centralization of a state engaged in constant military expeditions abroad. Rearticulating conservative values as opposition to the corruption of the Whigs, Bolingbroke resolved the contradiction that the Tories faced as a party of deference banished to opposition.⁷⁷ This anti-corruption program allowed the Tories to attract support beyond their core constituency of landowners, including the radical urban masses of the city of London.⁷⁸ The discourse of Bolingbroke and other Tories articulated a new popular identity cutting across class barriers, mobilized against the corruption and cynicism of the Whig regime and its associated new

economic elite.⁷⁹ In this way, 18th century conservatism also adopted the function of populist reaction against an entrenched governing party.

A similar dynamic was apparent in the late 19th century, another period where British conservatism was undergoing a crisis, faced with the rise of a Liberal party ready to address the challenges of industrialization and the exhaustion of British imperialism. A maverick member of the elite of the Conservative party, ex-Liberal Joseph Chamberlain, aimed to resolve these contradictions by replacing the dominant British policy of free trade with a system of protectionism against industrial competitors and redirecting trade to British dominions like Canada and Australia. This policy of 'imperial preference' gave rise to mass mobilization around Chamberlain, who aimed to use it to become leader of the Conservative party. Protectionism acquired strong populist characteristics since it was presented as a bold challenge to the 'orthodoxy' of free trade and mainstream economics. By appealing to the patriotism of the popular masses, imperial preference claimed that it could undercut Liberal support, although in the end Chamberlain's populism was more effective in challenging the standing of traditional Conservative elites inside the party.⁸⁰

In the 20th century Thatcherism was also analyzed as a form of populism, most notably by Stuart Hall who tried to make sense of how neoliberalism could enjoy genuine support among parts of the working class.⁸¹ The Thatcherite project was actively presented as an insurgency against the rigidity of the post-war welfare state. This combined with traditional Conservative themes of moral crisis, demand for law and order, and strong nationalism. This shows very aptly the role of political agency, since Thatcher articulated an idiosyncratic definition of the 'system' as the welfare state and trade unions, weakened by lagging economic performance that severely undermined their legitimacy and had made significant parts of the working class look for a new sense of identity as national economic sovereignty was beginning to be challenged by globalizing neoliberalism.

The above examples show aptly how the current crisis and transformation of the Conservative party since the EU referendum of 2016 is not a unique occurrence in the history of conservatism. The Brexit movement and the populist wave that took over the Conservative party displacing its former (neo)liberal elite around David Cameron emerged at a similar juncture of political and economic unrest, after the financial crisis of 2008 had upset the dominance of neoliberal ideology while new social and cultural values were rapidly imposing themselves. In the absence of a strong left-wing force capable of addressing these questions, actors from the right were able to cultivate frustrations and insecurities of groups facing concurrent economic and cultural marginalization.⁸²

Similar dynamics can also be seen in the United States, where populism has often been used to generate support for conservative elites. An early example of this can be considered the discourse of the Republican party at the turn of the 20th century, especially president (1900-08) and then third-party candidate (1912) Theodore Roosevelt. He presented the taming of gilded capitalism as a nationalist project entwined with the ambitions of the USA as a new imperial power. The adoption of much of this ‘progressive’ agenda by the Republican establishment, coming after the convulsions caused by the rise of the agrarian People’s Party in the 1880s, allowed the party of the establishment to present itself as a force of emancipation against entrenched economic interests – although their actual record of genuinely curbing these forces was debatable.⁸³

In the 20th century a prototypical conservative-populist strategy was Richard Nixon’s appeals to the ‘silent majority’ in the 1960s that fractured the New Deal coalition. A more concerted project however came in the early 1990s, when Newt Gingrich merged traditional American conservative values like religion, nationalism and the free market with an accentuated antagonistic discourse against ‘liberal elites’. Emerging at a time of major economic anxieties in US society after the end of the Cold War and the crumbling of the dominant Republican coalition of the Nixon-Reagan period which had led to the Clinton victory, with populist cross-currents challenging both major parties in the 1992 presidential election, this fusion of conservatism and populism became a staple of Republican strategy for the following two decades.⁸⁴ Gingrich drew heavily on Southern conservatism, whose key themes could be potentially re-articulated as populism at the national level, an example of how conservatism (especially of a periphery) can operate as *de facto* populism.⁸⁵

