

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the Study

Nations the world over have given due prominence to peace in their socio-economic and political development. Concern over the role that conflict plays in the destruction of nations made states adopt a wide range of measures to ensure peace and stability through good governance and accountability. Despite all these, the world has been faced with various forms of violence, but none has challenged global security as greatly as terrorism.

Terrorism is a universal enemy of mankind. According to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP Report, 2017), terrorism is a criminal act intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public. Though, the international community has spared no effort in the fight against terrorism, different kinds of brutal and bloody terrorist attacks continually present themselves to the public through various channels and there is no sign of any decrease in the number of new attacks being launched. Anecdotal statistics show that since the current global war on terrorism declared after the 9/11 attack, the world had witnessed number of other terrorist attacks. These are exemplified by the rampage of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in the Middle East and the 2016 fatal terrorist attacks in Western Europe (Hanrahan and Wang, 2016). This had heightened fear among the populace. Jeavans and Stylianou (2014) reported that over 5,045 were killed in fourteen (14) different countries around the globe in 665 jihadist attacks. Out of this number, many were killed in an execution-style form, including fifty reported to have been beheaded in Syria, Iraq and Yemen.

Although, domestic terrorism has often impacted locally on respective states, it is apparent that local manifestations of terrorism have proliferated beyond national borders and constituted

sub-regional, regional, if not global security challenges. In essence, the Boko Haram insurgency which proffers under the name “Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Liddaawatiwal Jihad” meaning “people committed to the propagation of the Prophet’s teaching and Jihad” is a Jihadist militant organisation based in North-east Nigeria. Even, the adopted name of the terrorist group reflects their conflict. (Hoffman, 2006). “Boko Haram” means “Western culture is forbidden by Islam” or “the Westernized elites and their way of doing things contradict Islam” – not just in schools but also in politics and society. The group thinks Western civilisation is forbidden, thus its disdain for Western ways of life, like multi-party democracy, in what they term a predominantly Muslim country like Nigeria. Also, in the list of acts considered as “Haram” are pornography, prostitution, the drinking of alcohol and many other practices that conflict with Islamic civilisation. Perouse de Montclos (2014) noted that contesting Western values and security of the Nigerian State and exposing corruption amongst the ruling elite gave Boko Haram a political outlook, even though not in the mould of Hamas in Palestine, Hezbollah in Lebanon or the Muslim Brothers in Egypt but a sect engaged in terrorist violence.

Boko Haram like all terrorists can destabilise any nation. In fact, beyond its destabilising effects in Nigeria, the crisis which started around 2002 had equally spread to the sub-region by having a harrowing effect on the neighbouring countries of Niger, Cameroon and Chad. Thurston (2018) observed that after the sect lost most of its territory in 2015, due to the assertive leadership in Abuja, there was a growing regionalization and internalization of conflict. However, it has further been observed that the ability of the local terrorist organisation to spread within states in the region is not limited to West Africa. Today, the practice of terrorism is now a common place. In Pakistan, the activities of an Islamic insurgent group by name Harakat Al Mujahadin based in Kashmir have spread beyond Pakistan. The group, which has close links with Al Qaeda, had

supported the call for attacks on western interests as made by Osama Bin Laden. The terrorist group has many training camps in Afghanistan. It was linked with several attacks including that of Indian troops and civilian targets in the disputed region of Kashmir. It also kidnapped five western tourists and forced the release of Omar Sheikh who in February 2001 was arrested for the abduction and killing of United States (US) journalist Daniel Pearle (Pettifort and Harding, 2003).

Another group exemplified as an African terrorist group that has the capability for local and across the border attacks is Al Shabab. This terrorist group is of great threat to the security of entire East Africa. Part of its exploits includes targets within its base in Somalia, coordinated suicide bombings in the Ugandan capital, Kampala in 2010, a deadly raid on a Nairobi Mall in September 2013 and a Nairobi Hotel in December 2018. Following its success in Uganda, it continues to threaten neighbouring countries as well as Western interests in Africa. In January 2013, the Ethiopian government arrested more than a dozen Al Shabab insurgents plotting an attack in East Ethiopia (Sabahi, 2014).

Returning to Nigeria, even though Boko Haram displays its ability for sub-regional exploits, its emergence could be traced to a Maitatsine fundamentalist group that attacked the Northern Nigerian city of Kano led by a dissident, Mohammed Marwa Maitatsine (Maitatsine means the one who curses). According to Thurston (2018), Marwa preaches a millenarian “Qur’an-only” doctrine that was far outside the Northern Nigeria Muslims mainstream. When his group clashed with the authorities in Kano in December 1980, between four thousand and six thousand people were killed including the leader himself. In this way, the emergence and continued threat by Boko Haram in the North-east can be traced to the impact of Maitatsine on some previous crises in the North-east. For instance, in 1982, authorities released hundreds of the prisoners held after the Kano riots: many of them resettled in the North-east resulting in several religious riots by the

ex-Maitatsine followers in the Bulunkutu suburb of Maiduguri in 1982, killing as many as 3,350 people. This was followed by other similar riots in Yola, Adamawa State, in 1984, killing over 700, and in Gombe in 1985, killing 100 (Kastfelt, 1989 cited in Thurston 2018). These had been followed by a series of other religious crises.

However, according to Dokkens (2008), many of the conflicts in Nigeria especially northern Nigeria are among religious groups. Complex factors also drive these conflicts between Muslims and Christians. Ochunu, in Thurston, (2018) observes that one aspect of the conflict is “indigenes” versus “settlers” (residents are given preferential legal status as the supposed rightful natives of an area). There were complaints by Hausa and Muslim settlers in Plateau, Kafanchan and Zango Kataf of being treated as perpetual settlers. There was though a feeling of the threat of immigration of Hausa and Fulani into the communities. The immigration of the Hausa and Fulani invoked bitter memories dating back to the pre-colonial period when the present-day Kaduna and Plateau State resisted the Jihad of Uthman Dan Fodio. Other memories dated back to impositions of Muslim emirs on non-Muslim people by the colonialists in the form of “sub-colonialism” (Ochunu, 2014, cited in Thurston 2018).

Relatedly, Kaduna also witnessed further religious violence in 2000, following the re-introduction of Sharia criminal law. The action reignited days of widespread violence resulting in the death of thousands of people with loss of properties and displacement of communities. Consequently, these events of religious violence, which have their historical roots in the colonization of Nigeria and long-standing commercial and religious ties of Northern Nigeria with North Africa and the Arab world, continued to be part of Nigeria’s political development until date. Even as the country has entered a long and unbroken democratic ethos since 1999, the adversity between the Muslims and Christians has further deepened with growing mutual

suspicion. This brought Nigeria to a dangerous phase with the emergence of the Jama'at Ahlis Sunnah Lid-da wawal-Jihad (Boko Haram) which tends to explore this religious divide to further threaten the already fragile peace in Nigeria.

Thus, from the 1980s when northern Nigeria witnessed the emergence of what might eventually be placed within the fabric of militant Islam, there was a shift in focus from a band of albeit fundamentalist in the 1980s to committed hardcore Islamists with a clear political and very often violent ideology in the 2000s. This has made religion a very sensitive issue in Nigeria. Hence, religious issues come onto the front burner in major aspects of government bureaucracy, politics, economy and national security. Therefore, this study is an attempt to examine the issue of the terrorist acts of Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria arising from the ashes of the spasmodic religious crisis, Nigeria has been passing through and which has continually threatened the country's nascent democracy since the group became violent in 2009.

1.2. Statement of the problem

Nigeria's varied conflicts are complex and hydra-headed, facing a myriad of challenges. The long running religious violence of Boko Haram has today taken the central stage as an act of terrorism, leading to bloodshed and economic setbacks in Nigeria. This has become a source of major concern to all and sundry in the country. Since 2009, Boko Haram has carried out violent campaigns in North eastern Nigeria so as to oust the democratically elected government and to replace same with the classical Islam that was established in West Africa long before the Jihad of Usman Dan Fodio, using vandalism of installations, bombings, kidnapping and attacking opposition forces (Asfura-Heim & McQuaid, 2015).

In essence, the Boko Haram religious violence has for over a decade caused serious security challenges to Nigeria with subsequent loss of lives and diversion of enormous resources in combating the insurgency. Every year, defence budgets are increased to fight the menace but oftentimes, no meaningful impact has been made towards defeating the insurgents, resulting in a loss of morale of the fighting soldiers. This has made the crisis more protracted and defied effort of successive regimes since its commencement in 2002.

According to Amdii (2012), Nigeria is a secular state, but the factor of Boko Haram religious violence has diluted this historical and constitutional practice. For instance, religious worship on Sundays by Christians is no longer what it used to be because of attacks. Even the Muslims are susceptible and vulnerable. As now observed, Nigerian polity can no longer be considered to be entirely stable as a result of the Boko Haram religious violence. Thus, the Boko Haram insurgency has been identified as one of the major security challenges confronting the Nigerian state (Mustapha & Usman, 2018).

Presently, expectations and hopes have become dampened with the prolonged Boko Haram religious violence, having repercussions on all aspects of life and human right, most especially in the North eastern Nigeria. Apparently of another great concern is that Boko Haram terrorism and insurgency that has been bedevilling Nigeria has gone beyond her immediate borders. The Nigeria's borders and geo-strategic environment in the North-eastern zone with her contiguous neighbouring nations remain largely vulnerable to nefarious activities and constitute a great challenge to the country's peace.

Lenshie and Yenda (2016) reported that of over 12.5 million Internally Displaced People (IDPs) in 21 sub-Saharan countries in Africa, Nigeria had the highest number of IDPs with over

four million mostly as a result of the activities of Boko Haram. The group caused 52,311 children to be orphaned with over 54,911 women made widows including the destruction of 5,600 classrooms in both primary, secondary and tertiary institutions and 956,453 units of houses destroyed in Borno State alone (Rilwan, 2018). In 2014, Boko Haram kidnapped 276 girls from a boarding secondary school in Chibok and the subsequent kidnap of another set of 110 school girls in Dapchi, Yobe state, all in North-eastern Nigeria in 2018. To date, some of the abducted Chibok girls are still in captivity and those that were released suffered abuses at the hands of their abductors, with many put in the family way (Ogbeche, 2017).

Despite the magnitude of the destructive effects of the Boko Haram religious violence, the amount of carnage perpetrated in the past decade, its continued threat to the very foundation of security and progress in North-eastern Nigeria in particular and the nation at large, the sect's act of terrorism is yet to be sufficiently studied in depth by scholars and policy makers. Although, many of the past studies on Boko Haram have intellectual and intuitive appeal, they were mostly based on anecdotal sources. As observed by Asfura-Heim & McQuaid (2015) researchers for most of the available literature on Boko Haram have very limited access to first-hand information. There is therefore the need to encourage more In-depth empirical studies on the Boko Haram insurgency rather than rely on media reports and documents usually based on mere hearsay, observation and assumption which make proffered solutions shallow and ineffective. Hence, the need to carry out this present empirical study becomes imperative.

1.3 Research Questions

Emanating from the statement of the problem, the following research questions are generated and which shall be answered in this study.

- i. What are the causes of the Boko Haram insurgency in North-eastern Nigeria?
- ii. What is the relationship between Boko Haram insurgents and other international terrorist groups?
- iii. What are the sources of funds and arms of Boko Haram insurgents in North-eastern Nigeria?
- iv. Why is Boko Haram localised in the North-eastern part of Nigeria than other geopolitical zones?
- v. What are the consequences of Boko Haram insurgency on Nigeria's national development?
- vi. What are the counter and anti-terrorism efforts employed by the Nigeria security agencies and their efficacies?

1.4. Objectives of the Study

The broad objective of this study is terrorism in Nigeria focusing on the spectres of the religious violence activities of Boko Haram Insurgency in North-east Nigeria, while the specific objectives are to:

- i. explore the causes of Boko Haram insurgency in North-east Nigeria,
- ii. examine the relationship between Boko Haram and the other international terrorist groups,
- iii. unravel the sources of funds and arms of Boko Haram insurgents
- iv. examine the prevalence of the activities of Boko Haram in the North-east rather than other geo-political zones,

- v. investigate the consequences of Boko Haram on Nigeria's national development and,
- vi. explore the counter and anti-terrorism efforts employed by Nigeria security personnel and their efficacies.

1.5. Significance of the Study

This study is very significant, as there is need to fill the gap in knowledge which was identified earlier in the statement of the research problem, in which many of the past studies failed to accord due recognition. As such, the present study is geared towards giving In-depth examination and appraisal of the previous assertions on the causes of Boko Haram in North-eastern Nigeria. Such analysis may validate or invalidate the findings of previous research or publications on the explanation of Boko Haram's insurgency within and outside Nigeria. In addition, the study will complement the existing body of knowledge in an academic discussion as it will explain access to funds and arms, external link, prevalence status, the consequences of Boko Haram's insurgency to the individuals, families, society, country and the international community.

The findings from this research involved the collection of quantitative data from security agents, qualitative data from victims of Boko Haram, senior security officers and members of the general public, religious leaders and content analysis of police case files involving Boko Haram members in custody. Also, different sources of secondary data, including, the use of official records from the security agencies, statements from suspected insurgents in custody, victims and the general public were used. Major sources of information on the Boko Haram religious violence are usually from the media and documents. These are, however limited in their objectivity, hence, weak as sources of data on which reliable policies can be formulated. It is therefore envisaged that after completing this study, findings will encourage future action by scholars in terms of theory construction in the area of study and policy makers can as well have access to very reliable data to

assist the government in taking appropriate measures to eliminate the problems of terrorism in North-eastern Nigeria and the country at large.

1.6. Scope of the Study

The study was carried out on Boko Haram insurgency as religious violence in North-eastern Nigeria. It covered all the North-eastern states of Borno, Yobe, Bauchi, Gombe, Adamawa and Taraba. Any attacks or issues of Boko Haram outside the North-eastern states were not made the concern of this study. The scope of the study is restricted to the investigation of causes of Boko Haram, the sources of arms and fund, the relationship between Boko Haram and other terrorist groups, why Boko Haram is localised to the North-east and consequences of Boko Haram on Nigeria's national development and the counter and anti-terrorism official employed by the Nigeria security personnel and their efficacies.

1.7. Structure of the Thesis

This work has been presented in five chapters. The Chapter I (Introduction), presented the Background of the study, Statement of the problem, Research questions, Significance of the study, Scope of the study, Structure of the thesis and Definition of terms.

Chapter II of the research, deals with Literature Review and the Theoretical Framework. It started with a Conceptual review of terrorism, Nature and types of terrorism, Historical review of terrorism in Nigeria, Practice of religious violence, Causes of Boko Haram insurgency in North-east Nigeria, the Relationship between Boko Haram insurgents and other international terrorist groups, Boko Haram's sources of funding and arms, Prevalence of Boko Haram in the North-east compared to other geo-political zones in Nigeria, Consequences of Boko Haram on Nigeria's national development, Counter and anti-terrorism efforts employed by the Nigeria security

personnel and their efficacies, Theoretical framework for the study and finally, Application and relevance of the strain theory to the present study.

Chapter III deals with Research design, Brief on the North-eastern Nigeria (study location), Study population, sample size and sampling technique, Method of data collection, Demographic characteristics of respondents, Procedures of data analysis, Research instrument, Quality assurance, Validity and reliability, Ethical issues, Researcher's background, beliefs and biases and Problems encountered.

Chapter IV deals with Data presentation and discussion of findings. It is presented under the following headings: Socio-demographic of the respondents, Causes of Boko Haram. Relationship between Boko Haram insurgency and other terrorist groups, Sources of funds and arms by Boko Haram insurgents, Prevalence of Boko Haram in North-eastern Nigeria rather than in other geopolitical zones in the country, Consequences of Boko Haram insurgency in relation to Nigeria's national development, counter and anti-terrorist efforts of Nigeria security agencies and their efficacies. This is followed by a thematic presentation of the findings from the causes of Boko Haram to the last objective of counter and anti-terrorism efforts employed by the Nigeria security personnel and their efficacies. Finally, there is discussion of findings which also followed the same thematic order and which related to the present findings to other preceding work which are reported in the literature.

Chapter V consists of Summary of the chapter, Summary of findings, Conclusion and Recommendations, Contributions to knowledge and Limitation of the study.

1.8. Definition of Terms

Terrorism

This refers to the use of violence to achieve political ends including any use of such violence to put the public or any section thereof in fear.

Boko Haram

Boko Haram is an Islamic fundamentalist terrorist organisation, which has been operating in Nigeria since 2002. The name of the group, which practices Sunni Islam, means “Western or non-Islamic education is a sin”. It is active in North-east Nigeria and wants to impose Islamic law as the only law in Nigeria.

Insurgency

Insurgency is the organised use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify or challenge political control of a state.

Insecurity

Insecurity refers to the feeling of uncertainty, a lack of confidence or anxiety about oneself.

Religious Violence

Religious violence is, specifically violence that is motivated by or in reaction to religious precepts, texts, or doctrines. This includes violence against religious institutions, people, objects, or when the violence is motivated to some degree by some religious aspects of the targets or precepts of the attacker.

ISIS

The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) officially known as Islamic State (IS), is a Salafist Jihadist militant group which follows a fundamentalist, Salafi doctrine of Sunni Islam which became notorious in 2014 for driving Iraq government forces out of key cities.

National Development

National development can be referred to as the acceleration of growth involving changes in the structure, attitude and institution with reduction of inequality and eradication of poverty using all available opportunities to improve the standard of living of people in a country.

North eastern Nigeria

Nigerian states of Borno, Yobe, Bauchi, Gombe, Adamawa and Taraba. These are located in the North eastern part of the country.

North western Nigeria

Nigerian states of Kano, Jigawa, Kaduna, Katsina, Sokoto, Kebbi, and Zamfara. They are in the north-western part of Nigeria.

Civilian JTF

This means civilian Joint Task Force. It is a vigilante group formed in 2013 to assist the Nigerian Army in the fight against Boko Haram.

Daesh

Is the Arabic language acronym for ISIS.

AQIM

Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is the recent franchise of the Osama Bin Laden jihadi network that was launched in 2007, which aims to overthrow the Algerian government and institute an Islamic State.

Almajiranci

Almajiris are poor migrants children mostly in Muslim North who partake in Almajirici by learning the Qur'an with a Mallam and equally beg for alms side by side with their study.

The next chapter reviews the literature on the subject and the theoretical framework. Previous studies on Boko Haram were reviewed thematically in consonance with the study objective. This was followed by the discourse on some theories of terrorism before the adoption of the Strain Theory as the one that is most suitable for the present study.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.0. This chapter reviews the available and relevant literature pertinent to this study. It will draw the relationship between the study and earlier works done and also provide necessary guidelines for a systematic investigation. The review is presented under the following sub-headings:

- Concept of terrorism.
- Nature and types of terrorism.
- Historical evolution of terrorism in Nigeria.
- The practice of religious violence.
- Causes of Boko Haram insurgency in North-east Nigeria.
- Relationship between Boko Haram insurgents and other terrorist groups.
- Sources of funds and arms to Boko Haram group.
- Prevalence of Boko Haram in the North-east, compared to other geo-political zones in Nigeria.
- Consequences of Boko Haram on Nigeria's national development.
- Counter and anti-terrorism efforts employed by Nigeria security agencies and their efficacies.
- Theoretical framework.

2.1. Concept of Terrorism

The systematic review of literature has revealed the concept of terrorism as a contentious phenomenon which defies globally accepted definition and status. This is as a result of a lack of consensus as to whether terrorism is a crime because it is found in various forms and degrees in

many nations. Even at that, Okoye (2017) observed that a common definition of terrorism has not yet been established as the concept is conceptualized differently by different individuals. It is also difficult to define because the very concept of terrorism constitutes cultural and psychological problems and most of the time is often both politically and emotionally charged. As Spencer (2006) put it, “the concept of terrorism is one of the most disputed terms in the social sciences”. Relatedly, Lacquer (1977) argued that a comprehensive definition of terrorism does not exist nor will it be found in any foreseeable future. Simon (1994) explicitly documented that, there are at least 212 different definitions of terrorism in use throughout the world, with 90 of them being used by governments and other institutions.

However, in a compendious form, Schmindt and Jongman (1988) examined 109 different definitions of terrorism and came up with a lengthy consensus concept of terrorism as an anxiety inspired method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-clandestine individuals, groups or non-state actors) for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons, whereby in contrast to assassination, the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. Within this context, the act of terrorism is viewed as a strategy for insurgency building which involves serious violence against persons or groups, and does not seek specific victims but does seek out specific targets for a specific outcome. The immediate human victims of the violence are generally chosen randomly in the form of targets of opportunity or selectively as representatives or symbolic targets from the target population.

By the same token, Winberg, Hirsch Hoefler and Pedahzur (2004) referred to terrorism as, ‘politically motivated tactics involving the threat or use of force or violence in which the pursuit of publicity plays a significant role’. This definition goes to establish, that terrorism is a public act and the act must be such that the greater society will see it and react to the attack. Extending this

line of reasoning, the act can be viewed as an intentional act of violence designed to create fear in the target audience or society and for the intent of changing behaviour in a particular society. Hence, the act of terrorism is recognized as a violent mode of reaction to a conflictual relationship to achieve the desired goal.

The United Nations General Assembly Resolution, (49/60) adopted by the body on 9 December, 1994, defined terrorism as a criminal action, intended or calculated to pursue or strike terror in the general public (group of persons or particular person), for reasons of political purposes, under circumstances that cannot be justified either politically, religiously, philosophically or any other nature that is inward to justify the action. As such, the act is seen as an aberration to the social order in any part of the world, with highly destructive tendencies and a commission of a crime against humanity. Within the same perspective, the United Nations Panel (2005) referred to terrorism as an act intended to cause deaths or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants to intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organisation to do or abstain from doing any act. Thus the spectres of terrorism are all embedded in negativism to achieve political or social objectives.

