

LONDON METROPOLITAN UNIVERSITY

THE ROLE OF TRANSNATIONAL TELEVISION IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL DECISION-MAKING AFTER THE COLD WAR

Ph.D. Thesis

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Mom Tati, znam da bio bio ponosan.

Mojoj Mami, mom Hajri i mojoj Majri – bez nje nista od ovoga ne bi imalo smisla.

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AUTHOR'S DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this submission is my own work and that, to the best of my knowledge and belief, it contains no material previously published or written by another person nor material which has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma of the university or other institute of higher learning, except where due acknowledgment has been made in the text.

Zeljka Lekic
July 30, 2009

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ABSTRACT

This research investigates the role of media in the area of foreign policy, and especially the role of the 24/7 international news channels; it argues that media can make an impact on the process of political decision-making, rather than on the content of the policies themselves, and it specifies when, where and under what conditions this interaction can take place, including the most important features of both media coverage and political process. The interdisciplinary strategy of the research was implemented through two interrelated comparative analyses: (a) an assessment of the impact of the two international TV news channels, CNN International and BBC World, on a specific international political decision in comparison to the relative impact of other factors; and (b) the application of this procedure to two relevant case studies, which are, together with the content analysis, the primary research tools. Two cases with similar political/historical/strategic circumstances, but with different political outcomes, have been selected: Kosovo, before the beginning of NATO air strikes in 1999; and Darfur, in the periods of political discussion about possible international action in 2004 and in 2006.

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INTRODUCTION

THE PURPOSE OF THE THESIS AND ITS CENTRAL QUESTIONS

Both scholars and politicians claim that the period since the 1990s is a time characterized by the empowerment of media, and especially of television. It has been argued that television news has taken over from the newspaper the role of the major source of information¹ and that “because of its wide reach and high credibility” it has the potential to profoundly shape public opinion². Despite the generally justified criticisms that electronic mass media give too little space and time to foreign news, claims about media power and influence especially refer to international news coverage. This claim is placed alongside the observation that even these rare pieces of international news are mostly related to non-armed and armed conflicts, and are broadcast without the background vital for understanding³ - a trend accompanied by the closure of foreign news bureaus.

The end of the Cold War has brought significant changes: the framework that news professionals had long been using to select, structure and prioritize international news does not apply to the new world anymore⁴, and at the same time a «loss of policy certainty» in the aftermath of the Cold War may have opened up a particular window for the media and their influence⁵. The last decade was also the period when television 24/7 news channels developed steadily; only in Europe there are 162 national and international news channels available today to viewers⁶. Their global real-time news coverage has been associated with accelerating the pace of international communication, and even further, with direct participation in diplomatic practices and even in foreign policy outcomes – a phenomenon called “medialism”, “tele-diplomacy”, and the “CNN (Cable News Network) Effect”. Politicians claim 24/7 news channels have the role of “the sixteenth

¹ McDonald, D.G., Twentieth-Century Media Effects Research, in J.D.H. Downing, D. McQuail, P. Schlesinger and E. Wartella (eds), 2004, *The Sage Handbook of Media Studies*, pp. 183-200, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage

² Iyengar S. and D. Kinder, 1987, *News That Matters: Television and American Opinion*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press

³ Only in the 1990s, the three major US networks almost halved their foreign coverage, from 30% of total news coverage in the first half of decade, to only 21% in the second half; and overseas current affairs programming on Britain’s terrestrial television channels decreased substantially in the past decade, Thussu, D.K., *Media Plenty and the Poverty of News*, in Paterson, C. and A. Sreberny (eds.), 2004, *International News in the 21ST Century*, John Libbey Publishing for University of Luton Press

⁴ Norris, P., 1995, *Politics and the press: The news media and their influence*, Boulder, CP: Lynne Rienner, quoted in H. Denis Wu, 2003, *Homogeneity Around the World, Comparing the Systemic Determinants of International News Flow between Developed and Developing Countries*, *Gazette: The International Journal for Communication Studies*, SAGE Publications, London, Thousand Oaks and New Delhi, Vol 65 (1): 9-24

⁵ Sahw, M., 1996, *Civil Society and Media in Global Crises*, London: Pinter, quoted in Robinson, P., 2001, *Theorizing the Influence of Media on World Politics*, *European Journal of Communication*, SAGE Publications, Vol 16(4): 523-544

⁶ TV news channels explode in Europe but future unsure, October 9, 2009, Marie-Dominique Follain/AFP/Expatica

member of the UN Security Council”⁷, they have created an environment in which “public debate is no longer run by events, but by the coverage of events”⁸, and that their ability “to bring graphic images of pain and outrage into our living rooms has heightened the pressure both for immediate engagement in areas of international crises and immediate disengagement when events don’t go according to plan”⁹.

Although the topic of media influence in this arena became “in fashion”, scholars mostly agree that “we don’t have yet theories and models needed to understand the challenges of the modern media to officials and diplomats, the options available for dealing with these challenges, and their actual and potential effects on all the actors involved in diplomacy”¹⁰. Therefore, the primary purpose of this research is to investigate the role of media in the area of foreign policy, and especially the role of the 24/7 international news channels. In particular, it is concerned with the pattern of visibility and insight they bring to actions and events all over the world and its interaction with political decision making/makers. This study aims to determine *when, where and under what conditions this visibility and interaction could happen*. Therefore, the main research questions are:

- Does media, and particularly 24/7 international news channels, have an ability, to which extent and under which circumstances, to make the impact on the process of international decision-making?
- What are the features of media coverage and political process that could enhance such an impact?

RELEVANCE TO RESEARCH LITERATURE

The so called “CNN effect” has been until now a subject of different, and very often opposite and confusing definitions and approaches, of which a majority dealt with the policy-forcing effects in decisions about humanitarian intervention, mainly by the United States and Great Britain. It was defined as “a loss of policy control on the part of policy makers because of the power of the media, a power that they can do nothing about”¹¹, and summarized as “the way breaking news affects foreign policy decisions”¹²; in other words, as a theory that “compelling television images, such as images of a humanitarian crisis”, cause policymakers to intervene in a situation when such an intervention might otherwise not be in the national interest¹³. Some studies have elevated the debate about the CNN effect to a higher paradigmatic level, claiming that “CNN’s real-time coverage has destroyed the conventional diplomatic system and determined political and

⁷ Boutros-Boutros Ghali, former UN Secretary General, in Ammon, R.A., 2001, *Global Television and the Shaping of World Politics*, McFarland & Company, Inc., Jefferson, North Carolina, and London

⁸ Douglas Hurd, former British foreign secretary, quoted in Taylor, P., 1997, *Global communications, international affairs and the media since 1945*, London: Routledge

⁹ Madeleine Albright, former US Secretary of State, quoted in Neuman, J., 1996, *Light, camera, was: Is media technology driving international politics?*, New York: St. Martin’s Press, p. 14-15

¹⁰ Gilboa, E., 2001, *Communication Theory*, Oxford University Press

¹¹ Livingston S and T. Eachus, 1995, *Humanitarian crises and US foreign policy: Somalia and the CNN Effect reconsidered*, *Political Communication*, 12, p. 143

¹² Schorr, D., 1998, November 27, *CNN effect: Edge-of-seat diplomacy*, *Christian Science Monitor*, p. 11

¹³ Feist, S., 2001, *Facing down the global village: The media impact*, in Kugler, R. and E. Frost (eds.) *The global century*, Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, p. 713

diplomatic outcomes”¹⁴ and that generally the media, particularly television, “have completely transformed world politics”¹⁵.

However, some authors argue that media actually just follow the agenda set by politicians, saying that CNN also provides a “convenient way for administration officials to leak new policies in the hope that they’ll define the debate before political opponents do”¹⁶. The most radical theory to this effect is the “manufacturing consent” or “propaganda model”, according to which media content is “filtered” primarily by the reliance of the media on information provided by government, business, and “experts” funded and approved by these primary sources and agents of power¹⁷. Two implicit versions of this model, the executive and elite versions have been identified¹⁸. Unlike the executive version that denies any possibility for media to be critical and to have ability to influence executive processes, the latter emphasizes that media coverage conforms to the interests of political elites whether they are in the executive, legislative or any other politically powerful position in society and reflects consensus or conflict and struggles within the centers of power. In general, there are two approaches to the news production process: on one side is a propaganda model of the media, in which news coverage is seen to have a mobilizing function on behalf of special political and/or economic interests¹⁹, whose ultimate form is a ruling class as conceived in the Marxist tradition, and on the other is the view that news output, at least in modern, democratic societies, is a complex and contingent outcome of practical organizational circumstances, specific legal, financial and technical considerations, access to sources and journalists’ professional ethics²⁰. But these approaches are by no means mutually exclusive²¹. According to some, official sources – key members of the political establishment – dominate the news²², having as a consequence that even the best journalism is extremely dependent on the

¹⁴ O’Neill, M., 1993, *The roar of the crowd: How television and people power are changing the world*, New York: Times Books

¹⁵ Ammon, R.A., 2001, *Global Television and the Shaping of World Politics*, McFarland & Company, Inc., Jefferson, North Carolina, and London; and Edwards, L., 2001, *Mediapolitik: How the mass media have transformed world politics*, Washington, D.C., Catholic University of America Press

¹⁶ Strobel, W.P., May 1996, *The CNN Effect: How Much Influence Does the 24-Hour News Network Really Have on Foreign Policy*, *American Journalism Review*, University of Maryland, p. 34-37

¹⁷ Herman, E., and N. Chomsky, 1988, *Manufacturing Consent*, New York: Pantheon

¹⁸ Robinson, P., 2001, *Theorizing the Influence of Media on World Politics*, *European Journal of Communication*, SAGE Publications, Vol. 16(4): 523-544

¹⁹ Herman, E., and N. Chomsky, 1988, *Manufacturing Consent*, New York: Pantheon; Herman, E., 1986, *Gatekeeper versus propaganda models: a critical American perspective*, in Golding, P., G. Murdock and P. Schlesinger (eds) *Communicating Politics: Mass Communications and Political Process*, New York: Holmes and Meier

²⁰ Schudson, M., 1991, *The sociology of news production revisited*, in Curran, J. and M. Gurevitch (eds), *Mass Media and Society*, London: Edward Arnold; Williams, K., 1993, *The light at the end of the tunnel: the mass media, public opinion and the Vietnam War*, in Eldridge J. (ed) *Getting the Message: News, Truth and Power*, London and New York: Rutledge

²¹ Paterson, C. and A. Sreberny, *Shouting from the Rooftops: Reflections on International News in the 21st Century*, in Paterson, C. and A. Sreberny (eds.), 2004, *International News in the 21st Century*, John Libbey Publishing for University of Luton Press,

²² Sigal, L.V., 1986, *Sources Make the News*, in *Reading the News*, Manoff, R.K. and M. Shudson, eds., New York: Pantheon Books, p. 9-37; Van Ginneken, J., 1998, *Understanding Global News: A Critical Introduction*, SAGE Publications, London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi

political messages of a small spectrum of official news sources²³; while according to others, it is not a domination but a strong and persistent influence that can break down under various circumstances²⁴ - thus the news media could still have a possibility to have the “final say... by raising other issues, interjecting doubts, questioning motives, and seeking out critical sources for balance”²⁵. The propaganda model, as other competing approaches, will be presented in more detail in Chapter 1, but it will not be of prime importance for this research since it assumes in advance the effects of the complex process of news production that this research is going to investigate, and it focuses exclusively on media content, rather than expanding its scope to studying media effects directly²⁶.

More generally, communication theories of agenda-setting, which underline the correlation between the salience of issues or events in media and their salience in the public and elite’s mind²⁷, and of framing, which consists of “select(ing) some aspects of a perceived reality...in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendations”²⁸, also deal with the role of media in the foreign policy area. Framing analyses share with agenda-setting research a focus on the relationship between media and the elite’s perception of reality. However, framing analysis “expands beyond agenda-setting research into what people talk or think about by examining how they think and talk about issues in the news”²⁹. Framing effects have been defined as “changes in judgment engendered by subtle alterations in definition of judgment or choice of problems”³⁰.

Very important for this research are the theories that combine elements of two opposite approaches to the CNN effect and that define conditions in which possible interaction between the media coverage and the political process could take place. In particular, the “Indexing hypothesis” suggests that reporters index the slant of their coverage to reflect the range of opinions that exists within the government³¹, but also that such journalist practice does allow for critique of policy. Hallin labeled it “the sphere of legitimate

²³ Bennett, W.L., 1990, Toward a theory of press-state relation in the United States, *Journal of Communications*, 40, pp. 103-125

²⁴ Hallin, D. C., 1986, *The Uncensored War: The Media and Vietnam*. New York: Oxford University press; Palmer, J., 2000, *Spinning into control: news values and source strategies*, Leicester University Press *Studies In Communication & Society*

²⁵ Cook, T., 1998, *Governing the News, The News Media as a Political Institution*, The University of Chicago Press

²⁶ Klaehn, J., 2002, A Critical Review And Assessment Of Herman And Chomsky’s Propaganda Model, *European Journal of Communication*, Sage Publications London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi, Vol 17 (2): 147-182

²⁷ Simon, A.F., Summer 1997, Television News and International Earthquake Relief, *Journal of Communication* 47 (3), pp. 82-92

²⁸ Entman, R.M., 1993, Framing: Towards clarification of a fractured paradigm, *Journal of Communication*, 43(4), p. 52

²⁹ Pan Z. & G.M. Kosicki, 1993, Framing analyses: An approach to news discourse, *Political Communication*, 10, p. 70

³⁰ Iyengar, S., 1987, Television news and citizens’ explanations of national affairs, *American Political Science Review*, 81 (3), p. 816

³¹ Gilboa, E., 2005, The CNN Effect: The Search For A Communication Theory Of International Relations”, *Political Communication*, 22: 27-44, Taylor & Francis Inc.

controversy”³² – when a disagreement over a certain issue exists among important elites, “journalists who covered such issues felt obliged to present a more balanced form of coverage that gave government critics a significant amount of time and space to present their views”³³. Robinson developed it further, pointing out that in a case when elite dissensus is accompanied by policy uncertainty within government and by critically framed media coverage, “media takes sides in political debate and becomes an active participant and can influence policy outcomes”³⁴. Therefore, according to his “policy-media interaction model”³⁵, “media influence on policy occurs when there exists, first, policy uncertainty... and, second, extensive and critically framed media coverage”. In this situation, “policy-makers can be forced to respond to media-driven public pressure or the fear of potential negative public reaction to government inaction”³⁶. Robinson also underlines that one could expect the media to have a major impact in low-cost responses to humanitarian crises, such as government involvement in aid agency relief, when the policy response involves “at most, the allocation of additional funds, military logistical support and donations”³⁷.

An attempt will be made to bring originality to this research through the usage of the journalistic experience for understanding investigated media practices and their every-day professional environment, for obtaining relevant information and data needed for academic research strategies; it also informs the selection of case studies in which existing media effects theories will be tested, and their hypotheses confirmed, developed or confronted. Academics and journalists express different and very often opposite positions toward various aspects of media practice and its importance. For journalists, the explanation of news coverage is obvious – competition and cost-effectiveness – and academics, in their view, are on a constant search for “irrelevant phantom explanations of journalism”³⁸. Different approaches can be observed within the academic world too. The studies of media output and its influence vary in their orientation: world-politics centric studies rely primarily on interviews with senior policy makers without systematic analyses of media coverage, while media-centric studies are based on framing and content analyses of media reports, public opinion surveys and interviews with journalists. Another source of variation derives from the point of departure of the research: media production and output on one side or political system on another. The intention of this research will be to bridge the gap between these approaches by adopting an

³² Hallin, D., 1986, *The Uncensored War*, Berkeley: University of California Press

³³ Wolfsfeld, G., 2001, *The News Media and Peace Process*, The Middle East and Northern Ireland, United States Institute of Peace, Washington DC, p.12

³⁴ Robinson, P., 2001, *Theorizing The Influence Of Media On World Politics*, European Journal of Communication, SAGE Publications, Vol 16(4): 523-544

³⁵ Robinson, P., 2002, *The CNN Effect: The myth of news, foreign policy, and intervention*, London: Routledge

³⁶ Robinson, P., 2000, *Research Note: The News Media and Intervention, Triggering the Use of Air Power During Humanitarian Crises*, European Journal of Communication, SAGE Publications, London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi, Vol 15 (3), p. 405-414

³⁷ Robinson P., *The CNN Effect: The myth of news, foreign policy and intervention*, 2002, Routledge, London and New York, p.124

³⁸ Paterson, C. and A. Sreberny, *Shouting from the Rooftops: Reflections on International News in the 21st Century*, in Paterson, C. and A. Sreberny (eds.), 2004, *International News in the 21st Century*, John Libbey Publishing for University of Luton Press, p. 13

interdisciplinary research strategy and by taking into account contemporary arguments and theories deriving from communication and media studies.

METHODOLOGY

In terms of the methods employed for the analysis of media coverage, the key conclusions some researchers drew, was that it was not possible to analyze individual texts in isolation from the study of the wider system of ideology which informed them. According to Philo and Glasgow Media Group, in any contentious area there will be competing ways of describing events and their history³⁹. Ideas are linked to interests and these competing interests will seek to explain the world in ways which justify their own position. So ideology, defined as an interest-linked perspective, and the struggle for legitimacy “go hand in hand”⁴⁰ – an approach that is clearly compatible with the “propaganda model” mentioned above, which sees propaganda as the means by which an ideology is maintained. According to Foucault, discourse (understood as statements in general or a particular group or type of statements) is “a social force which has a central role in what is constructed as ‘real’ and therefore what is possible” and it is thus “crucial in explaining how the social subject is positioned and limited”⁴¹. For these authors, analysis of the media impact or lack of impact over the policy process is not only a question of method, but is connected with a vision of the wider social order. However, the major implications of these schools of thought will be used here only as they are relevant for this research with the focus on the nature of the processes in which media and political decision-making interact. Going back to methods, Van Dijk suggests that a discourse analytical approach has to go beyond the traditional studies of ideology and language that have focused on ‘lexical items’ i.e. individual words which may imply a value judgment. He notes that opinions and the assumptions which they contain may be expressed in many complex ways in text and talk, in for example: “headlines, story structures, arguments, graphical arrangements, syntactic structures, semantic structures of coherence, overall topics and so on”⁴² – an approach congruent with the framing analysis that will be presented on following pages. Philo underlines the importance of visual images in the studies of television news, taking the example of UK media coverage of the Falklands War, at the moment when the British military had ordered the bombing of the air field at Port Stanley, the capital of the Falklands, which was occupied and being used by Argentine forces. The British Ministry of Defense claimed initially that this attack was successful and that the air field could not be used, but it was then forced to make a concession, issuing a statement that the air field could be used by ‘light air craft’. The

³⁹ Philo, G., Hewitt, J. and P. Beharrell, 1995, *And Now They’re Out Again: Industrial News*, in Philo, Greg. (ed.) *Glasgow Media Group Reader: Industry, Economy, War and Politics*, Vol. 2, London: Routledge; Philo, G., Beharrell, P. and J. Hewitt, 1977, *One Dimensional News – Television and the Control of Explanation*, in Beharrell, P. and G. Philo, (ed.), *Trade Unions and the Media*, London: Macmillan; Glasgow University Media Group, 1980, *More Bad News*, London: Routledge; Glasgow University Media Group, 1982, *Really Bad News*, London: Writers and Readers

⁴⁰ Philo, G., 2007, *Can Discourse Analysis Successfully explain the Content of Media and Journalistic Practice*, *Journalism Studies*, Vol 8 Number 2

⁴¹ Foucault, M., 1994, *What is Enlightenment?*, in Rabinow, P. (ed.) *Michel Foucault, Essential Works Volume 1 (Ethics)*, England: Harmondsworth, p. 318

⁴² Van Dijk, T., 1998, *Opinions and Ideologies in the Press*, in Bell, A. and P. Garrett, (ed.) *Approaches to Media Discourse*, Oxford: Blackwell, p. 31

ITN journalist reporting on this statement used pictures of a very large Hercules transport plane going along the run way as the visual background, creating a contradiction between the images and his report⁴³ – a contradiction that would not be obvious if images were not analyzed. All these arguments have been taken into account for the purpose of the qualitative analysis of media coverage made in this research. In particular, the use of framing and agenda-setting theories is intended to address the concerns raised in these theories and methods in line with the main research questions listed above. Additionally, Philo suggests that the analysis of media content should be accompanied by the analysis of the production and reception processes, seeing reception as the way in which media output is received and understood by mass media audiences, i.e. 'ordinary citizens'. The focus of my research is on reception by a limited group in the overall audience – the elites referred to above. The assessment of such reception is done through a comparative analysis of media content, real-world indicators and the political processes in question, which should be an adequate method for assessing possible media impact.

Therefore, the interdisciplinary strategy is implemented through two interrelated comparative analyses: (a) an assessment of international TV news channels' impact on a specific international political decision in comparison to the relative impact of other factors; and (b) application of this procedure to two relevant case studies, which will be, together with the content analysis, the primary research tools. While the case study research may lack the generalizability of research based upon a large number of cases, its primary virtue is the in-depth analysis that it offers⁴⁴ and therefore it should be able to provide the essential evidence needed to disentangle causal processes and mechanisms. To avoid criticisms about generalizability, two cases with similar political/historical/strategic circumstances, but with different political outcomes, have been selected: Kosovo and Darfur. These cases are comparable because both include mass violation of human rights, refugee exodus and humanitarian emergency, and both places at the same time have no major political and strategic significance for key political decision makers. In the two cases the political outcome is completely different: the Kosovo case ended with a NATO bombing campaign unprecedented in the history of this organization while in Darfur only sporadic and very limited international intervention has occurred until the present day.

Each of the case studies has two basic components:

1. Quantitative and qualitative analysis of television archive material prior to relevant political decisions, in order to identify the intensity and time devoted to the country/conflict/political process in question and to detect the frames used in the coverage. The primary source of television material will be CNN International and BBC World, because of their worldwide reach, their large elite audience and their considerable influence on the media agendas of other news media, particularly where events outside the main Western nations are concerned. At the same time, their coverage will also be compared with the coverage of news agencies/major newspapers in the same time period, which will allow me to

⁴³ ITV, main news, 14th May 1982, in Philo, G., 2007, Can Discourse Analysis Successfully explain the Content of Media and Journalistic Practice, *Journalism Studies*, Vol 8 Number 2

⁴⁴ Gerring J., May 2004, What Is A Case Study And What Is Good For, *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 98, No. 2

identify potential moments of “media silence” or the pictures “they choose to ignore”.

- Analysis of the political process that includes the historical and political background of the region and conflict in question, i.e. so called real-world indicators, and the time line of the process of decision-making through the archive analysis of relevant documentation of the political process, including transcripts of sessions of governing institutions, public statements, and published interviews. This analysis will not have only a quantitative aspect – measuring the level of attention given to the country/conflict/political process in question – but also a qualitative one, in an attempt to discover the frames used by politicians and observable implications of elite dissensus and policy uncertainty or inconsistency which could reinforce possible media influence.

SUMMARY OF CHAPTERS

Chapter 1 will present a summary of the available literature published until now about the main communication and international politics approaches that deal with the media, especially 24/7 television news channels, and international political decision-making. The focus of the chapter will be on CNN effect theory and some of its most quoted cases, in order to examine the writing that underpins and debates the main hypothesis of this research: that media can, under certain conditions, influence international decision making in relation to distant conflict situations.

Chapter 2 will describe the main characteristics of ‘real-time’ transnational news channels, in particular CNN International and BBC World and will explain the reasons behind the decision to choose television, and in particular these two 24/7 international news channels, as the most adequate source of media coverage in this research.

Chapter 3 will outline the methodological approach taken in this study and it will explain how empirical part of this research fulfills the goal of investigating the interaction between media coverage and the international political decision-making process.

Chapters 4, 5 and 6 belong to the Kosovo case study. Chapter 4 will present the background of the Kosovo case: the history and main characteristics of the region, including its geo-strategic importance, the history of international policy toward Kosovo, and an overview of the situation in the investigated time period. Chapter 5 will show the results of both quantitative and qualitative content analysis of the television archive material prior to political decisions regarding Kosovo in 1999, in order to identify the intensity and time devoted to this region/conflict/political process and to detect the frames used in the coverage. Chapter 6 will present the results of the analysis of the time line of the process of decision-making through the archive analysis of relevant policy documentation, in order to determine the level of attention given to Kosovo by key policy makers, but also to detect whether the frames used by media and the policy prescriptions they represented were accepted and followed by politicians, and to discover observable implications of policy uncertainty or inconsistency which could reinforce the possible media influence. It will also contain hypotheses deriving from the comparison of the results of the media and policy process analyses in this case.

Chapters 7, 8 and 9 belong to the Darfur case study and they will follow the same pattern as the Kosovo case study. Therefore, Chapter 7 will present the background of the Darfur case, including the history and main characteristics of the region, the history of international policy toward Darfur, and an overview of the situation in the investigated time period; Chapter 8 will present the results of both quantitative and qualitative content analysis of the television archive material before key events in Darfur in 2004 and 2006; and Chapter 9 will show the results of the analysis of the time line of the process of decision-making through the archive analysis of relevant policy documentation and will present hypotheses deriving from the comparison of the results of media and policy process analyses in this case.

The Conclusion will present the results of the comparative analysis of the Kosovo and Darfur case studies, and through this comparison, will provide answers to the main research questions.

A POSSIBLE LIMITATION OF THIS RESEARCH

Politicians' public faces may not be a true reflection of what is actually being attended to behind the scenes: we cannot see inside the minds of policy-makers and directly observe news media influence at work, so more varied and inventive methods are needed to understand the processes by which media have effects; for example, we may assume that as a matter of routine politicians and their advisers attempt to anticipate what media responses will be to anticipated events, but there is relatively little evidence of the details of the daily workings of this process, clearly due to problems of access to relevant information. But detailed content analysis of media coverage and archive analysis of relevant documentation of the political processes should overcome this limitation. Assuming the relative transparency of political decision making in Western democracies, these sources should be relevant indicators of how a political decision has been initiated, created and developed.

SUMMARY

As presented above, the primary purpose of this research - to investigate the role of media in the area of foreign policy and to determine under what conditions the interaction between media and political decision making/makers is possible – will be achieved through the analysis of media content and political processes in two carefully selected case studies, within the framework of communication theories that deal with media effects, notably agenda setting, framing, the “CNN effect”, and the indexing hypothesis.

CHAPTER ONE: LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter presents a summary of the most relevant part of the literature published until now about the main communication and international politics approaches that deal with the media, especially 24/7 television news channels, and international political decision-making. Theory review is very important part of every social science research, since it enables us to generate informed and logically coherent hypotheses about how and why phenomena occur⁴⁵, and that will be the main task of this chapter. The focus of the chapter will be on the CNN effect theory and some of its most quoted cases, in order to examine the writing that underpins and debates the main hypothesis of this research: that media can, under certain conditions, influence international decision making in relation to distant conflict situations. Additionally, the literature review will help in defining these conditions and the form the media influence can take.

MEDIA EFFECTS IN COMMUNICATION THEORY

Media effects studies began to develop at the beginning of the last century, and in these early days direct media effects were typically conceived of as learning effects; other effects were a consequence of what was learned⁴⁶. Subsequently Lazarsfeld summarized the issue of media effects more broadly in these terms: "Mass media can affect knowledge, attitudes, opinions and behavior of individuals. These effects can be immediate or delayed, of short duration or long-lasting. Effects upon individuals might slowly become transformed into institutional changes. They can come about in simple reactions or complicated chains as when institutional changes produced by the media in turn affect individuals."⁴⁷ In his book *Public Opinion* 1922, Lippmann argued that "the mass media are the principal connection between (a) events that occur in the world and (b) the images of these events in our minds"⁴⁸. He pointed out the importance of media in shaping our notion of the world beyond what we can experience directly, and the world of politics, especially international, which is almost entirely beyond the reach of our direct experience. Similarly, Laswell believed that "media play the critical role in directing our attentions to issues"⁴⁹. More than 40 years ago, Cohen formulated the question that was going to be investigated until the present day: "What are the consequences, for the foreign policy-making environment, of the way that the press defines and performs its job, and of the way that its output is assimilated by the participants in the process?"⁵⁰ Going further in the analysis of the media output and its effects, Cohen identified three major roles of the press in the foreign policy field, and that

⁴⁵ Robinson P., *The CNN Effect: The myth of news, foreign policy and intervention*, 2002, Routledge, London and New York, p.19

⁴⁶ Edwards, R., 1915, *Popular Amusements*, New York: Association Press; Wilcox, D.F., 1900, *The American Newspaper: A study in social psychology*, Philadelphia: American Academy of Political and Social Sciences

⁴⁷ Lazarsfeld, P.F., 1948, *Communication research and the social psychologist*, in W. Dennis (Ed.), *Current trends in social psychology*, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, p. 249

⁴⁸ Lippmann, W., 1922, *Public Opinion*, New York: Harcourt Brace, in Dearing J.W. and E.M. Rogers, 1996, *Agenda-Setting*, Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, London, New Delhi, p.11

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Cohen, B., 1963, *The Press and Foreign Policy*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, p. 4

is considered as a major contribution of his study. These are: the role of the press as observer, which focuses on important aspects of the search for and presentation of foreign policy news; the role of the press as participant, focusing on the interplay between the press, policymakers and other participants in the foreign policy process; and the role of the press as catalyst, looking at the manner in which the press is used by the public to satisfy its interests in foreign affairs and the implications of this role for foreign policy coverage⁵¹. In the late 1960s, cognitive psychology began to provide raw material for advances in mass communication effects research. Armed with such concepts as salience and pertinence, media effects research began to abandon the question of whether media had effects and instead to attempt to specify the mechanisms by which those effects were achieved⁵². Another pioneer research of media effects was published by Maxwell E. McCombs and Donald L. Shaw in 1972 and in their influential article the term agenda-setting appeared for the first time. It concluded that “the media appear to have exerted a considerable impact on voters’ judgments” of what they considered the major issues of the 1968 US presidential campaign. While presidential candidates placed widely different emphasis upon different issues, the judgments of the voters seemed to reflect the composite of the mass media coverage⁵³. During 1980s and 1990s, agenda setting was transformed from a hypothesis to a research area, incorporating earlier sociological concerns such as gatekeeping⁵⁴, which is linked with the process of media production and news diffusion⁵⁵, which derives from the research of media reception. Attempts were also made to link agenda setting to other theories, such as news framing, media priming, and the spiral of silence⁵⁶. Media priming refers to the activity of the media in proposing the values and standards by which objects of media attention can be judged; while agenda-setting refers mainly to the importance of an issue, priming tells the public whether something is good or bad, whether it is communicated effectively, etc. The concept of the spiral of silence describes the tendency for people to be influenced in what they think by what they think other people think, i.e. the tendency for those who think they hold a minority or deviant view to refrain from expressing it in public, thus accelerating the dominance of the supposed consensus. Media framing and agenda-setting itself will be presented in more detail later in this chapter, since they present major theoretical approaches in this research.

⁵¹ Larson, J.F., 1984, *Television's Window On The World: International Affairs Coverage On The Us Networks*, Ablex Publishing Cooperation, Norwood, New Jersey, p. 130

⁵² McDonald, D.G., *Twentieth-Century Media Effects Research*, in J.D.H. Downing, D. McQuail, P. Schlesinger and E. Wartella (eds), *The Sage Handbook of Media Studies*, 2004, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, pp. 183-200

⁵³ McCombs, M.E and D. L. Shaw, *The Agenda-Setting Of Mass Media*, *The Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 36, No. 2 (Summer, 1972), pp 176-187

⁵⁴ Becker, L.B., McCombs, M.E., and J.M. McLeod, 1975, *The development of political cognition in* Chafee, S., (ed.) *Political communications: Issues and strategies for research*, *Sage Annual Reviews of Communication Research* No. 4, Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, p. 21-63; White, D.M., 1950, *The “gatekeeper”*: A case study in the selection of news, *Journalism Quarterly*, 27(4), 383-390

⁵⁵ Breed, W., 1960, *Social control in the news room*, in Schramm, W. (ed.) *Mass communications*, Urbana: University of Illinois Press, p. 178-194

⁵⁶ McDonald, D.G., *Twentieth-Century Media Effects Research*, in J.D.H. Downing, D. McQuail, P. Schlesinger and E. Wartella (eds), *The Sage Handbook of Media Studies*, 2004, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, pp. 183-200

Despite the fact that specific media phenomena like CNN and the Internet recently became increasingly popular as research topics, according to some authors media studies still “retain a Cinderella status” in all main theoretical schools of international relations. A survey of six leading American and British international-relations journals shows that less than 2 percent of all articles concerned any aspect of media⁵⁷.

Beside the general theories of agenda setting⁵⁸ and framing⁵⁹, the overall framework of communications theory today includes also some specific theories that deal with press-government relations such as the indexing hypothesis⁶⁰, manufacturing consent or propaganda model theory⁶¹, and - the most important for this research – the so called CNN effect. The indexing hypothesis and the propaganda model theory deal primarily with the production phase of the news cycle, and as such they are not as relevant for this research as the agenda-setting, framing and CNN effect are. Still, their assumptions will be presented here not only because they contradict the CNN effect theory by viewing media coverage as a reflection of governmental interests and opinions alone, but also because they link media effects with the analysis of the political process.

According to the manufacturing consent or propaganda model theory, media content is “filtered” primarily by the reliance of the media on information provided by government, businessmen, and experts funded and approved by these primary sources and agents of power, and consequently they are able to use the media to mobilize public support for governmental policies⁶². “Most biased choices in the media arise from the pre-selection of right-thinking people, internalized preconceptions, and the adaptation of personnel to the constraints of ownership, organization, market and political power”⁶³. Such theorists believe that government officials keep the information available to the public within “such narrow ideological boundaries that democratic deliberation and influence are all but impossible”⁶⁴. This theory does not assume that news workers and editors are typically coerced or instructed to omit certain voices and accentuate others, but that the process of control is often unconscious and that the censorship is largely self-censorship. Its basic argument in this context is that meanings are essentially filtered by the constraints that are built into the system⁶⁵. Critics of this “neo-Marxist” theory, often

⁵⁷ Mekelberg, D., 1998, unpublished doctoral research, University of Sussex, in Shaw, M., *Media and Public Sphere without Borders? News Coverage and Power from Kurdistan to Kosovo*, in Nacos, B.L., Shapiro R.Y. and P. Isernia (eds), 2000, *Decisionmaking in a Glass House; Mass Media, Public Opinion and American and European Foreign Policy in the 21st Century*, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, INC. London, Boulder, New York, Oxford, p. 29

⁵⁸ McCombs, M., Shaw D. & Weaver D., 1997, *Communication and democracy: Exploring the intellectual frontiers in agenda-setting*, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers, Mahwah, New Jersey London

⁵⁹ Reese, S., Gaundy O. and Grant A. (eds.), 2001, *Framing public life*, Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum

⁶⁰ Bennett, W.L., 1990, *Toward a theory of press-state relation in the United States*, *Journal of Communications*, 40, pp. 103-125

⁶¹ Herman, E., and N. Chomsky, 1988, *Manufacturing Consent*, New York: Pantheon

⁶² Gilboa, E., 2005, *The CNN Effect: The Search For A Communication Theory Of International Relations*, *Political Communication*, 22, Taylor & Francis Inc., pp. 27-44,

⁶³ Herman, E., and N. Chomsky, 1988, *Manufacturing Consent*, New York: Pantheon, p. xii

⁶⁴ Entman, R.M., 2004, *Projections of Power: Framing News, Public Opinion, and US Foreign Policy*, Chicago: Chicago University Press, p. 4

⁶⁵ Klaehn, J., 2002, *A Critical Review And Assessment Of Herman And Chomsky's Propaganda Model*, *European Journal of Communication*, Sage Publications London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi, Vol 17 (2): 147-182

referred to as an almost conspiratorial view of the media⁶⁶, underline that it is based primarily on circumstantial evidence⁶⁷. For example while its assumption of ideologically serviceable media means in practice that the media's interpretations "can and typically do propagandize and/or mislead audiences", and therefore have consequential influence and effects, the model focuses exclusively on media content, rather than expanding its scope to studying media effects directly⁶⁸. Herman and Chomsky's idea of a unified ruling class and ruling-class interests is also seen as problematic⁶⁹. Contrary to this model's tendency to ignore the possibility that journalists might actually take sides during elite debates over policy, or even take the side of non-elites, and in doing so become powerful participants in a political debate, Timothy Cook argues that journalists should not be considered as the passive recipients of official information but as active participants functioning as a political institution in their own right⁷⁰. The most common conclusion is that while it may serve as a tool to analyze American media coverage of conflicts during the Cold War, it is much less relevant to the conflicts of the post-Cold War era⁷¹. But beside this, *executive* version of the manufacturing consent paradigm, there is also the second, *elite* version⁷², which holds that news media coverage conforms to the interests of political elites in general whether they are in the executive, legislative or any other politically powerful position in society. According to Robinson, an important claim of elite manufacturing consent theory is that news coverage which criticizes or challenges executive policy occurs when elite conflict exists with regard to that policy and hence, contrary to the executive version of the manufacturing consent paradigm, the possibility that news media coverage might be critical of executive policy is allowed for. An implication of this possibility is that "news media coverage might have the ability to influence executive policy processes when there is elite conflict over an issue"⁷³. The "Indexing hypothesis" suggests that reporters index the slant of their coverage to reflect the range of opinions that exists within the government⁷⁴, i.e. that they open and close the news gates to a broader range of views according to levels of conflict among public officials and established interests involved in decision-making about an issue⁷⁵. According to Mermin,

⁶⁶ Holsti, O. R. and J. N. Rosenau, 1984, *American Leadership in World Affairs*, Boston, MA: Allen and Unwin, p. 174

⁶⁷ Gilboa, E., 2005, *The CNN Effect: The Search For A Communication Theory Of International Relations*, Political Communication, 22: 27-44, Taylor & Francis Inc.

⁶⁸ Klaehn, J., 2002, *A Critical Review And Assessment Of Herman And Chomsky's Propaganda Model*, European Journal of Communication, Sage Publications London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi, Vol 17 (2): 147-182

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Cook, T., 1998, *Governing the News, The News Media as a Political Institution*, The University of Chicago Press, p. 12

⁷¹ Compaine, B., 2002, *Global media*, Foreign Press, 133, pp. 20-28, in Gilboa, E., 2005, *The CNN Effect: The Search For A Communication Theory Of International Relations*, Political Communication, 22: 27-44, Taylor & Francis Inc.

⁷² Hallin, D., 1986, *The Uncensored War*, Berkeley: University of California Press; Bennett, L. W., 1990, *Toward a Theory of Press-State Relations in the United States*, Journal of Communication 40(2): 103-25

⁷³ Robinson, P., 2001, *Theorizing the Influence of Media on World Politics, Models of Media Influence on Foreign Policy* European Journal of Communication, SAGE Publications, London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi, Vol 16(4): 523-544

⁷⁴ Gilboa, E., 2005, *The CNN Effect: The Search For A Communication Theory Of International Relations*, Political Communication, 22: 27-44, Taylor & Francis Inc.

⁷⁵ Bennett, W.L., 2005, *News; The Politics Of Illusion*, Pearson Longman, p. 4

the indexing norm is extremely convenient to news organizations because “a single set of sources minimizes the expenditure of time and money and maximizes presumed credibility”⁷⁶. He explains that indexing does not actually amount to a mirroring of an objective account of problems and policies, but to a reinforcement and reproduction in the news of the “strategic calculations of politicians”⁷⁷, and thus, the media make no independent contribution to foreign policy debate. But he also underlines that when there is no policy debate at all, only consensus, “indexing does allow for critique of policy” and journalists may find a critical angle in the possibility that existing policy, on its own terms, might not work⁷⁸. Other authors believe too that this indexing hypothesis is not mutually exclusive with CNN effect and other media approaches that see news output as a “complex and contingent outcome of practical organizational circumstances, specific legal, financial and technical considerations, access to sources and journalists’ professional ethics”⁷⁹.

AGENDA-SETTING

“There is an enormous amount of news “killed” every day”, as Park said of media gatekeeping; he thus implied what is today called the agenda-setting process⁸⁰. The original agenda setting theory deals with the media agenda, the public agenda and the policy agenda, and the interrelationships among these three elements and it has been mainly applied to political communication, especially election campaigns. For example, the analysis of French television news in the run-up to the first round of the 2002 French presidential elections shows that its focus on the issue of *l’insécurité* greatly contributed to the public concern about this subject and also moderated the campaign themes of two candidates, Jacques Chirac and Jean-Marie Le Pen⁸¹. Agenda-setting refers to the process by which “problems become salient as political issues around which policy alternatives can be defined and support or opposition can be crystallized”⁸². Agenda-setting offers an explanation of “why information about certain issues, and not other issues, is available to the public in a democracy; how public opinion is shaped; and why certain issues are addressed through policy actions while other issues are not”⁸³. Rather than focusing on positive or negative attitudes toward an issue, agenda-setting scholars focus on the salience of an issue, i.e. the degree to which an issue on the agenda is perceived as relatively important⁸⁴. Agenda setting includes the notion that “the media are more

⁷⁶ Mermin, J., 1999, *Debating war and peace: Media coverage of US intervention in the post-Vietnam era*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, p. 25-26

⁷⁷ Ibid, p. 43

⁷⁸ Ibid, p. 9

⁷⁹ Sakr, N., *Al-Jazeera Satellite Channel: Global Newscasting in Arabic*, in Paterson, C. and A. Sreberny, 2004, *International News in the 21st Century*, John Libbey Publishing for University of Luton Press, p. 147-168

⁸⁰ Park, R.E., 1922, p. 328, in Dearing J.W. and E.M. Rogers, 1996, *Agenda-Setting*, Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, London, New Delhi

⁸¹ Kuhn, R., 2005, *Be Very Afraid*, *European Journal of Communications*, Sage Publications, London, p. 182-188

⁸² Cobb, R., and C., Elder, 1972, *Participation in American Politics: The dynamics of agenda-building*, Boston: Allyn and Bacon

⁸³ Dearing J.W. and E.M. Rogers, 1996, *Agenda-Setting*, Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, London, New Delhi, p.2

⁸⁴ Ibid, p.8

successful at telling people what to think about rather than what to think”⁸⁵. As Dearing and Rogers noted, “the agenda-setting process must, theoretically, be a zero-sum game”, i.e. if an issue is to climb the public, media or policy agenda, “it must push other issues down the agenda and eventually shove one of the earlier issues off of the agenda”⁸⁶. But since the agenda-setting theory suggests that that media coverage can play a role in putting some issues on government’s agenda, it follows that lack of media coverage can also be a factor in lack of policy and therefore the media blackout of most of the world’s major conflicts can also be linked to the absence of those conflicts from the both policy and public agendas of foreign countries⁸⁷.

Although the process is not easy to prove, since media can take their priorities from public opinion as well as from politicians or employ similar criteria to select problems, support for the hypothesis of media agenda-setting effects has been found in numerous studies over the past few decades. After reviewing the literature, Rogers and Dearing state that “the media agenda seems to have direct, sometimes strong, influence upon the policy agenda of elite decision makers”⁸⁸. According to Iyengar, “the themes and issues that are repeated in television news coverage become the priorities of viewers. Issues and events highlighted by television news become especially influential as criteria for evaluating public officials”⁸⁹. Investigating patterns of influence in agenda-setting through the time-series measure of presidential, media and congressional attention, Edwards and Wood found that in foreign policy the president responds primarily to: a) fluctuations in attention by media, and b) world events⁹⁰.

Some authors point out that a definite cause-and-effect relationship can be often seen between news stories, especially on television, and a surge in relief efforts and humanitarian aid⁹¹. For example, crisis in the news such as Chechnya (1995-97), Kosovo (1998), Rwanda (1994), and Yugoslavia (1994-95) received 85-100% of their requirements whereas forgotten emergencies received far less⁹².

⁸⁵ Cohen, B., 1963, *The Press and Foreign Policy*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press

⁸⁶ Dearing J.W. and E.M. Rogers, 1996, *Agenda-Setting*, Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, London, New Delhi, p. 66

⁸⁷ Hawkins, V., 2002, *The Other Side Of The CNN Factor: The Media And Conflict*, Journalism Studies, Volume 3, Number 2, Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, pp. 225-240

⁸⁸ Rogers, E.M and J.W. Dearing 1994, *Agenda Setting Research: Where Has It Beed, Where It Is Going*, p. 91, in Graber D.A., (ed), 2000, *Media Power in Politics*, 3rd Edition, Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press

⁸⁹ Iyengar, S., 1991, *Is anyone responsible? How television frames political issues*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, p. 2

⁹⁰ Edwards, G.C. III and B.D. Wood, January 1999, *Who Influence Whom? The President, Congress, And The Media*, *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 93, No.2, pp. 327-344

⁹¹ Jakobsen, P.V., 2000, *Focus On The CNN Misses The Pont: The Real Media Impact On Conflict Management Is Invisible And Indirect*, *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 37, no.2, SAGE Publications, London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi, pp.131-143; Giardet, E.R, ed., 1995, *Somalia, Rwanda, and Beyond: The Role of the International Media in Wars and Humanitarian Crisis*, Dublin: Crosslines Global Report and the Italian Academy for Advanced Studies at Columbia University, p. 150

⁹² OCHA, 1999, *Financial Tracking Database for Complex Emergencies*, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, http://www.reliefweb.int/ocha_ol/, in Jakobsen, P.V., 2000, *Focus On The CNN Misses The Pont: The Real Media Impact On Conflict Management Is Invisible And Indirect*, , *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 37, no.2, SAGE Publications, London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi, pp.131-143

One of the most often quoted examples of media agenda-setting is the news of the famine in Ethiopia that appeared on major US networks on October 23, 1984. NBC Nightly News correspondent Garrick Utley summarized the situation in this African country before the story was broadcast: “if ever there was an example of the saying “out of sight, out of mind”, it is what is happening in Ethiopia”⁹³. The effect of the NBC report was described as “electrifying”⁹⁴: suddenly the New York Times and other newspapers were running front-page stories and the report was carried by 425 world broadcasting stations in October 1984, with a potential audience of 470 million people⁹⁵. The story was taken up in the popular press and then given a huge further incentive by the intervention of Bob Geldof. The increase of media attention was very impressive, as Mary Magistad described: “Literally overnight, it seemed that everyone wanted to cover Ethiopia. Reporters deluged Addis Ababa by the hundreds: many aid workers who had been trying for more than a year to pull the news media’s attention to the famine were now finding themselves so busy briefing journalists that they barely had time to do their normal relief work”⁹⁶. After the broadcast, relief agencies reported a surge in donations. For example, two organizations, Catholic Relief Services and Save the Children, reported receiving a total of over \$4.4 million⁹⁷. Government aid had unexpectedly become a hot political issue in many Western countries. “The United States government announced that it was adding \$10 million to its existing commitments, while the British government announced that it was adding £5 million and 6000 tones of grain to Ethiopian relief efforts.”⁹⁸ Ethiopia is also considered as an example of how media set the agenda for each other. As The Economist noted in a development report: “What put Ethiopia in the front page in October? Most cynically, competition between two television channels.”⁹⁹ According to Philo, the decision to feature the story of the famine and the manner in which it was treated were largely directed by the internal logic of the media institutions¹⁰⁰. Media very often function as each other’s prime reference group: ideas for item on the TV news or TV talk shows often come straight from the papers, while the lead items in the morning

⁹³ Quoted in Boyer, P., 1986, *Famine in Ethiopia: The TV accident that exploded*, p. 294, in Emery, M. and T.C. Smythe (eds.), *Readings in mass communication*, Dubuque, IA: Brown

⁹⁴ Philo, G., *From Buerk to Band Aid; The media and the 1984 Ethiopian famine*, in Eldrige J. (ed), 1993, *Getting The Message, News, Truth And Power*, Glasgow University Media Group, Routledge, London and New York

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ Magistad, M., 1986, *The Ethiopian bandwagon: The relationship between news media coverage and British foreign policy toward the 1984/85 Ethiopian famine*, LMA thesis, Sussex University in Philo, G., *From Buerk to Band Aid; The media and the 1984 Ethiopian famine*, in Eldrige J. (ed), 1993, *Getting The Message, News, Truth And Power*, Glasgow University Media Group, Routledge, London and New York

⁹⁷ “Donation for drought relief surge”, 1984, November, *New York Times*, p. C25, in Simon, A.F., 1997, *Television News And International Earthquake Relief*, Adam F. Simon, *Journal of Communication* 47 (3), Summer, pp. 82-92

⁹⁸ Philo, G., *From Buerk to Band Aid; The media and the 1984 Ethiopian famine*, in Eldrige J. (ed), 1993, *Getting The Message, News, Truth And Power*, Glasgow University Media Group, Routledge, London and New York

⁹⁹ *The Economist*, November 1984, in Philo, G., *From Buerk to Band Aid; The media and the 1984 Ethiopian famine*, in Eldrige J. (ed), 1993, *Getting The Message, News, Truth And Power*, Glasgow University Media Group, Routledge, London and New York

¹⁰⁰ Philo, G., *From Buerk to Band Aid; The media and the 1984 Ethiopian famine*, in Eldrige J. (ed), 1993, *Getting The Message, News, Truth And Power*, Glasgow University Media Group, Routledge, London and New York

papers often derive from the TV news of the previous evening. “If a few media hype an issue, others will often feel forced to follow. Here again, the most prestigious media are obviously more influential.”¹⁰¹ Dearing and Rogers call it “intermedia agenda-setting in action”¹⁰². There are two important terms related to this initial phase of agenda setting: a trigger event, “a cue-to-action that occurs at a point in time and serves to crystallize attention and action” and “simplifies the nature of a complex issue into a form that the public can more easily understand”¹⁰³ and a ‘mediahype’, “a media generated, wall-to-wall news wave, triggered by one specific event and expanded by the self-reinforcing processes within the news production of the media”¹⁰⁴.

Some prominent examples could be found also of the “opposite side” of agenda-setting, i.e. media black-out. Some of them, like the first phase of genocide in Rwanda or the plight of the Shia in southern Iraq will be examined in more detail within the analysis of the CNN effect theory, but literature also noted the proposed intervention to facilitate humanitarian assistance to refugees in eastern Zaire in 1996, Operation Assurance, that was cancelled. A former diplomat at the UN revealed that the US “which had initially decided to participate, had decided against going ahead with the operation when it became clear that the media were not particularly interested”¹⁰⁵. Seib concludes that the agenda-setting process is “inconsistent and unpredictable”: “not every catastrophe will capture the public’s interests, regardless of its magnitude; not every government or agency will respond, regardless of the level of public concern.”¹⁰⁶

FRAMING

Framing is often regarded as the second-level of agenda-setting: while the first level of agenda setting is “the transmission of object salience”, the second level of agenda setting is “the transmission of attribute salience”¹⁰⁷. In the language of attribute agenda setting, “framing is the construction of an agenda with a restricted number of thematically related attributes in order to create a coherent picture of particular object”¹⁰⁸. Framing is selecting “some aspects of a perceived reality” to enhance their salience “in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or

¹⁰¹ Van Ginneken, J., 1998, *Understanding Global News: A Critical Introduction*, SAGE Publications, London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi, p. 81

¹⁰² Dearing J.W. and E.M. Rogers, 1996, *Agenda-Setting*, Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, London, New Delhi, p.35

¹⁰³ Cobb, R.W and C.D, Elder 1983, *Participation in American Politics: The dynamics of agenda-building*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, original work was published by Allyn & Bacon in 1972, in Dearing J.W. and E.M. Rogers, 1996, *Agenda-Setting*, Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, London, New Delhi, p. 78

¹⁰⁴ Vasterman, P., 2004, *MediaHype*, Amsterdam: Aksant in McQuail, D., 2005, *McQuail’s Mass Communication Theory*, fifth edition, Sage Publications, London, p. 317

¹⁰⁵ Hawkins, V., 2002, *The Other Side Of The CNN Factor: The Media And Conflict*, *Journalism Studies*, Volume 3, Number 2, pp. 225-240, Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group

¹⁰⁶ Seib, P., 1996, *Headline Diplomacy: How News Coverage Affects Foreign Policy*, Praeger, Westport, Connecticut, London, p. 91

¹⁰⁷ McCombs, M and S.I. Ghanem, *The Convergence of Agenda Setting and Framing*, in Reese, S.D., Gandy, O.H and A.E. Grant (eds), 2001, *Framing Public Life: Perspectives On Media And Our Understanding Of The Social World*, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers, Mahwah, New Jersey, London, p. 68

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid*, p.70

treatment recommendation”¹⁰⁹. Framing analysis shares with agenda-setting research a focus on the relationship of these issues, but it “expands beyond agenda-setting research into what people talk or think about by examining how they think and talk about issues in the news”¹¹⁰. Gamson and Modigliani defined a frame as a “central organizing idea or story line that provides meaning to an unfolding strip of events” and “suggests what the controversy is about, the essence of the issue”¹¹¹. Dutch historian Chris Lorenz illustrated the process of framing with the example of the events which took place long time ago, on 21 January, 1793, in Paris: “Some observers might claim that King Louis XVI was then and there murdered by the mob. Other observers might claim that Citizen Louis Capet was beheaded by the executioner. There are no adjectives here, just substantives and verbs. Yet, the very choice of words implies a choice of legitimacy: of the victim, of the act, of the actor.”¹¹²

News frames “bundle key concepts, stock phrases, and stereotyped images to reinforce certain common ways of interpreting development”¹¹³. The theory of framing suggests that journalists commonly work with news frames to “simplify, prioritize, and structure the narrative flow of events”¹¹⁴. That means that frames are not only to help audiences “locate, perceive, identify, and label” the flow of information around them¹¹⁵ and to “narrow the available political alternatives”¹¹⁶, but also serve as working routines for journalists that allow them to “quickly identify and classify information to package it for efficient relay to their audiences”¹¹⁷. As Walter Lippmann recognized back in 1922: “without standardization, without stereotypes, without routine judgments, without a fairly ruthless disregard of subtlety, the editor would soon die of excitement”¹¹⁸. “The jobs of commissioning, editing, producing and reporting involve choices; choices of which facts to include and which to leave out, how to juxtapose images and what contextual material to provide. These choices combine, over time, into discernible patterns, which exert a cumulative influence over the course of subsequent events.”¹¹⁹ Through frames, journalists “give the story a spin”, “taking into account their organizational and modality

¹⁰⁹ Entman, R.M., 1993, Framing: Towards clarification of a features paradigm, *Journal of Communication*, 43(4), p. 53

¹¹⁰ Pan Z., and G.M. Kosicki, 1993, Framing analyses: An approach to news discourse, *Political Communication*, 10, p. 70

¹¹¹ Gamson, W. A and A. Modigliani, 1987, The changing culture of affirmative action, in Braungart, R.G and M.M. Braungart, (Eds.), *Research in political sociology*, Vol. 3, Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, pp. 137-177

¹¹² Lorenz, C., 1987, quoted in Van Ginneken, J., 1998 *Understanding Global News: A Critical Introduction*, SAGE Publications, London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi, p. 148

¹¹³ Norris, P., *News of the World*, in Norris, P., (ed), 1997, *Politics and the Press, The news Media and Their Influences*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder London, p. 275

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

¹¹⁵ Goffman, E., 1974, *Frame analyses*, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, p. 21

¹¹⁶ Tuchman, G., 1978, *Making news: A study in the construction of reality*, New York; Free Press, p.156

¹¹⁷ Gitlin, T., 1980, *The whole world is watching: Mass media in the making & unmaking of the news left*, Berkley: University of California Press, p. 7

¹¹⁸ Lippmann, W., 1922, *Public Opinion*, New York: Harcourt Brace, in Carruthers, S.L., 2000, *The Media At War; Communication And Conflict In The Twentieth Century*, Palgrave Macmillan, p. 231

¹¹⁹ Lynch, J., *Reporting the World: The Ethical Challenge to International News*, in Paterson, C. and A. Sreberny, 2004, *International News In The 21st Century*, John Libbey Publishing for University of Luton Press, p. 261- 284

constraints, professional judgments, and certain judgments about audience”¹²⁰. Hertog and McLeod proposed a definition of frames as “organizing principles that are socially shared and persistent over time, that work symbolically to meaningfully structure the social world”¹²¹. By treating news frames as evidence of a system that defines what we know and how we know it, Durham considers the mass mediated practice of framing as “a social process that enables society to function”¹²².

Many authors point out the importance of the first and/or most influential early definition of an event. A dominant frame in the earliest news coverage of an event “can activate and spread congruent thoughts and feelings in individuals’ knowledge networks, building a news event schema that guides responses to all future reports”¹²³. Cohen and Wolfsfeld argue that it is extremely difficult to change existing media frames, especially about conflict. “The frames take on an almost mythical quality, and after a while none of the parties raise many questions about them. Antagonists who attempt to swim against this interpretive tide usually drown.”¹²⁴ The practical consequences are that political leaders put a lot of efforts to impose their own frames on an event from the start ¹²⁵, but also that major world news organizations, especially American, British and French, have “a quasi-monopoly in providing prime definitions of breaking news”¹²⁶. This significant role of the US/UK media organizations in the framing of world events is one of the reasons to choose CNN International and BBC World as the main source of material for empirical media analysis in this research, as will be explained in next chapter.

Framing effects are obviously not one-way. Since an interface between journalists and elites is considered as “a key transmission point for spreading the activation of frames”, it is not always easy to “determine where the line between elite and journalists should be drawn, or who influenced whom”¹²⁷. It also pressures other, less-influential parties like movement activists to “develop discourses and techniques suited to obtaining coverage from mainstream news organizations that are not entirely eager to provide them with

¹²⁰ Neuman, W.R., Just, M.R., and A.N., Crigler, 1992, Common knowledge. News and the construction of political meaning, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, p. 120

¹²¹ Hertog, J.K and D.M. McLeod, A Multiperspectival Approach to Framing Analysis: A Field Guide, in Reese, S.D., Gandy, O.H and A.E. Grant (eds.), 2001, Framing Public Life; Perspectives On Media And Our Understanding Of The Social World, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers, Mahwah, New Jersey, London, p. 140

¹²² Durham, F.D., Breaching Powerful Boundaries: A Postmodern Critique of Framing, in Reese, S.D., Gandy, O.H and A.E. Grant (eds), 2001, Framing Public Life; Perspectives On Media And Our Understanding Of The Social World, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers, Mahwah, New Jersey, London, p. 123

¹²³ Entman, R.M., 2004, Projections of Power: Framing News, Public Opinion, and US Foreign Policy, Chicago: Chicago University Press, p. 7

¹²⁴ Cohen, A. A., and Wolfsfeld, G. (eds), 1999, Framing the Intifada, Norwood, NJ: Ablex, p. xvii, in Kent, G., 2005, Framing War and Genocide, British Policy and News Media Reaction to the War in Bosnia, Hampton Press Communication Series: Political Communication, p. 179

¹²⁵ Entman, R.M., 2004, Projections of Power: Framing News, Public Opinion, and US Foreign Policy, Chicago: Chicago University Press, p. 7

¹²⁶ Van Ginneken, J., 1998 Understanding Global News: A Critical Introduction, SAGE Publications, London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi, p. 114

¹²⁷ Entman, R.M., 2004, Projections of Power: Framing News, Public Opinion, and US Foreign Policy, Chicago: Chicago University Press, p.11

coverage that meets their goals”¹²⁸. A huge volume of literature is dedicated to the relationship between the journalists and their sources, as one aspect of framing and this relationship will be investigated in following chapter in so far as it is related to framing theory. As Dearing and Rogers noted, “the relationship of media reporters and policy makers is symbiotic in that journalists need access to the sources of news and policy makers need coverage of their proposals and actions; nevertheless, the needs of journalists and policy makers are often incompatible because of their different orientation to time”¹²⁹. Many media coverage analyses have shown that presidents and government officials usually receive the greatest media attention, especially in crisis situations¹³⁰, and in that way have the biggest possibility to “sell” their own frame of the story, but Entman found out that this may have been a result of another motivation that seems to drive journalists – helping audiences predict future events: “by focusing more on actions, plans and statements of the most powerful than on the assertions of those who have less power to affect future actions, then, the media help audiences economize on the time they spend with the news.”¹³¹ Similarly, instead of viewing framing effects as evidence of unilateral elite manipulation, Druckman underlines the importance of sources’ credibility, suggesting that “framing effects may occur because citizens delegate to ostensibly credible elites to help them sort through many possible frames”¹³². Cook concludes that the news is the result of “recurring negotiations between sources and newsmen”, and that journalists can “create importance and certify authority as much as reflect it”¹³³ in deciding who should speak, on what subjects, under what circumstances, and in such a way they still have „the final say... by raising other issues, interjecting doubts, questioning motives, and seeking out critical sources for balance”¹³⁴.

Framing effects differ from persuasion and bias. Nelson and Oxley put the focus of persuasion on the altering of belief content, underlining that persuasion “takes place when a communicator effectively revises the content of one’s beliefs about the attitude object, replacing or supplementing favorable thoughts with unfavorable ones, or vice-versa”, and from such a definition of persuasion framing differs in showing “subtler ways the communication can influence attitudes without altering the content of one’s beliefs about the attitude object.”¹³⁵ Also, framing is considered as “a more sophisticated concept” than

¹²⁸ Molotch, 1977, in D’Angelo, P., 2002, *News Framing As A Multiparadigmatic Research Program: A Response To Entman*, Journal of Communication, December; 52, Oxford University Press, pp 870 – 888

¹²⁹ Dearing J.W. and E.M. Rogers, 1996, *Agenda-Setting*, Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, London, New Delhi, p. 74

¹³⁰ Entman, R.M., 2004, *Projections of Power: Framing News, Public Opinion, and US Foreign Policy*, Chicago: Chicago University Press, p. 88; Soderlund, W.C. and E. D. Briggs, *Sources Used in U.S. Television News Coverage of Crisis and Non-Crisis Situations in Grenada (1983), Panama (1989), Cuba (1988-92) and Haiti (1990-93)*, International Communications Bulletin Volume 34, No. 1-2, Fall 1999

¹³¹ Entman, R.M., 2004, *Projections of Power: Framing News, Public Opinion, and US Foreign Policy*, Chicago: Chicago University Press, p. 88

¹³² Druckman, J.N., November 2001, *On The Limits Of Framing Effects: Who Can Frame?*, The Journal of Politics, Vol. 63, No. 4., pp. 1041-1066

¹³³ Cook, T.E., 1998, *Governing With The News, The News Media As A Political Institution*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago & London, p. 87

¹³⁴ Cook, T.E., 1998, *Governing With The News, The News Media As A Political Institution*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago & London, p. 105

¹³⁵ Nelson. T.E. and Z.M. Oxley, November 1999, *Issue Framing Effects on Belief Importance and Opinion*, Journal of Politics, Vol. 61, No. 4, pp.1040-41

bias because it goes “beyond notions of pro or con, favorable or unfavorable, negative or positive” and it adds a cognitive dimension and possibilities of “additional, more complex emotional responses”. Framing also reflects “the richness of media discourse and the subtle differences that are possible when a specific topic is presented in different ways”¹³⁶.

McCombs and Ghanem made a distinction between frames that are attributes of the objects being presented and frames that are attributes of communication presentations, like for example a camera angle in the case of television¹³⁷. Messaris and Abraham distinguish some of the properties of visual images in their framing function. The first is its analogical quality: since “the recognition of objects in pictures does not appear to require prior familiarity with the particular representational conventions of those pictures...it can make images appear more natural, more closely linked to reality than word are, it can also inveigle viewers into overlooking the fact that all images are human-made, artificial constructions”. Because of their “indexicality”, or the “true-to-life quality” of the picture, it comes with “an implicit guarantee of being closer to truth than other forms of communication are” and consequently, the use of photographic media, including television and video, in the framing process could “diminish the likelihood that viewers would question what they see”. Due to these reasons, authors argue that viewers may be less aware of the process of framing when it occurs visually than when it takes place through words and that “visual images may have the capacity of conveying messages that would meet with greater resistance” if put in another way of communication¹³⁸.

The conclusion is frequently reached that mass-mediated frames limit the range of interpretable meanings by an audience¹³⁹. It is also argued that framing as such could have a considerable effect on foreign policy. For example, according to Kent, UK media description of the genocide in eastern Bosnia and B&H government forces’ attempts to defend the civilian population or to break the siege of Sarajevo as “fighting” contributed significantly to UK government determination not to intervene¹⁴⁰. Michael Sells argues “the dehumanization of Bosnians as “Balkan” tribal haters... was promoted by a wide variety of Western diplomats as the major reason for the refusal to stop the genocide

¹³⁶ Tankard, J.W. Jr., *The Empirical Approach to the Study of Media Framing*, in Reese, S.D., Gandy, O.H and A.E. Grant (eds.), 2001, *Framing Public Life; Perspectives On Media And Our Understanding Of The Social World*, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers, Mahwah, New Jersey, London, p. 96

¹³⁷ McCombs, M., *The Convergence of Agenda Setting and Framing*, and Salma I. Ghanem, in Reese, S.D., Gandy, O.H and A.E. Grant (eds.), 2001, *Framing Public Life; Perspectives On Media And Our Understanding Of The Social World*, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers, Mahwah, New Jersey, London, p. 70

¹³⁸ Messaris, P. and L. Abraham, *The Role of Images in Framing News stories*, in Reese, S.D., Gandy, O.H and A.E. Grant (eds.), 2001, *Framing Public Life; Perspectives On Media And Our Understanding Of The Social World*, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers, Mahwah, New Jersey, London, p. 215

¹³⁹ Entman, R.M., 1993, *Framing: Towards clarification of a features paradigm*, *Journal of Communication*, 43(4); Gamson W. and Modigliani, A., 1989, *Media discourse as a symbolic contest: A constructionist approach*, *American Journal of Sociology*, 95; Gitlin, T., 1980, *The whole world is watching: Mass media in the making & unmaking of the news left*, Berkley: University of California Press; Pan Z. and G. M. Kosicki, 1993, *Framing analyses: An approach to news discourse*, *Political Communication*, 10

¹⁴⁰ Kent, G., 2005, *Framing War And Genocide, British Policy and News Media Reaction to the War in Bosnia*, Hampton Press Communication Series: Political Communication, p. 242

when it became known in the early summer of 1992”¹⁴¹. Similarly, it is considered that the tendency of media coverage to portray genocide in Rwanda as a tribal conflict with a little attempt to understand and present the basis of the killings, inhibited serious attention to the crisis from both policy-makers and the broader public¹⁴².

THE SPHERE OF INTERNATIONAL POLICY

Before moving to the theory that most specifically deals with the relationship between media, especially 24/7 news channels, and foreign policy, its procedures and decisions – the “CNN effect” theory, it would be useful to clarify key elements of the sphere of international politics and the ways it functions.

Since the end of World War II and the onset of the Cold War, Realism, also known as the power-politics school of thought, has dominated the field of international relations. According to this school, the state constitutes the only significant actor in international affairs and, acting through its government, it is seen as a unitary and rational actor which pursues, above all, national interests and competes in this matter with other nation-states in an environment characterized by anarchy¹⁴³. Governments calculate the costs and benefits of all alternative policies so as to choose those practices that maximize their gains¹⁴⁴ and they prioritize national interests over wider systemic interests, that is, norms of state behavior shared generally by states, in situations when for example, human rights have been systematically violated, international borders rearranged by force, etc¹⁴⁵. Thus, the realist approach would rule out acting out of emotion and humanitarian considerations, public pressure or global television coverage as sufficient causes for humanitarian intervention¹⁴⁶, with its representatives claiming that it focuses on the world as it is, not on how it should be.¹⁴⁷ According to realists, actors in world politics are defined on the basis of three main criteria: sovereignty, recognition of statehood, and the control of territory and population¹⁴⁸ and other entities on the international scene cannot be seen as distinct and autonomous entities because they do not combine these three essentials. International organizations are characterized as instruments or extensions of

¹⁴¹ Sells, 1996, p.40 in Kent, G., 2005, *Framing War And Genocide*, British Policy and News Media Reaction to the War in Bosnia, Hampton Press Communication Series: Political Communication, p. 242

¹⁴² Robinson, P., 2002, *The CNN Effect, The myth of news, foreign policy and intervention*, Routledge, London and New York

¹⁴³ Russett, B., Starr, H. and R. Stoll, 1989, *Choices in World Politics: Sovereignty and Interdependence*. New York: Freeman. p. 28

¹⁴⁴ Keohane, R.O., ed., 1986, *Neorealism and Its Critics*, New York: Columbia University Press, p. 11; Lieshout, R.H., 1992, Neo-institutional Realism and the Possibilities of Cooperation, *Acta Politica*, 27(4): 405-424, in Geeraerts, G., October 1995, *Analyzing Non-State Actors in World Politics*, Centre for Peace and Democracy Studies, Brussels, Pole Paper Series, Vol. 1, No. 4

¹⁴⁵ Kent, G., 2005, *Framing War And Genocide*, British Policy and News Media Reaction to the War in Bosnia, Hampton Press Communication Series: Political Communication, p. 106

¹⁴⁶ Gilboa, E., 2005, *The CNN Effect: The Search For A Communication Theory Of International Relations*, *Political Communication*, 22: 27-44, Taylor & Francis Inc.

¹⁴⁷ Burchill, S., 1996, *Realism and Neo-realism* in Burchill, S. and R. Devetak, eds, with Linklater, A., Paterson M. and True, J. *Theories of International relations*, Palgrave, London, p. 31

¹⁴⁸ Hocking, B. and M. Smith 1990 *World Politics*. New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf. p. 80, in Geeraerts, G., October 1995, *Analyzing Non-State Actors in World Politics*, Centre for Peace and Democracy Studies, Brussels, Pole Paper Series, Vol. 1, No. 4

states with little influence on nation-state interactions¹⁴⁹ while other non-state actors, be they multinational corporations or trans-nationally organized groups are hardly considered at all¹⁵⁰. Accordingly, the realist approach would also question the competence of citizens and assert that the quality of foreign policy is likely to suffer if the mass public is allowed to have a direct impact¹⁵¹.

In recent years, Realism has developed from what is called the 'classical' model, to become the founding framework for a number of more sophisticated and specialized strands, as a response to an increasingly complex world situation, demanding more specialization and new explanations to understand international relations between states¹⁵². Many of the realist assumptions were challenged in this process and it was the assumption of state predominance that was the first to come under direct attack. Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye were among the first scholars to call for a revision of the state-centric paradigm, because it failed to recognize the importance of non-state actors¹⁵³. In their 1971 essay collection *Transnational Relations and World Politics*, they identified the phenomena of "transnational interaction" which they define as "the movement of tangible or intangible items across state boundaries when at least one actor is not an agent of a government"¹⁵⁴. The authors highlighted the importance of nongovernmental actors in a great number of international interactions.

The term mediatization has been used to describe the ongoing political changes as well as changes in the media sphere since the '90s. At a political level, the focus was on international governance: the dramatic increase of number of international organizations, a growing range of issues that are subject to "international regimes" and agreements that regulate aspects of international affairs, transnational relationships and domestic society even in the absence of formal international organizations. These developments have encouraged "the creation of groups that seek to influence decisions on international governance or to use them to advance their domestic political positions", for instance by enlisting international support against oppressive governments¹⁵⁵. It has been argued that these changes gave way to the loss of elite control over foreign policy, which made foreign policy community more amenable to humanitarian interventions. Most of the

¹⁴⁹ Grievies, F. L., 1979, *Transnationalism in World Politics and Business*. New York: Pergamon Press. p. 4, in Geeraerts, G., October 1995, *Analyzing Non-State Actors in World Politics*, Centre for Peace and Democracy Studies, Brussels, Pole Paper Series, Vol. 1, No. 4

¹⁵⁰ Archer, C., 1992, *International Organizations*. Second Edition. London: Routledge. p. 85, in Geeraerts, G., October 1995, *Analyzing Non-State Actors in World Politics*, Centre for Peace and Democracy Studies, Brussels, Pole Paper Series, Vol. 1, No. 4

¹⁵¹ Jacobs, L.R., February 2005, *Who Influence US Foreign Policy*, Page, B.I., *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 99, No. 1

¹⁵² Moe, Marit, 2005, *The Contact Group on Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo: The Institution and its Mediation Role*, MPhil, School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University College London, University of London, p. 12-20

¹⁵³ Geeraerts, G., October 1995, *Analyzing Non-State Actors in World Politics*, Centre for Peace and Democracy Studies, Brussels, Pole Paper Series, Vol. 1, No. 4

¹⁵⁴ Keohane R. and J. Nye, 1971, *Transnational Relations and World Politics*, Harvard University Press, p. 332, in Geeraerts, G., October 1995, *Analyzing Non-State Actors in World Politics*, Centre for Peace and Democracy Studies, Brussels, Pole Paper Series, Vol. 1, No. 4

¹⁵⁵ Brown, R., *Spinning the war: political communications, information operations and public diplomacy in the war on terrorism*, in Thussu, D.K and D. Freedman, 2003, *War and the Media, Reporting Conflict 24/7*, SAGE Publications, London. Thousand Oaks, New Delhi

post-Cold War interventions, like Somalia and Bosnia, have been done in the name of humanitarianism, what Michael Mandelbaum refers to as “the foreign policy of Mother Teresa” or foreign policy as “a branch of social work”¹⁵⁶. These interventions were considered even more significant because they signaled a major development in world politics, “development of a norm of forcible humanitarian intervention in which state sovereignty could be violated in order to preserve and to protect basic human rights”¹⁵⁷. International society, it was claimed, was undergoing a shift from a state-centric and non-interventionist value system toward a cosmopolitan one in which basic human rights were held to be superior to state sovereignty¹⁵⁸. These new scenarios in which the national interests of major powers are only moderately or even minimally involved while as a result of media attention a “world-wide perception of large scale violations of life and globally legitimate principles” is developed, led Shaw to define a new form of ‘global crisis’ in the early 1990s, with the Kurdish crisis as the first example¹⁵⁹. In 2000, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan called on the international community to forge a consensus regarding when and how the “right of humanitarian intervention” should be exercised and, in response, the Canadian government instigated the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS)¹⁶⁰.

An alternative and radical interpretation of Western interventionism is that it represents merely a continuation of traditional power politics in which the ‘humanitarian’ label is used to disguise the selfish pursuit of Western interests¹⁶¹. Additionally some claim that the end of the Cold War has even decreased the visibility of foreign policy. Disappearance of the East-West threat, it has been argued, has made national security a far less urgent and persistent issue than it had been since the end of World War II, so “crises can arise, but they get resolved and disappear, unlike the steady Soviet military and nuclear threat during the Cold War”. Also, the end of the bipolar world of the Cold War “has made foreign affairs more complex to follow and interpret” which is yet an additional barrier to increasing the public’s attention to foreign policy. As the result, domestic policies “have easily filled the gap in the public’s attention space”. “This, in the long run, could give presidents and policymakers even more of a monopoly over such information relative to the public than they have normally had; thus they will have a further advantage in their efforts to direct, rather than respond to public opinion.”¹⁶².

¹⁵⁶ Madnelbaum, M., Foreign Policy as Social Work, Foreign Affairs, January 1996, in Livingston, S., beyond the CNN Effect, The Media-Foreign Policy Dynamic, in Norris, P., ed., 1997, Politics and the Press, The news Media and Their Influences, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder London, p. 293

¹⁵⁷ Robinson P., The CNN Effect: The myth of news, foreign policy and intervention, 2002, Routledge, London and New York, p. 8

¹⁵⁸ Wheeler, N., 2000, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society, Oxford: Oxford University Press in Robinson P., The CNN Effect: The myth of news, foreign policy and intervention, 2002, Routledge, London and New York, p. 8

¹⁵⁹ Shaw, 1996, p. 156 in Kent, G., 2005, Framing War And Genocide, British Policy and News Media Reaction to the War in Bosnia, Hampton Press Communication Series: Political Communication, p. 154

¹⁶⁰ Robinson, P., October 2005, The CNN Effect Revisited, Critical Studies in Media Communication, Vol. 22, No. 4, pp. 344-349

¹⁶¹ Chomsky, N., 1999, The New Military Humanism: Lessons from Kosovo, Mornoe, ME: Common Courage Press; Hammond, P., and E., Herman, (eds.), 2000, Degraded Capability: The Media and the Kosovo Crisis, London: Pluto Press

¹⁶² Shapiro, R.Y. and L.R. Jacobs, Who Leads and Who Follows? US Presidents, Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy, in Nacos, B.L., Shapiro R.Y. and P. Isernia (eds), Decisionmaking in a Glass House; Mass

Robinson argues that the “war on terror” after September 11, has pushed humanitarian concerns further down, if not off altogether, on the American, but also wider international foreign policy agenda, and created the concept of humanitarian intervention used as a policy tool that Western leaders employ in order to justify interventions driven by national interest and not altruistic concern for the humanitarian needs of “other” people¹⁶³.

Therefore, despite the ongoing changes in the international policy sphere, national interests keep their central position in the inter-state relations and as such, will be used as a basic point in the analysis of political process in this research. Experts underline that national interests are “far more limited than most assume”, unless national security is threatened. However appalling TV pictures and newspaper reporting are, in the US, and probably in many other Western countries as well, “severe human rights violations, including genocide” are most unlikely to constitute a vital national interest¹⁶⁴. The Clinton administration’s Presidential Decision Directive No. 25 defines clearly those limits of the US national interest beyond which it is highly unlikely that the US will ever commit itself, certainly militarily and on the ground¹⁶⁵. In 1993, National Security Adviser Anthony Lake underlined that while considering humanitarian engagement, the US administration has to take into account other factors beside the public pressure “increasingly driven by televised images”: cost; feasibility; the permanence of the improvement our assistance will bring; the willingness of regional and international bodies to do their part; and the likelihood that our actions will generate broader security benefits for the people of the region in question¹⁶⁶. In March 1996, he developed a seven-point checklist of national interests that might lead to the US use of force, defining a clear *exit* strategy as more important than any immediate urgency for entering any conflict prevention operation. Additionally he pointed out that increasingly US interests require that US military keep peace in the wake of internal conflicts¹⁶⁷. “It is not possible for the US to lead everywhere and in every situation,” US State Department spokesman Nicholas Burns responded in the face of UN appeals for at least logistics support in Rwanda in 1994. “We have led where we think U.S. interests require: in Haiti, and in Bosnia, and we will not hesitate to lead in future situations, where our national interests are directly and

Media, Public Opinion and American and European Foreign Policy in The 21st Century, 2000, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, INC. London, Boulder, New York, Oxford, p. 240-243

¹⁶³ Robinson, P., The CNN Effect Revisited, Critical Studies in Media Communication, Vol. 22, No. 4, October 2005, pp. 344-349

¹⁶⁴ Conclusions from deliberations of the Council on Foreign Relations conference, “US National Interests after the Cold War,” at Wye Plantation, Maryland, 14 – 16 December 1995

¹⁶⁵ PDD 25 on “Multilateral Peace Operations,” 5 May 1994

¹⁶⁶ Quoted in Hoge, J., July/August 1994, Media Pervasiveness, Foreign Affairs 73, number 4, p. 136

¹⁶⁷ “Principles Governing US Use of Force”, speech by National Security Adviser Anthony Lake at George Washington University, 8 March 1996, in Gowing, N., 1997, Media Coverage: Help or Hindrance in Conflict Prevention. New York: Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Violence

in some cases vitally affected.”¹⁶⁸ British national interests are for example, considered not too different¹⁶⁹.