All this of course paved the way for the even stronger shock of Trumpism in the mid-2010s. Trumpism presents many of the features of conservative-populist fusions identified above. It used populism as a transparent personal strategy of a maverick seeking to overturn the established elites of a conservative party. It articulated hierarchical values like the nation and the privileges of an ethnic majority as threatened by external forces and ‘liberal elites’. And it came at a time of persistent economic crisis and de-legitimation of neoliberalism, for long the official economic ideology of the Republican party, that however had also exposed the Democratic party to fissures of its working-class base. Using the threat of cultural peripheralization from new progressive social values and migration, Trump was able to attract these working-class voters to the Republican party.

We can also note the opposite trajectory of populists turning to conservatism, especially after they have dislodged parties of the mainstream center-right as the main force of the right. This is

the case with the contemporary European populist radical right, whose parties have achieved a prominent position in multiple party systems. Their ‘mainstreaming’ can thus be understood in terms of the argument presented here: as personalistic or weakly institutionalized movements and parties seeking thicker ideological and organizational grounding. Given the affinities between populism and conservatism, the latter is the preferred landing ground for many populist actors seeking to engage in more conventional, ‘horizontal’ forms of politics.

It is evident in recent years how populist actors actively court the term ‘conservative’. In Central and Eastern Europe for example, right-wing parties had a long ideological tradition of understanding themselves as conservative i.e., as defenders of certain traditional values and hierarchies in society. However, they pivoted to an intense populism while in opposition in order to gain power, presenting ruling elites in their country and their allies in the EU as progressive, liberal and intrusive on national traditions. While this populism of course did not disappear once parties like Fidesz in Hungary and PiS in Poland gained power, they have also sought ways to re-ideologize their appeals. In both Poland and Hungary, a re-claiming of the term ‘conservative’ has taken place, actively informing the policies of these governments.⁸⁶

Similar to this is how many among the far right try to reposition themselves in the transnational party landscape of the European Parliament. Here, associating oneself with party families bearing the name ‘conservative’ can be useful. Parties of the far-right have been coveting association with the European Conservative and Reformists (ECR), membership of which moderates (it is hoped) their reputation.⁸⁷ Once they enter power, formerly Eurosceptic right-wing populists like Giorgia Meloni no longer seek to overturn or exit from the EU, but to influence it towards more conservative and traditionalist directions. In all these ways, populists can partially de-mobilize the ‘people’ into a more deferential ‘nation’ putting its trust in established power structures like the EU, if the latter is appropriately steered and protected from foreign foes.

Right-wing populists also re-adopt traditional conservative positions, particularly on social and moral issues. Right-wing populists, especially in Western Europe where social modernization had advanced, had been trying to modernize for years by shedding many traditional right-wing stances and creating a more updated profile next to their focus on populism and migration. This was also drawing on the historical self-perception of extreme right ideologies like fascism and Nazism as modernist and radical, different from the stifling conservatism of traditional elites.⁸⁸ Currently however, right-wing populists have been using increasingly moral-conservative appeals, usurping

the role of mainstream center-right and conservative parties (who had been abandoning their traditional positions on these moral issues for a while). Moral conservatism on hot-button cultural issues – ‘woke’, gender, trans rights – allows these parties to redefine conservatism as a set of values under threat by liberal elites. In this way they combine conservatism and populism and build coalitions that unite the audiences of both appeals.

Conclusion

This article makes two contributions to the study of political ideologies. First, it shows that ideologies can be understood better if seen in all their dimensions, not just as ideational systems of thought but also as discourses, practices and strategies; as reflections of specific structural conditions and social interests; and as forms of political organization. These *modes of politics* are produced by ideologies and subsequently embody them in practices, organizations and discourses in the political world.