The UK Act of Terrorism (2000) defined terrorism as an act of a person acting on behalf of or in connection with any other organisation which carried out activities directed towards the overthrowing or influencing by force or violence, of Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom or any other government *de jure* or *de facto*. In this Act, terrorism implies the use of violence for political ends and includes any use of violence to put the public or any section of the public in fear. In this manner, the act of terrorism is seen as a calculated strategy to advance some political ends by destroying non-combat targets or a group or population. It is also a sort of violent asymmetric conflict with the intent to instil some form of fear or danger amidst the populace.

In a more sociological perspective, Kydd and Walter (2006) defined terrorism as actions focusing on harming some people to create fear in others by targeting civilians and facilities or systems on which civilians rely. This definition can be construed to mean a grievous type of violence perpetrated by groups or individuals within or outside the government circle that is specifically directed against civilians or government institutions as a way of calling attention to perceived real or imaginary injuries in a clandestine way. The bottom line of such action is designed to change minds by destroying bodies which are a form of costly signalling. Extending this, the UNDP in its (2017) report titled *Journey to Extremism in Africa* sees terrorism as criminal acts intended or calculated to provide a state of terror in the general public. In this manner, terrorism is seen today as an armed rebellion against the people or constituted authority.

However in Nigeria, terrorism is even harder to conceptualise because in most cases, terrorist organisations have not embraced comparatively defined and comprehensive goals. Unlike in the Niger Delta areas of Nigeria, where terrorist were motivated by championing environmental concerns, terrorists in the North seems to be motivated by religious concerns (Agbibo, 2013). Basically, as such in this study, terrorism is construed to mean a process of creating serious public panic as well as undermining the confidence in the government and political authorities as a result of a notable historical wrong. Within this context, the Boko Haram insurgency represents the contemporary type of terrorist group. This modern form of terrorism often rejects all the ways and promotes an uncompromising view of the world by the beliefs of religion. The case of the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria represents this new type of terrorism, which typically is understood to be rooted in religious faith-based tenets.

According to Curr and Cole (2000), two of the 64 international terrorist organisations in the 1980s could be classified as religious, but this figure has risen to 25 out of 58 by 1995. Thus,

Boko Haram as “new terrorism” can be said to be on the increase with the tendency to reject all other ways and promote an uncompromising view of the world following the group’s religious tenets. Hoffman (1998) believed that it is this religious motivation that is the defining characteristics of “new terrorism” with the ability to produce a radically different value system, mechanism of legitimisation and justification, the concept of morality and world view.

2.2. Historical Evolution of Terrorism

The history of terrorism dated back to over 2,000 years ago when the zealots, Jewish opponents of Rome’s occupation of Palestine during this period, killed Romans in broad daylight frighten the Roman authorities and other Jewish collaborators. The terror group believed in the use of armed resistance to free the Jews from being subjected to rule other than the rule of God.

During the French Revolution, the state used terrorism against its actual, imagined or potential enemies. In the nineteen century, anarchists who opposed governments of any kind used terrorism widely. Several world leaders fell victim to assassination, called “Propaganda of the deed” which also entailed bombing of caves, theatres and landmarks (Shirk, 2019). Typical examples are the assassination of the US President William McKinley (1843–1901) and France’s President Marie François Sadi Carnot (1837–1894). However, the “new terrorism” perpetrators perhaps are likely to take more risks and even prepare to die, as martyrdom is seen as a way to reaching heaven. They, therefore, have a limitless tendency to unleash violence with no fear of backlash as there is no sponsor or state to protect. These are what stereotypes like Boko Haram as an emergent terror group symbolises. There are, however, many other typical types of terrorism throughout history before the modern terrorism of the twenty-first century which gain its

significance and world attention with the 9/11 attack on the New York Twin Towers of the World Trade Centre Building.

The terrorist attack of 11 September, 2001 gave rise to war on terror with the American invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan as well as other operations in Yemen, Pakistan and Syria. Thus, Al Qaeda (the Base), headed by Osama Bin Ladin came into existence to check the onslaught of the West. ISIS equally came with a different mission, to launch a Jihad to create a territory with attacks on enemies nearer home: namely the apostate Shiite communities typified by Assad's government in Syria and the government in Iraq that are averse to the creation of a "pure" radically Islamic State. Soon after, the world began to witness the activities of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, Al-Shabaab of East Africa and in West Africa where terrorist groups like Al Zawan in Northern Mali, Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) and the dreaded Boko Haram terrorising North-eastern Nigeria. The Boko Haram operates even in areas bordering the North-east like Niger, Cameroon and Chad Republics, causing devastating security threats and turned itself to a regional crisis and religious terrorism.

It was the activities of Boko Haram in North-eastern Nigeria that formed the focus of this study, which is traced to the early 1980s, where a group called Maitatsine unleashed terror on the ancient city of Kano leading to the death of several hundred people. Unlike the Maitatsine revolt, which lasted for over two weeks following military intervention, the current Boko Haram crisis has lasted for several years causing a huge loss of lives and properties in the country. Ajayi (2017) reported that the Borno State Governor, Kashim Shettima once remarked that Boko Haram had made 54,911 women widowed and also 52,311 children orphans in Borno State. The group is believed not to be against Christians alone but constitutes opposition to the Muslim establishment and the government of Nigeria. This is religious violence that has been the bane of the Nigerian

government for over a decade. Part of its fundamental goals is to create an Islam nation in the twelve northern states of Nigeria, and eventually spread Islamic religion throughout the rest of the country.

2.3. Practice of Religious Violence

The problem of the practice of violence was raised in academic literature as early as the 1970s. In 1972, the originals of both Rene Girard's study *Violence and the Sacred* and Walter Burkert's *Homo Necans* inquiring into the connection between violence and Greek religious ritual and myth was a very popular work. Burkert (1997) retrospectively observed that the evidence and the interpretation of the two books were partly comparable since both attempted to uncover a hidden "crime" in existing institutions. The two investigations point of departure were also similar, namely, sacrificial rituals. In their daily lives, human beings are forbidden under pain of punishment to kill other human beings, but for precisely this reason, the killing can become a holy act. Girard (1972) describes the circular relationship between holiness and violent action as follows: 'it is a crime to kill the victim because it is sacred – but the victim would not be sacred if not killed'.

The two authors offer a different explanation of this link. However, Burkert (1997) argues that since aggression against an animal is a communal action, it is a prerogative of the collective and therefore "holy". Girard begins with the biblical account of the scapegoat. When the high priest lays all the guilt and transgressions of the people on a male goat on the Day of Atonement and sends it into the wilderness, the destructive forces that have piled up in society are thereby discharged. But whether this is understood as a communal triumph in the bold action of killing, or

as a catharsis of aggression through the vicarious victim, in each, communality is constituted or renewed through the ritual of killing.

Scholars who follow this line tend to see religious violence as unavoidable and, in fact, as socially productive; but others take a different view. The suspicion that religion and destructive violence are closely linked goes back to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries when it was argued that the devastating wars of religion could be explained by the fact that a monotheism, treating the worship of other gods as idolatry, necessarily led to intolerance and promoted violence. In the wake of 11 September 2001, there was a renewed suspicion that monotheistic religions cause violence (Scheafa, 2016). However, one tends to wonder why religious violence is less pronounced in other monotheistic religions like Christianity and Buddhism.

Religious violence is the major form of social asymmetric conflict in the African continent. In Nigeria for example, violence in the south of the country is mainly secular and driven by grievances associated with resources and environmental damage. The north has seen far more ethnic, tribal and religious violence, often manipulated by politicians for political gain and profit especially in areas where neither Muslims nor Christians are a clear majority. Resource scarcity and ethnic identity politics play a prominent role in the conflicts of these regions. For example, over the last decade, an increasing number of the pastoralist Hausa-Fulani have migrated southward from the drought-ridden north, bringing with them cattle that are encroaching on more fertile lands historically owned by other ethnicities.

The above scenario has often been portrayed in the media as being Muslims versus Christians, while the violence has frequently been fuelled by land use issues and indigenous versus settler's right which have some ethnic connotations. For example, a major outbreak of violence in

February 1992 in the town of Zango, Kaduna State between Hausa-Fulani and Kataf Christians was largely over land ownership and access to markets. More recently, in late November 2011, what was initially described by Reuters as religious violence was a clash over the ownership of cattle and fertile farmland in Barikin-Ladi, an area in the city of Jos, the capital of Plateau State that left at least 10 people dead.

This concept of ethnicity applies to the consciousness of belonging to, identifying with, and maintaining loyalty to a social group, distinguished by shared cultural tradition, a common language, in-group sentiments and identity. Thus, ethnicity makes it very difficult for different ethnic groups to agree on anything (Ayatse and Akuva, 2013). It is also important to note that roughly two-thirds of Nigeria's "minority" ethnic groups (like the Kanuri, the tribe most strongly represented among members of Boko Haram) are located in the northern states, contributing to a shared sense of being marginalized or disadvantaged in terms of receiving a "fair share" of Nigeria's system of resources distribution. Thus, the combination of resource scarcity and ethnic identity politics is particularly volatile among marginalized communities during times of national elections. For example, as noted earlier, rioting in several northern cities after the 2011 presidential election (which was won by Goodluck Jonathan, a Southern Christian) left more than 800 dead (Perry, 2014). In essence, the socio-economic and political roots of the conflict in northern Nigeria tend to run much deeper than the grievances that animate the violence in the south. However, this discussion of the secular dimensions of the conflicts in the north is not meant to diminish the importance of religiously oriented violence. The manifestation of it is that religion posed a serious threat to national security, particularly in Nigeria.

Based on this submission, this study, thus, delineates the features and expressions of Boko Haram as a form of domestic terrorism and product of conflict escalation rooted in religious

violence. Available literature was reviewed alongside with other related studies in consonance with the research questions and presented thematically hereafter. The idea is to ensure robust work on the reviewed literature on each study objective before proceeding to the next. This gives an easier appraisal of the previous works done by past authors and scholars and their stance on the subject matter in line with the research questions. The review started with causes of Boko Haram until the last theme dealing with counter and anti-terrorism measures employed by Nigeria security agencies and their efficacies.

2.4. Causes of the Boko Haram Insurgency in North-east Nigeria

Various explanations and several factors have been suggested as causes of Boko Haram insurgency in North-east Nigeria by many scholars and researchers. Some of these explanations have been based on factors which include, politics (Mantzikos, 2013) and Thurson (2018), economic and social equality (Dala, 2013 and Agwu, 2017), corruption (Aro, 2013 and Smith, 2015), bad governance (Bala, 2016), religious ideology (Walker, 2016), poverty and unemployment (Inuwa, 2013 and Matfess, 2017) underdevelopment (Thurston, 2018). Empirically, Alao, Atere and Alao (2012) carried out a study on Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria examining the growth of the sect and the efforts of government in addressing its challenges and the implication. The study found that the Boko Haram insurgency was a manifestation of frustration as a result of the nation's political, religious and economic system. The study adopted a descriptive research design and data was obtained from secondary sources. However, this finding could not be generalised and, maybe value laden as a result of individual perceptivity. Most Nigerians in other parts of the country including the North-east are also part of the manifested frustration created by the inept governance system in Nigeria. Extant literature has acknowledged that religious terrorism like Boko Haram is

motivated by larger factors beyond the frustration thesis and the act is just only symbolically carried out to further faith-based tenets.

According to Shuriye, Adeyemi and Huud (2013) in their study *Global Challenge of Mutual Suspicion: Boko Haram Uprising in Nigeria* using secondary sources found that failure of the Nigerian leaders to ensure good governance led people to unemployment and poverty with many youths preferring to die or kill than to remain in their present state. Although these findings agreed with most outcomes of research on causes of Boko Haram, still an inclusion of primary data by way of a quantitative approach would have enhanced the validity of the findings. Added to this, is the explanation by Campbell (2014) in his book entitled *Nigeria Dancing on the Brink* that politics plays a role in the cause of Boko Haram judging from the action of embittered northern politicians who turned towards a radical Islamic preacher for leadership as the People Democratic Party of Nigeria (PDP) jettisoned its power-sharing arrangement. This proposition is contentious as power had now shifted to the opposition party, All Progressive Party (APC) with a northern Muslim as President but Boko Haram activities are far from over.

In a more sociological perspective, Perry (2014) characterized the problems of Nigeria as a nation-state from colonization to the present day and averred that perhaps the greatest damage is the public trust. Politicians lie, banks steal, heads of industries bribe, soldiers' salaries are pocketed by the commanders. It is like in doing anything; Nigeria goes the opposite way as things were falling apart. He surmised that:

And when crime equates to money, and money equal status, and status to everything, all shame evaporates. Insecurity at all levels cause of Nigeria's woes (P.24)

Perry's work suggests that insecurity at all levels is the cause of Nigeria's problems which may include the issue of Boko Haram. However, while it is agreed that his proposition may be a

factor in the problem of insecurity and Boko Haram, it may be in combination with other factors. Similarly, Boko Haram is being viewed as a creation of northern power brokers while some fingered the Presidency and even the CIA. However, none of these can be linked to the actual cause of Boko Haram. From the historical viewpoint, Boko Haram emerged when the late Yar'Adua (a Muslim) was in power. Thus, to think it was the Presidency being headed by a Christian president (Goodluck Jonathan) that is causing the crisis is entirely illogical. As to the claim that the CIA is believed to have instigated the crisis, this agrees with the assertion by Campbell (2014), when he predicted the disintegration of Nigeria by 2015. But of what benefit will it be to the United States if Nigeria disintegrates with a possibly smaller but richer "Niger Delta Republic"? If it is for economic reasons, the earlier and recent reported crude oil discovery to the tune of a billion-barrel in the Gulf of Mexico (Di Christopher, 2019) had cast doubt on this proposition, as the US may not need a disintegrated Nigeria to have unrestricted access to its newfound discovery.

But even then, Northern Nigeria usually regarded by the South as "parasitic" will fight with all its military and political might to retain a united Nigeria, even as the country continues its search for crude oil in the Lake Chad Basin and other areas of the North. However, in the unlikely event that secession happens, the example of Southern Sudan's secession should act as a lesson. Thus, Southern Sudan, having seceded from Sudan with all the oil has known no peace, even with the abundant resources all to itself. Therefore, there is the need to examine other factors that caused Boko Haram beyond this view offered by some schools of thought, through an integrative scientific methodological approach which is the focal point of this study.

Furthermore, Walker (2016) in his book entitled *Eat the Heart of Infidels* examined how the history of Northern Nigeria from the time of Uthman Dan Fodio till date has been shaped by

the rise of Islam and conflict between Islam and modernity. The study posited a religious ideological viewpoint as a causal factor of Boko Haram. Although Walker's study was drawn from first-hand testimony, controversial narrations and some secondary sources, but the explanations made were subjects of anecdotal data. Earlier on, using almost the same methodological approach as Mantzikos (2013), the author also identified politics as the main cause of Boko Haram. According to him, the Islamic sect believed that politics in Nigeria has been seized by a group of corrupt, false Muslims and the sect wants to wage war against them and the federal government of Nigeria to create a "pure" Islamic state ruled by Sharia law. However, this conclusion has been based on anecdotal data and not on empirically verifiable research study. Smith (2015) in his work entitled *Boko Haram: Inside Nigeria Unholy War*, which relied heavily on In-depth interviews of some Nigerians and key informants like security forces, internally displaced persons, prominent clergymen, academics and anti-corruption crusaders, submitted that neglect of obvious environmental nuances, inept government, corruption, long tradition of Islamic radicalism and brutal security forces, all combined to form a terrorism perfect breeding ground for the probable causes of Boko Haram.

Adejoh (2017) in his work, *The State, Terrors and Nigeria's national security*, examined concepts of terrorism and national security in Nigeria. He reviewed various literature on terrorism generally and Boko Haram in particular. He found that the phenomenon is symptomatic of the failure of the Nigerian State to convey to her citizens their "desired" good life. He posited that Boko Haram is also a language of dissent against growing immiseration, hopelessness and alienation of the weaker majority.

Schmidt (2017) in his study on *The Absence of Northern Nigeria's Social Development and the rise of Boko Haram*, using secondary data, found that absence of social development like

accessible educational opportunities and lack of gender equality as the major cause of Boko Haram. He opined that economic opportunities in the country cannot go in isolation of social development and offered that economic imbalance between the North and South is to be blamed for Boko Haram's rise to power. However, it is contended that even though the economic disparity between the North and the South is a notorious reality, the menace, is still only localised to the North-east and not the entire Northern space, while gender inequality may also not be a core cause of Boko Haram. Extending this line of reasoning, it is hereby suggested that issues of a north-south divide in economic disparity may not be the main reason for the rise of Boko Haram.

Ogbonna and Jimenez (2017) carried out a study on *The Inordinate activities of Boko Haram: A Critical Review of Facts and Challenges* using various secondary data for the analysis of findings. Their study illuminated that Boko Haram is as a result of multiple factors such as poverty, illiteracy, inequality, unemployment, and corruption among others, propelling the group's activities. They averred that politics in Nigeria had been hijacked by corrupt, false Muslims, thus, the group must attack these "drifting politicians" so as to create a "pure" Islamic State. This research, however, suffered from a lack of systematic and reliable empirical data. This negated the impact of his research validity.

In their work, *Killing People; Dividing a Nation? Analysing student perceptions of the Boko Haram Crisis in Nigeria* Langer, Gode-Froidt and Meuleman (2017), used both primary and secondary sources, and sample population of 6,830 students of Nigeria's tertiary institutions of which 55.9 per cent were male and 43.7 per cent were female. The results of findings demonstrated a North-South divide with Christian or Igbo and Muslim or Hausa-Fulani holding different ideas on the causes of the crisis. The authors also examined the views of the respondents under the backup of various contending reasons for the cause of Boko Haram, from the religious aspects, to

the role of unemployment and poverty, inequality, low education and to the role of corruption, moral decadence and pervasiveness, inefficiency and general impunity prevalent among the upper political class. They found that there are important differences between the different ethno-religious and spatial groups. Among the people in the southern states, a great margin of (63.0%) hinged the rise of Boko Haram on religious/extremism whereas almost half of their Northern counterparts (46.6 persons) saw it in the light of poverty/lack of opportunities. Thus, the perception of the insurgency across Nigeria's contrasting nationalities revealed the centrality of "ethno-religious thinking". Based on this, the authors concluded that Boko Haram painfully lays bare Nigeria's ethnoreligious cleavages, possibly as undermining efforts at nations-building

In another work carried out by Thurston (2018) on *Boko Haram: The History of An African Jihadist Movement*; which drew data sources from Arabic and Hausa documents, propaganda videos, press reports and interviews with experts in Nigeria, Cameroon and Niger found that Boko Haram is a consequence of economic inequality, endemic corruption, demography, poverty, underdevelopment and contentious politics. His key argument is that Boko Haram was caused by politics of implementation of full Sharia's in 2000, and counterproductive conflict management of the bitter memories of the inter-communal violence in Nigeria dating back to 1980 and highly competitive elections in Borno State in 2003. This work mostly relied on a qualitative approach in terms of its methodology by the use of "secondary data and propaganda videos". However, the nebulous part of the findings on the study of the causal factors of Boko Haram is the facts of contentious politics and endemic corruption which are not bad deeds limited to the Northern part of Nigeria and specifically the North-east. Hence, the main issue should be, why the insurgency is localised to the North and especially North-east Nigeria. This is because contentious politics and endemic corruption are realities that affect the entire Nigerian's territory and space.

Also, Matfess (2017) in her book *Women and the War on Boko Haram* conducted a desk review of relevant literature relying on Non-Governmental Organisations (NGO's) reports and grey literature due to the paucity of studies on Boko Haram. However, she used reports from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Department for International Development (DFID), Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. She also conducted interviews with Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in their camps in Yola, Mubi, Damaturu, Abuja and Maiduguri. She equally interviewed some vigilantes (Civilian JTF) in Yola and Maiduguri and former insurgents. This is in addition to the personal interview with the Governors of Borno (the epicentre of Boko Haram) and that of Adamawa (another state in our study area) and with members of Borno Elders Forum. Apart from the key informant interview, most of her interviews were conducted using Focus Group Discussion (FGD). Use of Focus Group Discussion creates a lack of anonymity and also mutual suspicion given the sensitive nature of the topic and especially the researcher being a foreigner. This may however result into the problem of measurement biases. Her key findings are that lack of substantive change in Borno State following the implementation of Sharia by the then Governor Ali Modu Sheriff, the collapse of the state economy leading to widespread unemployment and underemployment, and the role of Almajiranci are the cause of violence by the group. This researcher agrees that the application of Sharia and collapsed economy could engender Boko Haram. However, the question that should be asked is why should Almajiranci be associated with prevalence of Boko Haram when only 25% (2.7 million) of the Almajiris are from North-east Nigeria when entire Northern Nigeria has 9.5 million Almajiris as reported by UNICEF (Awofadeji, 2014) leaving much larger proportion of this to North-west which has little or no Boko Haram prevalence.

Aderenle, (2014) explored the issue of Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria under the backdrop of symptoms of poverty and political alienation. Using In-depth analysis of desk survey of the media report and other documents, he identified poverty and political alienation as causes of Boko Haram. He observed that the irony of poverty in Nigeria is that, it portrays a tale of several countries with regional disparities. Citing Omoh (2012) quoting Nigerian Bureau of Statistics (NBS), the regional poverty disparity can be appreciated thus:

Table 2.0: Regional Incidence of Poverty by Different Poverty Measures in Nigeria

Source: Adenrele (2012)

Region	Food Poor	Absolute Poor	Relatively Poor	A Dollar per day
North Central	38.6	59.5	67.5	59.7
North East	51.5	69.0	76.3	69.1
North West	51.8	70	77.7	70.4
South East	41.0	58.7	67.0	59.2
South-South	35.5	55.9	63.8	56.1
South West	25.4	49.2	59.1	50.1

Analysing the above table, he opined that poverty is higher where activities of Boko Haram are more prevalent in the North-east. More than 65 per cent of people in the North-east are very poor with less than one dollar income per day compared with 55 per cent in South-South.