It will be useful at this point to explain how foreign policy actually differs from the domestic one. Generally it can be said that policy decisions are made in greater secrecy and in the less accountable way than those relating to issues at home, and that on foreign policy questions, the range of viewpoints is correspondingly narrower than on domestic issues¹⁷⁰. Wood and Peake point out that contrary to domestic agenda setting that proceeds “in a slow secular fashion, occasionally spurred by focusing events or the policy entrepreneurship of important factors or groups”, foreign policy issues “tend to burn into the scene as a result of crises or other dramatic occurrences, and once they are on the scene attention is driven by a continuous stream of policy events”¹⁷¹.

Theories and analyses of domestic policy agenda setting usually focus on concepts like problem perception, issue definition, mobilization of interest, subsystem formation, venue shopping and institutional attention. While the first two and last of these concepts are also relevant to foreign policy agenda setting, for many foreign policy issues subsystems do not develop, since “these issues do not typically involve the material or benefits required to invoke strong interest group participation”¹⁷². In the example of the US, Congress and its committees are generally considered to have less influence in foreign policy than in domestic policy, while the president is the primary venue through which new foreign policy issues enter the system¹⁷³. Even within the international policy arena, the US president “is the political system’s thermostat, capable of heating up or cooling down the politics of any single issue or an entire platter of issues”¹⁷⁴.

Gilboa makes a distinction between two respective interrelated stages of foreign policy, both of them potentially influenced by global news media. The first is policy making, where “policy options, positions, and tactics are considered and decided within the domestic environments of the parties concerned”. The second phase, interaction and diplomacy, entails “implementing policies toward other actors, presenting positions and demands decided in the earlier stage, and seeking solutions through confrontation,

¹⁶⁸ Response by Nicholas Burns, 25 July 1996, in Gowing, N., 1997, *Media Coverage: Help or Hindrance in Conflict Prevention*. New York: Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Violence

¹⁶⁹ Paragraph 267 of the Ministry of Defence's Defence Estimates 1995. London: CMD 2800 in Gowing, N., 1997, *Media Coverage: Help or Hindrance in Conflict Prevention*. New York: Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Violence

¹⁷⁰ Kent, G., 2005, *Framing War And Genocide, British Policy and News Media Reaction to the War in Bosnia*, Hampton Press Communication Series: Political Communication, p. 156-7

¹⁷¹ Wood, B.D. and J.S. Peake, March 1998, *The Dynamics Of Foreign Policy Agenda*, *American Political Science Review*, Vo. 92, No.1, pp. 173-184

¹⁷² Ripley R.B. and Franklin G.A., 1991, *Congress, the Bureaucracy, and Public Policy*, 5th Edition, Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks-Cole, in Wood, B.D. and J.S. Peake, March 1998, *The Dynamics Of Foreign Policy Agenda*, *American Political Science Review*, Vo. 92, No.1, pp. 173-184

¹⁷³ Jones, B.D., 1994, *Reconceiving Decision-Making in Democratic Politics: Attention, Choice, and Public Policy*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, in Wood, B.D. and J.S. Peake, March 1998, *The Dynamics Of Foreign Policy Agenda*, *American Political Science Review*, Vo. 92, No.1, pp. 173-184

¹⁷⁴ Bosso, C.J., 1987, *Pesticides and politics: The life cycle of a public issue*, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, p. 261

negotiation, or a combination of both¹⁷⁵. Kent divided the foreign policy process into more phases: problem formation, agenda setting, policy formulation, legitimation and adoption, implementation and administration, and policy evaluation, underlining that some of them can be bypassed or omitted all together, with a frequent overlap between them: “problem formation or definition will determine the precise nature of the issue that is established on the policymaker’s agenda, changes to an agenda issue inevitably mean a (however minor) re-definition of the problem itself”¹⁷⁶. Cobb and Rochefort believe that problem definition is a fundamentally important phase of foreign policy management, because at that point critical characteristics of a problem are defined which will effectively limit policy debate and options for policy action sometimes with long term effect. “Once crystallized, some definitions will remain long-term fixtures of the policymaking landscape; other definitions may undergo constant revision or be replaced altogether by competing formulations.”¹⁷⁷ Since of course different types of problem will require quite distinct treatment on the policy agenda, their categorization is very important. Rosenau suggested that factors affecting the status of the problem are: the extent to which their solution requires human and nonhuman resources, the territory affected, and the extent to which the means and ends of issue resolution are tangible¹⁷⁸. What is clear is that classifying a condition into one category rather than another will likely define it as a particular kind of problem. If a problem is defined as pressing, “whole classes of approaches are favored over others, and some alternatives are highlighted while others fall from view”¹⁷⁹. Alternative specification is the process of narrowing the range of possible positions for any one issue¹⁸⁰. But, some problems never reach a policy making arena. According to Cobb and Elder, the first barrier consists of values, beliefs, and myths that the dominant portion of the community embraces, while various procedures, other organisational rules and devices, and customs create the second barrier¹⁸¹. The result is a process known as “non-decision-making”, “by which demands for change in the existing allocation of benefits and privileges in a community can be suffocated before they are even voiced; or kept covert; or killed before they gain access to the relevant decision making arena.”¹⁸² But, as Hastings argues: “if you can do something and you don’t then it is doing something”¹⁸³. Some writers suggest that the most common

¹⁷⁵ Gilboa, E., *Global Communication and Foreign Policy*, 2002, International Communication Association, p. 731-748

¹⁷⁶ Kent, G., 2005, *Framing War And Genocide*, British Policy and News Media Reaction to the War in Bosnia, Hampton Press Communication Series: Political Communication, p. 156-7

¹⁷⁷ Cobb and Rochefort, 1994, p.4, in Kent, G., 2005, *Framing War And Genocide*, British Policy and News Media Reaction to the War in Bosnia, Hampton Press Communication Series: Political Communication, p. 156-7

¹⁷⁸ Dearing J.W. and E.M. Rogers, 1996, *Agenda-Setting*, Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, London, New Delhi, p.79

¹⁷⁹ Kingdon, 1995, p.198, in Kent, G., 2005, *Framing War And Genocide*, British Policy and News Media Reaction to the War in Bosnia, Hampton Press Communication Series: Political Communication, p. 158-160

¹⁸⁰ Dearing J.W. and E.M. Rogers, 1996, *Agenda-Setting*, Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, London, New Delhi, p.76

¹⁸¹ Cobb, R., and C., Elder, 1972, *Participation in American Politics: The dynamics of agenda-building*, Boston: Allyn and Bacon, pp.86-88

¹⁸² Ibid.

¹⁸³ In Kent, G., 2005, *Framing War And Genocide*, British Policy and News Media Reaction to the War in Bosnia, Hampton Press Communication Series: Political Communication, p. 149

effect of the media coverage is symbolic policy action, i.e., a government decision to commit itself publicly to the “appearance of action by way of palliative humanitarian operations, rather than through a firm political commitment to do everything possible to prevent or end a conflict, using military force if necessary”¹⁸⁴. Such reactions are “easier to make and publicize more favourably than substantive policy decisions that tangibly benefit or burden segments of society and reallocate resources”¹⁸⁵. Robinson also points out that one could expect the media to have a major impact in low-cost responses to humanitarian crises, such as government involvement in aid agency relief, when the policy response involves “at most, the allocation of additional funds, military logistical support and donations”¹⁸⁶.

THE CNN EFFECT

Before moving to the definition of the CNN effects theory, it will be useful to summarize the conditions in which this theory was created. There are some interrelated consequences of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War that are usually invoked to account for the change of media coverage, which presented a base for the construction of this theory. The absence of military threats to Western security has made military intervention “a matter of choice rather than compulsion”¹⁸⁷, widening the scope for legitimate debate concerning the need and utility of using military forces and other foreign policy issues, which consequently made the media more independent in defining these issues and more influential too. Since established frames and associative thinking do not seem to apply anymore, the media seek to “fill the cognitive and emotional gap with their own theories of international relations.”¹⁸⁸

With the end of the Cold War, no new organizing principle has been found, and media face what Foreign Affairs editor James F. Hoge, Jr. calls “the end of predictability”¹⁸⁹. But Entman also suggests, taking the example of media coverage of interventions in Somalia, Bosnia and Kosovo - i.e. the tendency of media to “press insistently for intervention” and then “criticize (the same) interventions when they actually occurred” - that “journalists themselves... became as ambivalent, inconsistent, and theoretically rudderless after the Cold War”¹⁹⁰. The last two decades was also the period when transnational television 24/7 news channels developed steadily and their number in 2005

¹⁸⁴ Gowing, N., 1997, *Media Coverage: Help or Hindrance in Conflict Prevention*. New York: Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Violence

¹⁸⁵ Paletz, D.L., 2002, *The Media in American Politics: Contents and Consequences*, 2nd edition, New York: Longman, p.315

¹⁸⁶ Robinson P., *The CNN Effect: The myth of news, foreign policy and intervention*, 2002, Routledge, London and New York, p.124

¹⁸⁷ Jakobsen, P.V., 2000, Focus On The CNN Misses The Point: The Real Media Impact On Conflict Management Is Invisible And Indirect, , *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 37, no.2, SAGE Publications, London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi, pp.131-143

¹⁸⁸ Entman, R.M, Declaration of Independence, The Growth of Media Power after the Cold War, in Nacos, B.L., Shapiro R.Y. and P. Isernia (eds), *Decisionmaking in a Glass House; Mass Media, Public Opinion and American and European Foreign Policy in the 21st Century*, 2000, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, INC. London, Boulder, New York, Oxford, p. 12-24

¹⁸⁹ Hoge, J.F. Jr., Fall 1990, The End of Predictability, *Media Studies Journal*, pp. 1-11

¹⁹⁰ Entman, R.M., 2004, *Projections of Power: Framing News, Public Opinion, and US Foreign Policy*, Chicago: Chicago University Press, p. 101

reached 72¹⁹¹ and has kept growing until today. Their global real-time news coverage has been associated with accelerating the pace of international communication, and even further, with direct participation in diplomatic practices and even foreign policy outcomes – a phenomenon called “medialism”, “tele-diplomacy”, and the “CNN (Cable News Network) Effect”.

The most common point in CNN effect theory definitions is that media took over control of information, recognized already 50 years ago as “a power in the foreign policy sense”¹⁹², and thereby got the ability to “move and shake governments”¹⁹³. “By publicizing foreign events”, Kegley and Wittkopf observe, the media may “provoke decision making about issue which, had they not attracted attention, would probably have been met with apathy and indifference”¹⁹⁴. Feist described the CNN effect as a theory that “compelling television images, such as images of a humanitarian crisis, cause US policymakers to intervene in a situation when such an intervention might otherwise not be in the US national interest”¹⁹⁵, while Livingston and Eachus explained it as “a loss of policy control on the part of policy makers because of the power of the media, a power that they can do nothing about.”¹⁹⁶

This power has been reinforced by the speed with which information is exchanged in the modern world, and the “CNN effect” exactly points to the ability of this first truly global television network and other similar international TV channels to “inform the public *instantly and continuously* of news from anywhere in the world and thereby force national decision-makers to deal with the reported problems and issues quickly – often without sufficient time to deliberate”¹⁹⁷. Schorr defined the CNN effect as “the way breaking news affects foreign policy decisions”¹⁹⁸, while according to Seib, the CNN effect is “presumed to illustrate the dynamic tension that exists between real-time television news and policymaking, with the news having the upper hand in terms of influence”¹⁹⁹. Livingston identified three variations of CNN effects: an accelerant to decision making when media shortens the decision-making process and television diplomacy is evident; an impediment to the achievement of desired policy goals with two types: one in which emotional, grisly coverage undermines morale, and another related to

¹⁹¹ Figure presented at the News Xchange conference, Amsterdam, Netherlands, 10-11 November, 2005)

¹⁹² Cohen, B., 1963, *The Press and Foreign Policy*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, p.279

¹⁹³ Cohen, B.C., 1994, “A View from the Academy” in Bennett W.L and D.L. Paletz, eds., *Taken By Storm: The Media, Public Opinion, and US Foreign Policy in the Gulf War*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, p. 9

¹⁹⁴ Kegley, J.W. Jr. and E.R. Wittkopf, 1987, *American Foreign Policy: Pattern and Process*, New York: St. Martin’s Press, p. 327, in Mermin J., 1997, *Television News And American Intervention In Somalia: The Myth Of A Media Driven Foreign Policy*, *Political Science Quarterly*, Volume 112, Number 3, p. 385-403

¹⁹⁵ Feist, S., 2001, *Facing down the global village: The media impact*, in Kugler, R. and E. Frost (eds.) *The global century*, Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, p. 713

¹⁹⁶ Livingston S. and T. Eachus, 1995, *Humanitarian crises and US foreign policy: Somalia and the CNN Effect reconsidered*, *Political Communication*, 12, p. 143)

¹⁹⁷ Old or New Ball Game? Mass Media, Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy, Nacos, B.L, Shapiro R.Y. and P. Isernia, in Nacos, B.L, Shapiro R.Y. and P. Isernia (eds), *Decisionmaking in a Glass House; Mass Media, Public Opinion and American and European Foreign Policy In The 21st Century*, 2000, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, INC. London, Boulder, New York, Oxford, p. 2

¹⁹⁸ Schorr, D., 1998, November 27, CNN effect: Edge-of-seat diplomacy, *Christian Science Monitor*, p. 11

¹⁹⁹ Seib, P., 2002, *The global journalist: News and conscience in a world of conflict*, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, p. 27

breaches in operational security; and a policy agenda-setting agent, in which case emotional, compelling coverage of atrocities or humanitarian crises re-order foreign policy priorities²⁰⁰. According to Gilboa, CNN effects may include: “forcing” policy on leaders, “limiting” their options, “disrupting” their policy considerations, and “hindering” implementation, as well as “enabling” policymakers to adopt a policy and “helping” implementation by “legitimizing” their actions²⁰¹. Some authors observe that media even have the ability to function as an intermediary or arbitrator²⁰², facilitating the communication between parties, “particularly if the principals cannot or do not wish to contact each other directly”²⁰³. In this context Gilboa proposes a special conceptual model, “media-broker diplomacy”, with three variants: direct intervention, when journalists temporarily become mediators and specifically help parties to begin official negotiations; bridging, when journalists attempt to help parties realize the value of negotiations to resolve their conflict; and secret mediation, when journalists secretly explore a possible solution²⁰⁴. According to Gilboa, the first variant was seen in 1977 when Walter Cronkite mediated between Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menache Begin; when British correspondent and Syrian leader Hafez Assad’s biographer, Patrick Seak attempted to break the deadlock in Israeli-Syrian negotiations in March-April 2000; and in October 2002 when Russian reporter Anna Politkovskaya, a reporter for the Russian newspaper Novaya Gazetta, who had been very critical of the Russian military operations in Chechnya, tried to mediate between the Russian government and Chechen terrorists who held 700 hostages in a Moscow theater. The second variant was seen in: Ted Koppel’s Israeli-Palestinian special broadcasts in 1988 and 2000 on Nightline, the TV-shot which motto was “Bringing people together who are worlds apart”; again in the role of Thomas Friedman of the New York Times in initiating and promoting the 2002 Saudi Arabia plan for Arab-Israeli peace; and in the role of Michael Gonzales of the Wall Street Journal in 2003 in initiating and promoting a European alliance with the United States before the war in Iraq began, which resulted in the eight European states’ letter of support. The third variant concerns how the editor of Sports Illustrated and one of SI’s chief correspondents Whitney Tower helped 35 Hungarian coaches and athletes defect to US during the 1956 Melbourne Olympic Games, two months after Soviets brutally crushed a democratic rebellion in Hungary; and the mediation between the US and the Soviet Union of an ABC diplomatic correspondent John Scali during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, that was crucial to its peaceful resolution.

²⁰⁰ Livingston, S., 1997, Beyond the CNN effect: The media-foreign policy dynamic, p. 293, in P. Norris (ed.) Politics and the press: The news media and their influence, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner

²⁰¹ Gilboa, E., 2005, The CNN Effect: The Search For A Communication Theory Of International Relations, Political Communication, 22: 27-44, Taylor & Francis Inc.

²⁰² Schellenberg, J.A., 1982, The Science of Conflict, New York: Oxford University Press, p. 236

²⁰³ Vincent, R.C., 2000, A Narrative Analysis of US Press Coverage of Slobodan Milosevic and the Serbs in Kosovo, European Journal of Communication, Sage Publications London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi, Vol. 15 (3): 321-344

²⁰⁴ Gilboa, E., June 2005, Media-Broker Diplomacy: When Journalists Become Mediators, Critical Studies in Media Communication, Vol. 22, No.2, pp. 99-120

Still some doubts have been cast on the validity of the CNN effect thesis, especially by journalists themselves²⁰⁵, who questioned how influential the media really are. According to Strobel, “the closer one looks at those incidents that supposedly prove a CNN Effect... the more the Effect shrinks. It is like a shimmering desert mirage, disappearing as you get closer.” For example he notes that although CNN can make life more difficult for foreign policy makers, it “also provides a convenient way for administration officials to leak new policies in the hope that they’ll define the debate before political opponents do”. He quotes Herman Cohen, former US assistant secretary of state for African affairs, who described this knotty relationship between media and politicians with the example of Somalia in the early 1992: “It started with government manipulating press, and then changed to press manipulating the government.”²⁰⁶ Strobel also points out that policy-makers can be very persistent in non-involvement despite the TV pictures suggesting an intervention, if it is potentially high in costs, especially the cost of American casualties. Natsios and Jakobsen agreed that the CNN effect has been highly exaggerated²⁰⁷, while Johanna Neuman argues: “while technology has enabled faster feedback from the public in matters of war and peace, while it has speeded the deliberative process and shortened reaction time, while it has written a new job description for diplomats and given the public sense of being there, it has not, in the end, changed the fundamentals of political leadership and international governance”²⁰⁸. According to Ammon, real time television rarely, if ever, “is a sole cause for particular outcome” i.e. that it can be necessary, but not a sufficient condition for particular outcome to occur²⁰⁹. Seib also asserted that media-policy outcomes relationship is definitely not a “straight-forward cause-and-effect process”²¹⁰. Badsey suggested that “although the CNN effect may happen, it is unusual, unpredictable, and part of a complex relationship of factors”²¹¹. Gowing also expressed caution regarding the media’s role in politics, describing it as “ambiguous, unclear, and often misconstrued”²¹². Therefore, the CNN effect has been often presented in a pejorative way, as an implicit assumption that this kind of media effect contributes to or even significantly affects problem definition in a somewhat haphazard manner²¹³.

²⁰⁵ Gowing, N., 1994, *Real-Time Television Coverage of Armed Conflicts and Diplomatic Crises: Does it Pressure or Distort foreign Policy Decisions?*, The Joan Shorenstein Barone Center on the Press, Politics and Public Policy, Harvard; Strobel, W., 1997, *Late Breaking Foreign Policy*, Washington, DC: United States Institute of Press

²⁰⁶ Strobel, W.P., May 1996, *The CNN Effect: How Much Influence Does the 24-Hour News Network Really Have on Foreign Policy*, *American Journalism Review*, University of Maryland, p. 34-37

²⁰⁷ Natsios A., 1997, *US foreign policy and the four horsemen of the apocalypse: Humanitarian relief in complex emergencies*, Westport, CT: Praeger, p. 124; Jakobsen, P.V., 2000, *Focus On The CNN Misses The Pont: The Real Media Impact On Conflict Management Is Invisible And Indirect*, *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 37, no.2, SAGE Publications, London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi, p. 133

²⁰⁸ Neuman, J., 1996, *Lights, Camera, War: Is Media Technology Driving International Politics?*, Sta. Martin’s Press, New York, p.16

²⁰⁹ Ammon, R.J., 2001, *Global Television and the Shapping of World Politics*, McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers, Jefferson, North Carolina and London

²¹⁰ Seib, P., 2002, *The global journalist: News and conscience in a world of conflict*, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, p. 27

²¹¹ Badsey, S., 1997, (ed.), *The media and international security*, London: Cass, p. 19

²¹² Gowing, N., 1997, *Media Coverage: Help or Hindrance in Conflict Prevention*. New York: Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Violence

²¹³ Kent, G., 2005, *Framing War And Genocide, British Policy and News Media Reaction to the War in Bosnia*, Hampton Press Communication Series: Political Communication, p. 167

But there are two conclusions that are common for both the “cheerleaders” and critics of the CNN effect theory. The first is that the news media have a larger impact on the process of policy making, such as timing and the extent of consultation before making a decision by the accelerating the pace of international communication, rather than on the content of the policies themselves. As former US Secretary of State Colin Powell observed, “live television doesn’t change the policy, but it does create the environment in which the policy is made”²¹⁴. The same was noted from journalists’ point of view: “We influenced events, but not the outcome.”²¹⁵ Ammon listed three specific ways in which successive advances in communication and media technology have affected the ways diplomacy is conducted: first, by displacing diplomacy’s traditional methods; second, by increasing the diplomatic influence of non-traditional actors; and third, by accelerating diplomacy’s pace²¹⁶. In the ‘60s, political decision makers enjoyed far greater influence over public information about foreign events. For example, describing the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962 US President John F. Kennedy’s secretary of defense, Robert S. McNamara, said, “I don’t think I turned on a television set during the whole two weeks of that crisis”²¹⁷. Throughout the whole period, Kennedy repeatedly benefited from “a cocoon of time and privacy afforded by the absence of intense television scrutiny”²¹⁸. Similarly, when the Berlin Wall went up in 1961, it took fifteen hours before President Kennedy even received word that the East Germany had begun to build barricades. He made no public statements about the border closing for eight days, and no statements were allowed to be issued in his name. However, “communication’s collapse of time and space” forced President Bush to make a statement within hours of the Wall’s destruction²¹⁹, because as Beschloss pointed it out, TV today “prevents presidents from presuming that they can maintain a monopoly on information for long”²²⁰. Former Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, told the US Senate: “Television’s ability to bring graphic images of pain and outrage into our living rooms has heightened the pressure both for immediate engagement in areas of international crises and immediate disengagement when events don’t go according to plan”²²¹. Former US State Department spokesman Nicholas Burns put it less diplomatically: “The challenge for us in government is to balance the need to feed the beast of television against the more natural

²¹⁴ McNulty, T., 1993, Television’s impact on executive decision-making and diplomacy, Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, 17, p. 80, in Gilboa, E., 2005, *The CNN Effect: The Search For A Communication Theory Of International Relations*, Political Communication, 22: 27-44, Taylor & Francis Inc.

²¹⁵ Stewart Purvis, Editor-in-Chief of ITN, interview, 13 January 1994, in Gowing, N., 1994, “Real-Time Television Coverage of Armed Conflicts and Diplomatic Crises: Does it Pressure or Distort foreign Policy Decisions?”, The Joan Shorenstein Barone Center on the Press, Politics and Public Policy, Harvard

²¹⁶ Ammon, R.A., 2001, *Global Television and the Shaping of World Politics*, McFarland & Company, Inc., Jefferson, North Carolina, and London, p. 7

²¹⁷ Quoted in Beschloss, M. R., *The Video Vise; TV Squeezes Our Bosnia Options*, The Washington Post, May 2, 1993, PAGE C1

²¹⁸ Beschloss, M. R., *The Video Vise; TV Squeezes Our Bosnia Options*, The Washington Post, May 2, 1993, PAGE C1

²¹⁹ Ammon, R.A., 2001, *Global Television and the Shaping of World Politics*, McFarland & Company, Inc., Jefferson, North Carolina, and London, p. 79

²²⁰ Beschloss, M. R., *The Video Vise; TV Squeezes Our Bosnia Options*, The Washington Post, May 2, 1993, PAGE C1

²²¹ Quoted in Neuman, J., 1996, *Light, camera, was: Is media technology driving international politics?*, New York: St. Martin’s Press, p. 14-15

and wise human instinct to reflect before speaking”²²². How seriously politicians took the pressure from media shows in the fact that the number of press officers employed by governments across the world has significantly increased during past decades. The UK government defended its decision to hire 3200 press officers in total by blaming the 24/7 news culture and the phenomenal growth of the Internet²²³. Already in the '70s it was estimated that 30 to 50 percent of the large White House staff was involved with media relations in some form²²⁴, while ten years ago, according to one estimate, the number of communications professionals in America (150000) exceeded the number of journalists (130000) and the gap is growing²²⁵. In many recent crises 24/7 media news coverage has almost replaced ambassadors and experts as the authoritative sources of critical information and evaluation on what is happening in the world. The first US President Bush’s press secretary, Marlin Fitzwater, said that in many international crises, “we virtually cut out the State Department and the desk officers... Their reports are still important, but they often don’t get here in time for the basic decision to be made”²²⁶. According to Margaret Tutwiler, former Secretary of State James A. Baker’s adviser and press secretary: “Time for reaction is compressed... analysis and intelligence gathering is out”²²⁷. According to Seib, events in the Soviet Union during August 1991 illustrated television’s role as high-speed diplomatic messenger. “As events developed, General Colin Powell, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “kept one eye on CNN and another on intelligence reports that were still flowing in”²²⁸. And in the White House Situation Room, staff members “used both CNN and US intelligence reports to monitor the movements of troops, tanks, and war planes”²²⁹.

The second important element of the conclusions about CNN theory is policy (un)certainty, defined as “function of the degree of consensus and coordination of the subsystems of the executive with respect to an issue”²³⁰. “The greater the level of uncertainty over policy within the executive, the more vulnerable the policy process is to the influence of negative media influence – the possibility that public opinion might be influenced, associated damage to government image and credibility and policy makers

²²² Talking to the World About American Foreign Policy” by Nicholas Burns, Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics, Vol. 1, No. 4, Fall 1996, p. 12 in Gowing, N., 1997, Media Coverage: Help or Hindrance in Conflict Prevention. New York: Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Violence

²²³ Hencke, D., Ministers say 24/7 news demands 3,200 press officers, August 31, 2006, The Guardian

²²⁴ Wise, D., 1973, The Politics of Lying, New York: Vintage

²²⁵ Dowie, M., Torches of Liberty, in Stauber J.C., and S., Rampton, Toxic Sludge is Good for You, Monroe: ME: Common Courage Press, 1995, in Bennett, W.L., 2005, News; The Politics Of Illusion, Pearson Longman, p. 128-131

²²⁶ McNulty, T., 1993, Television’s impact on executive decision-making and diplomacy, Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, 17, p. 71, in Gilboa, E., 2005, The CNN Effect: The Search For A Communication Theory Of International Relations”, Political Communication, 22: 27-44, Taylor & Francis Inc.

²²⁷ Author interview, Alexandria, Virginia, March 29, 1996, Livingston, S., beyond the CNN Effect, The Media-Foreign Policy Dynamic, in Norris, P., ed., 1997, Politics and the Press, The news Media and Their Influences, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder London, p. 293

²²⁸ Beschloss, M.R., and S., Talbott, 1993, At the Highest Levels, Boston: Little, Brown, in Seib, P., Headline Diplomacy; How News Coverage Affects Foreign Policy, Praeger, Westport, Connecticut, London, p. 112

²²⁹ Ibid.

²³⁰ Robinson, P., 2001, Theorizing the Influence of Media on World Politics, European Journal of Communication, SAGE Publications, Vol 16(4): 523-544

might themselves start to question the cogency of existing government policy”²³¹. As Badsey points out, “if leaders don’t have a clear policy on a significant issue, the media may step in and replace them”²³². According to Strobel, the media seemed to have an impact when “policy was weakly held, was already in the process of being changed or was lacking public support”²³³. Hoge also underlines the significance of the degree of cohesion of the political elite: “the existence of policy that can command public support against emotional swings stirred up by television imagery is a key. In the absence of persuasive government strategy, the media will be catalytic”²³⁴. Or, as Livingston put it: “the key variable in the media’s effect on foreign policy is not the presence or absence of cameras but rather the presence or absence of political leadership”²³⁵. ABC News’ Ted Koppel stated in his testimony before the US Congress that “news coverage has a significant impact only if those responsible for making policy have not defended that policy clearly and have not marshaled public support for it... If an administration has thought its own foreign policy through, and is prepared and able to argue the merits and defend consequences of that policy, television and all its technologies can be dealt with. If, on the other hand, the foreign policy is ill-conceived and poorly explained, it does not much matter whether the news arrives by satellite or clipper ship, eventually the policy will fail”²³⁶. Gowing, whose overall conclusion regarding media power and world politics is that media impact only occurs in rare moments of “policy weakness”, quotes former UN General Secretary Kofi Annan on this aspect of media-politics relationship: “When governments have a clear policy... then television has little impact... When there is a problem and the policy has not been thought (through)... they have to do something or face a public relations disaster”²³⁷. Wolfsfeld pointed out that the level of elite consensus set not only a limit to the possible impact of media on the decision-making process, but also on the content of media coverage itself: “the greater the level of elite consensus, the more likely the news media are to play a supportive role in implementing such policies”²³⁸. Alexander George specifies the types of “faulty policy” that might emerge from intra-governmental politics: no policy at all; compromised policy, when the direction that policy should take is left unclear or the means for achieving a well enough defined objective are left unclear or unfocused; unstable or blind policy when the internal

²³¹ Ibid.

²³² Badsey, S., 1997, (ed.), *The media and international security*, London: Cass, p. 19

²³³ Strobel, W.P., *The CNN Effect: How Much Influence Does the 24-Hour News Network Really Have on Foreign Policy*, *American Journalism Review*, University of Maryland, May 1996, p. 34-37

²³⁴ Hoge, J., July/August 1994, *Media Pervasiveness*, *Foreign Affairs* 73, number 4, p. 136

²³⁵ Livingston, S., *beyond the CNN Effect, The Media-Foreign Policy Dynamic*, in Norris, P., ed., 1997, *Politics and the Press, The news Media and Their Influences*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder London, p. 293

²³⁶ Testimony before the US House of Representatives Committee on International Relations, chaired by Lee Hamilton, R-IN, April 26, 1994, Quoted in Jost, K., *Foreign policy and Public Opinion*, CQ Researcher, July 15, 1994, p. 617

²³⁷ Gowing, N., 1994, “Real-Time Television Coverage of Armed Conflicts and Diplomatic Crises: Does it Pressure or Distort foreign Policy Decisions?”, *The Joan Shorenstein Barone Center on the Press, Politics and Public Policy*, Harvard

²³⁸ Wolfsfeld, G., 2001, *The News Media and Peace Process, The Middle East and Northern Ireland*, United States Institute of Peace, Washington DC, p.10

struggle over policy is not really resolved²³⁹. Robinson developed a “policy-media interaction model”, according to which media influence on policy occurs when there exists policy uncertainty and extensive and critically framed media coverage. According to this model, in a case of elite consensus, media operate within “sphere of consensus”, i.e. media “manufactures consent” for official policy. If there is elite dissensus, media operate within “sphere of legitimate controversy”, i.e. media reflect elite dissensus. If there is policy certainty within executives, although coverage might become critical and pressure government to change policy, media influence will be resisted. But in a case that elite dissensus is accompanied by policy uncertainty within government and critically framed media coverage, “media takes sides in political debate and becomes an active participant and can influence policy outcomes”²⁴⁰. Entman also argues that “journalists have strong professional motivations to include opposition readings of foreign policy in their stories, and enjoy the greatest opportunity to satisfy these motives when the event or issue is ambiguous”²⁴¹.

It has been argued that satellite coverage of events in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square marked the beginning of what has become a dramatic increase in live television reporting of international crises²⁴². But even after the end of the Cold War, there have not been many cases of media coverage important for the CNN effect theory, and almost all of them have been used both to confirm and deny CNN effect theory’s assumptions. For some of them, like the Gulf War, it has been argued that the American government used the media to mobilize support for its preferred policies and that it was not driven by the media to intervene²⁴³. Pulitzer Prize winner Charles Krauthammer welcomes the assumption that American intervention in the Gulf War was not galvanized by pictures and emotion, but by cold calculation, unlike the intervention in Somalia where “we went because of pictures”²⁴⁴. In assessing the influence of television on international diplomacy in the last years of the twentieth century, Somalia and Bosnia were often cited as proof that “satellite television, its lens trained on human suffering, was driving diplomacy”²⁴⁵, but some authors claim that CNN effect in these two cases as well as in Northern Iraq “did matter” but was insufficient to cause interventions by itself²⁴⁶. The question whether Western powers reacted to television pictures or to the facts on the

²³⁹ George, A.L., 1980, *Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice*, Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, p. 114, in Robinson, P., 2001, *Theorizing The Influence Of Media On World Politics*, European Journal of Communication, SAGE Publications, Vol 16(4): 523-544

²⁴⁰ Robinson, P., 2001, *Theorizing The Influence Of Media On World Politics*, European Journal of Communication, SAGE Publications, Vol 16(4): 523-544

²⁴¹ Entman, R.M., 2004, *Projections of Power: Framing News, Public Opinion, and US Foreign Policy*, Chicago: Chicago University Press, p. 18

²⁴² Hoge, J., *Media Pervasiveness*, Foreign Affairs 73, number 4 (July/August 1994), p. 136

²⁴³ Jakobsen, P.V., 2000, *Focus On The CNN Misses The Pont: The Real Media Impact On Conflict Management Is Invisible And Indirect*, Journal of Peace Research, vol. 37, no.2, SAGE Publications, London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi, pp.131-143

²⁴⁴ Krauthammer, C., *Intervention Lite: Foreign Policy by CNN*, The Washington Post, February 18, 1994, Friday, Final Edition, Page A25

²⁴⁵ Neuman, J., 1996, *Lights, Camera, War: Is Media Technology Driving International Politics?*, Sta. Martin’s Press, New York, p. 228

²⁴⁶ Jakobsen, P.V., 2000, *Focus On The CNN Misses The Pont: The Real Media Impact On Conflict Management Is Invisible And Indirect*, Journal of Peace Research, vol. 37, no.2, SAGE Publications, London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi, pp.131-143

ground that became visible remained largely unanswered. At the same time, some other factors are also considered important: for Somalia, it was “a low risk operation promising a high humanitarian and political payoff by the Bush administration”²⁴⁷, while some Western “non-interventions” in the 1990s, like Bosnia between 1992 and May 1995, Kosovo in June 1998 and Rwanda in April 1994, suggest that casualty estimates and exit points are decisive when Western governments are reluctant to intervene in humanitarian crisis²⁴⁸. In these situations, it has been argued, media generated pressures are likely to result in minimalist policies, which are primarily aimed at demonstrating to their action-demanding publics that “something is being done” so that ground deployment can be avoided.

I will present here in brief four post-Cold War cases that have often been used both pro and contra the assumptions of the CNN theory: the Gulf War and the subsequent Kurdish crisis (1990-91), the war in Bosnia (1992-5), the intervention in Somalia (1992) and the genocide in Rwanda (1994). As will be seen, politicians themselves frequently affirmed that the news media were of considerable importance in shaping policy responses in these cases. Although it can be assumed that politicians, being under pressure “to be seen to be doing the right thing”, may exaggerate television’s effect on their actions, hiding behind it as a justification for their decisions²⁴⁹, it is equally plausible that the desire to project an image of the immunity from transient influences may lead to an under-emphasis on television reporting and public pressure²⁵⁰. So, in general, their remarks about the CNN effect can be taken as they are, without the examination of their deeper motives. Some policy-makers even expressed caution regarding media effects. Former US Secretary of State Warren Christopher warned that although “television is a wonderful phenomenon and sometimes even an instrument of freedom...but (it) cannot be the North Star of America’s foreign policy.”²⁵¹ According to Edward Bickham, Special Adviser to the British Foreign Secretary in 1991-3, “the power of television in foreign policy is a mixed blessing”, since reactions to the priorities of the news room are “unlikely to yield a coherent or a sustainable foreign policy”. “Foreign policy should be made by democratic governments, accountable to Parliament, not in reaction to which trouble spots the news gathering organizations can afford to cover from time to time”, he said²⁵². Former Defense Secretary James Schlesinger argued that in the post-Cold War era the United States have come to make foreign policy in response to “impulse and image”: “In this age

²⁴⁷ Ibid.

²⁴⁸ Drozdiak, W., 1998, NATO Appeals for Peace in Kosovo, *The Washington Post*, 29 May, A37; Evans, G., 1997, Responding to Crises in the African Great Lakes, *Adelphi Paper* 211, London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies:62-69; Jakobsen, P.V., 1998, Western Use of Coercive Diplomacy After the Cold War: A Challenge for Theory and Practice, New York: Macmillan, 79-109; Smith, R. J., 1998, NATO Albania Deployment Less Likely, *The Washington Post*, 28 May, A30

²⁴⁹ Seaver, Brenda M. “The Public Dimension of Foreign Policy.” *The Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics*, Winter 1998, Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 65-91

²⁵⁰ Carruthers, S.L., 2000, *The Media At War; Communication And Conflict In The Twentieth Century*, Palgrave Macmillan, p. 209

²⁵¹ Quoted in Gowing, N., 1994, “Real-Time Television Coverage of Armed Conflicts and Diplomatic Crises: Does it Pressure or Distort foreign Policy Decisions?”, *The Joan Shorenstein Barone Center on the Press, Politics and Public Policy*, Harvard, p. 20

²⁵² Bickham, E., Special Adviser to the British Foreign Secretary 1991-3, *Playing To the Heart of the Nation*, *Spectrum*, Autumn 1993, p.3

image means television, and policies seem increasingly subject, especially in democracies, to the images flickering across the television screen”²⁵³.

THE GULF WAR AND THE KURDISH CRISIS

Some authors argue that the post-Cold War era in international affairs truly began not in 1989 but in 1991, with the Coalition victory in the Gulf War against Iraq. “It combined forces and elements that may not coalesce very often in the future: the credibility of an American president’s attempt to demonize a small state; the seemingly clear national interest in preserving access to oil; the former rival superpower, the Soviet Union, actually allying with the United States; and a relatively clear path to victory.”²⁵⁴ The Gulf War, August 1990-February 1991, was conducted between Iraq and a coalition force from 34 nations, authorized by the United Nations and led primarily by the United States and the United Kingdom in order to return Kuwait, invaded by Iraqi forces, to the control of the Emir of Kuwait.

An unprecedented level of live news coverage was available from the Gulf War. “For the first time since Washington’s privileged ladies brought picnic lunches down to the battle of Bull Run to watch an early Civil War battle, an audience had witnessed war.”²⁵⁵ The American news network CNN provided 17 hours of continuous live coverage of the initial air attack on Baghdad until it was closed down by the Iraqi authorities and US President Bush allegedly first learned that his order for the attack had been put into effect through this broadcast. “I learn more from CNN than I do from the CIA”, he admitted²⁵⁶. UK Prime Minister Major is recorded as “sitting in Downing Street flipping between television channels”, having been alerted by CNN that “something was up”²⁵⁷. As Richard N. Haass of the Bush National Security Council staff recalled, “We didn’t have six minutes in some ways to contemplate [the invasion of Kuwait], and certainly not six hours or six days, if you’ll look at the night when we first found out about it and then at every breaking point since then.” Paul Wolfowitz, undersecretary of defense in the Bush administration, noted that Saddam’s assault was “the first time in history that we had live coverage of a surprise attack.”²⁵⁸ US administration considered CNN at that time as the quickest and most effective way for transmitting their messages because “all countries in the world had it and were watching it on real-time basis”²⁵⁹. In one occasion, James Baker decided to deliver the last ultimatum to Saddam Hussein through CNN, and not

²⁵³ Schlesinger, J., Quest for a Post-Cold War Foreign policy, Foreign Affairs, Winter 1992, in Livingston, S., beyond the CNN Effect, The Media-Foreign Policy Dynamic, in Norris, P., ed., 1997, Politics and the Press, The news Media and Their Influences, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder London, p. 293

²⁵⁴ Entman, R.M., Declaration of Independence, The Growth of Media Power after the Cold War, in Nacos, B.L., Shapiro R.Y. and P. Isernia (eds), Decisionmaking in a Glass House; Mass Media, Public Opinion and American and European Foreign Policy in the 21st Century, 2000, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, INC. London, Boulder, New York, Oxford, p. 11

²⁵⁵ Neuman, J., 1996, Lights, Camera, War: Is Media Technology Driving International Politics?, Sta. Martin’s Press, New York, p. 212

²⁵⁶ Friedland, L., 1992, Covering the world: International television news services, New York: Twentieth Century Fund Press, pp. 7-8

²⁵⁷ Quoted in Taylor, P., 1992, War and the Media. Propaganda and Persuasion in the Gulf War, Manchester University Press, Manchester

²⁵⁸ Quoted in Beschloss, M. R., The Video Vise; TV Squeezes Our Bosnia Options, The Washington Post, May 2, 1993, page C1

²⁵⁹ Wriston, W., 1997, Bits, bytes, and diplomacy, Foreign Affairs, 76, p. 19

through the US ambassador to Iraq²⁶⁰. Iraqi President Saddam Hussein used CNN in the same way: he accordingly invited CNN to be his special guest for the duration of hostilities, even when other organizations were temporarily ordered to leave at the start of the air war, as he hoped that “footage of civilian casualties of Allied bombing would quickly turn American civilians against the war”²⁶¹. He also challenged the US-led coalition through CNN by proposing a peace plan that was afterward perceived in Washington as a false proposal²⁶².

It was argued that after the Gulf War, it will never again be possible to discuss the conduct of war without reference to the media²⁶³. But the Gulf War was also ironically labeled as a “perfect war”²⁶⁴ which did not appear as “blood and guts spilled in living color on the living room rug” but through a “radically distanced, technically controlled, eminently “cool” postmodern optic”²⁶⁵. “The audience was spared the worst of it...Still, there were sound effects, the noise of missiles hissing through air, and there were blazes of light in the sky, the result of Patriot missiles intercepting Scud missiles, resembling a child’s Nintendo game.”²⁶⁶ America’s major television networks penned a collective letter of protest to President Bush, complaining that “never in American history has this country been faced with as large as commitment of manpower and equipment with as little opportunity for the press to report”²⁶⁷. In America, according to MacArthur, it was difficult to find anyone who didn’t count Desert Storm as “a devastating and immoral victory for military censorship and a crushing defeat for the press and the First Amendment”²⁶⁸.

Following the defeat of Iraqi forces by the allied coalition, the Kurds that were located at the north of Iraq mounted an armed uprising against the Iraqi authorities. By the end of March 1991 the Kurdish rebellion has been ruthlessly crushed and between 500.000 and one million Kurdish refugees wound up in the snow-covered mountains on the border between Iraq and Turkey. Within a month, Operation Provide Comfort was launched and involved the deployment of both US air power and ground troops in northern Iraq.

²⁶⁰ Gilboa, E., 2002, *Global Communication And Foreign Policy*, International Communication Association, p. 731-748

²⁶¹ Carruthers, S.L., 2000, *The Media At War; Communication And Conflict In The Twentieth Century*, Palgrave Macmillan, p. 133

²⁶² Gilboa, E., 2002, *Global Communication And Foreign Policy*, International Communication Association, p. 731-748

²⁶³ Sheppard, E.D. and D. Bawden, 1997, *More News, Less Knowledge? An Information Content Analysis Of Television And Newspaper Coverage Of The Gulf War*, *International Journal of Information Management*, Vol. 17, No.3, pp. 211-227

²⁶⁴ Kellner, D., 1992, *The Persian Gulf TV War*, Boulder, Co.: Westview Press, p. 386

²⁶⁵ Cumings, B., 1992, *War and Television*, London: Verso, p. 121

²⁶⁶ Neuman, J., 1996, *Lights, Camera, War: Is Media Technology Driving International Politics?*, St. Martin’s Press, New York, p. 212

²⁶⁷ Quoted in MacArthur, J.R., 1993, *Second Front: Censorship and Propaganda in the Gulf War*, University of California Press, p. 10

²⁶⁸ MacArthur, J.R., 1993, *Second Front: Censorship and Propaganda in the Gulf War*, University of California Press, p.8

Soon after the liberation of Kuwait, Bush said, “American lives are too precious for us to be sucked into a civil war”²⁶⁹, explaining that he feels “frustrated any time innocent civilians are being slaughtered”, but that “the United States and these other countries with us in the coalition did not go there to settle all the internal affairs of Iraq”²⁷⁰. But then newscasts began to carry images of the cold and hungry Kurds, in which reporters went beyond merely showing Kurdish suffering to actual advocacy of Western intervention on the Kurds’ behalf: “television was putting world leaders on the spot, linking them directly to the visible plight of the miserable refugees, putting the victims’ accusations (of abandonment) against the powerful”²⁷¹. As Daniel Schorr observed, “within a two-week period, the President had been forced, under the impact of what Americans and Europeans were seeing on television, to reconsider his hasty withdrawal of troops from Iraq”²⁷². “Score one for the power of the media, especially television, as a policy-making force”, he concluded²⁷³. Richard Haass from the US National Security Council was quoted as stating “I would be the first to admit that I think television probably had the greatest impact at this time in pushing us through the various phases of policy. The political and the human desire to respond to what was unfolding on the screen had a sizeable impact”²⁷⁴.

Shaw reached a similar conclusion about the British policy toward the same crisis: “in Kurdistan it was the British media and public opinion which forced governments’ hands”²⁷⁵. That was seen as an historic U-turn by the UK government: on 8 April 1991, Prime Minister John Major, who had initially abjured any responsibility for the rebellion – “I don’t recall asking the Kurds to mount this particular insurrection” – retracted²⁷⁶. ‘Safe heavens’ were to be established for the Kurds, and Westminster’s policy lead was followed by the White House two days later. Major himself said that he “had been moved by footage of the Kurdish refugees as he was putting his socks on in his flat, and had, against diplomatic advice, devised the ‘safe heavens’ scheme on the back of an envelope flying to an EC summit in Luxembourg”²⁷⁷. It has been argued that the impact of images of suffering Kurds were strengthened by two additional factors: the presence on the grounds of authoritative reporters, able to provide a first-hand gloss on the images that the camera produced, and the integration of pictures as well as first-hand commentary

²⁶⁹ Quoted in Bulloch, J., and H., Morris, 1992, *No Friends But the Mountains*, New York: Oxford University Press, p. 30

²⁷⁰ Schorr, D., July/August 1991, *Ten Days that Shook the White House*, *Columbia Journalism Review*, p.

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²⁷¹ Shaw, M., 1996, *Civil Society, Media and Global Crisis: Representing Distant Violence*, London: Pinter, p. 87-97

²⁷² Schorr, D., July/August 1991, *Ten days that shock the White House*, *Columbia Journalism Review*, pp. 21-23

²⁷³ Ibid.

²⁷⁴ Quoted in Strobel, W., 1997, *Late Breaking Foreign Policy*, Washington, DC: United States Institute of Press, p. 128

²⁷⁵ Shaw, M., 1996, *Civil Society and Media in Global Crises*, London: Pinter, p. vii

²⁷⁶ Quoted in Shaw, M., 1996, *Civil Society, Media and Global Crisis: Representing Distant Violence*, London: Pinter, p. 89

²⁷⁷ Gowing, N., 1994, “Real-Time Television Coverage of Armed Conflicts and Diplomatic Crises: Does it Pressure or Distort foreign Policy Decisions?”, *The Joan Shorenstein Barone Center on the Press, Politics and Public Policy*, Harvard

into a general narrative – elaborated more or less consistently over a period of weeks by news anchors and through voiceovers as well as by the reporters on the ground²⁷⁸.

Additional argument for the CNN effect assumption in this case was an extreme contrast between the visibility of the plight of the Kurds in Iraq and “the largely overlooked rebellion” of the Shia population of Iraq’s south that happened at the same time and “in fact cost far more lives”, but did not provoke any Western reaction²⁷⁹. It has been claimed that the “essential difference” between Shia and Kurdish rebellion and their outcomes was a difference in a real-time media attention²⁸⁰. The same was argued for the Kurdish rebellion of 1988, i.e. the anti-Kurdish “Anfal” campaign, mounted between February and September 1988 by the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein, in which upwards of a thousand Kurdish villages were destroyed and thousands of Kurds were gassed, “all beyond the visibility of real-time television”²⁸¹.

A number of critics have challenged these conclusions. In addition to the fact that the Kurdish crisis was exceptional in that responsibility could be easily attributed to Western leaders²⁸², some have pointed out the importance of Turkey - a valued NATO ally – that was highly exercised by the crisis on its border and did not want to import what it saw as further Kurdish problems²⁸³. Brent Scowcroft, National Security adviser to President Bush is quoted as stating: “Without Turkey factored in, with just television pictures, I don’t know what our response would have been. We were very sensitive to Turkey’s anxiety about allowing the Kurds to stay. That was fundamentally what motivated us”²⁸⁴. Similarly, Wheeler argues that TV “did not determine this interventionist response” but “enabled” intervention in the domestic context²⁸⁵, while Miller argued that the United States and Britain did not change their policies in the Kurdish crisis, but only “adapted them to accommodate the refugee crisis and the pressures on Turkey.”²⁸⁶

²⁷⁸ Shaw, M., *Media and Public Sphere without Borders? News Coverage and Power from Kurdistan to Kosovo*, in Nacos, B.L., Shapiro R.Y. and P. Isernia (eds.), *Decisionmaking in a Glass House; Mass Media, Public Opinion and American and European Foreign Policy in the 21st Century*, 2000, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, INC. London, Boulder, New York, Oxford, p. 37

²⁷⁹ Shaw, M., 1996, *Civil Society, Media and Global Crisis: Representing Distant Violence*, London: Pinter, p. 80-3

²⁸⁰ Ibid, p. 23

²⁸¹ Wolfsfeld, G., 1997, *Media and Political Conflict: News from the Middle East*, Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, p. 135, in Ammon, R.J., 2001, *Global Television and the Shapping of World Politics*, McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers, Jefferson, North Carolina and London

²⁸² Carruthers, S.L., 2000, *The Media At War; Communication And Conflict In The Twentieth Century*, Palgrave Macmillan, p. 211-212

²⁸³ Robinson P., 2002, *The CNN Effect: The myth of news, foreign policy and intervention*, Routledge, London and New York

²⁸⁴ Livingston, S., 1997, *Clarifying the CNN Effect: An Examination of Media Effects According to Type of Military Intervention*, The Joan Shorenstein Barone Center on the Press, Politics and Public Policy, Harvard, in Robinson, P., 2000, *World Politics And Media Power: Problems Of Research Design*, Media, Culture & Society, SAGE Publications, London, Thousand Oaks and New Delhi, Vol. 22: 227-232

²⁸⁵ Kent, G., 2005, *Framing War And Genocide, British Policy and News Media Reaction to the War in Bosnia*, Hampton Press Communication Series: Political Communication, p. 196

²⁸⁶ Miller, D., 2002, *March, Measuring media pressure on security policy decisionmaking in liberal states: The positioning hypothesis*, Paper presented at the annual convention of the International Studies Association, New Orleans, p.47

THE WAR IN BOSNIA

Wars in former Yugoslavia began with the 10-day war in Slovenia in June-July 1991, and continued with the all-out war in Croatia, and an especially vicious one in Bosnia and Herzegovina. A number of leading writers argue that “the wars in the former Yugoslavia stemmed primarily from the resurgence of Serbian nationalism, in part coinciding with, and then fostered by, the former Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic’s government in Belgrade, culminating in territorial aggression by military forces directed and supported by Serbia”²⁸⁷. After hundreds of thousands people had died, on August 30, 1995, NATO aircraft launched a series of strikes against selected targets in Serb-held parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which heralded the start of Operation Deliberate Force, NATO’s first air campaign that lasted for two-and-a-half weeks and forced the Bosnian Serbs to participate in the peace negotiations that were concluded in Dayton, US, in November 1995.

Western great-power policy towards former Yugoslavia and especially Bosnia between 1992 and the summer of 1995 is considered as an example of the absence of an automatic link between media images of suffering and decisive intervention to alleviate it. In the words of Minear, Scott and Weiss, the Balkan wars are a case of “blanket coverage, selective action”²⁸⁸. Silber and Little point out that Western governments treated the war almost as if it were a natural disaster, “enthusiastically addressing the symptoms of the conflict, without making any real effort to challenge its causes”²⁸⁹. Top policymakers in the Bush administration “have made no bones” about the fact that they regarded the deployment of ground troops as the only effective means of stopping the fighting in Bosnia, and that the principal purpose of resolution 770 and other actions taken during 1992 were to defuse the pressure for such a deployment, which they perceived as too risky²⁹⁰. Pentagon officials dismissed the air drops as “gesture politics” regarding them as inefficient²⁹¹. Similarly, Douglas Hurd, UK Foreign Secretary for much of the period “made a virtue of not being deflected from his government’s preferred path”, and remarked in September 1993 that Her Majesty’s Government would not be propelled into military intervention “simply because of day-to-day pressure from the media”²⁹². Describing the lack of UK interests in Bosnia, he often used the famous quote of Otto von

²⁸⁷ Denitch, 1996, p.180 in Kent, G., 2005, *Framing War And Genocide, British Policy and News Media Reaction to the War in Bosnia*, Hampton Press Communication Series: Political Communication. These writers, including Almond, 1994; Christopher Bennett, 1995; Donia and Fine, 1994; Garde, 1992; Judah, 1997; Lukic and Lynch, 1996; Malcolm, 1994; Magas, 1993; Mazower, 1992; Ramet, 1996; Tanner, 1997; Thompson, 1992; Silber and Little, 1995

²⁸⁸ Minear, L., Scott, C., and T.G. Weiss, 1996, *The News Media, Civil War, and Humanitarian Action*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, p. 57

²⁸⁹ Silber and Little, 1995, p.282, in Kent, G., 2005, *Framing War And Genocide, British Policy and News Media Reaction to the War in Bosnia*, Hampton Press Communication Series: Political Communication, p. 136-7

²⁹⁰ Strobel, W., 1997, *Late Breaking Foreign Policy*, Washington, DC: United States Institute of Press, p. 147-153

²⁹¹ Tisdall, S., 1993, *Clinton Team Split Over Bosnian Force*, *The Guardian*, 20 March, 11, in Jakobsen, P.V., 2000, *Focus On The CNN Misses The Point: The Real Media Impact On Conflict Management Is Invisible And Indirect*, *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 37, no.2, SAGE Publications, London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi, pp.131-143

²⁹² Quoted in Minear, L., Scott, C., and T.G. Weiss, 1996, *The News Media, Civil War, and Humanitarian Action*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, p. 58

Bismarck, the German Chancellor from 1871 to 1890, that the Balkan area was not worth “the healthy bones of single Pomeranian musketeer”²⁹³. Hurd blamed foreign correspondents covering the Bosnian crisis for advocating military intervention by being the founding members of the “something must be done” school²⁹⁴. Former US President Bill Clinton also complained that television coverage of Bosnia was trying to force him “to get America into a war”²⁹⁵.

Some authors argue that the war in Bosnia really was “the first true television war” – “the most comprehensively documented war ever”²⁹⁶. Martin Bell, the former BBC correspondent who became a member of the British Parliament also suggested that “No other war – not even the Gulf War ... has been fought so much in public, under the eye of the camera”²⁹⁷. It was exactly the war in Bosnia that motivated Bell, who had worked for the BBC for 31 years, to call for an end to “bystander’s journalism” based on the old tradition of detached, cool and neutral reporting, and to promote what he called a “journalism of attachment”²⁹⁸. “The Bosnia war,” said Bell, “has left me with the conviction that a foreign policy based only on considerations of national interest, and not at all of principle, is not only immoral but inefficient.”²⁹⁹ Christiane Amanpour, the CNN foreign correspondent, shared the same view about the Bosnia war coverage. “In this war,” she said, “there was no way that a human being or a professional should be neutral. You have to put things in context. For me, objectivity does not mean treating all sides equally; it means giving all sides an equal hearing, it does not mean drawing a moral equivalent for all sides. I refuse to do that because I am going to report honestly”³⁰⁰. Amanpour, who challenged President Clinton for a perceived “flip-flop” on policy to Bosnia³⁰¹ believes that CNN’s vivid, continuous coverage of the war in Bosnia might have at the end altered US foreign policy toward the region³⁰². On what occasion, then, has it been considered that news did produce a tactical shift over former Yugoslavia? Gowing suggests that the first occasion was in the wake of the American and British press and television reports uncovering Serb concentration camps at Omarska and Trnopolje in the Summer of 1992 when Western governments “were caught off-guard and unprepared for what emerged in the media”³⁰³. A similar argument was made

²⁹³ Quoted by David Loyn, BBC journalist, interview with the author of the thesis, September 18, 2008

²⁹⁴ Hindell, K., 1995, The influence of the media on foreign policy, *International Relations*, 12, p. 73

²⁹⁵ Morris, D., 1997, *Behind the Oval Office*, New York: Random House, p. 245

²⁹⁶ Gow, Paterson and Preston, 1996, p.3, in Kent, G., 2005, *Framing War And Genocide*, British Policy and News Media Reaction to the War in Bosnia, Hampton Press Communication Series: Political Communication,, p. 136-7

²⁹⁷ Bell, 1996, p.137, in Kent, G., 2005, *Framing War And Genocide*, British Policy and News Media Reaction to the War in Bosnia, Hampton Press Communication Series: Political Communication, p. 136-7

²⁹⁸ Culf, A., November 23, 1996, BBC Man Attacks Neutral War Reports, *The Guardian Home Page*; Pg. 8

²⁹⁹ “Conflict of Interest,” an edited version of Martin Bell’s speech to the Chichester Festival, reprinted in *The Guardian*, 11 July 1996. “Journalism of attachment” was first proposed by Martin Bell at the NewsWorld 96 conference in Berlin, 22 November 1996. See Culf, A., November 23, 1996, BBC Man Attacks Neutral War Reports, *The Guardian Home Page*; Pg. 8

³⁰⁰ Evans, H., 2004, Propaganda versus Professionalism, *British Journalism Review*, Vol.15, No 1, 35-42

³⁰¹ CNN World Report conference, May 1995

³⁰² Amanour, C., 1996, Television’s Role in Foreign Policy, *The Quill* 84(3):16-17

³⁰³ Gowing, N., 1994, “Real-Time Television Coverage of Armed Conflicts and Diplomatic Crises: Does it Pressure or Distort foreign Policy Decisions?”, *The Joan Shorenstein Barone Center on the Press, Politics and Public Policy*, Harvard

concerning the use of force for defending the Gorazde “safe area” two weeks after the fall of Srebrenica. “High levels of media coverage were present during this period...In terms of framing, media coverage empathized with the refugees from Srebrenica. It was also critical of western policy for having failed to protect the “safe area”. During the same period policy was uncertain.”³⁰⁴

Perhaps the most prominent example of potential media influence is a change of policy in Bosnia in 1994 when a more forceful approach was espoused, “albeit with vacillations”³⁰⁵, by NATO and President Clinton. After two years in which the West dithered about what to do in Bosnia - at times doing very little, at times virtually nothing, an ultimatum with the threat of the air strikes against Bosnian Serbs was given, apparently as the result of television footage which depicted, almost in real time, the gruesome consequences of a mortar bomb attack on a Sarajevo market in February 1994. For Martin Bell “the TV images certainly made a difference. Among other effects, they brought about a change of policy by the British and Canadian governments about the use of air-power”³⁰⁶. Clinton stated for CNN: “Like people everywhere, I was outraged by the brutal killing of innocent civilians in the Sarajevo market... The events of the past year and the events of the past few days reinforce the belief that I have that more must be done to stop the shelling of Sarajevo and the murder of innocents.”³⁰⁷ But some believe that what the Clinton Administration did was seize upon the pictures to be able to take action that basically they had decided they had to take. “They were very, very concerned about the way in which the North Atlantic Alliance was unraveling, especially in view of the way in which Russia seems to be changing, and so this was the opportunity to take action”³⁰⁸. White House communication director Mark Gearan said: “It did not take just the TV coverage of the Sarajevo massacre to push things forward. Things were moving.”³⁰⁹ US Secretary of State Warren Christopher similarly argued that “television images mobbed a policy we had clearly started on”³¹⁰, while former US Assistant Secretary of Defense Graham Allison underscored the importance of news coverage as catalyst: “If a shell had fallen in Sarajevo and 68 people had been killed, and there would

³⁰⁴ Robinson, P., 2000, Research Note: The News Media And Intervention, Triggering The Use Of Air Power During Humanitarian Crises, *European Journal of Communication*, SAGE Publications, London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi, Vol 15 (3), p. 405-414

³⁰⁵ Carruthers, S.L., 2000, *The Media At War; Communication And Conflict In The Twentieth Century*, Palgrave Macmillan, p. 213-216

³⁰⁶ Bell, M., 1995, In Harm's Way, Penguin Books Ltd., in Carruthers, S.L., 2000, *The Media At War; Communication And Conflict In The Twentieth Century*, Palgrave Macmillan, p. 213-216

³⁰⁷ CNN Reliable Sources 9:30 pm ET, February 13, 1994

³⁰⁸ Barrie Dunsmore, ABC Diplomatic Correspondent, CNN Reliable Sources 9:30 pm ET, February 13, 1994

³⁰⁹ Quoted in Gowing, N., 1994, “Real-Time Television Coverage of Armed Conflicts and Diplomatic Crises: Does it Pressure or Distort foreign Policy Decisions?”, *The Joan Shorenstein Barone Center on the Press, Politics and Public Policy*, Harvard

³¹⁰ Gowing, N., 1994, “Real-Time Television Coverage of Armed Conflicts and Diplomatic Crises: Does it Pressure or Distort foreign Policy Decisions?”, *The Joan Shorenstein Barone Center on the Press, Politics and Public Policy*, Harvard

have been no pictures of it, would the US policy have changed? I do not think it would have.”³¹¹

Former US Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke argued that the reason the West finally, belatedly intervened in Bosnia in 1995, in a situation where “difficulties in achieving peace were tremendous...with no trust between sides and the European nations tending to withdraw from the situation”³¹², was heavily related to media coverage³¹³. Some others believe that the personal motives were included too: “Clinton sought to add another international achievement to his repertoire, in order to establish his image as a peace superpower and “world policeman” in the eyes of both his voters and the rest of the world”³¹⁴. Kent concludes that while “nothing the media had done caused the Western powers or the UN to prevent or reverse genocide on a large scale”, it might be argued that “over time, news media created pressures that by forcing minimal measures such as aid delivery, in turn had a snowballing effect, creating further interest, leading to more coverage and so on. In this incremental way the news system did challenge the overall policy of the West towards ex-Yugoslavia.”³¹⁵

INTERVENTION IN SOMALIA

In early 1991, the situation in Somalia deteriorated quickly after the overthrow of the repressive dictator of twenty-one years, President Mohammed Siad Barre. On January 6, 1991, the United States vacated the embassy in the capital of Mogadishu, and United States officials and relief experts fled the city. Very soon, violence and drought ensued and brought on a terrible famine throughout the country. After the emergency airlifts of food proved to be inefficient³¹⁶, President George Bush decided to deploy 23.000 US ground troops to Somalia on December 9, 1992 in Operation Restore Hope.

In the case of Somalia, White House press secretary Marlin Fitzwater asserted that “after the elections, the media had free time and that was when the pressure started building up... Finally the pressure was too great. The President said: “I just can’t live with this for two months”³¹⁷. Former President Bush confirmed that he ordered US troops into Somalia in 1992 after seeing “heart-rending pictures of starving waifs on television”.

³¹¹ Gowing, N., 1994, “Real-Time Television Coverage of Armed Conflicts and Diplomatic Crises: Does it Pressure or Distort foreign Policy Decisions?”, The Joan Shorenstein Barone Center on the Press, Politics and Public Policy, Harvard

³¹² Daalder, I., 2000, Getting to Dayton: The Making of America’s Bosnia policy, in Bloch-Elkon, Y. and S. Lehman-Wilzig, 2005, Media, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy in International Crises: An Exploratory Model, Paper presented at the ICA conference, 27-31 May, New York, NY, USA

³¹³ Holbrooke, R., No Media-No War, 1999: 20 in Robinson, P., 2001, Theorizing The Influence Of Media On World Politics, European Journal of Communication, SAGE Publications, Vol 16(4): 523-544

³¹⁴ Foyle, D.C., 1999, Counting the Public In: Presidents, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy, New York: Columbia University Press, in Bloch-Elkon, Y. and S. Lehman-Wilzig, 2005, Media, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy in International Crises: An Exploratory Model, Paper presented at the ICA conference, 27-31 May, New York, NY, USA

³¹⁵ Kent, G., 2005, Framing War And Genocide, British Policy and News Media Reaction to the War in Bosnia, Hampton Press Communication Series: Political Communication, p. 203-8

³¹⁶ Perlez, J., U.S. Says Airlifts Fail Somali Needy, The New York Times, July 31, 1992, Section A; Page 9; Column 1

³¹⁷ Gowing, N., 1994, “Real-Time Television Coverage of Armed Conflicts and Diplomatic Crises: Does it Pressure or Distort foreign Policy Decisions?”, The Joan Shorenstein Barone Center on the Press, Politics and Public Policy, Harvard, p. 68

Bush said that as he and his wife Barbara watched television at the White House they saw “those starving kids...in quest of a little pitiful cup of rice”, and that he phoned Defense Secretary Dick Cheney and Gen. Colin Powell, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. “Please come over to the White House,” Bush recalled telling the military leaders. “I-we-can’t watch this anymore. You’ve got to do something.”³¹⁸ According to former US Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger, Somalia was a clear case of CNN effect: “the television coverage, over time, the impact that made on the Congress, the impact that made publicly and the impact it made on all of us, including the President, finally led us to decide to do something in Somalia. It would be foolish to deny that it didn’t make a difference. Of course it did.”³¹⁹ George Kennan, the esteemed diplomat who fathered the containment policy of the Cold War, was critical of US intervention in Somalia exactly because he believed emotions evoked by television pictures were driving American diplomacy. “If American policy from here on out, particularly policy involving the uses of our armed forces abroad, is to be controlled by popular emotional impulses, and particularly ones provoked by the commercial television industry, then there is no place – not only for myself, but for what have traditionally been regarded as the responsible deliberative voices in governments”, he wrote in an article just before US Marines landed on the beaches of Mogadishu.³²⁰ Bernard C. Cohen argued that by focusing daily on the starving children in Somalia, a pictorial story tailor-made for television, TV mobilized the conscience of the nation’s public institutions, compelling the government into a policy of intervention for humanitarian reasons.”³²¹ In the view of Michael Mandelbaum, “televised pictures of starving people” in Somalia “created a political clamor to feed them, which propelled the US military” into action³²², while Adam Roberts characterizes US intervention in Somalia as “responding to immediate pressure of media.”³²³

Mermin found that the analysis of media coverage about Somalia at that time, i.e. the chronology of events and the content of news stories, confirms the arguments that television contributed to US intervention. But the evidence of his study also indicates that, with the exception of CNN - that without any apparent cues from Washington sent a reporter to Somalia and explicitly framed it as “a tragedy the United States has turned its back on”³²⁴ - it was only after Washington turned its attention to Somalia that major US networks deemed events there worthy of coverage. “If television inspired American intervention in Somalia, it did so under the influence of governmental actors – a number of senators, a House committee, a presidential candidate, and figures within the Bush

³¹⁸ Hines, 1999: A11, in Robinson, P., *Theorizing the Influence Of Media On World Politics*, European Journal of Communication, 2001 SAGE Publications, Vol 16(4): 523-544

³¹⁹ Former Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger in CNN Reliable Sources 9:30 pm ET, February 13, 1994

³²⁰ Quoted in Neuman, J., 1996, *Lights, Camera, War: Is Media Technology Driving International Politics?*, Sta. Martin’s Press, New York, p.22

³²¹ Cohen, B.C., 1994, *A View from the Academy*, in Bennett W.L and D.L. Paletz, eds., *Taken By Storm: The Media, Public Opinion, and US Foreign Policy in the Gulf War*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 9-10

³²² Mandelbaum, M., *The Reluctance to Intervene*, Foreign Policy 95, Summer 1994, 16

³²³ Roberts, A., *Humanitarian War: Military Intervention and Human Right*, International Affairs 69, July 1993, 446, in Mermin, J., 1997, *Television News and American Intervention in Somalia: The Myth of s Media Driven Foreign Policy*, Political Science Quarterly, Volume 112, Number 3, p. 385-403

³²⁴ *Somalia Problems Mounting Without Signs of Respite*, CNN, 5 May 1992

administration – who made considerable efforts to publicize events in Somalia, interpret them as constituting a crisis, and encourage a US response.”³²⁵ After initial efforts of aid organizations to attract journalists to Somalia failed, as had the Red Cross press briefings and tours for journalists in the Autumn of 1991, and only after an estimated 300.000-500.000 Somalis had died of starvation by mid-summer 1992, in August 1992 the Bush administration took action which was itself designed to secure media attention: a US military airlift of food into Somalia³²⁶. Robinson also found that only marginal amounts of media coverage could be found prior to President Bush’s decision to intervene and that journalists framed reports in a way that was supportive of Bush’s decision³²⁷.

According to Livingston and Eachus, the US decision to intervene militarily in Somalia “was the result of diplomatic and bureaucratic operations, with news coverage coming in response to those decisions”³²⁸. Using the realist approach to international relations, Gibbs presented an alternative explanation of the US intervention in Somalia – strategic and economic interests. “Somalia was close to shipping routes in the Red Sea and to the strategically important Bab-el-Mandeb straits, and Conoco, an American oil company, had been investing in oil explorations.”³²⁹ It was argued that the White House had some additional less charitable reasons for the interventions in Somalia, a desire “to initiate a dramatic relief effort on the eve of the Republican national convention”³³⁰ and also to “reanimate memories of America’s victory in the Gulf War, allowing the departing ‘Foreign Policy President’ to go out in a blaze of glory”.³³¹

GENOCIDE IN RWANDA

The violence in Rwanda in 1994 that followed the murder of the President of Rwanda Juvénal Habyarimana in a plane explosion is considered as one of the worst in the history of humankind. Within a period of less than three months, at least 500,000 people, particularly members of the Tutsi population, were killed; thousands and thousands were maimed, raped and both physically and psychologically afflicted for life; two million fled to neighbouring countries; and one million became internally displaced³³². At the same time, the withdrawal of the bulk of the UN forces and the failure of the Security Council to reinforce them and “acknowledge that genocide was taking place cost thousands of

³²⁵ Mermin, J., 1997, Television News and American Intervention in Somalia: The Myth of a Media Driven Foreign Policy, *Political Science Quarterly*, Volume 112, Number 3, p. 385-403

³²⁶ Carruthers, S.L., 2000, *The Media At War; Communication And Conflict In The Twentieth Century*, Palgrave Macmillan, p. 219-220

³²⁷ Robinson, P., 2002, *The CNN Effect, The myth of news, foreign policy and intervention*, Routledge, London and New York

³²⁸ Livingston, S. and T. Eachus, 1995, Humanitarian crises and US foreign policy: Somalia and the CNN Effect reconsidered, *Political Communication*, 12, p.413

³²⁹ Gibbs, D., 2000, Realpolitik and humanitarian intervention: The case of Somalia, *International Politics*, 37, 41-55, in Gilboa, E., 2005, *The CNN Effect: The Search For a Communication Theory of International Relations*, *Political Communication*, 22: 27-44, Taylor & Francis Inc.

³³⁰ Perlez, J., 22 August 1992, US Encounters Snags in Airlift to Aid Somalia, *The New York Times*, Section 1; Page 1; Column 1

³³¹ Carruthers, S.L., 2000, *The Media At War; Communication And Conflict In The Twentieth Century*, Palgrave Macmillan, p. 219-220

³³² *The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience*, March 1996, Published by: Steering Committee of the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, *Journal of Humanitarian Assistance*, <http://www.reliefweb.int/library/nordic/book1/pb020.html>

lives and will be recorded as one of the most culpable and tragic of the UN's many mistakes on intervention"³³³.

While a doubt about the influence of media coverage has been cast in previous cases, there has been an almost unanimous consensus that a lack of media coverage was directly linked with the lack of international reaction in Rwanda. Gowing asserts that media played a mixed role in Rwanda: "while the media were a major factor in generating worldwide humanitarian relief support for the refugees, distorted reporting on events leading to the genocide itself was a contributing factor to the failure of the international community to take more effective action to stem the genocide"³³⁴. There are several explanations why media largely ignored the genocide in Rwanda whilst in progress. Beside the factors resulting from every day journalist practice, like ease of access to locations and the dangers that reporters could confront, which both were unfavorable in the case of Rwanda, a compelling 'good news' story was at that time concurrently being played out in South Africa, which monopolized media and diplomatic attention as the genocide reached its conclusion: namely the inauguration of Nelson Mandela as President of the new 'multiracial' South Africa on 10 May 1994³³⁵. As a result, it took three weeks from the beginning of the genocide – a long time in the world of rolling news and given the intensity of the slaughter - before editorials finally began referring to it as genocide and even then, the label genocide rarely appeared in the main headlines – "certainly not often enough to raise the awareness of the general public to the extraordinary event that was taking place"³³⁶. Hammock and Charny believe that during the genocide Rwandans never achieved "living victim status" in Western public sentiment, because the graphic pictures that emanated from Rwanda during the genocide largely portrayed dead corpses "clogging rivers and lakes"³³⁷. The media's framing of Rwanda as a refugee crisis – rather than as a 'genocide and its aftermath' story – had other distorting effects. It meant that the NGOs and subsequent UN operation "concentrated their efforts on those who had left Rwanda, neglecting to assist the internally displaced, or to aid the new RPF government in restoring stability to the country."³³⁸ According to Ammon, Rwanda also suffered from lack of political and historical context. "A reductionist medium, such as television, requires that the complex be simplified, and lends itself well to black-and-

³³³ Linden, I. , 1995, The Churches and genocide: lessons from Rwanda, *Svensk Missionstidskrift* 83 (3/1995): 5-15, in *The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience*, March 1996, Published by: Steering Committee of the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, Journal of Humanitarian Assistance, <http://www.reliefweb.int/library/nordic/book1/pb020.html>)

³³⁴ Gowing, N., 1997, *Media Coverage: Help or Hindrance in Conflict Prevention*. New York: Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Violence

³³⁵ Carruthers, S.L., 2000, *The Media At War; Communication And Conflict In The Twentieth Century*, Palgrave Macmillan, p. 224-228

³³⁶ Kent, G., 2005, *Framing War And Genocide, British Policy and News Media Reaction to the War in Bosnia*, Hampton Press Communication Series: Political Communication, p. 201-2

³³⁷ Hammock, J.C. and J.R. Charny, *Emergency Response as Morality Play: The Media, the Relief Agencies, and the Need for Capacity Building*, in Rotberg, R.I. and T.G., Weiss, (eds.), 1996, *From Massacre to Genocide: The Media, Public Policy, and Humanitarian Crisis*, Washington D.C., The Brookings Institution, p.122

³³⁸ Carruthers, S.L., 2000, *The Media At War; Communication And Conflict In The Twentieth Century*, Palgrave Macmillan, p. 224-228

white portrayals of good and evil. Rwanda offered no simple, black-and-white distinction.”³³⁹

From the analyses of British television news coverage of the Rwanda refugees crisis of the aftermath of genocide in July 1994, Philo also concluded that at the height of the refugee crisis, when coverage was most intense, “the news was dominated by calls for humanitarian aid” with the effect to focus public understanding of the priorities of aid on the immediate needs of refugees “rather than on the long-term solution of rebuilding the economic and social infra-structure of Rwanda”³⁴⁰. It also had the effects of creating a rush on the part of governments and some NGOs to be “seen to be doing something in this news media spot-light”, with the air drops by the US military as “a classic example of a publicity stunt which contributed nothing to resolving a crisis”. Even more dangerous, according to the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance, there was “a distinct lack of capacity in (or unwillingness of agencies to work in) lower-profile, but nevertheless crucial preventive activities”, like latrines – which while extremely important to the control of cholera, were not televisual and did not attract media attention³⁴¹. Another conclusion of the post-genocide coverage of Rwanda was that reporters from capitals were much more likely to endorse the policy prescriptions and concerns of government ministries who were their major sources than were journalists in the field³⁴².

Ammon argues that regarding the US strategic interest, Rwanda differed significantly from the post-Gulf War Kurdish crisis. For example, “a NATO ally did not lie just beyond the border of Rwanda, as did Turkey just North of Iraq; the genocidal forces inside Rwanda were not a known and recently vanquished opponent, as were those of Saddam Hussein; and a major UN military coalition was not already in place for Rwanda, as it had been in Iraq.”³⁴³ Also, Rwanda was not perceived as “doable” during the genocide: given the issues at stake and the risks involved, “the leading members of the international community judged that intervening inside the Rwanda itself entailed risks that exceeded those justified by national interest or any reasonable degree of humanitarian concern.”³⁴⁴

CONCLUSIONS OF THE LITERATURE REVIEW

The literature reviewed in this chapter brings evidence about the existence of interaction between media coverage and (international) political decision-making. The theories and examples analyzed above present the basis for the construction of the hypothesis of this research: that media can, under certain conditions, have an impact on the process of

³³⁹ Ammon, R.J., 2001, *Global Television and the Shapping of World Politics*, McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers, Jefferson, North Carolina and London

³⁴⁰ Philo, G., Hilsum, L., Beattie, L., and R. Holliman, *The Media and the Rwanda crisis: effects on audiences and public policy*, in Philo, G., ed., 1999, *Message Received: Glasgow Media Group Research 1993-1998*, London: Longman, pp.215-228

³⁴¹ Ibid.

³⁴² Ibid.

³⁴³ Ammon, R.J., 2001, *Global Television and the Shapping of World Politics*, McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers, Jefferson, North Carolina and London

³⁴⁴ Hammock, J.C. and J.R., Charny, *Emergency Response as Morality Play: The Media, the Relief Agencies, and the Need for Capacity Building*, in Rotberg, R.I. and T.G.Weiss, (eds.), 1996, *From Massacre to Genocide: The Media, Public Policy, and Humanitarian Crisis*, Washington D.C., The Brookings Institution, p. 120

decision-making in relation to distant conflict situations. More precisely, these theories contributed to the research by pointing out the important features both of the media coverage, like the intensity of the coverage and the frames employed in the description of the conflict and region in question, and of the political process - political (un)certainty and elite consensus - as the conditions in which this interaction can take place. They also emphasize the importance of defining the policy-making environment, both in the region where a crisis is taking place and in the country(ies) that should formulate a policy toward that crisis; those specific circumstances, investigated by the case study approach, could help to explain the 'inconsistent and unpredictable' nature of the media effects' process. Additionally, these theories introduce some important factors that should be taken into account, like 'a trigger event', the speed of media coverage, etc.