While all modes of politics combine representation of specific societal interests and formalized ideologies with loose appeals to political authority and ideal visions of state-society relations, the article showed that in some modes of politics either of these two characters – which I schematically call ‘horizontal’ and ‘vertical’ – predominates. It is on this basis that the article makes its second argument about populism and conservatism: that they share more similarities than what their formal ideational content suggests. Both populism and conservatism a) construct political identities around an idealized vision of the relationship between political community and authority; b) can emerge from below as well as be employed by political actors from above; c) typically appear in periods of profound socioeconomic and value change; d) are usually rooted in specific groups but quickly broaden their appeal across class and sectional divides.

Of course, populism can attach itself to different ideologies. This article does not challenge this, nor the fact that, in its pure form, populism is fundamentally an emancipatory force. But it is precisely for this reason that the argument presented here is novel: while contemporary research fixates on the populist radical right as the only conceivable expression of populism from the right, I show that there are good reasons to expect populism to cross-fertilize conservatism and for actors to easily switch between the two. While populism can be seen in conjunction with many other ideologies of the left and right, its links with conservatism are as unique as they are under-studied.

Whereas the empirical analysis showed how political actors can oscillate between populism and conservatism as strategies of generating mass appeals and linkages, perhaps there is something more to be said about the forms of populism and conservatism I identified as emerging ‘from below’. When the dominant forces in a political system or its official ideology espouse a progressive and forward-looking character, conservative ideas may be the best available way to articulate popular dissatisfaction and pose the demand for autonomy. In these conditions, conservatism can indeed function as *a form of populism*, albeit an idiosyncratic one, precisely because, as discussed, there is much the two share in terms of emphasis and articulatory logic. And to the extent that it aims to conserve values and traditions with genuine mass appeal, as opposed to serving merely as strategy for elites defending their privileges, this ‘bottom-up’ conservatism-as-populism could even be considered as the genuine form of conservatism.

While of course these similarities should not be taken too far, and scholars must make every effort to define carefully the conceptual barriers between populism and conservatism, the argument of this article at the very least calls for a much closer comparative investigation of these two ideological phenomena than what was the case until now. Such an approach promises to yield a better understanding of both populism and the conservatism.

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¹ Amid a huge literature, see indicatively H. Kriesi, E. Grande, R. Lachat, M. Dolezal, S. Bornchier and T. Frey, *West European Politics in the Age of Globalization* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); M. Minkenberg, ‘The renewal of the radical right: Between modernity and anti-modernity’, *Government and Opposition*, 35 (2000), pp. 170-188; C. Mudde, *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); C. Mudde, *The Far Right Today* (Cambridge: Polity, 2019).

² For the most comprehensive recent comparative analysis on this topic see T. Bale and C. Rovira Kaltwasser (Eds), *Riding the Populist Wave: Europe’s Mainstream Right in Crisis* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021). Note the interesting semantic choice in the title of the volume, where adaptation to the far right and adoption of its policies is equated with turning ‘populist’.

³ Y. Stavrakakis, G. Katsambekis, N. Nikisianis, A. Kioupkiolis and T. Siomos, ‘Extreme right-wing populism in Europe: revisiting a reified association’, *Critical Discourse Studies*, 14 (2017), pp. 420-439.

⁴ K. O’Hara, ‘Burkean conservatism, legibility and populism’, *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 26 (2021), pp. 81-100; R.R. Barr, ‘Populists, outsiders and anti-establishment politics’, *Party Politics*, 15 (2009), pp. 29-48.

⁵ C. Mudde, ‘The populist Zeitgeist’, *Government and Opposition*, 39 (2004), pp. 541-563; P.A. Taggart, *Populism* (Buckingham: Open University Press, 2000).

⁶ On populism see, indicatively, M. Canovan, *Populism* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 1981); P.A. Taggart, *op. cit.*, Ref. 5. On conservatism, see S.P. Huntington, 'Conservatism as an ideology', *American Political Science Review*, 51 (1957), pp. 454-473; J.-W. Müller, 'Comprehending conservatism: A new framework for analysis', *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 11 (2006), pp. 359-365.