Adenrele (2012) also cited corruption, the concept of Almajiri system and political alienation and the ruling party power rotation programme that brought Goodluck Jonathan to power after the death of President Umar Musa Yar'adua. He argued that Northern politicians thereby created Boko Haram to destabilize the regime. However, this may sound implausible, since Boko Haram activities have continued unabated even with the current president Muhammadu Buhari from the North.

Inuwa (2013) conducted a study on “Religious Fundamentalism and Terrorism in Nigeria-Boko Haram Perspective”. He used both primary and secondary sources of data, where he interviewed senior government officials (mainly members of the security service), scholars,

diplomats and members of Civil Liberty Organisations. His secondary data includes documents, books, journals, unpublished materials, newspapers and workshop reports and policy documents at the National Defence College Nigeria Library. The study found that a large army of unemployed youth and poverty may act as a fertile ground for the recruitment of Boko Haram, thereby serving as a major cause of the insurgency.

Iyekekpolo (2016) in an article titled “Boko Haram understanding the context” argued that the cause of the insurgency is imbedded in the Nigerian historical context. He posited that political opportunities created by political actors as the main cause of the insurgency. That, the emergence of kleptomaniac political actors had left the population deprived, frustrated and aggressive thus creating a fertile ground for religious and ideological action to interpret societal reality thereby creating recurring insurgencies. He chronicled the Usman Dan Fodio Jihad of 1804, the Maitatsine violence of 1982 to the current insurgency of Boko Haram that had defied all military actions since it commenced in 2002. Although several writers have looked at Boko Haram as a reincarnation of Maitatsine crisis of the 1980s, other writers like Reneiri and Martini (2017) have viewed the rise of Boko Haram as an attempt to challenge the age-long feeling of supremacy by Sokoto Caliphate in a form dubbed as “horizontal inequality”.

Shuaibu, Salleh and Shehu (2015) in their study on *The Impact of Boko Haram Insurgency on Nigerian National Security* offered that although Nigeria is ranked 153rd out of 177 poor economic countries; poverty in Nigeria is more evidenced in the North-east (76.3%) compared with the South-east (59.1%). They reasoned that poverty is what is seen by many observers and analysts as the cause of Boko Haram in the North-east. One could argue that the poverty index in the North-west is equally high, but it has no incidence of Boko Haram in the area. Other factors

may equally be contributory. Therefore, there is the need to examine other factors that caused Boko Haram beyond these views offered by the various scholars, researchers and some schools of thought, through an integrative methodological approach which is the focal point of this study.

2.5. Relationship between Boko Haram Insurgents and Other Terrorist Groups

Today, Boko Haram is no longer a monolithic and homogeneous sect controlled by an overtly or covertly single dispositional leader. It is several organisations said to be presumably having relationships with other foreign terrorist groups. As Pham (2012) put it, there are indications of expanding links between Boko Haram and international Islamic organisations. The increasing spread of the insurgency has led some political and religious leaders both inside and outside Nigeria, to believe that the group has now expanded beyond its original composition with support from other foreign terrorist groups. This view was being buttressed by various researchers and scholars. According to Dala (2013) in the study carried out in his unpublished thesis on “Civilian Joint Task Force and Internal Security Operations in Nigeria: *Boko Haram Insurgency in Perspectives*”, found that Boko Haram operates alongside other affiliated terrorist groups such as Ansaru, a splinter group of Boko Haram, Al-Qaeda, Al-Shabaab and the Movement for the Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MOJAO) among others.

In the same vein, Asfura-Heim and McQuaid (2015) in their study on *Diagnosing the Boko Haram conflict: Grievances, Motivation and Institutional Resilience in North-east Nigeria* unravelled that Boko Haram received a small amount of training from foreign Jihadists and borrowed tactics from transnational terrorist organisations. The sources of data which include both quantitative and qualitative type made the findings to be more potent and reliable. The researchers interviewed Nigerian academia using field research experiences and American subject matter

experts. However, despite the richness of the study in outlays and execution, the multi-directional focus of the study makes generalization almost impossible and has major defects. In another qualitative study carried out by Olasile (2015) on *Boko Haram; The Menace of Small Arms and Light Weapons Proliferation in Nigeria*, he threw illumination that Boko Haram shares aspiration with ISIS and has a relationship with Somalia, where they received training by Al Qaeda, Al Shabaab and other terrorist groups after the 2009 attacks.

Comolli, (2015) in her study on Boko Haram *Nigeria Islamic Insurgency* established that the sect had a relationship with other foreign terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). She argued that relation with AQIM is significant in communication and weapon training apart from the Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. She added that the two foreign terrorist groups may have strengthened Boko Haram's capacity to conduct terrorist attacks. Comolli further sifted the idea that all foreign linkages of Boko Haram were solely to boost the groups' capabilities in enhancing its domestic operations. Additionally, she suggested that due to better planning of attacks and a level of sophistication which was made possible by external support, arms and logistics are being provided externally to the Boko Haram group. However, this may not entirely be so as Boko Haram may have technically minded members among their group that could assist it in making a sophisticated Improvised Explosive Device (IED).

Furthermore, the UNDP report (2017) tagged *Journey to Extremism* also confirmed the relationship of Boko Haram with key Islamic Jihad groups like Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Jama'at Tawhid Wal Jihad fi Garbi Afriqqiya (Movement for the Unity and Jihad in West Africa, MUJAO), Jama'atul Ahlus Sunnah Lidda'awati wal Jihad (Boko Haram) and Ansaru in Nigeria and Cameroon, Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen (Al-Shabaab) in East Africa and the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in Central Africa. The UNDP Report (2017) further claimed that

many foreign fighters are known to have travelled from Saudi to Libya, Syria and Iraq and in a smaller number of cases to Somalia and Nigeria, in support of the violent extremist activity. This shows the relationship between Boko Haram and other terrorist groups.

Imogire (2013), in his study entitled *Boko Haram: Insurgency and Sub-Regional Security: Implication for ECOWAS*, collected data from primary and secondary sources using the qualitative technique. His key respondents were desk officers from major security agencies using unstructured interviews. He also included unplanned and unscheduled individuals who played one role or the other on security issues relating to Boko Haram using purposive sampling techniques, while data collected were content analysed. The study found that Boko Haram received adequate support from other insurgent groups across Africa, the Middle East and Asia. Although this study suffered some methodological defects, however, the findings agreed with the view of Copeland (2013) suggesting that, Boko Haram sought assistance from international terrorist groups perhaps expanding its operations outside Nigeria.

Afinotan, Olaleye and Afinotan (2016) carried out a qualitative study on *National Security, Boko Haram Insurgency and the International Dimension of Terrorism*. The study relied on secondary sources of data using archival materials, literary research, extant literature and internet sources. Data collected was analysed through the use of content analysis. Study findings highlighted that the manner of operations of Boko Haram resembles those of extremist Jihad movements in other parts of the world like ISIL, Al Qaeda and Hesbollah. The findings affirmed that with Boko Haram's declaration to ISIS in 2015, it links the group with a worldwide terrorist network.

Uhler (2017) in his research on *Boko Haram: Why they became an affiliate of Daesh*, investigated the history of Boko Haram and its subsequent pledge to Daesh otherwise known as Islamic State. The researcher carried out a qualitative study using the method of text analysis taking into consideration abductive reasoning which he applied. He contends that the method of text analysis was applied to the empirical material used for the study, that any conclusion reached as a result of the abduction will provide new insight on the subject at hand. His findings suggests a relationship between Boko Haram and other terrorist organisations and goes further to reveal that the pledge to such relations is guided by financial standing of the foreign terrorist groups. It also affords Boko Haram a brand recognition which attracts recruits, money and publicity. Since Daesh is the richest terrorist group according to Uhler, it is not a surprise that Boko Haram pledged allegiance to the group in 2015.

Similarly, Hill (2013) in his article “Religious Extremism in Northern Nigerian: Parallels between the Pseudo-Tijanis and Boko Haram” using secondary data, advanced that although Boko Haram is unique, it is not the first Islamic group to spring from or operate in Northern Nigeria. The study found that the Boko Haram group forged bonds with like-minded Al Qaeda in the land of the Islamic Maghreb (AQLIM) which operates throughout the Maghreb and Sahel, and Al Shabaab which is mainly based in Somalia with some reach into the Sahel too. The author opined that it was a fall out of this partnership, that perhaps led to the group suicide bombing of the UN Headquarters in Nigeria in 2011. However, like mentioned elsewhere one could not rely on a single attack on a target of international interest to conclude relationship with foreign terror groups, even though such relationship can be gleaned from the open allegiance pledged by Shekau to ISIS sometimes in 2015.

Zenn (2018) reviewed a recent book by Al Barnawi, one of the two sons of late Muhammed Yusuf, which was entitled *Islamic State West African Province Versus Abubakar Shekau*. The book provided an insight into the links between Boko Haram and international terrorist groups. It mentioned Al Qaeda as providing guardians and training by AQIM. This is especially with the devastating Boko Haram operations in the Christmas Day bombing in Minna, Niger State and Easter bombing in Kaduna State in 2011 and 2012, respectively. Similarly, Iraq based Jihadists were mentioned as providing ISWAP with theological guardians. It is hereby contended that the work may be bereft of objectivity given the inherent security implication certain revelation may pose to the group.

However, with the commonalities of linkage relationship of Boko Haram with other foreign terrorist groups by most of the studies reviewed offers a presumable impression that Boko Haram group may not be a monolithic but a heterogeneous organisation with support relations from other international terrorist groups.

2.6. Boko Haram's Sources of Funding and Arms

Globally, terrorist groups throughout the world do not file tax returns. This makes it difficult to unveil their sources of funding, but like other terrorist groups, Boko Haram in Nigeria obtains funds to sustain its operation through diverse sources of funds. According to Mustapha and Ahmed (2018), the group's sources of funds include membership dues, levies, donations, extortions, ransoms, external funding and bank robberies. They added that before the death of their leader Mohammed Yusuf in July 2009, Boko Haram relied on payment of membership dues and a daily levy of one hundred naira (approximately \$0.8) from each member. The identified members of the group then were predominantly petty traders, commercial motorcyclists, roadside car washers, mechanics, farmers and host of other artisans.

However, Asfura-Heim and McQuaid (2015) in their report on Boko Haram, which relied on open-source material and unclassified documents prepared by the US government, stated that the sect gets its funds through criminality, extortion and limited local and foreign donations. This view concurred with those of Nwatu and Ogbuabor (2012) that terrorist organisations (like Boko Haram) hardly succeed without support and assistance sometimes from states, individuals and organisations sympathetic to the cause which the group professes to fight. The support can be in terms of financial assistance, weapons supply, military or paramilitary training, technical and propaganda support and the release of classified document and information. Furthermore, Olasile (2015) also reported that the Boko Haram group gets its arms and funds from attacks on military and police formations, kidnapping for ransom, bank robbery, arms smuggling etc. He also asserted that in 2002, Bin Ladin sent three million dollars to Salafist groups in Nigeria, one of which is Boko Haram showing an earlier relationship with the group.

Ogundipe (2018) observed that the role of foreign fighters in assisting the Boko Haram terror group has further reinforced the use of foreign fighters to acquire guns when Nigeria's Chief of Army Staff offered that Boko Haram now uses drones and foreign fighters.

Ogundipe quoting the Army spokesman, General Sani Kukasheka Usman:

...we have noticed daring moves by the terrorist increased used of drones against our defensive positions and infusion of foreign fighters in their ranks. These potent threats require us to continually review our operation. (P1).

The writer further argued that the relationship of Boko Haram group with foreign fighters portends grave danger for the success of the operations to stop the group from gaining ground in its fight to install an Islamic State in a secular Nigeria.

Olasile (2015), in his study on *Boko Haram – the Menace of Small Arms and Light Weapons Proliferation in Nigeria* adopting a qualitative approach from existing literature such as books, journals, conferences papers, newspapers and found that: Boko Haram secures its arm through porous border in Nigeria with 1,499 irregulars (illegal) routes and over 250 footpaths and that the group purchases arms from allied military groups and arms traffickers operating within Nigeria and across the Western Sahara region. The study further found that: Boko Haram shares aspirations of ISIS, thus emboldening it through an influx of illegal aliens, ammunitions and surplus Improvised Explosive Device (IED).

Similarly, Innocent and Chibuke (2016) in their work *Terrorist Financing in Nigeria: A case of Boko Haram* in which data was collected through focus group discussions (FGD) and documentary sources, they found that the country is yet to take concrete steps to stem the rising spate of financial crimes, including terrorist financing, corruption and money laundering. The study indicated that the Boko Haram group got its funding through these sources. It is however contended that with the enactment of a law to check terrorist financing in 2011 and the EFCC keeping watch on heavy banking transactions, this may not be entirely the case.

Still on Boko Haram sources of funds, Comolli (2015) also contends that the group carries out bank robberies, extortion, kidnapping and control of urban and rural areas by the imposition of taxes. She also opined that the study of Boko Haram fundraising is said to have begun in 2001 following the terrorist attack on the World Trade Centre. As further reported by the writer, Boko Haram spokesperson, Abu Qaga stated in an interview that:

During the last Hajj (last August) our leader travelled to Saudi Arabia and met Al-Qaeda there. We enjoy financial and technical support from them. Anything we want from them we asked. (P.10)

She, also argued that other sources include financing by politicians and involvement in closer ties with AQIM, Ansar U Din and MUJNA following the crisis in Mali. The closer relationship, according to her is no doubt a lucrative interaction. Other sources of income by Boko Haram include kidnapping for ransom and extortion of civil servants and farmers for money. Although, she stated that “Hawala”, an Islamic system of financing is equally another source as is internet scams, the two cannot be corroborated as “Hawala” is a system mainly used in Somalia and may be relevant in case of Al Shabaab, even though such knowledge could be passed to Boko Haram by the East African terror group. Also, operations of Boko Haram are largely outside the capital cities following their ousting in 2013 by the military and the Civilian JTF to the fringes and Sambisa forest. Thus, the use of the internet and indeed internet scams may be hampered due to a spate of attacks on critical telecommunication infrastructures in 2011 and an obvious case of difficulty in getting a proper network in the bushes of Sambisa and other rugged terrains where they now seek sanctuary.

Nevertheless, Campbell (2014) in his study on the sources of funds and arms of Boko Haram confirmed the local and international character of Boko Haram funding that, the religious terrorist group has many sources of income within Nigeria and outside. He explained that, while during the early period, members engaged in small trading and farming activities to raise funds, there are also donations from local financiers and high-profile politicians and state governments. On the international scene, arrested Boko Haram members have been found in possession of 170,000 Euros which included banknotes earlier paid to AQIM following a kidnap operation in Algeria. It is thus clear that not all the funds for Boko Haram activities came from armed robbery and kidnapping or “direct criminal activities” even though they are veritable sources.

However, one cannot be sure that all kidnaps by Boko Haram are for ransom, as one could argue that the initial kidnap of Chibok girls was to use them for forced marriages. This may be inferred from the conditions of 21 Chibok girls released, with some of them pregnant and others have already become mothers. In contrast, the recent kidnap of 110 girls from Dapchi Science Secondary School in Yobe State by the group on 8 February 2018, and their subsequent release a month after paints a gory picture of kidnap for ransom. This is even as the Nigeria's government vehemently denied that ransom was paid. One cannot rule out the role of other criminal groups who could stage a kidnap operation and pretend to act for Boko Haram, thus using Boko Haram as a franchise.

Zenn (2018) reinforced that kidnap for ransom was a source of funds when he remarked that the group has financiers from Borno and bordering areas of Cameroon Extreme North Region. These financiers provide it with weapons and act as a go-between in kidnapping for ransom operations. He gave the example of one Abdallah who served as a key negotiator with the Cameroon Government for release of the French Moulin Fournier, a family of seven in 2013, for a whopping \$ 3.14 million. This anecdotal information suggests that money can be got through criminal activities of the type rather than relying on the assistance of foreign groups with its attendant pitfalls and banking restrictions as regards illegal transfers. The risk of using the banking system as a source of getting finance is best described by Asfura-Heim and McQuaid (2015) who assert that Boko Haram appears to manage its funds largely outside the banking system using a system of couriers to transfer cash outside Nigeria and across the border to neighbouring countries. This is akin to the Hawala system mainly used by the militant al Shabaab in Somalia.

On sources of arms, Onuoha (2013) in his study on *Porous Borders and Boko Haram's Arms Smuggling Operations in Nigeria* using various security sources, including newspaper

documents re-emphasised the porous nature of Nigeria's border with over 70 per cent of the about eight million illegal weapons in West Africa in the country. With this development, Boko Haram fighters devised various methods of concealing and successfully smuggling small arms and light weapons (SALW) across Nigeria's borders; through the porous borders in Borno and Yobe states, which are the epicentres of the sect.

The sources of arms, as found by Onuoha deserves of being quoted in full:

During the Libyan uprising, for instance, the state armoury was either ordered opened in February 2011 by Muammar Gaddafi or looted by rebel forces and mercenaries, and the majority of these weapons were never recovered. Terrorist groups like AQIM acquired heavy weapons such as SAM-7 anti-aircraft and anti-tank missiles, transporting them back to the Sahel region. They were either surreptitiously obtained by posing as Gaddafi's supporters or indirectly purchased from mercenaries who had acquired these arms from Libyan depositories. (P3)

It is not surprising that some of these sophisticated arms were intercepted by security forces between July 2012 and August 2013 at various locations in Bama, Daban Masara and Bulabilin, Borno state. This finding buttress earlier study by Aghedo and Osumah (2012) that also suggested that Boko Haram had carried out deadly attacks armed with weapons from diverse sources including smuggling via the porous borders, robbery, looting of armoury and illegal purchase from servicemen.

2.7. Prevalence of Boko Haram in the North-east Compared to Other Geo-political Zones in Nigeria

On the issue of localization of the Boko Haram insurgency to North-eastern Nigeria, Comolli (2015) opined that Boko Haram is Kanuri driven, hence, its prevalence in the North-east. Apart from this, the heartland of the group is Borno State which is Kanuri dominated with the former leader of the sect, Mohammed Yusuf and the current leader Shekau from the Kanuri ethnic group.

Thus, one may tend to believe that the group is ethnically inclined to the Kanuri tribe and even with the localization of its attacks and operations that are mainly confined to the North-east.

Also, an earlier study done by Baca (2015) had posited this Kanuri thesis, that being the most populous ethnic group, served as chief protagonist of the Boko Haram crisis, and once they formed the majority of the Muslim population in the North-east, religious extremism in the North-east will be attributed to that ethnic group. This explains the prevalence of Boko Haram in the North-east compared to other regions in the country. He further asserted that when several adherents of Boko Haram were killed, including Mohammed Yusuf, by security forces in 2009, those affected in the majority were from Kanuri extraction. However, Weate (2014) believed that North-eastern Nigeria had been a harsh country long before the emergence of Boko Haram. He traced the emergence of the group to the long political and economic decline of Nigeria's North-east and the enduring Kanuri opposition to the Northern power structure.

Pieri and Zenn (2016), contend that Boko Haram leaders draw their inspirations and legitimacy from Uthman Dan Fodio's 1804 Fulani led Jihad and his subsequent establishment of Sokoto Caliphate in Northern Nigeria. However, the group rather than emerging from the North-west of Nigeria and implement their style of the caliphate in the Sokoto area opted for Kanuri homeland makes the assertion of this writer contentious. It is argued that the group may have received its inspiration from the older Kanem Borno Empire by manipulating the memory and the historical narratives of the same empire as argued by other writers making it be entirely a North-eastern Nigeria affair.

UNDP (2017) in its report remarked that groups like Boko Haram may logistically exploit "ungoverned terrain" to typically attack these remote areas in the "periphery" often termed "borderlands" connecting two or more states that have experienced generations of neglect and

marginalization across political, social and economic spheres. There are violent extremism “hotspots” e.g. North-eastern Nigeria, Northern Mali and the Kenyan coastal region. With this “accident of geography” coupled with a porous extensive border makes the entire geographical fringes vulnerable.

The fringes in the North-east are mainly desert areas with dense vegetation at Sambisa Forest, thus providing ideal training ground for the group. Meanwhile, the Mandara Mountain along the Nigeria-Cameroon border, where state authority is weak and smuggling is pervasive provides an ideal supply route, hideout and staging ground. The recent upsurge in Boko Haram attacks in rural towns at the foothills of the Mandara Mountain in Adamawa State, where Muhammad Yusuf’s followers had the first major battles with the Nigerian security forces in 2004, support the claims made by high-level Nigerian and Cameroonian officials that *Boko Haram* is operating from bases in Cameroon.

Buratai (2017) argues that the porous and extensive border in the North-east has been linked to Boko Haram prevalence. This area covers the Sambisa Forest, Gwoza Hills and expansive border running through Chad, Niger and Cameroon. Consequent upon the porous border, the Minister of Interior General Dambazau confirmed that the federal government intends to carry out e-monitoring of Nigeria’s borders to check the menace of insecurity in the country. (The Nation, 2019). Relatedly, recent work by Meagher and Mustapha (2020) on the localization of Boko Haram group in North-eastern Nigeria assert that the sect emerged in a comparatively quiet and remote place rather than where there are Muslims majority. This geo-strategic location in the in the North-east Nigeria has constituted a great challenge to peace and security.

2.8. Consequences of Boko Haram on Nigeria’s National Development

Boko Haram's insurgency has emerged as the most frightful terrorist act that has created a clear threat to Nigeria's polity, social, economic and industrial sectors as well as the sustainable development of the nation. The impact of this violence has not only been huge on the lives of the population but also threatens the corporate existence of the Nigerian Federation (Omotosho, 2015). Several studies conducted by researchers and scholars found that the national development of Nigeria tends to correlate negatively with the Boko Haram insurgency. For example, Abayomi (2018) observed that over the years Boko Haram has created widespread insecurity, increased tension between different ethnic groups and interrupted development activities by scaring investors from coming to do business in Nigeria.