Some of the theories presented in this chapter, and especially CNN effect theory, deal in a great extent with the role and the effect of international 24-hours news channels. The next chapter is devoted to the characteristics of two of these channels, CNN International and BBC World, which are considered as the most influential in both media and international politics world, and as such will be the main source of media content data for this research.

In the case study part of my research, I will present the results of the in-depth comparative analysis of two cases with similar political/historical/strategic circumstances, but with different political outcomes, Kosovo and Darfur, applying the most important conclusions of the literature findings summarized above. These cases are comparable because both include mass violation of human rights, refugees' exodus and humanitarian emergency, and both of the places at the same time have no major political and strategic significance for key political decision makers. In each case the political outcome is completely different: the Kosovo case ended with a NATO bombing campaign unprecedented in the history of this organization while in Darfur only sporadic and very limited international intervention has been seen until the present day.

CHAPTER TWO: REAL TIME TELEVISION

Academic researchers dealing with this relationship between media and international policy, but also diplomats, the military and NGOs tend often to view the media as a monolithic, homogeneous group that acts in the same uniform way³⁴⁵. For example, when politicians are critical toward certain media coverage, as US officials were at one point during the post-invasion period in Iraq, they usually talk about “news organizations” or “news reporters” in general, rather than addressing specific media. Three years after the fall of Saddam Hussein, several US officials noted a tendency of *media* to focus on the violence in Iraq and even accused them of carrying the terrorist message by reporting on so many attacks³⁴⁶, treating in this way all news organizations as if they belonged to one homogenous group. “Footage of children playing or shops opening and people resuming their normal lives will never be as dramatic as the footage of an IED explosion”³⁴⁷, US President George W. Bush said. But this perception is problematic and misguided. Except maybe in the most cataclysmic events, media seldom speak with one voice³⁴⁸ and their behavior has become increasingly variable, competitive and unpredictable³⁴⁹. Therefore, in research on media coverage and especially on its possible impact on political decision-making it is of crucial importance to choose the most appropriate representatives of this “diverse lot”³⁵⁰. The purpose of this chapter is to explain the reasons behind the decision to choose television, and more concretely two 24/7 international news channels as the main sources of media coverage in this research. These international or cross-border channels, according to some authors, have not simply adapted to globalization, but helped sustain the globalizing process; they have added to the flow of information, providing networks of communication and systems of exchange that drive integration in the fields of politics, culture and finance on a world scale³⁵¹. CNNI and BBCW, which have been selected for this research, are not the only international news channels, but certainly are the current leading ones: for example, full time distribution of CNNI in 2002 reached 84.7 million television households, while the following three Pan-European news channels, British Sky News, French TV5 and Euronews (the latter jointly owned by 19 European public-sector TV channels) had 24, 71.4 and 48.9 millions respectively³⁵².

³⁴⁵ Gowing, N., 1997, *Media Coverage: Help or Hindrance in Conflict Prevention*. New York: Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Violence

³⁴⁶ CNN, *Reliable Sources*, March 26, 2006

³⁴⁷ US President George W. Bush in CNN, *Reliable Sources*, March 26, 2006

³⁴⁸ Myers et al., 1996, in Kent, G., 2005, *Framing War And Genocide*, British Policy and News Media Reaction to the War in Bosnia, Hampton Press Communication Series: Political Communication, p. 192

³⁴⁹ Gowing, N., 1997, *Media Coverage: Help or Hindrance in Conflict Prevention*. New York: Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Violence

³⁵⁰ Gowing, N., 1997, *Media Coverage: Help or Hindrance in Conflict Prevention*. New York: Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Violence

³⁵¹ Chalaby, J. K., 2003, *Television for a New Global Order*, *Transnational Television Networks and the Formation of Global System*, *Gazette: The International Journal for Communication Studies*, SAGE Publications, London, Thousand Oaks and New Delhi, Vol. 65(6)

³⁵² Crowe, C. (ed.), 1998, 1999, 2000, *Media and Marketing Europe Guide: Pan-European Television*. London: Emap Media; Collison, T. (ed.), 2001, 2002, *Media and Marketing Europe Guide: Pan-European Television*. London: Emap Media, in Chalaby, J. K., 2003, *Television for a New Global Order*, *Transnational Television Networks and the Formation of Global System*, *Gazette: The International*

CNNI and BBCW are important not only because of the size of their domestic and international audience, including a large elite audience, but also because of their considerable influence as news services on the agendas of other news organizations. In November 2008, CNN even launched its own news wire service that delivers news stories to newspapers and Internet news sites 24/7/365, competing in this way directly with the Associated Press (USA), Reuters (UK) and Agence France-Presse and emphasizing its role as the agenda-setter for other media. CNN representatives explained this move saying that “with a worldwide staff of 3800 people, CNN is able to maintain a strong flow of up-to-the-minute stories and to provide original reporting on world news”³⁵³.

TELEVISION – PEOPLE TRUST WHAT THEY SEE

Many researches have shown that television is the predominant mass medium to which audiences turn for information³⁵⁴ (although in last few years, television has struggled to maintain that position in the competition with the Internet, especially with younger audiences³⁵⁵) and, that with respect to international affairs, “television becomes a particularly important source of international news during periods of crisis and the accompanying saturation coverage”³⁵⁶. One of the studies on television’s importance found that in 2002, 79% of the population regarded television as their main source of world news³⁵⁷. At the same time, the majority of national television stations around the globe have been forced to reduce the number of international correspondents responsible for the coverage of world news, to curtail production costs³⁵⁸ (for example three major US networks, ABC, NBC and CBS, reduced the number of overseas bureaus from 15 to around six, some of them staffed by freelancers, in the period from 1986 to 2004³⁵⁹), therefore relying even more on transnational news channels and news agencies as co-orientation models and sources of material.

Journal for Communication Studies, SAGE Publications, London, Thousand Oaks and New Delhi, Vol. 65(6)

³⁵³ Joe Middelburg, CNN’s vice president for sales and affiliate relations, quoted in Bloom, D., October 30, 2008, CNN Launching Global Newswire Service, RushPRnews

³⁵⁴ Larson, J.F., 1982, International Affairs Coverage on U.S. Evening Network News, 1972-1979. in W.C Adams (Ed.), Television Coverage of International Affairs, Norwood, NJ: Ablex Publishing corp.; Iyengar, S. & Kinder, D.R. 1987, News That Matters: Agenda-Setting and Priming in a Television Age, Chicago: University of Chicago Press; Iyengar, S., 1991, Is anyone Responsible? How Television Frames Political Issues, Chicago: University of Chicago Press

³⁵⁵ Pew Research Center, December 23, 2008, Internet Overtakes Newspapers as News Outlet, available at <http://pewresearch.org/pubs/>

³⁵⁶ Larson, J.F., 1984, Television’s Window on the World: International Affairs Coverage on the U.S. Networks. Norwood, NJ: Ablex Publishing Corp, p. 12, in Soderlund, W. C. and E. D. Briggs, Sources Used in U.S. Television News Coverage of Crisis and Non-Crisis Situations in Grenada (1983), Panama (1989), Cuba (1988-92) and Haiti (1990-93), International Communications Bulletin Volume 34, No. 1-2, Fall 1999)

³⁵⁷ Independent Television Commission, 2003, The Public’s View, London: ITC

³⁵⁸ Wu, H. Denis, 2003, Homogeneity Around the World, Comparing the Systemic Determinants of International News Flow between Developed and Developing Countries, Gazette: The International Journal for Communication Studies, SAGE Publications, London, Thousand Oaks and New Delhi, Vol 65 (1)

³⁵⁹ Boyd-Berrett, O., 2005, Journalism, media conglomerates and the Federal Communication Commission, in Stuart, A. (ed.), Journalism: Critical Issues, Open University Press, p. 342-356

An important evaluative dimension associated with television is credibility. Televised news is believed to be highly credible and authentic because “people trust what they see more than what they hear. Seeing is believing.”³⁶⁰ Therefore, images are widely regarded as having authority, representing a reflection of the world at large. “They are not typically seen as constructions... but as mirrors of the events that they depict.”³⁶¹ Additionally, television has the capacity to transmit live or only slightly delayed visual sights and sounds; it “provides a sense of reality that is more complete, more intense, and more valid than what can be conveyed through print”³⁶². There is no doubt that there are some television pictures which will never be forgotten by anyone who saw them broadcast live, like the assassination of Robert Kennedy (1968), the fall of the Berlin Wall (1989), and the images from Lower Manhattan on September 11, 2001³⁶³. In a comparison of newspaper versus television news in the United States, Weaver pointed out two important characteristics of television that have a significant impact on the way the TV news will be perceived: “Newspapers use an impersonal narrative voice, which stands in rather stark contrast to the intensely personal narration by television news reporters. Furthermore, the narrative style of television conveys a sense of the reporter’s omniscience, encouraging viewers to have an exaggerated view of how much it is actually possible to know and do in the real world.”³⁶⁴ Some authors assert that television’s impact on American attitudes toward foreign policy is much greater than print journalism ever had, claiming that “live action pictures on television – of starving children in Somalia or protesting students in China or ravaged villages in Bosnia – give it ... a(n) impact...that overrides any conflicting information received from newspapers or from the president, the State Departments, congressional leaders, or anyone else” and that “television reaches a huge inadvertent audience, those at the bottom of that foreign policy power pyramid who are normally uninterested in world events.”³⁶⁵ Or as a journalist put it: “in the book of Genesis, it is God who brings order out of chaos; in the modern world, television journalists have to make a stab at doing it.”³⁶⁶

³⁶⁰ Graber, D.A., 1988, *Processing the News. How People Tame the Information Tide*, 2nd edition, New York: Longman, 172-3

³⁶¹ Zelizer, B., *Journalism through the camera’s eye*, p. 167-177 in Allen, R.C and A. Hill, 2004, *The Television Studies Reader*, Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, New York

³⁶² Larson, J.F., 1984, *Television’s Window on the World: International Affairs Coverage on the US Networks*, Ablex Publishing Cooperation, Norwood, New Jersey, p. 11

³⁶³ Tester, K., September 11, 2001: *Sociological Reflections*, in Paterson, C. and A. Sreberny, 2004, *International News in the 21st Century*, John Libbey Publishing for University of Luton Press, p. 187-198

³⁶⁴ Weaver, P.H., 1975, *Newspaper News and Television News*, in Carter, D. and R. Adler, (eds.), *Media Agenda-Setting in a Presidential Elections*, , New York: Praeger, in Larson, J.F., *Television’s Window On The World: International Affairs Coverage on the US Networks*, 1984, Ablex Publishing Cooperation, Norwood, New Jersey, p. 28

³⁶⁵ Tester, K., September 11, 2001: *Sociological Reflections*, in Paterson, C. and A. Sreberny, 2004, *International News In The 21st Century*, John Libbey Publishing for University of Luton Press, p. 187-198

³⁶⁶ Morris, C, formerly head of the BBC’s Religious Broadcasting and later Controller of BBC Northern Ireland, *What’s so good about bad news*, *Listener*, 25 September 1986, Hibbert Lecture, in *New, truth and power*, Eldrige, J., in Eldrige, J., (ed.), 1993, *Getting The Message, News, Truth And Power*, Glasgow University Media Group, Routledge, London and New York

At the same time, some claim that the modern mass media's effects on democracy are malign and have coined the term 'media malaise' to encapsulate the argument³⁶⁷. According to these authors, market competition and the search for bigger audiences and circulation figures force the media to dwell on dramatic news, especially bad news about crimes and conflict, death and disaster, political incompetence and corruption, sex and scandal³⁶⁸. The strongest form of malaise theory concentrates on television rather than the print media, making the case that it is not merely the content of television but its very form which makes it impossible to inform and educate. "At best, it can only amuse and entertain; at worst it confuses and alienates politically, de-legitimizes the political system and undermines democracy"³⁶⁹. With the development of 24 hours international news channels which service is based on real time coverage that brings more and more news, collected globally and broadcast almost instantaneously, television news is increasingly accused of being shallow and superficial³⁷⁰, and conditioned by "the new priorities" – "drama, extreme brevity, instant gratification, anything to prevent the viewer from zapping."³⁷¹ In this way, "the public is presented with a ceaseless flow of fast changing and barely explained events – news bites – which roll over each other with bewildering speed"³⁷². This 'fast forward' effect is said to create political confusion, fatigue, alienation and distrust among the many citizens who lack the information, understanding and motivation to make sense of the news³⁷³. As Stossel comments, "television in the era of 24-hours-a-day coverage is news as a process". If it is true to say that journalism is the first draft of history, according to Stossel "television coverage is the first rough draft of journalism"³⁷⁴. Another criticism of the television news is related to war coverage in particular, which, according to some, has become increasingly restrained and sanitized, and described as "de-realisation" and "the aesthetics of disappearance"³⁷⁵. For example, at the beginning of war in Afghanistan, CNN chief Walter Issacson instructed his staff to

³⁶⁷ Robinson, M. J., 1976, Public Affairs Television and the Growth of Political Malaise: The Case of "The Selling of the Pentagon", *American Political Science Review*, 70, 409-432; Postman, N., 2005, *Amusing Ourselves to Death*, Penguin USA

³⁶⁸ Land, K. and G.Lang, 1968, *Politics and Television*, Chicago: Quadrangle, p. 307, in Newton, Kenneth, 1999, *Mass Media Effects: Mobilization or Media Malaise*, *British Journal of Political Science*, 29

³⁶⁹ Fallows, J., 1997, *Breaking the News: Host the Media Undermine American Democracy*, New York: Vintage, pp. 52-65 in Newton, K., 1999, *Mass Media Effects: Mobilization Or Media Malaise*, 1999, *British Journal of Political Science*, 29, 577-599

³⁷⁰ Postman N. and S. Powers, 1992, *How to Watch TV News*, New York: Penguin Books, p. 39; Du Brow, R., 1990, TV News Too Trivial to See the Big Picture, *Los Angeles Times*, 10 February 1990: F1, 6

³⁷¹ Du Brow, R., 1990, TV News Too Trivial to See the Big Picture", *Los Angeles Times*, 10 February 1990: F1, 6

³⁷² Postman N. and S. Powers, 1992, *How to Watch TV News*, New York: Penguin Books, p. 39

³⁷³ Ranney, A., 1983, *Channels of Power: The Impact of Television on American Politics*, New York: Basic Books, in Newton, Kenneth, 1999, *Mass Media Effects: Mobilization or Media Malaise*, *British Journal of Political Science*, 29

³⁷⁴ Stossel, S., 2001, October 22, Terror TV, *The American Prospect*: 37, in Tester, K., September 11, 2001: *Sociological Reflections*, in Paterson, C. and A. Sreberny, 2004, *International News In The 21st Century*, John Libbey Publishing for University of Luton Press, p. 187-198

³⁷⁵ Petley, J., Let the Atrocious Images Haunt Us, p. 165-175, in Miller, D., (ed.), 2004, *Tell Me Lies, Propaganda and Media Distortion in the Attack on Iraq*, Pluto Press, London Sterling, Virginia; Bennet W. L. and Paletz, D.L., 1994, *Taken By Storm: the media, public opinion, and U.S. foreign policy in the Gulf War*, University of Chicago Press

avoid displaying an excess of gruesome images of the war³⁷⁶. With its standards under scrutiny, BBC also announced in June 2005 that it would use a time delay mechanism in live coverage of some news events to prevent broadcasting “really distressing, upsetting images”³⁷⁷.

It has been said that it is the format of television news that very often dictates the content itself. For example, news items involving ideas, processes and trends, rather than single events, are more difficult to present in simple visual form and as such pose problems for television coverage; also, the maximum length of two or three minutes devoted to each story limits the detail and depth in which the story can be pursued, and imposes a very simple presentation, “leaving a viewer with only the bare bones of the story”³⁷⁸. Hawkins found that due to time constraints the television news is able to cover fewer news items than the newspaper, resulting in less geographical consistency, while the reliance on moving images leads to a greater tendency for sensationalism³⁷⁹. Journalists themselves admit that television news is not very good at covering ‘long lasting’ and relatively static stories like climate changes, AIDS, or famine in Africa³⁸⁰. “(Television) likes to show the story advancing, quantifiably if possible, with wartime body counts, election year polling updates, and the like, usually, coverage withers when the flow of information dwindles”³⁸¹. As Weaver pointed out, events that can be spectacularly filmed are more likely to be covered on television than those that cannot³⁸². Summarizing experience from three decades of US foreign policy, Beschloss warned that television with its focus on the tangible and the dramatic could encourage politicians to favor crisis management over long-term planning³⁸³.

But some researchers find little or only qualified support for the video-malaise theory and claim that cheaper and easier access to growing amounts of political news and information have the effect of mobilizing mass publics, and that watching television news is associated with high levels of political knowledge, participation and personal efficacy³⁸⁴. One of the previous empirical researches has shown that the more people

³⁷⁶ Kurtz, H., 31 October 2001, CNN Chief Orders “Balance” in War News, Washington Post, C1

³⁷⁷ Cowell, A., June 24, 2005, BBC to Use Time Delay Device to Weed Out Upsetting Images, New York Times, available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2005/06/24/international/europe/>

³⁷⁸ Postman, N and Powers, S., 1992, How to Watch TV news, Penguin Books, New York

³⁷⁹ Hawkins, V., 2002, The Other Side Of The CNN Factor: The Media And Conflict, Journalism Studies, Volume 3, Number 2, Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group

³⁸⁰ What’s wrong with TV news coverage of global warming and weather?, November 11, 2005, News Xchange conference, session transcripts available at

http://www.newsxchange.org/newsx2005/transcripts_05.html

³⁸¹ Seib, P., 1996, Headline Diplomacy; How News Coverage Affects Foreign Policy, Praeger, Westport, Connecticut, London, p. 33

³⁸² Weaver, P.H., 1975, Newspaper News and Television News, in Carter, D. and R. Adler, (eds.), Media Agenda-Setting in a Presidential Elections, , New York: Praeger, in Larson, J.F., Television’s Window On The World: International Affairs Coverage on the US Networks, 1984, Ablex Publishing Cooperation, Norwood, New Jersey, p. 28

³⁸³ Beschloss, M, R. 1993, Presidents, Television and Foreign Crises, Washington D.C: Annenberg Project on Television and US Foreign Policy

³⁸⁴ Norris, P., 1996, Does Television Erode Social Capital? A Replay to Putnam, PS, 29, 474-80; Newton, K., 1999, Mass Media Effects: Mobilization Or Media Malaise, British Journal of Political Science, 29, 577-599

watch television news, the more they know about politics, and the higher they rate their own interest, information and understanding of politics³⁸⁵. Also, some believe that development of television's technology itself can contribute to "television democracy", taking the power to decide what will be seen and when from government and enormously wealthy corporations to the hands of the people³⁸⁶, and that television can also help "dismantle historically anachronistic images of the "others""³⁸⁷. Others point out that some forms of television journalism also act as "a public interlocutor demanding answers from policy makers and authorities"³⁸⁸. Cottle presented the example of television coverage of the situation of refugees and asylum seekers incarcerated in Australia's notorious detention centre "Woomera" in the South Australian desert³⁸⁹ that "proved to be a powerful indictment of the Australian government's anti-asylum seekers policy, and helped to place in the public domain arguments and accounts that had not been aired previously"³⁹⁰. Another similar case is the BBC Panorama "Inside Guantanamo", of 5 October 2003, which was broadcast in other countries as well as the UK, and which was "the first serious attempt to give a human face and identity to the hitherto invisible 'terrorism suspects' transported by the US military to Cuba and incarcerated without trial at Guantanamo Bay"³⁹¹. Such TV programs can also contribute to what John Thompson has termed "the transformation of visibility", "where the operations of power and the powerful have become, courtesy of the media spotlight, increasingly subject to public surveillance and critical scrutiny."³⁹²

To summarize: on one side, televised news is believed to be credible, authoritative and authentic, providing the feeling of immediacy and with far greater emotional power than in the other media. It has been also linked with the development of 'television democracy' and with high levels of political knowledge and public participation in political processes. On other hand, television news has been increasingly accused of sensationalism and superficiality, thus causing political confusion, fatigue and alienation. Most of these arguments, especially immediacy but also superficiality, have been used in the discussions about the development of international real time news TV channels.

³⁸⁵ Newton, K., 1999, Mass Media Effects: Mobilization Or Media Malaise, 1999, British Journal of Political Science, 29, 577-599

³⁸⁶ Ted Koppel, 1989, ABC special, "Revolution in a Box", in Morse, M., News as Performance, The Image as Event, p. 209-225, in Allen, R.C and A. Hill, 2004, The Television Studies Reader, Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, New York

³⁸⁷ Ignatieff, M., 1998, The Warriors Honour: Ethnic War and the Moderns Conscience, London: Chatto & Windus

³⁸⁸ Dryzek, J., 2000, Deliberative Democracy and Beyond, Oxford: Oxford University Press; Benhabib S., 2002, The Claims of Culture, News Jersey; Princeton University Press in Cottle, S., In defense of "thick" journalism; or how television journalism can be good for us, in Allan, S., 2005, Journalism: Critical Issues, Open University Press, p. 109-124

³⁸⁹ ABC, Dour Corners, About Woomera, 19 May 2003, Cottle, S., In defense of "thick" journalism; or how television journalism can be good for us, in Allan, S., 2005, Journalism: Critical Issues, Open University Press, p. 109-124

³⁹⁰ Cottle, S., In defense of "thick" journalism; or how television journalism can be good for us, in Allan, S., 2005, Journalism: Critical Issues, Open University Press, p. 109-124

³⁹¹ Ibid.

³⁹² Thompson, J., 1995, The Media and Modernity, Cambridge: Polity, in Cottle, S., In defense of "thick" journalism; or how television journalism can be good for us, p. 109-124 in Allen, R.C and A. Hill, 2004, The Television Studies Reader, Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, New York

Before giving more details about specific real time news TV channels, it is important to note that it is the concept of 'real time coverage' - defined as the transmission of pictures less than two hours old³⁹³ - that has created new dynamics and pressures in television journalism, but also in the sphere of political decision-making by compressing transmission and policy response times³⁹⁴. Or, as former BBC journalist Martin Bell pointed out: "We are in the 'Decade of the Dish'"³⁹⁵.

CNN INTERNATIONAL AND BBC WORLD

So-called global or international television channels differ from national ones on the grounds that they present a form of deterritorialized broadcasting. Their audience is multi-national and potentially counts hundreds of millions of citizens, their coverage is spread across boundaries, and their schedules are designed to cross time zones. Above all, they can use their worldwide resources to adopt "a global perspective on key events and rise above the national angle that characterizes the treatment of international news by terrestrial broadcasters."³⁹⁶

National televisions devote a considerably lower percent of their daily news hole to the coverage of international events, and even when they do cover them, they mostly use the material of international news agencies, depending in that way on the selection made by the latter. In the cases where they decide to spend valuable resources to send their TV crew abroad, they are, as noted above, usually doing so to get a local angle of an international story. Therefore, the amount of international news on national TV channels, but also the frames themselves, is directly linked with domestic concerns at any given time: a balance with the most important domestic events like national elections; national interests in the conflict/region in question, etc. The potential impact of their programming is restricted not only by their limited reach, but also because of the use of the domestic language that, with the exception of Anglo-Saxon and possibly French national media, limits their (elite) audience.

³⁹³ Jakobsen, P.V., 2000, Focus On The CNN Misses The Pont: The Real Media Impact On Conflict Management Is Invisible And Indirect, *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 37, no.2, SAGE Publications, London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi, pp.131-143; Gowing, N., 1994, Real-Time Television Coverage of Armed Conflicts and Diplomatic Crises: Does it Pressure or Distort foreign Policy Decisions?, The Joan Shorenstein Barone Center on the Press, Politics and Public Policy, Harvard; Strobel, W., 1997, Late Breaking Foreign Policy, Washington, DC: United States Institute of Press

³⁹⁴ Gowing, N., 1994, Real-Time Television Coverage of Armed Conflicts and Diplomatic Crises: Does it Pressure or Distort foreign Policy Decisions?, The Joan Shorenstein Barone Center on the Press, Politics and Public Policy, Harvard; Strobel, W., 1997, Late Breaking Foreign Policy, Washington, DC: United States Institute of Press

³⁹⁵ Bell, M., Bosnia: Television's War, Presentation to Wilton Park conference on 28 February 1994, in Gowing, N., 1994, Real-Time Television Coverage of Armed Conflicts and Diplomatic Crises: Does it Pressure or Distort foreign Policy Decisions?, The Joan Shorenstein Barone Center on the Press, Politics and Public Policy, Harvard; Strobel, W., 1997, Late Breaking Foreign Policy, Washington, DC: United States Institute of Press

³⁹⁶ Chalaby, J.K., 2003, Television For A New Global Order, *Transnational Television Networks and the Formation of Global System*, *Gazette: The International Journal for Communication Studies*, SAGE Publications, London, Thousand Oaks and New Delhi, Vol. 65(6): 457-472

Demers argues that the 'global' media are those that "have the resources, both human and capital, to undertake in-depth reporting projects, and enough power to challenge big business and massive governmental bureaucracies". According to him, global media are "a product of the most pluralistic countries of the world and their publishers and editorial staff are more insulated from special interest and parochial political pressures because they are less likely to grow up in the community their medium serves."³⁹⁷ For example, CNN's major stated determination is to create the first truly 'global information company'; to be the 'global network of record; seen in every nation on the planet, to broadcast in most major languages, to focus on non-US journalists, to become world citizens who just happen to be based in the US'"³⁹⁸. CNN founder Ted Turner's admonition to all of his employees that the word "foreign" is banned on CNN and that they have to speak of international affairs, not foreign affairs, is famous in media circles.³⁹⁹ Of course there are some who challenge that 'global' perspective of Western based transnational news channels. For one of their arguments they use the comparison of their news programmes with Al Jazeera TV in whose coverage of the war in Iraq for example one has been able to see injured Iraqi citizens or antiwar protests in the Muslim world and beyond, contrary to CNN that has not given "more than a glimpse" of these stories⁴⁰⁰. Al Jazeera was founded in 1996 as the first Arab non-stop news network and it reaches 35 million Arab-speakers today; it gained international notoriety with its coverage of the Afghan and then the Iraq war, and by airing Osama bin Laden's video messages from its headquarter in Doha, Qatar. It used this reputation to go more global: it hired more international staff and in November 2006 it launched the news channel in English, with bureaus in Washington and London preparing one third of programmes daily. This TV channel is considered nowadays as the main competitor to CNNI and BBCW, but at the time of the events in Kosovo and Darfur selected for the case studies in this research its coverage is not believed to be relevant.

CNN International, together with BBC World i.e. BBC World News – to use its new name since April 2008 – is considered as the key 24 hours international news network watched not only in diplomatic enclaves across the globe, but also in most international and national newsrooms, profoundly influencing global television journalism. It has shaped not only the format of television news (in the use of graphics, camera angles, and the background monitor screen and inventing new formats for news, such as the 'newsflash'⁴⁰¹), but also the content itself. These channels are frequently quoted by news organizations and television stations as well as print media and are used as a co-orientation model in selection of what is more and what is less important among the daily international political events and stories. Some believe that this 'US-UK duopoly' has a

³⁹⁷ Demers, D., 2002, *Global Media, Menace or Messiah*, Revised Edition, Hampton Press, INC, Cresskill, New Jersey, 99-134

³⁹⁸ Kung-Shankleman, L., 2000, *Inside the BBC and CNN; Managing Media Organization*, Routledge, London & New York, p. 153

³⁹⁹ Judy Woodruff, CNN Prime Anchor and Senior Correspondent, A Brookings/Harvard Forum: Press Coverage and the War on Terrorism "The CNN Effect": How 24-Hour News Coverage Affects Government Decisions and Public Opinion, January 23, 2002

⁴⁰⁰ Harman, D., March 25, 2003, World and America watching different wars, *The Christian Science Monitor*, Specials: War in the Gulf, available at <http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/0325/p01s04-woiq.html>

⁴⁰¹ Volkmer, I., 1999, *News in the Global Sphere, A Study of CNN and Its Impact on Global Communication*, University of Luton Press

power to “bestride the news agendas and news flows of the world”⁴⁰². This claim has been supported by data about the international reach of US/UK media, not only of BBC and CNN, but also international newspapers and news magazines as International Herald Tribune, Time, The New York Times and The Economist; radio stations such as BBC World Service and Voice of America; and two world’s biggest wire services, Associated Press and Reuters⁴⁰³. It has been argued that modern journalism itself is an Anglo-American invention⁴⁰⁴ and this has been borne out by the example of the internationalization of the CNN model of round-the-clock television news⁴⁰⁵.

The BBC was the world’s first public service broadcaster and for over seventy years has operated on the integrated factory model, producing a very high percentage of its own programming; through its subsidiary BBC Worldwide, they have engaged in a range of commercial activities including two subscription/advertising-financed international satellite networks, BBC Prime and BBC World. The BBC’s first Director General, John Reith’s (1889-1971) vision of the role and responsibilities of public service broadcasting shaped not only the BBC but also its continental PSB peers from their inception to the present day. The UK government theoretically has wide powers over programming: it can require a program not to be broadcasted and the BBC is precluded from broadcasting its own views on matters of public policy. But in practice these are seldom exercised⁴⁰⁶. Still, criticism of programming, by politicians of all persuasions, is a long-standing tradition extending back to the organization’s origins. For some this antipathy is inevitable: “The reason why prime ministers, of whatever political complexion, always resent the BBC is that, in their eyes, it represents an altogether too powerful, non-elected citadel within a democratic state... an autocratic centralist institution, which could not be easily manipulated.”⁴⁰⁷ Additionally, for many Conservative politicians in the UK, the BBC had long exhibited the worst sins of British business: complacency, excessive trade union power, weak management and inadequate entrepreneurial spirit⁴⁰⁸. As a counterweight comes the BBC’s perceived ability to shape public opinion, to set the agenda for political debate and to determine the public-relations approach of political parties. There has long been a conviction that the BBC is connected to a privileged upper stratum of British life⁴⁰⁹, and that thanks to its position and recruiting policy, BBC staff are formidably articulate, intelligent, well educated and often well connected - perhaps helping to explain why the organization has such strong support among national opinion-formers. Because of its long and august history, because of its wartime role, because of

⁴⁰² Tunstall J. and D. Machin, 1999, *The Anglo-American Media Connection*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 88

⁴⁰³ Thussu, D. K., 2000, Legitimizing ‘Humanitarian Intervention’? CNN, NATO and the Kosovo Crisis, *European Journal of Communication*, Vol 15(3): 345–361

⁴⁰⁴ Chalaby, J., 1996, Journalism as an Anglo-American Invention, *European Journal of Communication* 11(2): 303–26

⁴⁰⁵ Thussu, D. K., 2000, Legitimizing ‘Humanitarian Intervention’? CNN, NATO and the Kosovo Crisis, *European Journal of Communication*, Vol 15(3): 345–361

⁴⁰⁶ Ibid, p. 91

⁴⁰⁷ Anthony Howard, quoted in Kung-Shankleman, L., 2000, *Inside the BBC and CNN; Managing Media Organization*, Routledge, London & New York, p. 91

⁴⁰⁸ Blumler, J., 1992, Television and the Public Interest. London: Sage., in Kung-Shankleman, L., 2000, *Inside the BBC and CNN; Managing Media Organization*, Routledge, London & New York, p. 75

⁴⁰⁹ Kung-Shankleman, L., 2000, *Inside the BBC and CNN; Managing Media Organization*, Routledge, London & New York, p. 67

its decades spent dominating the national airways, the BBC occupies a unique national position – summed up by one CNN representative as “somewhere between The Beatles and the Queen”⁴¹⁰. But it is not only the national position that is an important element of the BBC’s strategy, it is also a world development; according to one of the BBC’s strategy papers, this television station intends to become a major international broadcaster in the satellite age⁴¹¹.

In the early years CNN was regularly lampooned by the big three networks as “Chicken Noodle News”⁴¹², but already in 1986, when the Challenger Space Shuttle exploded, CNN was the only television channel to cover it live. It then sold its footage to broadcasters all over the world, creating an awareness of CNN, particularly in Europe, which would have been hard and expensive to achieve through marketing campaigns. As a result, a few months later CNN was available in over 150.000 households⁴¹³. It was also the only news service to broadcast exclusive live coverage of events such as Tiananmen Square Massacre (1989), the US invasion on Panama (1989) and the release of Nelson Mandela (1990). During the 1991 Gulf War, CNN’s ratings outpaced those of the big three networks, reaching ten times their normal value⁴¹⁴. During the opening hours of the Gulf War, CNN provided seventeen hours of continuous live coverage⁴¹⁵ and polls reported CNN as the public’s first or second overall choice for news at that time⁴¹⁶. As a result of CNN’s capabilities, it became a primary channel of communication between the antagonists in the conflict – US President George Bush and Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. Ted Turner stressed the network’s importance in a telephone call to his Baghdad producer, Rober Wiener. “We’re global network,” said Turner. “If there’s chance for peace... it might come through us. Hell, both sides aren’t talking to each other, but they’re talking to CNN. We have a major responsibility.”⁴¹⁷ And while the three major networks were eliminating foreign correspondents, CNN was opening new foreign bureaus at a rate that left it as many reporters stationed abroad by the end of 1992 as ABC, CBS and NBC combined⁴¹⁸. CNN’s core competence, its ability both to cover and to transmit breaking news as it happens from all around the world rests to a great extent on its organizational infrastructure. CNN is a geographically diffused news network with an unconventional structure that arises from the confluence of its core missions. It has the

⁴¹⁰ Interview with the author, Shankleman, L.K., 2000, *Inside the BBC and CNN; Managing Media Organization*, Routledge, London & New York p. 142

⁴¹¹ Kung-Shankleman, L., 2000, *Inside the BBC and CNN; Managing Media Organization*, Routledge, London & New York, p. 100

⁴¹² Taylor, P.M., *Global Communications, International Affairs and the Media since 1945*, London: Routledge, p. 95

⁴¹³ Kung-Shankleman, L., 2000, *Inside the BBC and CNN; Managing Media Organization*, Routledge, London & New York, p. 77

⁴¹⁴ Fang, I. E., 1997, *A History of Mass Communication: Six Information Revolutions*, Boston: Focal Press, p 202

⁴¹⁵ Sheppard E.D. and D. Bawden, 1997, *More News, Less Knowledge? An Information Content Analysis of Television and Newspaper Coverage of the Gulf War*, *International Journal of Information Management* 17, number 3 (June), p. 212

⁴¹⁶ Fang, I. E., 1997, *A History of Mass Communication: Six Information Revolutions*, Boston: Focal Press, p 202

⁴¹⁷ Quoted in Wiener, R., 1992, *Live from Baghdad*, New York: Doubleday, p. 253

⁴¹⁸ Ammon, R.J., 2001, *Global Television and the Shapping of World Politics*, McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers, Jefferson, North Carolina and London

headquarter in Atlanta, US, and 37 bureaus around the world with this coverage supplemented and carried by more than 900 affiliates worldwide. In seven international production centers, including those in Washington, New York and Hong Kong, it produces five regionalized schedules, including one dedicated to Europe, Middle East and Africa⁴¹⁹. It has a unique delivery infrastructure; internationally, its signal, carried by eight satellites, covers most of the populated world. CNN often receives criticism for its alleged superficiality; it has been described “a mile wide and an inch deep”⁴²⁰ or “visual wallpaper”⁴²¹. Such criticism no doubt stems for its early days when it espoused the editorial policy ‘if it bleeds, it leads’, but it is claimed that such days are long gone; its prime international competitor, BBC World, itself admits that the old stereotype of CNN dominating breaking news situations as a result of technology and resources rather than of analyses, is no longer true⁴²². The CNN News Group, a division of Time Warner Inc., is engaged in a wide range of broadcasting activities across a variety of media, including CNN International, channel transmitted via international satellite network.

Whereas the BBC has gained a reputation for objective rather than mass-market-appeal news presentation and gathering, CNN has become famous for airing globally attractive ‘mass’ news events⁴²³. According to Shankleman, there are four governing beliefs that “drive the BBC’s culture and the attitudes that arise from them: a deep commitment to the UK; an equally strong conviction that the organization is special, different and important because it has public service status; a belief that it is special not just because it is publicly funded, but because it is simply ‘the best in the business’; and finally a conviction that those that work at the BBC are custodians of a unique broadcasting heritage and have a personal duty to defend this”⁴²⁴. At the same time, she also presented “the four unconscious shared beliefs that lie at the heart of CNN’s culture: a commitment to breaking news as fundamental as the BBC’s commitment to public broadcasting and rooted in the firmly held belief that CNN’s news make a difference to the course of world events; a conviction that CNN understands the realities of life – the organization is proud of its pragmatic view of the role of broadcasting and hard-nosed about its business priorities; a belief that CNN is successful because it takes risks and does things differently – the organization’s unorthodox beginnings have risen to an institutionalized iconoclasm which in turn leads to an ‘official’ policy of disregarding convention; and, fourth, the ingrained feeling that the organization is an underdog, a battling outsider in a hostile industry, something that creates a combative attitude to the world outside”⁴²⁵.

⁴¹⁹ <http://www.cnnblogawards.com/whatscnn.php>

⁴²⁰ Bibb, P., 1993, *Ted Turner: It Ain't As Easy as It Looks: A Biography*, Johnson Books, in Kung-Shankleman, L., 2000, *Inside the BBC and CNN; Managing Media Organization*, Routledge, London & New York, p. 128

⁴²¹ Auletta, K., 1996, *Media Man: Ted Turner's Improbable Empire (Enterprise)*, Atlas Books, W.W. Norton, London and New York, in Shankleman, L.K., 2000, *Inside the BBC and CNN; Managing Media Organization*, Routledge, London & New York, p. 128

⁴²² Kung-Shankleman, L., 2000, *Inside the BBC and CNN; Managing Media Organization*, Routledge, London & New York, p. 128

⁴²³ Volkmer, I., 1999, *News In The Global Sphere, A Study Of CNN And Its Impact On Global Communication*, University of Luton Press

⁴²⁴ Kung-Shankleman, L., 2000, *Inside the BBC and CNN; Managing Media Organization*, Routledge, London & New York, p. 148

⁴²⁵ *Ibid*, p. 164

Therefore, the main characteristics of the internal culture and structure of these two TV stations – the long-term tradition of professional journalism and credibility for BBC, and the reputation to be the first and the best informed for CNN – were one of reasons to choose their international news channels, CNN International and BBC World, as the primary source of media material for the empirical analysis in this research. But the most important arguments are certainly their international reach and their considerable impact on the international political elite.

Full time distribution of CNNI and BBCW doubled in a period of five years, between 1997 and 2002: 25.1 millions of television households had BBCW in 1997, while the number increased to 56.4 in 2002; CNNI was available in 58.9 millions of television households in 1997, and, as already noted, 84.7 millions in 2002⁴²⁶, while the latest figures show that the number has increased up to 150 million households in 210 countries and territories. Today, BBCW is available in more than 276 million homes, 1.5 million hotel rooms, on 57 cruise ships, 42 airlines and 34 mobile phone platforms⁴²⁷. It relies on 58 international bureaus the corporation has amassed across the world after decades of news broadcasting⁴²⁸. Some claim that the audience share of both CNNI and BBCW in a world of more than 6 billions inhabitants make them “less a global mass medium than the office intercom of global elites”⁴²⁹. Indeed, more important than numbers is the issue of who is actually watching these channels. There is “a passionately loyal – if small – group of viewers” who follow their signal from hotel to hotel as they travel from place to place around the world; then, another group of people “who have been dispatched – perhaps for years at a time – to locations around the world”, who work for embassies, NGOs, and commercial enterprises; and finally, “a much larger, but more diffuse” group that could be described as “influentials” and that includes ministers, company and state presidents, senior policy officials⁴³⁰. Writing in the Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics, former US State Department spokesman Nicholas Burns described how CNNI was a part of his daily routine: “I turn on CNN International at 7:00 AM in my office and keep it on throughout the day. Its jingles and theme music provide the backdrop in government offices and palaces from Santiago to Seoul.”⁴³¹ The first US President Bush’s press secretary Marlin Fitzwater stated that “CNN has opened up a whole new communication system between governments in terms of immediacy and directness. In many cases, it’s

⁴²⁶ Crowe, C. (ed.), 1998, 1999, 2000, *Media and Marketing Europe Guide: Pan-European Television*. London:Emap Media; Collison, T. (ed.), 2001, 2002, *Media and Marketing Europe Guide: Pan-European Television*. London: Emap Media, in Chalaby, J. K., 2003, *Television for a New Global Order, Transnational Television Networks and the Formation of Global System*, *Gazette: The International Journal for Communication Studies*, SAGE Publications, London, Thousand Oaks and New Delhi, Vol. 65(6)

⁴²⁷ <http://www.bbcworld.com/Pages/About.aspx>

⁴²⁸ Chalaby, J.K., 2003, *Television For A New Global Order, Transnational Television Networks and the Formation of Global System*, *Gazette: The International Journal for Communication Studies*, SAGE Publications, London, Thousand Oaks and New Delhi, Vol. 65(6): 457-472

⁴²⁹ Carruthers, S.L., 2000, *The Media At War; Communication And Conflict In The Twentieth Century*, Palgrave Macmillan, p. 201

⁴³⁰ *Influential Europeans/Asians Study: As Sales Analysis*, Center for International Strategy, Technology and Policy, Atlanta, GA: Georgia Institute for Technology, 1995, in Flournoy, D. M. and R. K. Stewart, 1997, *CNN-Making News in the Global Market*, Luton: University of Luton Press, p. 106

⁴³¹ Burns, N., Fall 1996, *Talking to the World about American Foreign Policy*, Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics 1, p.13

the first communication we have”⁴³². The same thing was observed by Barbara McDougall, former Canadian External Affairs Minister: “I took notice. At Foreign Ministers’ meetings I heard them talk about what they had seen on CNN or the BBC.”⁴³³ During the war in Afghanistan in 2002, US Secretary of State Colin Powell advised his president and vice-president to “stay away from CNN” because of the added pressure brought by continuous war coverage⁴³⁴. Many similar examples supporting the hypothesis of the importance of CNNI and BBCW for politicians have been presented in the previous chapter in the description of four post-Cold War conflict situations that have been often used for testing the CNN effect theory’s assumptions. For example, US President George Bush admitted that at the beginning of the Gulf War in 1991 he learned more “from CNN than... from the CIA”⁴³⁵, while Christiane Amanpour, the famous CNN foreign correspondent who challenged President Clinton for a perceived “flip-flop” on policy to Bosnia⁴³⁶ believes that it was CNN’s vivid, continuous coverage of the war in Bosnia that might have at the end altered US foreign policy toward the region⁴³⁷.

Although the management of these two channels underlined very often that their mission was “not to influence world opinion”, but “to report and inform”⁴³⁸, it can be said without any doubt that both CNNI and BBCW, although different in the way they were established and structured, became important factors in international diplomatic and media circles in the past years. That was the main reason behind the decision to choose the coverage of these two international channels from Kosovo and Darfur as the main source of material for empirical media analysis in this research. The methodology of the research is explained in the following chapter.

⁴³² Quoted in Whittemore, H., 1990, *CNN: The inside story*, Boston: Little, Brown, p. 302

⁴³³ Barbara McDougall, former Canadian External Affairs Minister, interview, 19 April 1994, in Gowing, N., 1994, *Real-Time Television Coverage of Armed Conflicts and Diplomatic Crises: Does it Pressure or Distort foreign Policy Decisions?*, The Joan Shorenstein Barone Center on the Press, Politics and Public Policy, Harvard

⁴³⁴ Woodward, B., 2002, *Bush at War*, New York: Simon and Shuster, in Chalaby, J.K., 2003, *Television For A New Global Order, Transnational Television Networks and the Formation of Global System*, *Gazette: The International Journal for Communication Studies*, SAGE Publications, London, Thousand Oaks and New Delhi, Vol. 65(6): 457-472

⁴³⁵ Friedland, L., 1992, *Covering the world: International television news services*, New York: Twentieth Century Fund Press, pp. 7-8

⁴³⁶ CNN World Report conference, May 1995

⁴³⁷ Amanpour, C., 1996, *Television’s Role in Foreign Policy*, *The Quill* 84(3):16-17

⁴³⁸ Former CNN President and CEO Tom Johnson quoted in Arnett, P., *Peace, War and Global Communication*, An Elizabeth Evans Baker Lecture, Ohio University, Athens, Ohio, 16 April 1996, in Fournoy, D.M. and R. K. Stewart, 1997, *CNN Making News In The Global Market*, University of Luton Press, p. 64

CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY

This chapter outlines the methodological approach taken in this study and it explains how the empirical research fulfills the goal of investigating the interaction between media coverage, with the focus on the 24/7 news television channels, and international political decision-making process.

MEDIA EFFECTS RESEARCH

The traditional division of inquiry relating to television news includes three areas: production research, which investigates the factors in the selection and shaping of news content; content research, which looks at various characteristics of the news content disseminated by the media; and effects research, which investigates the impact of news coverage. In this research the last two were combined, examining both media content and media effects, by taking media coverage as an independent variable, touching on the research question whether and under which conditions – both political and media content conditions – media coverage can influence political decision making.

The literature review helped in the identification of two dangerous traps in the empirical research that had to be avoided. Firstly, although science generally seeks to identify definite cause-and-effect relationships, such relationships have proven somewhat elusive in media effects research: “after” is not the same as “because of”, nor does correlation necessarily imply causation. As Gilboa suggests, it is clearly necessary to distinguish between cases where a government wishes to intervene, and therefore not only does not object to media coverage of atrocities but actually initiates or encourages it, and cases when a government is reluctant to intervene and consequently resist media pressure to do so. It is important to keep in mind that “global television cannot force policy policymakers to do what they intend to do anyway”⁴³⁹. Another problematic assumption confuses “force” and “pressure”: the “forcing” framework suggests that the media is taking over the policymaking process, while the “pressuring” framework considers the media as one of several factors competing to influence decision⁴⁴⁰. This is linked to the second dangerous trap in media effects research: television rarely, if ever, is the sole cause for particular outcome; it could be a necessary, but not sufficient condition when it affects policy, so it can not be treated in a vacuum and the policy process should not be oversimplified. Lynch called it the “Feedback Loop”, a way of describing the role of news as one among many influences on the complex process at work in the world of events. “Isolating media strategy – consciously or instinctively pursued – as a measurable factor in those events can be like trying to retrieve a single color from a tin of mixed paints. But its presence, no matter how diluted, remains a visible part of the blend.”⁴⁴¹ Although one can conclude, based on these arguments, that it is hard to identify a clear

⁴³⁹ Gilboa, E., 2005, *The CNN Effect: The Search for A Communication Theory of International Relations*, Eytan Gilboa, Political Communication, 22: 27-44, Taylor & Francis Inc.

⁴⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴⁴¹ Lynch, J., *Reporting the World: The Ethical Challenge to International News*, in Paterson, C. and A. Sreberny, (eds.), 2004, *International News in the 21ST Century*, John Libbey Publishing for University of Luton Press, p. 261- 284

link between media messages and human thought or action - in this research, specific international political decisions - comparison of highly similar cases, but with different levels and content of media coverage allows me to exclude the identical variables, like political, strategic or economic interest, and – in combination with other methods and materials which will be listed in this chapter – to assess the television's influence in those cases.

There are generally two types of approaches to media effect studies. One is world-politics centric, for example Gowing⁴⁴², who relies primarily on interviews with senior policy makers and to a much lesser extent journalists, and whose study suffers from the methodological weakness of face-value anecdotal recounting of policy makers' views about their own power in relation to the media in the absence of analysis of the media coverage itself⁴⁴³. The second approach is media-centric, for example Shaw⁴⁴⁴, who conducts framing analyses of media reports and extensive public opinion surveys; or Volkmer⁴⁴⁵ whose empirical evidence is drawn from a content analysis of a CNN program World Report and interviews with CNN journalists in Atlanta, but without including real-world indicators. Robinson suggests that researchers must avoid world politics-centrism and media-centrism by adopting an interdisciplinary research strategy, the strategy that was implemented in this research. This entails becoming sensitive to contemporary arguments and theories in both communication studies and international relations, and in terms of methodology, to analyze both the media and political processes⁴⁴⁶.

This interdisciplinary strategy was implemented through two interrelated comparative analyses: (a) an assessment of international TV news channels' impact on a specific international political decision in comparison to the relative impact of other factors; and (b) application of this procedure to two relevant case studies.

THE CASE STUDY METHOD

In general, a case study is the preferred strategy when “how” or “why” questions are being posed, when the investigator has little control over events, and when the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon with some real-life context, and especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident. The most important application of the case study is to explain the presumed causal links in real-life interventions that are too complex for the survey or experimental strategies⁴⁴⁷. While in-depth case study research may lack the generalizability of research based upon a large

⁴⁴² Gowing, N., 1994, Real-Time Television Coverage of Armed Conflicts and Diplomatic Crises: Does it Pressure or Distort foreign Policy Decisions?, The Joan Shorenstein Barone Center on the Press, Politics and Public Policy, Harvard

⁴⁴³ Kent, G., 2005, Framing War And Genocide, British Policy and News Media Reaction to the War in Bosnia, Hampton Press Communication Series: Political Communication, p. 168

⁴⁴⁴ Shaw M., 1996, Civil Society and Media in Global Crises, London: Pinter

⁴⁴⁵ Volkmer, I., 1999, News in the Global Sphere, A Study Of CNN And Its Impact On Global Communication, University of Luton Press

⁴⁴⁶ Robinson, P., 2000, World Politics And Media Power: Problems Of Research Design, Media, Culture & Society, SAGE Publications, London, Thousand Oaks and New Delhi, Vol. 22: 227-232

⁴⁴⁷ Yin, R.K., 2003, Case study research: design and methods, 3rd edition, Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, London and New Delhi, p. 1-15

number of cases, its primary virtue is the in-depth analysis that it offers⁴⁴⁸ and therefore it can provide the essential evidence needed to disentangle causal processes and mechanisms. The use of theory is very significant in doing case studies; it provides not only an immense aid in defining the appropriate research design, data collection and generalizing the results of the case study, but it also serves as a guide in the selection of the case studies themselves. The previous literature provided me with additional case studies, some of them presented in the literature review chapter in a less detailed manner, which helped me to choose those for special treatment and identify plausible causal hypotheses. It is important to note that the case study does not represent a “sample”: the goal is to expand and generalize theories (analytic generalization) and not to enumerate frequencies (statistical generalization)⁴⁴⁹. Or, as three notable social scientists describe in their single case study done years ago, the goal is to do a “generalizing”, and not a “particularizing” analysis⁴⁵⁰. The evidence from multiple cases is often considered more compelling⁴⁵¹ since it can blunt criticism reflecting fears about the uniqueness of artifactual condition surrounding one case study⁴⁵². As will be shown, each case study was carefully selected so that it predicts contrasting results but for predictable reasons, i.e. presents a theoretical replication.

First of all, the choice of Kosovo and Darfur was made because of their high similarity and several common points in their historical and political background. The most important is a continuous gross violation of human rights. Between 1981 and 1989, nearly six hundred thousand Kosovo Albanians, “half the adult population – were arrested, interrogated, reprimanded or interned”⁴⁵³, while during the 1998-99 Kosovo war, former Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic’s crackdown on independence-seeking ethnic Albanians claimed 10,000 lives and displaced about 1 million people. In Darfur, thousands of people have been killed and about 2.5 million have been forced from their homes in three years of conflict between 2003 and 2006. Both Kosovo and Darfur suffered from protracted negligence and political and economic marginalization by their countries’ administrative and political centres, Belgrade and Khartoum. Kosovo was former Yugoslavia’s poorest, most illiterate and most underdeveloped region; it had a per capita gross national product of 31 per cent of the Yugoslav average⁴⁵⁴. The socio-economic under-development of Darfur was evidenced in the unequal access to, and generally low level of, social services, and general neglect of the region in Sudan’s development, in spite of population expansion, cyclical droughts and deepening

⁴⁴⁸ Gerring J., What Is A Case Study And What Is Good For, American Political Science Review, Vol. 98, No. 2, May 2004

⁴⁴⁹ Yin, R.K., 2003, Case study research: design and methods, 3rd edition, Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, London and New Delhi, p. 26

⁴⁵⁰ Lipset, S.M., Trow, M. and J., Coleman, 1956, Union democracy: The inside politics of the International Typographical Union, New York: Free Press, pp 419-420, in Ibid .

⁴⁵¹ Herriott, R.E and W.A.Firestone, 1983, Multisite qualitative policy research: Optimizing description and generalizability, Educational Researcher, 12, 14-19

⁴⁵² Yin, R.K., 2003, Case study research: design and methods, 3rd edition, Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, London and New Delhi, p. 46-54

⁴⁵³ Kent, G., 2005, Framing War and Genocide, British Policy and News Media Reaction to the War in Bosnia, Hampton Press Communication Series: Political Communication, p. 23

⁴⁵⁴ Financial Times Survey; Yugoslavia III; Pg. 29, Kosovo riots jolt the regions, David Buchan, Financial Times (London); June 1, 1982, available at <http://www.kosovo.net/press1980.html>

livelihoods crises⁴⁵⁵. Kosovo and Darfur are also linked by the myths of the “fatherland”. Serbs have been and still are claiming Kosovo as the birthplace of medieval Serbia, while Darfur “is seen as remote and savage, but at the same time it is sacred ground of the fatherland (*al-watan*) even – or perhaps especially – for the vast majority who have never set foot there”⁴⁵⁶. The general political situation in the home countries of Kosovo and Darfur was in both cases far from stable. Wars in former Yugoslavia began with the 10-day war in Slovenia in June-July 1991, and continued with the all-out war in Croatia, and subsequently in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992-1995); the process of the country’s dissolution continued further, although in a peaceful manner, with Montenegro’s referendum for independence in 2006. A 21-year civil war between the North and South of Sudan concluded in 2005 with a peace agreement that includes a plan for referendum on independence for the South, scheduled for 2011. In the international political sphere, the United States, and to the lesser extent, the United Kingdom and the United Nations (especially in the case of Darfur), were the major decision makers, so their political decisions were the main subject of analysis in the case studies. In both cases the US at some point saw European countries’ reactions as inadequate. While urging the Europeans “to exert every influence they can and bring whatever pressure they can to bear upon the Sudanese government...to prevent another Rwanda from taking place” in Darfur in 2004, former US Secretary for Defense William Cohen underlined that the US faced “a similar situation in dealing with Kosovo in which the European nations were not eager to take the lead in dealing with Milosevic’s ethnic cleansing policy and process”⁴⁵⁷. During the discussion on possible international actions in Darfur, experts have pointed to Kosovo as an excellent example for what should be done. According to Susan Rice, a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution and former US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, the international reaction in Darfur could and should come in the form of air strikes targeted at the aircraft, the airfields and the other assets that have been involved in the genocide in Darfur itself: “It’s exactly what we did in Kosovo in a far lesser humanitarian crisis... and eventually Milosevic, a far more significant military adversary than the Sudanese government, assented.”⁴⁵⁸ She also pointed out that not even in Kosovo could the US get UN Security Council approval “for action to save civilians”, and yet the United States and NATO acted without that authorization after which, in retrospect, the Security Council came back and gave post facto legitimatization to that⁴⁵⁹. The International Crisis Group recommended sanctions particularly targeted against Sudanese officials, stressing that there is a “qualitative difference” between the sort of the larger contextual economic sanctions that have been in place since the Clinton administration in Sudan, and picking out individuals in the government who are assessed to have been complicit or responsible for mass atrocities, and “then saying to those people, you, perhaps over the next 20 or 30 years of your life are going to be unable to travel

⁴⁵⁵ Srinivasan, Sharath, 16 October 2006, Minority Rights, Early Warning and Conflict Prevention: Lessons from Darfur, Minority Rights Group International, available at <http://www.darfurpeaceanddevelopment.org/article.php?ID=900>

⁴⁵⁶ Prunier G., 2005, *Darfur: The Ambiguous Genocide*, C. Hurst & Co. Ltd., London, p. 111

⁴⁵⁷ CNNI, *Your World Today*, July 1, 2004

⁴⁵⁸ Rice, S., a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, April 5, 2007, *Darfur at a Crossroads: Global Public Opinion and the Responsibility to Protect*, The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C.

⁴⁵⁹ PBS, *Online NewsHour*, November 17, 2006

anywhere, your assets are going to be frozen and some day you will sit in the dark like Milosevic did”⁴⁶⁰. One possible important difference between Kosovo and Darfur might be the location - the former is placed on the European continent (although in its southeastern corner), while the latter is in Africa – and that difference (understood as a ‘real world indicator’) will be taken into account in the analysis of both the media coverage and the political process.

But despite the similar historical and political background, the international reaction to these two cases was completely different: the Kosovo case ended with a NATO bombing campaign unprecedented in the history of this organization while in Darfur only sporadic and very limited international intervention has occurred. Therefore the goal of my research was to determine whether the quantity and content of media coverage of Kosovo and Darfur, with other real-world indicators being similar, had any effect on the different political outcomes⁴⁶¹.

Through the case studies, the theoretical propositions that led to their selection, especially agenda-setting, framing and the CNN effect theory, were followed and tested. The propositions helped to organize the entire case study and to define alternative explanations to be examined, not only within the theory itself, but also real-world rival explanations. The evidence for case studies was collected from various sources: video archive records, documents, and interviews, as well as data obtained through the additional primary method in my research, content analysis. Each of the case studies has two basic components:

- quantitative and qualitative analysis of television archive material prior to relevant political decisions, and
- in-depth analysis of the political process that includes the historical and political background of the region and conflict in question, i.e. so called real-world indicators, and the time line of the process of decision-making through the archive analysis of all relevant political process documentation.

All important points of the policy process and the circumstances under which it happened are aligned in a chronological order, a method that is used for the reconstruction of historical events, to allow the discovery of factors that could lead to the political decisions in question, which is then compared with the distribution and content of news items in the same time period.

MEDIA CONTENT ANALYSIS

Content analysis is classically described as “a research technique for the objective, systematic and quantitative description of the manifest content of communication”⁴⁶². Newer forms of content analysis like the one utilized in this research emphasize

⁴⁶⁰ John Prendergast, Special Advisor To The President, International Crisis Group, Hearing Of The Senate Committee On Foreign Relations, Subject: Sudan, Peace But At What Price?, June 15, 2004

⁴⁶¹ Real-world indicators will be analysed more thoroughly in the case studies chapters, while the more detailed comparison between real-world indicators in Kosovo and Darfur cases will be presented in the conclusion part of the research.

⁴⁶² Berelson, B., Content analysis in communication research, in Holsti, O.R. (ed.), 1969, Content Analysis for the Social Sciences and Humanities, Addison Wesley, London, in Sheppard, E.D and D. Bawden, 1997, More News, Less Knowledge? An Information Content Analysis of Television and Newspaper Coverage of the Gulf War, International Journal of Information Management, Vol. 17, No.3, pp. 211-227

qualitative as well as quantitative analyses, and the inclusion of latent as well as manifest content, and of form as well as strict content, e.g. style of presentation⁴⁶³. For any content analysis, it is necessary to define the unit of “news” to be analyzed, and to define a set of categories for the analyses. In television the unit of analysis may range from the entire program as the largest unit to the single word as the smallest, but as in most studies of international news, the individual news item was used as the basic unit of analysis. In both case studies I conducted the content analysis of the news stories of two 24/7 international news channels, CNN International and BBC World News, because of, as already explained, their worldwide reach, their large elite audience and their considerable influence on the media agendas of other news media, particularly where events outside the main Western nations are concerned. Another issue central to content analyses is the question of representativeness of the sample of news stories studied. In the Kosovo case study, the media coverage was analyzed in a time period of more than two months before the beginning of NATO air strikes on FR Yugoslavia during the night of March 23/24, 1999 - from January 15, the date of Racak massacre (that is argued to be a galvanizing event in the Kosovo case) until March 23. In the Darfur case study more than eight months of media coverage during 2004-2006 within two separate time periods have been chosen for the analysis, taking into account the length of the conflict, but also the expected small number of stories about Darfur on both CNNI and BBCW. These time periods were chosen because they contained many of the constitutive events of the cases of Kosovo and Darfur. For Kosovo, the time period comprises the massacre in Racak, the last peace negotiations in Rambouillet and Paris, and the events before the beginning of NATO air strikes, while for Darfur that was the period of the worst atrocities, of the US recognition of the genocide that took place there, and of numerous UN resolutions including the one that prescribed deployment of UN forces. But the key criteria for the selection of these time periods was that they preceded the most relevant political decisions and actions (or expected action is the case of the deployment of UN forces in Darfur) in both case studies, because the focus of the research is on the relation news product – policy formation, i.e. on the possible influence of the news product on policy formation. Prediction of the media (and public) reaction to political decisions is part of the decision-making process and analysis of the time period before the decision was taken and announced allows us to reach the same – or at least similar – conclusions on what media would prefer politicians to do as politicians did: common points in media preferences and politicians’ decisions would provide a basis for the investigation of possible media effect, as would divergences between them.

The analysis was conducted on material from two different sources:

- Transcripts of all stories about Kosovo and Darfur broadcast on BBC World and CNN International during the selected time periods;
- Archive video-material of a stratified sample of all stories about Kosovo and Darfur broadcast on BBC World and CNN International in these time periods.

⁴⁶³ Fiske, J., 1990, *Introduction to Communication Studies*, Routledge, London, in Sheppard, E.D and D. Bawden, 1997, *More News, Less Knowledge? An Information Content Analysis of Television and Newspaper Coverage of the Gulf War*, *International Journal of Information Management*, Vol. 17, No.3, pp. 211-227

Both transcripts and the sample video material of news items have been provided by the Research Departments of CNN International and BBC World, at the request of the author of this thesis.

The first step in the analysis of CNNI and BBCW archive material was to establish the interplay between media coverage and policy-making through quantitative research into the amount of television attention devoted to these two crises, in an attempt to deduce whether high levels of media interest preceded international (non)intervention, based on the assumptions of agenda-setting theory. The transcripts of all news items in selected time periods have been used to count the total number of items, and the total duration of items, as well as their distribution throughout the time periods, in order to link it afterwards with documented politicians' reactions. However, this methodology is open to the objection that it is interested only in uni-linear media impact and that its conclusions about causality are ultimately somewhat conjectural⁴⁶⁴. Therefore, the research applies content analysis both qualitatively and quantitatively, utilizing the advantages of precision of the latter and the flexibility and appropriateness to the specific nature of the study of the former, deriving the methods from the research paradigm of framing.

The fundamental question about content-analytical methodologies relates to 'meaning' and 'significance': how far is it possible to pin down, fragment and re-assemble the constituent parts of the analyzed meaning of any text?⁴⁶⁵ News frames as attributes of the news text are embedded in the key words, metaphors, concepts, symbols, and visual images emphasized⁴⁶⁶. As a number of authors have argued, the framing of news media reports is crucial in determining their political impact⁴⁶⁷, so news media framing is a key factor in determining the level of pressure for intervention. The deductive approach to content analyzing frames was chosen for the analysis. This approach involves predefining certain frames as content analytic variables to verify the extent to which frames occur in the news. To be able to set up frame categories that will be sufficiently sensitive to capture the nuances of the reports, I needed some familiarity with the content, structure, general nature and overall tone of the material. Therefore, frames were set in advance – they partly derived from previous researches of similar subjects and could be applied to more or less any similar crisis, and partly from a preliminary review of the material collected for this analysis. It was possible to identify two main sets of frames in advance: the empathy/distance⁴⁶⁸ and pro-intervention/contra-intervention frames plus their combinations. Focus on human suffering (empathy frame) + underlining international responsibility (pro-intervention frame) = direction toward the request for international reaction. By contrast, focus on possible risks and casualties and lack of national interest

⁴⁶⁴ Carruthers, S.L, 2000, *The Media At War; Communication And Conflict In The Twentieth Century*, , Palgrave Macmillan, p. 165

⁴⁶⁵ Kent, G., 2005, *Framing War and Genocide, British Policy and News Media Reaction to the War in Bosnia*, Hampton Press Communication Series: Political Communication, p. 238

⁴⁶⁶ Gamson, 1988 in Kent, G., 2005, *Framing War and Genocide, British Policy and News Media Reaction to the War in Bosnia*, Hampton Press Communication Series: Political Communication, p. 225

⁴⁶⁷ Robinson P., 2002, *The CNN Effect: The myth of news, foreign policy and intervention*, Routledge, London and New York, p. 306

⁴⁶⁸ In the context of this study, empathy is defined as "the power of identifying oneself mentally with a person or object", while distance is "aloofness or reserve"; *The Oxford Compact English Dictionary*, 1998, Oxford University Press

(contra-intervention) + description of the conflict as “tribal enemies” and insanity (distance frame) = direction toward the “bodybag effect” or “Dover count”, as it is called nowadays, i.e. request for restraint in action. After the most important frames were defined, a further element of the quantitative aspect of this study was developed: the usage of key words. The selection of certain key words, as some authors point out, is usually part of a much wider “ideological battle”⁴⁶⁹ - like for example the choice of ‘ethnic conflict’ over ‘genocide’, a word that “usually demands a response, which will at least punish the perpetrator”⁴⁷⁰ - so that was taken into account in the preparation of the key words’ list. Bergelin has noted that “the meaning of a frequently-recurring item is not essentially linked to the fact that it occurs ten times ... but it is essentially linked to the fact that it is placed in opposition to another item which occurs rarely (or something that is even absent)”⁴⁷¹, so in this research for example, references to the Darfurian population as ‘victims’ are counted in opposition to their categorization as ‘fighters’, and these key words were additionally analyzed in the context in which they have been used. This final list of key words for both Kosovo and Darfur case studies was formed after a test analysis on a random sample of items from BBCW and CNNI coverage. The actual coding devices for media coverage and the list of key words are not identical for Kosovo and Darfur case studies due to the different circumstances in question: that will be presented in detail in each case study. Still, they are equivalents in that they collectively build up the frames chosen for the analysis in this research and as such suitable for the comparison.

Additionally, the number of times various categories of sources are quoted was counted which has proven to be very helpful in ascertaining the frames employed and the concomitant rhetoric. Transcripts of all news items enable additional analysis of sources – about the type of knowledge they provide. Based on previous studies⁴⁷², the type of knowledge was divided in five different categories:

1. factual - saying what happened;
2. explanatory - explaining why it happened;
3. descriptive - describing what it is like to be involved in what happened;
4. evaluative - evaluating if what happened was good or bad;
5. recommendations - recommending what should be done about what happened.

To check the consistency of my coding practice over time and reliability of findings, I conducted the analyses of the type of knowledge the sources provide twice, with a lapse of time in between.

⁴⁶⁹ Carruthers, S.L, 2000, *The Media At War; Communication And Conflict In The Twentieth Century*, , Palgrave Macmillan, p. 165

⁴⁷⁰ Kent, G., 2005, *Framing War and Genocide, British Policy and News Media Reaction to the War in Bosnia*, Hampton Press Communication Series: Political Communication, p. 164

⁴⁷¹ Bergelin, 1972, p.319, in Kent, G., 2005, *Framing War and Genocide, British Policy and News Media Reaction to the War in Bosnia*, Hampton Press Communication Series: Political Communication, p. 238

⁴⁷² *Bosnia Coverage in 1995 in US TV Networks*, Media Monitor, 1995 year in Review, Volume X, Number 1, January/February 1996; Brewer, P.R., Graf, J. and L. Willnat, 2003, *Priming or Framing - Media Influence on Attitudes toward Foreign Countries*, Gazette: The International Journal for Communication Studies, SAGE Publications, London, Thousand Oaks and New Delhi, Vol 65 (6): 493-508

One shortcoming of the quantitative text analysis method is that many very powerful concepts, central to frames, need not be repeated often to have a great impact⁴⁷³. As already noted in the literature review chapter, this is especially relevant for the dominant frame in the earliest news coverage of an event that “can activate and spread congruent thoughts and feelings in individuals’ knowledge networks, building a news event schema that guides responses to all future reports”⁴⁷⁴. Many authors believe that this initial interpretative framework, once established, is extremely difficult to alter fundamentally⁴⁷⁵, so it is very important to detect it in the content analysis. And, unless the content of reports is analyzed qualitatively, frames are “difficult to detect fully and reliably, because many of the framing devices can appear as natural, unremarkable choices of words or images”⁴⁷⁶.

That is the reason why I conducted an extensive analysis of the selected sample of news items which covered “turning-point” events and investigated ways in which the news is packaged, what was the overall context of the key words used, the amount of exposure and the tone of presentation, visual effects, labeling and vocabulary – all tools of the framing process. For example, attention was paid to the number of times when CNNI and BBCW had their own TV crew in the field, because it makes “a great deal of difference”⁴⁷⁷ whether news is gathered and transmitted to the television networks through major international news agencies, or is gathered and sent to the anchor location by a full-time network correspondent. The latter type of report is considered “more visually exciting, more central to the creation and structure of news broadcast and more important for maintenance of an audience flow” than a report from a news agency read by the anchor⁴⁷⁸. Or as Gowing pointed out, “the sight of a company’s own correspondent *in situ* is what the field reporting of conflicts is all about”⁴⁷⁹. Although it was the language of the news reports that was primarily examined in this research, attention was paid to the visual dimension of media coverage. Despite the difficulty of developing a coding scheme that measures the images’ cognitive and affective content, “a difficulty compounded by the absence of any well-developed general models of how visual images affect political thinking and feeling”, visual content of the news stories is very important, since “visual messages are multidimensional and possess many potential interpretations as

⁴⁷³ Hertog, J.K and D. M. McLeod, A Multiperspectival Approach to Framing Analysis: A Field Guide, in Reese, S.D., Gandy, O.H., and A. E. Grant, (eds.), 2001, *Framing Public Life: Perspectives On Media And Our Understanding Of The Social World*, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers, Mahwah, New Jersey, London, p. 147-153

⁴⁷⁴ Entman, R.M., 2004, *Projections of Power: Framing News, Public Opinion, and US Foreign Policy*, Chicago: Chicago University Press, p. 7

⁴⁷⁵ Cohen, A. A., and W. Gadi (eds), 1999, *Framing the Intifada*, Norwood, NJ: Ablex, p. xvii, in Kent, G., 2005, *Framing War and Genocide, British Policy and News Media Reaction to the War in Bosnia*, Hampton Press Communication Series: Political Communication, p. 179; Hall, S., Critcher, C., Jefferson, T., Clarke, J., and B. Robert, 1978, *Policing the Crisis: Mugging, the State and Law and Order* (Critical social studies), Macmillan, Paperback

⁴⁷⁶ Entman, R. M., 1991, *Framing US Coverage of International News*, *Journal of Communication* 41: 6

⁴⁷⁷ Larson, J.F., 1984, *Television’s Window On The World: International Affairs Coverage On The Us Networks*, Ablex Publishing Cooperation, Norwood, New Jersey, p. 25

⁴⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁷⁹ Gowing, N., 1997, *Media Coverage: Help or Hindrance in Conflict Prevention*. New York: Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Violence

they interact with the keyword of the frame.”⁴⁸⁰ It has an additional value since not many recognize that the camera may “take a position”, so it is usually (wrongly) assumed that “true reality simply presents itself to us in a relatively unmediated form”⁴⁸¹. Van Ginneken makes a distinction between three physical dimensions that play a role in news framing. The first dimension is the direction in which the camera is pointed; for example the perception of the viewer is different if the camera is on the side of protestors or police. The second dimension is the physical distance to the subject, which may translate into a psychological distance: panoramic and long shots imply anonymity, while close-ups and medium shots imply identification as individuals. The third dimension is the vertical angle; the higher vantage position implies insignificance and/or the helplessness of the picture subject, while a lower vantage position implies the overpowering nature of the subject⁴⁸². These basic principles were taken into account in the analyses of video material.

Parallel analysis of news agencies/major newspapers in the same time periods allowed the identification of the moments of “media silence” or the pictures “they choose to ignore”. In this context it is important to note that media themselves function as each other’s prime reference group in many ways - if a few media emphasize an issue, others will often feel forced to follow – so it is not hard to detect issues that have been deliberately put aside by one channel. Again, the most prestigious media are obviously the most influential. A TV news agency, namely Reuters TV, has been selected because it could be considered relatively independent of intentional external manipulation since it has a global presence, but no direct access to public and potential policy-makers, while the New York Times has been chosen due to its status as the leading international newspaper that won nine Pulitzer Prices for international reporting in last 20 years⁴⁸³ and as the first in overall reach among US opinion leaders⁴⁸⁴. Media silence has proven to be very powerful and some recent excellent examples come from the media coverage of the US and British forces’ invasion on Iraq. During the whole period of this war and long after the official end had been proclaimed by the US President George W. Bush, media almost totally ignored the fact that no evidence was found of any alleged links between Saddam Hussein’s regime and Osama bin Laden (which was constantly asserted by the US administration as a valid motive for the invasion of Iraq). As a result, several polls found that 48% of the US public believed US troops found evidence of close pre-war links between Iraq and the al-Qaida terrorist group. Viewers of Fox Television, the channel which called their program of war coverage - it is very indicative - “Operation Iraqi Freedom”, were the most likely to think this⁴⁸⁵. To the contrary, the toppling of a statue of Saddam Hussein by an Iraqi crowd helped by an American military vehicle received extensive coverage and was broadcast live. This statue was located in a square in front of the Palestine Hotel, used mostly by journalists, and the scene was described as

⁴⁸⁰ Entman, R.M., 2004, *Projections of Power: Framing News, Public Opinion, and US Foreign Policy*, Chicago: Chicago University Press, p. 56

⁴⁸¹ Van Ginneken, J., 1998, *Understanding Global News: A Critical Introduction*, SAGE Publications, London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi, p. 167-171

⁴⁸² Ibid.

⁴⁸³ <http://www.pulitzer.org/bycat/International-Reporting>

⁴⁸⁴ 2006-2007 US opinion leaders Study, Erdos & Morgan, <http://www.nytimes.whsites.net/mediakit/>

⁴⁸⁵ Lobe, J., October 23, 2003, *The Hazards of Watching Fox News*, Inter Press Service

being staged for television, "... the most staged photo-opportunity since Iwo Jima"⁴⁸⁶. Another important indication is that corpses of US soldiers and dead Iraqi civilians are almost never shown on US television (many studies of US television news coverage of the invasion of Iraq have shown that "while dramatic, the coverage was not graphic... not a single story examined showed pictures of people being hit by fired weapons"⁴⁸⁷); while corpses of Saddam Hussein's two sons in August 2003 were shown without any trouble, because, as US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld explained, "Iraqis deserved the certainty of their deaths"⁴⁸⁸.

Regarding the stance towards intervention, the research findings are partly interpretive; for example, a 1 to 5 scale on the extent to which journalists appeared supportive or negative of official policy was developed. It served to additionally test the propositions of the CNN effect theory that critical media coverage, in a combination with a lack of policy certainty, may open a path to media influence.

Therefore, the media analysis in both case studies consists of:

- quantitative research into the amount of television attention devoted to the crises;
- quantitative and qualitative content analysis that includes counting of key words, but also analysis of the overall context of the key words used, the amount of exposure and the tone of presentation, visual effects, labelling and vocabulary;
- parallel analysis of news agencies/major newspapers during the same time periods; and
- a measure of the extent to which media appeared supportive of or negative towards official policy.

POLITICAL PROCESS ANALYSIS

Analysis of the political process contains two main components. First is the summary of the historical and political background of both Kosovo and Darfur and the most important real-world indicators, as a "variable that measures more or less objectively the degree of severity or risk of a social problem"⁴⁸⁹. Real-world indicators are important because they indicate a region's possible strategic significance for key decision makers - like the size of its territory, population, size of the immigrant population, natural resources, and close military and political relations with EU/US, which enabled me to identify possible influences other than television coverage and to avoid the trap of oversimplification of the policy process. Through the comprehensive analysis of the conflict in question it is also possible to assess the 'reality' behind the corresponding media representation of that 'reality', since we could hardly assume that the news media ought simply to "reflect this in a quantitatively proportional way"⁴⁹⁰. That is the reason why I sought to check alternative versions of reality through an external, reliable version of the same

⁴⁸⁶ Robert Fiske, www.informationclearinghouse.info/article2838

⁴⁸⁷ PEJ, Project for Excellence in Journalism, Embedded reporters: what are American getting?, www.journalism.org/resources/research/reports/war/postwar/lynch.asp

⁴⁸⁸ BBC News, 27.03.03., www.news.bbc.co.uk

⁴⁸⁹ Dearing J.W. and E.M. Rogers, 1996, Agenda-Setting, Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, London, New Delhi, p.7

⁴⁹⁰ McQuail, 1992, p.220, in Kent, G., 2005, Framing War and Genocide, British Policy and News Media Reaction to the War in Bosnia, Hampton Press Communication Series: Political Communication, p. 193

information, such as official and other institutional records and statistics, alternative media reports, expert analytic accounts and eye witness comparisons.⁴⁹¹

Another component of the political process' analysis was the time line of political decision making during the same time period used for media content analysis. That included the archive analysis of all relevant political process' documentation, including press-statements, transcripts of press-conferences, US Congress, UK House of Commons and UN Security Council debates' transcripts, and all public speeches by key decision makers about Kosovo and Darfur in these time periods. Documents are very reliable as sources of evidence because they are: stable – they can be reviewed repeatedly; unobtrusive – they are not created as a result of the case study; exact – they contain exact names, references, and details of an event; and of broad coverage – they cover a long time span, many events, and many settings⁴⁹². Of course, it has been also taken into account that documents are not always accurate and may not be lacking in author's bias, considering the fact that even the "verbatim" transcripts of official US Congress hearings have been deliberately edited, by the congressional staff or some of the speakers, before being kept in final form⁴⁹³. Although the analysis of the policy documents was largely interpretative, since it appeared to be the only comprehensive way to capture a possible link between media coverage and political decision making, there are still some concrete measurable figures that have been taken into account in order to determine a path of possible agenda setting, and that was used further on in the comparison of two case studies. The most important indicator is the level of attention given to Kosovo and Darfur by politicians. In both cases the level of attention given to these cases by the US presidents was considered as very important, since "no one can compete effectively with the president in terms of prestige, status, media access, public attention and interest"⁴⁹⁴. To capture US presidential attention registered through all diverse outlets, including the State of the Union address, news releases, position taking, briefings, speeches and letters, I have used the Public Papers of the President, an annual compilation of activities during each year, and the Federal News Service via Nexis. Of course, the president's public face may not be a true reflection of what is actually being attended to behind the scenes, but as we are unable to know beyond question what the president is doing, we must assume that "what he does and says publicly from week to week reflects what is on his agenda"⁴⁹⁵. Attention of the US Congress was examined by measuring the numbers of hearings devoted to a subject, since hearings are "the most typical source of media stories and the most likely focus of institutional response to media coverage of issues" and also "an excellent indicator of what Congress is taking seriously"⁴⁹⁶. Only those hearings when Kosovo or Darfur were the main subjects of the hearings, or when considerable

⁴⁹¹ Kent, G., 2005, *Framing War and Genocide, British Policy and News Media Reaction to the War in Bosnia*, Hampton Press Communication Series: Political Communication, p. 193

⁴⁹² Yin, R.K., 2003, *Case study research: design and methods*, 3rd edition, Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, London and New Delhi, p. 86

⁴⁹³ Ibid.