⁷ This is especially the case for the British conservative tradition. Edmund Burke is considered its progenitor while Hugh Cecil codified these ideas in his famous 1912 book. For a critical discussion of this see A. Vincent, 'British conservatism and the problem of ideology', *Political Studies*, 42 (1994), pp. 204-227.

⁸ C. Mudde, 'The populist zeitgeist', *op. cit.*, Ref. 5.

⁹ B. Moffitt, *The Global Rise of Populism: Performance, Political Style, and Representation* (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2016).

¹⁰ E. Laclau, *On Populist Reason* (London: Verso, 2005).

¹¹ K. Weyland, 'Clarifying a contested concept: Populism in the study of Latin American politics', *Comparative Politics*, 34 (2001), pp. 1-22.

¹² For some recent exceptions see R. Bourke, 'What is conservatism? History, ideology and party', *European Journal of Political Theory*, 17 (2018), pp. 449-475; O'Hara, *op. cit.*, Ref. 4. On political science having ignored 'the right' see S.M. Lipset, *Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1960), pp. 17-18.

¹³ Huntington, *op. cit.*, Ref. 6, pp. 454-455, 457.

¹⁴ Müller, *op. cit.*, Ref. 6; R. Scruton, *The Meaning of Conservatism* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001). Huntington identifies a third approach which he calls 'aristocratic' i.e., that conservatism is the ideology of the aristocratic classes in Europe, and which he dismisses, partly because it overlaps with the other two. On an important example of this approach see P. Kondylis, *Konservativismus: Geschichtlicher Gehalt und Untergang* (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1986).

¹⁵ The 'universality' of ideologies like liberalism refers to their ideational content and professed ambitions rather than their implementation that, from the exclusion of women from basic civic rights to the legitimation of colonialism, falls far short of universality. Regarding philosophical assumptions and their self-avowed universal applicability however, populism and conservatism's contextual nature indeed differs from Enlightenment ideologies like liberalism and socialism.

¹⁶ O'Hara has approached this affinity between conservatism and populism via the concept of 'legibility': O'Hara, *op. cit.*, Ref. 4. The perspective of conservatism as an ideology fundamentally at odds with the Enlightenment mindset has been advanced, among others, by Karl Mannheim, whose analysis evokes in many ways similar views of populism. K. Mannheim, *Conservatism: A Contribution to the Sociology of Knowledge* (New York: Routledge, 2005 [1936]).

¹⁷ G. Ionescu and E. Gellner (Eds) *Populism: Its Meaning and National Characteristics* (New York: Macmillan, 1969).

¹⁸ Taggart, *op. cit.*, Ref. 5.

¹⁹ Kondylis, *op. cit.*, Ref. 14.

²⁰ L. Goodwyn, *The Populist Moment: A Short History of the Agrarian Revolt in America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978).

²¹ A classic overview and updating of this thesis is in R.S. Katz and P. Mair, 'Changing models of party organization and party democracy: The emergence of the cartel party', *Party Politics* 1 (1995), pp. 5-28. The reference work on parties and their organizations remains to this day M. Duverger, *Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern World* (London: Methuen, 1954).

²² See here also: Y. Stavrakakis, 'Antinomies of formalism: Laclau's theory of populism and the lessons from religious populism in Greece', *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 9 (2004), p. 256: '[O]rganizational aspects of populist movements should not be studied independently from populist discourse but as dimensions of the discourses through which these movements and political identities are constituted...[P]opulism is neither a set of particular ideological contents nor a given organizational pattern, but rather a discursive logic, a mode of representing social and political space which, no doubt, influences both these realms'.

²³ The study of ideas by focusing on their real-world impact, the institutions they generate and the ways that these become their material expression draws on sociological and constructivist perspectives, especially in IR theory. For reference works see J.T. Checkel, 'The constructivist turn in International Relations theory', *World Politics*, 50 (1998),

pp. 324-348; T. Risse, 'Ideas do not float freely: transnational coalitions, domestic structures, and the end of the cold war', *International Organization*, 48 (1994), pp. 185-214.