Similarly, in terms of commercial activities major markets in Maiduguri, Mubi and Potiskum which had once served regional markets in Chad, Burkina Faso, Mali, and the Central African Republic, are now rendered comatose as a result of Boko Haram activities. Buratai (2017) qualified a loss of ₦1.082 trillion (\$3.5 billion) in agricultural production and destruction of over 400,000 housing units in the region. With these, the negative effects on the nation's development are huge. This also impacts reconstruction and development efforts in the North-east due to the competing need to appropriate such funds to fight the terrorist activities of Boko Haram.

Suleiman (2012) in a related work suggests that the tourism industry which generates approximately ₦80 billion (\$222.8m) annually in the North is at a standstill as all economic activities in this value chain, are being disrupted by the activities of suicide bombers. Other studies have equally established that terrorism in the like of Boko Haram shrinks and diverts the flow of capital, goods, individuals and services, such that there is increased spending on security instead of such monies being used for healthcare, education and infrastructure (Maierrieks and Gries, 2013). This applies also to the Boko Haram insurgency whereby the millions spent and still being

spent could be used for the improvement of infrastructure and the general wellbeing of the people. Also, Abubakar (2016) in his unpublished thesis on *Religious Fundamentalism and National Security in Nigeria: An appraisal of the Boko Haram Insurgency* found that the activities of Boko Haram caused economic decline, thereby having a grave effect on the national development.

Taylor (2014) in a study on *Boko Haram: Reaching Across International Boundaries to Aid Nigeria in the Humanitarian Crisis* toed the line of other writers when he offered that as a result of the Boko Haram crisis farms were destroyed, there was a reduced flow of goods in local markets thus lowering investments. This affects the country's national development. Similarly, the group activities had hindered development opportunities such as education, as the kidnapping of students makes them go through emotional and physical health problems. This could affect school enrolment. Similarly, Tari, Kibikiwa and Umar (2016) also carried out a study on *Effects of Boko Haram Insurgency on the Food Security Status of Some Selected Local Government Areas in Adamawa State, Nigeria* using a multi-stage sample technique to conduct their sample and obtained data by the administration of the questionnaire. The study found that the attacks by Boko Haram caused a serious challenge to agriculture thereby affecting food security. Since the whole areas that made up North-east Nigeria were located within the fertile agricultural belt and the Lake Chad Basin, any activity of Boko Haram will no doubt affect the agricultural production of the country and by extension the national development.

Bala (2016) in his study on *Boko Haram and Economy Security of Northern Nigeria*, using an integrative methodology found that the activity of Boko Haram has caused declining economic activities and the dwindling internally generated revenue and job losses. These in a way have a direct bearing on the Direct Foreign investment (DFI) thereby affecting Nigeria's national development. Relatedly, in a study conducted by Obamwonyi and Owenvbiugie (2015), on *Boko*

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observed that an absence of cohesion, especially in the face of the insurgency spelt doom for the nation. They identified sabotage, “enemies within” and subversion, which fingered moles and sympathizers thwarting the efforts of the military and thereby prolonging the war instead of an outright defeat of the insurgents. According to them, the consequence on the country’s national development has been catastrophic reducing the gross domestic output of the nation.

Adebisi and Oyedeki (2015) in their study *Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria: Defining, Addressing and Understanding, its impact on Telecommunication Industry* using questionnaire to collect data from 200 employees of major telecommunication service providers, found that due to the bombing of thirty telecommunication infrastructure sites in the North-east, the telecommunication sector came under threat with colossal losses through Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), as a result of economic loss to the country. The finding also indicated that communication operators had lost over ₦75 billion (\$208 million) to damage equipment by 2012. The idea of damage to base stations was to frustrate communication that would enable intelligence operators’ to track and bring Boko Haram members to justice. Similarly, these destructions have implications on the economic activities of the region and by extension the development of the country. Similarly, the banks and other commercial activities depend greatly on telecommunication infrastructure to carry out their operations and the recently introduced cashless policy of the federal government of Nigeria. The loss to the economy has been colossal and the effect on the national development, by extension is unimaginable.

Furthermore, Ogomegbunam and David (2019) in a study titled *Boko Haram Activities: A major setback to Nigerian Economic Growth* contend that Boko Haram insurgency is particularly disturbing because of its negative impact on the process of economic growth and productivity of

the country. This could have changed the economic structure of Nigeria to zero, thus widening the gap between North-eastern Nigeria and other regions of the country. In the same vein, Okereocha (2012), in a World Investment Report (WIR) of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Developmental (UNCTAD) estimated that in terms of finance and investment, domestic economy of Nigeria has lost a whopping ₦1.33 trillion (\$3.5 billion) owing to the activities of the Boko Haram Islamic sect. Also, 80 billion naira (\$222 million) was lost by the tourism sector yearly in addition to other losses in the nation's economy. He added that the insurgency also affected the closure of businesses resulting in huge loss of both human and financial capital in Northern Nigeria and generally in the country.

In the educational sector, Ohiwerei (2014), investigated *The Effects of Boko Haram insurgency/Terrorism on Business Education in Nigerian Universities* and how the activities of Boko Haram affected business in particular and business education in general. He found that as a result of poverty many people had resorted to terrorism to survive. He also observed that the attacks on schools had resulted in many students/children dropping out of school. This situation is worrisome, looking at the number of children who have never been in school in the North-east. Thus, the Boko Haram insurgency has further worsened the illiteracy level in the region. The effect on education and by extension, national development is very great. This is given the role of education as an engine that drives national development in any country.

Atsua and Abdullahi (2015) examined the impact of the Boko Haram insurgency on principals, teachers and students in senior secondary schools in Borno State, Nigeria, using qualitative research design. They allowed groups to express their opinion freely and voluntarily about Boko Haram's activities as they impacted on schools. The study found that Boko Haram had caused destruction and displacement of communities, rape of communal values, culture and

tradition, loss of peace and a paucity of community development. These had a grave effect on the educational system, with a loss of revenue and overall negative impact on national development. The use of Focus Group Discussion has however its inherent disadvantages when it comes to guaranteeing the anonymity of the respondents.

Isokpan and Durojaiye (2016) carried out a study on the *Impact of the Boko Haram Insurgency on the Child's Right to Education in Nigeria*, using secondary sources of data. The study found that the Boko Haram insurgency had drastically affected school attendance through attacking schools and the killing of several students and also the abduction of over 276 Chibok girls in 2014. They opined that the constant attacks undermined the efforts of the government to ensure child rights to education in the North-east which is already backward. This undermines the importance of education in the development of human capital and therefore posing a serious threat to national development.

Medugu (2017) examined *The Effects of Boko Haram Activities on Educational Development in Madagali Local Government Area of Adamawa State*. He also explored the socio-economic implications of activities of Boko Haram on education using convenience sampling in the study area. The study found that the Boko Haram insurgency affected the management of education. This is because repairs to damage from attacks and normal maintenance and investment in education may be put on hold due to the fear of further attacks on already rehabilitated facilities. He indicated that by June 2014 over 209 schools were destroyed in Yobe State making the Governor of the State, Ibrahim Gaidam lament that:

I am sad that the resources we could have used to provide other infrastructure are now being channelled due to the reconstruction of school.
(P18)

The writer equally lamented that the psychological impact affected children's ability to learn and concluded that such obstacles of access to education could result in severe developmental problems by negatively affecting children's contribution through educational advancement. Equally, every country stands to gain if children are given the platform for good education. According to Brende (2015), President of World Economic Forum, providing every child with access to education and the skills needed to participate fully in society will boost GDP by an average of 28% per year in lower income countries. This is a yardstick for national development. Thus, lack of access to learning through the activities of Boko Haram could stifle the ability of the children to surmount their capacity to meet their daily need that could enhance their quality of life. This is especially disturbing as school enrolment in the North-east has been at its lowest, compared to national average, even before the Boko Haram crisis started in 2002.

Awojobi (2014) explored the Socio-economic implication of the Boko Haram insurgency in the North-east using a qualitative technique. The study found a drastic reduction of commercial activities in the region as a result of attacks by the sect, where banks, markets and shops opened irregularly due to the fear of coordinated attacks by Boko Haram. Quoting Okereocha (2012), the writer stated that human capital and investors drain hampered economic development in the North-east which has led to the migration of people to other parts of the country. Shiklan (2012) in Awojobi (2014) reported that:

The Maiduguri Monday market said to be the biggest market in the city is reported to have been seriously affected as hundreds of shop owners, especially southerners are said to have closed their businesses and left the troubled city. About half of the 10,000 shops and stalls in the market were said to have been abandoned by traders who have fled the city. (P148)

Finally, Gamawa, (2017) in his study found that the Boko Haram activities had caused a humanitarian crisis in the North-eastern region with over 1.6 million people displaced between

2014–15. Also, by May 2017, about 168,000 people including returning migrants had fled to neighbouring countries like Chad, Niger and Cameroon. This has greatly affected all the regions' activity in terms of agricultural production which has led to food insecurity and malnutrition in the region, since the majority of the people in the North-east are generally farmers. Thus, the impact of Boko Haram on food security and agricultural production in the region cannot be overemphasised. Since the largest percentage of people in the agricultural sector of the country are from the North-east, the effect on food production and food security is enormous. This may have an indirect effect on the country's national development.

2.9. Counter and Anti-terrorist Efforts Employed by Nigerian Security Personnel and their Efficacies

There is no clear-cut definition of counter-terrorism, but the concept has been consistently evolving in the security literature. It is an elaborate concept which initially focuses on military might, but now encompasses a broad range of security apparatus. Paul (2003) defined counter-terrorism as a reaction to dealing with many different forms of terrorist threats. This definition connotes that terrorism is a form of violent fight, threat, struggle or war that cannot be won but only reduced and controlled to some degree. Within this context Tella (2017) concurred that while conventional warfare is important to decimate terrorism, soft power approach is an important strategy to curb the menace. Rethinking on the intertwined concepts of counter-terrorism and anti-terrorism one might see a superficial distinction in terms but without much difference. International write up on the two concepts only makes a primary difference, that counter-terrorism is not proactive but offensive in that, it is a measure to proffer steps that are put together to fight terrorism. In the case of anti-terrorism, it is reactive and defensive. From this perspective, Rapoport (2004) explains counter-terrorism in terms of defence and deterrence. What this means, is that

defensive terrorism entails forcefully preventing terrorists from attaining the physical objective while deterrence aims at halting terrorists before reaching the target. That is to say, the operation of the type undertaken by the Nigerian government to physically fight Boko Haram can be described as a counter-terrorism effort. Extending this, while the use of legislation that aims at framing laws to prosecute the terrorists and also to monitor their sources of financing among others are anti-terrorism efforts.

Globally, terrorism has a direct impact on human rights and with devastating repercussions on the enjoyment of rights to life, liberty and physical integrity of victims. The havocs created by Boko Haram insurgency destabilized the government, undermined civil societies and jeopardized peace and security in the affected areas. While the activities of Boko Haram negates everything that human rights represent, the counter-terrorism strategies of the Nigeria government are no less in total compliance and strict adherence to the International Human Right Treaties (Terrorist Prevention Act) TPA of 2011 (Shobande, 2015). However, one could not entirely agree with the assertion of Shobande being a government official, that the counter-terrorism effort of Nigeria is free of human rights violations. It is important to mention that various cases of human rights violations have been witnessed from both sides. Indeed the Nigerian government counter-terrorism efforts have failed to pay attention to early warning systems and danger signals on terrorists through a lack of complimenting the use of force with dialogue.

In the real sense of it, the Nigerian government has been preventive but has not entirely complied with the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy which was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 2006. As observed by Amosu (2015) there have been challenges and violations of the legal procedure of arresting presumed terrorists. Nevertheless, the counter-terrorism projects of the Nigeria government are still targeted towards enhancing the

criminal justice capacity for the effective rule of law based on the investigation, prosecution and adjudication of terrorism cases in addition to the promotion of inter-agency collaboration on counter-terrorism issues. The predictable presumption has been to enhance the national legal regime against terrorism, strengthen international cooperation against the menace and ensure due observance and compliance of human right.

By contrast, the efforts of the United Nation Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) appeared more of anti-terrorist effort as its participants in the round table is heavily tilted towards people involved in the administration of justice without the main agency fighting terrorism like the army being in the forefront in the fight against the menace in the strategic meeting. Olojo (2019) in an article entitled *Another Chance for Nigeria to get Counter- terrorism Right* remarked that Nigeria's new leadership must recognise the distinct threat posed by Boko Haram's two factions – the Boko Haram and the new faction that is styled Islamic State of West Africa Province (ISWAP) in August 2016. He observed that as the 2018 Global Terrorism Index listed Boko Haram as one of the four deadliest terror groups with fatalities increasing by nearly 60% between 2017 and 2018, the government needs to know the distinction between the two factions from their mode of recruitment, attacks, rapport with civilians transnational ties. This will assist the new present political leadership in Nigeria to develop a more effective counter-terrorism strategy.

Bako (2018) in his study entitled *Inter-Agency Collaboration and National Security – Assessment of Counter-Terrorism Operations in the North-east* used data from both primary and secondary sources, structured and unstructured interviews. He also interviewed officers and personnel of key security agencies – the Army, Air Force, Nigeria Police etc. His findings revealed that although inter-agency collaboration is tied to the 1999 constitution, there was a challenge of poor cooperation among security agencies, lack of common intelligence doctrine, inadequate

training and support for the ongoing counter-terrorism operations in the North-east. He identified a counter-terrorism centre, emerging technology, an increased media campaign and security seminars as prospects for counter-terrorism efforts. The study further suggested promulgation of a National Security Policy of Joint Intelligence doctrine, Joint Counter-terrorism, the provision of logistics support and enhancement of public perception strategies.

From this perceptive, a growing number of studies have been conducted on the counter-terrorism efforts of the Nigeria government and their efficacy. Shobande (2015) in his work entitled *Counter Insurgency and National Security in Nigeria – An Appraisal of the Nigeria Air Force Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance (ISR) Efforts* using descriptive research based on qualitative data and field survey (primary) and documents analysis (secondary) data, administered questionnaire to selected respondents in the North-east zone of Nigeria and the Service Headquarters, Abuja. Unstructured interviews were also conducted on resource persons on the subject matter to achieve a balanced appraisal. The data was analysed and presented using descriptive statistics. The study found that there is inadequate specialist crew training. There is also the limited capacity of Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance (ISR) aircraft and dysfunctional Central Intelligence Processing Centre. It recommends aircraft spare provision agreement with manufacturers, accelerating indigenous capacity building for Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) manufacture and specialist training for Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) crews. It equally recommends for the signing of an aircraft spares agreement with manufacturers of aircraft in NAF inventory and accelerate indigenous capacity building for UAV manufacturers.

Makukwi (2006) in his study, ‘Issues and Challenges of International Terrorism as it affects National Security in Nigeria’ using both primary and secondary sources of data, revealed that lack

of advanced technology, sustained professional training and constraints in policy implementation makes counter-terrorism action inadequate. He also found a lack of multi-agency approach to the handling of counter-terrorism efforts as a drawback to Nigeria's efforts. He opines that this will reduce unhealthy rivalry, bottleneck and bureaucracy in tackling the challenges. The study recommends a continental and regional security mechanism involving Nigeria in the counter-insurgency efforts as an influential member of Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa (CISSA) and New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) security communities.

Makukwi also proffers a recommendation on anti-terrorism strategies like the laws on the financing of terrorism (Anti-Terrorism Acts 2011) which has since been implemented by the federal government probably prompted by this recommendation more than a decade and a half ago. He however acknowledged some sub-regional initiatives of the African government in the establishment of African Terrorist Study Centre in Algeria in 2003 with the support of the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1373 with Economic Community of West African State (ECOWAS) initiating a Regional Criminal Investigation and Intelligence Bureau (RCIIB) focusing on illicit drugs, arms trafficking, terrorism and money laundering. He identified Pan Sahellian Initiative (PSI) involving the nations of Niger, Chad, Mali and Mauritania as a good counter-terrorism strategy achieved via protection of borders, tracking of movement of persons, strengthening ports security and customs and immigration procedures.

Tella (2017) in his work entitled. *Boko Haram Terrorism and Counter Terrorism: The soft Power Context*, using several secondary sources remarked that successive Nigerian government have preferred the use of military force to address the issue of Boko Haram. This primacy given to a hard power approach to quell such insurgency has engendered reprisal attacks since 2005. However, the continued use of hard power by the Nigerian government had made some local

people seek from Boko Haram protection against the indiscriminate crackdown by the Nigeria Military. This had alienated the local communities against the army making them reluctant to give reliable intelligence to the security forces. He offered that to end Boko Haram insurgency, the Nigeria government should effectively harness its smart power (an effective combination of hard and soft power) in its counter-terrorism campaign. He reasoned that while the hard power is important to decimate the group, the soft power is symbolized by activities towards winning the hearts and minds of the terrorists, potential recruits and the general public. The soft power equally entails capacity building, economic development, public education, counselling and fatwas.

Mainasara (2016) in his study on *Terrorism and National Security: An Appraisal of the Nigeria Armed Forces Counter-Terrorism Effort*, using both primary and secondary sources of data, conducted unstructured interviews of senior officers of the security agencies and military personnel that participated in recent operations on Boko Haram in the Niger Republic. He equally used official publications, books, journals and seminar dissertations as his secondary sources. He drew lessons from the Algeria and USA example of counter-terrorism efforts which hinged on the protection of potential targets, integration of technology and the establishment of a coordination centre. He posited that terrorists are innovative in terms of targeting and attacking inclusive of tactics. Given this, the armed forces of Algeria and USA promote innovation capacity, flexibilities and integration of new tactics in its counter-terrorism efforts. He thus reasoned that combating terrorism is an evolving process which requires innovation from commanders and troops to anticipate and counter new threats.

Aside from this, there is the need to carry out the integration of technology to provide security in key places as it could generate an intelligence database which could be analysed to identify threats. Another important aspect of counter-terrorism efforts is border control which is

lacking and resulting in free movement of insurgents within the region of Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon and Niger that are bedevilled with activities of Boko Haram. Mainasara further identified nations support for the armed forces is another identified counter-terrorism measure giving legitimacy to the war this as the potential to boost the morale of the soldiers with a telethon to raise fund for the welfare of the troops.

2.10. Theoretical Framework for the Study

In this section, relevant theories that give credence and necessary explanation to the study are discussed. Six (6) related theories based on the study objectives are used: namely, Relational theory of violence, Vengeance theory, Islamic Theocratic state theory, Globalization theory of terrorism, oppression and Humiliation theory and finally, the Strain theory. The six (6) theories are used to complement each other and to provide a basic theoretical framework for the study. The first five (5) theories provide the requisite background to the study, while the strain theory is the focal point in which the study is anchored.

2.11.1 The Relational Theory of Violence

The relational theory of violence originated from the critical realists and relational sociologists and developed primarily in the symbolic interactionism tradition of Mead (1934). It was later popularized by scholars like McAdam (1983), Tarrow (1989) and Bourdieu (1992). Amongst exponents that further influenced the development of the theory are Tilley (2003), Donati (2008) and Della-Porta (2018). The relational theory assumes the ways social relations are generated (emergence) and changed (morpho-genesis) and how violent social formations are configured. Its main thrust is that violence such as terrorism develops in a relational outgrowth involving interpersonal processes where radical elements and larger segments of human societies especially

the state and its instrument of public order got entangled with what constitutes the law and order creating forceful detraction. This characterisation forms the foundation of the theory and makes the skeleton around which relational theory was built.

The theory is a wide-ranging idea of human interaction and reflection of differences of the perception of interpersonal processes that promote, inhibit or channel collective violence and interlink it with non-violent issues with the tendency for radicalization. According to Della Porta (2018), the theory advanced that radicalization stems from the complex and contingent set of interaction among individuals groups and institutionalized actors. That, radicalization is facilitated by encounters between social movements and authorities in several reciprocal adjustments. As such, the theory's concern tends to focus on other conflictual actions and reactions of human behaviours often expressed in a violent reciprocal relationship. For instance, where there are recurrent or intermittent clashes between institutionalized forces and political adversaries, this impalpably and continuously heightens radicalization, eventuating to a justification for more violent forms of reaction, akin to terrorism.

The theory further proposes that when some conflict emerges out of the history of a nation, this often leads to the development of negative stereotypes such as rancorous hostility, hatred, discrimination and other repugnant reproaches. The relational theory also pinpoints the relationships and implications of a rising counter-movement within or outside the terrorists in question. This vista understands terrorism used in a relational context involving the terrorist and various segment of interest in the environment where the terror is displayed. In his exposition in the context of the relational theorising of terrorism, Alimi (2011) delineates some of the key areas of interaction that are worthy of note. These are the relationship between the social movement and political environment (the state, the law enforcement etc), the relationships among the social

movement actors (the terrorist and their sponsors and between the social movement and a counter movement as exemplified by the relationship between Boko Haram and its various factions.

Thus, the nature of the relationship between the state as a custodian of force, its law enforcement machinery and their adroitness and tactics to intervene in terms of persuasion or force applied in the process of management and control of social movement and actions like the terrorist activities of Boko Haram in North-east Nigeria are germane and significant in understanding the situation of relational violence. These denote in a way that relational theory aims to explain violent conflicts between groups by exploring the differences in their socio-economic and cultural milieu. More concretely, the relational theory aims to explain violent conflicts between groups by exploring the sociological, political and value difference between such groups.

The theory further argues that cultural and value differences as well as group interests all influence relationships between individuals and groups in a variety of ways. As such, the theory takes the view that the spur of events that leads to the development of ruptured relationships rather than the social and political conditions, often gives rise to impetuous violence and other eschewed forms of conflicts. Thus, in this theory, the relationality concept has gained widespread usage which helps to isolate and expound the social and institutional factors giving rise to militant groups or terrorist groups viz-a-viz the nature and roles of law enforcement such as the police.