⁴⁹⁴ Druckman, J.N., November 2001, *On The Limits Of Framing Effects: Who Can Frame?*, *The Journal of Politics*, Vol. 63, No. 4., pp. 1041-1066

⁴⁹⁵ Wood, B.W. and J.S. Peake, *The Dynamics Of Foreign Policy Agenda*, *American Political Science Review*, Vo. 92, No.1, March 1998, pp. 173-184

⁴⁹⁶ Edwards, G. C. III, Barrett, A., and J. Peake, 1997, *The Legislative Impact of Divided Government*, *American Journal of Political Science* 41 (April), 546-63

discussion about Kosovo and Darfur took place within hearings called on another issue, have been counted. The same methods were applied to the public speeches of the UK prime ministers, foreign secretaries, UN secretary general, and transcripts of the UK House of Commons and UN Security Council's debates. The purpose was to track temporal sequences, i.e. to see whether changes in hypothesized independent variable - television coverage, its quantity and content – actually precede changes in the dependent variable, namely a political decision.

But the main objective of the section about the decision making process was not quantity but description and interpretation, since the goal was primarily to detect whether the frames used by media and the policy prescriptions they represented were accepted and followed by politicians, and to discover observable implications of policy uncertainty or inconsistency which could reinforce the possible media influence. Policy (un)certainity has been defined as a “function of the degree of consensus and coordination of the subsystems of the executive with respect to an issue”⁴⁹⁷, and, as pointed out in the literature review chapter, is claimed to be “the key variable in the media's effect on foreign policy”⁴⁹⁸. The use of the documents allowed me a relatively systematic tracking of the state of policy on a day-to-day basis. As for the presidential public speeches, the same applies to all other documents, i.e. they cannot be taken “at face value”, but as Robinson points it out, such problems should not be exaggerated too. He considers the press briefings as the crucial arena in which the executives attempt both to set news agendas and to sell policy to the wider public, because with respect to crisis situations, maintenance of public support is considered vital and policy-makers are unlikely to be willing to display indications of uncertainty in such situations. “Evidence of wavering or inconsistent/undecided policy in these situations is therefore a strong indication of uncertainty with the executive. Conversely, when the executive is already intent on taking military action, press briefings play a key role in justifying and promoting policy to both journalists and the broader public.”⁴⁹⁹ One of the biggest sources of the policy documents analysis in this research is transcripts of press-conferences, especially the daily press-conferences of the US State Department, the institution that is, together with the White House, considered as the major newsmaker in the world⁵⁰⁰.

Another source that was used for the policy process analysis are interviews with policy makers about their assessment of the importance of news media, some of them conducted personally and some already published. From the position of a researcher from Bosnia and Herzegovina, I had limited access to political officials from the US, UK and UN involved in the political processes linked to Kosovo and Darfur cases, so only few interviews about their assessment of the importance of news media were conducted personally, while others were used from different media outlets. Again there is a fact that

⁴⁹⁷ Robinson, P., 2001, *Theorizing the Influence of Media on World Politics*, European Journal of Communication, SAGE Publications, Vol 16(4): 523-544

⁴⁹⁸ Livingston, S., *beyond the CNN Effect, The Media-Foreign Policy Dynamic*, in Norris, P., ed., 1997, *Politics and the Press, The news Media and Their Influences*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder London, p. 293

⁴⁹⁹ Robinson P., 2002, *The CNN Effect: The myth of news, foreign policy and intervention*, Routledge, London and New York, p.135-6

⁵⁰⁰ Van Ginneken, J., 1998, *Understanding Global News: A Critical Introduction*, SAGE Publications, London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi, p. 88-93

we cannot see inside the minds of policy-makers and directly observe news media influence at work, the point made by Carruthers when she stated that “debate about the impact of television during humanitarian disasters eludes empirical verification”⁵⁰¹. Both sorts of the interviews were conducted after the investigated events actually took place, so one can assume that interviewees had at least less interest to distort the situation than while it was ongoing. The main importance of the interviews as a method is that they are insightful, i.e. provide information about possible causal inferences. Similarly, the opinions about media effects in concrete situations of journalists themselves, expressed at international news conferences, or in different media outlets and publications, or even their own researches on this subject, as was the case with Gowing and Strobel⁵⁰², were used as participant sources.

Attention was also paid to public surveys about Kosovo and Darfur, as a component of both the political process and media coverage – as an indicator of public (voters’) (non)support, but mostly as a tool of media pressure on decision-makers, depending on the exact time and way it was broadcast. Entman points out that media’s promotion of the power of a putative “public opinion”, since it bears only imperfect resemblance to actual public sentiments and interest, does not necessarily augment the public’s representation in foreign policymaking but rather further increases the media’s influence⁵⁰³. Media themselves have a quite ambiguous attitude toward public opinion polls. The BBC guidelines that have been widely adopted as an example of good practice even specify the language that should be used in reporting polls in order not to give them “greater credibility... than they deserve: polls ‘suggest’ but never ‘prove’”⁵⁰⁴. The realist view is that public opinion can contribute very little to the effective conduct of foreign affairs, so that opinion survey results can best be seen as a ‘well of ideas’ to draw from rather than a stream of directives from the public⁵⁰⁵. But in order to become part of public discourse, polling majorities must be represented by media and therefore, polls were in this research regarded as a component of the relationship between media and the political process.

Therefore, the main elements of the political process’ analysis are:

- the summary of historical and political background of Kosovo and Darfur to produce an analysis of real-world indicators
- the archive analysis of all relevant political process’ documentation

⁵⁰¹ Carruthers, S., L., 2000, *The Media at War: Communication and Conflict in the Twentieth Century*, London: Macmillan, p. 208

⁵⁰² Gowing, N., 1994, *Real-Time Television Coverage of Armed Conflicts and Diplomatic Crises: Does it Pressure or Distort foreign Policy Decisions?*, The Joan Shorenstein Barone Center on the Press, Politics and Public Policy, Harvard; Gowing, N., 1997, *Media Coverage: Help or Hindrance in Conflict Prevention*. New York: Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Violence; Strobel, W., 1997, *Late Breaking Foreign Policy*, Washington, DC: United States Institute of Press

⁵⁰³ Entman, R.M, *Declaration of Independence, The Growth of Media Power after the Cold War*, in Nacos, B.L., Shapiro R.Y. and P. Isernia (eds), *Decisionmaking in a Glass House; Mass Media, Public Opinion and American and European Foreign Policy In The 21st Century*, 2000, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, INC. London, Boulder, New York, Oxford, p. 25-27

⁵⁰⁴ BBC, 2001, *BBC Program Makers, Guidelines for the General Election campaign*, www.bbc.co.uk/info/genelection in Brookes, R., Lewis, J. and K. Wahl-Jorgenson, 2004, *The Media Representation Of Public Opinion: British Television News Coverage Of 2001 General Election*, Media, Culture & Society, SAGE Publications London, Thousand Oaks and New Delhi, Vol. 26 (1):63-80

⁵⁰⁵ Kent, G., 2005, *Framing War And Genocide, British Policy and News Media Reaction to the War in Bosnia*, Hampton Press Communication Series: Political Communication, p. 182-7

- interviews with policy makers

All sources of evidence were reviewed and analyzed together, so that the findings were based on the convergence of information from different sources. A parallel comparison between the media coverage and the policy process had as a goal to provide the answers to three important questions:

- Did (and to what extent) a rise in attention by media on a certain subject, i.e. events in Kosovo and Darfur, precede a rise in attention by public officials to the same issues? It was analysed by counting the number of public statements/press-conferences/US Congress hearings and UK House of Commons sessions, dedicated to Kosovo and Darfur and its comparison with distribution of media items and also by interviews with political officials themselves, thus testing agenda-setting theory.
- Were (and to what extent) the frames used by media and policy prescription they represented accepted and followed by policy officials? It was investigated by the qualitative and quantitative analysis of media coverage and comparison of its results with the results of the qualitative analysis of public statements, thus testing framing theory.
- What were the most important characteristics of the political decision making process, like for example the existence of moments of policy uncertainty or dissensus? Did it correspond to the media coverage critical toward the political decisions and empathetic toward the victims of the conflict? It was researched by the analysis of the historical and political background of the conflict in question and the qualitative analyses of public statements, and its comparison with the results of the qualitative analysis of media coverage, testing in this way the CNN effect theory.

SECTION 1: THE KOSOVO CASE STUDY

The following chapters contain the results of the Kosovo case study. It has two basic components: quantitative and qualitative analysis of television archive material from CNNI and BBCW prior to the beginning of the NATO air strikes on FR Yugoslavia on March 23, 1999; and analysis of the political process, which includes both the historical and political background of this region and conflict - i.e. so called real-world indicators - and the time line of the process of decision-making through archive analysis of the relevant policy documentation collected from the same time period used for media coverage analysis.

CHAPTER 4: THE BACKGROUND TO THE KOSOVO CASE

This chapter presents the background of the Kosovo case: the history and main characteristics of the region, including its geo-strategic importance, the history of international policy toward Kosovo, and an overview of the situation in the relevant time period.

HISTORY

“The Yugoslav crisis began in Kosovo, and it will end in Kosovo”. This statement is something with which most of the people in the Balkans agree, a process which is coming to an end at the moment of the writing of this thesis. But the history of war and battles in Kosovo began long before the dissolution of Yugoslavia, and as many note “in Kosovo, history is not really about the past, but about the future.”⁵⁰⁶

Although it was not part of Serbia for several hundred years, before and during Ottoman period, Serbs often refer to Medieval Kosovo in general terms as the ‘cradle of the Serbs’⁵⁰⁷. One of the most important events was the great battle of Kosovo between the Ottoman Empire and the Serbs in 1389, the one mentioned by Serb nationalists centuries later and whose 600th anniversary created the opportunity for Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic to raise tensions in the already tense situation on Kosovo at that time. One of the legacies of this battle is that Serbs consider themselves as a ‘heavenly people’, since Lazar, the Serb leader who was killed in the battle, “was offered a choice between an earthly kingdom and a heavenly one and he chose the latter one”⁵⁰⁸. How essential Kosovo is thought for the Serbian national-religious mythology can be seen by their three-part theological parallel: the defeat of the Serbs in Kosovo in 1389 is compared to the crucifixion of Christ; the second phase, corresponding to Christ’s death and burial, is the withdrawal of the Serbian people from Kosovo in the Velika Seoba or Great Migration after the Austrian invasion in 1689; and the third phase, corresponding to the resurrection, is the reconquest of Kosovo by Serbian forces in 1913⁵⁰⁹.

⁵⁰⁶ Judah, T., 2000, *Kosovo; War And Revenge*, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, p. 2

⁵⁰⁷ Malcolm, N., 1998, *Kosovo: A Short History*, Papermac, p. 41

⁵⁰⁸ Ibid, p. 80

⁵⁰⁹ Ibid, p. 140

After the Great powers, Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy and Russia, forced Albania to give the Kosovo region to Serbia, there began a period of suppression of the Albanian language and the denial of their existence as a national minority, associated with a large-scale program of settling Slavs in the Albanian-inhabited areas⁵¹⁰. Five years later, in 1918, Kosovo was incorporated into the newly established Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, and then the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. At the beginning of WWII some Albanians in Kosovo who were fighting on the German side attacked Serb villages, “with the general aim to get rid of the colonist and take back the confiscated land”⁵¹¹. After the war, on September 3, 1945, the People’s Assembly of Serbia passed a law establishing the Autonomous Region of Kosovo-Metohija and declaring it as a constituent part of Serbia⁵¹², and as such, a part of Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The number of Serbs and Montenegrins in Kosovo remained relatively stable, moving between 200000 and 260000 in the post-war period, but what did change was their proportion of the population as whole, which dropped from a combined 27.5 per cent in 1948 to 14.9 per cent in 1981 and 10.9 in 1991⁵¹³. The main reason for that is the extremely high Albanian birth-rate, together with Serb emigration; in the 1991 census the Albanian proportion of the population was 82.2 per cent⁵¹⁴. But despite the relative size of the populations, Serbs accounted for 68 per cent of the administrative and leading positions and roughly 50 per cent of the workers; this ethnic imbalance made the 1950s and early 1960s the worst period of Tito’s rule from the Albanian point of view⁵¹⁵. Additionally, the autonomous status of Kosovo was reduced by the new Yugoslav constitution of 1963, which triggered the first massive demonstration for independence in 1968 organized by ethnic Albanians. The new Yugoslav constitution of 1974, which would remain in force until the final break-up of Yugoslavia, gave the autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina a status equivalent in most ways to that of the six republics themselves, with their own direct representation on the main federal Yugoslav bodies⁵¹⁶. But although its constitutional status was improved, huge social and economic problems in Kosovo, together with the unemployment level, the highest in the whole country, formed the basis on which both Serb and Albanian nationalism was growing. “The competing national myths – with the Serbs claiming Kosovo as the birthplace of medieval Serbia and the Albanians claiming they are descended from the ancient Illyrians – are trotted out by each group to bludgeon the other”⁵¹⁷. At that time, between 1981 and 1989, nearly six hundred thousand Kosovo Albanians, “half the adult population – were arrested, interrogated, reprimanded or interned”⁵¹⁸. Slobodan Milosevic came to power in 1987 and the situation in Kosovo culminated on March 23, 1989 when the provincial assembly of Kosovo, orchestrated by Serbian officials, adopted the constitutional amendments which ended Kosovo’s

⁵¹⁰ Ibid, p. 269

⁵¹¹ Ibid, p. 293

⁵¹² Malcolm, N., 1998, *Kosovo: A Short History*, Papermac, p. 316

⁵¹³ Judah, T., 2000, *Kosovo; War And Revenge*, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, p. 44

⁵¹⁴ Ibid.

⁵¹⁵ Malcolm, N., 1998, *Kosovo: A Short History*, Papermac, p. 323

⁵¹⁶ Ibid, p. 327

⁵¹⁷ Hedges, C., May/June 1999, *Kosovo's Next Masters?*, *Foreign Affairs*, p. 24

⁵¹⁸ Kent, G., 2005, *Framing War and Genocide, British Policy and News Media Reaction to the War in Bosnia*, Hampton Press Communication Series: Political Communication, p. 23

autonomy. Milosevic sent the army to occupy Kosovo, suspended Albanian language education and suppressed Albanian media.

According to Kent, the same impulse governed the need of Kosovars, Croats, Slovenians and Bosnians at that time: “to liberate themselves from the centralizing domination of Belgrade”⁵¹⁹. While the Serbs themselves accused Croatia and Slovenia of conspiring against them, and even claimed that “the physical, political, legal and cultural genocide of the Serbian population”⁵²⁰ was taking place in Kosovo, “the venal opportunism of the renamed communists under Milosevic” was actually “the primary necessary condition”⁵²¹ for the break-up of Yugoslavia and the wars that followed. “The resurgence of nationalism in Serbia, fomented and tapped by Belgrade’s political elite, triggered a wave of reactive nationalisms in the other non-Serb peoples of Yugoslavia”⁵²². The wars in Croatia and Bosnia did not make the situation in Kosovo any better, since it created a huge wave of “new colonists”; by the autumn of 1994 roughly 6000 Serb refugees from these countries had been sent to Kosovo by the Serbian authorities⁵²³, and this trend continued in 1995 after the Croatian army’s action against the Serb-held Krajina region. In that period, the late 80s and the beginning of the 90s, Kosovo got new political leadership; in December 1989, the Association of Writers was turned into a political movement, the Democratic League of Kosovo, under the leadership of Ibrahim Rugova. He was elected President of the Kosovo “Republic” at the assembly in 1992 and his policy of civilian resistance and nonviolence lasted for over a decade, despite the human rights abuses suffered by the Kosovo Albanians. Under Rugova’s leadership, the ethnic Albanians set up their own schools, clinics, and a shadow administration that levied taxes, drawing on the resources of a diaspora of more than 600,000 ethnic Albanians in Europe and some 300,000 in Canada and the United States⁵²⁴. But his policy collapsed as a victim of international indifference, which became obvious after the 1995 Dayton agreement was swiftly followed by the European Union’s recognition of Yugoslavia, even though the EU had earlier demanded that Yugoslavia first resolve the Kosovo issue. “Kosovo Albanians, with understandable rage, did not grasp why the Bosnian Serbs, responsible for some of the worst acts of genocide since World War II, were handed nearly half of Bosnia at Dayton. It shattered all hopes for peaceful change in Kosovo”⁵²⁵.

Two other factors also contributed to the weakening of Rugova’s position - political crisis in Albania and its descent into anarchy in the spring of 1997, and the development of new forms of direct actions: shooting and bomb attacks against Serb institutions and officials from the summer of 1996. By the summer of 1997 a spokesman for something calling

⁵¹⁹ Ibid.

⁵²⁰ Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences (SANU) Memorandum, published in *Vecernje Novosti*, October 24, 1986

⁵²¹ Kent, G., 2005, *Framing War and Genocide*, British Policy and News Media Reaction to the War in Bosnia, Hampton Press Communication Series: Political Communication, p. 13

⁵²² Kent summarized the arguments underpinning the work of Mark Almond, Ivo Banac, Christopher Bennett, Daniele Conversi, Chris Cviic, Donia and Fine, Paul Garde, James Gow, Marco Hoare, Slaven Letica, Noel Malcolm, Branka Magas, Mark Mazower, Sabrina Ramet, Mark Thompson and Ivan Vejvoda, in Ibid.

⁵²³ Malcolm, N., 1998, *Kosovo: A Short History*, Papermac, p. 352

⁵²⁴ Hedges, C., May/June 1999, *Kosovo's Next Masters?*, *Foreign Affairs*, p. 24

⁵²⁵ Ibid.

itself the 'Kosovo Liberation Army' was giving interviews in Switzerland⁵²⁶, and according to Tim Judah, it was actually the BBC, chosen because of its global reach, which was first informed about the KLA's intentions in January 1998⁵²⁷. Former BBC correspondent in Belgrade Paul Wood met three KLA representatives in Geneva. "Wood met the three in a café near the station in Geneva...They told Wood that the KLA was going to step up its attacks on the Serbs and indeed launch an armed insurrection. Wood did not file a story. 'What could I tell the BBC,' he says, 'that I met three Albanians in a café in Switzerland who told me they were about to start a war?'"⁵²⁸. The Serb military police counter-attacked with reprisals directed at villages which gave shelter to the KLA guerillas. In late February 1998, one such reprisal killed 80 civilians, in the Drenica region of central Kosovo. This massacre "sent shock-waves throughout Kosovo": it marked the absolute end of the campaign of non-violent resistance and the onset of mass armed struggle⁵²⁹.

During the year the KLA moved out and became stronger militarily; by July, they claimed control of about 40% of all of Kosovo. According to a US foreign policy expert, that changed the dynamic in two very different ways: the KLA became the political leadership of Kosovo, displacing Rugova, and there was a change in the attitude of the international community, particularly the Europeans, but also many in the United States, who believed that "the KLA are a bunch of thugs, and these thugs are now winning"⁵³⁰. All of a sudden, a policy designed "to oppose Milosevic creates a situation where the more we oppose Milosevic, the more these thugs will win—at what point are the KLA thugs the problem?"⁵³¹

INTERNATIONAL POLICY TOWARD KOSOVO

Although both Serbs and Albanians have a propensity to believe that Serbia and Kosovo are fantastically important, rich and strategic corners of Europe and the US, it can hardly be the case. The territory of Kosovo, an area of 10,887 square kilometers⁵³² in southern Europe, with Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia and Albania bordering it, does not possess anything of great interest for the Western powers. While it is true, for example, that a major European motorway and rail link does connect Croatia, Hungary, Greece and Bulgaria through Serbia and Kosovo, "the fact that this link was more or less closed to large scale international commercial traffic for much of the 1990s did not impoverish most of the rest of Europe or North America"⁵³³. The main significance of Kosovo's territory is that it is located in the vicinity of the EU and NATO member countries, which makes a possible spill-over of conflict more dangerous. In particular, the proximity of

⁵²⁶ Malcolm, N., 1998, Kosovo: A Short History, Papermac, p. 355

⁵²⁷ Judah, T., 2000, Kosovo; War And Revenge, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, p.135

⁵²⁸ Ibid.

⁵²⁹ Ignatieff, M., 2001, Virtual War; Kosovo And Beyond, Vintage, p. 13

⁵³⁰ Ivo Daalder, US foreign policy expert, former director for European Affairs at the National Security Council, interview for PBS Frontline, War in Europe, 2000

⁵³¹ Ivo Daalder, US foreign policy expert, former director for European Affairs at the National Security Council, interview for PBS Frontline, War in Europe, 2000

⁵³² Административно територијална подела Републике Србије на покрајине, округе, општине и Град Београд - Administarive-territorial division of Republic of Serbia on districts, municipalities and the City of Belgrade

⁵³³ Judah, T., 2000, Kosovo; War And Revenge, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, p. 224

Macedonia, and the history of national and ethnic rivalries in this region, whose very boundaries – and even title – are contested, is an often-cited reason for concern.

The Bush Administration, which appeared to be totally ignorant of the killings in Croatia and Bosnia, issued a famous Christmas warning to Milosevic in December 1992, announcing that the United States was prepared to take unilateral military action if he engaged in human rights abuses and military action against Kosovo Albanians. But US officials underlined that this statement first, clearly confirmed the status of Kosovo as a part of Serbia⁵³⁴, and second, that it was “not very precise”, in the sense that “it needed to be multilateral to be meaningful”⁵³⁵. This warning is considered to be the basis for six years of US policy: “an unspecified threat, of unspecified certainty, to prevent unspecified acts of escalation by Serbia”⁵³⁶. Although it was reiterated by the Clinton administration shortly after it was first issued, by 1996-1997 a realization emerged within the administration that the Christmas warning, originally issued as solely an American commitment, “could no longer be implemented”⁵³⁷.

In February 1998, Robert Gelbard, the US special envoy to the region, visited Pristina and Belgrade. He criticized the violence committed by the Serbian police, but also attacked the KLA. “We condemn very strongly terrorist actions in Kosovo. The UCK is, without any questions, a terrorist group.”⁵³⁸ He stated very clearly both publicly and to Milosevic personally that the determining factor is how he would deal with the Kosovo Liberation Army. “You can deal with this terrorist group in a way that is consistent with dealing with terrorism, but don’t go after the population,” he said, “find a way to resolve the Kosovo problem politically—give the Kosovars more political rights, greater autonomy, and more rights over their own destiny. Then the United States and its allies will continue to engage Serbia, and will allow Serbia to emerge as part of the community of nations”⁵³⁹. It seemed to be a turning-point. “If the KLA were a terrorist group and the representative of the most powerful nation on earth said so, then there could be no objection to the Serbian police moving in to finish it off. No doubt unintentionally, the US had appeared to give Milosevic a green light to act.”⁵⁴⁰

Another disappointment for Kosovo Albanians was the meeting of Ibrahim Rugova with the US President Bill Clinton in Washington on May 27, 1998, when Rugova warned that without direct American intervention, Kosovo was headed for all-out war. “‘We will not allow another Bosnia to happen in Kosovo,’ a senior Administration official quoted Mr.

⁵³⁴ Richard Holbrooke, US diplomat, interview for PBS Frontline, War in Europe, 2000

⁵³⁵ Samuel Berger, former US National Security Advisor, interview for PBS Frontline, War in Europe, 2000

⁵³⁶ Gellman, B., April 18, 1999, The Path to Crisis: How the United States and Its Allies Went to War, Washington Post, A Section; Pg. A01

⁵³⁷ Ivo Daalder, US foreign policy expert, former director for European Affairs at the National Security Council, interview for PBS Frontline, War in Europe, 2000

⁵³⁸ Agence France Presse, 23 February 1998

⁵³⁹ Ivo Daalder, US foreign policy expert, former director for European Affairs at the National Security Council, interview for PBS Frontline, War in Europe, 2000

⁵⁴⁰ Judah, T., 2000, Kosovo; War And Revenge, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, p. 138

Clinton as telling Mr. Rugova. The assurances were largely theoretical. Nothing concrete was promised.”⁵⁴¹

One US official recalls that the discussion in Washington was going nowhere in the spring of 1998. “Some White House officials were wary of American involvement in Kosovo and top Pentagon officials had become weary of the Balkans, where nothing was ever solved, and we might get sucked into additional troop deployments.”⁵⁴² Although US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright persisted in demanding a discussion on the use of force, in the early part of 1998 the White House was preoccupied with very different things: the Monica Lewinsky story had just broken. “There’s the notion that, at this point, if you engage in another foreign adventure, it would have been portrayed that you start using force in a “Wag-the-Dog” scenario”⁵⁴³... There’s a strong belief in the White House, and in other parts of the administration, that forceful rhetoric—threats without really having a policy behind it, such as those coming from the State Department—was the wrong kind of policy at the wrong time”⁵⁴⁴.

In June 1998 NATO defense ministers met in Brussels and ordered the organization’s military chiefs to prepare a range of options, should the use of force ever become necessary. At the same time the EU and other Western countries banned all new foreign investment in Serbia and began proceedings to ban Yugoslav airlines from flying to their countries⁵⁴⁵. On June 12, the Contact Group, the organization consisting of the US, UK, Germany, Russia, Italy and France, called for an immediate ceasefire and the “withdrawal of security units used for civilian repression” from the province and demanded that the Kosovo Albanian leadership “make clear its rejection of violence and acts of terrorism”⁵⁴⁶. Some US allies, notably the UK Prime Minister Tony Blair, concluded by the early part of the summer, that no solution to this problem could ever happen without military force and that, at some point, the use of force would have to include the use of ground troops; from about July, 1998, and onwards, “that was the leitmotif of British policy”⁵⁴⁷. But, a signal was sent from the United States at that time that “there is no way we are ever going to consider any deployment of ground troops, NATO or US, in this situation”⁵⁴⁸.

On September 2, US President Bill Clinton and Russian President Boris Yeltsin agreed on a statement for an end to violence in Kosovo and for negotiations. Eight days later, Javier Solana, NATO’s secretary-general, announced that the organization had completed

⁵⁴¹ Sciolino, E. and E. Bronner, April 18, 1999, Crisis in The Balkans: The Road to War - A special report; How a President, Distracted by Scandal, Entered Balkan War, The New York Times, Section 1; Page 1; Column 2

⁵⁴² Rubin, J., September 30, 2000, A Very Personal War, Financial Times, London, p. 9

⁵⁴³ Wag the Dog is a 1997 film about a Washington spin doctor who distracts the electorate from a presidential sex scandal by hiring a Hollywood producer to construct a fake war.

⁵⁴⁴ Ivo Daalder, US foreign policy expert, former director for European Affairs at the National Security Council, interview for PBS Frontline, War in Europe, 2000

⁵⁴⁵ Judah, T., 2000, Kosovo; War And Revenge, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, p. 165

⁵⁴⁶ Contact Group and the foreign ministers of Canada and Japan, Statement, London, 12 June 1998, in Marc Weller, The Crisis in Kosovo 1989-1999: From the Dissolution of Yugoslavia to Rambouillet and the Outbreak of Hostilities vol. 1, Cambridge, 1999, p. 236

⁵⁴⁷ Ivo Daalder, US foreign policy expert, former director for European Affairs at the National Security Council, interview for PBS Frontline, War in Europe, 2000

⁵⁴⁸ Ibid

its plans for military intervention should it become necessary⁵⁴⁹. On September 23, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1199, demanding a ceasefire in Kosovo and the start of real dialogue.

But then, on September 28, the bodies of 16 Albanian civilians killed by security forces were found in Gornje Obrinje, near Glogovac. The massacre made the front page of the New York Times on September 30, and according to witnesses, the newspapers held the central position in the White House situation room, at the National Security Council's meeting that day. "The Times sat in the middle of the oak table in the middle of the situation room, like a silent witness of what was going on... The terrible photograph of that dead person in that village was kind of a reminder, a reality, and it had a very real effect on the dialogue."⁵⁵⁰ There was a decision then to press ahead for NATO action, to try and sidestep the British, French, German and Russian view that one needed a Security Council mandate⁵⁵¹. Richard Holbrooke, who got an order to meet with Milosevic, explains that in the immediate pre-Congress election period, and given the mood of Congress and the situation in Washington at that time, it was clear that Congress would not support a deployment of NATO ground forces similar to the one in Bosnia, which both Secretary Albright and he had argued was essential to keep any cease-fire viable. So their negotiating instructions were to threaten the use of force, but to introduce only unarmed civilians into the Kosovo area⁵⁵². October 13 brought the first "activation order" in NATO's history, a formal agreement to authorize the bombing of Yugoslavia, although only the Phase I of the three-phase air campaign, amounting to about 50 air defense targets, was approved⁵⁵³. Thanks to this threat and after the numerous meetings in Belgrade and European capitals, the agreement on the partial withdrawal of the Serbian police and military formations and a ceasefire in Kosovo was made, together with the deployment of OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission, led by the US diplomat William Walker, with a mandate to observe and report on the possible violations of the agreement. Refugees returned back to their homes, and humanitarian catastrophe was temporarily prevented, but some international officials, aware of the fact that spring brings new chances for the fighting to continue, knew that the problem was not solved and that they were "just kicking the can down the road"⁵⁵⁴. "At the back of our minds was the thought and, in a sense, the obligation, to use force if we had to"⁵⁵⁵.

KOSOVO JANUARY-MARCH 1999

"Spring has come early"⁵⁵⁶ in Kosovo. Serb forces unleashed an assault on Albanian rebels in southern Kosovo on January 15, reportedly killing at least 15 KLA members⁵⁵⁷.

⁵⁴⁹ Judah, T., 2000, *Kosovo; War And Revenge*, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, p. 177-178

⁵⁵⁰ Richard Holbrooke, US diplomat, interview for PBS Frontline, War in Europe, 2000

⁵⁵¹ Judah, T., 2000, *Kosovo; War And Revenge*, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, p. 181

⁵⁵² Richard Holbrooke, US diplomat, interview for PBS Frontline, War in Europe, 2000

⁵⁵³ Gellman, B., April 18, 1999, *The Path to Crisis: How the United States and Its Allies Went to War*, Washington Post, A Section; Pg. A01

⁵⁵⁴ Madeleine Albright quoted in Rubin, J., September 30, 2000, *A Very Personal War*, Financial Times, London, p. 9

⁵⁵⁵ Tony Blair, former UK Prime Minister, interview for PBS Frontline, War in Europe, 2000

⁵⁵⁶ US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, quoted in *Behind the Kosovo crisis*, Allan Little, BBC News, 12 March, 2000, available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/674056.stm>

Fighting continued for the whole day and by nightfall, when it became too dangerous to remain, members of the Kosovo Verification Mission had found only one dead villager and several wounded⁵⁵⁸. But the next morning, William Walker, Head of KVM, and his colleagues, accompanied by the group of journalists, returned to Racak and found the bodies of 45 ethnic Albanians, mostly men between the ages of 18 and 65, shot through the head or neck and laid out in a ditch above the village⁵⁵⁹. They were not in uniform, and Helena Ranta, a Finnish forensic doctor, later reported that there were no indications “of the people being other than unarmed civilians”⁵⁶⁰. “It is obvious people with no value for human life, have done this”, Walker said⁵⁶¹ and immediately accused Serbian forces of responsibility for this massacre.

The Racak massacre had a galvanizing effect. It was significant for Albanians, “both in terms of fear and in terms of militant determination to resist”⁵⁶², but even more for the International Community, because “it was an indication that Milosevic was prepared to use methods of ethnic cleansing... it was a pivotal moment”⁵⁶³. On the very day of January 15 a meeting of principals was held in the White House. Despite the reports of non-compliance with the October agreement, US officials concluded that they simply “cannot stomach any decisive action”⁵⁶⁴, and adopted a policy paper called October plus, which strengthened the original agreement a little bit, re-invigorated the shuttle diplomacy between the Albanians and Milosevic to get a political agreement, and sent “some bodyguards to some of the OSCE monitors”⁵⁶⁵. But on January 19, the US administration said that it “could no longer accept simply going back to the status quo”⁵⁶⁶; the Racak event “energized all of us to say that this requires a larger plan, and a steady application of military planning for an air campaign”⁵⁶⁷.

At the time, the Europeans opposed air strikes “because the KLA was often responsible for breaking the October ceasefire and because there was no accompanying political strategy”, so Albright’s team decided to recommend that American soldiers would join a NATO peacekeeping force if an agreement was reached⁵⁶⁸. Within a few days, Clinton approved the new strategy, but he did not announce it publicly until February 13, which is one day after the Senate had voted and had failed to remove him from the office. “Once the Lewinsky scandal ended, once the final political step in that torturous year-long

⁵⁵⁷ The Associated Press, January 15, 1999

⁵⁵⁸ Gellman, B., April 18, 1999, *The Path to Crisis: How the United States and Its Allies Went to War*, Washington Post, A Section; Pg. A01

⁵⁵⁹ At least 22 Kosovo Albanians found dead, Reuters, January 16, 1999

⁵⁶⁰ Gellman, B., April 18, 1999, *The Path to Crisis: How the United States and Its Allies Went to War*, Washington Post, A Section; Pg. A01

⁵⁶¹ Horror on the hillside in Kosovo, Juliet Terzieff, *The Times of London*, January 17, 1999

⁵⁶² Strobe Talbott, *NATO’s War Against Milosevic: The Untold Story*, Newsnight Special, BBC 2, 20 August 1999

⁵⁶³ Tony Blair, interview for PBS Frontline, *War in Europe*, 2000

⁵⁶⁴ Ivo Daadler, interview for PBS Frontline, *War in Europe*, 2000

⁵⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶⁶ Samuel Berger, interview for PBS Frontline, *War in Europe*, 2000

⁵⁶⁷ Madeleine Albright, interview for PBS Frontline, *War in Europe*, 2000

⁵⁶⁸ Rubin, J., September 30, 2000, *A Very Personal War*, Financial Times, London, p. 9

process is over, the president feels able to commit to the deployment of ground troops. He wasn't able to commit beforehand."⁵⁶⁹

On January 21, President Clinton discussed the situation on the phone with the UK Prime Minister Tony Blair, and two leaders agreed to fashion a diplomatic solution that included ground troops as peacekeepers in Kosovo instead of an immediate bombing campaign in reprisal for Racak⁵⁷⁰. On January 28, NATO warned that "it stands ready to act and rules out no option to ensure full respect by both sides in Kosovo for the requirements of the international community"⁵⁷¹. Two days later, after Kofi Annan, the United Nations Secretary General, said that the threat of force was justified to get the Serbs to the bargaining table, the allies decided they had justification enough under international law to authorize air strikes against Yugoslavia if it did not agree to negotiate a settlement⁵⁷².

Negotiations between Serbia and the Kosovo Albanians began on February 6, in Rambouillet castle near Paris, under the chairmanship of the UK and French Foreign Ministers, Robin Cook and Hubert Vedrine. The peace plan reaffirmed the sovereignty and territorial integrity of FR Yugoslavia with a high level of autonomy for Kosovo. It proposed that three years after its entry into force, "an international meeting shall be convened to determine a mechanism for a final settlement for Kosovo, on the basis of the will of the people, opinions of relevant authorities, each Party's efforts regarding the implementation of this Agreement, and the Helsinki Final Act"⁵⁷³. Over the next six months Serb and Yugoslav forces would have been withdrawn, except lightly armed border troops and 2500 police, and the KLA disarmed. And, according to the Annex B, it predicted NATO peace implementation forces of 30000 soldiers who "shall enjoy, together with their vehicles, vessels, aircraft, and equipment, free and unrestricted passage and unimpeded access throughout the FRY including associated airspace and territorial waters" – an article that according to the Serb side and some authors⁵⁷⁴ would be unacceptable to any sovereign country. But, problems appeared at the very beginning of the negotiations – Milosevic did not come, sending Serbian President Milan Milutinovic in his stead and the Kosovo Albanians were disparate group, "18 different people who spent most of their time arguing with each other"⁵⁷⁵. After no deal was reached until February 23, even with a three-day extension agreed on February 20, the delegations went home, with the second round of negotiations scheduled for March 15 in Paris. The Kosovo Albanians managed to get support for the peace plan from their people

⁵⁶⁹ Ivo Daadler, interview for PBS Frontline, War in Europe, 2000

⁵⁷⁰ Sciolino, E. and E. Bronner, April 18, 1999, Crisis in The Balkans: The Road to War - A special report; How a President, Distracted by Scandal, Entered Balkan War, The New York Times, Section 1; Page 1; Column 2

⁵⁷¹ Letter dated 30 January 1999 from the Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization addressed to the President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

⁵⁷² Sciolino, E. and E. Bronner, April 18, 1999, Crisis in The Balkans: The Road to War - A special report; How a President, Distracted by Scandal, Entered Balkan War, The New York Times, Section 1; Page 1; Column 2

⁵⁷³ Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo, US Institute of Peace

⁵⁷⁴ Kissinger, H., 13 November, 1999, The Guardian, in Bellamy, Alex J., April 2001, Reconsidering Rambouillet, Contemporary Security Policy, Vol.22, No.1, Frank Cass, London, pp.31–56; Chomsky, N., 1999, The New Military Humanism: Lessons from Kosovo, Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press

⁵⁷⁵ Richard Holbrooke, US diplomat, interview for PBS Frontline, War in Europe, 2000

back home, accepted the agreement in its entirety and officially signed it on March 18, giving up temporarily their dreams of independence. The US conducted one last diplomatic effort, sending Richard Holbrooke for talks to Belgrade on March 22-23, but he was not able to persuade Milosevic to accept the agreement. On March 24, NATO launched air-strikes against Yugoslavia.

NATO military officials said that already during the Rambouillet talks, it became apparent that they “were going to end up relying on the military means to coerce Milosevic into an agreement”⁵⁷⁶. Beside that, the US State Department official James Rubin admitted afterwards that the real US strategy “was more pragmatic than was publicly understood at the time”⁵⁷⁷, i.e. that they didn’t actually expect to get agreement from the Serbs and the Albanians⁵⁷⁸, but to “unite the Europeans behind air strikes by clearly defining the aggressor and the victim”⁵⁷⁹. Still, Rambouillet remains “the great ‘what if...?’ of modern Balkan history”⁵⁸⁰.

The table below presents the most important dates in Kosovo’s recent history with the focus on the period between January 15 and March 23, 1999, which will be analyzed in the following chapters.

Table 1: KOSOVO HISTORY

| | |
|-------------------------|--|
| March 1989 | Kosovo stripped of autonomy by the constitutional amendments |
| December 1992 | “Christmas warning” to Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic, announcing that the United States is prepared to take unilateral military action if he engages in human rights abuses and military action against Kosovo Albanians |
| Summer 1996-Summer 1997 | Formation of the Kosovo Liberation Army and first armed attacks against Serb institutions and officials |
| September 1998 | Massacre of 18 Albanian civilians in Gornje Obrinje |
| October 1998 | The first “activation order” in NATO’s history – a formal agreement to authorize the bombing of Yugoslavia – is made |
| October 1998 | The agreement on the partial withdrawal of the Serbian police and military formations and a ceasefire in Kosovo is made, together with the deployment of OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission |

⁵⁷⁶ Gen. Wesley Clark, former NATO Supreme Allied Commander, interview for PBS Frontline, War in Europe, 2000

⁵⁷⁷ Rubin, J., September 30, 2000, A Very Personal War, Financial Times, London, p. 9

⁵⁷⁸ James Rubin, Interview on the PBS Charlie Rose Show, April 2000

⁵⁷⁹ Rubin, J., September 30, 2000, A Very Personal War, Financial Times, London, p. 9

⁵⁸⁰ Judah, T., 2000, Kosovo; War And Revenge, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, p. 220

| | |
|---------------------|--|
| January 15, 1999 | Meeting of principals in the White House - a policy paper called October plus is adopted |
| January 15, 1999 | Massacre of 45 ethnic Albanians in Racak |
| January 16, 1999 | Discovery of the massacre victims' bodies by the Head of OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission William Walker and journalists |
| January 19-21, 1999 | New US-UK strategy, including the organization of direct peace talks and a threat with NATO air strikes, is adopted |
| February 6, 1999 | Beginning of the negotiations between Serbia and Kosovo Albanians at the Rambouillet castle near Paris |
| February 23, 1999 | First round of negotiations ends without results |
| March 15, 1999 | Second round of negotiations begins in Paris |
| March 18, 1999 | Kosovo Albanians sign the February 23 peace agreement, accepting it in its entirety, including demilitarization provisions |
| March 22-23, 1999 | Last diplomatic mission conducted by the US Ambassador Richard Holbrooke in Belgrade fails |
| March 24, 1999 | NATO campaign in FR Yugoslavia begins |

CHAPTER 5: KOSOVO MEDIA COVERAGE

This chapter shows the results of both quantitative and qualitative content analysis of the television archive material prior to political decisions regarding Kosovo in 1999, in order to identify the intensity and time devoted to this region/conflict/political process and to detect frames used in the coverage. The archive material of CNN International and BBC World was chosen as the main sources for the media analysis while their coverage was compared with the articles about Kosovo published in the New York Times and with transcripts of stories from Reuters TV agency (material used by both TV channels as Reuters' subscribers).

The media coverage was analyzed for the time period of more than two months before the beginning of NATO air strikes on FR Yugoslavia on night March 23/24: from January 15, the date of Racak massacre – that will prove to be a galvanizing event in the Kosovo case – until March 23. Extensive qualitative analysis is made for three turning points within this time period: the aftermath of the Racak massacre (January 15-18), the end of the first round of the Rambouillet negotiations (February 19-23), and the end of the Paris negotiations and events before the very beginning of NATO air strikes (March 15-23).

QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS

Transcripts of all stories about Kosovo broadcast on BBC World and CNN International in the period between January 15 and March 23 show that CNNI broadcasted in total 290 items or 4.3 items per day in this period. Additional information available from transcripts is the total duration of stories – 594.85 minutes for the whole period, or on average 8.8 minutes per day. However this gives only the duration of the *stories produced* on this subject, not the total duration of *broadcast reports* about Kosovo, since there is no record how many times certain stories were repeated in the program, which is the usual practice of 24-hours news channels. From that total number of stories, 147 stories or 50.6%, were broadcast in the key periods where the video material will be qualitatively analyzed: after the Racak massacre (6.2 %); at the end of the first round of the Ramouillet talks (14.4 %); and in the days before the beginning of NATO air campaign (30%) (Figures 1, 2, 3).

January 22 also produced above the average number of items per day, 6 items, when the Contact Group at Political Director level met in London to discuss Kosovo, but more attention was given to the Yugoslav Government's announcement that it was going to freeze a decision to expel the US official William Walker, Head of the OSCE Observation Mission, after the talks the previous day between Slodoban Milosevic and Knut Vollebaek, OSCE Chairman-in-Office and Norwegian FM. CNNI reported also with 6 items on January 30 about the UK Foreign Secretary Robin Cook's mission to Belgrade and Skopje to persuade both Milosevic and Kosovo Albanians to get involved in the peace talks, and about the NATO warning to both sides, underlining that NATO Secretary General Javier Solana from that moment had the power to authorize Cruise Missile attacks on Yugoslavia at any time.

BBCW broadcast in total 87 items or 1.29 items per day in the period between January 15 and March 23, 1999. The total duration of the produced stories is 163.05 minutes, or 2.4

minutes par day. Items were less concentrated in the key periods than on CNNI - 28 items, or 32.1%: January 15-18 – 9.2%; February 19-23 – 6.9%; and March 15-23 – 16%. (Figure 1, 2, 3).

January 20 also had more than the average number of items per day, 4 items, announcing NATO readiness to intervene in the crisis in Kosovo (multi national naval forces were being moved closer to the Yugoslav coast) and giving attention to the mission of two senior NATO generals, General Wesley Clark and General Klaus Naumann to try to persuade Slobodan Milosevic to meet his obligations in Kosovo; and on March 13, 5 items, on the EU’s demand for the rapid progress towards a deal in the Kosovo peace talks, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov’s diplomatic mission in Belgrade and the explosions in Mitrovica and Podujevo markets where 6 persons were killed and dozens injured. BBCW did not give a lot of attention to the very beginning of the Rambouillet peace talks, there were no items about Kosovo in the period February 4-9 (talks began on February 6), the first item about the ongoing talks was broadcast on February 9, reporting that progress is made, “albeit slow and painful”, towards a political settlement.

Figure 1: KOSOVO MEDIA COVERAGE - JANUARY 1999




Figure 2: KOSOVO MEDIA COVERAGE - FEBRUARY 1999





Figure 3: KOSOVO MEDIA COVERAGE - MARCH 1999



It is hard to give a final assessment about the level of attention given to Kosovo in the coverage of CNNI and BBCW, as there is no commonly agreed basis for a comparison which would establish its significance. At the beginning of the investigated period their coverage could not be considered as very extensive if, for example, one takes into account that CNN ran 84 news items, or in average 10.5 per day, mentioning Bosnia and Herzegovina in the eight-days period after the massacre in Srebrenica on July 11-18, 1995⁵⁸¹, compared with the total of 36 items, or 4.5 items per day, aired by CNNI and 17 items, or 2 items per day, aired by BBCW in the period of the same length after the Racak massacre. This conclusion is reinforced by the comparison with CNN coverage of the market place bombing in Sarajevo on February 5 1994, when this channel broadcast 132 items in 5 days, or on average 36.4 items per day, after the massacre of 68 civilians in Bosnia's capital⁵⁸², while in the period of the same length after the Racak massacre it had 22 stories, or 4.4 items per day, and BBCW only 10 (2 per day). But if the coverage of the whole period is compared with the average of 1.9 items per day on CNN about Rwanda genocide in the period of its escalation, April 6-21, 1994⁵⁸³, one can say that Kosovo was considered as rather an important topic on these channels. It is interesting to note that at one point during this period, UNHCR complained that "because of the high

⁵⁸¹ Robinson, P., 2002, *The CNN Effect: The myth of news, foreign policy, and intervention*, London: Routledge, p. 78

⁵⁸² Ibid, p. 90

⁵⁸³ Ibid, p. 110

profile of Kosovo on the international scene” this organization found itself “devoting human and financial resources out of proportion to what it is able to do elsewhere in the world” and that they were, with regard to Kosovo, faced with the challenge of “handling the visibility (CNN) factor”, i.e. balancing the needs of, and their attention to, “populations who are not of interest to the world media with those who are”⁵⁸⁴. The intensity of coverage was different on the two channels, but the distribution of stories of both CNN International and BBC World follows the similar pattern, especially in the key periods: aftermath of the Racak massacre, the end of Rambouillet negotiations and a pre-intervention week. Distribution of stories is a significant indicator of their possible role as agenda-setters and this will be investigated in more detail later.

At this point, the NYT articles and Reuters TV stories were used to check the distribution of news stories and detect possible moments of media silence on BBCW and CNNI. The selection of NYT articles from Lexix-Nexix was made on the basis that each had Kosovo as its main theme, i.e. ignoring those in which it was mentioned only in passing or only in some other context, while for the Reuters TV stories, all their transcripts mentioning Kosovo were used. It appeared that both NYT and Reuters followed the same path of ups and downs of media attention – the biggest number of stories was again published and produced in the last days of Rambouillet negotiations and Paris talks, with NYT having a special news sections titled “Deadline in the Balkans” for the first time period, and “Conflict in the Balkans” for the second. At the same time, it seems that they paid greater attention to the Racak massacre (or its consequences) a bit later than BBCW and CNNI: NYT had the biggest number of articles about Kosovo that month on January 20, and Reuters TV on January 21, although this agency was actually the main provider of the pictures from the scene of the massacre itself since neither of two international channels had a camera crew in Kosovo at that time. But in general, the fact that the distribution on news stories was almost equal indicates that:

- there was no event or issue about Kosovo in this time period that CNNI and BBCW deliberately decided to ignore; and
- the basis for the selection of three time periods for the qualitative analysis in this research was the right one.

Additional information available from the transcripts is the number of times various categories of sources are used and the type of knowledge they provided. Sources were divided into four different categories. First category includes US, UK and NATO officials, as the conductors of the air campaign. Other international officials of the UN, UNHCR, OSCE, EU, different international NGOs and independent experts, all except Russians, are in the second category. Serb and Yugoslav sources, together with Russian as their main supporters, are included in the third category; while Albanian sources form the fourth category.


In the BBCW coverage, the first category of sources absolutely dominate; they represent 46.1% of all sources used, from which US officials lead with 22.7 %. Sources were used as follows (Figure 4):

⁵⁸⁴ Karen Koning Abuzayd, Regional Representative United Nations High Commissioner For Refugees, Before The US House Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on International Operations, March 9, 1999

US/UK/NATO: 46.1%

International officials (UN, UNHCR, OSCE, EU, ICTY...): 26 %
Serb/Yugoslav (11.2 %) + Russian (1.7 %): 12.9 %
Albanian: 15.2 %

Figure 4: BBCW SOURCES IN KOSOVO COVERAGE




In the coverage of CNNI, the domination of the first category of sources is even more obvious, they represent almost half of all sources used – 49.3%, with US officials, soldiers on the ground and political experts accounting for 38.2 %. Other international sources from the second category are rarely used, with the exception of the OSCE, i.e. the head of its observation mission in Kosovo, US national William Walker. Sources were used as following (Figure 5):

US/UK/NATO: 49.3%,

International officials (UN, UNHCR, OSCE, EU, ICTY...): 17.8 %
Serb/Yugoslav (12.5 %) + Russian (2.7 %): 15.2 %
Albanian: 17.7 %

Figure 5: CNNI SOURCES IN KOSOVO COVERAGE



Transcripts of all news items enable additional analysis of sources – about the type of knowledge they provide. To make this analysis reliable, a clear line had to be drawn among the categories of statement described in the methodology chapter – factual, explanatory, descriptive, evaluative and recommendations – and especially between factual and descriptive, which contain many similar points. Factual statements were those that answer only basic questions like who, what, when and where, while descriptive statements actually describe situations with more attributes. For example, statements like “no one remained alive in the village”, “50000 people left their homes” and “funeral is going to take place tomorrow” are merely factual, while “talks are complex and difficult”, “meeting with Milosevic was blunt direct and forceful” and “it’s a life and death issue for them” are clearly descriptive. Sometimes, the differences were even smaller: for example the statement “we are asked to capitulate in Paris” became descriptive because the verb “capitulate” was used instead of “sign” or “accept the agreement” – it describes the situation as “capitulation”. Statements like “life is hard, children are afraid” were also included in the descriptive category – although it does not include many attributes, it is more than a factual statement, while “boys and men are in forest” would be descriptive if it described the circumstances in which they left homes, but in this way it is only factual. Recommendations and evaluative and explanatory statements were less difficult to categorize. Evaluative statements could be considered as a sub-group of the descriptive statements, but with one important distinction: they were not just giving more details and descriptions of the issue or event; they assessed clearly whether the issue or event described is positive or negative. There were not many evaluative statements and these were assertions like “this is unspeakable atrocity” and “who can kill children has no religion” (sic). Recommendations were statements like “get serious”, “it is time to start

talk and do serious business” and “more responsibility should be shifted to Europeans”; while examples of explanatory statements are “who ever would sign that agreement cannot go back to Serbia” and “the reason of Serb attack is to weaken KLA and to disperse population” (sic).

In the BBCW coverage, US officials had the biggest percentage of descriptive statements, especially during the phase of peace negotiations; it was their definition of the progress or lack of it, which was mostly used. NATO and UK officials were mostly responsible for recommendations, advising all sides, especially Serbs, to comply with the requests of the International Community. Statements from Albanian sources, i.e. local people and refugees on the ground, were mostly used to provide factual knowledge, especially about the ongoing events and situation in Kosovo, while OSCE, i.e. its observation mission in Kosovo, has given evaluative judgments, mostly about the massacre in Racak.

Table 2: BBCW SOURCES – CATEGORIES OF STATEMENT

| SOURCES ⁵⁸⁵ | CATEGORIES OF STATEMENT | | | | | |
|------------------------|-------------------------|-------------|-------------|------------|-----------------|-------|
| | Factual | Descriptive | Explanatory | Evaluative | Recommendations | Total |
| US officials | 3.7% | 55.5% | / | 14.8% | 26% | 100% |
| UK officials | / | 52% | / | 8.3% | 39.7% | 100% |
| NATO officials | 18.7% | 50% | / | / | 31.3% | 100% |
| Albanians | 38.8% | 22.2% | / | 22.2% | 16.8% | 100% |
| OSCE officials | 33.3% | 33.3% | / | 26.6% | 6.8% | 100% |
| NGO/experts | / | / | 100% | / | / | 100% |

In the CNNI coverage, the situation is very similar. Compared to other sources, the “voice of the US/UK/NATO alliance” had the biggest percentage of recommendations for expected behavior, especially the US officials in this case, while facts from the ground were collected from local Albanian people. But this network has used Serb/Yugoslav sources to get more descriptive and even explanatory knowledge, taking interviews with local political experts, opposition leaders and people on the streets.

Table 3: CNNI SOURCES – CATEGORIES OF STATEMENT

| SOURCES ⁵⁸⁶ | CATEGORIES OF STATEMENT | | | | | |
|------------------------|-------------------------|-------------|-------------|------------|-----------------|-------|
| | Factual | Descriptive | Explanatory | Evaluative | Recommendations | Total |
| US officials | 6.3% | 65.8% | 2.5% | 2.5% | 22.9% | 100% |
| UK officials | 17.3% | 52% | 4.7% | 5% | 21% | 100% |

⁵⁸⁵ Only sources with significant percentages of statements from different categories are presented

⁵⁸⁶ Only sources with significant percentages of statements from different categories are presented

| | | | | | | |
|----------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|------|
| NATO officials | 20.6% | 55% | / | 3.2% | 21.2% | 100% |
| Albanians | 25% | 50% | 4.5% | 6.8% | 14.7% | 100% |
| OSCE officials | 20% | 51% | 4.4% | 15.5% | 9.1% | 100% |
| Yugoslav/Serb | / | 70.5% | 13.2% | 9.8% | 6.5% | 100% |

To check the consistency of my coding practice over time and reliability of findings, I conducted the analysis of the type of knowledge the sources provide twice, with a lapse of time in between. From 501 investigated statements (378 in CNNI stories and 123 in BBCW stories), I got the same results for 413 statements, or for 82.4% of the total number of statements; results within the margin of error, i.e. differences of less than 18% will not be used. Most of the inconsistencies in the results derived from the similarities between factual and descriptive statements, and in some cases between descriptive ad explanatory statements, but it did not have a major impact on the division among categories: after second analysis Albanian sources remained the ones that provided a majority of factual knowledge, while US officials (and Serb/Yugoslav sources in the case of CNNI) were still the main sources for descriptive statements.

The centralization of news gathering at institutions and the tendency of reporters to grant more credibility to official sources have been recognized a long time ago. Several studies came to the same conclusion: that the routine activity of news production is heavily dependent upon and directed toward official and accredited sources and their representatives⁵⁸⁷. More than 30 years ago, an analysis of the news content of two of the most influential US newspapers, the New York Times and the Washington Post, showed that “government officials, domestic or foreign, were the sources of nearly three-quarters of all hard news”, while US officials and agencies made 46.5 %⁵⁸⁸. Nearly a quarter-century later, a similar study of six daily newspapers, and another one on television news, confirmed that proportions were still about the same⁵⁸⁹. The results of the CNNI and BBCW transcript analysis confirm the thesis that journalists tend to rely heavily on official sources, a practice that Entman explains by “the ease of regular access to officials, the dependable supply of news the officials provide, the need to cultivate such sources over time, usefulness of citing legitimate, authoritative sources, and even the motivation of journalists to help audience predict future events”⁵⁹⁰. Probably the most precise definition of this relationship is Gans’s comparison with a dance: “although it

⁵⁸⁷ Van Ginneken, J., 1998, *Global News: A Critical Introduction*, SAGE Publications, London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi

⁵⁸⁸ Segal, L.V., 1973, *Reporters and Officials: The Organization and Politics of News Reporting*, Lexington, MA: Heath, in Bennett, Lance W., 2005, *News; The Politics of Illusion*, Pearson Longman, p.116

⁵⁸⁹ Brown, J.D et al., 1987, Invisible power: Newspaper news sources and the limits of diversity, *Journalism Quarterly*, 64, p 45-54; Whitney D.C et al., 1989, Geographic and sources biases in network TV news, *Journal of Broadcasting*, 33, p. 159-14

⁵⁹⁰ Entman, R.M., 2004, *Projections of Power: Framing News, Public Opinion, and US Foreign Policy*, Chicago: Chicago University Press, p. 88-92

takes two to tango, either sources or journalists can lead, but more often than not, sources do the leading ...”⁵⁹¹ Since the focus of this research is on the possible effects of media coverage, and not on the production process of news, of which the relationship with sources is a part, I will not go further into the analysis of the potential consequences of this tendency at this point. The selection of sources could be an indication of the framing process that is important for this study, and the majority role of official sources may imply that their interpretation of events was mainly reproduced in media coverage too. Qualitative and quantitative analysis of media coverage and its comparison with politicians’ statements will show how much the frames used by CNNI and BBCW correspond with those of the US/UK/NATO officials and it will give a better insight into the relationship between the usage of official sources and the final product, a TV story, as will be shown at the end of Chapter 6. At this stage it is also important to note that Albanian sources were used only slightly more than Serb (and Russian) sources, 2.5 % of difference on both channels; that will be an important element in the analysis of the treatment of the two sides to the conflict in media coverage.

Qualitative and quantitative analysis of video-material was made on the stratified sample of all news items broadcast in the period between January 15 and March 23, 1999, designed to follow the ups and downs of media attention. This method was used because simple counting alone of the number of TV items would not be sufficient: “the direction of coverage, positive, negative, of neutral, must be decoded and calculated to allow any meaningful evaluation of the media’s influence”⁵⁹².

The sample of CNNI material includes every 15th news item in this time period, plus every 2nd news item in key periods. So the sample contains 64 news items, which is 22% of the total number of items. The sample of BBCW comprises every 10th item in January 10-March 23 period, plus all items in key periods – it is a sample of 34 items, or 39% of the total number of items. The difference in the sample sizes corresponds to the difference in the total number of stories between the two news channels and presents an attempt to get comparable bodies of data. Key word analysis was conducted throughout the whole period, while qualitative analysis was made only during the three most important time periods, 19 days in total.

As explained in the methodology chapter, two main frames were selected in advance: the empathy/distance frame toward the (Albanian) population in Kosovo and pro-intervention/contra-intervention frame related to Western policy options. For the purpose of quantitative analysis the key words approach was used, based on the assumption that chosen key words do not only express the definition of the situation, but they also “signal the social or political opinions”⁵⁹³ of the media about the events. Starting from the empathy/distance frame, the number of times the population of Kosovo was referred to as “refugees”, “women, children (boy, girl), elderly”, “civilians”, “villagers”, “farmers”, “people”, “victims” (empathy frame) was counted. Conversely, the number of times the words “Albanian(s)”, “men”, “soldiers”, “fighters”, “rebels”, “separatists” (distance

⁵⁹¹ Gans, *Deciding What’s News*, 1980 in Van Ginneken, J., 1998, *Global News: A Critical Introduction*, SAGE Publications, London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi, p. 91

⁵⁹² Gilboa, E., 2005, *The CNN Effect: The Search for a Communication Theory of International Relations*, Political Communication, 22, 27-44

⁵⁹³ Van Dijke, T.A., 1991, *Racism and the press*, London: Routledge, p. 53

frame) were used to label population of Kosovo was quantified. For example, when the term “refugees” or “victims” were used for the population, one could expect empathy towards them and a will to help, while labels that define them as members of a particular state instead of people, define them as “others” and create distance. Regarding the pro-intervention frame, words “help”, “protect”, “react”, “act”, “air strike”, “campaign”, “assault”, “pound”, “blow”, “bomb(ing)”, “military - action, intervention, operation” were counted, as they signal the necessity of intervention; while the words “interest”, “uncertain, unclear”, “danger(ous)”, “peace - talks, agreement, process, deal, accord”, “peacekeepers, peacekeeping”, “negotiations” and “diplomatic, diplomacy” were held to indicate a focus on the absence of a perceived national interest, the dangers of that possible involvement and the preference for negotiations over military action. But the keyword was counted only if it was used in the sense implied by the frame; for example phrase “peace talks” was counted only if it was used in the context of the best option possible. Also, reading the context was necessary to prevent the inadvertent counting of keywords preceded by a negative – if the word “react” was preceded by “not”, it could not be counted as an incentive to (military) action. A test analysis of the key words was made on a random sample of 5 items from BBCW coverage, and 10 items from CNNI (15% of each total number of items), and it helped me to modify a selection of key words: in the second frame category, the words diplomacy and diplomatic, peacekeeping and peace keepers were added, since all are words connected with the diplomatic solution of the crisis. Also, in the first frame category, the word Muslim(s) was excluded since that label was not used at all in the test sample - complete analysis will show that the word Muslim did not appear one single time in the whole sample, so one can say that religious identity was not considered as an important characteristic of the Kosovo population in the media coverage. The word ceasefire was also excluded from the key words, since it was invariably used in the context of ceasefire violation or described as a “fragile” ceasefire. The fact that it is only used in the context of its breach will be interpreted more in the qualitative analysis.

Quantitative analysis showed the following results:

Table 4: KEY WORD ANALYSIS OF BBCW KOSOVO COVERAGE

| Request for international reaction | Request for refrain from action | Row sum |
|--------------------------------------|--|---------|
| Empathy frame 22% n=67 | Distance frame 20.5% n=62 | |
| Pro-intervention frame 21.5% n=65 | Contra-intervention frame 36% n=109 | |
| Total: 43, 5 % | Total: 56.5% | 100% |

The results show that key words of the contra-intervention frame were used more often, although additional attention was paid and all of them were excluded each time that they had the opposite meaning, like “peace talks are thousands miles from here, both in distance and spirit”, “peace that never was”, “on Kosovo diplomacy is dead”, etc. The empathy frame is a bit more dominant than distance frame; and the frequency of the empathy key words is highest in the period after the Racak massacre, and during the few

days before the beginning of the NATO campaign. But the distance and contra-intervention frame together, a combination that should indicate a possible impediment effect, were represented with more than a half of total number of key words – 56.5 %.

Table 5: KEY WORD ANALYSIS OF CNNI KOSOVO COVERAGE

| Request for international reaction | Request for refrain from action | Row sum |
|-------------------------------------|--|---------|
| Empathy frame 13% n=81 | Distance frame 19% n=114 | |
| Pro-intervention frame 29% n=175 | Contra-intervention frame 39% n=238 | |
| Total: 42% | Total: 58% | 100% |

The distance frame is dominant, although phrases like “rebels who want to free Kosovo from Serb rule” and “independence fighters” were not counted within this frame, since it could have positive meaning, and every mention of the word terrorist, since it was only used when Serb/Yugoslav sources were quoted; from the empathy frame, only the phrase “people with gun” was excluded. Also, the contra-intervention frame is dominant, even after phrases like “there is no agreement to sign”, “peace agreement appeared further away than ever”, “no peace for them to monitor on Kosovo”, “non-existing peace”, were excluded. That means that empathy and pro-intervention frame, which should combined provide an incentive for the government to intervene, were even less equally represented than in the case of BBCW coverage, with 42 % of all key words.

QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS

The qualitative analysis extends the quantitative analysis by exploring details of these dominant frames in the coverage in key time periods. It was used to avoid losing the important aspects of reporting that could not be discovered by the simple counting of the key words. More detailed analysis of the context in which key words were used and the overall tone of journalists’ reports was conducted, while special attention was given to the reporters’ stand-ups, i.e. the part of the report when the journalist in the field speaks directly to camera - and indirectly to the public - that is usually utilized to point out the most important segments of the report: sending the correspondent in the field “may look like a terrible waste of time and money, since most often the information presented was available elsewhere and could just as well have been read elsewhere too”, but “this automatically promotes him or her to the status of eyewitness, and promotes whatever s/he says to the status of ‘verified reality’”⁵⁹⁴. Some other important features of the coverage were taken into account:

- Visual elements of the reports to check how much they correspond with the key words and phrases used. Although the main focus of the research is more on the narrative part of the story, the picture as the main television’s tool must not be ignored, so some universal attributes have been taken into account like the apparent spatial magnitude of sensation, e.g., how long a shot in a story lasts, the

⁵⁹⁴ Van Ginneken, J., 1998Understanding Global News: A Critical Introduction, SAGE Publications, London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi, p. 183

apparent strength of a sensation, e.g., how close up the shot is, and a quality, e.g., the mise-en-scene, or placement of elements in the shot⁵⁹⁵;

- The main position – predominately positive/negative – of the story vis-à-vis Western policy: a nominal scale of five points, from very positive to very negative was created;
- Presence of the channels’ correspondents on the ground, since it indicates the level of importance given to the story - the role of “authoritative reporters, able to provide a first-hand gloss on the images that the camera produced, (is) central”⁵⁹⁶;
- Parallel analysis of NYT articles and Reuters TV stories that allowed me to compare the content of the stories (not only on numbers of stories published and produced) and identify possible pictures and themes CNNI and BBCW chose to ignore.

THE RACAK MASSACRE, JANUARY 15-19

As was noted in the transcript analysis, the coverage at the beginning of investigated period was not very extensive. It is obvious that CNNI and, to some extent BBCW, did not consider Kosovo as an important topic at the very moment of the massacre – although BBCW had a reporter in the region, Jacky Rowland, who immediately reported by phone from Kosovo on January 16, they had no camera, but they used video material from TV agencies. CNNI used the same pictures, and they had to broadcast reports of freelancers and the British TV station ITN from Kosovo, since they had no reporter on the field. It will be seen that the reports of UK journalists will be exactly those who presented the Kosovo population with more empathy and Western policy with more criticism on both channels.

The first BBCW reports on January 16 described the village as “a scene of disbelief, confusion, shock”⁵⁹⁷ and the massacre as a “some kind of execution”⁵⁹⁸, saying that “local people believe the men were massacred in cold blood by Serb forces”⁵⁹⁹. There was no precise definition of what actually happened, but it was concluded that “whatever proves to be the case, these killings can only inflame the already tense situation throughout Kosovo”⁶⁰⁰. The following report from Kosovo on that day began with a more personal tone: “Nothing had prepared me for what I saw in Racak...”⁶⁰¹ The victims were described as “ordinary people, farmers, laborers, villagers”⁶⁰². At that time senior international officials were already “in no doubt that Serbian police killed these

⁵⁹⁵ Neuendorf, K. A., 2005, *The Content Analysis Guidebook*, Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, London, New Delhi, p. 98

⁵⁹⁶ Shaw, M., *Media and Public Sphere without Borders? News Coverage and Power from Kurdistan to Kosovo*, in Nacos, B.L., Shapiro R.Y. and P. Isernia (eds), 2000, *Decisionmaking in a Glass House; Mass Media, Public Opinion and American and European Foreign Policy in the 21st Century*, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, INC. London, Boulder, New York, Oxford, p. 37

⁵⁹⁷ BBCW, January 16, 1999, Reporter: Jacky Rowland

⁵⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹⁹ BBCW, January 16, 1999, Reporter: John Leyne

⁶⁰⁰ Ibid.

⁶⁰¹ BBCW, January 16, 1999, Reporter: Jacky Rowland

⁶⁰² Ibid.

people”⁶⁰³, so the final judgment was given: “this could only be an execution”⁶⁰⁴. The same report was repeated on January 17. On that day, the New York Times, for the first time reporting about the Racak massacre quoted a senior NATO diplomat saying that “once again, it takes a massacre to put this back to the top of the international agenda”⁶⁰⁵, and the same path of criticism toward Western policy on Kosovo was followed by BBCW on January 18. “International justice came face to face with Serbian obduracy”⁶⁰⁶, BBCW reported on the Serbian refusal to let Louise Arbour, ICTY Chief Prosecutor, come to Kosovo and investigate the massacre, describing it as “a slap in the face of the International community”⁶⁰⁷. International monitors were characterized as “largely impotent”⁶⁰⁸, who “can do little apart from watch... as events unfold beyond their control”⁶⁰⁹. It compared the situation with Bosnia and its four-year long waiting for international intervention, saying that “parallels are hauntingly similar”⁶¹⁰, and that “their (Western governance) action, or lack of it... has it seems only postponed an all-out conflict in the province”⁶¹¹. “Washington’s determination not to put American lives at risk in yet another Balkans conflict”⁶¹² was underlined, concluding that “without American forces on the ground, it is unlikely that NATO’s other members would or could mount a Bosnia-style operation in Kosovo”⁶¹³. At the end, another criticism of Western policy: “by denying the Albanians the one thing they want most of all, independence, Western diplomacy could yet trigger the one thing it sought to avoid, an all out war”⁶¹⁴. Out of eight analyzed stories in this period, three had a negative tone toward Western policy and other five were neutral. Two kinds of pictures were dominant: unarmed monitors watching through binoculars as a contrast with Serb tanks bombing the villages, and long shots of women and children crying over victims’ bodies. What were missing are statements from local people from Racak village, although they were provided by Reuters TV⁶¹⁵ – facts from the location were presented by the BBCW journalist and OSCE Head of Mission William Walker. Also there were only wide shots of bodies lying in the ditch - no headless corpses, no close-ups of corpses’ hands and legs or bullet wounds that were filmed by the Reuters TV crew⁶¹⁶. The lack of more dramatic shots could probably be partly explained by the television tradition, already noted by BBC journalist in the similar situation - the aftermath of a mortar bomb landing in a Sarajevo street. “A camera crew from the agency “poop”, whose pictures could be used by everyone, arrived first and saw immediate results of the massacre. It was instructive to

⁶⁰³ Ibid.

⁶⁰⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁰⁵ Perlez, J., January 17, 1999, US Weighs Its Reaction To Massacre In Kosovo, The New York Times, Section 1; Page 6; Column 3

⁶⁰⁶ BBCW, January 18, 1999, Reporter: Jim Fish

⁶⁰⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁰⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁰⁹ BBCW, January 18, 1999, Reporter: Jim Fish

⁶¹⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹¹ Ibid.

⁶¹² Ibid.

⁶¹³ Ibid.

⁶¹⁴ Ibid.

⁶¹⁵ Yugoslavia: Bodies of Forty-Five Massacred Albanians Found Near Racak, Reuters TV, January 16, 1999

⁶¹⁶ Ibid.

see how the reporters from different countries and different television traditions, dealt with the pictures. The Italians used almost all of them: the brains, the intestines, the gutter literally running with blood in the rain. The French used the gutter and the bodies. The Americans used the gutter. We used none of these things: just the covered bodies being put into the ambulances, the empty pram, the abandoned shoes”⁶¹⁷.

CNNI had the reports of ITN from Kosovo on January 15, before the bodies in Racak were found, and it dealt with two monitors, including one British, who were shot and wounded. “The fragile ceasefire which held in Kosovo since October is collapsing”⁶¹⁸, it said, and the concern was expressed that “if civil war does erupt, it is the foreign monitors who would be caught in the middle”⁶¹⁹. A phone report of a free-lancer from Kosovo about the Racak massacre on January 16 quoted William Walker, head of the OSCE mission, calling the event “a crime against humanity”⁶²⁰, and concluded: “observers admit the Friday massacre of innocents is the most serious threat yet to the fragile ceasefire in the province”⁶²¹. In the following days, criticism of Western slowness is evident again in the reports of British ITN: “while the international community considers its next move, people in Racak are leaving their homes, terrified of what might happen if they stay”⁶²². Monitors are again described as “powerless to stop the assaults... standing by and watching where the shells land”⁶²³, and insufficient to deal with the situation: “it may take more than an overstretched team of monitors to stop the fighting from spilling out of control”⁶²⁴. In a report from the hills around Racak, the ITN reporter is seen surrounded by the women and children sitting on the frozen ground in the forest, and he says in his stand-up from there that “these people haven’t eaten for two days”⁶²⁵. A close shot of a small girl within this group of refugees is the most touching. A reporter visited Racak accompanied by KLA soldiers, “rebels who want to *free* Kosovo from Serb rule”, where “the bodies of 40 villagers killed by the Serbian police still lay”, because “there is simply no one left in this village to bury them”⁶²⁶. On January 17, a CNNI reporter from Washington announces that “some say it’s time for NATO air strikes or even deployment of ground troops”, but that “caution too came from...US senators, reluctant to commit troops to another Bosnia-like peace keeping mission”⁶²⁷. In the report from Washington, Albanians are described only as “rebels” and “separatists”. On January 18, a CNNI journalist in the studio reports that “adding to the tensions, Belgrade ordered another key Western figure, the chief ceasefire verifier out of the country. William Walker had been outspoken in his criticism of Serb authorities and linked them to the Racak massacre. Until that point, the OSCE and its verifiers on the ground in

⁶¹⁷ Simpson, J., *Depicting Violence on television*, in Hargrave, A. M. (ed.), 1993, *Violence in Factual Television, Annual Review 1993*, Broadcasting Standards Council/John Libbey p.14

⁶¹⁸ CNNI, January 15, 1999, Reporter: Kevin Dunn (ITN)

⁶¹⁹ Ibid.

⁶²⁰ CNNI, January 16, 1999, Reporter: Juliette Terzieff

⁶²¹ CNNI, January 16, 1999, Reporter: Juliette Terzieff

⁶²² CNNI, January 17 1999, Reporter: Phillipa Young (ITN)

⁶²³ CNNI, January 18 1999, Reporter: Bill Neely (ITN)

⁶²⁴ CNNI, January 17 1999, Reporter: David Clinch

⁶²⁵ CNNI, January 18 1999, Reporter: Bill Neely (ITN)

⁶²⁶ Ibid.

⁶²⁷ CNNI, January 17 1999, Reporter: Kathleen Koch

Kosovo had been meticulously careful to balance blame”⁶²⁸. He finished the report with a conclusion that “with refugees once again fleeing their villages and tensions growing, there are serious doubts much time remains”⁶²⁹, and his last sentence was strongly reinforced with the last shot of baby crying in a man’s hands, in a long row of refugees. Still, it is noted that ethnic Albanians were those who “have provoked the tensions”⁶³⁰. Out of nine analyzed stories in this period, seven stories had a neutral tone toward Western policy, while other two were slightly critical – one of them from ITN. CNNI used the same agencies’ pictures of Racak massacre, only with some more details, like a box of cigarettes near a corpse’s hand, and more victims’ relatives, but without any disturbing shots. There were more pictures of refugees with their plastic bags escaping from villages on trailers, and destroyed and still burning houses - they were mostly used in a story from January 17 that explained the background of Kosovo conflict and that was the other one critical toward Western (non)involvement.

As was found in the quantitative analysis, qualitative analysis confirmed that reports from both CNNI and BBCW used the word “ceasefire” to indicate only that there was no ceasefire in Kosovo anymore, with phrases such as “ceasefire violation”, “threats to the ceasefire” and “the fragile ceasefire”: it was a common element of their coverage. BBCW was more critical toward (the lack of) Western policy and described the Racak massacre’s victims and their relatives’ pain in more personal tones, while CNNI, although empathetic toward refugees, took a greater distance toward Kosovo Albanians and their goals. The implications of the media coverage analysis of this period for this research, as of the following two periods, will be summarized before the policy process analysis.

THE RAMBOUILLET NEGOTIATIONS, FEBRUARY 19-23, 1999

BBCW coverage in this time period was focused on the end of the first round of negotiations in Rambouillet and its consequences in Belgrade and Pristina. Already on February 19, a report expressed no faith in the positive outcome of the negotiations, since the “progress has been... far too slow”⁶³¹. In the following days the agreement looked “as far away as ever was”⁶³²; its acceptance was described as “unthinkable”⁶³³; and it was explained that “it is not just the Serbs who are the problem”⁶³⁴ and “who stubbornly refused to sign a deal, so the Albanians”⁶³⁵. The way in which the International Community dealt with the situation did not get the highest grade too: as was reported on February 21, “the threat of air strikes against the Serbs rings rather hollow”⁶³⁶. It is stated with certainty that Western troops will play a role in Kosovo, but “either in the form of NATO peace keepers if the deal is reached or as *aggressors* if it isn’t”⁶³⁷. Jacky Rowland reported from Belgrade on the extension of the talks’ deadline that “Serb negotiators have forced the International community to back down”; that “the decision to extend the

⁶²⁸ CNNI, January 18 1999, Reporter: Jim Clancy

⁶²⁹ Ibid.

⁶³⁰ Ibid.

⁶³¹ BBCW, February 19, 1999, Reporter: Khalid Javed

⁶³² BBCW, February 21, 1999, Reporter: John Leyne

⁶³³ BBCW, February 22, 1999, Reporter: Bridget Kendal

⁶³⁴ BBCW, February 21, 1999, Reporter: John Leyne

⁶³⁵ BBCW, February 22, 1999, Reporter: Bridget Kendal

⁶³⁶ BBCW, February 21, 1999, Reporter: John Leyne

⁶³⁷ BBCW, February 19, 1999, Reporter: Khalid Javed

Kosovo Peace talks is being seen in Serbia as a victory for Belgrade”; and that “Milosevic will be making maximum political capital out of this latest victory over the West”⁶³⁸. At the same time it was warned that fighting in Kosovo “can break out again at any time”⁶³⁹ and that, if monitors leave as part of preparations for NATO air strikes, “who would be able to tell the outside world what atrocities would be committed in this corner of the Balkans”⁶⁴⁰. A report from Kosovo, on February 23, began with the observation that “Kosovo peace talks are thousands of miles from here, both in distance and spirit”, but the end is less pessimistic: “For those who have left their homes in fear in the two days of fighting in Bukos the idea of the peace deal being close is hard to believe. But elsewhere in Kosovo there is now great optimism that the end of this war is finally insight.”⁶⁴¹

The fault for a failure of the first round of negotiations about Kosovo was almost equally divided on both sides in BBCW reports; the only exception was the report from Belgrade in which Milosevic and Serbian/Yugoslav officials were clearly described as the “bad guys”. No details about the content of the agreement or its disputable parts were given, although it was available to media: the New York Times published on its first page on February 21 that “the ethnic Albanians...are seeking an independent Kosovo but apparently will agree to the autonomy on offer here”, while “Serbia continued to refuse to allow NATO ground troops to police any accord”⁶⁴². Reuters TV provided sound bites of the US officials speaking on this issue too⁶⁴³. Some sympathy was expressed toward the Kosovo population, but not precisely ethnic Albanians, since the pictures in the report from Kosovo showed the funeral of a Serb soldier and the grief of his relatives. Two of the six investigated stories were negative toward the Western policy (other four were neutral), but it was more the International Community’s credibility and (non)decisiveness than its choice of options that was criticized. Deployment of ground troops was not very favorably covered either, as it can be seen from the label of NATO forces as aggressors if they came to Kosovo without a peace plan.