²⁴ Note here that 'mode of politics' is not proposed as an alternative concept to describe populism, conservatism or other ideologies. It is not meant, for instance, to substitute '[thin-centred] ideology', 'discourse', 'strategy' etc. in the analysis of populism. It is rather a conceptual lens to study ideologies, highlighting the interconnections between their content and its material expressions. In this sense, the study of modes of politics does not call for a choice between different perspectives of ideologies, but for their integration and fruitful study side by side.

²⁵ Katz and Mair, *op. cit.*, Ref. 21.

²⁶ Much of the debates among the political elites of early modernity concerned precisely such questions. See indicatively Harvey C. Mansfield, *Statesmanship and Party Government* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965); Peter J. Stanlis, *Edmund Burke and the Natural Law* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1958).

²⁷ N. Mouzelis, 'On the concept of populism: Populist and clientelist modes of incorporation in semiperipheral polities', *Politics and Society*, 14 (1985), pp. 329-348.

²⁸ Katz and Mair, *op. cit.*, Ref. 21.

²⁹ See for example the foundational S.M. Lipset, *op. cit.*, Ref. 12.

³⁰ My use of the topographical description of modes of politics as 'horizontal' and 'vertical' builds on works that have looked at populism and conservatism as discursive appeals ordering through articulation the political field precisely along a vertical axis. For conservatism, the classical such statement is E.L. Gibson, *Class and Conservative Parties: Argentina in Comparative Perspective* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996): '[T]he Left seeks to slice society horizontally; conservative movements seek to slice it vertically' (p. 18). For populism, I rely especially on the work of Jenne, who defines populism as a discourse mobilizing 'along up-down vertical cleavages'. See E.K. Jenne, 'Is nationalism or ethnopopulism on the rise today?', *Ethnopolitics*, 17 (2018), pp. 546-552.

³¹ The top-down vs. bottom-up distinction draws on some recent works that explicitly discuss populism in these terms. Most notably see Heiskanen in this journal. J. Heiskanen, 'The nationalism-populism matrix', *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 26 (2021), pp. 335-355.

³² K. Weyland, 'A political-strategic approach', in C. Rovira Kaltwasser, P. Taggart, P. Ochoa Espejo and P. Ostiguy (Eds), *Oxford Handbook of Populism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), p. 59.

³³ R. Heinisch and O. Mazzoleni (Eds), *Understanding Populist Party Organisation: The Radical Right in Western Europe* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019).

³⁴ Moffitt, *op. cit.*, Ref. 9.

³⁵ Barr, *op. cit.*, Ref. 4, pp. 38, 41-42; Weyland, *op. cit.*, Ref. 11, p. 14.

³⁶ Barr, *op. cit.*, Ref. 4, pp. 33-34.

³⁷ Goodwyn, *op. cit.*, Ref. 20.

³⁸ P. Aslanidis, 'Populism and social movements', in C. Rovira Kaltwasser et al (Eds), *op. cit.*, Ref. 32, pp. 305-325; Laclau, *op. cit.*, Ref. 10.

³⁹ D. Ziblatt, *Conservative Parties and the Birth of Democracy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017).

⁴⁰ Barr, *op. cit.*, Ref. 4, pp. 38-39.

⁴¹ Müller, *op. cit.*, Ref. 6, pp. 361-364.

⁴² Consider, for example, imperial projects of capitalist modernization and aggressive militarism in 19th and 20th century Japan and Germany. See B. Moore, *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World* (Boston: Beacon, 1967).

⁴³ See for example E.D. Genovese, *The Southern Tradition: The Achievement and Limitations of an American Conservatism* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993). One may object to Genovese's assessment of the essence of the Southern ideology in 19th century United States, however he outlines convincingly how a conservatism defending entrenched hierarchies and privileges on a certain level can be re-articulated on another as a bottom-up defense against externally imposed modernization and encroachment.

⁴⁴ Genovese, *ibid.* McLynn similarly sees the opposition in 18th century England between the regime of the Glorious Revolution and Jacobitism (the support for the deposed Stuart dynasty) as 'the struggle of one form of conservatism

against another, [...] the empirical/positivistic variety against the nostalgic, reactionary kind'. F.J. McLynn, 'The ideology of Jacobitism on the eve of the rising of 1745 – part I', *History of European Ideas*, 6 (1985), p. 15.