The relational theory has been widely applied to understanding various levels of social movements and agitations. According to Della-Porta (2018), the theory was employed in examining the labour protest and radicalization in Franco's Spain and ethnic revival, and in the authoritarian regimes in the Middle East that reacted strongly to the so-called religious awakening in Mubarak's Egypt or under the Israeli occupations of Palestine. Also, Ibrahim, Kale & Abba

(2016) used the theory to explain the emergence of activities of Boko Haram extremists in North-east Nigeria and suggested that complaisance in values invariably creates “we” and “other” dichotomy fuelling the rising upheavals. They argued that the fact that some groups are perceived as different makes others feel they are entitled to less or are inferior because of values. This no doubt inhibits or prevents the flow of communication between the reverence and the less obeisance group (others) to the extent of twisting perception that they have of one another.

Denoting this implies that the State and other members of the Nigeria society who are targets of Boko Haram violence may indeed find it difficult to fathom out the extremists’ penchant for bloodletting. Conversely, the (other) Boko–Haram terrorist believes that the group in this context believes that the redress is to put more effort into their savagery activities and terrorist acts. The Boko Haram common purpose of fighting the “unbelievers” of Allah is that modernization has deprived them of good governance and created injustice and strains of poverty for them in Nigerian society. Despite the popularity of the relational theory, it suffers some limitations. It has failed to consider the psychological and sociological implications to the build-up and reactions to violence and terror activities. The theory also neglects the role of ideologies and their forms of social and political conditioning that give rise to violence, terror and terrorism. Thus, the relational theory seems weak and cannot adequately explain the causal factors of Boko Haram violence and other activities perpetrated by the group.

2.11.2 Vengeance Theory

The vengeance theory is eclectic, as it is a product of many disciplines such as theology, history, politics, criminal justice and criminology. Its root can be traced to Margolin (1933) in his diction

of, “eye for an eye or tooth for a tooth,” which remains instructive in both religious and judicial orientation in seeking justice through vengeance. The use of vengeance theory as enunciated by Margolin was an important early concept of the theory which is indeed relevant in criminological work. The contemporary proponents of vengeance theory include Newman and Lynch (1987) from the Marxian and Freudian perspectives, Figuredo and Weingast (1998) from history and politics and Richardson (2008) from international relations and criminology.

The thrust of vengeance theory as a theoretical template considers terror and other forms of violence in the context of “tit for tat” wave of violence between actors. The theory assumes that the existence of inequality in power, injustice and rewards are built into the social structure by states, not evolutionary but revolutionary and what can bring redress is counter-revolution in form of vengeance. As expounds by the theory, vengeance may restore the integrative core of the society that is highly prone to injustice and violence will increase if the vengeance effect outweighs the deterrence and incapacitation effects.

According to Newman and Lynch (1987), vengeance theory advanced on the notion of the idea of “circle of violence”, development of violent ideology in relations to the social reality of dehumanisation, and other historical and critical wrongs. Besides, they were of the view that the development of ideology is significant to vengeance which can be built around the following propositions:

- vengeance is built as punitive motivation for a wrong done,
- vengeance is for return an injustice in and on equivalent terms,

- the recourse to atavistic feeling in nature is inherent in feuding to hold a grudge and prepare for vengeance, and thus:
- vengeance becomes a collective action and responsibility to be built into societal structure as an ideological code.

Apparently of great concern is the last proposition when vengeance becomes a collective action which is often associated with senseless destructive tendencies as the case of Boko– Haram killing innocent citizens, destroying properties and derailing the educational system and socio-economic development of North-eastern Nigeria. To this end, Bloom (2004) drew attention to the notion of circles of violence associated with the Palestine terrorist organisation as a collective action and the agent of Israel law enforcement and the military in the circle of arsons, assassinations, suicide and violent action including those perpetrated on civilians as an illustration of vengeance.

Within this context, Richardson (2008) articulated the vengeance theory as applied to terrorism. He succinctly focused on the role of vengeance with the use of three “Rs” as implicit in terrorist activities. Richardson identified the first “R” as “Revenge” in itself to injury or humiliation. He argued that revenge here could be personal or more of a common source of the goal of terrorism. In this way, terrorists see themselves as playing the role of faith defenders as exemplified in revenge for state wrongdoings. The second “R” denotes “Renown”. This goes to show that vengeance is carried out publicly to announce justification for action and the cause of the terrorist action and the cause of the terrorist act. This is also aimed to advance the footing of vengeance or exalt the terrorist’s image nationally or internationally. The third “R” depicts “Reaction”, which represents conscious requital retribution and vengeance. Thus, revenge becomes the guise of terrorist action which instigates state security apparatus such as the police or military reaction, to counter the vengeance’s action of a terrorist organisation.

Given this focus, the vengeance theory remains crucial to state and security agencies and apparatus readiness for counter-terrorism operations. The theory also emphasises on deterrence and incapacitation as enforced by security agencies to counter-terrorism. Despite its popularity, the theory has failed to account for the interplay and implication of social, economic and political structures on feuding groups and the group zeal and motivation to gain vengeance. Generally, vengeance theory as applied to revenge either in punishment or understanding of terror portrays barbarism and uncivilized nature of society.

2.11.3 The Islamic Theocratic State Theory

The Islamic theocratic state theory came into the limelight with the rise of power of Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), the United States of America and United Nations designated terror movement with the caliphate in Baghdad (Iraq). The major proponent of the theory is Megoran (2009). The theory is premised on the overflow of worthy and good kufur system (the rule of Allah) and that the best way to ensure the good government is the enthronement of Islam in communities. It contends that Western Education is incapable of stimulating meaningful development and prosperity in society. The Islamic theocratic state theory argues that the mode of justice is the Islamisation of society. In this theory, theocracy symbolises the exercise of political power by clergy of a particular religion, usually (although, not necessarily) claiming to be acting primarily on behalf of divinity and governing according to its requirements and principles. There are very few theocratic states in the world even as the worldwide influence of religious political ideology has grown in the past three decades (Megoran, 2009).

The literal meaning of “Theocracy” is “the rule of God”, hence, in the Islamic theocracy the concept is as espoused in the following way:

The Koran (Qur'an in Arabic) and Sunnah (the “habit” or “usual practice”, ways of living following prophet Muhammad's examples, legally

relevant for the Muslim community) becomes the instrumentations to governance. This is founded in the doctrine of Shariah (Sharia-al-Allah, in Arabic, literally “pathway to be followed to God”) under the “vicar” of the prophet, or caliph (Khalifa in Arabic) to govern the Umma, who pledged loyalty (Baya in Arabic). These conditions will ensure land of Islam (Dar al-Islam in Arabic, literally Hogar of peace, as no necessity for war against infidels is present and Muslim community should live in harmony within it) boarding Dar al-Kufr (Land of disbelief/Heresy), which must be fought and annihilated. (Anglio, 2017, P186.)

Based on this theory, the insurgent organization called Islamic State (IS) has changed the paradigm of the territorial statehood, by threatening the concept of Westphalian and international sovereignty. Islamic state and medieval caliphate territorial project are based on a powerful anti-secular interpretation of sovereignty. Islamic States interpretation of the sovereignty is inspired by Sayyid Qutb’s thought, who said the West concept of sovereignty is in contrast with Islam (Angio, 2017). This is just as Boko Haram rejects democracy and western education as incompatible with Islam. To this end, Thurston (2016) and Flynn (2017) underscore the implications of the theocratical theory of violence in the activities of Boko Haram in North-east Nigeria. The annexation of territories, the raising of flags, the designation and declaration of the caliphate, the insistence of the collection of jiz’a (haraji or tax) from the subdued neighbouring communities and the war with the Nigerian and Nigerians (as kufur state), the pledge of loyalty to ISIS, all fit into the identification of the movement (Boko Haram) and its violent atrocities under violence theocratical movement.

Agbibio (2013) citing David Rapoport (1984) revealed how the actions of groups like Boko Haram quite fundamentally differ from religious terrorism that goes back many years laced in with the flavour of new type terrorism. While, Agbibio (2013) shows that this new type of terrorism

(such as practised by ISIS and Boko Haram) produces, citing another writer, “radically different value system, mechanisms of legitimation and justification, the concept of morality and worldview” which consequently led to religious terrorism. This represents a very different and possibly far more lethal threat than that posed by more familiar, traditional terrorist adversaries” (Hoffman, 2006, P44)

However, the Islamic theocratic state theory has been criticised for its various limitations. First, the theory rejects democracy and western education (especially by the groups like ISIS and Boko Haram) which have severally been demonstrated to be amiable to Islam and Islamic ideals and politics, governance and international relations. Secondly, the theory’s rejection of modernity such as cars, aeroplanes, YouTube, guns, rocket-propelled-grenades, war tanks contradicts the utopian concept of puritanical Islam as popularized by their teachings. This is exemplified in the advance of modernity by these terrorist groups to propagate their cause. Thirdly, the application of the theory in understanding and explaining terrorism is also limited by the neglect of psycho-social basis of the terrorists as actors in the game of terror. These inherent weaknesses led to the globalization theory to cater for inadequacies in the Islamic theocratic state theory.

2.11.4 Globalization Theory of Violence

Globalization has been proclaimed as the cycle of discovery, wealth and chaos. For this reason, many scholars have adjudged it as the confronting matter of the moment. Implicitly, the

phenomenon continues to be pondered upon for the motive of what it is, concerning what it is. Also, different authors and scholars depending on their perspectives have viewed globalization in various ways and many versions of globalization theory have emerged. According to Giddens (1997), globalization is the intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away. Bauman (1998) conceives it only in terms of “space war” while Ritzer (2008) sees it as the spread of worldwide practices, relations, consciousness and organization of social life. Furthermore, some proponents of globalization contemplate it as capable of increasing wealth, freedom, happiness and democracy, which critics look at as a cover-up concept for global capitalism. The concept has now been variously theorized with particular emphasis on violence, increasing terror and terrorism. Globalization has been studied variously with Nassar 2005 and Keller 2016 being contemporary proponents of the theory.

The theory as proposed by Keller (2016) sees globalization through the eye of the widely diverse range of social theorists that argued that today’s world is organized through the acceleration of globalization, which has strengthened the dominance of world capitalist system. The spread of informationalism, especially informational capitalism, transcending national borders, with its attendant aggressive posture is creating a hybridization of culture, with the systematic destruction of local culture and tradition through a global culture of modern technology. This impacts on the generic character of human interactions and practices, with the interdependence creating amplified conflict and violence.

According to Keller, the globalization theory of violence accepts terrorism as a dark side of globalization and visualises it as part of its uncertainty, ambiguity and contradictions, thus creating friends and foes, wealth and power capable of generating fresh conflicts and invigorating

a new move for further violence. It also proposes that internal to terrorism is fundamentalism, which is a product of globalization. Fundamentalism uses global forces such as mass-media and technology (Giddens, 2000). Moreover, as different groups access technologies like an aeroplane, the technology of destruction gives rise to dangers of an expected terror event worldwide and become part of the frightening mediascape of the moment. To Giddens, fundamentalism can also take various forms such as religion, ethnicity, nationalism and politics, but whatever form it takes, it is problematic, turbulent and at odd with modernism and cosmopolitanism. Beyond this, fundamentalism has always been catastrophic as it creates the global fastest option of risk of terrorism.

In his work entitled *Globalization and Terrorism* with the basic theme of “migration of dreams and nightmares”, Nassar (2005), contends that the dream of the underdog occasionally transforms into nightmares for those perceived as obstacles towards the fulfilment of dreams. This cycle revolves between powerful countries like the United States (US) and the weak countries or groups like the Al-Qaeda. This cycle of dreams and nightmares is enhanced by globalization and inspired terrorism. Bringing this down to Nigeria, the dreams of Boko Haram to set up an Islamic society in Nigeria becomes a nightmare to Nigeria’s secular government. In the process of violently crushing the dream of the group, led to the death of Muhammed Yusuf (the leader) in the group. Hence, the nightmare and dreams shifts in cycles between the government and the Boko Haram group which has been continuously ongoing in the country.

Relatedly, globalization has led to new technologies and facilitated free movements of people, making it easier for terrorist groups like Boko Haram to explore. As such, globalisation has contributed in no small way to the increased threat that terrorism now poses. The spread of technology has greatly empowered less powerful actors such as

Al-Qaeda and a variety of other terrorist groups. Also, Boko Haram terrorists in Nigeria have similarly explored other technological options to advance their cause via the use of drones, and rocket-propelled grenades in fighting the Nigerian State. These are all a fall out of globalization. The group has also used other transboundary mechanism for interaction through media outlet inform of YouTube, Facebook, Twitter and international media (CNN, BBC, Sky News, Al-Jazeera) to advance their cause or send messages to the world to propagate or accentuate the group's nefarious attacks on Nigerian State.

Furthermore, the impact of technology in computerized networks, satellite communication system, software and hardware which are products of globalization explained why the Islamic terrorist (Bin Ladden) could inflict terror against the United States destroying the World Trade Centre. Thus, globalization can be seen as a useful viewpoint for understanding the pace of terrorism and violence in today's world.

These notwithstanding, the application of the globalisation theory in understanding and explaining the pace of terrorism has several weaknesses and limitations. The ideas are rather vague and more of over simplification, which is very difficult to connect to the social reality of the world. The excessive reliance on the implication and use of technology negates the vital international socio-economics traditions and dynamics that gave birth to terrorism in the first place. During the post-Kosovo era (Serbia Herzegovina) and the negative or complicit role of the USA and other European nations, most extremist Islamic groups abhor anything globalization from the UN and its agencies like International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the design for negotiations and cessations of hostilities. With globalization, nations are supposed to work in collaboration, in the form of treaties and international organizations to counter-terrorism, the concept of "neighbour harbours neighbour terror" or their network (The case of India and Pakistan) or as previously thought

Nigeria/Chad, have a negative effect on national co-operations against terrorism. This weakens state responses and coordination in the fights against terror.

Also, the theory is only a totalizing perspective that fails to acknowledge the differentiation between the phenomenon of globalization and practices that occur within the international world. Besides, it has explained in a shallow manner the rising wave of terror through the use of a modern instrument of destruction and also normatively incapable of fathoming the causal factors of Boko – Haram insurgency in North-east Nigeria.

2.11.5 The Oppression and Humiliation Theory

The oppression and humiliation theory is an intermix of two theories. It posits that societies that have high incidences of oppression from the state or non-state actors do have the likelihood of high occurrences of violent conflicts. It also assumes that the oppressive conduct results in humiliation making the group being frustrated to retaliate as a consequence. Among the proponents of the theory are Steinberg (1996). Walter, (2002). Friedman, (2003) Lindner, (2006), Hilton, (2011) and Miler, (2016).

The oppression and humiliation theory has wider appeal to the understanding of various aspects of socio-cultural and psychological aspects of tension and violence emanating from religious relations, ethnic domination, economic subjugations and suppressed dignity According to Victoroff (2005), the oppression perspective of the theory is premised on injustice and other forms of oppressive actions in group relations such as domination, economic strain, debilitated political rights, prejudices and discriminations that relate to cultural identity, suppressed opportunities in employment, educational pursuit, and general forms of social exclusion. These

various acts of oppression often caused disaffection and loss of significance, which hurt, alienate and create social identities and bonds which build and nourish violence.

The humiliation side of the theory, as enunciated by Walker (2012) and Lindner (2006) advanced that what constitutes humiliation have been characterized under the state of powerlessness, estrangement and sense of deprivation and non-fulfilment. Similarly, Hartling, Linder, Spachloff and Britton (2013) contend that humiliation occurs in several forms. It can be:

- (i) an internal experience such as feelings or emotions,
- (ii) an external event like a degrading interpersonal interaction, bullying, abuse, violent conflict and even genocide,
- (iii) system or social conditions like intractable poverty, discrimination and forced dislocation.

In effect, humiliation is viewed as a strong force that can create rifts and breakdown of the relationship among members of society. This goes to explain that to be humiliated is to be placed against one's wish and often in a deep hurtful manner that transgresses established expectations. To this end, Lindner (2006) sees humiliation as an enforced lowering of a person or group to a process of subjugation that damages or strips away the person's or groups pride, honour or dignity. In this regard, humiliation expressed by groups in uneven and dominative relations and interactions is specifically manifested in acts of terror and terrorism in general (Friedman, 2003).

According to Lacey (2009), a humiliating event can generate powerful emotions that become part of group's identity where the need for vengeance can erupt into violence years later, even across generations especially in cases where the use of physical force is linked with respect and status. For instance, cases of ethnic domination and oppression in Eastern Europe, include a prohibition in the use of hijab and headscarf in public places. In Asia, Chinese oppression of the

Uyghur Muslims minority is also an example. Thus, membership in terrorism group fulfils certain emotional needs of an individual, at the same time providing an outlet for the emotions that can be prevalent in those oppressed by their nation's government (Miller, 2016).

Accordingly, the act of humiliation which is a pain of oppression is strong forces that can create drifts and severe relationship among people. In this perspective, most scholars look at the horrific event of 11th September 2001 in the United States that shocked the entire world as a cycle of humiliation between western countries and non-western people (Lindner, 2001). On this note, Neuhauser (2011) advanced an overview of collective agency and collective responsibility in explaining the impact of humiliation in violence and terror in the humiliation theory. Organizations like ISIS take advantage of people who, because of racism or religious or political discrimination have been pushed to the margins of society.

More importantly, oppression and humiliation theory sheds light in explaining and understanding of terrorism and religious violence in Nigeria. Examining the state management of Boko Haram crisis in its early phase, specifically, the law enforcement onslaught on the group members in 2009 in Maiduguri, several humanitarian agencies, advocacy groups, international media have documented various humiliating experiences meted on the group. This is aside from the cold-blooded murder of the group leader that was video recorded. Similarly, at the height of the insurgency, the military took over operations and the fight against Boko Haram, where they were accused of humiliating practices like rape, torture, extrajudicial killings and ransacking of communities with other acts of human rights violations against Boko Haram. Akanni (2019) and Amnesty International (2019) have also documented the atrocities perpetrated by Boko Haram on security agencies in terms of tortures, summary executions, beheadings, kidnappings and terrorizing of communities which grossly mirrored attempts to avenge humiliations and oppression

meted to the group. In this vein, the theory resonates on the explanation of terrorism and religious violence in Northeast Nigeria.

Relatedly, the issues of symbolism in religious appearances and practices such as the growth of beard and restricted use of veil (Hijab) have constrained members of religious groups from enlistment into the armed forces and law enforcement agencies and which have been cited as forms of oppression by Boko Haram leaders. At the macro-economic level, limited opportunities in employment for the youth and political participation and other forms of social exclusions have been exposed in the teaching of Boko Haram extremists to denote acts of oppression.

However, despite the orientation of the theory. It has a limitation in the disposition to the holistic explanation in terms of causal factors of Boko Haram, sources of arms and fund, localization of their violence in North-east Nigeria and relationship with other international terrorist groups. Also, oppression is not a sufficient justification to breed terror and terrorism especially in the context where other legal means and procedure could be exploited to address any form of oppression and injustice among the group. Similarly, studies have proven that very few members of minorities subscribe to terror and other forms of violence. The theory has also failed to consider the general socio-cultural and political factors giving rise to the perceived humiliation experienced by the terrorist group. Boko Haram emerged out of wide community support due to their erroneous representation and interpretation of Islam and its ideals. The need to take account of these weaknesses and to incorporate the general study objectives led to the Strain Theory.

2.11.6. The Strain Theory

The strain theory was first propounded by Robert Merton (1938) and revisited by Albert Cohen (1955). Cohen's version was almost similar to that of Merton. Richard Cloward and Lloyd Ohlin

(1960) later improved on the theory, but still shared Merton's idea that strain involved the incapability to achieve conventional success goals through legitimate means. The strain theory as originally proposed has been largely reinvented and refined by Robert Agnew (2001) by broadening its perspectives to become one of the most basic criminological theories that explain strains and terrorism in most practical terms. Other contemporary scholars that influenced the development of the theory are Quintan Wiktorowicz (2005) and Lanham and Littlefield (2007). The strain theory as now purified by Robert Agnew has not only become an integrated postulation but a congeries of ideas that propagates the belief that socio-economic strain causes deviance and even terrorism.

In its most limited form, the strain theory as enunciated by Merton (1938) explained strain as an inability to realize the society's success goal. According to him, it is the society that puts impediments in the form of strain to incite individuals to engage in deviant activities. As such, strain is pivoted around dissatisfaction, protest and dissent against the existing condition. Merton's theory regards deviant behaviour as a consequence of social processes operating in society. With an interchange of action and reactions, people mostly become deviant by the chain of circumstances. Accordingly, the lack of socio-economic and cultural goals often leads to dysfunctions which make the individual or group trying to achieve the societal goals through the deviant means. Strain sets in when individuals or groups are unable to meet their set goals in the social system (Merton, 1957).

From this standpoint, Merton develops five basic forms of responses in his goal means gap strain theory. His first means of response is conformity to social norms, which is the opposite of deviance. This involves the acceptance of societal approved means and goals. In Merton's view, there must be some consensus regarding accepted cultural goals and legitimate means of attaining

them. Without a consensus, society would exist only as collectives of people rather than as a unified culture and might experience conflict, chaos and violence continuously. The other four types of behaviour: innovation, ritualism, retreatism and rebellion involved a departure from conformity. These forms of deviant adaptations are the central subject of Merton's strain theory (Thio, 2001). Put together, the strain theories of Merton, Cohen and Clowards and Ohlin share in common the idea that when legitimate means of acquiring culturally define goals are limited by the structure of the society, the resulting strain may lead to crime or other deviance. However, despite the popularity of Merton's theory, it has failed to give sufficient impetus as to why do many people in adverse and stressful conditions still reject crime as an available alternative? It also lacks the disposition to holistically explain the discrepancy between aspiration and the opportunity to realize this aspiration which propels pressure towards deviant activities. These inadequacies have been complemented in Agnew's extension of the strain theory.