CNNI stories were less critical toward Western policy at that time: it was mostly the International Community’s way of dealing with Belgrade that was negatively reviewed, in reports from Serbian capital – the February 19 report ended with the journalist’s conclusion, in his stand-up from the city’s roofs, that “as pestering here in Yugoslavia appears to take precedence over any real talking, a successful initiative may be difficult to come by”⁶⁴⁴. US envoy Christopher Hill was that day, as described, “snubbed by Milosevic (and) forced to deliver a message to the Yugoslav Foreign Minister”⁶⁴⁵. A few days later the West was said to “unabatedly help him (Milosevic) to stay in power, at the

⁶³⁸ BBCW, February 21, 1999, Reporter: Jacky Rowland

⁶³⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁴⁰ BBCW, February 22, 1999, Reporter: Bridget Kendal

⁶⁴¹ BBCW, February 23, 1999, Reporter: Paul Welsh

⁶⁴² Perlez, J., February 21, 1999, Deadline In Talks On Kosovo Accord Is Delayed 3 Days, The New York Times, Section 1; Page 1; Column 6

⁶⁴³ US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright Says both Serbians and Ethnic Albanians Are Blocking a Kosovo Deal, Reuters TV, February 21, 1999

⁶⁴⁴ CNNI, February 19, 1999, Reporter: Nic Robertson

⁶⁴⁵ Ibid.

expense of the nation as a whole”⁶⁴⁶. A story from Kosovo on February 19 also had the destiny of the Serb population as the focus: “Suzana Andjelkovic, maybe one of the hundreds of state employees to lose their jobs should ethnic Albanians take charge of local administration around Kosovo; a scenario envisioned by the peace agreement”⁶⁴⁷. New fighting in Kosovo was described as “Yugoslav army soldiers...*responding* to incoming fire from ethnic Albanian soldiers”⁶⁴⁸. Still some empathy was expressed toward the hard life of people, and especially refugees, in Kosovo, and its description: “The village has no electricity or running water. For a child a wooden door is the best toy around”⁶⁴⁹, was reinforced by the close shots of children refugees, a woman singing lullabies to a baby in a cradle in a courtyard, and a small boy playing on the door. A story from Washington on February 20 reported on US dissatisfaction with the first extension of the negotiations, asserting that “US reluctantly agreed to a new deadline for the Kosovo peace talks”⁶⁵⁰ and that “US remains deeply suspicious of Yugoslav President Milosevic and his motives”⁶⁵¹. Although on February 22 a CNNI journalist quoted a US official saying that “NATO military strikes to bomb the Serbs into compliance would not be an option”⁶⁵², which “would leave mediators with two possibilities: extend the deadline again or go home”⁶⁵³, CNNI’s Christiane Amanpour, in a stand-up from Paris, described more precisely the US strategy in Rambouillet: “to first get ethnic Albanians to sign on to the whole deal, and pressure Milosevic to do the same, or build a convincing case to bomb Serbian targets.”⁶⁵⁴ Three days later, she underlined the request of the International Community: “As NATO continues its contingency plan, military and political leaders are warning both Serbs and Albanians to choose the road to peace.”⁶⁵⁵ Anyway, Amanpour’s appearance in Rambouillet, as the CNN’s chief international correspondent, has shown that this channel began to treat Kosovo as an important subject in its program. Nine of a total of eleven analyzed stories were prepared by reporters on the ground, in Rambouillet, Belgrade and Pristina. Except for two reports from Belgrade, which had a critical stand toward Western policy, the other nine were neutral. Beside typical conventional pictures of the exterior of Rambouillet castle and arrivals and departures of delegations, both channels began to use shots of war planes, but mostly illustrating the threat, rather than the best possible option if negotiations failed.

THE PARIS NEGOTIATIONS AND THE BEGINNING OF THE NATO CAMPAIGN, MARCH 15-23, 1999

At the beginning of the new meeting about Kosovo in Paris, BBCW reported that: “negotiators know that time is not on their side”⁶⁵⁶, because “with every delay, prospects

⁶⁴⁶ CNNI, February 22, 1999, Reporter: Brent Sadler

⁶⁴⁷ CNNI, February 19, 1999, Reporter: Alessio Vinci

⁶⁴⁸ CNNI, February 22, 1999, Reporter: Alessio Vinci

⁶⁴⁹ CNNI, February 21, 1999, Reporter: Alessio Vinci

⁶⁵⁰ CNNI, February 20, 1999, Reporter: Chris Black

⁶⁵¹ Ibid.

⁶⁵² CNNI, February 22, 1999, Reporter: Andrea Koppel

⁶⁵³ Ibid.

⁶⁵⁴ CNNI, February 20, 1999, Reporter: Christiane Amanpour

⁶⁵⁵ CNNI, February 23, 1999, Reporter: Christiane Amanpour

⁶⁵⁶ BBCW, March 15, 1999, Reporter: Jim Fish

for peace remain weak”⁶⁵⁷ and due to the fact that “more obstruction and delay in Paris will only buy time for the *men of violence* in Kosovo”⁶⁵⁸, without specifying who the men are. Still, on the same day, background of the Kosovo conflict was related to a “decade of increasingly brutal Serbian rule”, which was culminating in that moment with “Serbian forces storm(ing) villages in central Kosovo”⁶⁵⁹. The International Community was described as “far from united”, whose “warnings and limited sanctions... left Serbia-led Yugoslavia unimpressed, and may even have been taken in Belgrade as a signal to crash a KLA”⁶⁶⁰. “Only the victims are weary of this war, and their voice goes largely unheard”⁶⁶¹, concludes the report. Even more dramatic accounts appeared on March 17, with the opening line of the story: “in Kosovo diplomacy is dead”⁶⁶², followed by shots of the shelling of a village and destroyed houses. The report gave a more personal description of the ongoing events in Kosovo: “the village was rased before our eyes; they knew we were filming them, they did not care”⁶⁶³, with pictures of Serb soldiers breaking the doors and taking things out of houses and, afterward, close shots of Albanian refugees, small children and old men. Although it was Serb forces in the report “enjoying themselves destroying property and making sure that some Albanian families have nowhere to return to”⁶⁶⁴, the journalist in Kosovo had visited a Serb village too, where the village mayor told him that “Serbs feel like prisoners in their own country”⁶⁶⁵. Other BBCW reports in this period also recognized that “the KLA too is guilty of breaking the ceasefire”⁶⁶⁶, or at least that “there are conflicting accounts of who is responsible”⁶⁶⁷. Nor were the reports about the Paris meeting more optimistic – on March 18 it was reported that “not for the first time, the Kosovo talks appeared to reach an impasse”⁶⁶⁸ and that “as the search for the elusive peace goes on, so too does the war”⁶⁶⁹. After the Kosovo Albanians’ signature, reports became less suspicious toward the resolve of the International Community to carry out its threats: “air strikes are once again looking more likely”⁶⁷⁰ and “NATO now looks closer to acting than ever before”⁶⁷¹. On March 20, the leading visual theme was orange OSCE vehicles leaving Kosovo, and according to the reporter: “these pictures send a clear message: that a threat to bomb Serbia is real”. Still, less than 48 hours before the beginning of NATO air strikes, it was warned that “if the violence continues, NATO’s only other option is air strikes, military action which could unintentionally turn the crisis into a catastrophe”⁶⁷².

⁶⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶⁶² BBCW, March 17, 1999, Reporter: Agnes Roxbourg

⁶⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶⁶ BBCW, March 18, 1999, Reporter: Peter Biles

⁶⁶⁷ BBCW, March 20, 1999, Reporter: Fergus Nicoll

⁶⁶⁸ BBCW, March 18, 1999, Reporter: Peter Biles

⁶⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁷⁰ BBCW, March 19, 1999, Reporter: Fergus Nicoll

⁶⁷¹ BBCW, March 21, 1999, Reporter: Andrew Web

⁶⁷² BBCW, March 22, 1999, Reporter: Jim Fish

Although there were many shots of burned houses and refugees fleeing from villages, there were only very few personal accounts from these refuges in BBCW coverage (precisely two: on March 21 an Albanian woman told how her son was taken and probably killed, and on March 20 an Albanian man said his village was surrounded). There were no dramatic and more touching stories like the one of Reuters TV on March 15, about a eight-year old boy whose both legs were amputated after the marketplace bomb a day before⁶⁷³. In general, more reports were prepared from studio (eleven), than on the ground (three). Also, its coverage was much less explicit about whose fault the Kosovo situation was than for example the New York Times, which in its editorial article on March 18 recommended that "If Mr. Milosevic does not immediately stop attacking ethnic Albanians and agree to the peace plan, bombing is the appropriate response"⁶⁷⁴, described the Yugoslav President as a selfish dictator "since the preservation of his own power comes first, before patriotism or the welfare of his people"⁶⁷⁵ and even compared him with Iraqi President Saddam Hussein⁶⁷⁶. The position toward the International Community became more neutral (twelve stories), with one story even being positive, after the Kosovo Albanians' signature.

CNNI had a long tradition and a strong reputation of reporting from the wars in former Yugoslavia. How significant a role this channel had in this region shows in the fact that it was even used as a tool in political struggles: "During the December 1996 demonstrations in the streets of Belgrade... Serbian authorities had shut down coverage of the event by local media. But opposition leaders erected, in the downtown square, a huge television screen that carried the CNN signal"⁶⁷⁷. So, based on its history, one could expect that it would have an extensive coverage of the pre-intervention period (30% of all stories broadcast during the investigated period), and a heavy presence of its reporters on the ground - eighteen stories out of thirty were made by reporters in Kosovo, Serbia, Macedonia and France. CNNI reported on March 15 that the "international community's ability to bring peace to Kosovo is far from certain"⁶⁷⁸, but the reason for that was given in the US envoy Christopher Hill's statement who explained that: "this is an issue that has been around for the entire century"⁶⁷⁹. Wolf Blitzer, a CNN journalist who is, according to other White House reporters, "a frequent recipient of US administration officials' leaks"⁶⁸⁰, reported the same day that "NATO sources can see the allies may have a credibility problem given the number of times they previously threatened but failed to bomb"⁶⁸¹. On March 16, a stand-up of the reporter from Paris, where

⁶⁷³ Various: Kosovo Peace Talks Continue in France, Reuters TV, March 15, 1999

⁶⁷⁴ Kosovo Brinkmanship, The New York Times, March 18, 1999, Section A; Page 24; Column 1; Editorial Desk

⁶⁷⁵ Erlanger, S., March 22, 1999, Conflict In The Balkans: News Analysis; Holbrooke: Last Chip?, The New York Times, Section A; Page 1; Column 6

⁶⁷⁶ Smale, A., March 21, 1999, Two Different Tyrants, Very Much the Same, By, The New York Times, Section 4; Page 3; Column 1

⁶⁷⁷ Flournoy, D. M. and R. K. Stewart, 1997, CNN-Making News in the Global Market, Luton: University of Luton Press p. 67

⁶⁷⁸ CNNI, March 15, 1999, Reporter: Jim Bittermann

⁶⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁸⁰ Strobel, W.P., May 1996, The CNN Effect: How Much Influence Does the 24-Hour News Network Really Have on Foreign Policy, American Journalism Review, University of Maryland, p. 34-37

⁶⁸¹ CNNI, March 15, 1999, Reporter: Wolf Blitzer

“negotiations...seem to be approaching an end game”⁶⁸², confirmed that the International Community’s credibility was at stake: “if diplomacy fails, given all the tough rhetoric from some Contact Group’s members, and all the international prestige invested in these talks, it seems almost inevitable that NATO will carry out its threat to take military action against Yugoslavia”⁶⁸³. Strong criticism of the negotiation process and the negotiating sides came on March 19: “so much diplomacy ended with the mere fax communiqué”⁶⁸⁴; “it was a risky, perhaps flawed process from the start, this idea that you could bring *two aggressors* together to negotiate peace when neither side really seem to be interested in doing so”⁶⁸⁵; “to join the adults among the European nations they have to grow up and make peace”⁶⁸⁶. The majority of the reports from Washington, from the Pentagon and US Congress, in this period were focused on two issues: the dangers of possible intervention (“weather poses significant risk to pilots”⁶⁸⁷, “US would by far carry the biggest burden and assume the greatest risk”⁶⁸⁸, “it has to the Pentagon and the President openly worrying about losing a plane”⁶⁸⁹, “US commanders fear it could come at the high price, the loss of some American pilots”⁶⁹⁰, “the mission would not be easy as in Iraq”⁶⁹¹, “why the situation in Kosovo is worth of putting American lives at risk”⁶⁹²) and the skepticism of US Congressmen due to the lack of detailed strategy (“both parties remain concerned about...the scope and duration of the military action and about what air strikes will accomplish”⁶⁹³). On March 23 CNNI reported on a US public opinion poll⁶⁹⁴ showing that “there is certainly no US consensus on air strikes: 46% favor, 43% oppose”⁶⁹⁵. According to the reported poll, US public did not consider that it is “in the national interest of the US to bomb Kosovo: Yes – 42%, No – 50%, Undecided – 8%”, but “the greatest consensus among Americans comes on this issue, is it a moral obligation of the US to bomb Kosovo: Yes – 58%, No – 37%, Undecided – 5%”⁶⁹⁶. The public opinion poll appeared to show similarity with the general tone of CNNI stories – out of thirty analyzed stories, six were negative toward the US administration’s intention to act in Kosovo, due to high risk and perceived lack of national interest, three were positive, reporting on diplomatic efforts, while others were neutral. Only the reports from Macedonia, where the huge wave of refugees from Kosovo arrived and which “many Kosovars see...as a safe haven from the Serbs”⁶⁹⁷, expressed empathy toward the suffering population. Those were also the only reports in which the ethnic Albanians were called “Kosovars” as they usually call themselves. On March 17, a journalist

⁶⁸² CNNI, March 16, 1999, Reporter: Jim Bittermann

⁶⁸³ Ibid.

⁶⁸⁴ CNNI, March 19, 1999, Reporter: Jim Bittermann

⁶⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁸⁷ CNNI, March 18, 1999, Reporter: John King

⁶⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁸⁹ CNNI, March 19, 1999, Reporter: Jamie McIntyre

⁶⁹⁰ CNNI, March 22, 1999, Reporter: Jamie McIntyre

⁶⁹¹ CNNI, March 19, 1999, Reporter: Jamie McIntyre

⁶⁹² CNNI, March 22, 1999, Reporter: Jonathan Karl

⁶⁹³ CNNI, March 23, 1999, Reporter: Jonathan Karl

⁶⁹⁴ Gallup Poll, March 14-21, 1999, in CNNI, March 23, 1999, Reporter: Brian Cabell

⁶⁹⁵ CNNI, March 23, 1999, Reporter: Brian Cabell

⁶⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁹⁷ CNNI, March 23, 1999, Reporter: Matthew Chance

reported that “NATO and UN commanders monitoring Kosovo say there is little question whether Serb security forces in this majority Albanian province are conducting a brutal campaign”⁶⁹⁸, and two days later that NATO says “the risks of military action are far preferable than the consequences of doing nothing at all”⁶⁹⁹. On March 20, when OSCE monitors left Kosovo, “with no peace for them to monitor in Kosovo”, concern was expressed about “what the estimated 40000 Yugoslav troops massing in and around Kosovo may do once they have seen the verifiers leave”⁷⁰⁰. One of the most dramatic stories came on March 22 in which the words “suffering”, “crisis” and especially “refugees” - “illegal and unregistered and with little help of the authorities here”⁷⁰¹ - were repeated several times. The pictures in the story were even more affecting. It began with close shots of children standing and looking directly to camera followed by journalist’s introduction: “These are the child refugees of the Kosovo war”⁷⁰² and it ends with *a slow motion* of a woman and a small child in a courtyard – television tool to underline something by showing it in more detail. The rest of the story also included many shots of children playing or just standing in a courtyard, an old woman preparing bread, young women and girls washing dishes and laundry on the water pipe outside. In general, one could say that Martin Bell’s request for the “Journalism of Attachment” – “an approach to reporting, born of the war in former Yugoslavia, which argues that journalists should record the human and emotional costs of war rather than acting as ‘transmission vehicles’ for governmental or military sources”⁷⁰³ was very much fulfilled by the field reporters of both CNNI and BBCW in Kosovo. Reports made in direct contact with affected people on the ground, usually by journalists with a long experience of reporting from the region (Matthew Chance and Christiane Amanpour for CNNI, and Jacky Rowland for BBCW), expressed much more empathy toward the population and much stronger requests for the intervention than reports from Washington, Paris and London, which appeared to be more equal sided and more national-interest-orientated. Amanpour explained it with the case of Bosnia: “Once you treat all sides the same...you are drawing a moral equivalence between victim and aggressor. And from here it is a short step to being neutral. And from here it’s an even shorter step to becoming an accessory to all manners of evil.”⁷⁰⁴ In her last report from Belgrade before the beginning of NATO strikes she concluded that “an emergency session of the Serbian Parliament shows no room for compromise or maneuver” and that “the picture has never looked so dark”⁷⁰⁵. The Serbian Parliament’s resolution of that day, with its call on the United Nations and OSCE to facilitate a diplomatic settlement through negotiations “toward the reaching of a political agreement on a wide-ranging autonomy for Kosovo and Metohija with the securing of a full equality of all citizens and ethnic communities and with respect for the sovereignty and territorial

⁶⁹⁸ CNNI, March 17, 1999, Reporter: Matthew Chance

⁶⁹⁹ CNNI, March 19, 1999, Reporter: Matthew Chance

⁷⁰⁰ CNNI, March 20, 1999, Reporter: Matthew Chance

⁷⁰¹ CNNI, March 22, 1999, Reporter: Matthew Chance

⁷⁰² Ibid.

⁷⁰³ Bell, M., 1996, TV News: How Far Should We Go? Critical Studies in Mass Communications, 13 (3): 7-16

⁷⁰⁴ Christiane Amanpour, quoted in Hume, M., 1997, Whose war is it anyway? The dangers of the Journalism of Attachment. London: LM, p. 6

⁷⁰⁵ CNNI, March 23, 1999, Reporter: Christiane Amanpour

integrity of the Republic of Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia”⁷⁰⁶, was not mentioned. It was clear from the report that the decision on air strikes was already made. Compared with the BBCW coverage in which a difference of opinion with Russia was mentioned only twice (“Moscow’s position is clear and unchanged: no force to be used against Yugoslavia”⁷⁰⁷, and NATO’s “unwillingness to provoke Russian outrage”⁷⁰⁸), CNNI considered the “potential damage to US-Russian relations” as an important topic, especially when Russian Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov made “a U-turn over the Atlantic”⁷⁰⁹ on March 23, canceling the meeting with the US Vice President Al Gore after information about NATO readiness to act.

There are some overall conclusions about the media coverage in Kosovo January 15-March 23 that could be summarized before its comparison with the policy documents. Taking into account the distribution of news stories, and its highest concentration in the period of four days after the Racak massacre, during the last days of the first round of peace negotiations in Rambouillet, and during the week ahead of the beginning of NATO campaign (with the exception of BBCW in this last period that could only be explained by the possibility that news editors did not expect that air strikes would actually take place that time after so many previous unfulfilled threats), one could expect that media should have the strongest agenda-setting role in these periods. But, since the last two periods were both the time of peace talks organized by Western governments and of the last negotiations about planned air strikes, it would be reasonable to assume that media did not set the agenda in these periods, but rather reacted to the one imposed by politicians, i.e. that media only followed the ongoing events. It left only the possible exception of the Racak events. Key word analysis showed that CNNI’s coverage was not very empathetic toward the Kosovo Albanians, while in BBCW’s coverage the empathy and distance frames were almost equally represented, and that they in general preferred peace talks and diplomacy over military intervention, with CNNI’s reports insisting also on the lack of US national interest in this region. According to framing theory, media, and especially CNNI coverage in this case should produce an impediment effect that would constrain politicians in implementing a decision to intervene.

Qualitative analysis provides a more in-depth view of media coverage in the key periods. During the aftermath of the Racak massacre, UK journalists, both on BBCW and on CNNI, described the Racak massacre victims as “ordinary people, farmers, laborers, villagers”, and portrayed their relatives’ pain in very personal terms, while in other CNNI reports, although sympathy was expressed toward refugees, a greater distance toward Kosovo Albanians and their goals could be noted. It was the period when BBCW was the most critical toward the lack of Western policy in Kosovo, comparing the situation with Bosnia and its four-year long waiting for international intervention, opening in that way, together with the empathetic attitude toward the Kosovo civilians, a path for a possible “CNN effect”. Some of that criticism also appeared in CNNI reports. What is common for both channels is that they have never questioned the nature of what happened in Racak, contrary to, for example, the French *Le Figaro*, which openly discussed on its

⁷⁰⁶ Conclusions of Serbian parliament, March 23, 1999, Tanjug

⁷⁰⁷ BBCW, March 19, 1999, Reporter: Fergus Nicoll

⁷⁰⁸ BBCW, March 20, 1999, Reporter: Stephen Gibbs

⁷⁰⁹ CNNI, March 23, 1999, Reporter: Wolf Blitzer

pages whether the KLA, during the night January 15-16, “have gathered the bodies, in fact killed by Serb bullets, to set up a scene of cold-blooded massacre”, seeking to “turn a military defeat into a political victory”⁷¹⁰. They also never cast any doubt on the credibility of the person whose findings about the Racak events they quoted repeatedly, Head of OSCE Verification Mission William Walker; whereas some non-mainstream media did, using the opportunity to accuse him of covering up war crimes against civilians committed by the Salvadoran army, a US ally, in 1989⁷¹¹.

The coverage of the first round of peace talks in Rambouillet was on both channels largely a routine TV news coverage of similar conferences (exterior shots of the location, delegations coming in and out, occasional statements of participants, etc.), with the important characteristic that the two negotiating sides were treated more or less equally. Western countries were portrayed as not very effective in reaching any progress in the Kosovo situation, more by BBCW than by CNNI, since there was little chance to persuade neither of the two sides to accept the peace deal, while threats of air strikes, repeated many times until then without any concrete consequences, were described as empty words. But neither CNNI nor BBCW demanded or proposed any alternative solution.

Although on March 15, FRY agencies accused the BBC and CNN of fanning “anti-Serb hysteria” in their reporting on Kosovo⁷¹², CNNI was actually the most critical toward the US administration’s policy, i.e., its plan for air strikes against FR Yugoslavia, in the last days before the beginning of NATO campaign, focusing on the dangers in the possible intervention for US pilots, the lack of a detailed strategy and a perceived lack of national interest. BBCW’s position toward the Western policy in Kosovo was more neutral with even one positive story, after the Kosovo Albanians’ signature, but it was actually only in one of their reports that a journalist mentioned the issue of the role of NATO air strikes in exacerbating the humanitarian crisis in Kosovo, something which could “have brought into question the underlying legitimacy of NATO action”⁷¹³, warning that it could “unintentionally turn the crisis into a catastrophe”⁷¹⁴. Contrary to the conclusions of some authors like Hammond and Herman that “the mainstream media of the leading NATO powers supported the war against Yugoslavia with almost uniform and uncritical enthusiasm”⁷¹⁵, results of this analysis show that the coverage of CNNI in general could only have an impediment effect on policy makers, while the BBCW’s coverage was more

⁷¹⁰ Girard, R., January 20, 1999, The images filmed during the attack on the village of Racak contradict the Albanians' and the OSCE's version, *Le Figaro*. The same doubt was also expressed in other French media: Christophe, C., January, 21, 199, Les morts de Racak ont-ils vraiment été massacrés froidement?, *Le Monde*, p. 1 ; Despic-Popovic, H., Hazan, P. and J.-D. Merchet, Jan. 21, 1999, Nine Questions Concerning the Racak Dead, *Liberation* (Paris); AFP, 23 February, 1999, Victims of Racak Massacre Shot from a Distance: Belarusian Experts

⁷¹¹ North, D., January 26, 1999, Irony at Racak: Tainted U.S. Diplomat Condemns Massacre, *The Consortium*, available at <http://www.consortiumnews.com/1999/c012699a.html>

⁷¹² Central European & Eastern Adriatic Research Group, June 1999, *Kosovo Chronology: 1997 to the End of the Conflict*, London

⁷¹³ Robinson, P., 2002, *The CNN Effect, The myth of news, foreign policy and intervention*, Routledge, London and New York, p. 109

⁷¹⁴ BBCW, March 22, 1999, Reporter: Jim Fish

⁷¹⁵ Hammond P. and E., Herman, eds., 2000, *Conclusions: First Casualty and Beyond, in Degraded Capability: The Media and the Kosovo Crisis*, London: Pluto Press, p. 207

supportive but still far from enthusiastic. Although, referring to the critics of the media coverage at that time, it is important to note that neither CNNI nor BBCW ever shifted into the “deviant sphere”⁷¹⁶ of the pro and contra discussion about the prospect of the peace negotiations, by investigating the possibly hidden motives for its organization. Chomsky and some other authors insisted that the main purpose of the negotiations, and especially the military annex of the agreement that was apparently introduced in the final moments of the Paris peace talks in March after Serbia had accepted the agreement’s main political proposals, and that “virtually guaranteed rejection”, was not to create peace but to sabotage it⁷¹⁷. But they also claim that the annex was kept from the public, i.e. from the journalists covering the Rambouillet and Paris talks. According to Fisk, “Serbs say they denounced it at their last Paris press conference—an ill-attended gathering at the Yugoslav Embassy at 11 PM on 18 March.”⁷¹⁸ He even claims that these provisions were not made available to the British House of Commons until April 1, the first day of the Parliamentary recess, a week after the bombing started⁷¹⁹. This could explain the fact that the only comment that was close to this issue appeared on CNNI, not in March, but in February, when CNN’s chief international correspondent Christiane Amanpour stated that the possible outcome of the negotiations for the US is exactly to “build a convincing case to bomb Serbian targets”, but without mentioning any specific details of the proposed deal. But I found also that the critic that “media community virtually ignored the prospect of compromise raised at Rambouillet”⁷²⁰ does not stand too, since both CNNI and BBCW insisted more on the possible peaceful solution than on military intervention.

SUMMARY

These are the main conclusions of the media analysis in the Kosovo case study that will be compared to the results of the analysis of the political process in the next chapter:

- The intensity of coverage was different on the two channels, but the distribution of stories of both CNN International and BBC World followed the similar pattern, especially in the key periods: aftermath of the Racak massacre, the end of Rambouillet negotiations and a pre-intervention week.
- Since the last two periods were both the time of peace talks organized by Western governments and of the last negotiations about planned air strikes, it would be reasonable to assume that media did not set the agenda in these periods, but rather reacted to the one imposed by politicians, while the role of media as the agenda-setter could be possible during the aftermath of the Racak massacre.

⁷¹⁶ According to Hallin, who investigated the media influence in the Vietnam War, there are three spheres that exist with regard to any given political issue: one of consensus, one of legitimate controversy and one of deviance, and news media coverage, taking its cues from political elites, rarely produces coverage within the deviant sphere but rather either reflects elite consensus on an issue or elite legitimated controversy, Hallin, D., 1986, *The Uncensored War*, Berkeley: University of California Press

⁷¹⁷ Fisk, R., November 26, 1999, *The Trojan Horse That 'Started' A 79-Day War*, *The Independent*, London, Pg. 20; Chomsky, N., March 14, 2000, *Another Way For Kosovo?*, *Le Monde diplomatique*

⁷¹⁸ Fisk, R., November 26, 1999, *The Trojan Horse That 'Started' A 79-Day War*, *The Independent*, London, Pg. 20

⁷¹⁹ Ibid.

⁷²⁰ Ackerman S., June 14, 1999, *The Nation*, *Redefining Diplomacy, Extra!*, available at http://www.fair.org.extra_9907/kosovo-diplomacy.html

- Comparison with the coverage of the New York Times and Reuters TV agency showed that there was no event or issue about Kosovo in this time period that CNNI and BBCW deliberately decided to ignore.
- Official sources from the US, UK and NATO dominated the coverage of both CNNI and BBCW.
- Key word analysis showed that CNNI's coverage was not very empathetic toward the Kosovo Albanians, while in BBCW's coverage the empathy and distance frames were almost equally represented, and that they in general preferred peace talks and diplomacy over military intervention, with CNNI's reports insisting also on the lack of US national interest in this region. But in the coverage of both TV channels the distance and contra-intervention frame together, a combination that should indicate a possible impediment effect, were represented with more than a half of total number of key words.
- Qualitative analysis of the key time periods showed that the only exception could be again a period after the Racak massacre, when the coverage of both TV channels was the most empathetic toward the Albanian civilian population, and the most critical (especially BBCW) toward the lack of Western policy in Kosovo, opening in that way a path for a possible "CNN effect".

CHAPTER 6: KOSOVO POLICY PROCESS

This chapter presents the results of the analysis of the time line of the process of decision-making through the archive analysis of all relevant political process documentation, with the purpose to determine the level of attention given to Kosovo by key policy makers, but also to detect whether the frames used by media and policy prescriptions they represented were accepted and followed by politicians. It also presents hypotheses that derive from the comparison of the results of the media and the policy process analyses in the Kosovo case study.

In order to analyze the time line of the political decision making process during the same time period used for media content analysis, all available policy documents, including the press-statements, transcripts of press-conferences, US Congress, UK House of Commons and UN Security Council debates transcripts, and public speeches of key decision makers about Kosovo in this time period were searched through. The purpose was to determine the level of attention given to this issue by key policy makers, but also to detect whether the frames used by media and policy prescriptions they represented were accepted and followed by politicians, and to discover observable implications of policy uncertainty or inconsistency which could reinforce possible media influence. Therefore, beside the framing analysis, the goal was to track possible indications of: “unstable and contradictory policy” that occurs when sub-systems (i.e. President - State Department - Congress, Prime Minister - Foreign Office - Parliament) are in disagreement with each other; “no policy” that is important in the context of crisis policy-making where unexpected events often occur; and “wavering policy” which changes frequently due to a lack of commitment to that policy amongst the sub-systems⁷²¹. The analysis began with some quantitative measurements. In order to determine the level of attention of policy makers, all public statements were counted, whether presented at press-conferences or in the form of press statements of key policy makers, including the US President, US Secretary of State, US Secretary for Defense, UK Prime Minister, UK Secretary of Defense, UK Foreign Secretary, NATO Secretary General and UN Secretary General; also included were discussions about Kosovo in the US Congress, UK House of Commons and UN Security Council, from January 15 to March 23, 1999. Those figures have been added now to the earlier charts showing the distribution of CNNI and BBCW stories about Kosovo. Although not every political discussion results in a public statement, which was the reason for me to use the interviews with officials describing the decision-making process in the qualitative analysis, it is reasonable to assume that every significant rise of attention would become apparent in this way.

QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS

As it can be seen from the charts bellow (Figures 6, 7, 8), public statements in these time periods had a very similar distribution pattern as news stories. Although transcripts of CNNI and BBCW do not provide information about the exact time during the day when

⁷²¹ George, A.L., 1980, *Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice.*, Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, p. 114, in Robinson P., 2002, *The CNN Effect: The myth of news, foreign policy and intervention*, Routledge, London and New York, p. 27

they were broadcast, analysis of the time line on a day-to-day basis should be sufficient to show who led and who followed in a rise of attention.

Figure 6: KOSOVO MEDIA COVERAGE AND POLITICIANS' STATEMENT - JANUARY 1999




Figure 7: KOSOVO MEDIA COVERAGE AND POLITICIANS' STATEMENTS - FEBRUARY 1999





Figure 8: KOSOVO MEDIA COVERAGE AND POLITICIANS' STATEMENTS - MARCH 1999



In January, beside some first reactions to the Racak massacre on the very day that the bodies were discovered (January 16), mostly in the form of written press statements, the greatest number of public statements was recorded after quite intensive media coverage of this incident. The biggest number of stories on CNNI and BBCW was broadcasted on the 17th and especially on the 18th of January, while the biggest number of statements after the Racak massacre was issued on January 19. Another time that month when policy makers more intensively publicly discussed the Kosovo issue was on January 26, the first day of the Contact Group's meeting and also the day of US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright's meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov in Moscow. A further spike of policy attention occurred on January 28-30, when the Contact Group agreed on the organization of peace talks and NATO allies threatened to strike if Serbs and Kosovo Albanians did not attend a peace conference. On January 26, the rise of politicians' attention coincided with the rise of media attention, more on CNNI than on BBCW, while in the second period, coverage of BBCW and again more CNNI actually followed this rise of attention – TV stations had the biggest number of stories on January 30, after a large number of statements on January 28 and 29.

In February, the greatest number of public statements was recorded before the beginning and at the very end of the first round of negotiations in Rambouillet, on February 4, and on February 23-24. On February 4, media attention also registered a rise; the majority of stories concerned Clinton's first announcement that the US administration was "seriously considering" the possibility of US participation in peacekeeping troops in Kosovo. After that, it was obvious that policy makers decided to keep a low profile during the negotiations themselves, especially at their very beginning. There was one exception from this period both in media coverage and in politicians' attention, on February 10, the day of the funeral of the Racak massacre victims, and since politicians mentioned TV pictures of the funeral in their statements, it is easy to conclude that media coverage preceded politicians' attention in this case and that they reacted to that. Media turned again to Kosovo issues in the last days of the negotiations, expecting some results to announce, while politicians issued the highest number of statements on February 23/24 when negotiations actually ended.

In March, policy makers reacted most intensively first after former Senator Bob Dole's successful meetings with Kosovo Albanians when he announced that the peace agreement "might have been signed"⁷²² already that day; second when Kosovo Albanians actually signed the agreement (March 18-19); and finally on March 22-23, when it became obvious that the last diplomatic effort, Richard Holbrooke's attempt to persuade Milosevic to accept the agreement failed and that the air strikes would take place. CNNI's attention to Kosovo did not begin to rise before the beginning of the second round of negotiations (it did not give lot of attention to the diplomatic efforts of Bob Dole) and culminated as would be expected toward the beginning of the air strikes. BBCW had the biggest number of items that month on March 13, reporting on the EU and Russian diplomatic efforts ahead of the beginning of negotiations, but also on the explosions in Mitrovica and Podujevo markets where 6 persons were killed and dozens injured – coverage that did not provoke any politicians' reactions, and as already noted, it reported the end of negotiations quite modestly.

As already indicated in the analysis of the media coverage, the quantitative comparison of media coverage and public statements of key policy makers showed that media could only possibly have a function of agenda-setter in one moment during this whole time period: in the aftermath of the Racak massacre. This will be investigated further in the qualitative analysis of policy documents.

QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS

JANUARY 1999

In the days before the Racak massacre, there were only a few public statements about Kosovo, mostly reactions to the release of eight members of the Yugoslav Army, taken prisoner by the Kosovo Liberation Army, and wounding of two members of the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission – one of them British, again by the KLA – which

⁷²² News conference with former Senator Robert Dole on Kosovo peace process, Skopje, Macedonia, March 5, 1999

condemned these “irresponsible actions”⁷²³ and called on “both sides” to maintain a full ceasefire”⁷²⁴. US officials were aware of the increasing danger of renewed fighting in the spring, but mentioned it only once, in the context of the safety of international personnel in Kosovo⁷²⁵. Media apparently began to play a significant role in the aftermath of the Racak massacre immediately after bodies were discovered. According to Walker’s personal account, “a whole bunch of journalists” went together with him from Pristina to Racak on the morning of January 16, and recorded his first reaction to the discovery of the bodies: “I told a couple of the interviewers that I’d seen massacres before. I’d seen people who’d been executed. But I’d never seen anything like this. This exceeded anything I’d seen before, especially that pile of bodies”⁷²⁶. It was media again who pressed Walker to give the official assessment of what actually took place in Racak, just a few hours later, without any secondary evidence confirmation and before, as he claims, any consultations with the OSCE Headquarter or Washington. “When I got back to the office again, a lot of the press followed us back. A lot of them were filing this sort of thing, and they wanted a press conference. I said to give me a half an hour to think of what I want to say. I sat down at my typewriter or my computer, and knocked out a few words. Then I went up and appeared before the press conference, which was a packed house... I didn’t consult with anyone before that. I knew that it takes forever to get permission to do something like that. And I really didn’t think anyone was going to question the motive behind my holding a press conference... I thought the world should know that this sort of thing was occurring.”⁷²⁷ US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright got the news from media on January 16: “I wake up to that news on the radio. We’d had information that there would be some kind of a Serb spring offensive—they pushed the people out, and in the spring, the Serbs would just move in and mow them down. My first reaction was that they had actually started their campaign of mowing down the Kosovars.”⁷²⁸ CNNI and BBCW left no doubt about what was discovered that day in Racak, calling it “an execution”⁷²⁹, “massacre of innocents”⁷³⁰ and even “crime against humanity”⁷³¹, committed by the Serbian troops. The same day, January 16, US President Clinton issued a written statement in which he condemned “the massacre of civilians by Serb security forces”, and described it as “a deliberate and indiscriminate act of murder designed to sow fear among the people of Kosovo”⁷³². The incident in Racak was described further on by US officials as a “barbaric atrocity”⁷³³ and an “outrageous massacre”⁷³⁴. For the UK Foreign Secretary Robin Cook, the Racak massacre was a “war

⁷²³ UK Foreign Secretary Robin Cook, FCO Press Release: Kosovo - Release of Yugoslav Army Hostages, January 13, 1999

⁷²⁴ UK Foreign Secretary Robin Cook, FCO Press Notice: Kosovo, January 15, 1999

⁷²⁵ James Rubin, US State Department spokesperson, State Department regular briefing, January 4, 1999

⁷²⁶ William Walker, Head of OSCE Verification Mission on Kosovo, interview for PBS Frontline, War in Europe, 2000

⁷²⁷ Ibid.

⁷²⁸ Madeleine Albright, US Secretary of State, interview for PBS Frontline, War in Europe, 2000

⁷²⁹ BBCW, January 16, 1999, Reporter: Jacky Rowland

⁷³⁰ CNNI, January 16, 1999, Reporter: Juliette Terzieff

⁷³¹ Ibid.

⁷³² Statement on the Situation in Kosovo, January 16, 1999, Public Papers of the Presidents, William J. Clinton – 1999, Volume 1

⁷³³ Joe Lockhart, White House Spokesman, The White House Regular Briefing, January 18, 1999

⁷³⁴ James Rubin, State Department spokesperson, US State Department Regular Briefing, January 19, 1999

crime”⁷³⁵ and other Members of the House of Commons joined him in the condemnation of the massacre in the session on January 18: “It was impossible to *witness those scenes on television* without being both deeply moved and deeply angered” (emphasis added).⁷³⁶ Therefore both media and the US and UK officials used the same frame for the Racak events: the frame introduced by the Head of OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission William Walker, used and developed by CNNI and BBCW, and followed by US and UK officials. Only one journalist’s question about the responsibility for the Racak massacre has been put at the press-conferences in this period: “You all are absolutely 100 percent certain that the Serbs carried out the massacre of 47 people? There’s absolutely no question in your mind?”⁷³⁷, and the position of the US officials remained very clear: “We have no reason whatsoever to dispute the account put forward by Ambassador Walker and his team, who were there on the scene very quickly and had a chance to investigate”⁷³⁸. For the comparison, UN representatives were much more restrained regarding the description of the event, UN General Secretary Kofi Annan was “shocked to learn today of the *alleged* massacre of some 40 individuals, *apparently* civilians, in Kosovo”⁷³⁹, with no mention of those responsible. Although the UN Security Council “strongly condemned the massacre of Kosovo Albanians” in Racak on January 19, it only “*took note* (Serb forces were not blamed directly) of the statement by the Head of the KVM that the responsibility for the massacre lay with Federal Republic of Yugoslavia security forces”⁷⁴⁰. For three days after the Racak massacre, despite some differences in the coverage, both CNNI and BBCW criticized Western countries’ decision to deploy only “an overstretched team”⁷⁴¹ of unarmed OSCE monitors in Kosovo, describing them as “largely impotent”⁷⁴² and “powerless”⁷⁴³ to stop the fighting. In BBCW and ITN reports for CNNI, Western governance was also criticized for lack of action before the Racak massacre, which seemingly “only postponed an all-out conflict in the province”⁷⁴⁴ and slowness after it actually took place: “while the international community considers its next move, people in Racak are leaving their homes”⁷⁴⁵. BBCW reported a “growing chorus for NATO ground troops to separate the two sides and force them to talk”⁷⁴⁶, while both channels underlined that NATO’s other members would not “step into Kosovo if US does not participate”⁷⁴⁷. Therefore media criticized exactly those parts of the October ceasefire agreement that the US administration decided to leave in force at the meeting on January 15, less than 24 hours before bodies in Racak were discovered, determined to keep the status quo and aware of the fact that, at the time, “the Europeans

⁷³⁵ House of Commons, Parliamentary Debate about Kosovo, January 18, 1999, 03.30

⁷³⁶ Michael Howard, Folkestone and Hythe, House of Commons, Parliamentary Debate about Kosovo, January 18, 1999, 03.30

⁷³⁷ State Department Regular Briefing, January 19, 1999

⁷³⁸ James Rubin, State Department spokesperson, State Department Regular Briefing, January 19, 1999

⁷³⁹ Spokesman for Secretary-General Kofi Annan, January 16, 1999, UN Press Release SG/SM/6864

⁷⁴⁰ UN Security Council President’s statement made on behalf of the Council after the 3967th meeting of the Security Council, held on January 19, 1999, UN Press Release SC/6628

⁷⁴¹ CNNI, January 17, 1999, Reporter: David Clinch

⁷⁴² BBCW, January 18, 1999, Reporter: Jim Fish

⁷⁴³ CNNI, January 18, 1999, Reporter: Bill Neely (ITN)

⁷⁴⁴ BBCW, January 18, 1999, Reporter: Jim Fish

⁷⁴⁵ CNNI, January 17, 1999, Reporter: Phillipa Young (ITN)

⁷⁴⁶ BBCW, January 18, 1999, Reporter: Jim Fish

⁷⁴⁷ CNNI, January 17, 1999, Reporter: Kathleen Koch; BBCW, January 18, 1999, Reporter: Jim Fish

opposed air strikes because the KLA was often responsible for breaking the October ceasefire and because there was no accompanying political strategy”⁷⁴⁸. But then Racak happened and “that’s on the front page of the newspaper...we again have pictures of bodies, of heads torn off, of torsos” which warned that “muddling through is no longer possible” and there is no possibility to “postpone the moment of deciding what to do”⁷⁴⁹. Consultations in Washington and with the US allies lasted for few days, creating a short policy vacuum. On January 19, State Department spokesman James Rubin announced: “We have not taken a position on whether we should go now to the use of air power... What we’ve said is that we would not provide combat ground troops to the force in Macedonia to extract the verifiers; that we’ve made no decision on what force, if any, we would deploy or participate in if there were a peace agreement, and we would obviously consult with Congress. And that’s where things stand right now.”⁷⁵⁰ The same day, President Clinton devoted only one sentence to Kosovo in his annual State of the Union’s address “...with our NATO allies, we are pressing the Serbian government to stop its brutal repression in Kosovo, to bring those responsible to justice, and give the people of Kosovo the self- government they deserve”⁷⁵¹ without mentioning any concrete action.

In the same time period, UK officials expressed contradictory positions toward the KLA: while Cook warned on January 18 that “the agenda of the KLA is not independence for Kosovo, but a Greater Albania”, a day later Blair recognized for the first time ever that, “it is also necessary to have the full participation of the Kosovar side as well, including the KLA”⁷⁵². It is indicative that on the same occasion, he repeated the word “act” several times: “we certainly remain ready to act”, “we must act in concert with others and with our allies”, “we must act to save thousands of innocent men, women and children from humanitarian catastrophe”, “we have no alternative, therefore, but to act”. “We are ready to take whatever action is necessary”, he concluded. The Prime Minister’s intention and willingness to intervene in Kosovo can be recognized from this speech before the House of Commons, and in fact, with the exception of some discussions about possible Western reactions argued more intensively by BBCW in this period, the words “act” and “action” did not appear in media before March 1999, ahead of the beginning of the air strikes.

That week, Albright, defense secretary William Cohen, national security adviser Sandy Berger, CIA director George Tenet and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Hugh Shelton met for several hours each day, analyzing the problem and debating the plans. They were aware that it would be hard to secure American public support for a unilateral US ground intervention in Kosovo, that it had to be done as a NATO action, and that US allies “wanted one final attempt at reaching a peace agreement before we went to the step of using force”⁷⁵³. Based on the October ceasefire agreement, Racak would have justified an immediate military response, but it also would have required a NATO consensus to do that. But at that time, it would have been hard to achieve it, particularly because it would

⁷⁴⁸ Rubin. J., September 30, 2000, *Financial Times*, London, p.9

⁷⁴⁹ Ivo Daalder, US foreign policy expert, former director for European Affairs at the National Security Council, interview for PBS Frontline, *War in Europe*, 2000

⁷⁵⁰ James Rubin, State Department spokesperson, State Department regular briefing, January 19, 1999

⁷⁵¹ Text of President William J. Clinton’s State of The Union Address, United States Capitol, Washington, Dc, January 19, 1999

⁷⁵² Prime Ministers Questions, January 20, 1999, House of Commons Official Report, *Hansard*, 1.475

⁷⁵³ Samuel Berger, US National Security Advisor, interview for PBS Frontline, *War in Europe*, 2000

have been a case “with no historical precedent, because it’s about the treatment of a group within a sovereign state”⁷⁵⁴.

On January 19 the new strategy, threatening bombing again if Milosevic did not go along with the West, but, for the first time, demanding that he accepts NATO troops in his own country to enforce a deal under which he would withdraw almost all of his security forces and grant Kosovo broad autonomy⁷⁵⁵, “was put to Clinton and he approved it”⁷⁵⁶. Two days later, President Clinton was on the phone to Prime Minister Tony Blair describing the new approach. “The two leaders agreed that there were two options: to initiate an immediate bombing campaign in reprisal for Racak, or to fashion a diplomatic solution that included ground troops as peacekeepers in Kosovo, according to a White House aide who listened in on the conversation.” Blair said that ground troops could not be used to fight a war, but only as part of a political strategy,” the official said. “The President said, ‘I completely agree with you on that. If we sent in a ground force without some sort of agreement beforehand, sooner or later they’re sitting ducks for either side who is willing to provoke something.’”⁷⁵⁷ So, the US-UK policy over Kosovo emerged: the threat of air strikes (on January 20 NATO agreed to shorten the notice to move its aircraft from 96 to 48 hours), but no immediate military response; the organization of peace talks and American soldiers joining a NATO peacekeeping force if an agreement was reached; this was agreed already January 19-21 and would remain as such throughout the whole period until the beginning of NATO air campaign.

According to Albright’s associates, she had a long term frustration with Milosevic⁷⁵⁸ and there was no doubt for her that in dealing with Milosevic it was essential “to be prepared, if necessary, to use force, because force is the only language he appears to understand”⁷⁵⁹ and she repeated the same message several times: “President Milosevic understands only the language of force”⁷⁶⁰. Albright was a driving force behind the US moves in Kosovo and for her team Racak presented “a window opened for a decisive shift in western capitals”⁷⁶¹. Marshall Freeman Harris, senior foreign policy advisor of US Senator Bob Dole who was actively involved in the Kosovo negotiations, believes that the Clinton Administration saw Racak as “another example of the horrors that Milosevic could inflict”: “With Kosovo, however, the writing was already on the wall. Racak or no Racak, the Administration knew that it had to act”⁷⁶². But some officials, like Walker,

⁷⁵⁴ Richard Holbrooke, US diplomat, interview for PBS Frontline, War in Europe, 2000

⁷⁵⁵ Sciolino, E. and E. Bronner, April 18, 1999, Crisis in The Balkans: The Road to War - A special report; How a President, Distracted by Scandal, Entered Balkan War, The New York Times, Section 1; Page 1; Column 2

⁷⁵⁶ Rubin, J., September 30, 2000, A Very Personal War, Financial Times, London, p. 9

⁷⁵⁷ Sciolino, E. and E. Bronner, April 18, 1999, Crisis in The Balkans: The Road to War - A special report; How a President, Distracted by Scandal, Entered Balkan War, The New York Times, Section 1; Page 1; Column 2

⁷⁵⁸ Rubin, J., September 30, 2000, A Very Personal War, Financial Times, London, p. 9

⁷⁵⁹ Remarks by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright to Center for National Policy, Washington Court Hotel, Washington, D.C., January 21, 1999

⁷⁶⁰ Remarks by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright to the U.S. Institute Of Peace, USIP, Washington, Dc, February 4, 1999

⁷⁶¹ Rubin, J., September 30, 2000, A Very Personal War, Financial Times, London, p. 9

⁷⁶² Marshall Freeman Harris, US Senator Bob Dole’s senior foreign policy advisor, interview with the author of the thesis, July 19, 2007

think that “the consequences derive more from the incredible press that covered that story and described Racak”: “Everybody saw that our unarmed verification mission was making a difference, but not the sort of difference that would push this peace process forward... Racak was mentioned over and over again, that we’ve got to do something”. Alexander Versbow, who was a permanent US ambassador to NATO Council, also noted “a significant CNN effect at this time”⁷⁶³. US special envoy Christopher Hill claimed that “the press reinforced the pressure that we have to do something in Kosovo”⁷⁶⁴.

“They needed something like Racak to happen”, David Loyne, a BBC journalist who covered the Kosovo events in 1998, said in an interview with the author of this thesis, underlining that the UK (and US) government was already before that determined to intervene in Kosovo. He believes that things began to move in that direction with the massacre in Gornje Obrinje in summer of 1998, when eighteen people were killed with knives, or shots to the head, i.e. with the pictures of the victims of this massacre, that appeared in media all around the world and according to him, resulted in the ceasefire agreement and deployment of OSCE monitors. The presence of the OSCE monitors, and even more significantly, a trustable US official on the ground was, he pointed out, exactly the distinctive characteristic that made the Racak massacre a turning point in Kosovo⁷⁶⁵. Kent also claims that the Kosovo crisis was only constituted as a global crisis after international monitors were inserted on the ground: “prior to this Western intervention, there was less than extensive coverage of the plight of several hundred thousand dispossessed in late 1998”⁷⁶⁶. Alan Little, another BBC correspondent in Kosovo believes that already in March 1998, an action by Serb police in which 53 members of one Albanian family were killed in Prekaz village near Drenica was to change international public opinion about what was going in Kosovo and as such presented “a ruthless favour to the Kosovo Liberation Army”, but he also underlined the importance of Racak event: “That massacre changed everything”⁷⁶⁷. Just a week before the Racak massacre, a representative of the OSCE observer mission was quoted warning that the situation was worsening in Kosovo and at the same time blaming the KLA as “responsible for most provocations”⁷⁶⁸.

What is the importance of the Racak events in the context of this research? From the media side, the incident there included all aspects needed for fast reaction and intensive and dramatic coverage: shocking pictures of victims’ bodies and the grief of their relatives and, at the same time, a reliable person (from the US, but not representing the US government at that moment) who was able to immediately satisfy their need for the

⁷⁶³ Robinson, P., 2002, interview with author, 1 March 2001, *The CNN Effect: The Myth Of News, Foreign Policy, And Intervention*, London: Routledge, p. 95

⁷⁶⁴ Hill, interviewed in Saberi, R, 2000, *The Relationship between US Foreign Policy on Kosovo and CNN’s Coverage of the Crisis*, unpublished MPhil Thesis, University of Cambridge: 32, in Robinson, P., 2002, *The CNN Effect: The Myth Of News, Foreign Policy, And Intervention*, London: Routledge, p. 95

⁷⁶⁵ David Loyn, BBC journalist, interview with the author of the thesis, September 18, 2008

⁷⁶⁶ Kent, G., 2005, *Framing War And Genocide, British Policy and News Media Reaction to the War in Bosnia*, Hampton Press Communication Series: Political Communication, p. 198

⁷⁶⁷ Little, A., 12 March, 2000, *Behind the Kosovo crisis*, BBC News, available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/674056.stm>

⁷⁶⁸ Gabriel Keller, OSCE observer mission, quoted in ‘Kosovo rebels ambush police, take soldiers hostage’, CNN, January 8, 1999, available at <http://edition.cnn.com/WORLD/europe/9901/08/kosovo.01/index.html>

frame of the story. That frame, which clearly separated the perpetrators and victims contrary to the more balanced accounts noted before, was not changed and not questioned at any point and in any way during the following period, and it was reinforced by the further critical analysis of what Western governments had and had not done about Kosovo. At the same time, although aware of the necessity to deal with the Kosovo crisis at once and reportedly determined to do so, politicians did not have a plan to act that quickly. Ignatieff described it as “the hard truth” about America never having a coherent Balkans policy: “For a decade, America’s policies had been driven by massacre, crisis and catastrophe.”⁷⁶⁹ On one of the main open questions in ongoing discussions about media effects, whether it is an event or its coverage that presages politicians’ decisions, I would suggest that in a case like Racak they were forced to react to the facts on the ground that became visible through media coverage. Media did not change the outcome of the policy process, but they apparently did influence an environment in which this policy process took place: they were already on the ground, demanding an explanation of what happened in Racak; and likewise in the following days, through its aftermath coverage.

Although agreed already in the middle of January, a decision about peacekeeping troops was not publicly announced for some time. It was only said that the idea of sending US ground forces into Kosovo in the absence of a negotiated settlement agreed to by both sides, “has been ruled out”⁷⁷⁰ and it was repeated many times in this period: “the President has always said that he has no intention, plans to put any combat forces into a hostile environment”⁷⁷¹. UK officials more openly announced plans, but also insisted on peace negotiations: “If NATO is involved in considering military action, whether from the air or, subsequent to a political agreement, on the ground, Britain would of course want to be associated with any collective decision on that basis. In the meantime, the pressure must be on the two warring parties to establish a political dialogue and come to a long-term agreement, without which there will be no peace in Kosovo.”⁷⁷²

January 28-30 were important days: the Contact Group held a meeting in London at which the organization of peace talks in France was agreed and the final warning of NATO Secretary General Javier Solana was issued to Yugoslav President: “The Council has therefore agreed today that the NATO Secretary-General may authorize air strikes against targets on territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.”⁷⁷³ This time it was supported by the UN too, which can be seen in UN General Secretary Kofi Annan’s address to NATO on January 28 in Brussels: “The bloody wars of the last decade have left us with no illusions about the difficulty of halting internal conflicts—by reason or by force—particularly against the wishes of the government of a sovereign State. But nor have they left us with any illusions about the need to use force, when all other means have failed. We may be reaching that limit, once again, in the former Yugoslavia. And

⁷⁶⁹ Ignatieff, M., 2001, *Virtual War; Kosovo And Beyond*, Vintage, p. 65

⁷⁷⁰ James Foley, State Department Regular Briefing, January 25, 1999

⁷⁷¹ Joe Lockhart, White House Spokesman, The White House Regular Briefing, January 27, 1999

⁷⁷² George Robertson, UK Secretary of State for Defense, House of Commons Hansard Debates for January 25, 1999 (pt 3)

⁷⁷³ Letter dated 30 January 1999 from the Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Javier Solana addressed to the President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Slobodan Milosevic, UN S/199/107

now, Racak has been added to the list of crimes against humanity committed in the former Yugoslavia”⁷⁷⁴.

On January 29 US President Clinton expressed support for the peace talks: “Both sides now have an opportunity to stop a war that neither side can win and to start building a better future for all the people by peaceful means”⁷⁷⁵ and the following days were a period of intensive international pressure on Kosovo Albanians to participate in the talks and accept the peace agreement. US officials promised them from the beginning that “they will have a very, very high degree of self-government if they will come to Chateau Rambouillet and negotiate seriously”⁷⁷⁶, but they were also warned that if they refuse to do it, “the international community... would almost assuredly lose its enthusiasm for supporting the Kosovo Albanians in their aspiration for legitimate rights and in their effort to avoid being attacked by the Serbs, and furthermore, that we would take steps to cut off their ability to continue the conflict.”⁷⁷⁷

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One of the journalists’ questions posed at the State Department regular briefing on February 1 recapitulated much of the US media’s attitude toward the American engagement in Kosovo, often expressed on CNNI: “But with the United States taking most of the air responsibility, all of the naval responsibility as far as I know, all of the diplomatic responsibility, does the United States really need to get into Kosovo with ground forces? Haven’t we done enough?” But despite media criticisms, ahead of the beginning of peace talks, US officials began to introduce the idea of US participation in NATO ground troops: “If a settlement—and this is a big “if”—if a settlement is reached, a NATO presence on the ground in Kosovo could prove essential in giving both sides the confidence they need to pull back from their fights. If that happens, we are *seriously considering* the possibility of our participation in such a force. We are discussing it now with Congress and our allies. *No decision has been reached*” (emphasis added)⁷⁷⁸, with some first concrete figures too: “So if you get a smaller force and they came out to be 20000, our numbers could be very low, down maybe possibly as low as 2000 to 4000.”⁷⁷⁹ It was justified with the US intention “to keep the American link with NATO and to maintain our leadership within the NATO alliance”⁷⁸⁰ At the very beginning of the talks it was announced that “a news blockade has been imposed on the talks to encourage the parties to focus on the discussions rather than on telling the world how they are going”⁷⁸¹

⁷⁷⁴ Text of a statement made January 28 by Secretary-General Kofi Annan to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Brussels, UN Press Release, SG/SM/6878

⁷⁷⁵ Remarks by President Bill Clinton at Breakfast with Members of The U.S. Conference of Mayors, January 29, 1999

⁷⁷⁶ James Rubin, State Department Regular Briefing, February 1, 1999

⁷⁷⁷ James Rubin, State Department Regular Briefing, February 2, 1999; repeated by Madeleine Albright, US Secretary of State, in the Newshour with Jim Lehrer on February 4, 1999

⁷⁷⁸ Remarks By President Bill Clinton At The Presentation Of The Malcolm Baldrige Awards, The Grand Hyatt Hotel 1000 H Street Nw Washington, D.C., February 4, 1999

⁷⁷⁹ US General Henry H. Shelton, Hearing of The Senate Armed Services Committee Subject: Fy 2000 Department Of Defense Authorization Request, February 3, 1999

⁷⁸⁰ Madeleine Albright, US Secretary of State, in the Newshour with Jim Lehrer on February 4, 1999

⁷⁸¹ George Robertson, UK Secretary of State for Defense, House of Commons, February 11, 1999

which could explain the relatively small number of items on CNNI and BBCW in this period.

Television pictures from Racak, this time of the funeral of the massacre's 45 victims, were mentioned several times during the debate in the UK House of Commons on February 11: "*The scenes on television today* and the atrocities that have occurred before and during the past few weeks, have moved people across the world. That is why the talks are going on, and why, in many ways, it is remarkable that both parties are sitting down together in that chateau near Paris. It is why we must all hope that the talks are successful" (emphasis added)⁷⁸²; "If anyone doubts the need for a negotiated settlement, perhaps the *scenes of today's mass burial* in Kosovo will remove those doubts" (emphasis added)⁷⁸³. On this occasion, UK Secretary of Defense George Robertson underlined that Kosovo is "a European crisis", and that "a possible British commitment of some 8000 troops would be involved". On February 14, in an article in London's *The Independent* Blair explained that UK "responsibilities do not end at the English Channel", and he mentioned too the television scenes of burial in Kosovo: "The burial of 45 Albanians killed in the massacre at Racak that *many of us saw on television last week*, is a stark reminder of the price of failure" (emphasis added).⁷⁸⁴ The article was published exactly one day after President Clinton officially confirmed for the first time the US participation in NATO forces in Kosovo with a share that "would amount to a little less than 4000 personnel", justifying it with three reasons: the possibility of "a tremendous loss of life and a massive refugee crisis in the middle of Europe", the serious risk of the hostilities spreading to Albania and Macedonia, and even NATO allies, Greece and Turkey, and American participation as a provider of confidence, "particularly for Kosovo's Albanians"⁷⁸⁵. It was obvious that he waited for a more auspicious political atmosphere for this announcement, i.e. for the US Senate to acquit him of charges that he had committed perjury and obstructed justice in the Monica Lewinsky affair, which was done on February 12. It is also suggested by the fact that although the US policy was already agreed on January 19, until February 13 Clinton issued only 3 public statements mentioning Kosovo, including the State of the Union address, while between February 13 and March 23, he made 15 public statements mentioning Kosovo, and in some of them, Kosovo was the main subject of the address.

Although the US officials were very determined to finish the peace talks on February 20 as planned, as could be seen in the public statements given on February 18 by Clinton ("I think it would be a mistake to extend the deadline"⁷⁸⁶) and Albright ("We believe that these talks have to have a positive end and that they have to meet the deadline of Saturday noon and that a military operation will proceed if that deadline is not met...The Saturday deadline is firm."⁷⁸⁷), it looks like they underestimated the situation, i.e. the stubbornness of Kosovo Albanians in refusing some parts of the agreement and the Europeans' resolve to give more chance to a peaceful solution. After a deadline was

⁷⁸² Ibid.

⁷⁸³ Mr. Menzies Campbell, North-East Fife, House of Commons, February 11, 1999

⁷⁸⁴ Tony Blair, *The Independent* (London), February 14, 1999, Page 28

⁷⁸⁵ President Clinton's Weekly Radio Address, February 13, 1999

⁷⁸⁶ Press Conference with President Bill Clinton and French President Jacques Chirac, The White House, February 19, 1999

⁷⁸⁷ Madeleine Albright, US Secretary of State, in the Newshour with Jim Lehrer on February 18, 1999

extended for three more days, there was no public statement until February 22, contrary to extensive media coverage. BBCW's report from Belgrade was very critical toward the extension of the deadline that is "being seen in Serbia as a victory for Belgrade" out of which "Milosevic will be making maximum political capital", and it was announced with the headline: "Serb negotiators have forced the International community to back down"⁷⁸⁸. But their reports did not forget to mention in this period that "it is not just the Serbs who are the problem"⁷⁸⁹ and in general it still preferred the peaceful solution over military intervention. At the press conference of the White House's spokesman on February 22, all journalists were wondering "was it a mistake for the president to put down such a heavy marker on Friday", "was the president not informed of what the negotiating posture" was, and has the president's credibility "been damaged". CNNI was much less critical about this decision, reporting that the "US reluctantly agreed to a new deadline for the Kosovo peace talks"⁷⁹⁰ and that "Western powers continue to hope for the best, but plan for the worst"⁷⁹¹, in contrast to (for example) the US daily New York Times that published on February 22, that it was "inability of Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright to get the ethnic Albanian delegation to agree to the detailed plan being offered" that made it "impossible to end the talks and go ahead with NATO's threatened air strikes"⁷⁹².

Even on the very last day of the first three-day extension, when the second round of negotiations was going to be announced, in Washington it was not clear yet what would happen: to a journalist's question: "You extended the deadline again, sir, is that it?", Clinton replied: "Well, that's—no—I don't know. That's up to the parties."⁷⁹³ The extension was explained in the following days as the fulfilling of both parties requests⁷⁹⁴, but it was also underlined that in those three weeks, "the negotiations have produced more progress than we have seen in the decade since Kosovo's autonomy was stripped away by the Government in Belgrade"⁷⁹⁵

In general, neither CNNI nor BBCW insisted on military action against the Serbs, since both sides were presented as equally responsible for the failure to reach agreement. A survey conducted before the very end of negotiations in Rambouillet showed that the US public at that time had a similar position: they were in favor of committing a small number of ground troops in order to help establish peace in that region – 66%; but not very sure about participation in air and missile attacks against Serb military installations - 43% were in favor and 45% opposed⁷⁹⁶.

⁷⁸⁸ BBCW, February 21, 1999, Reporter: Jacky Rowland

⁷⁸⁹ BBCW, February 21, 1999, Reporter: John Leyne

⁷⁹⁰ CNNI, February 20, 1999, Reporter: Chris Black

⁷⁹¹ CNNI, February 20, 1999, Reporter: Brent Sadler

⁷⁹² Erlanger, S., February 22, 1999, Albanian 'Nay' Puts Milosevic in Role of Yea-Sayer, The New York Times, Section A; Page 6; Column 1

⁷⁹³ Remarks by President Bill Clinton at Meeting with Congressional Leadership, February 23, 1999

⁷⁹⁴ Joe Lockhart, White House Spokesman, White House regular briefing, February 22, 1999; Bill Clinton, Joint Press Conference With President Bill Clinton and President Jerry Rawlings of Ghana, The White House, February 24, 1999

⁷⁹⁵ President Bill Clinton Statement on the Kosovo Peace Talks, February 23, 1999

⁷⁹⁶ Public Opinion Online, February 22, 1999

Although some inconsistent public statements regarding the duration of the peace negotiations have been recorded during their last days, one can conclude that the reason was not a disagreement among key policy makers, i.e. representatives of executive power in both the US and the UK, but the unexpected refusal of Kosovo Albanians to sign a peace agreement. Without it, it was impossible to implement either of the options of the US (and UK) policy: to bomb Serbia because of its non-compliance or to enforce a peace deal with NATO ground troops in Kosovo. Although US Secretary of Defense William Cohen warned that the US does not want to see “a situation in which NATO forces are committed to the region only as an excuse for one or more parties to try to take advantage and exploit it to achieve something inconsistent with the agreement itself”⁷⁹⁷, referring mostly to the Kosovo Albanians, the majority of US and UK public officials’ statements at that time were much more favorable toward the Kosovo Albanians than media were, underlining that “for 10 years Kosovo’s Albanian population fought a courageous nonviolent campaign to regain the rights they had lost”⁷⁹⁸ and that “they earned the admiration of the world and the attention of successive US administrations”⁷⁹⁹. They left no doubt about how the conflict actually started: “a year ago, Serbian forces launched a brutal crackdown against Kosovo’s ethnic Albanians”⁸⁰⁰, adding also that “President Milosevic is not only blocking the achievement of a settlement, he has also, until now, failed to comply with virtually all the demands of the international community as expressed in relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions”⁸⁰¹. And while officials began to introduce the idea of NATO peacekeeping troops and US participation in it, media rarely discussed this option, again more BBCW than CNNI.

In comparison to an unexpected and dramatic event such as the Racak massacre, the relation between media and politicians during the official event of the Rambouillet peace negotiations was totally different. Unlike Racak, when media reacted first, Rambouillet was clearly an example of media following the politicians’ actions, but apparently with no influence in frame setting in either direction: media tended to treat sides almost equally and insisted on the peaceful solution, while politicians were much more in favor of Kosovo Albanians and were already presenting the possibility of military involvement.

Although some foreign policy experts believe that the KLA's refusal to sign the Rambouillet agreement in the first round of talks “let the NATO alliance off the moral hook and should have been used as an opportunity to step back”⁸⁰², it was obvious that US officials did not change their course and that they believed they could get (at least) Kosovo Albanians’ signature at the end. Therefore the main US administration priority at that moment was to promote the idea of US interest in the Kosovo crisis and this can be noted from the public statements in the period after the end of the first round of negotiations. The word “interest” was mentioned in almost every single public statement by President Clinton until the very beginning of NATO air strikes, but in a totally

⁷⁹⁷ Kozaryn Linda D., Feb. 8, 1999, Cohen Talks Kosovo, Iraq with European Allies, American Forces Press Service

⁷⁹⁸ Remarks of the Secretary of State Madeleine Albright to the US Institute Of Peace, Kosovo, USIP, Washington, Dc, February 4, 1999

⁷⁹⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰⁰ President Bill Clinton's Weekly Radio Address, February 13, 1999

⁸⁰¹ James Foley, Deputy Spokesman, State Department Regular Briefing, February 17, 1999

⁸⁰² Nye, J.S. Jr., Redefining the National Interest, Foreign Affairs, 78(4), July/August, 1999, p. 22

different context to the way it was used by CNNI; for example: “the United States does have a direct interest in whether there is instability in the Balkans”⁸⁰³, “we have a clear national interest in ensuring that Kosovo is where this trouble ends”⁸⁰⁴, “America has a national interest in achieving this peace...America cannot be everywhere or do everything overseas, but we must act when important interests are at stake and we can make a difference.”⁸⁰⁵ Three specific issues were promoted in this context: protection of “the regional stability for America that has a fundamental interest in peace and stability in Europe generally, and hence in southern Europe”; preservation of the progress made in Bosnia “which would be jeopardized by renewed violence in nearby Kosovo”; and maintaining “the capability and credibility of NATO”⁸⁰⁶. But although CNNI broadcasted Clinton’s soundbites 26 times from February 13 to March 23, on 8 different days in this period, his frame of US state interest was not reused on this channel; it actually mostly insisted on lack of interest and on dangers and risk to US pilots, a position that was taken by a significant number of US Senators. For example, one of the US official justifications for the intervention - risk to the NATO allies Greece and Turkey – was never mentioned on CNNI. It is interesting to note that the US public also did not accept that frame since the results of two public surveys conducted on March 23, the day before the beginning of air strikes, showed that more than half of interviewed Americans answered no to the question whether it is in the US’s own vital interest to be involved in Kosovo – even though, according to surveys’ answers, the US had a “moral obligation” to help keep the peace in Kosovo⁸⁰⁷. CNNI also reported on US public skepticism about US national interest in Kosovo, publishing results of a Gallup survey on March 23, with the remark that “crisis in Kosovo has now ended on America’s doorstep”⁸⁰⁸. Another proof of the absence of an automatic link between the intensive usage of official sources and promotion of their frames in media coverage is the “lessons from Bosnia” frame. US officials began to use this frame in February 1999, and insisted on it more and more toward the start of NATO air strikes: “Simply put, we learned in Bosnia that we can pay early or we can pay much more later”⁸⁰⁹; “But Bosnia taught us a lesson. In this volatile region, violence we fail to oppose leads to even greater violence we will have to oppose later, at greater cost”⁸¹⁰; “In Kosovo, we will not repeat those early mistakes in Bosnia”⁸¹¹; “We are determined to avoid in Kosovo a repeat of the terrible, senseless

⁸⁰³ Joint Press Conference with President Clinton and President Jerry Rawlings of Ghana, The White House, February 24, 1999

⁸⁰⁴ Foreign Policy Address By President Bill Clinton, The Grand Hyatt Hotel On Union Square, San Francisco, California, February 26, 1999

⁸⁰⁵ US President Bill Clinton’s radio address, March 18, 1999

⁸⁰⁶ Walter B. Slocombe, Under Secretary Of Defense For Policy, Before The Senate Armed Services Committee, Subject – Kosovo, February 25, 1999

⁸⁰⁷ Public Opinion Online, March 23, 1999, Organization conducting survey: ABC News; Public Opinion Online, March 23, 1999, Organization conducting survey: Gallup

⁸⁰⁸ CNNI, March 23, 1999, Reporter: Brian Cabell

⁸⁰⁹ Secretary Of State Madeleine Albright Remarks To The U.S. Institute Of Peace, Washington, DC, February 4, 1999

⁸¹⁰ US President Clinton’s Weekly Radio Address, February 13, 1999

⁸¹¹ UK Prime Minister Tony Blair, NATO 50th Anniversary Conference - NATO, Europe, Our Future Security, March 8, 1999

bloodshed of Bosnia”⁸¹²; “So what have we learned from Bosnia? We learned that if you don’t stand up to brutality and the killing of innocent people, you invite the people who do it to do more of it. We learned that firmness can save lives and stop armies”⁸¹³; “Now we have a chance to take the lessons we learned in Bosnia and put them to work in Kosovo before it’s too late”⁸¹⁴; “We act also because we know from bitter experience throughout this century, most recently in Bosnia, that instability and civil war in one part of the Balkans inevitably spills over into the whole of it, and affects the rest of Europe”⁸¹⁵. BBCW mentioned Bosnia in the Kosovo context twice: immediately after the Racak massacre (before US officials began to use this frame), when journalists, criticizing the indecisiveness of Western governments in Kosovo, warned that parallels with Bosnia are “hauntingly similar”⁸¹⁶; and another time on March 15, describing a chronology of the Kosovo story. CNNI did not use this frame at all.

There was great reluctance on the part of most members of US Congress to intervene in Kosovo at that time, and especially to commit American forces, even to a peacekeeping mission. Many opposing opinions on the administration’s policy on Kosovo were expressed in the Congress session. One of the indications of the US Senate’s mood was the remark of the US Senator Jim Inhofe before the Senate Armed Services Committee on February 25, commenting on the reasons for US intervention in Kosovo: “You don’t use the loss of life as justification for going into and potentially sending ground troops into Kosovo. Is that correct?... I just don’t like to hear that argument.”⁸¹⁷ US Senators expressed doubt “whether it is a real peace agreement if that peace agreement is arrived at through bombing”⁸¹⁸. Against the advice of the US administration, Congress held a discussion about Resolution 42 - the Peacekeeping Operations in Kosovo Resolution, on March 11, which was criticized by both President Clinton and US State Department officials. Clinton said: “I do not believe that the Congress should take any action that will, in effect, preempt the peace process or encourage either side to say no to it. So I thought it was premature... Every President has reserved the right to both receive the advice and consent and support or endure the opposition of Congress, but not to give up the constitutional responsibility to deploy United States forces in peacetime”⁸¹⁹. According to the State Department: “Our view is that an excessive debate or negative signal from Capitol Hill could complicate our ability to get the Kosovar Albanian agreement to sign, without which we can’t put the military pressure on the Serbs that is necessary to get them to agree to the peace plan. So we believe that this could be a

⁸¹² Remarks By President Bill Clinton At Ceremony Honoring The Late Yitzhak Rabin, The White House, March 19, 1999

⁸¹³ Remarks By President Bill Clinton To AFSCME Conference With Remarks On Kosovo Omni Shoreham Hotel, Washington, D.C., March 23, 1999

⁸¹⁴ Ibid.

⁸¹⁵ UK Prime Minister Tony Blair, House Of Commons, March 23, 1999

⁸¹⁶ BBCW, January 18, 1999, Reporter: Jim Fish

⁸¹⁷ US Senator Jim Inhofe (R-Okla.), The Senate Armed Services Committee, Subject – Kosovo, February 25, 1999

⁸¹⁸ Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison, (R-Tx.), Senate Floor Speech, March 19, 1999

⁸¹⁹ Remarks by President Bill Clinton at Signing Ceremony and Summit Closing Statements Casa Santo Domingo, Convention Center Antigua, Guatemala, March 11, 1999

complicating factor that could destroy the ability of the peace process we've instituted to work."⁸²⁰

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But, as soon as the Kosovo Albanians signed the peace agreement, on March 18, the situation became "as clear as it could be": "The Albanians have said yes to the accords and the Serbs are saying no. At the same time, Belgrade's security forces are stepping up their unjustified and aggressive actions in Kosovo and if Belgrade doesn't reverse its course, the Serbs alone will be responsible for the consequences."⁸²¹ On March 19, Clinton addressed the Congress and media, with the same message: "Make no mistake; if we and our allies do not have the will to act, there will be more massacres. In dealing with aggressors in the Balkans, hesitation is a license to kill... This is a conflict with no natural boundaries. It threatens our national interests... But we must weigh those risks against the risks of inaction... So from my point of view, as I made clear to the Congress today, I think the threshold for their conduct has already been crossed."⁸²² On March 20, in Washington, US President Bill Clinton's national security team huddled at the White House to discuss plans for NATO air strikes on Yugoslavia. On the same day, the United States and some other Western nations began wholesale evacuations of their diplomatic staff in Belgrade, while the last of the international monitors from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe crossed the border from Kosovo into Macedonia. There were not many public statements during the last weekend before NATO air strikes, the weekend when it was decided to make a final diplomatic effort and send the US special envoy Richard Holbrooke to get Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic to sign up to a peace plan for Kosovo. "We are ready to do it, and President Milosevic should not misunderstand that," said British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook in an interview with the BBC."⁸²³ A day after that, the Mail on Sunday quoted Cook describing the situation "as very grave". "If there is no progress, then we are looking at a time scale of a matter of days in which action can begin... Those preparations are now under way," he said.⁸²⁴ During the last days before the beginning of the NATO campaign the same messages were simultaneously sent by the US and UK officials. On March 22, Clinton underlined that "there is strong unity among the NATO allies; we all agree that we cannot allow President Milosevic to continue the aggression with impunity... Serbia's mounting aggression must be stopped"⁸²⁵ while Robertson warned that "we are perhaps on the brink of a real humanitarian catastrophe in Kosovo. Our choice is either to stand by as the blood and the refugees flow or to take on the aggressor with determination and with a will to stop the carnage."⁸²⁶

⁸²⁰ James Rubin, State Department spokesperson, State Department Regular Briefing, March 11, 1999

⁸²¹ Remarks By Secretary Of State Madeleine Albright Prior To Senate Foreign Policy Briefing, Senate Crypt, U.S. Capitol, Washington, D.C., March 18, 1999

⁸²² Stakeout Following Congressional Leaders meeting with President Bill Clinton, White House Driveway, Washington, D.C., March 19, 1999; Press Conference With President Bill Clinton, The White House, Washington, D.C., March 19, 1999

⁸²³ All eyes on Belgrade as U.S. makes final plea to Milosevic, CNN, March 21, 1999

⁸²⁴ Sunday Mail, March 21, 1999, NATO Clears the Decks for Serbian Air Strikes, p. 26

⁸²⁵ Statement By President Bill Clinton Regarding Situation In Kosovo, The South Lawn, The White House, Washington, D.C., March 22, 1999

⁸²⁶ George Robertson, UK Secretary of State for Defense, House of Commons, Monday 22 March 1999

On March 23, Clinton referred to television and specifically CNN's role in this conflict two times on the same occasion: once quoting one Congress member whom he met that morning and who told him: "Mr. President, I support your policy, but most of my folks couldn't find Kosovo on a map. They don't know where it is. And they never thought about it before it appeared on CNN"; and another time warning "if you've been watching on the television, you know they have now started rolling from village to village, predominantly in north-central Kosovo, shelling civilians, torching their homes so they can't come back". His rhetoric strengthened the last day before the NATO air strikes; he compared Kosovo this time not only with Bosnia, but also with the WWII: "And so what—I want to talk to you about Kosovo today, but just remember this; it's about our values. What if someone had listened to Winston Churchill and stood up to Adolf Hitler earlier? How many peoples' lives might have been saved, and how many American lives might have been saved?" He mentioned the risk to US pilots, but concluded: "So apart from the humanitarian issue and apart from our interest in Kosovo, this thing has no natural boundaries"⁸²⁷. President Clinton obviously wanted to construct an image of the Kosovo conflict around three key elements which (1) established a link between the Second World War Nazi regime and the Belgrade regime; (2) demonized the Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic, not only as a criminal dictator like Hitler, but also as a leader that refused all peace proposals; (3) reiterated that peace and prosperity in Europe was of central interest for the USA.⁸²⁸ The same day, the same message from the UK Prime Minister Blair: "Britain stands ready with its NATO allies to take military action... We act also because we know from bitter experience throughout this century, most recently in Bosnia, that instability and civil war in one part of the Balkans inevitably spills over into the whole of it, and affects the rest of Europe, too... To walk away now would not merely destroy NATO's credibility; more importantly, it would be a breach of faith with thousands of innocent civilians... in my judgment, the consequences of not acting are more serious still for human life and for peace in the long term."⁸²⁹ He emphasized the justice of the cause, using an emotional and rhetorical style in his statements which promoted the image of "humanitarian bombings"⁸³⁰.