⁴⁵ D. Caramani, 'Will vs. reason: The populist and technocratic forms of political representation and their critique to party government', *American Political Science Review*, 111 (2017), pp. 60-61.

⁴⁶ Ionescu and Gellner, *op. cit.*, Ref. 17.

⁴⁷ V.R. Hadiz and A. Chrysosgelos, 'Populism in world politics: A comparative cross-regional perspective', *International Political Science Review*, 38 (2017), pp. 399-411.

⁴⁸ Aslanidis, *op. cit.*, Ref. 38, p. 307; C. Bickerton and C. Accetti, 'Populism and technocracy: Opposites or complements?', *Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy*, 20 (2017), p. 193.

⁴⁹ Bale and Rovira Kaltwasser, *op. cit.*, Ref. 2; Huntington, *op. cit.*, Ref. 6, p. 454; Gibson, *op. cit.*, Ref. 30, p. 7.

⁵⁰ N. Gidron, 'Many ways to be right: Cross-pressured voters in Western Europe', *British Journal of Political Science*, 52 (2022), pp. 146-161. See also Huntington, *op. cit.*, Ref. 6, p. 457.

⁵¹ In populism this can be done by an 'overdeveloped state' (if populism is already in power) or an all-dominant party leadership. N. Mouzelis, *op. cit.*, Ref. 27; also Barr, *op. cit.*, Ref. 4, pp. 42.

⁵² D. Caramani, *op. cit.*, Ref. 45, pp. 55, 64. Populist parties of course can end up with thick and strong organisational structures akin to those of sectional mass parties. But rather than a way to represent societal interests, this organisational maturing of populist parties must be understood primarily as a pragmatic and tactical effort to build adaptable and resilient structures in party competition. And even then, the role of leadership at the top over followers in the bottom will remain paramount. See Heinisch and Mazzoleni, *op. cit.*, Ref. 33.

⁵³ One nuanced difference between the heteronomous organizations of populists and conservatives is that in populism the linkages between leaders and followers are purely 'plebiscitary', whereas because such linkages carry the potential for radicalization, conservatives prefer more deferential ones.

⁵⁴ Goodwyn, *op. cit.*, Ref. 20; Gibson, *op. cit.*, Ref. 30; Scruton, *op. cit.*, Ref. 14.

⁵⁵ N. Gidron and P.A. Hall, 'Populism as a problem of social integration', *Comparative Political Studies*, 53 (2020), pp. 1027-1059.

⁵⁶ Kondylis, *op. cit.*, Ref. 14.

⁵⁷ Huntington, *op. cit.*, Ref. 6, p. 454.

⁵⁸ D. Slater and N.R. Smith, 'The power of counterrevolution: Elitist origins of political order in postcolonial Asia and Africa', *American Journal of Sociology*, 121 (2016), pp. 1475-76.

⁵⁹ Goodwyn, *op. cit.*, Ref. 20.

⁶⁰ J. Gest, *The New Minority: White Working Class Politics in an Age of Immigration and Inequality* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).

⁶¹ A thorough exposition of this horizontal vision of societal competition is in A. Moravcsik, 'Taking preferences seriously: A liberal theory of international politics', *International Organization*, 51 (1997), pp. 513-553.

⁶² Gibson, *op. cit.*, Ref. 30, p. 18.

⁶³ Weyland, *op. cit.*, Ref. 11; Moffitt, *op. cit.*, Ref. 9.

⁶⁴ B. De Cleen and Y. Stavrakakis, 'Distinctions and articulations: A discourse theoretical framework for the study of populism and nationalism', *Javnost*, 24 (2017), pp. 301-319.

⁶⁵ K.A. Hawkins, R.E. Carlin, L. Littvay and C. Rovira Kaltwasser (Eds), *The Ideational Approach to Populism: Concept, Theory and Analysis* (London: Routledge, 2019).