Robert Agnew's (1992) work undertook the strain theory from the most fundamental level to widen the scope of Merton's postulation. According to Jang and Agnew (2015), the strain theories state that certain strain of stressor's lead to negative emotions which create pressure for corrective action. In contrast to Merton, Agnew (1992) located strain as more than a lower-class problem and identified several sources of crime provoking strain, such as goal blockage, failure to achieve positively value goals, removal of the positive stimulus and the presence of negative influences. As such, Agnew's General Strain Theory GST focuses on a much broader of strain and factors that influence the likelihood of criminal coping. In this way, the (GST) builds on previous strain theories in many ways and goes well even beyond Merton's proposition with the modification that strain can be the starting point for a group to depart from normative behaviours. In this vein, Agnew's general strain theory has thus brought to the sharpest focus the notion of

strain as a prospect for deviance and crime, when their associated factors are not timely addressed.

The theory as exemplified by Agnew (1992) conceptualized strain as a relationship in which others are not treating individuals as they would like to be treated. In other words, strain to Agnew involves treatment perceived as inconsiderate and unjust. To this end, the GST assumes that crime is a consequence of a negative relationship with others. As such, Agnew contends that both blocked opportunities and inability to avoid stressful circumstances create strain. Agnew identified two types of strain: the subjective and objective types. The subjective strains refer to events or conditions that are disliked by people who are experiencing or have experienced them. This is regarded as the individual evaluation of an event or condition. The objective strains are conditions or events that are disliked by most members of a group.

Broadening the perspective on the strain, Agnew, however, contends that the presence of both the subjective and objective strains are not sufficient enough to trigger deviance or terrorism but they have an associative impact on strong negative emotional states of people. For Agnew, strains increase the likelihood of negative emotions like rage, dissatisfaction and frustration but when combined with other traits such as humiliation, oppression, deprivation and anger, they give rise to a desired corrective action or redress. In other words, the genius of the strained logic is therefore the emphasis it places on the perception of injustice Wilson, (2017).

According to Agnew (2001), strains can be said to most likely result in crime: when they are high in magnitude, associated with low social control, perceived as unjust and created some pressures or incentives to engage in criminal activities. These assumptions can be reduced to a simple theme, that, strain can stimulate undesirable or unfavourable circumstance and when excessive, the pressure generated through conditions of anger and frustration may incite a response

of which criminality becomes a pathway or revenge to the injustice on the ground. In his enunciation, Agnew (2002) opined that strain is often a product of inequity in social class and consequently can be associated with individuals or groups' disappointment and failure. Thus, injustice is a basic feature of socio-economic strain. In other words, where injustice is endemic violence is imminent. Most forms of injustice can affect the propensity for crime through anger and negative emotions (Scheverman, 2013)

Enlarging the strain theory, Agnew (2010) considers the role of strains in terrorism. He argues that the spring pool of terrorism is accumulated in excessive strain. As earlier espoused by him, Agnew reiterated that strains contribute to the existence of negative emotions such as anger and frustration. These emotions generate a pressure of some kind of reaction which can be very violent in nature. More specifically, he emphasized that when strains are frequent with long duration and have a reasonable expectation to persist, thereby affecting a large number of people, this condition can strongly encourage violent reaction or response tantamount to terrorism. Extending this line of reasoning, Agnew further illustrated that grievances associated with relative deprivation, religion, western education, modernization and other socio-cultural issues can generate violent conflict like terrorism. He concluded by locating how the gap from reduced social control impacts on religious extremism to incubate beliefs favourable to terrorism.

Buttressing Agnew's strain theory, Wiktorowicz (2005) drew attention to why ordinary people joined Islamic extremist movements. Using a Salafist group, he researched and found that Islamic extremists preyed on disoriented young people who are confused in looking for the meaning of Islam. Wiktorowicz examines how radicalization contributes to Islamic uprising, which he attributed to spectres of disorientation and disablement, a sort of social strains of missed and blocked opportunities. Wiktorowicz argued that the socialization process of radicalization in

religious extremism has prodded ordinary people to engage in the high-risk venture and high-cost activity such as terrorism. In essence, radicalization to Islamic extremists means real Islam which connotes an act of terror and a demonstration of commitment to Allah. Although, this is an erroneous representation of real Islam and misconception of Jihad (Holy war).

Wiktorowicz (2005) further postulated that the psychological aspect of radicalisation process and tactics which pinpoint signs of alienation and blocked goals, which are societal strains, germinate and grow violence in Islamic uprising. For instance, the radicalization tactics and recruitment of Boko Haram have lured young ones with no means of livelihood into terrorism. In this sense, joblessness and poverty have made youths to be subsistable to terrorist ideologies and made them to opt for crimes against the Nigeria state. In this manner, the act of negative influence (strain) as earlier stated by Agnew which propels terrorism is also being reiterated by Wiktorowicz to support radicalisation and violence in Islamic uprising. Thus, there can be no doubt that Agnew's strain theory remains undeniably significant today in espousing situational circumstances brooding religious violence, which culminates in terrorism.

2.12. Application and Relevance of the Strain Theory to the Present Study

According to Agnew (2010), criminal researchers have historically recognized strain for its long explanatory value for violence and crime. As such, this study is anchored on strain theory because of its relevance and scope it offers for analyzing human discontentment particularly in the society at large. The general strain theory developed by Agnew is all reaching, with an inclusive approach to other theories of crime. Most studies now agreed that strain plays a significant part in the creation of violent conflict, crime and terrorism Post, (2007) and Hoffman, (2006).

This study focuses on the In-depth investigation of Boko Haram religious violence in North-eastern Nigeria. The strain theory is deemed appropriate to the study as it propagates the

belief that injustice, frustration and anger as a result of blocked opportunities or goals may provoke a response of revenge or redress which could lead to extreme violence like terrorism. The theory is also very germane to this study as it provides illumination that in a troubled economy like Nigeria, where there is a high degree of strain, such as poverty, unemployment and poor quality of living, people may deviate from the legitimate institutionalized means to achieve their desired goals. This is because people who lack economic opportunities are naturally resentful about their socio-economic status, view themselves as having been alienated from the main stream society (Aiyegba, 2015). Aside from this, in most societies, poverty reinforces hunger which causes discontentment. As a last resort, the criminal activity could be one method to alleviate the conflict caused by these social strains (Sikes, 2017).

The strain theory thus has merit because it is pivoted around anxiety, tenseness, insecurity and criminality. The theory has been used in many criminological studies relating to poverty, terrorism and criminality. (Okoye, 2017. Sikes, 2017, Wilson, 2016 and Okechukwu and Meisamari, 2012).

The strain theory when applied to this study pre-supposes that individuals or groups are in the best position to interpret or know why they have adopted the illegitimate means to achieve their success goal. A case in point is the Boko Haram targeting young students and vulnerable juveniles, brainwashing them into believing that they are fighting for a just cause that will yield great reward in heaven (Okoye, 2017). This no doubt is a negative influence as expounded by Agnew (2002) in the role of strain in terrorism and Wiktorowicz (2005) in his exposition of radicalization in Islamic uprising. The Boko Haram sect emerged as a fundamentalist group and believed that it has since 2005 engaged in a major societal transformation, although virulent in its capacity, tactics and ideology. Presently, its civil strife and religious militancy have constituted a

strong menace to peace, security, stability and the territorial integrity of Nigeria. The Islamist sect, Boko Haram has also portrayed the nation as a normless society, where Muslim fundamentalism, evangelical Christian militancy and concomitant issues of ethno-political conflicts are on the rise.

According to Okoye (2017), Agnew in expounding the strain theory offers an appropriate understanding of terrorism causes, Agnew further opined that both strains and grievances are the pivots around which the sloppy pole of terrorism revolves. As stated by Adejoh (2017), Boko Haram religious violence is a language of dissent against growing immiseration, hopelessness and alienation of the weaker majority. This statement cannot be totally faulted because, the violence perpetrated by Boko Haram religious extremists in Nigeria is expressive serving to vent their strain of frustration, abject poverty and injustice. Contrary to expectations in Nigeria that the advent of a democratic regime in 1999 will reverse the long year of suffering and social injustice in the country and bring the majority of people to an era of prosperity, leadership at all levels of governance failed the masses. Hope and expectations were dampened as solutions and condition deteriorated and exacerbated with unemployment and hunger.

The strain theory has now become a generalized wide-ranging system of ideas of social action, and human reaction or response to conditions and circumstances deemed unfavourable to collective aspirations. This has been demonstrated very clearly in Sikes (2017) study of sources of strain experienced by homegrown Jihadist terrorists and Okoye (2017) of the content analysis approach of the theoretical understanding of terrorism. The studies are also suggestive that strain in itself can be a direct reflection of extreme violence.

Deploying the example of Boko Haram, Aiyegba (2015) in his study on the terrorist insurgency contends that a society, bedevilled with the problem of an endemic rate of poverty and unemployment, especially among its productive segment of the population as is currently the case

in Nigeria, will have its peace and stability endangered. In Nigeria, the youth are the vulnerable group most susceptible to committing and perpetrating all sort of crimes as a result of unjust and prolonged societal induced strains. Hence, this group of young people is majorly the perpetrator of the Boko Haram religious violence.

The religious violence and terrorism that depict Boko Haram insurgency in North-eastern Nigeria arose out of the harsh realities of societal induced strain coupled with the implicit emotion of frustration and injustice. In the word of Wiktorowicz (2005), Islamic rising radicalisation is a signpost of a missed opportunity as a result of the strain of alienation occasioned by the temptation of western education and modernization, which have led to violent behaviour as a mode of respond to terrorism. This act is destabilizing and undivining on the strength of moral obligation, religious tolerance and national integration. Sectarian violence in Nigeria to issues of religious fundamentalism and fanaticism are out-products of societal strains which are inimical to national security and sustainable development that are very critical to the material progress of any polity.

As espoused by Smelser (2007), strains endanger the relationships among the part of a system leading to its malfunctioning. The disparity between goals and means engenders frustration which leads to strains that are favourable to terrorism. This undermines the safety, goal accomplishment and security of citizens, which also inhibits productive economic activities with attendant negative consequences on sustainable human and national development.

In essence, these deficiencies are responsible for the deepening ethno-political conflicts, religious violence and other social malaise in Nigerian society at large. Perhaps, the plausible cause of the Boko Haram sect in North-eastern Nigeria can be linked to one or two of these deficiencies and the end product of these aberrations of societal induced strains have presently been catastrophic on both the psyche and overall functioning of Nigeria State. More so, a nation that

allows its youths to be idle is sitting on a time bomb because frustrated people seek relief in religion (Tell, 2009). Given the foregoing attestations, the adoption of the strain theory for this study is very apt in that most people confronting socio-economics distress and injustice are more likely to be drawn into a possible violent movement like Boko Haram as retaliation for a perceived injustice or notable historical wrong. The Nigerian society and government had failed the test of minimum standard of social justice (Ogaga, 2012). The rate of unemployment and level of poverty among the youth in a country like Nigeria, blessed with abundance resources, can create pains of strain activities of source of violence for such group like Boko Haram and has thus revealed an underlying assumption. That individuals or groups act and react within a given socio-cultural milieu in a patterned and purposive manner with behaviour directionally based on their objectives and aspirations and desires using any institutionalized means, whether legitimate or illegitimate as much as the end justifies the means. No doubt, the logic of strain is of great assistance in not only highlighting the causes but also of immense use in measuring the risk of societal strains that could engender terrorism (Wilson, 2016).

In sum, from the available and related copious literature reviewed, conceptual, theoretical and empirical studies from various scholars and researchers on the Boko Haram insurgency were covered. These works offered some valuable understanding of the study-objectives, but there appears presently to be no consensus regarding the causes of Boko Haram. Most of the scholars saw Boko Haram as a complex social phenomenon, with various intermingled causal factors. It thus becomes difficult to delineate explicitly, which of them are predominant critical factors that led to the emergence of religious terrorism, which this study aims to unravel. Furthermore, the various studies reviewed on the relationship between Boko Haram and other terrorist groups, the prevalence of Boko Haram in the North-east compared to other geopolitical zones in Nigeria and

Boko Haram sources of funding and arms presented commonalities of divergent views. Other works relating to the localization of the group to the North-east of Nigeria were equally examined, the effect of Boko Haram on Nigeria's national development and the counter and the anti-terrorist efforts employed by the Nigeria government.

However, most of the findings in the literature reviewed were based on anecdotal data, which has been somehow intuitive and findings sometimes inconsistent. Also, the body of evidence revealed limited empirical findings and feeble reliable facts on the subject. Hence, this present study has been designed to provide the lacuna by ensuring concrete and robust body of empirical evidence about the subject-matter of the study. From the theories so far considered and used on a complimentary basis, the weaknesses of them prompted the adoption of the strains theory as the focal point on which this study is anchored. The theory sets the tone on why Boko Haram became a threat to Nigeria flowing from the response to pain of societal induced strain of injustice and frustration. Thus, a better synthesis of the strains theory has been provided to draw a synergy to a better understanding of the phenomenon of Boko Haram as a domestic terrorism in the country.

CHAPTER THREE

METHODOLOGY

This chapter presents the research method adopted for this study. It consists of research design, the historical brief of the study area, study population, sample size and sampling techniques, methods of data collection, research instruments, validity and reliability of the research instrument, quality assurance procedure for data analysis, ethical considerations, researcher's background, beliefs and biases and problems encountered in the field.

3.1. Research Design

The study adopted a descriptive research design. It is a mixed method involving an integrative approach of quantitative research as well as the qualitative research method of data collection. The quantitative data was collected from the administration of 133 copies of questionnaire to respondents who are members of different law enforcement groups. These include the Police, the Army, Air Force, Immigration, Civil Defence and Civilian Joint Task Force, all involved in the fight against Boko Haram activities. The qualitative data was collected from In-depth interviews (IDIs) and Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) with the victims of Boko Haram insurgency at the Internally Displaced Persons' (IDPs) camps as well as traditional rulers, senior security officers, the religious leaders, general public and politicians. A documentary study was conducted on ten case files of the Boko Haram insurgents who were under police investigation for allegedly belonging to the insurgent group.

The adoption of the quantitative research method is in line with studies carried out in extant literature on Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria. In a study by Bilyaminu, Iya and Purokayo (2017) on analysis of the Impact of Boko Haram Insurgency on Education in Adamawa State, Nigeria,

the researchers adopted a quantitative research method. Primary data was used in the study. The data was sourced through the use of a structured questionnaire. Also, the use of qualitative data through In-depth and Key-Informant Interviews is in tandem with the work of Smith (2016) who conducted In-depth interviews for some Nigerians and key informant interviews with security forces, internally displaced people, prominent clergymen, academics and anti-corruption crusaders.

3.2. Study Location and Historical Brief on North-eastern Nigeria

North-eastern Nigeria was created in 1967 from the then Northern Nigeria. It had its headquarters in Maiduguri. It has been divided over the years through some political and administrative states creations. It now consists of the states of Borno, Bauchi, Adamawa Taraba, Gombe and Yobe. Before this time, the whole of the region was controlled from Maiduguri. North-eastern Nigeria consists of 307,892 square kilometres which is more than the size of the United Kingdom with 242,495 square kilometres. The most recent of the states that were created from the region is Taraba that was created in 1991 with its headquarters at Jalingo. Other State capitals in the region are Maiduguri (Borno), Bauchi (Bauchi), Gombe (Gombe), Yola (Adamawa) and Damaturu (Yobe). All the North-eastern states have a combined population of 23 million (Wikipedia, 2006).

However, of the states in the North-eastern region, the most populous is Borno state, the epicentre of Boko Haram, with a population of over five million. The state has boundaries with three countries: the Niger Republic to the North, Chad to the North-east and Cameroon to the East. This strategic location is significant in understanding the rise and growth of Boko Haram in the area. Extending this and because of international boundaries, it became an important trading and commercial centre.

Borno state was established in 1976 from the split of the North-eastern state. It is dominated by the Kanuri ethnic group and is a good example of enduring traditional political institutions in parts of Africa. In Borno, the rulers of the erstwhile Kanem Borno Empire have played a part in the politics of the area for over 1,000 years. The present dynasty gained control in the early 19th century with the support of the British colonial power who prevented military defeat from the other groups and established a new capital for the dynasty at Maiduguri or Yerwa (as referred by the natives) in 1905. This remained the capital until date. After Nigeria's independence in 1960, Borno remained fairly autonomous until the expansion of states in Nigeria to twelve (12) in 1967.

As an important centre of Islamic learning, Borno State witnessed one of history's most successful armed Jihads in the 18th century. However, 300 years later Boko Haram takes its root from the remnants of this historical empire (Smith, 2016). A map of Nigeria showing the study location (North east of Nigeria) is as shown in Appendix A

3.3. Study Population, Sample Size and Sampling Technique

The population for this study consists of all the citizens in the six states of the North-eastern geopolitical zone of the country. These include Boko Haram insurgents who were arrested by the Police, law enforcement agencies (Police, Army, Air Force, Civil Defence Officials, Immigration Officials and members of civilian JTF), religious leaders, traditional rulers, politicians and the general public in North-Eastern cities and towns of Maiduguri, Potiskum, Baga, Bama, Yola, Bauchi, Gombe, Mubi, among others.

A total of 369 respondents were selected for participation in this study. One hundred and fifty (150) respondents were selected for a cross-sectional survey, while the rest (219) comprised of respondents for both In-depth Interviews (IDIs) and Key Informant Interviews (KIIs). The

selection of the sample size for the study was to achieve a considerable degree of representativeness of the study population. Purposive sampling technique was used for the selection of the 369 respondents. This researcher adopted this non probability sampling technique by using his judgement to identify and select individuals that are highly knowledgeable about the phenomenon being investigated.

Thus, religious leaders, traditional rulers, politicians, front line security officers and other participants that best met the criteria for selection as KIIs based on their knowledge of what goes on in their communities. These groups of people had borne the brunt of the Boko Haram insurgency. During the targeted killings, Boko Haram mostly attacked police officers, intimidated and hounded the critics of their terror activities. These include moderate muslim scholars whose views conflict with that of the group. Security officers involved in the fight against Boko Haram insurgents also qualified as respondents to be interviewed for the survey equally on account of their experiences in combating the Boko Haram insurgency and also as victims of Boko Haram. Many have been maimed by the group right from the commencement of its violent campaign in 2009. All police officers interviewed were those eligible to go to the frontline. Thus, the Commissioners of Police of the states involved were implored to bring forward for the study only Police Officers on General Duty. These are officers illegible to carry out crime/ anti-terror operation duties. This group, therefore, excludes police officers on specialized duties like the artisans, the doctors and the technicians.

3.4. Methods of Data Collection

The study made use of both primary and secondary sources of data. The primary data was collected using a structured questionnaire, In-depth Interview and Key Informant Interview. The quantitative data was collected through the use of a structured questionnaire administered on 150 respondents

with the help of three specially trained research assistants who accompanied the researcher to the office of the Commissioner of Police. The use of research assistants was necessary given the magnitude of the data to be collected and the size of the study area. The use of a structured questionnaire is similar to the study of Bilyaminu et al (2017), and also Langer, et al (2017). The structured questionnaire was administered to obtain information on retrospective and prospective issues relating to Boko Haram religious violence without putting pressure on respondent's emotionality.

On the distribution of 150 copies of structured questionnaire, 90 copies were administered to six different security personnel (Police Officers, Army, Air Force, Customs, Immigration and Joint Civilian Task Force) in Borno State using purposive sampling technique. Fifteen (15) copies of the questionnaire were administered to each of the security personnel. The administration of the questionnaire was carried out personally by the researcher and because Borno State has more security personnel than all other states in the study areas. The remaining 60 copies of the questionnaire were administered by the research assistants in the rest of the five states of Adamawa, Bauchi, Gombe, Taraba and Yobe. Twelve (12) copies were distributed in each state. The Research Assistant One, handle the distribution of 36 copies in Adamawa, Yobe and Bauchi states while the second Research Assistant covered the remaining two states of Gombe and Taraba with 24 copies. Two (2) respondents were selected from each of the six security groups in the states (i.e. the Police, Army, Air Force, Customs, Immigration and Civilian Joint Task Force). The two research assistants and the researcher were also responsible for the collection of the questionnaires distributed by them. A hundred and thirty-three (133) copies questionnaire were returned filled which gave a response rate of 88.6%. The non-response rate is small and did not in any way affect the integrity of the data.

The qualitative data for the study involved the use of Key Informant Interviews [KIIs] and In-depth interviews [IDIs] to corroborate responses from the structured questionnaire in order to elicit spontaneous and instructive informative answers from the key informants on issues relating to Boko Haram religious violence in Nigeria. They are also to allow the collection of information through mutual views and penetrate into the inner life of the respondents on the issues at hand. All interviews were conducted face to face except for the three telephone interviews that were audio-recorded and thereafter transcribed by the researcher.

The documentary study involved extracting relevant information from files of suspects from “true cases” under investigation. The police case file is an inaccessible classified document except purely for research purposes. It however gives faith in the result of the study but still provides an incomplete account of the research subject. This study relied on the police case files also as a compliment to questionnaire and In-depth interviews. The conduct of interview using KIIs and IDIs by the research assistants, who were locally recruited, was predicated on execution of informed consent and clear line of interaction defined through trust building and rapport. It made the reliability and validity of the research outcomes compared to similar studies conducted by other researchers. The KIIs and IDIs questionnaire guides were generated from the research questions of the study and the relevant literature which gave novel insights on these.

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One hundred and nineteen (119) respondents were selected to participate in key informant interviews from the three top security officers, to the general public, religious leaders, traditional rulers and politicians in Borno, Yobe, Adamawa, Gombe, Bauchi and Taraba states. A large number of participants (219) is due to the availability of participants and the heterogeneous nature

of the respondents. Similarly, a total of one hundred (100) respondents were selected for the In-depth Interview (IDI) from the various Internally Displaced Person (IDP) Camps in the study area.