As soon as the Kosovo Albanians signed a peace deal, the US and UK policy makers started again to promote the policy agreed two months earlier, despite the opposing voices, partly from the US Congressmen and partly from journalists themselves, which could be heard on CNN. BBCW's coverage, although also critical toward the Western governments for being "far from united"⁸³¹, became more positive after the Kosovo Albanians' signature. But, it also has to be noted that – with the exception of some doubt about the KLA's intentions in Kosovo expressed in the first few days after Racak massacre – not a single negative public statement by any UK MP or government official

⁸²⁷ Remarks by President Bill Clinton to AFSCME Conference, Omni Shoreham Hotel, Washington, D.C., March 23, 1999

⁸²⁸ Nohrstedt, S. A., Kaitatzi-Whitlock, S., Ottosen, R. and K. Riegert, 2000, *From The Persian Gulf To Kosovo – War Journalism And Propaganda*, European Journal of Communication, Sage Publications London, Thousand Oaks CA and New Delhi, Vol. 15 (3): 383-404

⁸²⁹ The Prime Minister Tony Blair, House of Commons, March 23, 1999

⁸³⁰ Nohrstedt, S. A., Kaitatzi-Whitlock, S., Ottosen, R. and K. Riegert, 2000, *From The Persian Gulf To Kosovo – War Journalism And Propaganda*, European Journal of Communication, Sage Publications London, Thousand Oaks CA and New Delhi, Vol. 15 (3): 383-404

⁸³¹ BBCW, March 15, 1999, Reporter: Jim Fish

toward UK involvement in Kosovo has been recorded throughout the whole investigated period.

SUMMARY

There are some important conclusions to be drawn about the relationship between media and politicians in this period. It is obvious that media were not the one who set the agenda in February and March 1999 – during conventional events like the Paris talks and the signature of the peace agreement, and especially during the final official (and secret) discussions about the start of the NATO campaign, media only followed the events and reported on the discussions. But *how* those events and discussions have been reported is a totally different issue.

As noted in the media coverage analysis, Western alliance voices absolutely dominated both CNNI and BBCW coverage of Kosovo, representing 46.1 % of all sources on BBCW and 49.3 % on CNNI. Among them, US sources' soundbites have been used most often: 22.7% on BBCW and even 38.2% on CNNI. Additionally, US sources were exactly those that provided a majority of descriptive and recommendation statements on both channels. According to the manufacturing consent or propaganda model theory, the reliance of the media on information provided by government and sources approved by these primary sources and agents of power should result in practice in government's ability to use the media to mobilize public support for governmental policies⁸³², in such a way that the frames they produce are automatically reused by media and promoted in their coverage. Analysis of media coverage and its comparison with politicians' statements and the frames they were using provided evidence that it was not the case in the period before the beginning of the NATO campaign in Kosovo. Heavy usage of official sources by both CNNI and BBCW did not coincide with the promotion of the frames set by UK and US officials. Contrary again to the manufacturing consent theory that denies the possibility that journalists might actually take sides (either consciously or unintentionally) during elite debates over policy, or even take the side of non-elites, CNNI paid great attention to the opponent voices from the US Congress, insisting more on the dangers for the US pilots and a lack of national interest, and avoided totally for example a comparison with Bosnia that could provide some familiar connections and provoke empathy – the frame that was often used by the US administration officials. Although Robinson found out that CNN became more supportive toward the US policy in Kosovo after NATO strikes began⁸³³, Lawrence Freedman argues that "the "body-bag" effect played a significant role also during the campaign itself, concerning the reluctance of the US policy-makers to escalate beyond air strikes"⁸³⁴. With no strong opposition to official UK government policy toward Kosovo in London, BBCW had an even more independent role, expressing criticisms and objections. In Gans's terms, this confirms that sources may make themselves available, and reporters may be under considerable

⁸³² Gilboa, E., 2005, The CNN Effect: The Search For A Communication Theory Of International Relations", Political Communication, 22: 27-44, Taylor & Francis Inc.

⁸³³ Robinson, P., 2002, The CNN Effect: The myth of news, foreign policy, and intervention, London: Routledge, p. 108

⁸³⁴ Freedman, L., Victims and Victors: Reflections on the Kosovo War, Review of International Studies, 26(3): 335-358 in Robinson, P., 2002, The CNN Effect: The myth of news, foreign policy, and intervention, London: Routledge, p.108

pressure to report on them in ways that the sources find congenial⁸³⁵. But it also shows that the news is the result of “recurring negotiations between sources and newsmen... which favor only certain authoritative allocations of values”⁸³⁶. Usage of official sources can therefore be considered as the result of production values - the ease of regular access to officials, the dependable supply of news the officials provide, usefulness of citing legitimate, authoritative sources⁸³⁷ - at least as much as political values, with the news media still having the final say in what will be broadcast and published, “by raising other issues, interjecting doubts, questioning motives, and seeking out critical sources for balance”⁸³⁸.

But it has to be underlined also that no significant influence in setting frames was registered in the opposite direction either. There was only one exception from this trend, and that was the Racak massacre. The frame set by CNNI and BBCW that described the incident as a massacre committed by Serbian forces against unarmed Albanian civilians was fully accepted and reused by the US and UK politicians. Even the most critical among the US Senators claimed at that moment that it was “very important” for the US to take some steps to show its “displeasure with the killings in Kosovo”, mentioning air strikes as a possible reprimand⁸³⁹. The media frame of this incident came out of the interaction between journalists and the US official in the field, Head of OSCE Observation Mission William Walker. Therefore, for such an unexpected and dramatic event, media turned to a reliable person on the ground and pressure him to define the frame and that frame was reused by politicians in their statements afterward. During the officially staged events like those in Rambouillet and Paris, media created frames independently, but those frames had no significant influence on politicians' statements and decisions.

An additional important characteristic of media frame setting was a difference between the frames in the reports from Kosovo and in those from the US and UK capitals, which indicates that journalists in the field are much more “attached” to the suffering civilians, while reporters from capitals are much more likely to endorse the policy prescriptions and concerns of the states' elite who are usually their major sources of information. Such a tendency was already noted in previous research. In the analysis of media coverage of the aftermath of the Rwanda genocide for example, the Glasgow Media Group found out that the overwhelming majority of statements which endorsed the policy of disarming of the Hutu militias among the refugees were from reporters, aid agencies and African officials in Rwanda/Zaire, while by contrast on no occasion did any journalist reporting from London endorse that view or discuss the issue. They point out that it does raise the

⁸³⁵ Gans, H.J., 1979, *Deciding What's News: A Study of CBS Evening News, NBC Nightly News, Time and Newsweek*, New York: Vintage

⁸³⁶ Cook, T., 1998, *Governing the News, The News Media as a Political Institution*, The University of Chicago Press, p. 87

⁸³⁷ Entman, R.M., 2004, *Projections of Power: Framing News, Public Opinion, and US Foreign Policy*, Chicago: Chicago University Press, p. 88-92

⁸³⁸ Cook, T., 1998, *Governing the News, The News Media as a Political Institution*, The University of Chicago Press, p. 105

⁸³⁹ Stakeout with Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison (R-Tx), Subjects: Kosovo, Impeachment, Ohio Clock, The Capitol, Washington, Dc, January 19, 1999

question of “which has the greater authority in establishing what the news account should be”⁸⁴⁰.

There is another issue significant for the assessment of the media’s role in political decision making – the degree of the elite consensus and policy certainty. Despite the critical voices from among the US elite, a strong consensus was registered among representatives of executive power in both the UK and US, and also between UK and US too, a consensus accompanied by policy certainty that was permanently established in a short period after the Racak massacre. Madeleine Albright and Richard Holbrooke were strong promoters of an interventionist policy on Kosovo and, after the Racak massacre they were supported by Clinton and the whole administration. For the UK government, according to David Loyn⁸⁴¹, intervention in Kosovo, like the one in Sierra Leone in spring 2000, was a part of “the new doctrine of international community”, presented by Blair to the Economic Club of Chicago, US, on April 22 1999. Blair explained that this in practice meant “the explicit recognition that today more than ever before, we are mutually dependent, that national interest is to a significant extent governed by international collaboration and that we need a clear and coherent debate as to the direction this doctrine takes us in each field of international endeavor”. He confirmed on that occasion that he had believed “there was no alternative to military action” in Kosovo, and that one of the reasons why it was so important to win the conflict was “to ensure that others do not make the same mistake in the future”. It is interesting that he warned that the international community (“we” in his speech) was “continually fending off the danger of letting wherever CNN roves to be the cattle prod to take a global conflict seriously”. He pointed out again that in Kosovo “but on many other occasions”, he has had occasion “to be truly thankful that the United States has a President with his vision and steadfastness”, indicating again the strong personal relationships between two leaders which were, according to Loyn, another important factor in the Kosovo decision making process.

Therefore, findings of this analysis confirm the hypothesis of Robinson’s “policy-media interaction model”, according to which in a case of policy certainty within executives, although coverage might become critical and pressure government to change policy, media influence will be resisted⁸⁴². On the other hand, these findings also indicate that “when there is a problem, and the policy has not been thought through”, as in the case of the Racak massacre, politicians “have to do something or face a public relations disaster”⁸⁴³.

⁸⁴⁰ Beattie, L., Miller, D., Miller, E., and G. Philo, *The media and Africa: images of disaster and rebellion*, in *Message Received: Glasgow Media Group Research 1993-1998*, Philo, G., ed., 1999, London: Longman, pp.229-267

⁸⁴¹ David Loyn, BBC journalist, interview with the author of the thesis, September 18, 2008

⁸⁴² Robinson, P., 2001, *Theorizing The Influence Of Media On World Politics*, *European Journal of Communication*, SAGE Publications, Vol 16(4): 523-544

⁸⁴³ Gowing, N., 1994, *Real-Time Television Coverage of Armed Conflicts and Diplomatic Crises: Does it Pressure or Distort foreign Policy Decisions?*, The Joan Shorenstein Barone Center on the Press, Politics and Public Policy, Harvard

SECTION 2: THE DARFUR CASE STUDY

The following chapters contain the results of the Darfur case study. As in the Kosovo case study, it has two basic components: the quantitative and qualitative analysis of television archive material from CNNI and BBCW, for the periods April 1-September 9, 2004 and August 31-November 30, 2006; and analysis of the political process that includes both the historical and political background of the region and the conflict, i.e. so called real-world indicators, and the time line of the process of decision-making through archive analysis of relevant documentation of the political process collected from the same time periods used for media coverage analysis.

CHAPTER 7: THE BACKGROUND TO THE DARFUR CASE

This chapter presents the background of the Darfur case, including the history and main characteristics of the region, the history of international policy on Darfur, and an overview of the situation in the investigated time period.

HISTORY

Greater Darfur, a territory composed of three states (North, South, and West Darfur), is located in the northwestern region of Sudan, bordering Chad to the west, Libya to the northwest, and the Central African Republic to the southwest. Darfur was an independent sultanate from the late fourteenth century⁸⁴⁴; in 1916 it became a province of the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium established on the territory of today's Sudan in 1898; and then a state of the Republic of Sudan with its independence in 1956. Darfur, a large remote region with a surface of nearly half a million square kilometers⁸⁴⁵ and with no significant natural resources⁸⁴⁶ had been completely socially and economically neglected by the colonial administration; by 1935 there were only four government primary schools in the whole of Darfur⁸⁴⁷ and by the end of Condominium period only 5-6% of the investments for the whole of Sudan had reached its western province⁸⁴⁸. Independence changed little and Darfur was left to its own devices with almost no support from Khartoum⁸⁴⁹. Its primary role was as a labor resource for the lower ranks of the army and the irrigated cotton schemes along the Nile⁸⁵⁰.

At the same time, Darfur was home to a complex mix for which the tribe remained a key identifying factor. The three largest African tribes are the Fur (Darfur means "land of the Fur"), the Zaghawa, and the Masaaleit, but according to some sources, there are at least

⁸⁴⁴ Prunier G., 2005, *Darfur: The Ambiguous Genocide*, C. Hurst & Co. Ltd., London, p.8

⁸⁴⁵ Ibid, p.2

⁸⁴⁶ De Waal, A., October/November 2004, *Tragedy in Darfur*, Boston Review

⁸⁴⁷ Prunier G., 2005, *Darfur: The Ambiguous Genocide*, C. Hurst & Co. Ltd., London, p. 30

⁸⁴⁸ Harvie, C.H. and J.G. Cleve, *The National Income of Sudan*, Kharoum: Department of Statistics, 1959, in Prunier G., 2005, *Darfur: The Ambiguous Genocide*, C. Hurst & Co. Ltd., London, p. 33

⁸⁴⁹ Middleton, N. and P. O'Keefe, 2006, *Politics, History & Problems of Humanitarian Assistance in Sudan*, Review of African Political Economy No.109:543-559, ROAPE Publications Ltd.

⁸⁵⁰ De Waal, A., October/November 2004, *Tragedy in Darfur*, Boston Review

36 main tribes, and even as many as 90 by including sub-divisions or clans⁸⁵¹. Most of the region's 6 million people are "farmers and herders, who cling to the valleys where the soil is less sandy, or nomadic graziers, who migrate between the arid north and the south, which blooms green after the rains every August"⁸⁵². Although most of Darfur's farmers are African and its nomads Arab, centuries of intermarriage have blurred the most obvious distinctions: nearly all Darfurians are black, Muslim and speak Arabic⁸⁵³. Competition among the tribes, for economic and not ethnic reasons, has always been fierce, but tribal leaders customarily resolved these disputes, generally sporadic and at low levels of violence, and their decisions were respected by the authorities in Khartoum⁸⁵⁴.

One of the root causes of the present crisis go back to the 1980s, when prolonged droughts accelerated the desertification of northern and central Darfur and led to pressure on water and grazing land as the camel nomads were forced to move southwards⁸⁵⁵. A famine that had lasted from August 1984 to November 1985 killed an estimated 95000 people in Darfur⁸⁵⁶. In that situation, farmers who had always played host to camel nomads were now barring their migrations, and stopping them from using pastures and wells⁸⁵⁷. Violence in Darfur erupted in 1987 after Libya had begun to use the region as "a back door into Chad"⁸⁵⁸, following Colonel Gaddafi's dream of an 'Arab belt' across Sahelian Africa. In order to gain control of Chad, Gaddafi recruited Darfurian and Chadian Arabs, armed them, and formed them into an Islamic Legion that served as the spearhead of his offensives. Although the Libyans were defeated, members of the Islamic Legion "brought guns, which they also distributed to their kinsmen in Darfur, and most disturbing of all, they brought a new racial ideology, Arabism"⁸⁵⁹. Darfur, with its history of contentious political issues represented a fertile ground for the development of racial ideologies. Arab tribes there considered they were not sufficiently represented in the Fur-dominated local administration, and in 1986, a number of Arab tribes formed what became known as the Arab alliance or Arab gathering (*Tujammo al Arabi*) aimed at establishing political dominance and control of the region⁸⁶⁰. One of their first public appearances was the controversial letter to Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi, published on 5 October 1987, in which 23 Darfur leaders of Arab origin, a mix of mainstream intellectuals, tribal figures, and senior officials, attributed to the "Arab race" the "creation

⁸⁵¹ Darfur: ethnic composition, armed conflicts and violations of human rights, special issue of the Sudanese Human Rights Quarterly, Sudan Human Rights Organisation, Cairo, July 1999, pp. 10-11 in ICG Africa Report N°76, 25 March 2004, Darfur Rising: Sudan's New Crisis

⁸⁵² Robinson, S., Oct. 04, 2004, The Tragedy of Sudan, Time, p.22

⁸⁵³ Ibid.

⁸⁵⁴ Power, S., August 30, 2004, Dying in Darfur; Can the ethnic cleansing in Sudan be stopped?, The New Yorker

⁸⁵⁵ O' Fahey, R.S., May 15, 2004, A complex ethnic reality with a long history; Darfur, International Herald Tribune, p. 8

⁸⁵⁶ Prunier G., 2005, Darfur: The Ambiguous Genocide, C. Hurst & Co. Ltd., London, p. 56

⁸⁵⁷ De Waal, A., 5 August 2004, Counter-Insurgency on the Cheap, London Review of Books, Vol. 26 No. 15

⁸⁵⁸ De Waal, A., October/November 2004, Tragedy in Darfur, Boston Review

⁸⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁶⁰ Sudan; Darfur in Flames: Atrocities in Western Sudan, Human Rights Watch, April 2004, Vol. 16, No. 5 (A)

of civilization in this region ... in the areas of governance, religion and language"⁸⁶¹. The signatories ignored Islam as a unifying factor, disregarded generations of intermarriage and peaceful coexistence, and used race to polarize⁸⁶².

Meanwhile, Fur leaders distrusted the increasing tendency of the federal government to favor the Arabs. Between 1987 and 1989, serious battles broke out between Fur farmers and Arab camel herders; some two and a half thousand Fur were killed and four hundred villages were burned; five hundred Arabs died, and hundreds of the nomads' tents were burned⁸⁶³. There was an attempt at a reconciliation conference in 1989, but its recommendations for compensation and punishment were never implemented⁸⁶⁴.

It was also in 1989 that a group of pro-National Islamic Front officers overthrew Sadiq al-Mahdi's government in Khartoum. The head of state became "the devout and ruthless soldier, Omar al-Bashir, who ruled in uneasy alliance with Hassan al-Turabi, the charismatic leader"⁸⁶⁵ of the radical Islamist party. In the decade following the 1989 putsch, differences between Bashir and Turabi led to a split between the two, Turabi's dismissal from his post as speaker of the National Assembly in 1999, and later even to his arrest. Many Darfurians who had come into the Islamist movement under Turabi's leadership now left government and decided to organise on their own. In May 2000, they produced a widely circulated manuscript called "The Black Book" that, using sensitive records from state archives, detailed the region's systematic under-representation in national government since independence. The 'Black Book' also marked "a symbolic rapprochement between the Islamists and the secular radicals of Darfur"⁸⁶⁶, who would form the main rebel groups in Darfur, the Darfur Liberation Front (renamed in early 2003 the Sudan Liberation Army, or SLA) and the Islamist-leaning Justice and Equality Movement (JEM).

At that time, the conflict in central Sudan – between government forces in the North and rebels in the South, which began in 1955, abated in 1972 as a result of a peace agreement signed in Addis Ababa, and resumed in 1983 – was still ongoing. Although this civil war, which left an estimated two million Sudanese dead and twice as many displaced⁸⁶⁷, was mostly portrayed as the conflict of racial and religious hatreds, fought between Muslims in the North and Christians in the South, many experts believe that the overarching cause remained the same all the time: a consistent history of oppressive governance from Khartoum promoting regional marginalization and exploiting social divisions⁸⁶⁸. Despite

⁸⁶¹ Cited in Hussein Adam al-Haj, 31 December 2003, The Arab Gathering and the attempt to cancel the other in Darfur, in ICG Africa Report N°76, 25 March 2004, Darfur Rising: Sudan's New Crisis

⁸⁶² ICG Africa Report N°76, 25 March 2004, Darfur Rising: Sudan's New Crisis

⁸⁶³ Power, S., August 30, 2004, Dying in Darfur; Can the ethnic cleansing in Sudan be stopped?, The New Yorker

⁸⁶⁴ De Waal, A., 5 August 2004, Counter-Insurgency on the Cheap, London Review of Books, Vol. 26 No. 15

⁸⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶⁶ De Waal, A., Counter-Insurgency on the Cheap, London Review of Books, Vol. 26 No. 15, 5 August 2004

⁸⁶⁷ ICG Africa Report No 39, 28 January 2002, God, Oil, and Country: Changing the Logic of War in Sudan, pp 3 – 4

⁸⁶⁸ Johnson, D.H., 2003, The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars, London: International African Institute; Prunier G., 2005, Darfur: The Ambiguous Genocide, C. Hurst & Co. Ltd., London; De Waal, A., 5 August 2004, Counter-Insurgency on the Cheap, London Review of Books, Vol. 26 No. 15

the promise of regional autonomy for the South from the agreement in 1972, very soon it became clear that Khartoum had no intention of fulfilling it – a position which hardened in 1978, when oil was discovered in area around the town of Bentiu in the southern state of Wahda⁸⁶⁹. After the South's leaders turned to insurrection and formed a guerilla force – Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA) – the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD) facilitated negotiations for peace in 1993, which finally came to fruition in January 2005⁸⁷⁰. SPLA and Sudanese Government representatives signed six key political protocols in Naivasha, Kenya outlining power and wealth sharing arrangements for southern Sudan for a six-and-a-half-year interim period, after which a self-determination referendum in the south would decide whether the South became independent⁸⁷¹.

Wars and then a peace process between the South and the North have had some important consequences for Darfur. International attention to the problems in Sudan was principally focused on this conflict which resulted in a general failure fully to recognize the eruption of the humanitarian crisis in Darfur. At the same time, "the Khartoum regime correctly judged that the international community would not criticize it at a crucial point in the peace process, so it slowed the process in Naivasha to give itself time for a major offensive in Darfur"⁸⁷². And finally, the peace negotiations were a trigger for Darfurians – since the efforts to include their concerns on its agenda failed, they concluded that if they ever wanted to see their needs met, "they would have to do what John Garang had done in the South: take up arms against the Sudanese government and try to get the world's attention"⁸⁷³. The first established rebel group, the SLA, had a political platform similar to that of the SPLA, denouncing political and economic marginalization and under-development, and demanding separation of religion and state. JEM followed shortly with a similar political message, but also with an ambiguous plank on religion and alleged links with Turabi and Islamist circles⁸⁷⁴.

Open warfare erupted in Darfur on April 25, 2003 when the group of the SLA rebels, after two months of sporadic conflicts, swept into the airport in the town of al-Fashir, killed 75 Sudanese government soldiers, shot up four military aircraft and kidnapped the air force chief. "The SPLA had managed nothing of the kind in twenty years. The rebels in Darfur had mobility, good intelligence and popular support."⁸⁷⁵ Due to the region's history of political independence, political analysts believe that the rebels in Darfur constituted a greater threat to the Sudan government than the resistance in the south, that it represented "a threat to the heart of the regime" and that "the response was probably

⁸⁶⁹ Middleton, N. and P. O'Keefe, *Politics, History & Problems of Humanitarian Assistance in Sudan*, Review of African Political Economy No.109:543-559, ROAPE Publications Ltd., 2006

⁸⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁸⁷¹ Human Rights Watch, *World Report 2005*, Sudan

⁸⁷² ICG Africa Report N°76, 25 March 2004, *Darfur Rising: Sudan's New Crisis*

⁸⁷³ Power, S., August 30, 2004, *Dying in Darfur; Can the ethnic cleansing in Sudan be stopped?*, The New Yorker

⁸⁷⁴ ICG Africa Report N°76, 25 March 2004, *Darfur Rising: Sudan's New Crisis*

⁸⁷⁵ De Waal, A., 5 August 2004, *Counter-Insurgency on the Cheap*, London Review of Books, Vol. 26 No.

maniacal, but nonetheless, consistent to a threat to the core."⁸⁷⁶ The Government of Sudan had determined that a military response to rebels was necessary, but its armed forces were still heavily engaged in south Sudan and were also involved in occasional low-level conflict with Eritrea and Egypt⁸⁷⁷. So they used a strategy that had proven to be effective during the war in the South: "they sought out a local militia, provided it with supplies and armaments, and declared the area of operations an ethics-free zone"⁸⁷⁸. The Government supplemented its military presence by formalizing its relations with the *Janjaweed*⁸⁷⁹, a rough and exceptionally brutal armed militia with members mostly recruited among young members of Arab tribes which had a running land conflict with neighboring African tribes, but also among criminals who were pardoned and released from jail if they joined the militia⁸⁸⁰. This militia conducted the worst crimes against civilians in Darfur, including murders, mass rapes and destroying whole villages. Although the Government tried to deny its relationship with *Janjaweed* afterwards, describing it as "yet another outlawed group" which it "condemned and... is working hard to disarm"⁸⁸¹, President Bashir was recorded publicly announcing his strategy: "Our priority from now on is to eliminate the rebellion, and any outlaw element is our target ... We will use the army, the police, the mujahedeen, the horsemen to get rid of the rebellion"⁸⁸². The Sudan Government has consistently denied that substantial political issues are at the core of the rebellion and it dismissed it as "tribal warfare" or "banditry". It periodically tried to tie the insurgency to the agenda of "domestic or foreign foes, including the SPLA, Eritrea, Chad, Israel, and Hassan el-Turabi's Popular Congress (PC) party"⁸⁸³. The government also had a clear strategy to hide the conflict from the domestic public and the world. It has shown "zero tolerance for mildly critical media coverage"⁸⁸⁴, as shown by the banning of two independent newspapers and the closure of the Khartoum office of the Al-Jazeera Arab TV network in November/December 2003⁸⁸⁵. There had been violence in Darfur before, but in late July 2003 it "assumed a completely new scale and exploded"⁸⁸⁶, with intensified *Janjaweed* attacks often preceded by aircraft bombing, and it resumed until the end of the year despite the Chad-mediated meetings between the Khartoum government and the rebel group in the Chadian border-town of Abéché. In late September 2003, a US official reported that 574 villages had been destroyed and another

⁸⁷⁶ Charles Snyder, the senior representative on Sudan for the US Department of State, quoted in Crisis Shaped by Darfur's Tumultuous Past, April 7, 2006, Darfur Crisis, Background report, PBS Online NewsHour

⁸⁷⁷ Prendergast, J., 1997, Crisis and Response: Humanitarian Band-Aids in Sudan and Somalia, London: Pluto Press, p.19

⁸⁷⁸ De Waal, A., 5 August 2004, Counter-Insurgency on the Cheap, London Review of Books, Vol. 26 No. 15

⁸⁷⁹ *Janjaweed* can variously be translated as "evil horsemen" or "ghost riders"

⁸⁸⁰ Prunier G., 2005, Darfur: The Ambiguous Genocide, C. Hurst & Co. Ltd., London, p.97

⁸⁸¹ Darfur and the proliferation of armed conflict in Africa, January 21, 2004, press release, Embassy of the Republic of the Sudan, Washington, D.C., at: www.sudan.net

⁸⁸² Sudanese president says war against outlaws is government priority, Associated Press, 31 December 2003

⁸⁸³ ICG Africa Report N°76, 25 March 2004, Darfur Rising: Sudan's New Crisis

⁸⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁸⁵ Sudan: Reporters Without Borders Condemns seizure of Al-Jazeera equipment, Reporters Without Borders, 18 December 2003, available at http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=8815

⁸⁸⁶ Prunier G., 2005, Darfur: The Ambiguous Genocide, C. Hurst & Co. Ltd., London, p. 91

157 damaged since mid-2003⁸⁸⁷. But it took several months for the world to begin to realize the extent of what was happening in Darfur.

INTERNATIONAL POLICY AND THE DARFUR CRISIS 2004-2006

Prunier believes that the events in this region were and remained for the world “the quintessential African crisis: distant, esoteric, extremely violent, rooted in complex ethnic and historical factors which few understood, and devoid of any identifiable practical interest for the rich countries”⁸⁸⁸. Also, when the US and Europe had finally paid attention, the reaction was limited to humanitarian assistance without involvement in the political process, an approach that appeared to be unsustainable in the long run.

Sudan was far from representing a major item on Washington’s foreign policy agenda, but when the NIF came to power in 1989 with a strong Islamic stance, “Khartoum’s open-door policy to seemingly every Islamic militant group on the planet”, would prove destructive to US– Sudanese relations⁸⁸⁹. In November 1997, US President Bill Clinton’s Administration imposed successive sanctions against the Sudanese government for supporting international terrorism, destabilising neighbouring governments and human rights violations, especially against the Christian minority in the South. Already one year before, Clinton withdrew the US Ambassador from Khartoum, citing terrorist threats against American officials, while the United States and Saudi Arabia jointly pressured Sudan to expel Osama bin Laden, who had settled there in 1991. In August 1998, after Al Qaeda’s attacks on the American Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, Clinton ordered a missile attack on the al-Shifa pharmaceutical factory in Khartoum, which was suspected of producing chemical weapons⁸⁹⁰.

While this Administration made little progress in dealing with Sudan’s North-South war, President George W. Bush rejuvenated a multilateral peace process that had been hosted by Kenya since 1993, and, in 2001, appointed John Danforth, an ordained Episcopal minister and a three-term senator from Missouri, his special envoy for peace in Sudan⁸⁹¹. Involvement in this peace process was one of the explanations for the Administration’s choice to ignore the fighting in Darfur at first; according to some US officials, it calculated that Darfur might jeopardize US efforts to cajole the Sudan regime to sign a North-South peace agreement⁸⁹², which was important for President Bush to prove that he “was capable of making peace as well as war”⁸⁹³ at a time when the US was isolated and mistrusted abroad. The Bush Administration was also aware that Sudan’s oil reserves yield two billion dollars in annual revenue; reserves, exploited by China, Canada, and

⁸⁸⁷ Straus, S., January/February 2005, Darfur and the Genocide Debate, Foreign Affairs, Pg. 123 Vol. 84, No. 1

⁸⁸⁸ Prunier G., 2005, Darfur: The Ambiguous Genocide, C. Hurst & Co. Ltd., London, p. 124

⁸⁸⁹ Luke A., 2007, State rules: Oil companies and armed conflict in Sudan, Third World Quarterly, 28:5, 997 – 1016

⁸⁹⁰ Power, S., Dying in Darfur; Can the ethnic cleansing in Sudan be stopped?, The New Yorker, August 30, 2004

⁸⁹¹ Ibid.

⁸⁹² Susan E. Rice, The Brookings Institution, Dithering on Darfur: US Inaction in the Face of Genocide, Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, April 11, 2007

⁸⁹³ Power, S., Dying in Darfur; Can the ethnic cleansing in Sudan be stopped?, The New Yorker, August 30, 2004

Sweden, were off limits to American companies, because of a 1997 executive order barring US oil companies from operating in Sudan. An end to its civil war would allow US companies to “legally begin prospecting in Sudan”⁸⁹⁴. No less important, at that time the Government of Sudan was considered as an ally and a supplier of information “on its erstwhile friends”⁸⁹⁵ in the war on terrorism after September 11, 2001.

The Sudan government offensive that got underway in mid-December 2003, triggering a new wave of forced displacement of civilians, led UN officials to react and call for improved access, respect for international humanitarian law, and donor support⁸⁹⁶. By 2004, the human toll in Darfur was mounting, and the use of rape as a weapon of war and the systematic nature of attacks on civilians on the basis of their ethnicity prompted the departing UN Resident Coordinator in Sudan, Mukesh Kapila, in March that year to draw parallels between events in Darfur and the Rwandan genocide, stating that “the only difference between Rwanda and Darfur is the numbers involved of dead, tortured, and raped”⁸⁹⁷. The statement was well timed since the world had just been preparing to mark the 10th anniversary of the Rwandan genocide, and it was considered to have a great influence at that moment, especially regarding the media coverage of the Darfur crisis: “few people had ever heard of Darfur before...but now there was a good story: the first genocide of the twenty-first century”⁸⁹⁸.

“We concluded, I concluded, that genocide has been committed in Darfur and that the government of Sudan and the *Janjaweed* bear responsibility,” US Secretary of State Colin Powell told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in September 2004, after months of investigation and discussion within the State Department and after his own visit to Darfur in June 2004⁸⁹⁹. Powell’s pronouncement was considered to be partly the result of domestic political pressure, since on 22 July, the US Congress passed a resolution to describe the killings in Sudan as genocide, “the first time that Congress had described an ongoing massacre in such terms”⁹⁰⁰. But immediately after labeling it as a genocide, Powell made clear that “no new action is dictated by this determination”, despite the fact that the international Genocide Convention, signed by the US and 134 other countries, obligates signatories to “prevent and to punish” genocide where it is occurring. “Already stretched thin in Afghanistan and Iraq and wary of intervening in another Muslim state, the US has ruled out sending troops to Africa’s largest country, throwing its support instead behind a proposal to deploy several thousand African observers, not to halt the violence but to monitor it.”⁹⁰¹ Europe has shown even less resolve to be involved in Darfur crisis: “The French only cared about protecting Idris Deby’s regime in Chad from possible destabilization; the British blindly followed Washington’s lead, only finding this

⁸⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁹⁵ Prunier G., 2005, *Darfur: The Ambiguous Genocide*, C. Hurst & Co. Ltd., London, p.139

⁸⁹⁶ Jan Egeland, Under Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs, ICG interview, New York, 18 February 2004, in ICG Africa Report N°76, 25 March 2004, *Darfur Rising: Sudan's New Crisis*

⁸⁹⁷ Power, S., April 6, 2004, *Remember Rwanda, but Take Action in Sudan*, The New York Times, Section A; Column 2; Editorial Desk; Pg. 23

⁸⁹⁸ Prunier G., 2005, *Darfur: The Ambiguous Genocide*, C. Hurst & Co. Ltd., London, p.127

⁸⁹⁹ US Policy Cuts Uneven Trail in Darfur Conflict, April 7, 2006, *Darfur Crisis*, Background report, PBS Online NewsHour

⁹⁰⁰ Power, S., August 30, 2004, *Dying in Darfur; Can the ethnic cleansing in Sudan be stopped?*, The New Yorker

⁹⁰¹ Robinson, S., Oct. 04, 2004, *The Tragedy of Sudan*, Time, p.22

somewhat difficult since Washington was not very clear about which direction it wished to take; the Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands gave large sums of money and remained silent; Germany made anti-GoS noises which it never backed up with any sort of action and gave only limited cash; and the Italians remained bewildered.”⁹⁰² In the summer of 2004, Great Britain's top military officer, General Sir Mike Jackson, even declared that Britain could field a brigade to stop genocide in Darfur, but “no one in the British government seemed interested”⁹⁰³.

By mid-October 2004, an estimated 1.8 million people, or about a third of Darfur's population, had been uprooted, with an estimated 1.6 million Darfurians having fled to other parts of Sudan and another 200000 having crossed the border into Chad⁹⁰⁴. In October 2004, a World Health Organization official estimated that 70.000 displaced persons had died in the previous six months from malnutrition and disease directly related to their displacement, a figure that did not include violent deaths⁹⁰⁵.

In the following two years, the United Nations Security Council passed several resolutions regarding Darfur⁹⁰⁶, imposing an arms embargo and threatening sanctions, but with no improvements in the field or concrete actions. The most important was adopted on August 31, 2006, Resolution 1706, with which the UN Security Council authorized the deployment of a new UN peacekeeping force to the region⁹⁰⁷. But already on September 1, 2006, African Union officials reported that Sudan had launched a major offensive in Darfur⁹⁰⁸, and on September 5, Sudan asked the African Union force in Darfur to leave the region by the end of the month, adding that “they have no right to transfer this assignment to the United Nations or any other party”⁹⁰⁹. Although US officials insisted at that time that Resolution 1706 only *invites* Sudanese consent, and does not *require* it⁹¹⁰, all international efforts to implement it ended with its “workable alternative”⁹¹¹, a so-called hybrid peace keeping force that was supposed to have a predominantly African character: the United Nations provided mainly funding and logistics for this operation.

In the meantime, there have been several meetings between rebels' representatives and the government of Sudan, resulting in short-term ceasefire agreements. As the result of the one signed in April 2004, the African Union sent troops to Darfur, with the mandate to protect the EU and AU ceasefire observers. On November 9, the Sudanese government, JEM and SLA signed two additional accords, which were supposed to

⁹⁰² Prunier G., 2005, *Darfur: The Ambiguous Genocide*, C. Hurst & Co. Ltd., London, p.141

⁹⁰³ Reeves, E., October 27, 2006, *Europe's indifference to Darfur*, *The New Republic*

⁹⁰⁴ Straus, S., January/February 2005, *Darfur and the Genocide Debate*, *Foreign Affairs*, Pg. 123 Vol. 84, No. 1

⁹⁰⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁰⁶ UN Security Council Resolution 1556 on July 30, 2004; UN Security Council Resolution 1564 on September 18, 2004; United Nations Security Council Resolution 1591 on March 29, 2005

⁹⁰⁷ Security Council Verbatim Report meeting 5519 on 31 August 2006, retrieved on November 15, 2008

⁹⁰⁸ Associated Press, September 1, 2006, *Sudan reported to launch new offensive in Darfur*

⁹⁰⁹ AFP, September 5, 2006, *Defiant Sudan sets deadline for Darfur peacekeeper exit*

⁹¹⁰ Kristen Silverberg, US Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, US State Department Regular Briefing, August 31, 2006

⁹¹¹ United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan, media stakeout following the UN Security Council monthly luncheon, as released by the United Nations, November 8, 2006

establish a no-fly zone over rebel-controlled areas of Darfur, and also to grant international humanitarian aid agencies unrestricted access to the Darfur region⁹¹². All ceasefire agreements were broken within hours after the signing⁹¹³. On May 5, 2006, US Deputy Secretary of State Robert B. Zoellick and representatives of the African Union and the UN even managed to organize signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement, which called for the disarmament of the *Janjaweed* militia, and for the rebel forces to disband and be incorporated into the army. But, the agreement was signed only by the Government of Sudan and one fraction of the SLA, led by Minni Minnawi, shortly after learning that his younger brother had been killed in Darfur; JEM and a rival faction of the SLA rejected the agreement⁹¹⁴. During the following months, fighting was renewed, "threatening to shut down the world's largest aid operation" as international aid organizations considered leaving Darfur due to attacks against their personnel⁹¹⁵. On October 13, 2006 US President George W. Bush imposed further sanctions against those deemed complicit in the Darfur atrocities under the Darfur Peace and Accountability Act of 2006. The measures were said to strengthen existing sanctions by prohibiting US citizens from engaging in oil-related transactions with Sudan, freezing the assets of complicit parties and denying them entry to the US⁹¹⁶. Earlier that year, Bush also called for additional NATO forces in Darfur, but the reply of NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer was clear and remained the same until today: "What I could see is that NATO allies, individual allies, would participate in a possible UN mission. I don't exclude that at all, but NATO as such and NATO as an organization will not put a force on the ground in Darfur."⁹¹⁷

According to the figures from 2006, more than 400000 people are estimated to have been killed and at least 2 million displaced from their homes in Darfur since fighting broke out in 2003⁹¹⁸. While the planned 26000-member U.N.-African Union peace force are still waiting for the opportunity to bring security to this western Sudanese region⁹¹⁹, genocide in Darfur is "taking place in slow motion"⁹²⁰.

The table below presents the most important dates in Darfur's recent history with the focus on the time periods in 2004 and 2006 that will be analyzed in next chapters.

Table 6: DARFUR HISTORY

| | |
|-------------|---|
| 1984 – 1985 | Famine kills an estimated 95.000 people in Darfur |
|-------------|---|

⁹¹² Main parties sign Darfur accord, BBC News, May 5, 2006
⁹¹³ Wax, E., November 11, 2004, After Accord, Sudan Camp Raided Shelters Reportedly Destroyed and Residents Beaten, Washington Post, A Section; A01
⁹¹⁴ Kessler, G., May 6, 2006, Sudanese, Rebels Sign Peace Plan For Darfur; US Pressured Parties; Doubts Remain on Deal, The Washington Post, A Section; A01
⁹¹⁵ Voice of America, August 9, 2006, Disagreements Over Darfur Peace Plan Spark Conflict
⁹¹⁶ Washington Post, October 13, 2006, Nation in Brief, Bush signs law setting sanctions on Darfur crimes, A Section; A06
⁹¹⁷ US Policy Cuts Uneven Trail in Darfur Conflict, April 7, 2006, Darfur Crisis, Background report, PBS Online NewsHour
⁹¹⁸ Annan welcomes extension of African Union mission in Darfur, UN News Service, 21 September 2006
⁹¹⁹ Darfur force could fail if problems not settled-UN, Reuters, 15 Nov 2007
⁹²⁰ Kristof, N.D., February 9, 2006, Genocide in Slow Motion, The New York Review of Books, Volume 53, Number 2

| | |
|-------------------|--|
| 1987 – 1989 | Serious battles break out between Fur farmers and Arab camel herders due to the increasing tendency of the Sudanese federal government to favor the Arabs. |
| June 1989 | Omar al-Bashir becomes the head of state in Sudan, after a group of pro-National Islamic Front officers overthrows the government in Khartoum. |
| November 1997 | US President Bill Clinton's Administration imposes successive sanctions against the Sudanese government for supporting international terrorism |
| April 25, 2003 | Open warfare erupts in Darfur when a group of SLA rebels, after two months of sporadic conflicts, sweeps into the airport in the town of al-Fashir, killing 75 Sudanese government soldiers |
| March 19, 2004 | UN Resident Coordinator in Sudan, Mukesh Kapila states that the only difference between Rwanda and Darfur is the numbers involved of dead, tortured, and raped |
| April 2004 | African Union sends its troops to Darfur, with a mandate to protect the EU and AU ceasefire observers, as the result of a ceasefire agreement between rebels and the Sudanese government |
| June 30, 2004 | US Secretary of State Colin Powell and UN General Secretary Kofi Annan visit Darfur |
| July 22, 2004 | US Congress passes a resolution to describe the killings in Sudan as genocide |
| September 9, 2004 | US Secretary of State Colin Powell confirms before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that genocide has been committed in Darfur and that the government of Sudan and the <i>Janjaweed</i> bear responsibility |
| By October 2004 | An estimated 1.8 million people have been uprooted, an estimated 1.6 million Darfurians having fled to other parts of Sudan and another 200000 having crossed the border to Chad |
| January 2005 | Signature of peace deal ending the long-running North-South war in Sudan, which has killed more than 2 million people |
| May 5, 2006 | Government of Sudan and one fraction of |

| | |
|-------------------|---|
| | the rebel group sign the Darfur Peace Agreement |
| August 31, 2006 | UN Security Council adopts Resolution 1706, authorizing the deployment of a new UN peacekeeping force to the region of Darfur |
| By September 2006 | 400000 people are estimated to have been killed and at least 2 million displaced from their homes in Darfur |
| October 13, 2006 | US President George W. Bush imposes further sanctions against those deemed complicit in the Darfur atrocities under the Darfur Peace and Accountability Act of 2006 |

CHAPTER 8: DARFUR MEDIA COVERAGE

This chapter shows the results of both quantitative and qualitative content analysis of the BBCW and CNNI archive material about the crisis in Darfur. A choice of time periods for analysis of Darfur media coverage was much harder than in the Kosovo case study, simply because contrary to Kosovo, where significant political and military decisions have been made and implemented, Darfur is a clear example of international non-involvement. At the time of writing this thesis, the conflict in Darfur has lasted for more than 5 years, and during this period, no concrete action has been taken except extensive humanitarian assistance. Taking into account the length of the conflict, but also the expected small number of stories about Darfur on both CNNI and BBCW, more than eight months of media coverage during 2004-2006 within two separate time periods were analyzed in this case study. The security situation on the ground was the worst in these time periods, the massive violence and atrocities of 2004 began again in the second half of 2006 after a reduction in violence in 2005 and the first months of 2006, but it was also the time when some key events for Darfur happened.

The first investigated time period was between April 1 and September 9, 2004. April 2004 has been chosen because it was the moment when international media finally began to pay attention to the Darfur crisis and it would be useful to find out how much and in which way they did it at the very beginning, especially since early coverage is considered as the most important because “it shapes audience reactions to succeeding information”⁹²¹; and it was September 9, 2004 when US Secretary of State Colin Powell, after a whole summer of investigation of the atrocities, drawing upon hundreds of first hand accounts from victims and witnesses, embraced the investigators’ conclusions before the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations: genocide was taking place. Although it was immediately underlined that this did not oblige the United States to undertake any sort of drastic action, such as military intervention, some authors consider this announcement “historic” because it was the “first time the US government has declared ‘genocide’ while events are still in train”⁹²². Even further, De Waal gave it the same level of importance as the actions in Kosovo claiming that “for six decades, Americans have been dreaming of redeeming... historic fatal tardiness, and dispatching troops in time to save the day” and that “their failure to do so in Rwanda and Bosnia... sparked another round of soul-searching and led directly to the Kosovo bombing campaign and the Darfur genocide determination”⁹²³. Therefore the most important criteria for selection of this time period was that it preceded the most relevant political move at that time.

The second chosen period is between August 31 and November 31, 2006; this was the time when the first concrete action, deployment of UN peacekeeping forces, was *supposed* to take place, after the adoption of UN resolution 1706, but international efforts

⁹²¹ Entman, R.M., 2004, *Projections of Power: Framing News, Public Opinion, and US Foreign Policy*, Chicago: Chicago University Press, p. 82

⁹²² De Waal, A., 2005, *Defining Genocide, Index on Censorship* 1

⁹²³ Ibid.

to implement it failed again and resulted in the US, UK and UN capitulation to Khartoum's will.

The same methods of analysis as in the Kosovo case study were used in Darfur case study. Quantitative analysis was made from two different sources of material: transcripts and archive video material of all stories about Darfur broadcast on BBCW and CNNI in the periods April 1-September 31, 2004 and August 31-November 30, 2006. Additionally, an extensive qualitative analysis has been conducted for the three most important moments mentioned above: the beginning of the more substantial international media coverage - April 1-30, 2004, events before the US declaration of genocide in Darfur – August 9-September 9, 2004, and a period of expected deployment of UN forces – August 31-September 31, 2006. Again, for the purpose of both quantitative and qualitative analysis, CNNI and BBCW coverage has been compared with the articles about Darfur published in the selected time periods in the New York Times and with transcripts of stories from Reuters TV agency.

QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS

Transcripts show that BBCW broadcast in total 33 items about Darfur, or in average 0.2 items per day in the period April 1-September 9, 2004 (Figure 1), and 19 items in the period August 31-November 30, 2006, with the same average of 0.2 items per day (Figure 2). The length of produced material is 64.8 minutes for the first period, and 34.6 minutes for the second period; in total 99.4 minutes. That means that BBCW produced on average only about 24 seconds per day about Darfur during the two investigated periods, but further analysis will show that Darfur disappeared for more than 20 days from BBCW. Almost half of the total number of stories, 24 or 46%, were broadcast in the key periods, especially during one month before the declaration of genocide – 19%, and during one month after the adoption of the UN resolution 1706 – 19% too.

After two stories about Darfur in May 2004, and only one story in June 2004, BBCW coverage intensified during the summer of that year. July 27 saw an above average number of items – three stories. That was the day when EU foreign ministers gathered in Brussels and urged the United Nations to pass a resolution threatening sanctions on Sudan if it failed to immediately keep its promise to end the conflict in Darfur. Beside the coverage from Brussels, BBCW that day broadcast the accounts of Darfur refugees from refugee camps, but also the address of Sudanese President Omar Al-Bashir who warned that Sudan “will bow to nobody except Allah” at a rally in Khartoum. Two days after, on July 29, BBCW had two stories about Darfur, reporting about the meeting of twelve African nations in Accra, Ghana, in an attempt to tackle the problems of their continent, especially Darfur, and also about the statement of US Ambassador to the United Nations John Danforts who directly accused the Sudanese government of actions resulting in hundreds of people being killed every day in Darfur. On October 23, 2006, the only day in the three-months period of 2006 when BBCW had more than one item on the same day, BBCW broadcast two stories about Jan Pronk, the Head of UN Mission of the United Nations in Sudan, preparing to leave the country after being ordered out by the government because of the article he published on his personal website about Darfur.

CNNI also had 33 stories, or 0.2 stories on average per day, in the period April 1-September 9, 2004 (Figure 9), and 20 stories in the period August 31-November 30

(Figure 10) with the average number of items per day unchanged – 0.2. The total duration of produced material about Darfur on CNNI is one third longer than on BBCW – 89.1 minutes for the first period, and 59.9 minutes for the second period; 149 minutes in total. But when averaged out, that difference does not look very significant, as CNNI produced on average only 30 seconds of material about Darfur per day. 20 stories, or 38% of all produced stories, were broadcast in the key periods, again mostly during the month prior to the proclamation of genocide (17%), and during one month after the adoption of UN resolution 1706, also 17%.

Like BBCW, CNNI also gave most attention to the Darfur crisis during the summer of 2004; before that it had only five stories in May and four stories in June 2004. The exception to the CNNI daily average was July 1 with two stories, the day when US Secretary of State Colin Powell visited Khartoum and Darfur, and – beside representatives of the Sudanese government – met there with UN General Secretary Kofi Annan. CNNI had three stories on October 4, 2006, but one of them was dedicated totally to the life and work of international humanitarian workers in Darfur and the problems they faced, and another about the miserable living conditions of the domestic population of Chad compared to which even the life of Darfur refugees in camps in Chad looked ideal.

Figure 9: DARFUR MEDIA COVERAGE - APRIL-SEPTEMBER 2004





Figure 10: DARFUR MEDIA COVERAGE - SEPTEMBER-NOVEMBER 2006



It can be unambiguously concluded that the intensity of coverage of both CNNI and BBCW was highly inadequate to the proportions of the crisis in Darfur. Even if one takes into account that the period of three or four months can be too long to be able to get a representative average of stories per day, analysis of the coverage during the month with the biggest number of items on both TV channels, August 2004, shows similar results: BBCW had 0.4 and CNNI 0.3 stories per day. CNNI and BBCW were not an anomaly in the international media world regarding this matter. For example, the nightly newscasts of three major US networks, ABC, NBC and CBS, aired a meager total of 26 minutes on the bloodshed in Darfur during the whole year 2004, according to the Tyndall Report⁹²⁴. When Time magazine put Sudan on the cover of its October 4, 2004 issue, it marked the topic's only appearance on the cover of the three newsweeklies during that year⁹²⁵.

Why so late and why so little? Although it is not a major topic of this thesis, this media behavior deserves a brief overview of the explanation given by both experts and journalists themselves. According to Jakobsen, media coverage is decided "by a host of different factors, most of which have nothing to do with humanitarian need such as: geographic proximity to Western countries, costs, logistics, legal impediments (e.g. visa requirements), risk to journalists, relevance to national interest, and news attention cycles"⁹²⁶. The most obvious reason and the major obstacle in the case of Darfur was lack of access. Christiane Amanpour, CNN Chief International Correspondent, who produced the most touching and the most committed stories from Darfur in the summer of 2004 and who, according to her colleagues, "begged" her bosses to send her because she felt high-profile coverage could make a difference⁹²⁷, explained that the Sudanese government "for obvious reasons, was very, very tight on its dispensation of visas and access"⁹²⁸. She confirmed that by August 2004, global media were still not present there in great number, except some European – particularly British – television, which had been doing "as much as it can to highlight this situation"⁹²⁹. But once in a country, journalists had to wait in Khartoum for another week or two to get travel permits to go to Darfur, something that caused "an immense amount of frustration" among journalists in trying to "get in there and trying to get the story out as quickly as possible"⁹³⁰. Even in 2006, three years after the conflict started, journalists covering Darfur were still complaining about "huge restrictions by the Sudanese government on what journalists can do and where they can go" and the very bad security situation with *Janjaweed* "in the bush" and "people who would perhaps like to steal your vehicle and wouldn't be afraid of shooting you to do that"⁹³¹. Some journalists also say that "compassion fatigue may have taken hold with editors weary of a complex armed conflict that has been going on for decades and is

⁹²⁴ Ricchiardi, S., *Déjà Vu*, February/March 2005, American Journalism Review

⁹²⁵ Ibid.

⁹²⁶ Jakobsen, P.V., 2000, Focus On The CNN Misses The Point: The Real Media Impact On Conflict Management Is Invisible And Indirect, , Journal of Peace Research, vol. 37, no.2, SAGE Publications, London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi, pp.131-143

⁹²⁷ Ricchiardi, S., *Déjà Vu*, February/March 2005, American Journalism Review

⁹²⁸ Christiane Amanpour, CNN Chief International Correspondent, International Correspondents, CNNI, August 15, 2004

⁹²⁹ Ibid.

⁹³⁰ Neil Connery, ITV Correspondent, International Correspondents, CNNI, July 24, 2004

⁹³¹ For journalist, security the key issue to covering Darfur, Nic Robertson, CNN, May 16, 2006

difficult to sort out”⁹³². Iraq – and to a much lesser extent – Afghanistan were stories of the year in 2004, and international news budgets, already slashed in most newsrooms, were more likely to be consumed by these two stories than by Darfur⁹³³. Darfur managed to come out of the shadows during the spring/summer of 2004, but not for very long. After the Asian tsunami on December 26, 2004, “Darfur instantly vanished from the TV screens and the pages of newspapers... the media could handle only one emotion-laden story at a time, not two, and the tsunami was much more politically correct than Darfur; it was apolitical, only emotional.”⁹³⁴ Prunier also explains that “Darfur was not expected to happen when it did, and it did not fit the common patterns of thinking about Sudan”⁹³⁵. After more than 20 years of something that was known as a “religious war where wicked Muslims killed desperately struggling Christians” in Sudan, suddenly “Muslim-on-Muslim violence had surged” and all that when the world “was looking at Sudan as potentially the next profitable investment on the continent”⁹³⁶. Human right activists had another, not very favorable explanation for the media black-out: “With or without a war in Iraq, American journalists are generally slower to cover mass death if the victims are not white. The Rwandan genocide is a case in point”⁹³⁷. They point out that the media coverage of Darfur is part of the media coverage of Africa in general: “The media in the world is led by the American media which is paid for by American business interest, which has little to do with Africa.”⁹³⁸ It is not a secret that business profit is for commercial TV agencies the most important indicator whether some part of the world will be covered or not. For example, Reuters TV, over budget at that time from other events and lacking resources in the vicinity, decided not to cover a million refugees from the 1994 Rwanda genocide facing starvation at the Zaire border until their clients particularly demanded it⁹³⁹. Similarly, for APTV, the fact that more than a half of its annual subscription revenue comes from Europe, while the revenue from central and southern Africa is “so small as not to register” provides a clear explanation “to those who wonder why Africa, particularly, is not covered more”⁹⁴⁰. Similar to McLurgh’s Law, by which events diminish in importance in proportion to their distance from London⁹⁴¹, Van Ginneken proposed a “rule of thumb” for assessing when death in media terms reaches tragic proportions: “10000 deaths on another continent equal 1000 in another country equal 100 deaths in an outpost equal ten deaths in the centre of the capital equal one celebrity”⁹⁴². Most TV stations in order to save their overstretched budgets, usually rely

⁹³² Ricchiardi, S., *Déjà Vu*, February/March 2005, *American Journalism Review*

⁹³³ Ibid.

⁹³⁴ Prunier G., 2005, *Darfur: The Ambiguous Genocide*, C. Hurst & Co. Ltd., London, p. 128

⁹³⁵ Ibid.

⁹³⁶ Prunier G., 2005, *Darfur: The Ambiguous Genocide*, C. Hurst & Co. Ltd., London, p. 129

⁹³⁷ Carol Bogert, Human Rights Watch, quoted in Ricchiardi, S., *Déjà Vu*, February/March 2005, *American Journalism Review*

⁹³⁸ Omer Ismail, co-founder of the Darfur Peace and Development organization, interview with the author of the theses, February 18, 2007

⁹³⁹ Paterson, C., 1997, *Global Television News Service* in Paterson, C. and A. Sreberny, 2004, *International News In The 21st Century*, John Libbey Publishing for University of Luton Press, p.13

⁹⁴⁰ Baker, N., *Invisible Giants, Quiet Revolution*, in Paterson, C. and A. Sreberny, 2004, *International News In The 21st Century*, John Libbey Publishing for University of Luton Press, p. 72-73

⁹⁴¹ Schlesinger, P., 1987 2nd edition, *Putting 'Reality' Together: BBC News*, London: Routledge, p. 117

⁹⁴² Van Ginneken, J., 1998 *Understanding Global News: A Critical Introduction*, SAGE Publications, London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi,, p. 24

on TV agencies for coverage from remote corners of the world, and a lack of significant commercial interests for TV agencies to provide them causes a disappearance of these regions from TV news (as will be shown later, this was clearly the case with Darfur in the spring of 2004). The direct consequence of such a media policy to cover only the “must-cover news” in Africa, such as wars and coups, is the reinforcement of the Western perception that this continent is “all bad news, dreary and hopeless, with problems that were unsolvable and thus a waste of tears and newsprint”⁹⁴³.

As in the Kosovo case study, the NYT articles and Reuters TV stories were used to check the distribution of news stories and detect possible moments of media silence on BBCW and CNNI. The selection of NYT articles from Lexis-Nexis was made on the basis that each had Darfur as its main theme, i.e. ignoring those in which it was mentioned only in passing or only in some other context, while for the Reuters TV stories, all their transcripts mentioning Darfur were used. Analysis of NYT coverage shows that this newspaper too published the biggest number of articles in August and beginning of September – 19 in total, compared with only 7 articles per month in both May and June. Most of the articles in these two months were editorials by Nicholas D. Kristof, a prominent New York Times’ foreign correspondent who visited Darfur already in March 2004 and whose passionate columns about Darfur were cited by the US Senators while introducing the Darfur Peace and Accountability Act in the summer of 2005⁹⁴⁴, articles containing very personal accounts: “I’ll tell you more of her story on Saturday, because if she and her people aren’t victims of genocide, then the word has no meaning”⁹⁴⁵, and very strong political messages: “If Mr. Bush would step up to the cameras and denounce this genocide, if he would send Colin Powell to the Chad-Sudan border, if he would telephone Sudan’s president again to demand humanitarian access to the concentration camps, he might save hundreds of thousands of lives”⁹⁴⁶. Another article published in May 2004 compared the Darfur situation with the Balkans, a connection never mentioned on CNNI and BBCW: “...perhaps a million Muslims have been uprooted in the west, amid massacres that are drawing comparisons to the ethnic cleansing in the Balkans a decade ago”⁹⁴⁷. Nonetheless, most of the articles in this period had only 500 words or less. As on CNNI and BBCW, coverage intensified after the visit of the US Secretary of State Colin Powell and UN Secretary General Kofi Annan to Darfur on July 1. Reuters TV produced the biggest number of stories from Darfur in the same period, during August and the beginning of September, 65 in total, compared with only 5 in May and 17 in June. Their stories outnumbered significantly those produced by CNNI and BBCW, but this is due to the commercial TV agencies’ policy to send as many stories as possible from one single event – for example, 9 stories in total about Annan and Powell’s visit to Darfur (ahead of the visit, about the visit, and the aftermath of the visit) – and not with the subject selection – Reuters TV covered the same issues as CNNI and BBCW, only with some

⁹⁴³ Knickmeyer, E., Summer 2005, Darfur Fits Into a Pattern of Reporting Neglect, Nieman Reports

⁹⁴⁴ Darfur’s Silence, Summer 2005, Nieman Reports

⁹⁴⁵ Kristof, N.D., June 16, 2004, Dare We Call It Genocide?, The New York Times, Section A; Column 6; Editorial Desk; Pg. 21

⁹⁴⁶ Kristof, N.D., May 29, 2004, Bush Points The Way, The New York Times, Section A; Column 1; Editorial Desk; Pg. 15

⁹⁴⁷ Lacey, M., May 16, 2004, From Rogue State to Pariah State, The New York Times, Section 4; Column 1; Week in Review Desk; Pg. 7

more material about international aid agencies carrying out food and polio and tetanus vaccinations to Darfur's refugees, and visits of various US officials and civil rights activists which were not found very significant for the two TV channels.

As CNNI and BBCW, in 2006 NYT also had the biggest number of articles about Darfur August 31-September 30 - 20, compared with 14 in October and 11 in November. As can be seen, they had more intensive coverage of Darfur than the TV channels in November, but again, 5 of these 11 articles were editorials of Nicholas D. Kristof. In October, NYT paid a lot of attention to Sudanese government's decision to expel Jan Pronk, the Head of UN Mission of the United Nations in Sudan and its aftermath, like for example the UN decision to limit the role of its envoy. The number of Reuters TV stories also fell from September to November 2006; they produced 25 stories in September, 13 in October, and only 10 in November.

NYT and Reuters TV obviously had a similar pattern of Darfur news coverage to CNNI and BBCW, while in the case of NYT the most important difference in these two time periods was actually the personal engagement of one journalist. Therefore it can be concluded that:

- compared to other media, there was no event or issue about Darfur in this time period that CNNI and BBCW deliberately decided to ignore; and
- the selection of three time periods for the qualitative analysis in this research was the right one.

Additional information available from the transcripts is the number of times various categories of sources have been used and the type of knowledge they provided. There were five categories of sources in this case study. The first category includes US, UK and UN officials, as the main international actors in Darfur crisis; all other international officials, including African and European leaders belong to the second category. Sudanese officials as those accused for committing genocide in Darfur, represent the third category, while Darfur civilians and rebels are in the fourth category. The fifth category – humanitarian workers and human rights activists – is specific for this case study because in the Kosovo case study it represented less than 0.5% of all sources and it was not significant for the purpose of analysis. As will be confirmed in the further analysis of video-material, an appearance and high representation of this category of sources is very important for the framing analysis of media coverage, because it shows how much CNNI and, to lesser extent, BBCW, were focused more on the humanitarian aspects of the Darfur crisis, rather than the political, but also that by quoting these activists who had no political constraints in defining the situation on the ground, the two TV channels were more help-and-action oriented than politicians.


In the coverage of CNNI, this fifth category of sources was the dominant one, and it represents 34% of all quoted sources. Closely behind were the sources from the first category – 30%, among which 18% are US officials, especially US Secretary of State Colin Powell.

Sources were used as following (Figure 11):

US/UK/UN: 30% (from which 18% were US sources, 10% were UN sources and only 2% sources from UK)
 Other international officials: 5%
 Sudanese: 11%
 Darfurian: 20%

Humanitarian workers/human rights activists: 34%

Figure 11:CNNI SOURCES IN DARFUR COVERAGE




BBCW gave priority to the first category of sources – 37%, of which more than half were UN officials – 23%, more than the UK and the US sources together. Again, humanitarian workers and human rights activists are highly represented - 21% of all quoted sources.

Sources were used as following (Figure 12):

US/UK/UN: 37% (from which more than a half, 23% were UN forces, and the rest equally divided by US and UK sources – 7% each)
 Other international officials: 8%
 Sudanese: 18%
 Darfurian: 16%
 Humanitarian workers/human rights activists: 21%

Figure 12: BBW SOURCES IN DARFUR COVERAGE



Further, the type of knowledge these sources provided has been investigated, and, as in the Kosovo case study, special attention has been paid to the distinction between the five categories described in the methodology chapter – factual, explanatory, descriptive, evaluative, and recommendations – and especially between factual and descriptive. For example, factual statements were those in which pure facts were presented, like: “there is one doctor for 30000 people here”, “they bombed us several times”, “they smashed the window on the truck”, while descriptive used more attributes and metaphors – the statement “Sudan will bow to nobody except Allah” is descriptive since a metaphor explaining that Sudan will not bow to anybody was used. Also, a statement like “he has killed so many people he doesn't even know how many” would be factual if there was a number of people killed; in this way it is clearly descriptive. Other clear examples of descriptive statements were “going out from this camp became terrifying”, “the disaster in Darfur is man-made” and “people are too frightened to go home”. Sometimes, statements that might look as descriptive were in fact evaluative; for example “this has makings of new Rwanda”, “it will be a new Rwanda for you” or “Darfur is looking in every shape like Rwanda” were definitely evaluating whether what happened was good or bad since the events were compared with Rwanda that “become the baseline reference for absolute evil”⁹⁴⁸. These were the most frequent examples of evaluative statements. Recommendations were statements such as the “international community should take positive action in Darfur”, “we have to bring this tragedy to the end” and “there is a grave

⁹⁴⁸ Prunier G., 2005, *Darfur: The Ambiguous Genocide*, C. Hurst & Co. Ltd., London, p.127

situation that must be addressed immediately” (although the situation is *described* as grave, the focus is on the recommendation for action); while examples of explanatory statements are “we are fighting because we have been treated unjustly” and “if we allow military intervention, it will be the same as in Iraq”.

In the CNNI coverage, humanitarian workers and human rights activists were those who had the highest percentage of both descriptive and evaluative statements; it was they who underlined the gravity of the situation in Darfur by describing the terrible conditions in which people were living there, and also it was they who did not hesitate to use the word genocide and to compare Darfur with Rwanda. Recommendations were mostly given by the UN and – especially – US sources that focused on the actions that should be taken. Darfurian sources, mostly civilians, had the highest percentage of factual knowledge about the events on the ground, and these accounts were even more horrifying when given only as pure facts: “children were killed and the village was burned”. Explanatory statements were equally represented in the sound bites of Darfurian sources, i.e. rebel representatives, and Sudanese sources, who explained the reasons for their behavior, the motivation for rebellion on one side or rejection of all international proposals on the other.

Table 7: CNNI SOURCES – CATEGORIES OF STATEMENT

| SOURCES ⁹⁴⁹ | CATEGORIES OF STATEMENT | | | | | |
|---|-------------------------|-------------|-------------|------------|-----------------|-------|
| | Factual | Descriptive | Explanatory | Evaluative | Recommendations | Total |
| US officials | 16% | 32% | / | 16% | 36% | 100% |
| UN officials | 4% | 43% | 9% | 9% | 35% | 100% |
| Darfurians | 47% | 25% | 18% | 6% | 4% | 100% |
| Sudanese | 18% | 39% | 28% | 10% | 5% | 100% |
| Humanitarian workers/ Human rights activists | 8% | 58% | 8% | 18% | 8% | 100% |

In the BBCW coverage, the situation was different. UK, UN and US sources had the highest percentage of descriptive statements (especially descriptions by UN sources were used) and, predictably, of recommendations, again mostly by the US sources. Evaluative statements were given by humanitarian workers and human rights activists, while factual statements were given equally by Sudanese and Darfurian sources.

Table 8: BBCW SOURCES – CATEGORIES OF STATEMENT

| SOURCES ⁹⁵⁰ | CATEGORIES OF STATEMENT |
|------------------------|-------------------------|
|------------------------|-------------------------|

⁹⁴⁹ Only sources with significant percentages of statements from different categories are presented

⁹⁵⁰ Only sources with significant percentages of statements from different categories are presented

| | Factual | Descriptive | Explanatory | Evaluative | Recommendations | Total |
|---|---------|-------------|-------------|------------|-----------------|-------|
| US officials | 11.5% | 44% | / | 11.5% | 33% | 100% |
| UK officials | 20% | 60% | 20% | / | / | 100% |
| UN officials | / | 73% | / | / | 27% | 100% |
| Darfurians | 44% | 37.5% | 12.5% | 6% | / | 100% |
| Sudanese | 39% | 23% | / | 15% | 23% | 100% |
| Humanitarian workers/ Human rights activists | / | 40% | / | 40% | 20% | 100% |

To check the consistency of my coding practice over time and reliability of findings, the analysis of the type of knowledge the sources provide has been conducted twice, with some time distance in between. From 288 investigated statements (212 in CNNI stories and 76 in BBCW stories), I have got the same results for 251 statements, or for 87% of total number of statements. As in the Kosovo case study, most of the inconsistencies in the results derived from the similarities between factual and descriptive statements, but repeated analysis confirmed that local sources (Darfurians in CNNI coverage and Darfurians and Sudanese sources in BBCW coverage) provided the majority of factual knowledge.

Qualitative and quantitative analysis was conducted on the archive video-material of CNNI and BBCW about Darfur. Since the number of stories about Darfur was very small, any sample of the video-material would be inadequate for meaningful analysis. Key word analysis was conducted on all news items broadcast on these two TV channels in the periods April 1-September 9, 2004 and August 31-November 30, 2006, while detailed qualitative analysis was conducted of all news items in the key periods, i.e. 44 stories or 42% of the total number.

Again, the deductive approach to content analysis has been chosen. After the preliminary view of the material collected for this analysis and taking into account guidelines from previous researches into similar subjects, the same frame categories as in the Kosovo case study have been selected, which enabled me to make a valuable comparison between two case studies. As a result, the material was analyzed for keywords predicted to be associated with two main frames: the empathy/distance frames toward the civilian population in Darfur and the pro-intervention/contra-intervention frames related to Western policy options. Starting with the empathy/distance frame, the words: refugees, displaced persons, people, women, children, villagers, victims, starving/starve, dying/die/died were counted, with the assumption that identification of Darfurians as people, and highlighting their suffering would contribute to the identification of TV viewers (including political decision-makers) with the population in Darfur. To the contrary, the words: Africans, Sudanese, Muslims, rebels, men, fighters/fight/fighting, warring, killing/killed were counted as terms that define the crisis in Darfur as something distant, strictly related to the African continent, which does not require international help.

With regard to the pro-intervention/contra-intervention frames, the words: ethnic cleansing, genocide, humanitarian crisis/catastrophe/disaster, save/saving, protect, act, help, intervene/intervention were counted, because one could expect that these words would be associated with the positive and worthy dimensions of intervening in Darfur. To the contrary, the words: ethnic conflict, peace deal/talks/negotiations/initiative, interest, uncertain, unclear, danger would emphasize the risks of operation, (in)compatibility with national interests and necessity for diplomatic solutions as opposed to military intervention. Quantitative analysis of a small test sample, 6 stories from CNNI and 6 stories from BBCW, 11% of total number of items, has shown that of all words listed above, only the word “interest” did not appear, but I decided to keep it in the list of keywords since its absence also has significant meaning. The quantitative analysis showed the following results:

Table 9: KEY WORD ANALYSIS OF BBCW KOSOVO COVERAGE

| Request for international reaction | Request for refrain from action | Row sum |
|------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|---------|
| Empathy frame 49% n=195 | Distance frame 22% n=89 | |
| Pro-intervention frame 15% n=61 | Contra-intervention frame 14% n=58 | |
| Total: 64% | Total: 36% | 100% |

The empathy frame was absolutely dominant in the BBCW coverage, with the empathy frame key words evenly used during the whole investigated period. But at the same time, the intervention frame has been represented almost equally as often as the contra-intervention frame, although the context in which key words were used has been taken into account, to prevent the inadvertent false attribution of keywords; for example words “agreement” and “peace” in BBCW coverage were excluded when they were used in phrases like these: “many now accept the peace deal was fraud” and “they failed to reach any agreement”. In all cases key words belonging to intervention and contra-intervention frame have been counted only if they were used to describe the recommendable solution, either peace initiatives or more concrete interventions. Still, the empathy and intervention frame together, which should combined, according to framing theory, provide an incentive for the government to intervene, were represented with a strong majority of key words – 64%.

Table 10: KEY WORD ANALYSIS OF CNNI KOSOVO COVERAGE

| Request for international reaction | Request for refrain from action | Row sum |
|-------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|---------|
| Empathy frame 56% n=375 | Distance frame 20% n=135 | |
| Pro-intervention frame 20% n=136 | Contra-intervention frame 4% n=28 | |
| Total: 76% | Total: 24% | 100% |

In CNNI coverage the keywords predicted to be associated with the empathy frame outnumbered those predicted to be associated with distance frame by almost three to one. The domination of the intervention frame is even more obvious; the keywords associated with this frame were used almost five times more often. Again, special attention was paid to the context in which key words were used; for example although word “action” was preceded by “no” in the phrase “everybody is fed up in watching no action”, this was actually a criticism *demanding* some action, so it belongs to the pro-intervention frame. The empathy and intervention frame together are even more dominant than in BBCW coverage, and they were represented with 76% of all key words.

As indicated by the test analysis, the word ‘interest’ appeared not once in the BBCW and CNNI coverage. That could be a potential indicator that, according to these TV channels, national interests were not at stake in this case, but also that a lack of it did not represent an impediment for involvement and action – something that will be analyzed later through the qualitative analysis and comparison of its results with policy documents.

QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS

Since frames are “difficult to detect fully and reliably”, because many of the framing devices can appear “as natural, unremarkable choices of words or images”⁹⁵¹, the content of video-material was additionally analyzed qualitatively. As in the Kosovo case study, this gave a more detailed analysis of the context in which key words were used and the overall tone of journalists’ reports, with special attention again given to the reporters’ stand-ups, i.e. the part of the report when the journalist in the field speaks directly to camera - and indirectly to the public. Additionally, further features of the coverage were taken into account:

- The visual elements of the reports to check how much they corresponded with the key words and phrases used: duration of shots, the apparent strength of a sensation, e.g., how close up the shot is, the placement of elements in the shot, etc;
- The main position of the story vis-à-vis Western policy: a nominal scale of five points, from very positive to very negative was created;
- The presence of the channels’ correspondents on the ground, since it indicates the level of importance given to the story;
- Parallel analysis of NYT articles and Reuters TV stories that allowed me to compare the content of the stories (not only on numbers of stories published and produced) and identify possible pictures and themes CNNI and BBCW chose to ignore.

THE BEGINNING OF THE CRISIS, APRIL 01-31, 2004

Thanks to the advocacy of NGOs, primarily Amnesty International⁹⁵² and the International Crisis Group⁹⁵³, media began to “discover” Darfur in the spring of 2004. Although the BBC was, together with Le Monde and the New York Times, among the first media that reported about Darfur⁹⁵⁴, BBCW had only four items about the Darfur

⁹⁵¹ Entman, R. M., 1991, Framing US Coverage of International News, Journal of Communication 41: 6

⁹⁵² Amnesty International, July 2003, The Looming Crisis in Darfur, London

⁹⁵³ ICG media release, December 2003, The Other War in Sudan, Brussels

⁹⁵⁴ Prunier G., 2005, Darfur: The Ambiguous Genocide, C. Hurst & Co. Ltd., London, p.127

crisis in the period April 1-30, 2004. The first was aired on April 9, the day after Sudanese government, Sudan Liberation Army and Justice and Equality Movement rebels had agreed on 45-day ceasefire. It was reported that this ceasefire agreement “has brought a glimmer of hope to this bleak landscape”⁹⁵⁵, but that “signs of peace are few in this remote area”⁹⁵⁶. The final part of the story is even more skeptical; it ends with the remark that “the news will certainly receive only cautious optimism from a population so deeply scared by violence”⁹⁵⁷, strengthened by close up shots of an old woman wiping tears from her face and, at the very end, a wide shot of her standing beside a grave in the middle of the desert. Other video material in the story shows refugees going through the desert with their belongings on donkeys and horses, and wounded persons being carried on stretchers into a makeshift hospital. After this story, there was a pause of almost two weeks until the next two items, broadcast on April 22. This disappearance of Darfur from BBCW news coincided with the schedule of Reuters TV stories about Darfur: after a very brief story about the UN saying the world should pressure Sudan to end human rights violations, with ordinary shots from the UN Security Council in New York, Reuters TV sent the first material from Darfur that month only on April 21, with various shots of the charred remains of a car in a deserted village (pictures that would be repeated many times afterward on both BBCW and CNNI, most probably because of a lack of new material rather than because of the intention to insist on these specific ones), a destroyed school and hospital, and a refugee camp. In the meantime, the New York Times published six articles, of which three were editorials. All of them criticized the US administration for being “no more prepared to prevent genocide”⁹⁵⁸ than they were in Rwanda, Cambodia and Bosnia, and strongly recommended that it “use its leverage with Khartoum”⁹⁵⁹, not just to demand from the Sudanese government to let “aid agencies and humanitarian monitors have unhindered access to the displaced”⁹⁶⁰, but also that it “cease its aerial attacks, terminate its arms supplies to the *Janjaweed* and punish those militia accused of looting, rape and murder”⁹⁶¹. The authors of these editorials, including two Pulitzer Prize winners, Nicholas Kristof and Samantha Power, author of “A Problem from Hell: America in the Age of Genocide”, considered that the international community should even be willing to provide military protection for humanitarian workers if needed. Nothing similar was requested by BBCW journalists in April 2004, although one of their stories aired on April 22 was very strong and touching. It was one of only a few stories produced by BBCW crews in the field, in Darfur and in the border area in Chad. It firstly described the situation in Darfur where “rape and murder are the rule of the day”⁹⁶². According to the reporter, “only some managed to escape”⁹⁶³, but life in refugee camps

⁹⁵⁵ BBCW, April 9, 2004, Reporter: Sean De Vries

⁹⁵⁶ BBCW, April 9, 2004, Reporter: Sean De Vries

⁹⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁵⁸ Power, S., April 6, 2004, Remember Rwanda, but Take Action in Sudan, The New York Times, Section A; Column 2; Editorial Desk; Pg. 23

⁹⁵⁹ Editorial Desk, April 7, 2004, Peril in Sudan, The New York Times, Section A; Column 1; Editorial Desk; Pg. 20

⁹⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁹⁶¹ Power, S., April 6, 2004, Remember Rwanda, but Take Action in Sudan, The New York Times, Section A; Column 2; Editorial Desk; Pg. 23

⁹⁶² BBCW, April 22, 2004, Reporter: Glen Middleton

⁹⁶³ Ibid.

within Darfur is not much better: “this is still a good hunting ground for the militia, it is even too dangerous to stay here”⁹⁶⁴. These descriptions were illustrated with several shots of abandoned villages: burnt out huts, damaged pots and a close up shot of one single burnt abandoned plastic shoe in the dust – striking signs of ravages left after an attack by the *Janjaweed*. The reporter did a stand-up on a truck driving refugees through the desert on the way to Chad, saying that “with no end in sight to the war, these people will become just another number, another refugee”⁹⁶⁵. The conclusion of the story is even more empathetic toward the people of Darfur: “And in a midst of their nightmare, a new life is born. Fatma has given birth to a baby boy. His name is Ahmed. Age: three days. Born: a refugee”⁹⁶⁶. The story ends with a shot of the mother cradling her baby and a six-second long shot of a newborn baby. The second item broadcast that day was more focused on the origins of Darfur crisis: “The conflict in the west of Sudan began about a year ago when rebel leaders were encouraged by the success of the rebellion in the South”⁹⁶⁷, and it predicted a hard stand by the Sudanese government, “determined to block similar ambitions in the West”⁹⁶⁸. It portrayed the situation in Darfur as the “world’s worst ongoing humanitarian crisis”⁹⁶⁹, a phrase that would be utilized many times afterward and would become some kind of a leading theme in stories about Darfur on both BBCW and CNNI. Almost the same pictures were used as in the first story that day. On April 29, the fourth and last story that month about Darfur was broadcast on BBCW, and it sent out the message of aid agencies “frustrated by the government’s refusal to allow them access to the area”⁹⁷⁰, which warned that “when the rains arrive in mid-May the current shortages and the dislocation of the population will deepen into an even more dangerous crisis”⁹⁷¹. All four stories in this period were neutral toward the Western policy in Darfur, and did not mention even in a single word the possibility of their involvement. Three stories were made in the studio, while one prepared in the field was actually made not by a TV crew sent from London on purpose, but by a cameraman (not a journalist) based in Johannesburg, South Africa.