⁶⁶ Barr, *op. cit.*, Ref. 4, p. 32; Bickerton and Accetti, *op. cit.*, Ref. 48, p. 193.

⁶⁷ Barr, *ibid.*, p. 44; Caramani, *op. cit.*, Ref. 45, p. 63.

⁶⁸ Mouzelis, *op. cit.*, Ref. 27, pp. 341-344.

⁶⁹ Ziblatt, *op. cit.*, Ref. 39.

⁷⁰ Laclau, *op. cit.*, Ref. 9, p. 81.

⁷¹ B. Ardit, 'Populism is hegemony is politics? On Ernesto Laclau's *On Populist Reason*', *Constellations*, 17 (2010), pp. 488-497.

⁷² Gibson, *op. cit.*, Ref. 30; Ziblatt, *op. cit.*, Ref. 39.

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- ⁷³ A. Chrysogelos, 'The people in the "here and now": Populism, modernization and the state in Greece', *International Political Science Review*, 38 (2017), pp. 473-487.
- ⁷⁴ P. Mair, 'Populist democracy vs party democracy', in Y. Mény and Y. Surel (Eds), *Democracies and the Populist Challenge* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002), pp. 81-98.
- ⁷⁵ O'Hara, *op. cit.*, Ref. 4.
- ⁷⁶ R.H. Johnson, 'The new populism and the old: demands for a New International Economic Order and American agrarian protest', *International Organization*, 37 (1983), pp. 41-72.
- ⁷⁷ The most complete presentation of the social context of Bolingbroke's time, his philosophical thought and political strategies is the excellent I. Kramnick, *Bolingbroke and His Circle: The Politics of Nostalgia in the Age of Walpole* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1968).
- ⁷⁸ See especially Colley's essential study: L. Colley, *In Defiance of Oligarchy: The Tory Party 1714-60* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).
- ⁷⁹ For a framing of Bolingbroke's conservatism as an expression of populist discontent against modernization see Kramnick, *op. cit.*, Ref. 77, pp. 60, 171, 245-250.
- ⁸⁰ For an intriguing analysis of how the late 19th and early 20th century constellation resembles the 21st century in the intertwining of populism, economic nationalism and geopolitical change, and Chamberlain and Brexit compared side by side, see C.M. Dent, 'Brexit, Trump and trade: Back to a late 19th century future?', *Competition and Change*, 24 (2020), pp. 338-357. For a placement of Chamberlain and imperial preference in a long history of populist reactions to economic reaction and change, see B. Eichengreen, *The Populist Temptation: Economic Grievance and Political Reaction in the Modern Era* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), pp. 38-42.
- ⁸¹ S. Hall, 'The great moving right show', *Marxism Today* (1979), pp. 14-20. For a contemporary discussion of how Hall's concept of populism relates to the discursive approach see G. Colpani, 'Two theories of hegemony: Stuart Hall and Ernesto Laclau in conversation', *Political Theory*, 50 (2022), pp. 221-246. On populism and neoliberalism through a theoretical lens making use of Hall's work, see J. Maskovsky and S. Bjork-James (Eds.), *Beyond Populism: Angry Politics and the Twilight of Neoliberalism* (Morgantown: West Virginia University Press, 2020).
- ⁸² Gidron and Hall, *op. cit.*, Ref. 55.
- ⁸³ G. Kolko, *The Triumph of Conservatism: A Reinterpretation of American History 1900-1916* (New York: Free Press, 1963).
- ⁸⁴ N. Gingrich, 'The Washington Establishment vs. The American People'. Washington: Heritage Foundation (1990). Available at <https://www.heritage.org/budget-and-spending/report/the-washington-establishment-vs-the-american-people-report-the-budget>.
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- ⁸⁶ K. Bluhm and M. Varga (Eds) *New Conservatives in Russia and East-Central Europe* (London: Routledge, 2018).
- ⁸⁷ D. McDonnell and A. Werner, *International Populism: The Radical Right in the European Parliament* (London: Hurst, 2019).
- ⁸⁸ Minkenberg, *op. cit.*, Ref. 1.