Thus, the large number of participants (219) for the qualitative study (involving IDIs and KIIs) was to enable the collection of rich data that would answer the research questions. Similarly, since the respondents are from a diverse background (heterogeneous) the larger the number of respondents the richer the data that could address the research questions even though meaning lesser time spent on each participant (about 30 minutes). The interview took over 60 days to be completed traversing all the states that made up the North-east (Borno, Yobe, Adamawa, Gombe, Bauchi and Taraba states). After each interview, the participants were asked if they will be available for a follow-up, which they all replied in the affirmative.

The distribution matrix of the respondents for the key informant In-depth interview is presented below:

Table 3.1- Distribution Matrix of Respondents for the Key Informant Interviews (KIIs)

States	Top security Officers	General Public	Religious Leaders	Traditional Rulers	Politicians	Total
Borno	3	10	7	5	5	30
Yobe		10	5	5	5	25
Adamawa		7	3	3	3	16
Gombe		7	3	3	3	16
Bauchi		7	3	3	3	16
Taraba		7	3	3	3	16
Total						119

The differences in the number of respondents for each state are based on the frequency of Boko Haram attacks in the states. Borno and Yobe recorded the most attacks.

On the roles and responsibilities of the research team and the researcher in the interviewing of the one hundred and nineteen (119) Key Informants (KIs) the researcher interviewed 55 Key

informants in Borno and Yobe States. The Research Assistant One was responsible for the interview of thirty-two (32) key informants in Adamawa and Gombe States while the Research Assistant Two handled the interviews of remaining thirty-two (32) informants in Bauchi and Taraba states. The Research Assistant Three was solely responsible for the handling of the In-depth interviews of 100 internally displaced persons (IDPs). To be specific, a total of 70 IDPs were interviewed at the Teachers' Village. The rest (30) IDPs were interviewed in Yobe (12 respondents), Adamawa (6 respondents), Gombe (6 respondents), and Bauchi (6 respondents), by the Research Assistant Three. Taraba state had no IDPs at the time of data collection. In all the IDP camps and security formations visited, letters of introduction were used to obtain permissions to conduct the interview. Also, consent forms were served on all the persons that participated in the research (Appendixes B and C refer).

Before the Research Assistants were deployed to the field, an intensive interactive session was held for them to ensure respect for information rights, beneficence and privacy of respondents. These were to ensure utmost validity and reliability of result. Uniform criteria were also established for them to comply with in order to minimize research error and research bias. They were asked to interview the IDPs and other respondents one after the other to reduce participant's bias. They were also implored to conduct the research early in the morning in view of the usual high temperature in the area of study to reduce participant error. Similarly, to mitigate research error, the period assigned to them to submit the collected data was extended to avert fatigue or stress on the part of the Research Assistants. Finally, the collected data (responses) were carefully examined and screened for errors before accepting them for analysis and this was painstaking carried out by the Lead Researcher.

The secondary source of data for the study is by analysing 10 police case files obtained from the Special Anti-Robbery Squad of Borno State Police Command (an epic centre of Boko Haram). These police case files were personally handled by the researcher. The use of secondary data has strong strength and yield, despite its limitations. Police case file (as a secondary source) is being produced by the state, using large resource and expert professionals, making the outcome credible, objective and impartial as an instrument of data collection. Case file (as a documentary evidence) gives advantage of access to data with vast amount first hand information being held in documents. Although generally not easy to access in view of its confidential nature, it is none the less a cost effective mode of data collection. The police case file once accessed, can generally be a source of data that is permanent and available in a form to be checked by other researchers. The data are thus open to public scrutiny.

However, it has limitation which makes the researcher to evaluate the authority of the source and the procedure used to produce the original data so as to gauge the credibility of the documents. Thus, like other documents in social sciences, the case file is produced for other purpose not tailored for this or a particular research. This makes the content incomplete since it could not answer some of the research questions. Even in the present research under study.

There is also the limitation that the confessional statement contained in the police case file may have been recorded under duress. This is however mitigated by a provision in the Administration of Criminal Justice Act of 2015, which provides that statements obtained from suspects by police detectives are video recorded. This process controls the quality and credibility of statement under investigation, further reinforcing and strengthen the validity of the data.

The collection of data on the anti-terrorism and counter-terrorism efforts of the federal government involved the three top security officers through the use of a telephone interview and personally handled by the researcher. The telephone interviews involved top personnel each from the Army, the Intelligence Agency and the Police. This was conducted following a format of professionally formulated questions, with the researcher being trained to ask questions that may lead to spontaneous answers on the evolving strategy adopted on the situation. The telephone interviews lasted an average of 25 minutes. Respondents were reminded about the objective of the research, the peculiarity of the interview and the promised anonymity of the data. The experience of the researcher at the National Defence College (NDC) several years back, assisted in making a couple of contacts with advanced letters before getting the concurrence of the three senior top security officers, who remained unanimous and volunteered to grant telephone interviews. Having explained to them the purpose of the research and their right to withdraw their consent at any stage of the process, their responses to the questions were audio-recorded and transcribed. Irvine (2011), reports that some researchers have published their first-hand reflections on the use of the telephone to conduct various types of a qualitative interview. Telephone interview gives access to people who are geographically distant or located in dangerous places and encourage the display of less interviewer bias (Rahman, 2015), while being easier to schedule. The interview guide is as shown in Appendix D. Indeed, a small but growing body of research has documented the potential of In-depth telephone interviews as a viable option for qualitative research. Many studies on research methodologies have pointed out the practical advantages and other logistics conveniences of telephone interviews. This includes enhanced accessibility to geographically dispersed respondents, reduced costs, increased safety of respondents and flexibility for rescheduling (Cachia and Millward, 2011). Since telephone interviews appear to increase a perceived sense of

anonymity (Greenfield et al 2000); they are likely to be more suitable for collecting data on very sensitive issues.

Consistent with development in the social science research, this present study adopted a triangulated approach of complementing both the qualitative and quantitative approaches to reinforce each other. The qualitative study applied is an interpretative approach known as phenomenology (Merton, 1977). It is an approach to qualitative research that focuses on the community of a lived experience with a particular group. This is to arrive at a description of nature of a particular phenomenon (Creswell, 2013)

The process of data collection for the study involved the presentation of a letter of approval by the Inspector General of Police to the Borno State Commissioner of Police allowing the conduct of the research (see Appendix E). As a research connected with security, the assent of the Commissioner of Police of the state is necessary as the custodian of law and order in the state and since his men will also be used to ensure success of the research.

With the formal introduction of the mission of the team to the Commissioner, a request for the administration of 150 copies of the questionnaire was made and was granted. The Police Public Relations Officer (PPRO) had to take over from thereby providing the venue and arranged for the men to willingly without any coercion to participate in the exercise. The officers were assured of their anonymity and that they could withdraw their consent at any stage of the research.

After the endorsement of the letter of introduction from the Inspector General of Police, the researcher personally visited the Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS) in Maiduguri. It is a unit under the Borno State Commissioner of Police that is charged with anti-terrorism operations, investigations and prosecutions. It was at SARS the researcher requested for case files under

investigation (Police Document) that could be suitable for the research, having explained the purpose of the research to the Officer in Charge (O/C). It was agreed that he could make available 10 case files of “true cases” of terrorism (a purposive sampling) The O/C retrieved the case files from Investigating Police Officers (IPOs) and made copies available which process took two days. A “true case” for this purpose could have the statements of two or more persons suspected of having committed an offence (in this case, terrorism) with other information like the names of the suspect, his age, his occupation, his religion, his sex, his tribe etc. These are very important for the demography of the suspects. A sample statement form is as shown in Appendix F.

The next stage of data collection was to get the consent of Camp Commander of the IDP camps to collect other data relevant to the study. With the assurance of the team’s safety in the area of study, the researcher and his assistants visited the IDP camp at Teachers College Maiduguri, Borno State with letters of introduction that were addressed to the Commandant of the camp to allow for data collection. The choice of the Teachers College Maiduguri Camp amongst the eight IDP camps was based on its accessibility and security consideration. Moreover, it is more economical compared to camps in Gwoza and Malanfatori which were very far from the state capital. This also took cognisance of the Ethics Committee’s insistence on the safety of the researcher and the team, bearing in mind that research at a terrorist enclave is particularly dangerous as it exposes researcher to both expected and unexpected harms. (Lee-Treweek and Linkgole, 2000).

Lastly, both the quantitative data (questionnaire survey) and the qualitative data (Key Informants Interview (KIIs), In-depth Interviews and the transcribed abstractions of the telephone interviews including the police case files data was discussed in the next chapter. However, because of the highly sensitive nature of issues of anti-terrorism and counter-, terrorism efforts, quantitative

approach was not used to complement the qualitative methods applied in the case of the three top security operatives. But research by professionals from National Defence College and other experts in the field complemented this.

3.5. Research Instrument

The structured questionnaire is one of the key data collection instruments used for this study. The questionnaire consists of six sections [A-F]; (See Appendix G).

Section A: Demographic and socio-economic characteristics of the respondents. This section of the questionnaire contains variables such as age, gender, security apparatus, professional status, educational qualification, place of primary assignment, ethnicity, and religion. These variables are imperative for the study to give insight into the background of the respondents.

Section B: Causes of Boko Haram insurgency. This section of the questionnaire contains 12 causal factors questions on Boko Haram insurgency, and they are all close-ended questions with multiple choices. Some of the questions were in the Likert Scale type in which respondents were presented with alternative responses for each statement ranging from Strongly Agree (5) to Strongly Disagree (1). This was done to determine the more potent causal factors of Boko Haram insurgency.

Section C: Relationship between Boko Haram and other terrorist groups. This section of the questionnaire also consists of five close-ended questions which were presented in Likert scale type with numeric value 1–5 [strongly agree to Strongly Disagree] in form of simple statement to which respondents are to register their degree of the concurrence of personal feelings of their assessment of the relationship between Boko Haram and other terrorist groups.

Section D: Prevalence of Boko Haram in the North-east than in other geopolitical zones of Nigeria. This section has 12 questions on the prevalence factors. Six of the questions are in Likert scale in which respondents were presented with five alternative responses for each question ranging from ‘Strongly Agree’ to ‘Strongly Disagree’.

Section E: Sources of funds and arms used by Boko Haram. This section of the questionnaire contains six questions in five-point Likert scale format, ranging from Strongly Agree (Likert scale type) to Strongly Disagree with the numeric value of 1–5 respectively to capture the respondents’ answer. The questions in this section examined respondent’s view on sources of funds and arms by Boko Haram.

Section F: Consequences of Boko Haram insurgency on national development. This section also contains seven questions which were in Likert scale type to uncover the negative concomitant effects of Boko Haram activities on national development.

3.6. Validity and Reliability of the Research Instrument

The validity of the research instrument was ensured by conventional methods through the use of experts in the field of criminology. To enhance the validity of the questionnaire, a pilot study was conducted in Kano State which had a chequered history of religious violence in Nigeria. The test piloting was carried out on 25 participants and from the result of the analysis, the researcher showed the questionnaire to experts in the field of criminology. Their criticisms and suggestions were harmonized and also used for the modification of some items of the construct in the

questionnaire which gave further improvement on the questionnaire before the final administration for the study. The test and re-test method was utilised to ensure the reliability of the questionnaire.

3.6.1. Quality Assurance

In the study, both the quantitative and the qualitative data was triangulated as an integrative approach to complementing each other and enhancing the validity of the findings.

The essence of triangulation is to compensate for the weakness of looking at the problem of Boko Haram from a single angle or point of view. Thus, the triangulation method was performed as an attempt to map out or explain more fully the richness and complexity of human behaviour by studying it from more than one standpoint. (Cohen, Manion and Morrison, 2000). Thus, this is why the two methods were used to study the same problem. Thus, as Cresswell (2008) stated, triangulation is not just the mixing of data collection but:

... an approach that combined or associates both qualitative and quantitative form. It involves philosophical assumptions. It is more than collecting and analysing both kinds of data. It also involves the use of both approaches in tandem so that the average strength of the study is greater than the qualitative and quantitative research. (P4)

Thus, by this process, different types of evidence are brought together to test the sources of information against each other. This is why the two methods were employed to strengthen the validity of the findings of the study.

Triangulation in this research involves various instruments of data collection which includes questionnaire, in-depth/key Informant Interviews, telephone interview and content analysis of police case files. These provide a clear picture of the problem of Boko Haram; improved the analysis and interpretation of the collected data, thereby increasing its confidence thereof. While each of the tool has its peculiarities and merits, triangulations assures that any

weakness in any of the instruments is mitigated by the strength and potency of the other associating instruments.

However, one of the disadvantages of triangulations is its lack of a uniform methodology in applicability. There is also the tendency not to be able to explain one's technique adequately using varying methods for combining results. Triangulation is equally very costly as large budget is involved in deploying multiple / mixed methods. Finally, the approach produces large volume of data which makes the processing extensively time consuming and may also result in superficial treatment of same and potential for discrepant findings.

3.7. Procedures of Data Analysis

The quantitative data gathered with the structured questionnaire were edited and screened for possible errors. Data generated were scientifically processed through SPSS (Statistical Package for Social Sciences). The analysis was done in two stages. First, the univariate analysis was carried out using the simple percentage and frequency counts. The second analysis was for the bivariate variables in which the Chi-Square statistical analysis was used. In the case of the qualitative responses, the demographic characteristics of the respondents were not collected as suggested by the Ethics Committee. This is in line with the finding of Bhattacharjee (2012) and Yvonne and Dorothy (2007) that ethics of social research dictates that a researcher should take cognisance of few things in the study of human beings such as confidentiality, voluntary participation and to further ensure the anonymity of the respondents. The IDPs respondents are already traumatised in one way or the other by Boko Haram and should not be exposed to more dangers by forcing them to answer questions when they do not want to.

In-depth Interviews (IDIs) and Key Informal Interviews (KIIs) were conducted on Internally Displaced Person's (IDPs) in the camp and also the traditional rulers, religious leaders, general public, respectively. The IDIs and KIIs thematically centred on the first five research questions commencing from the causes of Boko Haram to the fifth on how the group's activities affects the Nigeria national development.

Meanwhile, responses by the KIIs and IDIs on why the war had prolonged and the challenges faced, were put together to answer the sixth research question (RQ6) dealing with counter- and anti-terrorism efforts employed by the Nigeria security personnel and their efficacies. An interview guide (see Appendix H) was used to elicit responses from the three senior security officials to augment responses of the KIIs and IDIs.

The participants were asked unstructured, context-specific and clarifying questions to guide the flow of questions and answers. The finalised scripts were analysed using the traditional way of going through the transcripts over and over to get used to them. Thereafter each sentence was categorized.

Thematic content analysis was used to code the data NVivo 20 (QSR International) using this iterative process by identifying emerging themes to define and refine their understanding in a broad and specific context. This process is guided mainly by the research questions (and other relevant themes) and continued over and over until saturation was achieved (i.e. no more themes emerge from the additional data) (Guba and Lincoln, 1994).

For the qualitative thematic analysis of the KIIs, IDIs and the case files, Braun and Clarke's (2006) thematic analysis was employed. Braun and Clarke indicated that the thematic analysis is a method for "identifying, analysing, and reporting the patterns or themes found across the data"

(P.79). To completely uncover the themes found in the data collected, the researcher performed a qualitative thematic analysis. The researcher followed the six steps or phases of thematic analysis by Braun and Clarke, which were the following:

- (1) familiarization of oneself with the data;
- (2) generation of initial codes;
- (3) searching for themes;
- (4) reviewing of themes;
- (5) defining and naming of themes; and the
- (6) production of the whole report” (P. 87).

The first phase was when the researcher read over the transcribed data a number of times to get acquainted with same. The researcher then listed down information and notes relevant to the research questions of the study. The next phase, initial codes from the transcriptions were generated; the codes assigned based on meaning provided for the data in the transcription. The third phase, involved searching for a theme across the data. This was when the researcher look for significant themes relevant in answering the research questions. As the coding process continued and themes added along the way, the researcher periodically reviewed the new found ideas based on the original data or the transcription content. The review of the new found ideas against the original data was to be sure that the themes were not based on researcher’s ideas and perceptions but were generated from the data gathered. The fifth and the last phase was describing and naming the themes based on their corresponding meaning. After this last phase, the transcriptions were uploaded manually in NVivo 20 by QSR to systematically code and tabulate the themes. The software was critical in determining the hierarchy of the themes, based on the number of references

(or times) they feature per transcription. Finally, after finalizing the themes, the report was written as well. (Braun and Clarke, 2006).

However, since the case files were not a result of a deliberate and guided interview by the researcher, only such themes that are relevant to the law enforcement agencies could be revealed. Thus, aspects like the relationship with other terrorist groups, how the group's activities affect Nigeria's national development can only be inferred from their statements to the police. The law enforcement agencies (the police) are only interested in getting information that could assist in the diligent prosecution of those in their custody. In view of this, not all research questions could find answers based on the coding of statements in the case files. All the entire qualitative transcriptions were typed in Microsoft Document and thereafter exported into NVivo for coding.

3.8. Ethical Considerations

The researcher sourced data mostly from victims of Boko Haram insurgency and the security personnel, especially the police who provided the researcher with access to 10 case files. Access to the victims of the insurgency was achieved by getting the approval of the heads of the Nigerian Army, Nigerian Air Force, Immigration and Nigerian Police within the area of study. However, to carry out research of this sensitive nature on the police required the approval of the Inspector General of Police (head of the police force of the entire country).

In any case, the researcher gave thoughtful consideration to the decision to conduct the research and complied with all ethical requirements and governmental regulations in Nigeria. No research study of participants was carried out that was not explicitly part of the approved Ethics Form. The decision of the respondents to participate in this research was based on the truly informed consent of the IDPs though with the consent of the IDP camp officials. This was to ensure that the respondents or subjects participated freely in the research. The case files were handled

with utmost secrecy and the identity of the Boko Haram suspects was not in any way disclosed to anyone. The collected data was handled carefully where it was saved in a passworded computer which only the researcher has access to.

3.9. Researchers' Background, Beliefs and Biases.

The researcher was a former police officer who had worked in the Nigerian Police for several years and now retired. He was a Commissioner of Police when he almost lost his life to Boko Haram when the Police Headquarters was attacked by the group in 2010 but fortunately survived because he was not in the office at the time of the attack. Although, a couple of officers lost their lives, the interest to conduct a study of the group started from that period. Thus, the IDPs, the KIIs and all the respondents are targets of Boko Haram from the year 2009 when the insurgency heightened. This was explained to the participants during the collection of data. This is with a view to making the respondents feel safe, gain their confidence and develop the willingness to participate in the study.

3.10. Problems Encountered on the Field

The research, on the whole, was not without its problems. These problems were inevitable based on the hostilities, fear and chaotic state of North-Eastern Nigeria. Lee-Treweek & Linkgole (2000) observed that doing research in a terrorist enclave such as a Boko Haram occupied area in the North-east is particularly dangerous, since it exposes the researcher to both expected and unexpected harm. These problems ranged from difficulty in the movement of researchers from one state to the other to bureaucratic upheavals and suspicion on the part of the respondents to the language barrier. Respondents demanded remuneration to partake in the interview; also government monitoring and interference, respondents attitude towards questionnaire and finally traversing the dilapidated inter-states roads. These are briefly discussed hereunder.

The researcher encountered transportation problem during the collection of data, plying from one part of the State to another was problematic. The researcher had to pass through various security checkpoints manned by soldiers and other security services. The researcher in the process of data collection once encountered members of the dreaded group as they attacked Damaturu (in neighbouring Yobe State). The researcher was moving to another State (Gombe) for further collection of data, as Damaturu is the main link road out of the Capital of Maiduguri. The itinerary had to be changed to the next area of study. The road was completely blocked, due to intensive stop and search being carried out by the military in response to the insurgency attack.

Similarly, getting across letters of introduction to the appropriate authority and carrying out the research was very difficult. This is because it was not easy to access the head of any of the security units especially the Military; hence, getting one's letters approved for the study involved a lot of security questioning, delays and sometimes apathy on the part of the junior officers who

often regarded researchers with suspicion. These difficulties were however mitigated with other agencies involved in the research. There was however the issue of mutual suspicion on the interviewer by especially those in the IDP camp based on the sensitive nature of the topic. This would be due to the horrible experiences they passed through in the hands of the militant group. Some had to trek to neighbouring Cameroon on foot, while the majority had lost members of their families.

Relatedly, there was also suspicion on the part of the security forces. At the commencement of this research, the research assistants were accosted by the camp commandant at Teacher's College IDPs camp on suspicion that their mission at the camp was dubious. It was my subsequent appearance that saved the situation and research proper started. Another difficulty was that respondents expected some form of inducement before speaking to the researchers. This was because Non-Government Organisations (NGOs) allegedly lure the IDPs with some gifts before interacting with them. It took the researchers some time to get willing participants for the research, but this did not substantially affect the quality of the data or number of volunteers for the study. Another problem encountered was the issue of time taken to interview one respondent. Initially, the proposal was to interview them in the form of a Focus Group but since the Ethics Committee advised against it, interviews were conducted one after the other to ensure anonymity and confidentiality. Focus Group Discussion could have saved some time as six to ten respondents could have been interviewed in 30 minutes. Considerable time was used since the researchers had to take on the respondents one at a time.

Furthermore, there was the language barrier among the research assistants. This was a source of worry hence the recourse to interpreters to record the responses in some cases. As for the problems encountered with the administration of the questionnaire, most of the respondents did not respond to the questions immediately, but took them to their residences and returned them filled. Thus, in the quantitative survey, out of the 150 copies of the questionnaire distributed, only 133 were returned fully completed and suitable for analysis.

Another problem encountered was the setting of the Teacher's College IDPs camp whereby apart from the leadership of the Army that controlled the camp, before the commencement of an interview, the researcher had to get the clearance of a certain camp chairman who was an appointee of the State government. The duty of the said chairman was to ensure that the role of the government in the crisis was not portrayed in a bad light by any respondent. The researcher had to ensure minimal interference by the chairman during the collection of data. The purpose of the research was partially explained to him,

Finally, there was difficulty in traversing the roads in the North-east covering Borno, Yobe, Bauchi, Gombe, Taraba and Adamawa. These roads covered more than 2,000 kilometres and are in a very bad state. Since commercial vehicles were mostly used to cover the distances, drivers charged higher as the roads worsened. This definitely is reflective of the cost of the research. The bad road also made the researcher miss an earlier appointment with the commissioner of Police in one of the States who was to get the letter of introduction approved for the exercise to commence.