CNNI had only two stories in April 2004. The first CNNI item in this period was aired on April 22, and it was primarily devoted to the horrors Darfur civilians were facing: “in the relative safety of a camp in neighboring Chad, refugees tell of murder and rape, burning and bombardment of their villages by government forces and militia groups”⁹⁷². The reporter referred to the ongoing discussion about what was actually taking place in Darfur, ethnic cleansing or genocide, but also pointed out a much bigger problem than this dilemma: “whatever you call it, there is no one to stop it”⁹⁷³. Neither side was marked as hundred percent guilty for violence in Darfur: “a shaky truce is in place, but both sides accuse the other of violating it”⁹⁷⁴. The story begins with strong pictures of

⁹⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶⁶ BBCW, April 22, 2004, Reporter: Glen Middleton

⁹⁶⁷ BBCW, April 22, 2004, Reporter: Richard Slee

⁹⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁷⁰ BBCW, April 29, 2004, Reporter: Gail Maclellan

⁹⁷¹ Ibid.

⁹⁷² CNNI, April 22, 2004, Reporter: Zain Verjee

⁹⁷³ Ibid.

⁹⁷⁴ Ibid.

two wounded men, one with his face bound with bandages and another without a leg, shows afterwards a large group of women and children sitting on the dusty ground in a refugee camp, and ends with a slow motion close-up shot of a small baby with a fly on her face – presenting in that way a whole range of the affected Darfur population, with the focus on the most vulnerable ones. On April 27, CNNI already indirectly labeled the crisis in Darfur: “it’s a race against time in the Darfur region of Western Sudan to stop what the UN calls a possible genocide in the making”⁹⁷⁵. The ceasefire between the government and rebels was described as “shaky as best”⁹⁷⁶, and the journalist announced in a stand-up from Washington that “now US officials warn there will be no restoration of ties with Sudan until the government ends the bloodshed in Darfur”⁹⁷⁷. Almost the same pictures were used as in the story from April 22, with additional close-up shots of babies and people around the van with humanitarian aid. Both stories were prepared from the studio, and while the first story was neutral toward Western policy in Darfur, the second one had positive tone toward the US administration’s political measures in this crisis.

What is common for the coverage of both CNNI and BBCW is that there was not enough video material from Darfur available (even Reuters TV had only one story from Darfur in this period): similar and even the same shots were often repeated. Also, both channels have been focused on the humanitarian crisis and the problems of Darfur civilians, reinforced by many shots of women and children. At the same time, contrary to the New York Times for example, there was no direct call for Western action in Darfur on either of the two channels. But, it is important to note that the word “genocide” was for the first time mentioned on CNNI already on April 27 (“possible genocide in the making”), while BBCW did not use it until July 24, 2004. It was not the first time that UK journalists were more reluctant to use word “genocide” than their American colleagues. Kent found that even four months after the beginning of all-out war in Bosnia, in July/August 1992, though the term “ethnic cleansing” had been used by various UK actors, including Paddy Ashdown, Anthony Parsons and a few TV news journalists, “there was still no systematic use by TV journalists of a recognizable descriptive term for a program of massacre and deportation under threat of death”⁹⁷⁸. Some media, such as the BBC in News at Ten, only pointed out that some American networks were calling the Serbian campaign “genocide”⁹⁷⁹. UK media seemed to be more cautious in labeling an event even when it happens in London: after the terrorist attack on the London transportation system on July 7, 2005, BBC waited for two and a half hours to carry a report discussing the possibility that the bombings might be the work of Al Qaeda and did not characterize it as a terrorist attack before UK officials did. On the contrary, US Fox News broadcast from central London “with a grainy image quality and a reporter dressed in a flak jacket, giving the impression of a war zone”⁹⁸⁰.

⁹⁷⁵ CNNI, April 27, 2004, Reporter: Elise Labott

⁹⁷⁶ CNNI, April 27, 2004, Reporter: Elise Labott

⁹⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁷⁸ Kent, G., 2005, Framing War And Genocide, British Policy and News Media Reaction to the War in Bosnia, Hampton Press Communication Series: Political Communication, p. 283-5

⁹⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁸⁰ Pfanner, E., July 11, 2005, Media access a challenge in UK attacks, The International Herald Tribune, p.

THE GENOCIDE DECLARATION, AUGUST 09-SEPTEMBER 09, 2004

BBCW broadcast 12 stories in this time period, and one of the main covered issues was again the situation in refugee camps in Darfur and Chad. The story on August 11 showed French soldiers in Chad unloading a cargo of aid bound for Darfur while the journalist explained that “it might not look like much, but when you have nothing, even a blue plastic bucket is a valuable commodity”⁹⁸¹. “These people are clinging to life, but they are too frightened to leave”⁹⁸², the journalist said, referring to the large group of women and children, and even small babies in a refugee camp. The last close up shot of malnourished children’s faces is the most remarkable and the journalist concluded that “whether it’s called genocide or ethnic cleansing, this is human misery on a huge scale”⁹⁸³. “Why would people endure such hardship”⁹⁸⁴, the journalist wondered in the story aired on August 17, in which striking images were shown of a small boy with burns on his back, after he was thrown into a fire by *Janjaweed* militia, and his mother with burned hands after she had tried to help him. At the end of this report the BBCW journalist is seen surrounded by women and children sitting under a tent in a dusty refugee camp saying: “Everyone here will tell you they are still too afraid to go back to their villages. They say they want international peacekeepers. But that’s something the Sudanese government says it will never accept.”⁹⁸⁵ The stories were getting even more pessimistic in tone on this issue toward the end of the investigated period. On August 27, the journalist reported that “ten years after the Rwanda genocide human rights activists say the parallels are too clear to ignore”⁹⁸⁶. This story warned that “the need is urgent”⁹⁸⁷ and that “food is running out, so too the hope that they’ll be able to return home soon”⁹⁸⁸. BBCW paid a lot of attention also to “Africa’s latest attempt to find a solution to the crisis in Darfur”⁹⁸⁹, both to the deployment of African Union troops and to the African Union mediated peace talks in Abuja, Nigeria, because, according to this channel, for the AU that was “a crucial test of its credibility and its determination to play a lead role in dealing with the continent’s problems”⁹⁹⁰. One of the most peculiar facts regarding the AU troops was that the first contingent came from Rwanda, the African country in which genocide was committed exactly 10 years before, so one of the few stories from the field was totally devoted to Rwandan soldiers. “In theory, they are here only to protect African ceasefire monitors; but some Rwandan soldiers come with bitter memories of the genocide in their country and they might be under pressure to intervene if wide spread abuses continue”⁹⁹¹, a journalist said in the report of August 15. In his stand-up in front of Rwandan soldiers disembarking from plane in Darfur, he concluded that “this is certainly a brave effort by the AU”⁹⁹², but that “these men are going to have to work very hard if

⁹⁸¹ BBCW, August 11, 2004, Reporter: Juliet Dunlop

⁹⁸² Ibid.

⁹⁸³ Ibid.

⁹⁸⁴ BBCW, August 17, 2004, Reporter: Paul Wood

⁹⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁸⁶ BBCW, August 27, 2004, Reporter: Alix Kroager

⁹⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸⁸ BBCW, August 27, 2004, Reporter: Alix Kroager

⁹⁸⁹ BBCW, August 25, 2004, Reporter: Peter Biles

⁹⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹⁹¹ BBCW, August 15, 2004, Reporter: Barnaby Phillips

⁹⁹² Ibid.

they are to have real impact on this vast crisis”⁹⁹³. But there was no statement by Rwandan officials, although Reuters TV had provided a sound bite of Rwandan President Paul Kagame expressing the official Rwandan position toward the most disputable issue of this deployment: “What is the purpose of having people go into an area like that and then they do nothing about what is happening? For me it doesn’t make sense.”⁹⁹⁴ Fifteen days later it was already clear that AU troops “face the daunting task of supervising the ceasefire that hardly exists”⁹⁹⁵ because “neither side seems ready to be the first to begin disarming its forces”⁹⁹⁶. Peace talks in Abuja were also considered important, although the progress has been marked as slow, with “modest hope of success”⁹⁹⁷. The agreed reinforcement of the monitoring mission and expansion of AU forces was described on August 30 as “one hopeful sign in an otherwise bleak and unforgiving landscape”⁹⁹⁸, and three days later it was further explained that “for some it all seems like a messy compromise, but others say that in this vast unwieldy region it is the Sudanese government that is best equipped to help its own people, and that while it’s still showing some willing, negotiations must continue”⁹⁹⁹. Western involvement in the Darfur crisis was rarely mentioned on BBCW in this period, with the exception of the story on August 24 that covered the visit of UK Foreign Secretary Jack Straw to Darfur. “For months now there have been warnings that time is running out for Sudan; now it appears it really is”¹⁰⁰⁰, the journalist announced during the visit, adding that “British Foreign Secretary hopes he can apply just the right amount of pressure”¹⁰⁰¹. But one day later it was underlined that although the “international community wants to see more progress”¹⁰⁰², there was “little support within the UN for tough sanctions”¹⁰⁰³ against Sudan. With the exception of the story about Straw’s visit to Darfur that was presented as a positive act of the UK government, all other stories were mostly neutral toward Western policy. Some criticism was expressed only in one story, but it was addressed to the international community in general, with the remark that “international pressure is mounting for a solution of the crisis, but not quickly enough for its victims”¹⁰⁰⁴. Three of twelve stories in total were prepared in the field, two from Darfur and one from Abuja.

CNN broadcast nine stories in this period, and the most important part of its coverage of the Darfur crisis were stories produced by Christiane Amanpour, the CNN Chief International Correspondent who spent the first half of August in Darfur. The main characteristic of these stories is that they were very person-oriented, i.e. they dealt with specific human destinies taken as examples of the large scale misery of Darfurian refugees. The report from August 10 begins with the story of a boy who “is one and a half

⁹⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁹⁴ Reuters TV, August 14, 2004, Rwanda: President Paul Kagame Says Rwandian Troops Sent To Darfur Would Intervene To Protect Darfur Residents

⁹⁹⁵ BBCW, August 30, 2004, Reporter: Jim Fish

⁹⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁹⁷ BBCW, August 25, 2004, Reporter: Peter Biles

⁹⁹⁸ BBCW, August 30, 2004, Reporter: Jim Fish

⁹⁹⁹ BBCW, September 2, 2004, Reporter: Stephan Gibbs

¹⁰⁰⁰ BBCW, August 24, 2004, Reporter: Juliet Dunlop

¹⁰⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰² BBCW, August 25, 2004, Reporter: Peter Biles

¹⁰⁰³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰⁴ BBCW, August 21, 2004, Reporter: Jim Fish

years old, and weighs only about 12 pounds”¹⁰⁰⁵. Pictures show this very skinny boy crying, placed in a sling where humanitarian workers are trying to weigh him and then various shots of “muac” measurement (middle upper arm circular) to determine the level of malnutrition. According to Amanpour, that was “the most poignant image”, which reinforced media responsibility to come to Darfur and “at least report on this suffering so that it doesn't happen in silence”.¹⁰⁰⁶ “For a population on the edge like this one, a simple case like diarrhea can be a killer”¹⁰⁰⁷, she said in the report, while showing the grandmother of a boy trying to put some food in his mouth and more pictures of women with babies on their chests, and close-ups of malnourished children. The story ends with shots of an old lady packing her sick grandson on her back and walking away through the desert with the journalist’s last comment: “Does she think he will survive? Inshallah, they say here, God willing”¹⁰⁰⁸. Another story that day was about Sara, “who is expecting her sixth child soon”¹⁰⁰⁹ and who “has not even seen milk in five months”¹⁰¹⁰, and showing her and her children carrying plastic sheeting for their makeshift home. Amanpour warned in a stand-up walking through the refugee camp that “aid is still only reaching about a third of more than two million people across this vast province”¹⁰¹¹ and after more scenes from the refugee camp she concluded: “caught between fear, hunger and disease, these people wonder just how they are going to survive”¹⁰¹². Next day, the story was about the humanitarian air drops, but again from the perspective of Darfurian refugees. The story began with a shot of a small boy sitting alone on a stone in the middle of a desert, waiting “as if expecting men from heaven... which is what this might just as well be”¹⁰¹³. “It is still just a drop in the desert, but a much needed one”¹⁰¹⁴, Amanpour said in the report, but this time she directed strong criticism at the international reaction, or rather lack of it, to this crisis: “Late planning for this emergency and a slow response from donor countries, means the UN is now making these expensive and inefficient airdrops.”¹⁰¹⁵ The end of the story does not bring more optimism, showing people and even small children running toward the sacs with food and women scraping up grain from the ground, with the journalist’s bitter comment: “this is their fate, a desperate rush to retrieve what ever aid comes the way”¹⁰¹⁶. After almost two weeks pause, the next story about Darfur was broadcast on August 23, about “African leaders in Abuja... searching for an African solution, to end the fighting, to end the dying”¹⁰¹⁷. But, five days later the story warned that “achieving peace may not be that easy”¹⁰¹⁸, because “mistrust between Arabs and Africans in this region dates back decades”. CNNI devoted one story on

¹⁰⁰⁵ CNNI, August 10, 2004, Reporter: Christiane Amanpour

¹⁰⁰⁶ Christiane Amanpour, CNN Chief International Correspondent, International Correspondents, CNNI, August 15, 2004

¹⁰⁰⁷ CNNI, August 10, 2004, Reporter: Christiane Amanpour

¹⁰⁰⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰¹⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹¹ Ibid.

¹⁰¹² Ibid.

¹⁰¹³ CNNI, August 11, 2004, Reporter: Christiane Amanpour

¹⁰¹⁴ CNNI, August 11, 2004, Reporter: Christiane Amanpour

¹⁰¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰¹⁷ CNNI, August 23, 2004, Reporter: Zain Verjee

¹⁰¹⁸ CNNI, August 28, 2004, Reporter: Tumi Makgabo

September 2 to the report of the UN Secretary-General's special representative for Sudan Jan Pronk, who failed to say directly that the Sudanese government was responsible for abuses in Darfur, as well as to US disagreement with these conclusions. The journalist warned in his stand-up in front of Darfurian protestors at the opposite side of the UN headquarters in New York that "after Mr. Pronk's briefing, the Security Council will take even more time now"¹⁰¹⁹. As expected, CNNI had two stories about the findings of the US genocide investigation, on both September 8 and 9. "The Secretary of State did not mince his words"¹⁰²⁰, it was announced in the story about Powell's testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, but it was clarified that "Powell suggested the US was not obligated to intervene more forcefully than it already has"¹⁰²¹. Powell's prognoses that the US draft resolution on Sudan, calling for the United Nations to create an international commission to determine whether genocide had occurred, will be "a tough sell with significant opposition from China and Pakistan"¹⁰²² were reported in the journalist's stand-up, as were Sudan's reaction that this draft represents "a political ploy by President Bush to get his hands on Sudan's oil and win re-election in November"¹⁰²³. Three stories out of nine were prepared from Darfur, while others were made either in studio or in New York and Washington. Three of them had a critical stand toward both the Western and international policy in Darfur, and the other six were neutral.

Pictures of starving and sick children dominated in the coverage of both CNNI and BBCW in this period, so the empathetic frame was strongly reinforced by the video-material used. Reuters TV provided more material about Darfur at that time, 55 stories in total, but, as already explained, many of them were dealing with the same issues. One of the most interesting sound bites provide by Reuters TV, which never appeared on CNNI and BBCW, was UN Secretary-General's special representative for Sudan Jan Pronk's attempt to use the presence of TV camera to secure guarantees of safety for refugees he has spoken to: "Can I ask you, can you guarantee, that all these people who make statements here will not be arrested because of the fact that they will be making statements. Can you guarantee that they can speak freely?" The man who was heard to reply "Yes, of course"¹⁰²⁴, did not appear in front of the camera. CNNI stories in this period had a similar position toward the necessity for action as the New York Times, which again in its committed editorials pointed out that: "every government in the world ought to view that (providing unrestricted access and security for aid groups) as a moral imperative and make clear to Khartoum that denying such access will cost it dearly"¹⁰²⁵. BBCW was more reserved regarding this issue in this time period.

¹⁰¹⁹ CNNI, September 2, 2004, Reporter: Richard Rorth

¹⁰²⁰ CNNI, September 9, 2004, Reporter: Andrea Koppel

¹⁰²¹ Ibid.

¹⁰²² Ibid.

¹⁰²³ Ibid.

¹⁰²⁴ Reuters TV, August 26, 2004, Nigeria/ Sudan: Darfur Sudanese Rebels Reject Disarmament Call/ UN Envoy Jan Pronk Visits Refugee Camps

¹⁰²⁵ Editorial Desk, August 16, 2004, Still Dying in Darfur, The New York Times, Section A; Column 1; Editorial Desk; Pg. 14

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BBCW had ten stories about Darfur in this time period. Already at the beginning BBCW estimated that the African Union had “lost credibility among the very civilians it was supposed to be protecting” and that “many now accept the peace deal was a fraud”¹⁰²⁶. Similar phrases were found about the AU’s failed efforts: “they have been too few, too undefended and too poorly equipped to stop the violence”¹⁰²⁷; “the scattered AU troops have been unable to stop the Sudanese government moving thousands of reinforcements into Darfur in the past few weeks”¹⁰²⁸; “its 7000 soldiers were given the impossible task of stabilizing an area the size of France; with financial problems and desperately low morale”¹⁰²⁹. Such phrases were repeated many times until the end of September 2006, the point at which these troops were supposed to be finally replaced by UN troops. Shots of AU troops were used in almost every report in this period, but every time there was either only one soldier walking alone through the desert or a small group just passing by burned huts and destroyed villages, pictures utilized to underline their impotence. But when it became clear that “despite relentless pressure from the international community”¹⁰³⁰, Khartoum would not accept the UN forces, it was concluded that “the AU seems to have little choice but to struggle on with its near impossible mission”¹⁰³¹ and that their decision to stay for Darfurian civilians is after all “a glimmer of hope for the crisis that engulfed them”¹⁰³². For them, for Darfur’s people whose suffering “has already been immense”¹⁰³³, “it’s the same old story... they sit and wait for peace to return”¹⁰³⁴. Already on September 8 it was said that the refugee camps within Darfur “are stretched to the breaking point and a new refugee crisis along the borders could... bring instability to the entire region”¹⁰³⁵. These words were reinforced by the last shot of the story, two small girls looking directly at the camera and indirectly to the viewer of the story. It is interesting that two stories in this period dealt primarily with the US movie actor George Clooney’s testimonies from Darfur, which he visited earlier that year. “Darfur’s best hope: a Hollywood star”¹⁰³⁶, the journalist began the story on September 15, while a day before it was explained that “far from the glimpse of Hollywood, George Clooney was in Darfur in April, hearing personal stories from one of the world’s most dangerous places”¹⁰³⁷. His campaign to help the people of Darfur and to push for UN peacekeeping troops there has been portrayed very positively, while international officials were far from getting that appreciation: “but at the UN in New York, there is little political will to force Khartoum to accept UN forces”¹⁰³⁸. The meeting of foreign ministers on Sudan, organized by the US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Danish Foreign Minister

¹⁰²⁶ BBCW, September 6, 2006, Reporter: Pascale Harter

¹⁰²⁷ BBCW, September 12, 2006, Reporter Jannat Jalil

¹⁰²⁸ BBCW, September 15, 2006, Reporter: Emma Jane Standley

¹⁰²⁹ BBCW, September 18, 2006, Reporter: Jonah Fisher

¹⁰³⁰ BBCW, September 16, 2006, Reporter: Jonah Fisher

¹⁰³¹ Ibid.

¹⁰³² BBCW, September 21, 2006, Reporter: Bridget Kendall

¹⁰³³ BBCW, September 12, 2006, Reporter Jannat Jalil

¹⁰³⁴ BBCW, September 18, 2006, Reporter: Jonah Fisher

¹⁰³⁵ BBCW, September 8, 2006, Reporter: Imogen Foukles

¹⁰³⁶ BBCW, September 15, 2006, Reporter: Emma Jane Standley

¹⁰³⁷ BBCW, September 14, 2006, Reporter: Katty Kay

¹⁰³⁸ Ibid.

Per Stig Moeller in the Waldorf Astoria Hotel in New York on September 23, was ironically described “as far away from the desperate misery of Darfur as you can get”¹⁰³⁹. The end of the story had the same tone; “as the talking continues, so does the dying”¹⁰⁴⁰, the journalist concluded while showing the pictures of the burial of a two-year old girl, her body covered with a white sheet, by her family members in Darfur. At the occasion of the UN General Assembly in New York, where “a deepening catastrophe” in Darfur reached “once again the top of the global agenda”¹⁰⁴¹, the case of Darfur was used for some criticism of the US administration’s acts in the past: “once dismissive of the United Nations’ multilateral approach, the US now needs the help of other states, not just over Darfur”¹⁰⁴². Out of ten stories, BBCW produced two stories in Sudan; others were made either in the studio or in New York. Three stories were critical toward Western policy in Darfur, while the other seven were neutral.

CNNI expressed a similar point of view regarding the (in)effectiveness of the AU’s peacekeeping troops in Darfur as BBCW: “too small and poorly equipped to make a difference in such a huge desolate area”¹⁰⁴³; “there are only 7000 mostly African peace keepers on the ground, one for every 4000 refugees... it would need five times that amount to prevent millions of people becoming extinct in plain sight”¹⁰⁴⁴; “woefully under equipped and unprepared soldiers”¹⁰⁴⁵; “7000 troops widely seen as cash strapped, poorly equipped and too weak to protect the people”¹⁰⁴⁶. The situation in Darfur, “a dry, desolate land, where tens of thousands of black Africans have been systematically slaughtered by an Arab militia, known as the *Janjaweed*”¹⁰⁴⁷, has been unambiguously described in only a few words: “death, disease and despair, it’s genocide in the 21st century”¹⁰⁴⁸. More striking images of malnourished children in refugee camps have been shown, where “poorest of the poor found refuge but only for a short while”¹⁰⁴⁹. A dramatic warning was issued on September 20: “It will take nothing short of an act of God to save the two million or so desperate displaced people of Darfur”¹⁰⁵⁰, accompanied by a slow motion shot of a woman with baby on her chest, television’s tool to underline something by showing it in more detail. Although it was pointed out that all that was happening in Darfur happened “as the world stood by and watched”¹⁰⁵¹, CNNI appreciated the efforts of the US administration. “President Bush called on world leaders to end what he called genocide”¹⁰⁵², a journalist announced on September 21, adding that the “US Congress added pressure this week proposing legislation which would impose new sanctions against Khartoum”¹⁰⁵³. The same New York meeting of foreign ministers

¹⁰³⁹ BBCW, September 23, 2006, Reporter: Tim Allman

¹⁰⁴⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴¹ BBCW, September 19, 2006, Reporter: Bridget Kendall

¹⁰⁴² Ibid.

¹⁰⁴³ CNNI, September 5, 2006, Reporter: Tim Lister

¹⁰⁴⁴ CNNI, September 15, 2006, Reporter: Jeff Koinage

¹⁰⁴⁵ CNNI, September 20, 2006, Reporter: Jeff Koinage

¹⁰⁴⁶ CNNI, September 21, 2006, Reporter: Elise Labott

¹⁰⁴⁷ CNNI, September 15, 2006, Reporter: Jeff Koinage

¹⁰⁴⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵⁰ CNNI, September 20, 2006, Reporter: Jeff Koinage

¹⁰⁵¹ CNNI, September 20, 2006, Reporter: Jeff Koinage

¹⁰⁵² CNNI, September 21, 2006, Reporter: Elise Labott

¹⁰⁵³ Ibid.

about Sudan, not very positively reported by BBCW, for CNNI was an opportunity where “they agreed: time is running out for the people in Darfur”¹⁰⁵⁴, and from which the journalist announced in a stand-up that “if the persuasion does not work, she (US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice) is warning of a tougher approach”¹⁰⁵⁵. While BBCW did not report about that at all, CNNI gave quite a lot of attention to the day of action on September 17, when peace activists gathered around the world to highlight the ‘forgotten war’ in Darfur. The biggest part of the story was about demonstrations in New York, where “thousands of voices have joined the Darfur debate in New York’s Central Park, saying no to genocide”¹⁰⁵⁶, but video-material from London and slide shots (photos) from Cambodia were also used. The journalist explained that in this “growing humanitarian crisis”, “the precise number of the dead and displaced is impossible to know”, while pictures moved to Darfur showing a man sitting by himself on the ground, his hands on his head, crying. The story included statements from various peace activists in New York warning about the ongoing genocide in Darfur, including former US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright saying: “everybody is fed up in watching no action”¹⁰⁵⁷. “If by the week end those discussions do not produce results, Darfur could be without an international presence within days. Time is running out for the people of Darfur”¹⁰⁵⁸, the journalist concluded in her stand-up from New York’s Central Park. This unusually long four-minute story was repeated also on September 18. For the first time, the number of positive stories toward Western policy in Darfur outnumbered negative stories: there were two positive stories, one negative, and six stories were neutral. But also none of the stories was made in Sudan; three were prepared from New York, one from Johannesburg, and the other five from the studio.

Although the coverage of both TV channels was generally critical toward the ineffective international – mainly African Union – actions in Darfur, it did not propose any more robust measures as for example the New York Times did, by asking for UN peacekeepers, “even over Sudan’s objections (if Sudan sees them coming, it will hurriedly consent)” and demanding from the US to impose a no-fly zone from Chad. Both CNNI and BBCW also failed to report about Paul Salopek, an American journalist held on spying charges after he crossed into Sudan from Chad without a visa in August 2006, but set free on September 9; this story that was covered by both the New York Times and Reuters TV.

SUMMARY

There are some overall conclusions about the media coverage of Darfur in both 2004 and 2006 that could be summarized before its comparison with policy documents. Taking into account the distribution of news stories, and its highest concentration in August 2004 and in September 2006, one could expect that media should have the strongest agenda-setting role in these periods. But the situation was not the same in these two time periods. In 2004 the number of items gradually rose from April to September, with a significant increase after a high-ranking US and UN official visit to Darfur. But media attention did

¹⁰⁵⁴ CNNI, September 22, 2006, Reporter: Elise Labott

¹⁰⁵⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵⁶ CNNI, September 17, 2006, Reporter: Elise Labott

¹⁰⁵⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵⁸ Ibid.

not fall after this visit, indeed it continued to grow in August. It could be said that the visit of officials at the beginning of July had a snowball effect: it provoked media coverage that created further interest, leading to more coverage and so on. Since there were no significant developments in the field that would normally attract media coverage in August, it means that media deliberately decided to pay attention to this conflict and as such could play a role of agenda-setter toward the end of summer 2004. In 2006, more intensive media coverage of Darfur in September was a direct consequence of the adoption of the UN resolution and expectations that the resolution would be implemented in the field. But as soon as the decision was made on October 1 to extend the first deadline for a transition of logistics, communication and staff to UN forces, and it became obvious that Sudanese government would not back down, media attention went down. In such circumstances, it can be concluded that media did not have a role of agenda setter in 2006. Key word analysis showed that both CNNI and BBCW were very empathetic toward the Darfur civilians, the frame that was supported by the pro-intervention approach, dominating more on CNNI than on BBCW. These two frames combined, according to framing theory, should provide an incentive for governments to intervene.

Qualitative analysis provides a more in-depth view of media coverage in the key periods. In April 2004, the period which was analysed to detect a dominant frame in the earliest news coverage of an event that “can activate and spread congruent thoughts and feelings in individuals- knowledge networks, building a news event schema that guides responses to all future reports”¹⁰⁵⁹, the situation in Darfur was characterized by BBCW as the ‘world’s worst ongoing humanitarian crisis’, and the humanitarian situation was a dominant theme in all of its stories that month. Political aspects of the conflicts were mentioned to a much lesser extent: once when the origins of the conflict were described, on which occasion the blame was almost equally shared between Government and rebels, and another time only with a mention of the ceasefire signed by the Sudanese government and rebel forces. The government of Sudan was indirectly accused of responsibility for the humanitarian situation because of their refusal to allow access to the region to the aid agencies, but not for the violence itself. The government’s actions were very euphemistically described as their determination to block rebels’ ambitions in the West, ambitions “encouraged by the success of the rebellion in the South”¹⁰⁶⁰. In general, both rebels and Government forces were held responsible in BBCW reports for the implementation of the ceasefire agreement. No responsibility of Western governments or the need for action on their part in Darfur was mentioned. In the same period, CNNI was more precise about what was happening in Darfur. Already on April 27, the situation was described as a “possible genocide in the making”¹⁰⁶¹, with the refugees’ accounts of “murder and rape, burning and bombardment of their villages by *government forces and militia groups* (emphasis added)”¹⁰⁶² reported. The gravity of the humanitarian situation was additionally reinforced by dramatic shots of refugees, while the political aspects were mentioned again only in the context of the ceasefire agreement, where “both sides accuse

¹⁰⁵⁹ Entman, R.M., 2004, *Projections of Power: Framing News, Public Opinion, and US Foreign Policy*, Chicago: Chicago University Press, p. 7

¹⁰⁶⁰ BBCW, April 22, 2004, Reporter: Richard Slee

¹⁰⁶¹ CNNI, April 27, 2004, Reporter: Elise Labott

¹⁰⁶² CNNI, April 22, 2004, Reporter: Zain Verjee

the other of violating it". But the major responsibility of the Sudanese government was underlined again with the reported US officials' warning that "there will be no restoration of ties with Sudan until *the government ends the bloodshed* (emphasis added) in Darfur"¹⁰⁶³. That was at the same time the only mention of Western governments' actions regarding Darfur.

CNNI continued to use the genocide frame set in April throughout the whole period until September, whereas BBCW did not begin to use the word genocide until the end of July, but the focus of both channels in August was on the urgent need to help Darfurian refugees. BBCW did compare the situation in Darfur with Rwanda in August: "ten years after the Rwanda genocide human rights activists say the parallels are too clear to ignore"¹⁰⁶⁴, but insisted still on the humanitarian needs of Darfur's refugees, reinforced with dramatic pictures of starving women and children and with the reported direct UN's call for financial help: "UN says it's lacking two thirds of the money that it requires to meet emergency need in Sudan for the rest of the year, a shortfall of more than 400 million dollars"¹⁰⁶⁵. The question of who is responsible for committing genocide is much less represented – a stand-point that can be seen from statements like "whether it's called genocide or ethnic cleansing, this is human misery on a huge scale"¹⁰⁶⁶ and the "rebels of the SLA represent one side of the world's most pressing humanitarian crisis"¹⁰⁶⁷. Its coverage remained absolutely neutral toward the Western (in)action in Darfur, and it mostly characterized the situation there as an African crisis, with the extensive coverage of the African Union's efforts: the deployment of African Union troops and the African Union-mediated peace talks in Abuja, Nigeria. According to BBCW, Darfur was for the AU "a crucial test of its credibility and its determination to play a lead role in dealing with *the continent's problems* (emphasis added)"¹⁰⁶⁸. CNNI described the situation in Darfur in very personal tones in August with the focus of stories on specific human destinies taken as the examples of the large scale misery of Darfurian refugees. These stories can be considered to have a much larger impact than stories with the statistics of mass murder, or genocide in this case, because according to some psychological research, the numbers, no matter how large they are "do not convey the true meaning of such atrocities"¹⁰⁶⁹. According to this research, "the numbers fail to trigger the affective emotion or feeling required to motivate action" and "may actually hinder the psychological processes required to prompt action"¹⁰⁷⁰. NYT journalist Nicholas Kristof noticed the same thing: "it's so much easier to make people care about an individual and to build that bond of empathy than when you're dealing with some kind of large, huge issue and impersonal people"¹⁰⁷¹. Such a strong empathy frame was accompanied by criticism of Western inaction in Darfur – CNNI had the biggest number of stories with a critical tone in August 2004. But CNNI also insisted on the need to address the humanitarian situation as the consequence of the crisis and genocide, rather

¹⁰⁶³ CNNI, April 27, 2004, Reporter: Elise Labott

¹⁰⁶⁴ BBCW, August 27, 2004, Reporter: Alix Kroager

¹⁰⁶⁵ BBCW, August 26, 2004, Reporter: Andrew Simmons

¹⁰⁶⁶ BBCW, August 11, 2004, Reporter: Juliet Dunlop

¹⁰⁶⁷ BBCW, August 21, 2004, Reporter: Jim Fish

¹⁰⁶⁸ BBCW, August 25, 2004, Reporter: Peter Biles

¹⁰⁶⁹ Slovic, P., March 2007, Numbed by Numbers, Foreign Policy Magazine

¹⁰⁷⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷¹ Nicholas Kristof, PBS, Online NewsHour, April 20, 2006

than on the causes and the political aspects of situation. Political solutions have been obviously left again to African leaders, who were “searching for an African solution, to end the fighting, to end the dying”¹⁰⁷², a process described as slow and painful since “mistrust between Arabs and Africans in this region dates back decades”¹⁰⁷³. Therefore, the conflict is illustrated more as an escalation of long-standing tensions in the region rather than as something new with concrete reasons behind it. Still, according to agenda-setting and framing theory, stories broadcast in this period with their intensity and frames employed, should create a substantial impact on the decision-making process, even if more in the direction of providing humanitarian assistance than of taking military actions.

The most important characteristic of the September 2006 coverage of both CNNI and BBCW was the recognition of the African Union troops’ failure to protect Darfur civilians. But when it became clear that the Sudanese government would not be persuaded to accept the deployment of UN forces, and that it has even deployed new tens of thousands of its own troops to Darfur “in a fresh offensive reminiscent of the bloodiest days of the conflict”¹⁰⁷⁴, the African organization’s efforts were again recognized as the only possible solution for the Darfur crisis; it was concluded that “the AU seems to have little choice but to struggle on with its near impossible mission”¹⁰⁷⁵. Although CNNI gave a lot of attention to peace activists’ gatherings in cities around the world, in their attempt to mark something symbolically called a “Day of action” for Darfur, neither one of two channels expressed the expectation that such an action should be done specifically by the US or UK government. In fact, CNNI had the biggest number of stories positive toward the US government’s policy about Darfur in this period. BBCW was more critical, but mainly toward US international policy in general, rather than specifically regarding Darfur. There were again lot of pictures and references to suffering civilians, but without explicit mentioning of those responsible for that situation.

Taking into account all the characteristics of CNNI and BBCW coverage of the Darfur crisis – its quantity, emotional intensity and level of pressure for action - one could say that media had potential impact on the decision-making process in the sense that they drew international attention to the plight of Darfurian civilians in summer 2004 and they catalyzed international reaction, but more in the form of humanitarian assistance than of military action or creating permanent political solution.

¹⁰⁷² CNNI, August 23, 2004, Reporter: Zain Verjee

¹⁰⁷³ CNNI, August 28, 2004, Reporter: Tumi Makgabo

¹⁰⁷⁴ CNN, Behind the Scenes, September 16, 2006, Darfur free falls as the world dithers and Sudan balks

¹⁰⁷⁵ CNNI, August 16, 2004, Reporter: Jonah Fisher

CHAPTER 9: DARFUR POLICY PROCESS

This chapter presents the results of the analysis of the time line of the process of decision-making through the archive analysis of relevant documentation of the political process, in order to determine the level of attention given to Darfur by key policy makers, but also to detect whether the frames used by media, and policy prescriptions they represented, were accepted and followed by politicians. Lastly I sought to discover any observable implications of policy uncertainty or inconsistency which might reinforce possible media influence. It also presents hypotheses that derive from the comparison of the results of the media and policy process analyses in the Darfur case study.

In order to analyze the time line of the political decision making process during the same time period used for media content analysis, all available policy documents, including press statements, transcripts of press conferences, US Congress, UK House of Commons and UN Security Council debate transcripts, and public speeches by key decision makers about Darfur in this time period were researched. As in the Kosovo case study, there were three main issues to be identified through the analysis of policy documents:

- the level of attention given to this issue by key policy makers, the points of time at which this attention has risen and fallen, and how much it corresponds with changes in the level of media attention;
- the frames used by politicians and their conformity (or non-conformity) with frames and policy prescriptions represented by media; and
- the observable implications of policy uncertainty or inconsistency which could reinforce possible media influence, including possible indications of “unstable and contradictory policy” that occurs when sub-systems (i.e. President - State Department - Congress, Prime Minister - Foreign Office - Parliament) are in disagreement with each other; of “no policy” that is important in the context of crisis policy-making where unexpected events often occur; and “wavering policy” which changes frequently due to a lack of commitment amongst the sub-systems involved in that policy¹⁰⁷⁶.

QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS

In order to determine the level of attention of policy makers the analysis began with some quantitative measurements. All public statements, presented in the press conferences or in the form of press statements by key policy makers were counted, including the US President, Secretary of State, Secretary for Defense, the UK Prime Minister, Minister of Defense, Foreign Secretary and the UN Secretary General; and also discussions about Darfur in the US Congress, the UK House of Commons and the UN Security Council, from April 1 to September 9, 2004, and then again from August 31 to November 30,

¹⁰⁷⁶ George, A.L., 1980, *Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice.*, Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, p. 114, in Robinson P., 2002, *The CNN Effect: The myth of news, foreign policy and intervention*, Routledge, London and New York, p. 27

2006. Those figures have been added now to the charts showing the distribution of CNNI and BBCW stories about Darfur each month (Figures 13, 14). As has been already mentioned, not every political discussion will result in a public statement, which was the reason for the use of the interviews with officials describing the decision-making process in the qualitative analysis, but it is reasonable to assume that a significant level of attention is likely to be represented by an increased number of public statements.

Figure 13: DARFUR MEDIA COVERAGE AND POLITICIANS' STAMENETS -
APRIL-SEPTEMBER 2004





Figure 14: DARFUR MEDIA COVERAGE AND POLITICIANS' STATEMENT -
SEPTEMBER-NOVEMBER 2006



As the charts indicate, public statements in these time periods had a similar distribution pattern to news stories, while the biggest difference can be noted toward the end of the investigated period, in November 2006. The charts presented above, and especially the one presenting the period between April and September 2004, provide another proof of the “snowball effect” – it seems that every rise of attention by politicians has provoked a rise of attention by media and vice versa. Wolsfeld called it the “politics-media cycle”: “changes in the political environment lead to changes in the role of the news media that then lead to further changes in the political environment”¹⁰⁷⁷. Transcripts of CNNI and BBCW do not provide information about the exact time during the day when stories were broadcasted, but analysis of the time line on a day-to-day basis should be sufficient to show who led and who followed these ups and downs of attention.

At the beginning, it should be noted that media started to recognize what was going on in Darfur in April 2004, after Mukesh Kapila, UN humanitarian coordinator for Sudan at that time, had told reporters in Nairobi on March 19 that the only difference between Rwanda and Darfur “is the numbers of the dead, murdered, tortured, raped”¹⁰⁷⁸ – another example of interaction between media and politicians, similar to the one after the Racak massacre with Head of OSCE observation mission William Walker, but with much slower and less intensive consequences. The most important difference between the two statements is that Kapila was not filmed by TV crews in such a dramatic environment like Racak was a day after the massacre, but his words were still the main trigger for media to begin to develop the genocide frame for Darfur. Other UN officials at that time openly disapproved of Kapila's outspokenness, which they saw as “a breach of etiquette”¹⁰⁷⁹, while US officials described his language as “apocalyptic”¹⁰⁸⁰. Political officials did provide statements about Darfur in April 2004, but only from the US and the UN (the first UK public statement on Darfur was made on May 11) and mostly at the level of the State Department or UN spokespersons at the regular daily press conference. The first special briefing devoted completely to US policy in Sudan was not held until April 27 and the first high-ranking UN official's press conference (of UN General Secretary Kofi Annan) was on April 28, after some media coverage about Darfur had already been provided. Statements by the representatives of the US administration intensified in the second half of May, after stories about Darfur broadcast on CNNI that month. The next moment of the rise of attention by both media and politicians was registered at the end of May, but it was linked directly to the signing of the North-South agreement protocols on May 26, with Darfur discussed only in the context of this agreement. The first special hearing about Darfur in the US Senate, of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, entitled “Peace, But at What Price?”, was held on June 15, and after that politicians' attention rose significantly, followed by media attention too, and culminated in Powell and Annan's visit to Darfur at the end of that month. The content of the politicians' public statements will be investigated in more detail in the

¹⁰⁷⁷ Wolsfeld, G., 2001, *The News Media and Peace Process, The Middle East and Northern Ireland*, United States Institute of Peace, Washington DC, p. 11

¹⁰⁷⁸ AFP, March 19, 2004, *West Sudan's Darfur conflict 'world's greatest humanitarian crisis'*, Nairobi

¹⁰⁷⁹ Kristof, N.D., *Genocide in Slow Motion*, *The New York Review of Books*, Volume 53, Number 2, February 9, 2006

¹⁰⁸⁰ Andrew Natsios, Administrator, US Agency For International Development, *Special State Department Briefing Re: US Policy In Sudan*, April 27, 2004

qualitative analysis, but it is interesting to note at this stage that media and their role in Darfur conflict were mentioned several times, exactly on the days when the biggest number of public statements was issued in July and August. On July 22 for example, UK Prime Minister Tony Blair “cautioned journalists against getting too far ahead of themselves”¹⁰⁸¹, since they were asking if the UK would be providing troops on the ground in Darfur. That was at the same time the day when the US Congress passed a resolution declaring the killings in Sudan as genocide and State Department officials announced more robust measures toward the Sudanese government, saying that it was a time to “put teeth behind the UN effort”¹⁰⁸². This rise of attention by politicians was followed by a rise of media attention, which then in turn preceded another rise of politicians’ attention. Therefore, on August 5, the day with the biggest number of public statements in the whole investigated period in 2004, US Secretary of State Colin Powell referred twice to the media: “It happened at the same time, however, that the situation in Darfur exploded upon our television screens, a situation that is desperate -- people calling out for need”¹⁰⁸³ and “Well before the humanitarian crisis made the front pages, the US began to mobilize the world community to address the unfolding catastrophe in Darfur”¹⁰⁸⁴. During August, CNNI and BBCW produced the biggest number of items about Darfur, obviously in that way keeping Darfur on the politicians’ agenda too, since there were no major official events registered in that period – US officials and the rest of the international community were waiting to see whether the Sudanese Government would comply with its commitment to improve the situation in Darfur within a deadline of another 30 days given by the UN Resolution 1556 that was adopted on July 30, but also for the findings of the US teams that had started investigation in the field at the end of July and were collecting evidence about war crimes in Darfur. This investigation resulted in the historical characterization of the events in Darfur as genocide on September 9, 2004.

In 2006, the highest level of both media and politicians’ attention was registered in September 2006, after the adoption of Resolution 1706, with which the UN Security Council authorized the deployment of a new UN peacekeeping force to Darfur. As expected, US, UK and UN officials reacted immediately on August 31, on the very day when the resolution was adopted, while CNNI had the first item a day after, and BBCW not until September 6. The most intensive diplomatic activities, followed by the most intensive media coverage, have been conducted on September 14-22, 2006. The events started with Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Elie Wiesel and US actor George Clooney’s address to the UN Security Council about Darfur on September 14, and they resumed with the report of UN Secretary General Kofi Annan’s on Sudan and his meeting with Sudanese President Omar al Bashir. These were followed by the African Union Peace and Security Council’s meeting at which they discussed the extension of their mandate in Darfur; by UK PM Tony Blair’s letter to each EU member in which he called for the joint

¹⁰⁸¹ Briefing from the UK Prime Minister’s Official Spokesman on: EU Commissioner, Reshuffle, Darfur, the Middle East and Regional Assemblies, July 22, 2004

¹⁰⁸² Richard Boucher, US State Department Spokesman, State Department Regular Briefing, July 22, 2004

¹⁰⁸³ Remarks by US Secretary of State Colin Powell to the “Unity: Journalists Of Color” Conference, August 5, 2004

¹⁰⁸⁴ Remarks by US Secretary of State Colin Powell, in an Editorial Letter discussing the situation in Sudan, US State Department release, August 5, 2004

substantial support for reconstruction and peace in Sudan if they accepted the UN resolution, but also for isolation and pressure if they refused. Later came the UN General Assembly session at which President Bush announced the appointment of his special envoy for Sudan and the meeting of NATO foreign ministers on Sudan. Also, in the background to these official events was the dispute between the UN and the US officials over the interpretation of the resolution's demands for the Sudanese government. The search for a compromise with the Sudanese government caused another rise in politicians' attention at the beginning of October, with the UN Security session about Sudan and direct and indirect communication between US and Sudanese officials about whether any volunteering to provide peacekeeping troops to Darfur would be considered as a hostile act by the Sudanese government or not. It was also the period when CNNI produced the biggest number of items, on October 4, but these stories dealt mainly with the life of international aid workers in Darfur and Chad, and about difficulties they were facing in their work, rather than about the life of Darfurians themselves. The Sudanese government's decision to expel Jan Pronk, the Head of UN Mission of the United Nations in Sudan, raised politicians' attention again on October 20, and it was followed by one week of media coverage ending with the reports from the China-Africa Summit in Beijing on November 3. Subsequently the level of media attention dropped significantly with only two more reports produced by the end of the month, while politicians' attention was reduced, if less than media attention.

According to the results of this quantitative comparison of media coverage and public statements of key policy makers, and the assumptions of agenda-setting theory, media could only possibly have a function of agenda-setter at one point during the whole investigated time period – from the end of July to the end of August 2004. This will be investigated further in the qualitative analysis of policy documents.

QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS

THE POLICY PROCESS IN 2004

By April 2004, the violence in Darfur had escalated for more than a year already, as the US administration and the rest of world mostly only stood back from it. As already explained in the background of the conflict, since the start of the Bush Administration US policy toward Sudan was focused on ending the country's long-running North-South war, which had killed more than 2 million people. Washington "has grown increasingly frustrated"¹⁰⁸⁵ by the slow pace of progress in the talks, particularly after the two sides missed a December 31, 2003 deadline for a deal to which they had pledged themselves in the October 2003 meeting with US Secretary of State Colin Powell. At one point in January 2004, a North-South deal was so close that Sudanese leaders from both sides began applying for visas to go to the White House for a signing ceremony. But then, the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) announced they would not participate with Sudan's government if it was involved in genocide in Darfur¹⁰⁸⁶. The US State Department warned that both the government and SPLA had until April 21 to "ink an

¹⁰⁸⁵ AFP, April 20, 2004, Sudan Accuses US of Hindering Peace

¹⁰⁸⁶ McLaughlin, A., June 30, 2004, Why Sudan Has Become a Bush Priority, Christian Science Monitor

agreement or leave themselves open to new sanctions”¹⁰⁸⁷. Rather than risk a collapse of the deal in the south, the Administration obviously chose to avoid the issue of Darfur. “They didn’t want to know about Darfur,” charged Ghazi Salahuddin Atabani, a friend and adviser to Sudanese President al-Bashir and then Khartoum’s lead negotiator in the talks. “They kept saying, ‘Please get rid of this problem.’”¹⁰⁸⁸ So in such conditions, on April 7, President George Bush issued a statement on the fighting in Darfur in which he warned the Government of Sudan that it “must not remain complicit in the brutalization of Darfur”¹⁰⁸⁹ and it should “bring the peace process with the SPLA to a just conclusion and bring peace and justice to Darfur”¹⁰⁹⁰. According to some US officials, this statement “in part, put the pressure on Sudan to sign the ceasefire agreement”¹⁰⁹¹ for Darfur which they did on April 8; but according to others it, together with Kofi Annan’s statement about Darfur of the same day (on the commemoration of 1994 genocide in Rwanda), “shattered the official silence, but only hinted at action”¹⁰⁹². State Department officials insisted that the US administration focus was “on diplomatic efforts”, while the situation in Darfur was characterized as a humanitarian crisis, with the spokesman saying that he hesitated “to use the ‘g’ word at this point, not really having considered it in that light.” This position would be subject to only slight modifications in the following period despite the very provocative questions that began to be posed by journalists in press conferences already in April: “You don’t want to see a flashback in 10 years of you standing at the podium and saying, ‘We condemn the atrocity’.”; “What else can the US do? We need to do something else.”¹⁰⁹³; “Don’t you think this is an under-reaction to a disaster with huge humanitarian proportions?”¹⁰⁹⁴; “Is there a time when patience is going to run out”¹⁰⁹⁵. State Department officials issued contradictory statements regarding the situation on the ground; on April 13 it was stated that “the violence appears to have diminished significantly”¹⁰⁹⁶, while less than two weeks later they reported to have “continued reports of people being killed, forced from their homes, people in camps for internally displaced people being attacked, villages being burned”¹⁰⁹⁷. On April 27, Andrew Natsios (Administrator, US Agency for International Development), who would later become the US special envoy for Sudan, announced: “We are facing in Darfur... the worst humanitarian disaster in the world right now”¹⁰⁹⁸, but refused to use the word

¹⁰⁸⁷ AFP, April 20, 2004, Sudan Accuses US of Hindering Peace

¹⁰⁸⁸ Robinson, S., Oct. 04, 2004, The Tragedy of Sudan, Time, p.22

¹⁰⁸⁹ Statement on the Fighting in the Darfur Region of Sudan April 7, 2004, Public Papers of the Presidents, George W. Bush – 2004, Volume 1

¹⁰⁹⁰ Statement on the Fighting in the Darfur Region of Sudan April 7, 2004, Public Papers of the Presidents, George W. Bush – 2004, Volume 1

¹⁰⁹¹ Charles Snyder, Acting Assistant Secretary Of State, Bureau For African Affairs, Department of State, Hearing of The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subject: Sudan, Peace But At What Price?, June 15, 2004

¹⁰⁹² Farley, M., October 28, 2004, How a Crisis Catches World’s Attention, Los Angeles Times, p.A-9

¹⁰⁹³ US State Department Regular Briefing, April 2, 2004

¹⁰⁹⁴ US State Department Regular Briefing, April 7, 2004

¹⁰⁹⁵ US State Department Regular Briefing, May 17, 2004

¹⁰⁹⁶ Richard Boucher, US State Department Spokesman, State Department Regular Briefing, April 13, 2004

¹⁰⁹⁷ Richard Boucher, US State Department Spokesman, State Department Regular Briefing, April 26, 2004

¹⁰⁹⁸ Andrew Natsios, Administrator, US Agency For International Development, Special State Department Briefing Re: US Policy In Sudan, April 27, 2004

genocide, claiming that the term is “not appropriate”¹⁰⁹⁹ at that moment. One of the reasons for scheduling this special press conference about Darfur was to increase media attention and solve the problem of getting visas for 28 people in the US Disaster Assistance Response Team who were prepared to go into the country to assist with the relief effort with the United Nations, the ICRC and the NGOs: “we’re hoping this press conference will release the visas”¹¹⁰⁰. At the end of April, UN General Secretary Kofi Annan also refused to make any statement about the nature of the conflict in Darfur, and explained that he was waiting for the reports of two UN teams at that time in Darfur¹¹⁰¹.

It is obvious that the US (and UN) officials were very reluctant to initiate any sort of action regarding Darfur in April 2004, in a month when they were expecting to get the North-South agreement finalized; this can be seen from the frame of their statements - the frame of diplomatic solution – but also from the rank of the officials issuing the statements: with the exception of the statements by Bush and Annan issued on the anniversary of the Rwanda genocide, all other statements about Darfur were given by the US and UN spokespersons. They did not want to admit the level and seriousness of the atrocities in Darfur, and they certainly avoided using the word genocide. On the contrary, CNNI used the word genocide already on April 27, and what is interesting is that it referred to UN sources. Since the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan refused to characterize war crimes in Darfur as genocide too, it is obvious that CNNI quoted UN sources on the ground. BBCW was focused more on the humanitarian crisis, but still gave much more importance to the situation in Darfur than UK officials did, since the latter did not pay attention to Darfur events that month at all.

But with a strong policy certainty over the non-action in Darfur and taking into account the small number of stories broadcast that month, it is reasonable to conclude that media could not have a strong influence on the decision-making process that month, despite the strong and personal engagement of some newspaper journalists and provocative and critical questions posed at regular press briefings. Humanitarian workers began to utilize the fact that higher media attention would help them to get access and improve the humanitarian situation in Darfur, as USAID Administrator Andrew Natsios did, organizing a press conference in an attempt to get visas for the 28 people of the US Disaster Assistance Response Team. They obviously recognized the existence of “a very clear correlation of access and attention”¹¹⁰², given that attention, as UN Undersecretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Jan Egeland put it, is “such a scarce commodity, in my trade, which is humanitarian work”¹¹⁰³. This interaction between media and international (humanitarian) staff working on the ground will be investigated in more detail later.

Although James Morris, Executive Director of the World Food Programme, who led one of the UN teams in Darfur, warned already on May 7 that “he had never visited people as

¹⁰⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹¹⁰¹ Press Conference with United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan, April 28, 2004

¹¹⁰² UN Undersecretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Jan Egeland, Stakeouts at the United Nations,

Re: The Situation in Darfur Region, Sudan, July 7, 2004

¹¹⁰³ Ibid.

terrified as the people he met in Darfur”¹¹⁰⁴, the efforts of the US administration and the rest of the international community were completely aimed at the finalization of the North-South agreement. A week before the signing of the agreement’s protocols, Powell did express the caveat that the US “will not normalize relations, even with an agreement at Lake Naivasha, until the crisis in Darfur is addressed”¹¹⁰⁵, but the majority of the remaining statements issued that month were very weak, like: “Darfur remains a continuing concern”¹¹⁰⁶ and “We’ll continue to press hard on the government”¹¹⁰⁷. On May 26, a few hours before the signing ceremony of the three protocols by Sudanese Vice President Ali Osman Taha and SPLA leader John Garang, documents to which much greater attention was given than they actually deserved according to its real importance (the final peace deal would not be signed before January 2005), it was proudly announced that this agreement has been “a major effort of the US policy since the beginning of the administration”¹¹⁰⁸, while Darfur was only mentioned in passing: “we are doing a lot to try to end the violence, the ethnic cleansing, the terrible humanitarian situation in Darfur”¹¹⁰⁹. Powell confirmed these US priorities in Darfur two days later: “We can worry about the political aspects of this a little later, but my focus is on the needs of the people right now... And that is a high priority for this administration.”¹¹¹⁰ May 2004 was also the month when the first UK public statement about Darfur was issued. On May 11, the UK Foreign Secretary Jack Straw said after the meeting with the Sudanese Foreign Minister Mustafa Osman Ismail that the Sudanese Government had a responsibility to rein in the *Janjaweed* militias which had already been recognized as responsible for the worst atrocities¹¹¹¹. But according to Alan Goulty, Tony Blair’s special envoy to Sudan, Britain at that time was not supportive of calls for military intervention in Sudan or new sanctions against the government and preferred a policy of “quiet diplomacy” with Khartoum¹¹¹². British diplomats believed that “their patience, as much as American bullying, led to the peace deal”¹¹¹³ that was supposed to end North-South war.

“We’ve made very clear our very serious concern about Darfur... but that is not a reason to delay peace in the rest of the country”¹¹¹⁴, the State Department spokesman said on June 2. But critical voices of journalists and human rights activities became very loud at that point. The US administration was accused that it “has shrunk from pressuring the

¹¹⁰⁴ Text of daily press briefing by the Office of the Spokesman for the Secretary-General of the United Nations, May 07, 2004

¹¹⁰⁵ Remarks by US Secretary of State Colin Powell to the American Council for Voluntary International Action, Re: Challenges in Humanitarian and Development Work, May 18, 2004

¹¹⁰⁶ Richard Boucher, US State Department Spokesman, State Department Regular Briefing, May 12, 2004

¹¹⁰⁷ Richard Boucher, US State Department Spokesman, State Department Regular Briefing, May 25, 2004

¹¹⁰⁸ Richard Boucher, US State Department Spokesman, State Department Regular Briefing, May 26, 2004

¹¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹¹¹⁰ US Secretary of State Colin Powell, State Department Foreign Press Center Briefing, Subject: US Foreign Policy, May 28, 2004

¹¹¹¹ Sudan: Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw Meets Sudanese Foreign Minister Dr Mustafa Osman Ismail, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, May 11, 2004

¹¹¹² Quoted in Blomfield, Adrian, May 31, 2004, British-US Rift on How to Deal with Sudan ‘Cleansing’, Daily Telegraph, p. 14

¹¹¹³ Blomfield, Adrian, May 31, 2004, British-US Rift on How to Deal with Sudan ‘Cleansing’, Daily Telegraph, p. 14

¹¹¹⁴ Richard Boucher, US State Department Spokesman, State Department Regular Briefing, June 2, 2004

central government on Darfur because of the interest in cutting a North-South deal"¹¹¹⁵, that by providing humanitarian assistance it would basically "feed the people that are still alive", but "can't stop more from being killed"¹¹¹⁶, and also for devaluation of that region's population: "Just imagine if a million people were made homeless, hundreds of thousands were killed in Europe that the US will have this kind of reaction?"¹¹¹⁷. Human rights activists demanded a Security Council Chapter VII resolution by which it would end and reverse ethnic cleansing in Darfur, ensure the protection of civilians, provide for the voluntary return in safety of all refugees and displaced persons, provide for effective and unrestricted delivery of humanitarian access, and also would create a UN accountability mechanism for past crimes against humanity and other grave abuses in Sudan¹¹¹⁸. But, nothing of this, as USAID officials warned, had provoked adequate action: "There's been a lot of noise made by the US, by the UN, increasingly by the media, by the Congress and many, many others. What's happened to the *Janjaweed*, the ones who have been doing most of the pillaging against civilians? What has happened is: nothing. There has not been a single enforcement action, that we are aware of, that has been taken against the perpetrators of this thing."¹¹¹⁹ A US-UK sponsored UN resolution was passed on June 11 to welcome the protocols at Naivasha and it only mentioned the situation in Darfur. Although genocide became something that the US administration was "looking seriously at"¹¹²⁰ and something they had "under intense review"¹¹²¹, already at that time Powell underlined that "it won't make a whole lot of difference after the fact what you've called it."¹¹²² On June 24, Pierre-Richard Prosper, US Ambassador-At-Large for the War Crimes Issues, for the first time listed the names of those responsible for war crimes in Darfur, demanding that these people had to be investigated and brought to justice¹¹²³. He threatened the imposition of new sanctions against Sudan, which "could range from travel restrictions to financial"¹¹²⁴. A State Department spokesman also confirmed that imposing sanctions on government of Sudan officials was something US officials were "looking at", and that it was "an idea under active consideration"¹¹²⁵, but time would show that that idea was never implemented. A draft UN resolution, prepared by US officials in June, called on the Sudanese government to "immediately fulfill its commitments, specifically to neutralize and disarm the government-supported militia, to

¹¹¹⁵ Editorial, June 7, 2004, 300,000 Deaths Foretold, Washington Post, A22

¹¹¹⁶ Journalist's question, US State Department Regular Briefing, June 4, 2004

¹¹¹⁷ Journalist's question, US State Department Regular Briefing, June 7, 2004

¹¹¹⁸ Julie Flint, Darfur Field Researcher, Human Rights Watch, Hearing of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subject: Sudan, Peace But At What Price?, June 15, 2004

¹¹¹⁹ Roger P. Winter, Assist Administrator, Democracy, Conflict & Humanitarian Assistance Bureau, United States Agency For International Development, Hearing of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subject: Sudan, Peace But At What Price?, June 15, 2004

¹¹²⁰ Adam Ereli, US State Department Deputy Spokesman, State Department Regular Briefing, June 24, 2004

¹¹²¹ Richard Boucher, US State Department Spokesman, State Department Regular Briefing, June 24, 2004

¹¹²² Secretary Colin L. Powell, Interview by Marc Lacey of the New York Times, Via Telephone, Washington, DC, June 11, 2004

¹¹²³ Pierre-Richard Prosper, US Ambassador-At-Large, Office Of War Crimes Issues, US State Department, Hearing of the Africa Subcommittee of the US House International Relations Committee, Subject: Confronting War Crimes in Africa, June 24, 2004

¹¹²⁴ Ibid.

¹¹²⁵ Adam Ereli, US State Department Deputy Spokesman, State Department Regular Briefing, June 18, 2004

protect civilians and to cooperate fully with humanitarian relief organizations”, but it proposed UN sanctions only against *Janjaweed*, “the government-supported militia”¹¹²⁶, not against the government’s officials themselves. On June 30, Powell arrived for a visit to Sudan, where he underlined that beside the humanitarian catastrophe, there was a serious “security crisis” in Darfur, and warned about the possibility of the UN resolution unless commitments made by the Government of Sudan are “actually executed and we see action”¹¹²⁷. Powell’s trip to Sudan was considered as “evidence of a major shift in the US policy” toward this country, especially because “the last time a US secretary of State visited Sudan was 1978, when Jimmy Carter’s envoy, Cyrus Vance, stopped to refuel his plane”¹¹²⁸. It has been explained by three reasons: the Bush team’s intention to bring Sudan back into the family of nations, as it did with Libya, and gain a diplomatic victory for the war on terror; to “fire up its Christian-conservative base” by securing a North-South peace deal; and to keep critics from having another issue with which to pillory its foreign policy if it could prevent a repeat of Rwanda’s 1994 genocide, which was especially important since it was election year¹¹²⁹. UN Secretary General Kofi Annan visited Sudan and Darfur at the same time as Colin Powell. Earlier that month, he still “wasn’t ready” to describe the situation in Darfur “as genocide or ethnic cleansing”¹¹³⁰. Although he was kept repeating that “if the Sudanese Government does not have the capacity to protect its population, the international community must be prepared to assist and the Sudanese Government should seek such assistance”, he also warned that there were not many countries ready to “send in the cavalry”, and even further that it “should avoid the situation where we allow States to hide behind the Secretary-General, use him as an alibi for their own inaction”¹¹³¹.

Despite the recognition that “the government of Sudan had failed to honor the commitments it made on July 3rd to improve the situation in Darfur”¹¹³², the final text of the UN resolution adopted on July 30 not only gave another 30 days to Khartoum to comply with its commitments, but failed to even mention the word “sanctions”, contrary to the US administration’s announcements of the previous month. The State Department spokesman issued a not very convincing explanation for this: “Our position is that this resolution, whether it has the word ‘sanctions’ in it or whether it has the word ‘measures’ in it, gives the Security Council and gives the international community the authority to impose sanctions, should they feel that that’s the way to go.... in the resolution it says that -- that it refers to Article 41, and Article 41 says that -- defines what ‘measures’ means”¹¹³³. In fact, US officials invoked again Sudan’s cooperation in fighting terrorism, which was already mentioned in previous months: “Despite our great difficulties with the

¹¹²⁶ Adam Ereli, US State Department Deputy Spokesman, State Department Regular Briefing, June 30, 2004

¹¹²⁷ Text of press conference with US Secretary of State Colin Powell and Sudanese Foreign Minister Mustafa Osman Ismail, discussing the situation in Sudan, June 30, 2004

¹¹²⁸ McLaughlin, A., June 30, 2004, Why Sudan Has Become a Bush Priority, Christian Science Monitor

¹¹²⁹ McLaughlin, A., June 30, 2004, Why Sudan Has Become a Bush Priority, Christian Science Monitor

¹¹³⁰ Text of Press Conference with UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, upon his arrival at UN Headquarters in New York, June 17, 2004

¹¹³¹ Press Conference by United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan, United Nations, June 25, 2004

¹¹³² Adam Ereli, US State Department Deputy Spokesman, State Department Regular Briefing, June 29, 2004

¹¹³³ Ibid.

government of Khartoum... we asked them to do hard things on terrorism when we engaged them initially. They made some serious changes in places that many people thought they wouldn't change. They did things for us when we asked them that were hard for them to do"¹¹³⁴.

This US approach requires a more detailed explanation. Bush administration efforts to improve relations with Khartoum began early in 2001, and intensified after the September 11 attacks, which Sudan condemned. A deal was struck after secret talks between US and Sudanese intelligence chiefs in London that year, and as a result, days later, the Bush administration abstained on a vote at the United Nations, which freed Sudan from international sanctions imposed for its alleged role in efforts to assassinate Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in 1995¹¹³⁵. Sudan's extensive cooperation with the US has been noted in the State Department's annual reports on terrorism. That was the reason why in the annual report for 2004, despite of all what was happening in Darfur that year, it was assessed that "Sudan took significant steps to cooperate in the global war on terrorism"¹¹³⁶. "We have not taken adequate measures given the enormity of the crimes because we don't want to directly confront Sudan [on Darfur] when it is cooperating on terrorism," John Prendergast, who served at the US National Security Council during President Clinton's second term, said in 2005¹¹³⁷.

At the same time, during July 2004, pressure from the US Congress intensified, culminating with the declaration describing the war crimes in Darfur as genocide and calling on the Bush administration "to seriously consider multilateral or even unilateral intervention to prevent genocide should the United Nations Security Council fail to act."¹¹³⁸ Already on May 6, the Senate passed Senate Congressional Resolution 99, which expressed congressional concern over the deteriorating human rights and humanitarian situation in Darfur and condemned the Sudan government's actions, and since then, both Republican and Democrat congressmen's statements expressed an unequivocal call for action: "I think I speak for everyone in this room when I say that I do not want to see the United States stand by while genocide unfolds"¹¹³⁹; "70 years ago there was not television. There was not good telephone communications. We have it today, so there's no excuse today that we can allow this situation in Darfur to continue as we allowed the situation in Rwanda to ravage a decade... The world must act now"¹¹⁴⁰; "And it is ethnic cleansing, and I believe that clearly the seeds of genocide have been sown in Darfur... It is ethnic cleansing. This is Bosnia. This is Srebrenica. This is Kosovo... If the

¹¹³⁴ Charles Snyder, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, State Department Foreign Press Center Briefing, Subject: Sudan and the Situation in Darfur, July 27, 2004

¹¹³⁵ Silverstein, K., April 29, 2005, Official Pariah Sudan Valuable to America's War on Terrorism, Los Angeles Times, p. A-1

¹¹³⁶ Country Reports on Terrorism 2004, April 2005, US Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for the Counterterrorism, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/45313.pdf>

¹¹³⁷ Quoted in Silverstein, K., April 29, 2005, Official Pariah Sudan Valuable to America's War on Terrorism, Los Angeles Times, p. A-1

¹¹³⁸ H. Con. Res. 467 [108th]: Declaring genocide in Darfur, Sudan, <http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=hc108-467&tab=summary>

¹¹³⁹ Sen. Joseph R. Biden (D-De), Hearing Of The Senate Committee On Foreign Relations, Subject: Sudan, Peace But At What Price?, June 15, 2004

¹¹⁴⁰ Rep. Donald M. Payne (D-NJ): Hearing of the Africa Subcommittee of the House International Relations Committee, Subject: Confronting War Crimes in Africa, June 24, 2004

government of Sudan will not solve the security crisis, then the international community must act”¹¹⁴¹; “What this resolution does is to add the political pressure on everyone. It requires the United Nations to take decisive and necessary action.”¹¹⁴²; “But I want to just say I am so pleased that we have left our party affiliation at the door, and we have come together to make a difference for so many people...And let the word go out that this is not a Democratic issue, this is not a Republican issue, this is a humanity issue”¹¹⁴³. Collision between the representatives of the US legislative and executive power over the US policy in Darfur became obvious. On July 2, Powell responded to the calls from Congress: “There are some who, based on what they have heard about the situation in Darfur and their concern about the needs of these people, want to immediately call it a genocide, whether it fits the definition of a genocide or not. I’m more interested in taking care of the people”¹¹⁴⁴; and even after the adoption of the congressional resolution the US administration kept the same position: “there is a precise definition of genocide in the Genocide Convention; that’s the standard against which we have to measure the evidence that can be accumulated”¹¹⁴⁵. Some days before, on July 19, Powell announced for the first time that the US had sent a team of experts to Darfur and on the other side of the border to Chad to talk to those who had been displaced and to prepare a report “as to whether the legal standard has been met or not met with respect to genocide”¹¹⁴⁶. The UN official stand on this issue was even more neutral: “It’s up to the signatories or the ratifiers of the genocide Convention to decide when genocide has taken place and what action can be taken”¹¹⁴⁷.

It is interesting to note that the US public was already at that time inclined to believe that genocide was occurring in Darfur, at the same time as media and Congress, but exactly two months before the US administration recognized it. Presented with two positions, only 24% of the sample endorsed the view that what was occurring in Darfur at that time “is just a civil war between the government and people in a resistant region that happen to be of a different ethnic group.” Instead, 56% took the position that what was occurring in Darfur, where “a million black African Darfuris have been driven into the desert by Arab militias who have destroyed their farms and prevented them from receiving relief,” was genocide. A majority was also willing to contribute US troops to a UN military force to enforce the cease-fire agreement in Darfur, provided that other countries contribute the lion’s share¹¹⁴⁸.

¹¹⁴¹ Rep. Frank Wolf, Press Conference with Representative Frank Wolf (R-Va); and Senator Sam Brownback (R-Ks), July 6, 2004

¹¹⁴² Sen. Sam Brownback (R-Ks), Press Conference with Senator Sam Brownback (R-Ks); and Senator Jon Corzine (D-Nj) Re: Situation In Sudan, July 13, 2004

¹¹⁴³ Rep. Elijah Cummings (D-Md), News Conference with Senator Sam Brownback (R-Ks); and Senator Jon Corzine (D-Nj) Re: Situation In Sudan, July 13, 2004

¹¹⁴⁴ Text of Interview with US Secretary of State Colin Powell, Discussing the Situation in Sudan, US State Department, June 30, 2004

¹¹⁴⁵ Richard Boucher, US State Department Spokesman, State Department Regular Briefing, July 24, 2004

¹¹⁴⁶ Interview with US Secretary of State Colin Powell, US State Department Website, PBS Charlie Rose Show, July 16, 2004

¹¹⁴⁷ Text of daily press briefing by the Office of the Spokesman for the Secretary-General of the United Nations, New York City, New York, July 23, 2004

¹¹⁴⁸ PIPA-Knowledge Networks poll, conducted July 9-14, 2004 with a nationwide sample of 892 American adults, <http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/>

On August 3, Annan optimistically announced that Sudan was indicating that it wanted to comply with the Security Council's demands on Darfur and was "moving in the direction of implementation"¹¹⁴⁹ of the Council's resolution of July 30. On August 5, the Secretary-General's Special Representative, Jan Pronk, reported that he and the Sudanese Foreign Minister, Mustafa Ismail, had reached agreement on "detailed steps to be taken in the next 30 days to begin to disarm the *Janjaweed* and other outlaw groups, improve security in Darfur and address the humanitarian crisis"¹¹⁵⁰. The same day, US President Bush announced \$95 million to help the people of Darfur¹¹⁵¹, filling in that way more than a half of a total funding gap of \$188 million, which the UN was facing at that moment for Darfur and Chad¹¹⁵². Also on August 5, Powell underlined that there was no UN resolution that would allow peacekeepers to go into Darfur "without the permission of the Sudanese government" and that the US administration believed "there are other ways to deal with this problem before thinking of that kind of solution"¹¹⁵³. UK Prime Minister Tony Blair, asked about the possibility to send ground troops to Darfur, also reiterated that "we would not prejudge or predict what might happen"¹¹⁵⁴. On August 11, at the State Department's press conference, journalists openly accused the US administration of deliberately toning down the rhetoric against the Sudanese government in the hopes that they would comply with the UN resolution, and that was exactly what happened - in the following three weeks the only comments about Darfur were welcome notes for the ongoing peace negotiations in Abuja: "Negotiations are in everybody's interest. They produce results. They are the means to a long-term solution to this problem"¹¹⁵⁵; "There can be no long-term solution to this problem without a resolution of the political differences between the rebels and the government...that is what the talks in Abuja are designed to address"¹¹⁵⁶. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Jan Pronk, attended another Sudan government staged event, a two-day conference about a draft law on "The Native Administration of the Three Darfur States" with a presence of tribal and traditional community leaders from west, north and south Darfur, assessing it as "a positive step towards the implementation of the Government's commitments laid out in the Darfur Plan of Action"¹¹⁵⁷. But international experts warned already in March 2004 that the government was actually only "manipulating traditional tribal leaders in its search for ways to weaken the rebellion" while the young rebels did not "appear to trust

¹¹⁴⁹ Text of Daily Press Briefing by the Office of the Spokesman for the Secretary-General of the United Nations, New York City, New York, August 3, 2004

¹¹⁵⁰ Text of Daily Press Briefing by the Office of the Spokesman for the Secretary-General of the United Nations, New York City, New York, August 05, 2004

¹¹⁵¹ Remarks by US President George W. Bush At Signing Of Defense Department Appropriations Act, August 5, 2004

¹¹⁵² Text of Daily Press Briefing by the Office of the Spokesman for the Secretary-General of the United Nations, New York City, New York, August 04, 2004

¹¹⁵³ Remarks by US Secretary of State Colin Powell to the "Unity: Journalists of Color" Conference, August 5, 2004

¹¹⁵⁴ Press Briefing from the UK Prime Minister's Spokesman, 23 August 2004

¹¹⁵⁵ Adam Ereli, US State Department Deputy Spokesman, State Department Regular Briefing, August 12, 2004

¹¹⁵⁶ Adam Ereli, US State Department Deputy Spokesman, State Department Regular Briefing, August 25, 2004

¹¹⁵⁷ Text of Daily Press Briefing by the Office of the Spokesman for the Secretary-General of the United Nations, New York City, New York, August 12, 2004

those leaders and at times have abducted, attacked or evicted them from areas under their control”¹¹⁵⁸. It has to be noted that the United Nations were totally divided in this period in their opinions about the nature of the violence in Darfur and the nature of the solution too. Although the US’s stand about this issue could be perceived as very cautious, some major European countries, including France for example, were “at odds with the United States in terms of perceiving this crisis to be born of an ethnic cleansing onslaught”¹¹⁵⁹, claiming it was only tribal violence that was happening in Darfur. At the Security Council, Russia and especially China were absolutely against taking any serious measures against the Sudanese government. China dominated Sudan’s crude oil sector, with a 40 percent share of Sudan’s main oil producing field that produces around 330000 barrels per day; it became Sudan’s biggest foreign investor with \$4 billion in projects¹¹⁶⁰. The Arab League has taken the side of the Sudanese government and the African Union was split; for example, in the report of the Organization of Islamic Conferences Mission about the situation in Darfur, published on August 11, it was stated that “the situation in the Darfur region is being erroneously and negatively depicted by some international organizations and the international media” and that it “has been blown out of proportions and being projected on the basis of unfounded and baseless allegations and reports”¹¹⁶¹.

At the end of August, despite expectations, the situation on the ground did not improve. Dennis McNamara, the Director of the United Nations Internal Displacement Division, told reporters in Nairobi on August 30 that there was “a chronic protection crisis in Darfur, which is inadequately addressed by humanitarian agencies, the Government of Sudan and the donors” and that “the population is traumatized and humiliated”¹¹⁶². UN Secretary General Kofi Annan also reported that although there had been some progress, “after 18 months of conflict, and 30 days after the adoption of resolution 1556, the Government of Sudan has not been able to resolve the crisis in Darfur, and has not met some of the core commitments it has made... most critically, on the question of security”¹¹⁶³. Although both UK and US officials first estimated that “there have been some improvements”¹¹⁶⁴ in Darfur, only two days later, after “more facts and information coming in”, the State Department stated that “it’s documented now from a variety of sources that the Government of Sudan and the *Janjaweed* militias have continued their attacks on civilians in Darfur. The Government of Sudan has not fully complied with the UN Security Council Resolution 1556, and it has failed to meet, fully, its obligations to ensure the protection of its own civilian population.”¹¹⁶⁵ The “US Government have shared some of their evidence” with UK officials, as Straw explained to the UK House of Commons on September 7, 2004, adding they were making proposals for a new Security

¹¹⁵⁸ ICG Africa Report N°76, 25 March 2004, Darfur Rising: Sudan’s New Crisis

¹¹⁵⁹ Samantha Power, PBS Online NewsHour, Crisis in Sudan, August 26, 2004

¹¹⁶⁰ Reuters, December 17, 2005, China’s Interests in Sudan Bring Diplomatic Cover

¹¹⁶¹ Organization of Islamic Conferences Mission, August 11, 2004, Report on Darfur

¹¹⁶² Text of Daily Press Briefing by the Office of the Spokesman for the Secretary-General of the United Nations, New York City, New York, August 30, 2004

¹¹⁶³ Report of the UN General Secretary Kofi Annan to the UN Security Council, August 31, 2004

¹¹⁶⁴ UN Report on Sudan: Foreign Secretary Jack Straw Welcomes Limited Improvement, But Says More Progress Is Needed, Foreign and Commonwealth Office; Remarks by US Secretary of State Colin Powell, Discussing Global Current Events, US State Department Website, September 1, 2004

¹¹⁶⁵ Richard Boucher, US State Department Spokesman, State Department Regular Briefing, September 3, 2004

Council resolution, in which they “press for an expansion of the African Union monitoring mission”¹¹⁶⁶. The UN Security Council session on September 2 began with an open briefing by the Secretary-General's Special Representative for Sudan, Jan Pronk, who “noted progress made by the Sudanese Government in 10 areas, but flagged two key areas in which the Government had not met its commitments”¹¹⁶⁷: to stop attacks by militias against civilians and to bring to justice or even identify any of the militia leaders or perpetrators of these attacks. On September 8, the State Department announced that the interviews their teams were conducting in the border area in Chad had revealed that “there is a consistent pattern to the attacks that have taken place and have continued, according to the African Union, as late as last week”¹¹⁶⁸, but that despite all these facts, another 30-day period had been given to Sudanese government until the next review.

“We concluded, I concluded, that genocide has been committed in Darfur, and that the government of Sudan and the *Janjaweed* bear responsibility, and that genocide may still be occurring”, Colin Powell announced on September 9, and called on the United Nations “to initiate a full investigation”¹¹⁶⁹. But, regarding the future US actions, he only recommended that “the most practical contribution we can make to the security of Darfur, in the short-term, is to do everything we can to increase the number of African Union monitors”, because “there is nobody prepared to send troops in there from the United States or the European Union or elsewhere to put it down in the sense of an imposition force” and “there's an overall reluctance to impose severe sanctions against Sudan”¹¹⁷⁰. UK officials did not even go that far. Atrocities committed in the western Sudanese region of Darfur “may well be genocide”, British Foreign Office minister Chris Mullen said a day after Powell's announcement, and added: “we ought not to get too bogged down in words at this point”¹¹⁷¹.

What are the main conclusions of the analysis of the policy process' documents for this period of 2004? The first and the most obvious one is that there was a strong policy certainty and consensus among the representatives of US executive power to avoid any more forceful action in Darfur, despite great domestic pressure from Congress. Although a call for US action in Darfur got bipartisan support in Congress, one of the few issues on which both Republican and Democrats presidential candidates agreed during the pre-election campaign in 2004 was exactly an exclusion of the possibility of sending US troops to Darfur. Democrat candidate John Kerry recommended that the US should provide logistical support through the African Union, and not just humanitarian support, but he also underlined that the US army was already “overextended” and unable to send troops to Darfur after Iraq¹¹⁷². There are several reasons that explain the US

¹¹⁶⁶ House of Commons Hansard Debates for 7 Sept 2004 (pt 9)

¹¹⁶⁷ Text of Daily Press Briefing by the Office of the Spokesman for the Secretary-General of the United Nations, New York City, New York, September 2, 2004

¹¹⁶⁸ Richard Boucher, US State Department Spokesman, State Department Regular Briefing, September 8, 2004

¹¹⁶⁹ US Secretary of State Colin Powell, Hearing of the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subject: Current Situation in Sudan and Prospects for Peace, September 9, 2004

¹¹⁷⁰ Ibid.

¹¹⁷¹ UK: Darfur 'may well' be genocide, CNN, September 10, 2004, <http://edition.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/africa/09/10/sudan.britain/index.html>

¹¹⁷² 2004 US Presidential Debate, Question 15, 30 September, 2004, available at <http://edition.cnn.com/2004/ALLPOLITICS/09/30/debate.transcript.1/index.html>

administration's approach to Darfur. The first critical factor is the lack of geopolitical importance of Darfur. Kosovo, because it was in Europe, received quick attention. So did Afghanistan and Iraq — after September 11, 2001. But, according to UN Undersecretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Jan Egeland, it would be hard to find again such a “combination of geographical isolation, political manipulation and government obstruction that enabled the problems in the western Darfur region to escalate from a manageable emergency into a humanitarian catastrophe”¹¹⁷³. Or as Eric Reeves, a Smith College expert on Sudan, explained: “the people of Darfur are poor, black, Muslim and don't sit over any valuable natural resources...You can't get any poorer than that geopolitically”¹¹⁷⁴. Another two issues that explain the lack of any strong action have already been explained: the finalization of the North-South peace deal and Sudan's cooperation in the anti-terrorism campaign.

Both UN and UK officials avoided describing the situation in Darfur as genocide, and Powell did it more than 16 months after the conflict in Darfur started. Similarly, during the Rwandan genocide, exactly a decade before Darfur erupted, State Department spokespersons in Washington “were instructed not to utter the ‘g-word’”, since, as one internal government memorandum put it, publicly acknowledging ‘genocide’ might commit the US government to do something at a time (a year after the Somalia debacle) when President Bill Clinton's White House was entirely unwilling”¹¹⁷⁵. In the aftermath of the extermination campaign there that claimed at least half a million civilian lives in three months, “many pundits agreed that a critical first step toward a better response the next time would be to openly call a genocide ‘genocide’”¹¹⁷⁶. But US officials did it for Darfur only after Powell had announced two months before that it would mean nothing in practice despite of the terms of the Genocide Convention, according to which such a designation would inevitably trigger an international response. Until September 9 (and even after by UK and UN officials) the situation in Darfur was framed mostly as a humanitarian crisis, or at best, ethnic cleansing.

Media, and especially CNNI (and the New York Times), had framed the situation in Darfur as genocide very early, well before US and UK politicians did, and immediately named those responsible for committing it. So, despite that fact that official sources from the UN, US and UK were the most often used in BBCW coverage, presenting 37% of all sources used, and were one of two most dominant in the CNNI coverage, with 30% of all sources used, media not only did not use their frame of the humanitarian crisis, but developed their own – of genocide. These findings are very similar to those from the Kosovo case study, and confirm the thesis that journalists can “create importance and certify authority as much as reflect it”¹¹⁷⁷ in deciding who should speak on what subjects under what circumstances, and in such a way “still have the final say”¹¹⁷⁸. In fact, the frame analysis in this case study has shown again that for setting the frames for dramatic

¹¹⁷³ Farley, M., October 28, 2004, How a Crisis Catches World's Attention, Los Angeles Times, p.A-9

¹¹⁷⁴ Quoted in Martin, S.T., May 10, 2006, Why should the US care?, St Petersburg Time Online

¹¹⁷⁵ Straus, S., January/February 2005, Darfur and the Genocide Debate, Foreign Affairs, Pg. 123 Vol. 84, No. 1

¹¹⁷⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁷⁷ Cook, T.E., 1998, Governing With The News, The News Media As A Political Institution, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago & London, p. 87

¹¹⁷⁸ Ibid.

events such as the atrocities and war crimes committed in Darfur, media mostly rely on credible (Western) persons on the ground, such as the UN and international humanitarian organizations' officials in Darfur and Chad. CNNI has confirmed it with its selection of sources, since humanitarian workers and human rights activists, who did not hesitate to use the word genocide, were surprisingly the most often quoted in this channel's coverage, with 34% of all sources used. And, again, CNNI gave a lot of attention to the US Congress' position, and its description and condemnation of the situation, while BBCW's position was even more independent since UK officials did not pay a lot of attention to Darfur at that stage, mostly supporting the US stand on this issue.

But although BBCW and CNNI used the word genocide, they did not discuss the legal implication of that description according to the Geneva Convention, or what exactly the US and the rest of the world should do to stop the crisis. Both TV channels insisted on urgent action to help Darfur civilians, but this call was focused on help to ensure their security and provide them with humanitarian assistance, rather than on finding a permanent solution for Darfur. In the only item of discussion of Western political measures in Sudan in August, BBCW pointed out that there was "little support within the UN for tough sanctions"¹¹⁷⁹ against Sudan, while CNNI similarly concluded that although "Powell called the resolution strong"¹¹⁸⁰, it will be "a tough sell with significant opposition from China and Pakistan"¹¹⁸¹, with Sudan's government saying it was "a political ploy by President Bush to get his hands on Sudan's oil and win re-election in November"¹¹⁸². On another occasion it said it was exactly because of the UN Secretary-General's special representative for Sudan Jan Pronk's report, who failed to say directly that the Sudanese government is responsible for abuses in Darfur, that "the Security Council will take even more time now"¹¹⁸³. Although they recognized the inability to get consensus on actions in Sudan within the UN, neither one of two channels gave any details about the content of these resolutions, or for example about the US failure to include the word sanctions in one of them. As already mentioned in the key word analysis, the word 'interest' never appeared in either CNNI or BBCW coverage, and it applied also to Western interest not to intervene, i.e. reasons including lack of geopolitical importance and the North-South deal were never mentioned in these channels' coverage.

Therefore, policy certainty and consensus not to intervene, with the empathetic media coverage and their insisting on (humanitarian) action resulted in officials reacting to media coverage but only with "symbolic" actions – providing a huge amount of money for humanitarian assistance that will "feed the people that are still alive", but "can't stop more from being killed", and a declaration of genocide, but without any concrete political or military actions as the consequence of that declaration. They could be counted as what one senior UK official labeled "pseudo decisions for pseudo action"¹¹⁸⁴. Or as one US

¹¹⁷⁹ BBCW, August 25, 2004, Reporter: Peter Biles

¹¹⁸⁰ CNNI, September 9, Reporter: Andrea Koppel

¹¹⁸¹ Ibid.

¹¹⁸² Ibid.

¹¹⁸³ CNNI, September 2, 2004, Reporter: Richard Rorth

¹¹⁸⁴ Background interview, 13 April 1994, in Gowing, N., 1994, *Real Time Television Coverage of Armed Conflicts and Diplomatic Crises: Does it Pressure or Distort Foreign Policy Decisions*, The Joan Shorenstein Center on the Press, Politics and Public Policy, Working Paper Series

official pointed out: “reacting can be anything from a UN resolution to sending a press spokesman out”¹¹⁸⁵. Again, the findings of this analysis confirm the hypothesis of Robinson’s “policy-media interaction model”, according to which in a case of policy certainty within executives, although coverage might become critical and pressure government to change policy, media influence will be resisted¹¹⁸⁶. On the other side, with such media coverage, politicians had to do something or “face a public relations disaster”¹¹⁸⁷, so there is no doubt that the designation of genocide was intentionally scheduled for September, after most Americans (and Congress) returned from their summer vacations, to give it as much attention as possible – as one US official explained it for another campaign: “from a marketing point of view, you don’t introduce new products in August”¹¹⁸⁸. That could be an explanation for journalists who posed the question regarding the timing of the investigation about genocide in Darfur already in July: “Why didn’t they start earlier? You’ve known for so long this was happening”¹¹⁸⁹. Media coverage of Darfur appeared to become a catalyst for humanitarian operations, the action that primarily serves to “salve some government’s guilt about standing apart from another case of killing and suffering”¹¹⁹⁰, but did not force crisis prevention or trigger international military intervention.

And Darfur was definitely not the only international conflict with a similar outcome. BBC journalist David Loyn takes the example of the Niger crisis in summer 2005 when short-term policy decisions were led by media images, set off by the powerful BBC reports by Hilary Andersson about babies starving to death in this country¹¹⁹¹. In the article he published in August 2005, he described what was happening at that time: “The images reflected what was clearly a worsening crisis, and since those first reports, the MSF therapeutic feeding centre in Maradi has received more media attention than anywhere on the globe... But all of this information was available to the big donors, governments and private funds several months ago, when intervention would have been much cheaper than it is now. They did not respond to the requests on paper as they did to pictures of dying babies.”¹¹⁹² Andersson herself underlined that their reports set off a worldwide aid effort that a year of United Nations warnings could not: “Within a few days of our reports though, Britain had doubled aid to Niger, aid began flowing in, the UN talked about how the power of television had woken up the world to Niger’s crisis... By the time our team left Maradi, our hotel was so full of journalists and aid workers that

¹¹⁸⁵ Background interview, 14 April 1994, in Gowing, N., 1994, *Real Time Television Coverage of Armed Conflicts and Diplomatic Crises: Does it Pressure or Distort Foreign Policy Decisions*, The Joan Shorenstein Center on the Press, Politics and Public Policy, Working Paper Series

¹¹⁸⁶ Robinson, P., 2001, *Theorizing The Influence Of Media On World Politics*, European Journal of Communication, SAGE Publications, Vol 16(4): 523-544

¹¹⁸⁷ Ibid.

¹¹⁸⁸ Andrew Card, the White House Chief of Staff, quoted in Gephardt, R., September 27, 2002, *Defend the Country, Not the Party*, Richard, New York Times, Section A; Column 2; Editorial Desk; Pg. 31

¹¹⁸⁹ US State Department regular briefing, July 20, 2004

¹¹⁹⁰ Gowing, N., 1994, *Real Time Television Coverage of Armed Conflicts and Diplomatic Crises: Does it Pressure or Distort Foreign Policy Decisions*, The Joan Shorenstein Center on the Press, Politics and Public Policy, Working Paper Series

¹¹⁹¹ Interview with the author of the thesis, September 19, 2004

¹¹⁹² BBC, 10 August 2005, *How many dying babies make a famine?* available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/africa/4139174.stm>

there were no rooms left”¹¹⁹³. So, the politicians’ reaction was fast, and she returned to Niger six weeks after filing the first reports, expecting things to be better. “But if anything what we saw this time was worse... The terrible truth is that this is the world we in the West accept in this day and age, and we assuage our consciences by dipping into our pockets when it gets so bad we can no longer bear it.”¹¹⁹⁴

Another representative example is the case of the five-year-old Bosnian girl Irma Hadzimuratovic, critically injured by a mortar attack in Sarajevo that killed her mother and who was facing death in August 1993 because doctors lacked the means to treat her wounds. Just one BBC story on Saturday night, August 7, made Irma become “the focus of extraordinary media attention as a symbol of Sarajevo’s apparent hell”¹¹⁹⁵. This was a media-driven story, reducing the ongoing killings and misery in Bosnia to one sensationalistic, emotionally overwrought, and simplistic drama about one little girl and the West’s ability to save her. Within days, UK Prime Minister John Major ordered the Royal Air Force to bring her to a London hospital, with 40 other evacuees, but at the same time it was promptly announced “there were no immediate plans to evacuate more sick and wounded from Sarajevo”¹¹⁹⁶. And once Irma had arrived in Britain “concern for those left in Sarajevo faded rapidly”; as one UK official reflected “the UK has a wounded heart for a very short period of time”¹¹⁹⁷. The sad truth is that the action that had begun because of the usual holiday shortage of news stories¹¹⁹⁸ - under the slogan “because you can’t help everybody it doesn’t mean you shouldn’t help somebody”¹¹⁹⁹ - did not even help Irma; she died in a London hospital on April 1, 1995¹²⁰⁰.

THE POLICY PROCESS IN 2006

Did anything change in Darfur two years later? The UN Security Council met on August 31, 2006 and adopted a resolution on Sudan that called for the strengthening of the UN force in Darfur by up to 17300 military personnel and by an appropriate civilian component including some 3300 civilian police. But immediately after the announcement, the UN underlined the importance of the consent of the Sudanese government and dialogue with them: “He (Annan) will continue his dialogue, which has been going on for quite a while, with the Sudanese authorities at different levels, and try

¹¹⁹³ BBC News, 2 August 2005, Reporting the crisis in Niger, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/newswatch/ifs/hi/newsid_4730000/newsid_4737600/4737613.stm

¹¹⁹⁴ BBC News, 23 September 2005, Niger’s children continue dying, available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4274728.stm>

¹¹⁹⁵ Gowing, N., 1994, Real Time Television Coverage of Armed Conflicts and Diplomatic Crises: Does it Pressure or Distort Foreign Policy Decisions, The Joan Shorenstein Center on the Press, Politics and Public Policy, Working Paper Series

¹¹⁹⁶ Schmidt, W. E., August 16, 1993, Wounded and Sick Bosnians Land in London, The New York Times, Section A; Page 6; Column 3

¹¹⁹⁷ Background interview, 21 January 1994, in Gowing, N., 1994, Real Time Television Coverage of Armed Conflicts and Diplomatic Crises: Does it Pressure or Distort Foreign Policy Decisions, The Joan Shorenstein Center on the Press, Politics and Public Policy, Working Paper Series

¹¹⁹⁸ Gowing, N., 1994, Real Time Television Coverage of Armed Conflicts and Diplomatic Crises: Does it Pressure or Distort Foreign Policy Decisions, The Joan Shorenstein Center on the Press, Politics and Public Policy, Working Paper Series

¹¹⁹⁹ UK Prime Minister Douglas Hurd, quoted in BBC News, 9 August 1993, Wounded Bosnian girl flown to UK, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/august/9/newsid_2528000/2528483.stm

¹²⁰⁰ <http://edition.cnn.com/almanac/9904/01/>

to get some movement on that issue”¹²⁰¹, while the US Ambassador to the UN insisted that the resolution only “invites the Government of Sudan to consent to deployment”, and does not “require their consent”¹²⁰². “I think what we need is acquiescence”, US Ambassador John Bolton said¹²⁰³. But asked to comment on the Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir’s reaction to the resolution, in which he announced he would not accept the multinational forces in Sudan and “he will fight them and he will lead the fight himself”, Jendayi Frazer, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, attacked not the Sudanese President but the media, saying that she did not have “confidence anymore about what has been reported as public statements in the newspapers” and that they need “that public rhetoric to be toned down”¹²⁰⁴. So, despite the quite intense public pressure on the Sudanese government that was expressed through press statements in September 2006, it seems that the US administration preferred “quiet diplomacy” from the very beginning of the investigated period that year. The UN Secretary General invited “other Member States who have an influence with the Sudanese Government...to use their influence to move the position of the Sudanese Government”¹²⁰⁵. While the UK was basically supportive of the US’s position toward the Sudanese government, stating that “If the Government of Sudan is genuinely concerned about the welfare and protection of its citizens, there is no reason why it should not welcome the terms of the Resolution”¹²⁰⁶, other permanent UN Security Council members insisted on the consent for the troops’ deployment, for example France: “For us, it is important for both political and practical reasons that the mission should be set up with the consent of the Sudanese authorities”¹²⁰⁷, and – as could be expected – China: “we hope that in order to have an effective implementation and operation by the peacekeepers, consent from the Sudanese government and consent from the Africa Union are given”¹²⁰⁸.

Annan sent an appeal to the UN member states on September 11 asking: “can the international community, having not done enough for the people of Rwanda in their time of need, just watch as this tragedy deepens”, but kept repeating that without the consent of the Sudanese Government, the UN would not be able to put in the troops, “so what we need is to convince the Sudanese Government to bend and change its attitude and allow us to go in”¹²⁰⁹. Two days later, US President Bush responded: “I’m frustrated with the United Nations in regards to Darfur. I have said and this government has said there’s

¹²⁰¹ Stephane Dujarric, Spokesman For The Secretary-General, Daily United Nations Press Briefing, August 31, 2006

¹²⁰² Statement By Ambassador John Bolton, US Representative to The United Nations, in the UN Security Council, August 31, 2006

¹²⁰³ Media Stakeout with Ambassador John Bolton, US Representative to The United Nations, Subject: Adoption of Resolution 1706 on Sudan, August 31, 2006

¹²⁰⁴ Jendayi Frazer, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, US State Department Regular Briefing, August 31, 2006

¹²⁰⁵ Stephane Dujarric, Spokesman for the Secretary-General, Daily United Nations Press Briefing, September 1, 2006

¹²⁰⁶ UK Foreign Office Minister for Africa welcomes Security Council Resolution on Darfur, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 31 August 2006

¹²⁰⁷ Remarks by the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs Spokesman, discussing events in the Middle East, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Paris, September 01, 2006

¹²⁰⁸ Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, Press Conference with British Prime Minister Tony Blair, 10 Downing Street, London, United Kingdom, September 13, 2006

¹²⁰⁹ Press Conference With United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan, September 13, 2006

genocide taking place in the Sudan, and it breaks our -- our -- our collective hearts to know that... The problem is that the United Nations hasn't acted"¹²¹⁰. He again implied that it might be possible for a UN force to go into Darfur without the consent of the Sudanese government, although explaining that US "would like their cooperation and support" and that they were "continuing to work" on that¹²¹¹. In his address to the 61st United Nations General Assembly on September 17, Darfur was the sixth foreign issue addressed, after Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon, Syria and Iran, and he repeated that "if the Sudanese government does not approve this peacekeeping force quickly, the United Nations must act"¹²¹². As a sign of his commitment to this issue, he named former USAID Administrator Andrew Natsios as his special envoy for Sudan. The United Nations again pushed the problem back to the member states: "I think the Secretary-General himself expressed frustration at the situation on a number of occasions... But, it is time for the Member States to make some decisions and to push strongly on the Darfur issue"¹²¹³. On September 16, Blair stated that "urgent action is needed by all parties to the conflict and by the international community if we are to find a lasting solution" and that Sudan will stay "at the top" of his agenda¹²¹⁴. According to this promise, he sent a letter to all EU members saying they should "commit to provide substantial support for reconstruction and peace through debt relief and aid, but "if it fails to move" they they should "agree further measures to isolate and pressure it"¹²¹⁵. On September 21, US officials expressed the toughest criticism of Sudan authorities until then: "President Bashir is basically saying that he should be allowed impunity in carrying out the atrocities that are taking place and that his government does not have to listen to either the other member states of the African Union or the United Nations, as represented by the UN Security Council"¹²¹⁶, after it obviously became clear that they would not "respond over time to concerted diplomatic pressure" as the US administration was hoping for from "the history of dealing with this Sudanese government"¹²¹⁷. US Foreign Secretary Condoleezza Rice presented it as a moral obligation: "if the notion of the responsibility to protect the weakest and most powerless among us is ever to be more than an empty promise, then we must take action in Darfur"¹²¹⁸, and after the meeting with foreign ministers, she threatened new measures again: "there are other measures at the disposal of the international community should we not be able to get the agreement of Sudan in the way that we would like to get the agreement of Sudan, which is that they would accede to

¹²¹⁰ Press Conference with US President George W. Bush, September 15, 2006

¹²¹¹ Kristen Silverberg, Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs, State Department Briefing on the upcoming United Nations General Assembly themes and Secretary Rice's schedule, September 15, 2006

¹²¹² Remarks by United States President George W. Bush at the 61st United Nations General Assembly, September 19, 2006

¹²¹³ Stephane Dujarric, Spokesman for the Secretary-General, Daily United Nations Press Briefing, September 20, 2006

¹²¹⁴ UK Prime Minister Tony Blair, Statement on Darfur situation for Action Day, 16 September 2006

¹²¹⁵ UK PM Tony Blair's letter to each EU member, published in full on September 17, 2006, available on http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/uk_politics/5353348.stm

¹²¹⁶ Jendayi Frazer, Assistant Secretary Of State For African Affairs, US State Department Foreign Press Center Briefing, Subject: U.N. 61st General Assembly: Review On Africa, September 21, 2006

¹²¹⁷ Sean McCormack, Department Spokesman, State Department Regular Briefing, September 14, 2006

¹²¹⁸ Remarks by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to the United Nations Security Council, September 22, 2006

the desires of the international community to stop the violence and stop the rape of women and children and to allow humanitarian workers to work”¹²¹⁹.

Mark Malloch Brown, UN Deputy Secretary-General, warned in an interview published on September 29 in *The Independent* that Prime Minister Blair and President Bush, speaking with respect to Darfur “need to get beyond this posturing and grand standing” and that their “megaphone” diplomacy was not “plausible”¹²²⁰. John R. Bolton, US Ambassador to the United Nations, chose the same day, the same way, through media, to respond: “We are proud of our efforts to bring relief to that tragedy. And to have Mr. Malloch Brown attack those efforts, as I say, brings great discredit to this institution... I think his remarks amount to undermining Resolution 1706”¹²²¹.

Obviously, this was a period of open public confrontation between the UN and US (and UK) over the policy in Sudan. In that month CNNI and BBCW were very critical toward UN policy in Darfur, but did not express open support to the UK and US governments’ efforts either (although CNNI did it much more than BBCW). They stated their position by insisting on the inadequacy of the existing solution – they emphasized the failure of African Union troops to protect Darfur civilians on numerous occasions, with phrases like “they have been too few, too undefended and too poorly equipped to stop the violence”¹²²² and “7000 troops widely seen as cash trapped, poorly equipped and too weak to protect the people”¹²²³ and pictures showing very small groups of AU soldiers only passing by burned huts and destroyed villages in Darfur, pictures utilized to underline their impotence. They also had stories with criticism addressed directly to the UN: “but at the UN in New York, there is little political will to force Khartoum to accept UN forces”¹²²⁴. The media position could be noted also in the questions posed at the UN press conferences: “is the UN just going to stand by when a new genocide is actually evolving”¹²²⁵. It is important to note that the public in the US and around the world again shared the same position as media on this issue. Already in March 2006, a public poll found that despite Americans’ weariness of the Iraq war, they strongly supported greater efforts to stop the killing in Darfur. More broadly, the poll found that 62 percent agreed that the United States “has a responsibility to help stop the killing in the Darfur region” and that 58 percent believed “more can be done” by the United States “to help end the crisis in Sudan.”¹²²⁶ September 17 was declared as the Global Day of Action for Darfur, when in many cities around the world events ranging from small candlelight vigils to mass concerts brought citizens together to urge their governments to pressure the UN Security Council into taking immediate action to protect the people of Darfur as it promised.

¹²¹⁹ Remarks by Secretary Condoleezza Rice with Danish Foreign Minister Per Stig Moeller after the Foreign Ministers Meeting on Sudan, New York, September 22, 2006

¹²²⁰ In Defence of The United Nations; Exclusive interview Mark Malloch Brown, outgoing deputy secretary general, By Paul Vallely, *The Independent*, September 29, 2006

¹²²¹ Remarks by Ambassador John R. Bolton, US Representative to the United Nations, on the comments in *The Independent* made by UN Deputy Secretary-General, Mark Malloch Brown, UN Security Council, September 29, 2006

¹²²² BBCW, September 12, 2006, Reporter: Jannat Jalil

¹²²³ CNNI, September 21, 2006, Reporter: Elise Labott

¹²²⁴ BBCW, September 14, 2006, Reporter: Katty Kay

¹²²⁵ Daily United Nations Press Briefing, September 6, 2006

¹²²⁶ Zogby International, <http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/>

But while US officials kept insisting on the possibility of "non-consensual deployment", privately they admitted there were "no good options for an invasion of Darfur" and worried "the Sudanese government would once again unleash *Janjaweed* militias on the people of Darfur in retaliation". "Can we take out the Sudanese on the ground and engage them in a game of 'Play Jihad with Me,'" one senior US official asked. "Sure we can, but truth is, that would be an act of war which could inflict even more pain on the people of Darfur."¹²²⁷

At the public level, the US and UN continued to accuse each other of ineffectiveness in Darfur in October 2006. On October 12, in his address to The Brookings Institution, UN Deputy Secretary-General Mark Malloch Brown said that President Bush and Prime Minister Blair were doing a good job in "highlighting the suffering in Darfur" but that neither country was doing enough in terms of selling the idea of a UN peacekeeping force: "They are the most outspoken... But they are not the most effective in securing President Bashir's cooperation, in my view"¹²²⁸. US officials answered the same day: "he might take a little -- allocate a little bit more of his time to doing the job at hand than going out giving speeches criticizing, criticizing member states"¹²²⁹. It was not just a matter of consent for the peacekeeping forces that caused disputes between the UN and US, but also the approach to this problem: while for example US Ambassador Bolton threatened many times that Khartoum cannot "frustrate the UN and therefore frustrate the international community"¹²³⁰, and kept repeating that "there are other steps"¹²³¹ that can be considered as well, that "this is not the only alternative"¹²³² or that "there are other ways of doing it"¹²³³ (although he never spelled out what those additional measures are), Brown estimated that "to threaten the drastic actions now, in a highly public way, would...not be helpful"¹²³⁴.

But it became apparent soon that the US began to slowly back up and started to emphasize the importance of international cooperation: "So inasmuch as we want to see that UN force go in and go in as soon as possible, we're also conscious of the fact and want to talk with our partners in the region about the need for the broader implementation of the peace agreement"¹²³⁵; "We know that we have to work with the international community in order to get this done"¹²³⁶. After Prime Minister Blair had discussed this

¹²²⁷ CNN, Behind the Scenes, September 16, 2006, Darfur free falls as the world dithers and Sudan balks

¹²²⁸ Brookings Institution Discussion With U.N. Deputy Secretary-General Mark Malloch Brown, Subject: The United Nations At A Crossroads: Debating The Use Of Force In An Evolving World, October 12, 2006

¹²²⁹ Sean McCormack, US State Department Spokesman, State Department Regular Briefing, October 12, 2006

¹²³⁰ Media Stakeout with Ambassador John Bolton, US Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Subject: Sudan and Other Issues, October 6, 2006

¹²³¹ Media Stakeout with Ambassador John Bolton, US Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Subject: Sudan and Other Issues, October 5, 2006

¹²³² Media Stakeout with Ambassador John Bolton, US Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Subject: Sudan and Other Issues, October 6, 2006

¹²³³ Ibid.

¹²³⁴ Brookings Institution Discussion With U.N. Deputy Secretary-General Mark Malloch Brown, Subject: The United Nations At A Crossroads: Debating The Use Of Force In An Evolving World, October 12, 2006

¹²³⁵ Tom Casey, Deputy Spokesman for the US State Department, State Department Foreign Press Center Briefing, Subject: New Developments in United States Foreign Policy, October 3, 2006

¹²³⁶ Dana Perino, White House Deputy Spokesman, The White House Regular Briefing, October 6, 2006

issue by phone with President Bush on October 19, when they agreed to “put maximum international pressure... on the Sudanese government to allow a proper peace keeping force in”, Blair raised that question at the informal EU summit in Lahti, Finland, on October 20, at which they reasserted “the European Union position, which is support for the United Nations force going into the Sudan”¹²³⁷. Blair made the same point after a meeting with Sudanese Vice-President Salva Kiir on October 31, when he warned that the Sudanese government “risked international isolation”¹²³⁸. Asked whether the Prime Minister had set out what isolation would mean, the PM’s spokesman said “it was better to let the Sudanese Government absorb the message before we talked in public. The Sudanese Government was in no doubt about what we meant. Sometimes it was better not to spell out threats publicly but rather deliver private messages. Private messages worked best in this situation”¹²³⁹. That was not the first and not the last time in this period that politicians insisted on private messages instead of communicating publicly; they did on the very day when Resolution 1706 was adopted - August 31, twice in October, and once in November too – so despite tough rhetoric used publicly, officials obviously preferred “quiet diplomacy” to find a solution for Darfur crisis.

International attention toward Darfur was diminishing in November 2006, and journalists began to express resignation too, asking for example: “Have you guys essentially come to the realization that this isn’t going to happen (UN forces in Darfur)”¹²⁴⁰. At the monthly press conference of British Prime Minister Tony Blair on November 6, he only briefly touched on the issue of Darfur and repeated that “there is a simple desire to stop the displacement of people and the death of people in Darfur... since the government of Sudan has been unable to do so”¹²⁴¹. On November 8, Annan announced a meeting with the Sudanese government in Addis Ababa for November 13, aimed at finding “a workable alternative”, i.e. the possibility of “getting into Darfur an effective force, strengthening the African Union force”¹²⁴². US officials took this compromise approach too: “We’re working to try to address that, try to address their concerns, try to address the concerns of some of the other states in the region... we’re looking at a variety of different options”¹²⁴³. On November 15 in Addis Ababa, Annan introduced a new solution for Darfur - the AU-UN hybrid forces. He urged African leaders to do more to achieve key development targets, saying that Africa now understands that development is first and foremost an African priority, and added: “I’m afraid that countries actually walking the walk, and not just talking the talk, are still the exception, rather than the rule”¹²⁴⁴. US officials did not give a lot of publicity to this agreement, and commented on it at the very

¹²³⁷ UK Prime Minister Tony Blair, press conference following the informal EU summit in Lahti, Finland, October 20, 2006

¹²³⁸ Press briefing from the UK Prime Minister's Official Spokesman on: Sudan, Iraq Inquiry Debate and Stern Report, October 31, 2006

¹²³⁹ Ibid.

¹²⁴⁰ Daily United Nations Press Briefing, November 6, 2006

¹²⁴¹ Monthly Press Conference with UK Prime Minister Tony Blair (As Released By 10 Downing Street), November 6, 2006

¹²⁴² Media Stakeout with United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan following the U.N. Security Council Monthly Luncheon, November 8, 2006

¹²⁴³ Sean McCormack, Department Spokesman, State Department Regular Briefing, November 9, 2006

¹²⁴⁴ Stephane Dujarric, Spokesman for the Secretary-General, Daily United Nations Press Briefing, November 16, 2006

end of the State Department's press-conference that day: "We are aware of Secretary General Annan's comments on this today and we think that the region and the people in Darfur deserve an effective protection of force and we hope that that is going to be the case"¹²⁴⁵. Blair's spokesman also noted that "it is an important breakthrough, but the next few days could be critical"¹²⁴⁶. Bush's envoy praised Annan for his "strong and effective leadership"¹²⁴⁷, and it looked like the time of disputes had passed: "It's not that we agree with the United Nations on everything, but on four critical issues with respect to the peacekeeping operation, there is, I think, unanimity of opinion between the United Nations and the United States government"¹²⁴⁸. He admitted that Resolution 1706 and Addis agreement are not "the same document"¹²⁴⁹, but also that they are continuing to work with Sudanese government privately, because "you cannot conduct diplomacy effectively in the media"¹²⁵⁰. But experts warned already that not only would the hybrid forces from the Addis agreement not be *the same* as UN troops from Resolution 1706, but that it presented "an ill-conceived, short-sighted and failed expedient to appease, yet again, the perpetrators of genocide". This hybrid force was to be 17000 troops versus the 22000 called for in the Resolution and it was supposed to derive its mandate from the AU, which Khartoum "readily manipulates"¹²⁵¹. It was to draw its troops principally from Africa, but overstretched by deployments to hotspots all over the continent, Africa had very little peacekeeping capacity to spare. The hybrid would have enjoyed UN funding but suffered "from the same "dual-key" problems that plagued the UN and NATO in the Balkans in the 1990s"¹²⁵², and according to Susan E. Rice, one of the greatest shortcomings of the hybrid force was that each and every aspect of it had to be negotiated by all the parties involved. Additionally there was, in fact, no agreement reached in Addis Ababa upon command responsibilities, mandate, troop levels or timeline for an international peacekeeping operation for Darfur. In the aftermath of the meeting, Sudanese Foreign Minister Lam Akol explained that Khartoum would accept some UN logistical support for AMIS efforts in Darfur, but no UN peacekeepers¹²⁵³. On November 21, Annan said he would expect to have Sudanese answers on those outstanding issues, i.e. the size of the force, the force commander and the status of the UN Special Representative, as they were to consult on and come back "as of today, or latest tomorrow"¹²⁵⁴. But a week later, Annan was still waiting for them "to come back on these three issues"¹²⁵⁵. On November 29, 20 members of the UK House of Commons signed

¹²⁴⁵ Tony Snow, White House Press Secretary, White House Press Gaggle, November 16, 2006

¹²⁴⁶ UK Prime Minister Official Spokesman, morning press briefing from 17 November 2006

¹²⁴⁷ Remarks by Andrew Natsios, The President's Special Envoy for Sudan to The National Holocaust Museum Photography Exhibit, National Holocaust Museum, Washington, D.C., November 20, 2006

¹²⁴⁸ Andrew Natsios, The President's Special Envoy for Sudan, Special State Department Briefing, November 20, 2006

¹²⁴⁹ Ibid.

¹²⁵⁰ Ibid.

¹²⁵¹ Susan E. Rice, former US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs The Brookings Institution, Dithering on Darfur: US Inaction in the Face of Genocide, Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, April 11, 2007

¹²⁵² Ibid.

¹²⁵³ Africa Action, 9 March 2007, Six Months Since 1706: The International Failure to Protect Darfur

¹²⁵⁴ Press Conference with United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan, Geneva, Switzerland, November 21, 2006

¹²⁵⁵ Media Stakeout with United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan, November 28, 2006

the Action for Darfur in which they asked the UK government to push for the enforcement of the no-fly-zone set up by the UN in 2004 but never implemented, for tough targeted sanctions including asset freezes and travel bans on members of the government of Sudan who have been identified by UN-sponsored investigations as responsible for atrocities in Darfur and for action against the offshore and international network of businesses owned by and linked to the government of Sudan. But UK Prime Minister Blair's only proposed solution at that time was to "keep up the pressure on the Sudanese Government"¹²⁵⁶. At one of the State Department's press-conferences in November journalists referred to "criticism from some people in the clergy that the US, notwithstanding the aid it's given, has not done enough to get the UN force that it publicly says it wants into Darfur, or to convince other countries to do that"¹²⁵⁷, but in the answer it was underlined that the administration and the President "have been primarily responsible for putting this issue on the international agenda and for being able to get the progress that we have"¹²⁵⁸, and the final remark on November 30 was that "people are continuing to discuss this, to work on this and to encourage and try and push the Sudanese government forward to accept that agreement"¹²⁵⁹.

Although US policy in Darfur was accused of being "anemic and simultaneously constipated" and "grossly out of step with US public opinion and in fact with the bipartisan view of Congress"¹²⁶⁰, it seems that in 2006, and especially in September, there was a strong consensus among all US political leaders, from both executive and legislative power, about the goal to be achieved in Darfur, and that was the deployment of the UN troops according to UN Resolution 1706. At this point, in the conditions of absolute consensus, CNNI had a large number of the stories with a positive tone toward the US administration's actions, and questions posed at the press conferences were much milder than they were in 2004: "You know, it would be hard to understand how, if the US had support from other countries, you wouldn't be getting -- moving -- you wouldn't be getting someplace. The US seems to be in a very lonely, moral position without a whole lot of help. Have you gotten anything in response to an appeal -- if not, of course, previous appeals? Is anybody weighing in besides Britain?"¹²⁶¹. BBCW was more critical, but mostly toward the US's inclination to unilateral foreign actions in the past, rather than to its policy in Darfur. Independent experts were suggesting much tougher measures at that time, ranking from sanctions particularly targeted against Sudanese officials to the air strikes, but although new sanctions would be introduced in the following years, Michael Gerson, former assistant to the US president for Policy and Strategic Planning, said that bombing was never seriously discussed, because of the relief groups' presence on the ground: "attacking the air force of Sudan would likely have... an

¹²⁵⁶ House of Commons debates, 22 November 2006, Oral Answers to Questions — UK Prime Minister Tony Blair

¹²⁵⁷ US State Department Regular Briefing, November 22, 2006

¹²⁵⁸ Tom Casey, US State Department Deputy Spokesman, US State Department Regular Briefing, November 22, 2006

¹²⁵⁹ Tom Casey, US State Department Deputy Spokesman, US State Department Regular Briefing, November 30, 2006

¹²⁶⁰ Susan Rice, a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, former US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Darfur at a Crossroads: Global Public Opinion and the Responsibility to Protect, The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., April 5, 2007

¹²⁶¹ US State Department Regular Briefing, October 6, 2006

immediate reaction of throwing them out of the country”¹²⁶². CNNI and BBCW never proposed or even mentioned any possible additional actions in Darfur, including military intervention. Also, neither one of the two TV channels were critical toward the US and UK governments after their decision to bow to Khartoum’s will and accept a bad compromise instead of the deployment of the UN troops. Therefore, in the Darfur coverage, during both 2004 and 2006, as in Kosovo coverage too, neither CNNI nor BBCW ever shifted into the “deviant sphere”¹²⁶³ of discussion about possible actions in Darfur.

In general, media coverage in this period was obviously a result of intensive diplomatic activities and expectations to reach a solution and implement the deployment of the UN troops, rather than an agenda-setter itself, but it still managed to develop some of its frame independently. The example is the African Union failure frame – media insisted on this frame in September 2006, while politicians mentioned this organization only in very positive terms, with statements like: “We commend the African Union for all of its efforts. The African Union has taken the leadership role, as is only right”¹²⁶⁴ and “I pay tribute to the efforts of the African Union and its peacekeepers”¹²⁶⁵. Therefore, the influence in frame setting was not registered in either of two directions in the relation between media and politicians.

SUMMARY

“The challenge for journalists in a situation like Darfur is to remember that our job is to cover history, albeit on the fly, and not just events or press conferences”, Nicholas D. Kristof of The New York Times said¹²⁶⁶. He believes that if Darfur underscored “weaknesses in the press, it also is a reminder of the power of our spotlight to do good”, by pricking the world's conscience¹²⁶⁷. It could be said that journalists partly fulfilled their professional responsibility (taking into account a small number of stories in CNNI and BBCW) of “pointing out some of the realities of the situation on the ground”¹²⁶⁸, or simply to be there, “to bear witness, and to make sure that these kinds of things do not happen in obscurity”¹²⁶⁹, and in such a way to create pressure on government to react to issues they would like to ignore and much before they planned to do so. Again, they

¹²⁶² Michael Gerson, Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations, Journalist Roundtable on Darfur, November 6, 2006

¹²⁶³ According to Hallin, who investigated the media influence in the Vietnam War, there are three spheres that exist with regard to any given political issue: one of consensus, one of legitimate controversy and one of deviance, and news media coverage, taking its cues from political elites, rarely produces coverage within the deviant sphere but rather either reflects elite consensus on an issue or elite legitimated controversy, Hallin, D., 1986, *The Uncensored War*, Berkeley: University of California Press

¹²⁶⁴ Remarks by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to The Africa Society of The National Summit on Africa Subject: US Policy Towards Africa, With Special Emphasis on Sudan, September 27, 2006

¹²⁶⁵ Remarks by Margaret Beckett, British Secretary of State For Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, At The 61st United Nations General Assembly, New York City, New York, September 22, 2006

¹²⁶⁶ Nicholas D. Kristof, The New York Times Correspondent, *Darfur's Silence*, Nieman Reports, Summer 2005

¹²⁶⁷ Ibid.

¹²⁶⁸ Jim Clancy, CNN Correspondent, *International Correspondents*, CNNI, July 24, 2004

¹²⁶⁹ Christiane Amanpour, CNN Chief International Correspondent, *International Correspondents*, CNNI, August 15, 2004

managed to have impact on the environment in which decisions were made, but in the conditions of policy certainty formed on the basis of national interests, media did not have any influence on the content of these decisions, especially the most important ones - about the sort of international intervention. In what has become a well-known anecdote among activists trying to stop the catastrophe in Darfur, President Bush, shortly after taking office, read a report on the Clinton administration's failure to act in Rwanda. Afterward Bush wrote in the margin: 'Not on my watch'¹²⁷⁰. The numbers in Darfur did not match the estimates of up to 800000 people killed in Rwanda - yet.

¹²⁷⁰ CNN, Behind the Scenes, September 16, 2006, Darfur free falls as the world dithers and Sudan balks

CONCLUSION

REVIEW OF CHAPTERS

Chapter 1 presented a summary of the available literature published until now about the main communication and international politics approaches that deal with the media, especially 24/7 television news channels, and international political decision-making. It gave an overview of the media effects studies' communications framework that includes general theories such as agenda setting¹²⁷¹ and framing¹²⁷², and specific theories that deal with press-government relations such as the indexing hypothesis¹²⁷³, manufacturing consent or propaganda model theory¹²⁷⁴, and – as the most relevant for this research – the so called CNN effect, but also the main features of the international policy sphere, such as 'interventionism', national interests and the realist approach to international relations. The focus of the chapter was on CNN effect theory, defined as the "the way breaking news affects foreign policy decisions"¹²⁷⁵, and some of its most quoted cases, which also served as a guide in the selection of the case studies and the most important units for the analysis. It introduced the two most common conclusions about media effects from previous research: that the news media have a larger impact on the process of policy making, such as timing and the extent of consultation before a decision is reached, by accelerating the pace of international communication, than on the content of the policies themselves; and that how influential media would be depends also on the level of policy certainty: "if leaders don't have a clear policy on a significant issue, the media may step in and replace them"¹²⁷⁶.

Chapter 2 described the main features of television as a news medium, and more specifically, the main features of two 24/7 international news channels, CNN International and BBC World. Despite criticisms of its superficiality, television is still considered as the main source of world news¹²⁷⁷, and its influence is linked to perceived credibility ('seeing is believing'), emotional power and instantaneous coverage. All these characteristics are reinforced by the format of the 24/7 international news channels, and CNN International and BBC World News are considered as the key representatives of this media group, watched in diplomatic enclaves across the globe. These channels are also frequently quoted by news organizations and, by being used as a co-orientation model, they have even helped to shape the news format of international broadcasters. The BBC has the traditions of the oldest European public broadcaster, with a strict regulatory framework, organizational structure, and in-house procedures including trainings for media professionals that are very much esteemed in the media world. This history has it

¹²⁷¹ McCombs, M., Shaw D. & Weaver D., 1997, *Communication and democracy: Exploring the intellectual frontiers in agenda-setting*

¹²⁷² Reese, S., Gaundy O. and Grant A. (eds.), 2001, *Framing public life*, Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum

¹²⁷³ Bennett, W.L., 1990, *Toward a theory of press-state relation in the United States*, *Journal of Communications*, 40, pp. 103-125

¹²⁷⁴ Herman, E., and N. Chomsky, 1988, *Manufacturing Consent*, New York: Pantheon

¹²⁷⁵ Schorr, D., 1998, November 27, *CNN effect: Edge-of-seat diplomacy*, *Christian Science Monitor*, p. 11

¹²⁷⁶ Badsey, S., 1997, (ed.), *The media and international security*, London: Cass, p. 19

¹²⁷⁷ Independent Television Commission, *The Public's View*, London: ITC, 2003

gained a reputation for trying to implement basic journalistic values and principles like reporting both sides and careful identification of sources in order to achieve 'objectivity' as the final goal as opposed to mass-market-appeal news presentation and gathering – although perhaps not everybody would agree that they actually achieve it – while CNN has become famous for airing globally attractive 'mass' news events¹²⁷⁸. Therefore, their worldwide reach, their large elite audience and their considerable influence on the agendas of other news media, particularly where events outside the main Western nations are concerned, explain the reason behind the decision to choose these two international news channels as the most adequate source of media coverage in this research.

Chapter 3 outlined the methodological approach taken in this research and explained how the empirical part of this research fulfils the goal of investigating the interaction between media coverage and the international political decision-making process. The main aim of the chosen approach was to avoid both world politics-centrism and media-centrism by adopting an interdisciplinary strategy that entails becoming sensitive to contemporary arguments and theories deriving from communication and media studies, and in terms of methodology, to analyze both the media and political processes. It was implemented through two interrelated comparative analyses: (a) an assessment of international TV news channels' impact on a specific international political decision in comparison to the relative impact of other factors; and (b) application of this procedure to two relevant case studies. The results of content analysis, the research method used for media output, indicate the most probable impact media could have on the process of political decision-making, according to the agenda-setting, framing and CNN effect theories. The results of the analysis of the political process indicate the features of this process that could enhance, according to the CNN effect theory, a possible impact of media. Comparative analysis of media coverage and the time-line of the political process show to what extent this impact actually took place: time-based comparisons point to which came first, allowing an inference of causality and influence and confirming/rejecting the hypothesis of agenda-setting, while frame analysis shows whether the frames used by media and politicians were the same, similar or different, with the help of the time-line again. In brief, content analysis itself cannot demonstrate media impact on political decision-making, but in combination with time-based analysis of the policy process and its main features, it can reveal the extent of media impact. This chapter also gave an explanation for selection of two case studies, Kosovo and Darfur, in which, despite many common points in their historical and political background, the international reaction was completely different: the Kosovo case ended with a NATO bombing campaign unprecedented in the history of this organization while in Darfur only sporadic and very limited international intervention has been registered until the present day. Therefore the goal of this research was to determine whether the quantity and content of media coverage of Kosovo and Darfur, in interaction with the main features of the process of decision-making, with other real-world indicators being similar, had any effect on the these political outcomes.

¹²⁷⁸ Volkmer, I., 1999, *News In The Global Sphere, A Study Of CNN And Its Impact On Global Communication*, University of Luton Press

Chapters 4, 5 and 6 belong to the Kosovo case study. Chapter 4 presented the background of Kosovo case: the history and main characteristics of the region, including its geo-strategic importance, the history of international policy toward Kosovo, and an overview of the situation in the investigated time period. It gave an overview of the relationship between Kosovo and Serbia, where Medieval Kosovo is often called the 'cradle of the Serbs'¹²⁷⁹, of the long history of repression of Albanians that culminated with Slobodan Milosevic's rise to power, and the beginning of the armed conflict with the formation of the Kosovo Liberation Army. It also summarized the history of international policy toward Kosovo that tightened after the Racak massacre on January 15, 1999. Chapter 5 showed the results of both quantitative and qualitative content analysis of the television archive material prior to the political decisions regarding Kosovo in 1999, namely the decision to bomb targets in FR Yugoslavia if Slobodan Milosevic did not accept the provisions of the peace agreement with Kosovo Albanians, in order to identify the intensity and time devoted to this region/conflict/political process and to detect frames used in the coverage. Taking into account the distribution of the news stories, the periods of its highest concentration, and a difference between unexpected and staged events, one could expect that media had the strongest agenda-setting role in the period of four days after the Racak massacre. Key word and qualitative analyses showed that it was also the period of the most critical media coverage toward the lack of Western policy on Kosovo, opening in that way, together with the empathetic attitude toward the Kosovo civilians, the path for a possible "CNN effect". The rest of the coverage toward the beginning of NATO campaign was characterized by the domination of a distance and contra-intervention frame, and even by criticisms towards the US and UK plans to act, and as such could only have an impediment effect. Chapter 6 presented the results of the analysis of a time line of the process of decision-making through the archive analysis of all relevant political process' documentation, with the purpose of determining the level of attention given to Kosovo by key policy makers, but also to detect whether the frames used by media and policy prescriptions they represented were accepted and followed by politicians, and to discover observable implications of elite dissensus, policy uncertainty or inconsistency which could reinforce possible media influence. Quantitative analysis showed that public statements in investigated time periods had a very similar distribution pattern as news stories and that in case of Racak massacre, the greatest number of public statements was recorded after quite intensive media coverage of this incident, confirming in this way the hypothesis of a media agenda-setter function in this period. Media did not change the outcome of the policy process, but they apparently did influence the environment in which this policy process took place: already on the ground, demanding an explanation of what happened in Racak, and in the following days, with its aftermath coverage. But further analysis of the political process also showed that after policy certainty and consensus among executive power representatives was established about the intention to act militarily if the Rambouillet negotiations failed, non-supportive media coverage could not make any impact.

Chapters 7, 8 and 9 belong to the Darfur case study and they followed the same pattern as in Kosovo case study. Therefore, Chapter 7 presented the background of the Darfur case, including the history and main characteristics of the region, the history of international

¹²⁷⁹ Malcolm, N., 1998, Kosovo: A Short History, Noel Malcolm, Papermac, p. 41

policy toward Darfur, and an overview of the situation in the investigated time period. It described the long term social and economic neglect of Darfur by the colonial administration and, after independence, by the Khartoum government; the root causes of the present crisis – draught and famine – which go back to the 1980s; and the military conflict between rebels and government forces that supplemented its military presence in Darfur by formalizing its relations with the *Janjaweed*¹²⁸⁰, a rough and exceptionally brutal armed militia. Sudan was for a long time far from representing a major item on Western foreign policy agenda, and when it attracted some attention, it was focused on ending another conflict in this country, the North-South war, which left an estimated two million Sudanese dead and double that amount displaced¹²⁸¹. Therefore, the conflict in Darfur erupted at a very inconvenient period for the US and the rest of the Western world, especially because it did not fit the common patterns of thinking about Sudan with the “Muslim-on-Muslim violence”¹²⁸² there. Chapter 8 presented the results of both quantitative and qualitative content analysis of the television archive material before key events in Darfur in 2004 and 2006 and it showed that the intensity of coverage of both CNNI and BBCW was highly inadequate to the proportions of the crisis in Darfur, which is more the rule than the exception in coverage of Africa, but that, taking into account the distribution of news stories, the period of highest concentration, and the nature of the events covered, media could have played the role of agenda-setter toward the end of the summer of 2004. Key word and qualitative analyses have shown that media coverage was very empathetic toward the Darfur civilian population (with the most touching and the most committed stories appearing in August 2004), a frame that was supported by the pro-intervention approach, dominating more on CNNI than on BBCW. These two frames combined, according to framing theory, should provide an incentive for governments to intervene. Chapter 9 showed the results of the analysis of the time line of the process of decision-making and the comparison of these results with the findings from media coverage analysis. It presented another proof of the “snowball effect” relationship between politicians’ attention and media coverage since it seemed that every rise of attention by politicians, especially in the period between April and September 2004, has provoked a rise of attention by media and vice versa, with the highest possibility for media to play the role of agenda-setter in August 2004 with regard to the declaration of genocide in Darfur by the US administration. But it also showed that empathetic and pro-intervention oriented media coverage, confronted with strong policy certainty and consensus among the representatives of the US (and UK) executive power to refrain from any more forceful action in Darfur, resulted in officials reacting to media coverage but only with “symbolic” actions – providing a huge amount of money for humanitarian assistance and the declaration of genocide, but without any concrete political or military action as the consequence of that declaration.

An important implication of the conclusions from previous chapters is that is not only the features of the media coverage, but of the political process too, that are decisive factors in assessing media interaction with politics and their possible impact on international decision-making. In practice that means that any research aiming to determine and assess

¹²⁸⁰ *Janjaweed* can variously be translated as “evil horsemen” or “ghost riders”

¹²⁸¹ International Crisis Group, 2002, *God, Oil, and Country: Changing the Logic of War in Sudan*, Africa Report No 39, Brussels: International Crisis Group, pp 3 – 4

¹²⁸² Prunier G., 2005, *Darfur: The Ambiguous Genocide*, C. Hurst & Co. Ltd., London, p. 129

possible media impact on given political decisions should include analysis of both media coverage and the political process. That it is the reason why this research contains not only comparative analysis between these two aspects in two concrete case studies, but also comparison of two case studies, which will be presented here. This comparison, combined and analyzed together with the findings of the reviewed literature, should provide answers to the main research question of this study: when, where and under what conditions is the interaction between media and political decision making/makers possible.

DARFUR VERSUS KOSOVO

Ignatieff believes that in struggling to make sense of international conflicts, usually (as it happens) “somewhere in the Balkans” or in “darkest Africa”, Western media and policy-makers have often concluded that these are “essentially non-sensical, ‘tribal’ wars between peoples drenched in ethnic hatred”, which lack rational explanation but “perpetually simmer, occasionally boiling over”. Besides removing any further obligation to understand the roots of conflict, he claims that explaining violence as inexplicable may also be conveniently self-serving: “if ‘ethnic violence’ is age-old and engrained, then there is little that on-looking states or international organizations can do, other than apply humanitarian band-aids to its consequences, or else retreat into ‘shallow misanthropy’ from a world ‘too crazy to deserve serious reflections’”¹²⁸³. This frame did appear from time to time in media coverage of Kosovo and Darfur, like for example in US envoy Christopher Hill’s statement for CNNI that Kosovo is an issue “that has been around for the entire century”¹²⁸⁴, or a journalist’s description of Sudan as “a place so chaotic Osama Bin Laden once found it the ideal to hide”¹²⁸⁵ where “mistrust between Arabs and Africans...dates back decades”¹²⁸⁶, but it was not a dominant one. Here are some main features of, and comparison between, media coverage of Darfur and Kosovo.

The first important difference between Kosovo and Darfur media coverage was the intensity with which reports were produced. While media investigated in this research produced on average 4.3 (CNNI) and 1.3 (BBCW) reports, or 8.8 (CNNI) and 2.4 (BBCW) minutes per day about Kosovo, they had only 0.2 reports (both CNNI and BBCW), and 30 (CNNI) and 24 (BBCW) seconds of material on average per day about Darfur. Although, according to media managers and journalists, ability to cover the conflict at a low cost, safety of journalists and access to the region are more likely to be an explanation for the priority level in the media agenda than political reasons, these findings give further proof of the common media policy to cover only the “must-cover news” in Africa like wars and coups, and in such a way, reinforce the Western perception that this continent is “all bad news, dreary and hopeless”. As noted earlier, the most intensive media coverage of Darfur was in August 2004.

However, secondly, the coverage of the Darfur civil population during the investigated periods was much more empathetic than in the case of Kosovo; for example, despite the

¹²⁸³ Ignatieff, M., 1998, *The Warrior's Honour: Ethnic War and the Modern Conscience*, London: Chatto and Windus, p. 24

¹²⁸⁴ CNNI, March 15, 1999, Reporter: Jim Bittermann

¹²⁸⁵ CNNI, May 7, 2004, Reporter: Todd Brian

¹²⁸⁶ CNNI, August 28, 2004, Reporter: Tumi Makgabo

grave violations of human rights and massive population exodus, the word genocide was not used in the Kosovo coverage at all. The strongest words used to describe the crimes committed by Serbian forces were “massacre” and “execution”, which were used in the aftermath of the Racak event when in general the most empathetic coverage regarding Kosovo was found. Although Kent found that UK media’s highly critical representation of Serbian repression of the Albanians in Kosovo was a significant departure from the previous representation of the Belgrade regime during the opening months of the war against Croatia for example¹²⁸⁷, the degree of equalisation of the sides in the conflict, as a result of the balancing procedures media have employed, was much higher in the Kosovo than in the Darfur coverage. Therefore, the findings of this research contradict those of Herman, for whom the media treatment of “body counts” in wars and atrocities throughout the world illustrates “how efficiently the intellectual and propaganda resources of the imperial state are mobilized to meet its need to demonize its enemies and put its own and its client states’ actions in a benevolent light”. He claims that when there is “an official and imperial demand for a high body count and great indignation”, as he says was the case in Kosovo in 1998 and 1999, the collective will be “deeply concerned with civilian casualties, will pursue refugees relentlessly to get details of their suffering, and will search eagerly for dead bodies”¹²⁸⁸. Comparative analysis of Kosovo and Darfur show that this was simply not that case: television coverage of Kosovo in 1999 was significantly less dramatic than of Darfur in 2004, with fewer pictures of refugees and dead bodies presented in a “sanitized” way, even in the coverage of the Racak massacre.

The pro-intervention frame figured much more in the Darfur than in the Kosovo media coverage, and that especially applied to the CNNI Darfur coverage, in which keywords associated with this frame outnumbered those associated with the contra-intervention frame by almost five to one, while in the Kosovo coverage there were one third more contra-intervention frame keywords than those associated with the pro-intervention frame.

The only figure which does go along with the general pro-interventionist and empathetic nature of the Darfur coverage is the number of stories critical of the (in)action of Western governments, namely American and British. Even if one deducts the number of stories which were critical toward the intention of the US government *to intervene* in Kosovo (which mostly appeared toward the beginning of NATO campaign and dealt with the risk for US pilots and lack of national interest) from the total number of critical stories – since these stories as such obviously could not present an incentive for intervention – the number of stories with a critical stance toward Western policy in Kosovo outnumbered those with the critical stand toward the Western policy in Darfur. Compared with five negative and five partly negative stories from Kosovo media coverage, there were only two negative and four partly negative stories in the Darfur media coverage and they mostly dealt with UN (in)action rather than with the responsibility of the US and UK governments. A possible conclusion from this kind of coverage is that the media position was that, beside the general moral obligation of each country toward the suffering

¹²⁸⁷ Kent, G., 2005, *Framing War And Genocide, British Policy and News Media Reaction to the War in Bosnia*, Hampton Press Communication Series: Political Communication, p. 262

¹²⁸⁸ Herman, E.S., 02.01.2002, *Body Counts In Imperial Service, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, and elsewhere*, Z Magazine, www.zmag.org

civilians, the main responsibility for the crisis in Darfur belonged to the UN, and not US or UK alone.

The frames employed by media to explain the situation on the ground, in the case of dramatic unexpected events like the massacre in Racak and genocide in Darfur, derived not from politicians in capitals, but from credible (Western) persons on the ground: the Head of the OSCE Observation Mission William Walker in Kosovo and local UN officials and humanitarian workers in Darfur. It means that the imperatives of journalistic practice – immediate access to the source, perceived credibility and experience of the source, and, not the least, English language competence – have the highest priority in such circumstances. Therefore, one can say that the indexing hypothesis would apply less and that journalists would have a more independent role in those extreme conditions than in the coverage of long-running political issues.

The selection of sources also indicates the focus of a story: the huge representation of humanitarian workers as sources of information in Darfur (in CNNI coverage 34% of all quoted sources), unlike Kosovo where they represented less than 0.5% of all quoted sources implies that media in Darfur were focused primarily on the humanitarian aspect of the conflict, while in Kosovo they more intensively covered the political process.

In presenting political solutions and political staged events, there was a slight difference between CNNI and BBCW. The CNNI media position seemed to be connected with consensus within elites (but elites on all levels, from both executive and legislative power): in the cases of dissensus, like before NATO bombing and during the spring/summer of 2004 they seemed to be more independent in frame choosing and “picking sides” – accidentally or not, in both cases CNNI journalists supported the side of the representatives of the US legislative power, either when they were suspicious toward the purpose and feasibility of air strikes on Serbia or were requesting stronger measures toward the Sudanese government and declaring genocide in Darfur. In such a way they showed that journalists might actually take sides during elite debates over policy and in doing so become participants in a political debate. But after the adoption of the UN Resolution in August 2006, when both US administration and Congress were jointly demanding its implementation on the ground, CNNI media coverage accepted and reproduced the same frame. The BBC seemed to be more independent in frame setting: it questioned the effectiveness of the air strikes in helping the Kosovo population when there was no opposition to this action among UK politicians, and it demanded action in Darfur (although to a lesser extent than CNNI) when UK politicians did not even symbolically declare that genocide was taking place there. Recent analyses of the media coverage of the war in Iraq have had similar findings: that British journalists often adopt a skeptical posture towards politicians, usually more often than their US colleagues¹²⁸⁹.

But, in both cases, there were some issues about which the points of view presented in the media coverage did not go far from the scope of the elite discussion, and that can be explained by the indexing hypothesis. In the Kosovo case, they did not question the motives for the organization of the Rambouillet negotiations, which was later on

¹²⁸⁹ Lewis J. and R. Brookes, *Reporting the War on British Television*, in Miller, D., 2004, *Tell Me Lies, Propaganda and Media Distortion in the Attack on Iraq*, Pluto Press, London Sterling, Virginia,

described by one of the organisers himself as the US administration's attempt to "unite the Europeans behind air strikes by clearly defining the aggressor and the victim"¹²⁹⁰, or Walker's immediate description of the Racak massacre and naming of its perpetrators. Regarding Darfur, they have never discussed the relevant legal duties deriving from the genocide declaration according to the Geneva Convention, nor the precise content of the UN resolutions adopted in the investigated period and US and UK failure to implement its threats against the Sudanese government.

As already presented in each case study, taking all these issues together, and employing the framing, agenda-setting and policy-media interaction model's hypotheses, the highest possibility for media impact toward the international intervention in Kosovo and Darfur occurred in two periods: in Kosovo immediately after Racak massacre, in January 1999, and in Darfur during August 2004. In Kosovo, according to the same hypotheses, media coverage ought to have presented an impediment to the achievement of desired policy goals, i.e. the conduct of the NATO air strikes campaign, in the period before it actually started, in February and March 1999, while in Darfur media coverage did not have such direction. But even if one takes into account less intensive media coverage in Darfur with no direct criticism addressed to specific Western governments, it does not explain the totally different political outcomes: immediate and decisive action after the media coverage of the Racak massacre on one side, but only a formal genocide declaration without any practical consequence in Darfur, despite the international legal obligations and pro-action oriented media coverage; and further, a bombing campaign on a European country without any precedent in NATO history despite the critical and non-supportive media coverage with no parallel in the Darfur case. So what would be the determining factor in the production of these outcomes? Comparative analysis of the political processes in the two cases provides the two most probable reasons related to the features of the political process: policy certainty and consensus within the executive power.

Issues regarding Kosovo were divided between anti-interventionists and humanitarian interventionists before (and even during) the NATO campaign¹²⁹¹ in Western nations. On the one hand, the war appeared to be another Vietnam, with Americans concerned with the long-term ethnic, religious and nationalist tensions and a battle with rebel forces believed to hold strong ties to organized crime and the illicit drug trade.¹²⁹² But on the another hand there was the concern for large-scale suffering and loss of life in the Albanian community, fear and hatred of the Serb political leader for his role in human rights violations, and most of all, a concern about the threat of war spreading and creating more general regional instability and the associated problem of vast cross-border refugee flows destabilising surrounding states¹²⁹³. These were the issues that have been discussed and balanced throughout the whole year 1998, and produced a decision to keep the status quo on Kosovo on the very day of Racak massacre, January 15, 1999.

¹²⁹⁰ Rubin J., September 30, 2000, A Very Personal War, James Rubin, Financial Times, London, Pg. 9

¹²⁹¹ Bird, K., 26 April 1999, False History Lessons, The Nation, 6

¹²⁹² Vincent, R.C., 2000, A Narrative Analysis of US Press Coverage of Slobodan Milosevic and the Serbs in Kosovo, European Journal of Communication, Sage Publications London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi, Vol. 15 (3): 321-344

¹²⁹³ Adelman, H., 1992, The Ethics of Humanitarian Intervention, Public Affairs Quarterly, 6(1), p. 74

But then, after few days of a no-policy gap during which consultations among the US administration officials and cross-Atlantic discussions between US president and UK prime minister were made, a new policy was defined. "In Kosovo, Milosevic underestimated the power of television. As the humanitarian catastrophe [of the Racak massacre] was relayed live on our screens, the British prime minister's moral case for a military response became unanswerable,"¹²⁹⁴ former UK Foreign Secretary Jack Straw explained. The new policy was not announced immediately due to the unfavourable domestic political situation in the US at that moment, but it was maintained until the beginning of NATO campaign, despite opposition from the US Congress and media. Racak was the point when new facts on the ground, publicized by media across the world, began to raise Kosovo from the so-called "C list" toward the top of the hierarchy of US foreign policy concerns¹²⁹⁵.

Nye claimed that one of the reasons why Kosovo and similar "C list" issues may come to dominate foreign policy agenda, is exactly the fact that these issues dominate media attention in the information age, and that "dramatic visual portrayals of immediate human conflict and suffering are far easier to convey to the public than "A list" abstractions like the possibility of a 'Weimar Russia', the rise of a hegemonic China and the importance of the alliance with Japan, or the potential collapse of the international system of trade and investment"¹²⁹⁶. But although media attention did help Kosovo to move toward the top of the US foreign policy hierarchy, especially after the Racak massacre, its critical coverage about the rationale of the air strikes did not manage to change a political decision in the conditions of policy certainty and consensus among the representatives of the executive power.

Lordanova found particularly interesting that the rhetoric used by politicians to justify action in Kosovo ("the first war for values"¹²⁹⁷, just war, punishing a dictator, a heroic struggle to save innocent people, etc.) resembled much more the language used at the time of the Gulf war than that used in relation to Bosnia. She believes that it is no wonder at all: "the Bosnian rhetoric of an 'incomprehensible ethnic strife' where the West persistently argued 'for the wisdom and necessity of not getting involved', had proved untenable", so "the great cultural narrative on the Balkans made a sharp turn with Kosovo: 'enough is enough'"¹²⁹⁸. I actually found that politicians did mention Bosnia in their public statements about Kosovo, but exactly in the context of the lessons learned

¹²⁹⁴ Quoted in Gibson, O., April 1, 2003, Straw warns against snap judgment, MediaGuardian, available on <http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2003/apr/01/pressandpublishing.Iraqandthemedi2>

¹²⁹⁵ William Perry and Ashton Carter concluded ten years ago that the US was supposed to rethink the way it understood risks to US security: at the top of their new hierarchy they put "A list" threats like that the Soviet Union once presented to our survival. The "B list" featured imminent threats to US interests - but not to its survival - such as North Korea or Iraq. The "C list" included important "contingencies that indirectly affected US security but do not directly threaten US interests: Kosovos, Bosnias, Somalias, Rwandas, and Haitis", in Nye, J.S. Jr., July/August, 1999, Redefining the National Interest, Foreign Affairs, 78(4), p. 22

¹²⁹⁶ Nye, J.S. Jr., Redefining the National Interest, Foreign Affairs, 78(4), July/August, 1999, p. 22

¹²⁹⁷ Vaclav Havel, quoted in Clark, D., April 16, 2009, The Guardian, p. 31

¹²⁹⁸ Lordanova, D., December 2001, Shifting Narratives: Representation and Mediation of the Balkan Conflict, Journal of Communication, Oxford University Press, pp. 826 – 831

from “those early mistakes in Bosnia”¹²⁹⁹ – a frame that was, except in the early coverage after the Racak massacre, totally ignored by media. Entman, whose analyses of the newsmagazine coverage of the US intervention in Kosovo also showed there was little but criticism of the Clinton administration, even after the bombing actually started – with cover headlines like “War in Kosovo: Where Will it End”¹³⁰⁰ and “We’re Trapped/Horror and Hostages: How America Stumbled Into a No-Win War”¹³⁰¹ – believes that Clinton’s decisions may be traceable “in part to post-Lewinsky bitterness and the ambiguity of Kosovo issues, but it also suggests the important role that demons and enemies play in the administration’s gaining credit for success... unlike Saddam Hussein, Kim Jong-Il, or other who have engaged in menacing rhetoric toward America, Slobodan Milosevic sought only to dominate a small, rather remote area of Europe, and he never seems particularly interested in the United States.”¹³⁰²

But whatever the precise reason for such a media attitude toward the intervention in Kosovo was, just as little as politicians influenced media frames in the analysed periods, so media made little impact on the frames used by politicians (again with the exception of the early coverage after the Racak massacre). Politicians’ frames, contrary to those of media, were focused on the salvation of “the values of Western civilization”¹³⁰³, justice for “innocent Albanian civilians...driven from their homes in Kosovo”¹³⁰⁴ and more pragmatically, “regional stability in Southeast Europe” and “the capability and credibility of NATO”¹³⁰⁵, and remained such throughout the whole investigated period.

In a similar way to Kosovo, policy certainty and consensus among the representatives of the executive power not to act in Darfur resisted the empathetic and intervention demanding media coverage. Within his “new doctrine of international community”, presented to the Economic Club of Chicago, US, on April 22, 1999, former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair underlined that “acts of genocide can never be a purely internal matter”¹³⁰⁶, but this guideline of anticipated Western foreign policy was not followed in Darfur five years later. Blair himself addressed this inconsistency in his quite honest farewell speech at the end of his mandate in 2006: “What is happening now in the Sudan cannot stand. If this were in the continent of Europe we would act. Showing an African life is worth as much as a Western one - that would help defeat terrorism too.”¹³⁰⁷ But, the Sudanese government’s existing cooperation in the anti-terrorism campaign was

¹²⁹⁹ UK Prime Minister Tony Blair, NATO 50th Anniversary Conference - NATO, Europe, Our Future Security, March 8, 1999

¹³⁰⁰ Newsweek, April 5, 1999

¹³⁰¹ Newsweek, April 12, 1999

¹³⁰² Entman, R.M., 2004, *Projections of Power: Framing News, Public Opinion, and US Foreign Policy*, Chicago: Chicago University Press, p. 99-100

¹³⁰³ UK Prime Minister Tony Blair, quoted in Lordanova, D., 2001, *Shifting Narratives: Representation and Mediation of the Balkan Conflict*, *Journal of Communication*, December; 826 – 831, Oxford University Press

¹³⁰⁴ UK Prime Minister Tony Blair, *The Daily Telegraph*, 25 March 1999:1

¹³⁰⁵ Walter B. Slocombe, Under Secretary of Defense For Policy, Before The Senate Armed Services Committee, Subject – Kosovo, February 25, 1999

¹³⁰⁶ Doctrine of the International Community, Speech by the UK Prime Minister, Tony Blair, to the Economic Club of Chicago, Hilton Hotel, Chicago, USA, April 22, 1999

¹³⁰⁷ Tony Blair's final speech to the Labour Party conference, 26 September 2006, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/5382590.stm

enough to lead Western governments to turn a blind eye to the genocide of this government against its own population; the US administration even assessed in its annual report for 2004 that “Sudan took significant steps to cooperate in the global war on terrorism”¹³⁰⁸. Especially during this presidential election year, but also later on, Bush Administration US policy toward Sudan has been focused on getting the North-South agreement finalized - “a major effort of US policy since the beginning of the administration”¹³⁰⁹, especially because after Afghanistan and Iraq, it was important for President Bush to prove that he “was capable of making peace as well as war”¹³¹⁰ at a time when the US was isolated and mistrusted abroad. These national interests, together with Darfur’s lack of geopolitical importance, made policy certainty and consensus to avoid action in the US executive resistant to Congressional and media pressure (in the same way as was the case with the interventionist policy of the Clinton administration before the NATO campaign in Yugoslavia), while UK officials mostly followed the US position. Therefore, one can conclude that the US (and UK) decision not to intervene was not a lack of policy, as was the case during a few days after the Racak massacre, but on the contrary, a well defined and coordinated policy; as Hastings argued: “if you can do something and you don’t then it is doing something”¹³¹¹. Media impact on politicians’ frame formation was not noted again, since the politicians were insistent on a diplomatic solution, especially in 2004, as described by BBCW journalists: “the aim for the moment: to keep up the diplomatic pressure; not usually a recipe for a swift solution”¹³¹². In 2006, US and UK officials took a harder stand, requesting the implementation of Resolution 1706, with which the UN Security Council authorized the deployment of a new UN peacekeeping force to the region, and accusing Sudanese government directly for non-cooperation, but they stepped back soon before Khartoum’s will – a change of policy that did not provoke media attention at all. Its coverage from Darfur decreased drastically after September 2006.

Nonetheless, there was a reaction to media pressure on the part of US officials, noted especially in August 2004 when politicians spontaneously mentioned ‘journalists’, ‘television screens’ and ‘front pages’ several times in the context of the Darfur crisis, and that reaction was materialized through the huge donation of humanitarian help to the Darfur population and the (formal) declaration of genocide. That confirms Robinson’s conclusion that one could expect the media to have a major impact in low-cost responses to humanitarian crises, such as government involvement in aid agency relief, when the policy response involves “at most, the allocation of additional funds, military logistical support and donations”¹³¹³. These moves can be described as pseudo actions, but it still demonstrates media’s role in agenda setting and as a primary or even sole source of information, and its ability to put pressure on politicians to do something or “face a

¹³⁰⁸ Country Reports on Terrorism 2004, April 2005, US Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for the Counterterrorism, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/45313.pdf>

¹³⁰⁹ Richard Boucher, US State Department Spokesman, State Department Regular Briefing, May 26, 2004

¹³¹⁰ Power, S., August 30, 2004, Dying in Darfur; Can the ethnic cleansing in Sudan be stopped?, The New Yorker

¹³¹¹ In Kent, G., 2005, Framing War And Genocide, British Policy and News Media Reaction to the War in Bosnia, Hampton Press Communication Series: Political Communication, p. 149

¹³¹² BBCW, July 27, 2004, Reporter: Bridget Kendall

¹³¹³ Robinson P., The CNN Effect: The myth of news, foreign policy and intervention, 2002, Routledge, London and New York, p.124

public relations disaster”¹³¹⁴. Or, as former US State Department spokesman Richard Boucher explained it from the politicians’ point view, “the images of strife and horror abroad that are displayed on CNN and other television outlets maybe really help foreign policy officials to explain the need for US intervention”, but it also “makes the case of the need to be involved sometimes more than we can”¹³¹⁵.

The results of this research show that there is one important factor in media coverage’s impact on the political decision-making process and that is the nature of the event covered by media. If an unexpected dramatic event unfolds, in which media react before politicians (or even after, but producing additional material independently) and act as sources of fresh information, they are able to create frames by themselves, using their own sources on the ground and applying the imperatives of journalistic practice listed earlier in the selection of these sources. As such, media coverage creates pressure on politicians to react and respond to the frame set by media and it affects the conditions in which political decisions are to be made. Coverage of this sort of event can provide a flashpoint or catalyst in the further development of the conflict, and, as it did in both the Darfur and Kosovo cases, it can reinforce media’s agenda-setting function and CNN effect. This especially applies to the real-time TV news channels due to the speed of transmission. “The media is changing the reality of warfare, it is not just reporting on it. It compresses the timescales,”¹³¹⁶ Jack Straw said. Therefore, the real-time TV news channels not only possess emotional power, credibility and authority, as does television in general, but are ‘changing the reality of warfare’ (and other kinds of dramatic event) by shortening the gap between the time when something happens and is to be broadcast on TV, and in such a way – by providing the information to the public (approximately) at the same time as to politicians – creating additional pressure and compressing the policy response time. The need for real-time transmission in such events also encourages the TV channels to select sources and set frames by themselves before politicians are ready to react and provide an official interpretation. These would be the main impacts of media coverage on the environment in which a political decision is made. 24/7 TV channels are also the closest thing so far to ‘global’ media and, as such, have “the resources, both human and capital, to undertake in-depth reporting projects, and enough power to challenge big business and massive governmental bureaucracies”¹³¹⁷.

The results of this analysis also confirm the thesis that television coverage is rarely, if ever, “a sole cause for a particular outcome” i.e. that it can be necessary, but not a sufficient condition for a particular outcome to occur¹³¹⁸. How “fertile” the ground for media influence would be, was determined by two features of the political process in

¹³¹⁴ Ibid.

¹³¹⁵ Richard Boucher, State Department spokesman under Baker and former Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger, quoted in Strobel, W.P., *The CNN Effect: How Much Influence Does the 24-Hour News Network Really Have on Foreign Policy*, American Journalism Review, University of Maryland, May 1996, p. 34-37

¹³¹⁶ Quoted in Gibson, O., April 1, 2003, Straw warns against snap judgment, *MediaGuardian*, available on <http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2003/apr/01/pressandpublishing.Iraqandthemedi2>

¹³¹⁷ Demers, D., 2002, *Global Media, Menace or Messiah*, Revised Edition, Hampton Press, INC, Cresskill, New Jersey, 99-134

¹³¹⁸ Ammon, R.J., 2001, *Global Television and the Shapping of World Politics*, McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers, Jefferson, North Carolina and London

these two cases – policy certainty and consensus among executive power representatives, based on an estimation of current national interests. Estimation of national interests includes the assessment of the real-world indicators, like the size of a country's territory, population, natural resources, and military and political relations with EU/US, but these indicators seemed to be reconsidered and reassessed many times during the process of political decision-making. For example, Kosovo has a small territory with no significant natural resources, and suffered from human right violations by the Serbian government for decades, but it became important at the moment when the conflict there presented a potential danger for neighbouring countries and regional stability, and when the personal frustration of some US officials at Slobodan Milosevic's behavior became too great. Also, a decision not to intervene in Darfur was made not only because it is located in 'dark Africa', but primarily because it could jeopardize the peace talks between the Khartoum government and the South, which were the US foreign policy's priority at that moment. The same process of the reassessment of real-world indicators is present in media production too. McLurgh's Law and Van Ginneken's rule of thumb applied to a great extent to the Darfur coverage, but then in August 2004, some issues strictly connected to journalistic practice – the possibility to link Darfur with the anniversary of the genocide in Rwanda and a lack of other stories during the holiday season – made the events in Darfur more interesting for the TV channels. The results of the reassessment of real-world indicators in the political process and in the process of media production are mutually dependent. One of the most prominent examples was the coverage and international response to the huge devastation and loss of life caused by the tsunami in South and Southeast Asia in December 2004. The tsunami's aftermath, although it was labeled as "one of the most geographically and logistically challenging stories to cover in a generation"¹³¹⁹, attracted huge media attention, partly because of the facts that: it was one of the favorite locations for Western holidaymakers, it was a high tourist season there, and because the week between Christmas and New Year is traditionally a news vacuum¹³²⁰. CNN had 50 reporters, producers and crew members at the scene within 48 hours of the disaster, while the US networks covered the story extensively during the first week after the tsunami: the three evening newscasts devoted more minutes to it than any other natural disaster during the 15-year period, except the Mississippi River floods in 1993 and Hurricane Floyd in 1999¹³²¹. This attention triggered the biggest outpouring of financial contributions and the largest mobilization of aid resources the world has seen in response to a natural disaster. But already six months later it was realised that a significant portion of the more than \$6 billion pledged by nations and other donors has not been materialized¹³²². "When the cameras roll the governments give. And then when the interest wanes, some of the money does not see the light of day", Roberta Cohen, a senior fellow at the Washington-based Brookings Institution, explained¹³²³. This relationship implies that the significance of real world indicators is actually something very fluid and not necessarily permanently defined in advance.

¹³¹⁹ Carr, D., December 28, 2004, Broadcasters Struggle to Make Sense of a Disaster, New York Times Section A; Column 1; Foreign Desk; Pg. 12

¹³²⁰ Robinson, J., January 2, 2005, How the world heard the grim news, The Observer, p. 19

¹³²¹ Bauder, D., January 3, 2005. Networks Send Top Names to Tsunami Zones, AP

¹³²² Bowman, Michael, June 21, 2005, Six months after tsunami, aid questions linger, Voice of America

¹³²³ Quoted in Ibid.

The results of this research could be applied to all distant crises and conflicts with no direct national threat for home countries, but which in one way or another requires political or - in exceptional cases – even military reaction, including the wars in former Yugoslavia (1991-1995), the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and even to smaller-scale conflicts like Russia's invasion of Georgia (2008) or the Lebanon war (2006).

There was not enough evidence in this research that media coverage can make a significant impact on the formation of politicians' frames regarding international conflicts, while media and public frames, according to the published public surveys available for these two cases, absolutely matched. This difference between the media impact on politicians and public frame formation, as well as the difference between the framing effect in the spheres of domestic and foreign policy, would also be an interesting subject for further research.

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