Despite the myriad of problems encountered the field research which started in December 2016 ended by February 2017, with the collection of both quantitative and qualitative data. Also, the secondary data was collected in the form of 10 Police case files (copies) to complement the

qualitative data. These are presented and analysed in the preceding chapter dealing with Presentation and Analysis of data. However, all the problems encountered were teething challenges which didn't substantially affect the smooth conduct of the study.

CHAPTER FOUR

DATA PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

This chapter presents the analysis of data generated for this study. The study relied on both primary and secondary sources of information. For the primary data, both quantitative and qualitative data gathering techniques were employed, while official documents served as the sources of the secondary data. The analysis involved simultaneous reporting (a triangulation process) in which three sources of data (questionnaire, In-depth interview, case files and official documents) were used to complement one another. This was done to provide clarity and further gain the advantages of these methods within a single study and to overcome the deficiency that flows from employing one method in isolation. The study findings are presented thematically and in consonance with the study objectives using the following sub-headings:

- Socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents.
- Causes of Boko Haram in Nigeria.
- Relationship between Boko Haram insurgency and other international terrorist groups.
- Sources of funds and arms used by Boko Haram insurgents.
- Prevalence of Boko Haram in North-eastern Nigeria more than in other geographical zones in the country.
- Consequences of Boko Haram insurgency in relation to Nigeria's national development.
- Counter and anti-terrorism efforts of the Nigerian security agencies and their efficacies.

4.1. Socio-Demographic Characteristics of the Respondents

This section presents data on the socio-demographic characteristics of respondents from the survey and qualitative data from the police case files. Socio-demographic data from the survey are first presented. Key variables examined are respondents age, gender, religion, educational status, security outfit of operatives, operative cadre, and ethnicity.

Data presented in Table 4.1.1 showed that the age of the respondents, the majority (79.0%) were 44 years old and below. The gender distribution of the respondents showed that male respondents constituted (91.7%) of the total respondents, while female respondents accounted for only (8.3%). This presents a ratio of at least 11:1 across the gender groups, skewed in favour of the male. Data on the respondents' religious affiliation depicted that majority (57.2%) were Muslims, 33.8% were Christians, while the rest (9.0%) were the worshippers of traditional religion.

A significant finding is that Islam and Christianity remain the two popular religions among the respondents. Information on religious attribute is also deemed important to this study because the central tenet of the work is on religious violence. The information gathered on ethnicity showed that almost half, that is, (46.8%) of the respondents were Hausa followed by Fulani (35.8%), while Barah was the least among the respondents with 17.4%. On the educational background, data showed that more than half, that is (51.9%) of the respondents obtained either B.Sc./HND degree, 5.3%, possessed a postgraduate degree, while the rest (42.8%) had only Islamic education (Qur'anic background). The distribution of respondents by security outfit showed that the civilian Joint Task Force constituted (30.6%) of the security personnel followed, by the police (28.3%), Army (18.5%) Customs and Immigration (15.8%) while the rest (6.8%) were Air Force personnel.

Table 4.1.1: Demographic Characteristics of Respondents in Questionnaire Survey

Age	Frequency	Percentage
24 and below	8	6
25–34	70	53

35–44	27	20
45 and above	28	21
Total	133	100
Gender	Frequency	Percentage
Male	122	91.7
Female	11	8.3
Total	133	100
Religion	Frequency	Percentage
Islam	76	57.2
Christianity	45	33.8
Others	12	9
Total	133	100
Ethnicity	Frequency	Percentage
Kanuri		
Hausa	62	46.8
Fulani	48	35.8
Barah	23	17.4
Total	133	100
Educational Qualification	Frequency	Percentage
BSc/HND	69	51.9
Islamic Diploma	57	42.8
Post Graduate	7	5.3
Total	133	100
Security Personnel	Frequency	Percentage
Police	38	28.3
Army	24	18.5
Civilian JTF	41	30.6
Immigrations & Customs	21	15.8
Air Force	9	6.8
Total	133	100
State	Frequency	Percentage
Borno	67	51.9
Adamawa	27	20
Bauchi	16	12.1
Gombe	13	10
Yobe	5	3.0
Taraba	5	3.0
Total	133	100

The profile data shows that most of the respondents are males and Muslims. It is also revealed that most of the respondents are from the Hausa, Fulani and Kanuri ethnic group. The

preponderance of officers from these ethnic groups may imply an effective execution of the war against the Boko Haram insurgency as they are likely to be more familiar with the terrain than those from other ethnic groups.

The demographic characteristics of Boko Haram in police custody revealed dominance of male sex with 83.3% with 16.7% to being females. The average age is 29.6 years with a standard deviation of 9.6 years. About 62% are within the youth age of less than 34 years. Mohammed Yusuf the group's leader was killed by police at age 39. As for religion, significant percentage 97.6% are Muslims. This is not surprising for a group that resent western education and its supposed link with Christianity. On educational qualification, 87.5% have less than a college diploma with majority of them having Qur'anic school certificate. These may be influenced by Mohammed Yusuf's teaching that western education is a sin. About 38.1% of the Boko Haram suspects are engaged in menial jobs with 11.3% farmers, 2.4% herdsmen and 7.1% house wives. The group members are regarded as very low-income unskilled workers. On ethnicity 61.6% are Kanuri, Hausa 21.4 %, Fulani 9.5%, other ethnic groups constitute 7.7%.

As for the 219 respondents for the In-depth and Key informant interviews, (qualitative data), their socio-economic and bio-data was not obtained. This is to maintain their anonymity and confidentiality as advised by the Ethics Committee (see Appendix I) and to avoid giving out any information that could involve subsequent tracking and harming the respondents. The limitation posed by the exclusion of respondent's socio-economic profile was compensated for by sample size of the respondents which was quite large, thus getting varied responses from the respondents. Also, IDPs were identified by their sex, since that was easily identifiable.

4.2. Causes of Boko Haram in Nigeria

This section presents data on the causal factors of Boko Haram in Nigeria. The significance of the data lies in the shedding of light that Boko Haram originated as a result of the ills of society. In addressing causes of Boko Haram insurgency, respondents were asked on what they considered to be the major cause(s) of the Boko Haram insurgency. A list of probable causes was given as options for the question. A percentage analysis of responses based on the causes of Boko Haram insurgency is found in Table 4.2.1

Table 4.2.1: Causes of Boko Haram Insurgency

Poverty	Frequency	Per cent
Cause of Boko Haram Insurgency	117	88.0
Not cause of Boko Haram Insurgency	16	12.0
Total	133	100.0
Illiteracy	Frequency	Per cent
Cause of Boko Haram Insurgency	112	84.2
Not cause of Boko Haram Insurgency	21	15.8
Total	133	100.0
Unemployment	Frequency	Per cent
Cause of Boko Haram Insurgency	103	77.4
Not cause of Boko Haram Insurgency	30	22.6
Total	133	100.0
Corruption	Frequency	Per cent
Cause of Boko Haram Insurgency	76	57.1
Not cause of Boko Haram Insurgency	57	42.9
Total	133	100.0
Bad Government	Frequency	Per cent
Cause of Boko Haram Insurgency	73	54.9
Not cause of Boko Haram Insurgency	60	45.1
Total	133	100.1
Ethnicity	Frequency	Per cent
Cause of Boko Haram Insurgency	38	28.6
Not cause of Boko Haram Insurgency	95	71.4
Total	133	100.0
Almajiranci	Frequency	Per cent
Cause of Boko Haram Insurgency	25	28.0
Not cause of Boko Haram Insurgency	108	82.0
Total	133	100.0
Value Incongruity	Frequency	Per cent
Cause of Boko Haram Insurgency	27	20.3
Not cause of Boko Haram Insurgency	106	79.7
Total	133	100.0

Data presented in Table 4.2.1 show the percentage distribution of responses on the causes of Boko Haram insurgency. From the Table, 88% of the respondents attributed Boko Haram insurgency to poverty, 84.2% attributed it to illiteracy, 77.4% said unemployment, 57.1% mentioned corruption, 54.9% alluded the cause to bad governance, 28.6% mentioned ethnicity, 28.0% ascribed the insurgency to Almajiranci, and 20.3% owed the insurgency to value incongruity. From the data presented in Table 2.1, it can be deduced that the majority of the respondents attributed Boko Haram insurgency basically to poverty, illiteracy, unemployment and corruption. These are strains resulting into conditions or circumstances disliked by most members of groups in the society. Also, failure to possess the basic socio-economic needs of food, education and job often increased the likelihood of negative emotions, and created strain which may generate violent reaction favourable to terrorism.

Table 4.2.2: Causes of Boko Haram Insurgency

The extra-judicial killing of Boko Haram leader Mohammad Yusuf led the group to be violent and start attacking	Frequency	Percentage
Strongly Agree	25	18.8
Agree	55	41.3
Undecided	12	9.0
Strongly Disagree	17	12.8
Disagree	19	14.3
No response	5	3.8
Total	133	100.0
There is a relationship between religious extremist ideology and Boko Haram insurgency	Frequency	Per cent
Strongly Agree	68	51.1
Agree	39	29.3

Undecided	12	9.0
Disagree	11	8.3
Strongly Disagree	1	.8
No Response	2	1.5
Total	133	100.0
The Boko Haram is a recent reincarnation of Maitatasine movement of 1980	Frequency	Per cent
Strongly Agree	56	42.1
Agree	27	20.3
Undecided	25	18.8
Disagree	21	15.8
Strongly Disagree	1	.8
No Response	3	2.3
Total	133	100.0
There is a relationship between political-economic interest and Boko Haram insurgency in the North	Frequency	Percentage
Strongly Agree	35	26.3
Agree	48	36.1
Undecided	21	15.8
Disagree	6	4.5
Strongly Disagree	21	15.8
No response	2	1.5
TOTAL	133	100.0

As a further probe to explore the causes of Boko Haram, Likert Scale questions were asked from the respondents on the issue that may probably lead to the Boko Haram insurgency. Data presented in Table 4.2.2 revealed that at least half of the respondents (50.1%) agreed in both strong and mild terms that extra-judicial killing of Boko Haram leader Mohammed Yusuf, led the group to be violent and start attacking, while 27.7% disagreed in both strong and mild terms.

Concerning the relationship between religious extremist ideology and Boko Haram insurgency, the data in the Table 4.2.2 showed that an overwhelming majority (80.4%) of the respondents agreed in strong and mild terms that there is a relationship between religious extremist ideology and Boko Haram insurgency while 9.1% of the respondents disagreed. However, 9.0% and 1.5% of the respondents were undecided and did not respond to the question, respectively.

Data presented in Table 4.2.2 further shows the percentage distribution of responses on the statement that Boko Haram is a recent reincarnation of Maitatsine movement of 1980. Findings show that more than six out of ten respondents, that is (62.4%) of the respondents agreed in both strong and mild terms that Boko Haram is a recent reincarnation of Maitatsine movement of 1980. On the statement if there is a relationship between political-economic interest and Boko Haram insurgency in the North, the data in the Table indicated that almost two-third (that is 62.4%) of the respondents agreed in both strong and mild terms, 20.3% disagreed while 15.8% were undecided. However, 1.5% did not respond to the question. Worthy of note from these findings as they denote the summation of Agnew (1995) synopsis on strain, that wherever the aspiration-opportunity gap strikes it tends to generate deviation. Based on the Boko Haram ideological background belief and indoctrination which saw western education, modernisation and the likes as forbidden and unlawful resulted into their religious extremism.

Bivariate Analysis of Causes of Boko Haram Insurgency

Given the responses provided by the respondents on the causes of Boko Haram, further analysis was carried out to examine if there are socio-demographic variables responsible for the responses of the respondents. The Chi-square analysis was employed to analyse the quantitative portion of the study. Results of the Chi-square analysis revealed, for the most part, the quantitative data does not provide any relationship between respondents' socio-demographic profile and their responses

on the causes of Boko Haram insurgency. However, worthy of note, is the Chi-square result showing that there is a significant relationship between educational qualification and attribution of Boko Haram insurgency to bad governance.

Table 4.2.3: Relationship between Educational Qualification and Attribution of Boko Haram Insurgency to Bad Governance.

Educational Qualification	Bad Government as Cause of Boko Haram		Total
	Yes	No	
Islamiya School	4 100.0%	0 0.0%	4 100.0%
Primary Education	2 66.7%	1 33.3%	3 100.0%
Secondary Education	7 25.9%	20 74.1%	27 100.0%
NCE/OND	11 37.9%	18 62.1%	29 100.0%
HND/Degree	47 72.3%	18 27.7%	65 100.0%
Postgraduate	2 40.0%	3 60.0%	5 100.0%
Total	73 54.9%	60 45.1%	133 100.0%
$X^2 = 24.383$; $df = 5$; $p\text{-value} = .000$			

Table 4.2.3 shows that the calculated value (X^2) is 24.383 and the ‘p’ value is .000 which is less than the level of significance of 0.05. Hence, the Null proposition is rejected and the alternative is accepted. This implies that there is a relationship between educational qualification and attribution of cause of Boko Haram insurgency to bad government.

Table 4.2.3 shows that majority of the respondents with Islamic and primary education attributed Boko Haram to bad governance. However, the majority of the respondents with higher

educational qualification did not attribute Boko Haram insurgency to bad governance. The attribution of Boko Haram insurgency to the bad government by the majority of the respondents with Islamic and primary education could be attributed to the unemployability of those with lower education in the labour market compared to those with higher educational qualification. Thus, that category is likely to be heavily affected by the harsh economic realities which they readily attributed to bad governance.

Table 4.2.4: Relationship between Ethnic Group and Attribution of Boko Haram Insurgency to Ethnicity

Ethnic Group	Ethnicity as a Cause of Boko Haram		Total
	Yes	No	
Hausa	8 20.5%	31 79.5%	39 100.0%
Fulani	9 45.0%	11 55.0%	20 100.0%
Kanuri	4 17.4%	19 82.6%	23 100.0%
Igbo	0 0.0%	6 100.0%	6 100.0%
Barah	6 60.0%	4 40.0%	10 100.0%
Others	11 31.4%	24 68.6%	35 100.0%
Total	38 28.6%	95 71.4%	133 100.0%
$X^2 = 12.675$; $df = 5$; $p\text{-value} = .027$			

Data presented in Table 4.2.4 reveal that the calculated value (X^2) is 12.675 and the ‘p’ value is 0.027, which is greater than the level of significance of 0.05. Hence, the Null Proposition (H_0) is rejected and the Alternative (H_1) is accepted. This implies that there is a relationship between ethnic group and attribution of cause of Boko Haram insurgency to ethnicity.

Table 4.2.4 shows that all but one of the respondents across the ethnic groups believe that Boko Haram is not caused by ethnicity. Majority of the respondents from Barah ethnic believed that Boko Haram is caused by ethnicity. Since Barah being a minority ethnic group in Borno State and are likely to be facing marginalization from the larger Kanuri populace, it is also likely that they will look at the issue based on the Kanuri ethnic dominance towards their very small population. Thus, of the major ethnic groups in Borno State, Onuoha (2018) reported that of the major tribes in Borno State – Kanuri – has the highest with 6,980,000 persons. This cannot be compared with Barah tribe that has just little above 10,000 people (Census, 2011)

Some of the interviews held with the key informant interviews imputed in the NVivo reveals themes that corroborated the findings of the quantitative data. The themes range from issues of political factors (Theme 1), religious factor and issues (Theme 2), social issues (Theme 3), support of crime and violence (Theme 4), and influence of foreign terrorist groups (Theme 5). The responses are presented below:

A response from a police officer represents the dominant position of police officers interviewed.

Excerpt 1

Ignorance coupled with youth unemployment because most of them are poverty-stricken and keying into violence is the best option. By nature of their activities, it appears they have been sponsored. When somebody gives you a stipend and you don't have means of livelihood you can join him and carry out nefarious activities – **A police officer in an IDI in Gombe State. Male.**

Similarly, another police officer had this to say;

Excerpt 2

I will attribute it to poverty. The society is poverty-ridden and poor people are more vulnerable... They are poor and unemployed and the paymasters come handy and willing to pay whatever is required. – A police officer in an IDI in Yobe State. Male.

However, a religious leader had this to say:

Excerpt 3

It is planned something and it's due to the nonchalant attitude of the government in attacking them in an unprofessional way of enforcing unworkable laws... – A religious leader in a KII in Bauchi State. Male.

Comparing the responses across the two groups (police officers/religious leaders), it is found that while the majority of the police officers identified unemployment, poverty and ignorance by the youths as reasons for the Boko Haram insurgency; the religious leaders identified the nonchalant attitude of the government and lapses in nipping the problem in the bud before it escalates. The difference in responses is that while the religious leaders are equally versed in Islamic theology and may have found that Mohammed Yusuf's preaching was instigative and required immediate intervention of government, this was never the case. Hence, the blame on the government's initial responses to the groups' provocative teaching. However, police officers by nature of their calling and wider interaction with people of diverse background, including Boko Haram, may be talking from a standpoint of experience built over years of national service. Still, in the qualitative data, a Civilian JTF interviewed had this to say:

Excerpt 4

... It started during their preaching with activities that go against the law. For instance, they don't use plate numbers on their vehicles, they don't use a crash helmet, and they deliberately carry overload on their motorcycles and many other things. In order not to

allow the running of a parallel government, they should be stopped... – **A member of the civilian JTF in Bauchi State. Male.**

However, the typical response of the traditional rulers on the causes of Boko Haram is that:

Excerpt 5

Government don't assist the masses and Boko Haram use to give people money. – **A traditional ruler in Yobe state. Male.**

A group comparison of the responses between the civilian JTF and the traditional rulers indicates that while the civilian JTF stated that the Boko Haram group operates above the law of the land, ignorance of the teaching of religion by their followers and the killing of Mohammed Yusuf, as the reason for the insurgency, the traditional rulers identified poverty, absence of basic amenities and love for money by the youth as causes of the crisis.

The difference in their responses is that, while the Civilian JTF who are employed to assist the army in the fight against Boko Haram looked at the issue within the spectrum of law enforcement angle in identifying the causes, traditional rulers looked at the issue based on the constitutional responsibility of the government. Some examples include the following: to alleviate poverty, to provide welfare and protect them, and not to oppress them through the apparatus of the state as epitomised by the high handedness of the army towards the populace. In the Nigerian social structure, traditional leaders/rulers are the custodians of the people's culture and tradition and they are a form of government at the local level that administers the people from time immemorial. So from their point of view, the insurgency could have been avoided if the government had exercised caution and tact in dealing with the group and the general populace.

Reinforcing the earlier findings in the qualitative analysis, the Internally Displaced Camp which consists of both male and female members gave their different responses based on gender.

An IDP (male) gave his reason on the causes of Boko Haram as follows:

Excerpt 6

Unemployment contributed to escalating this problem and also hypocrisy; if not because of hypocrisy, how do you just slaughter your fellow Muslim brother and describe him as an infidel? – **A male IDP in an IDI in Yobe State.**

Another IDP (male) asserts that:

Excerpt 7

Unemployment is the major cause; graduates are roaming the streets with unemployment. – **A male IDP in IDI in Adamawa State.**

For the IDP (female) one of them said that:

Excerpt 8

I don't know, some say religion and others say western education. – **A female IDP in an IDI in Bauchi State.**

While comparing the responses of the two groups – IDP females and IDP male, it was found that while the responses of the IDP females were diverse and oftentimes scanty, the IDP males mainly agreed that unemployment is the main cause of Boko Haram. The difference in their responses is that the IDP female comprised of mainly uninformed and uneducated villagers. The females are mainly concerned with their source of income – small farms and local commercial outlets that have been destroyed by Boko Haram. For the male IDPs who have identified unemployment, it mainly showed a level of exposure, a bit higher than their female counterparts. Also, as the level of interaction of the male IDPs with the society is quite broader, they are more conversant with the happenings in the society than the women folks who are basically confined in

a harem in the Northern part of Nigeria, where Islamic injunctions of keeping women away from public glare is still being practised. The men move out to farms, markets, hospitals, filling stations, schools, colleges, neighbouring countries etc. In sum, the causes of Boko Haram as revealed by popular rating from above discourse and also word clouds (see Appendix J) include unemployment, politics, poverty, and misrule which rank higher on the causes of Boko Haram across categories.

Furthermore, reinforcing the results in the quantitative analysis, other respondents interviewed (members of the general public) have these responses on causes of Boko Haram:

Excerpt 9

It's because of religious fanaticism. Religion brings a lot of problems, especially in some preaching sessions. Not every Islamic scholar can preach and some of them are not perfect enough to preach they just kill people, – A female respondent in a community in Yobe state.

Another one offered that:

Excerpt 10

Whenever the government fails and a group rose to challenge it, naturally people will not consider the nature and ideology of the group. All that people are after is who will subjugate this failed government and that is why people supported the group and even accepted the members. – A male respondent in a community in Gombe state.

So, their responses are a mix of religious fanaticism, failure of the government to meet public expectations and the concept of political thuggery bred by politicians. However, politicians as respondents offered that:

Excerpt 11

Misrule, corruption and marginalization led to all these ... yes, poverty is the mother of all crime it has eaten deep in the fabric of North-east, misrule also contributed. – A politician in a KII in Bauchi State. Male.

Excerpt 12

I will attribute this to poverty. The society is poverty-ridden and poor people are more vulnerable. The architect designs its use of money to catch the easy prey with a little token. They are so poor and unemployed. – A politician in a KII in Yobe State. Male.

Thus, comparing the two groups i.e. members of the general public and politician respondents; their responses all agreed that religious fanaticism and politics play a great role as causes of Boko Haram. Whereas the general public believes a mix of religious fanaticism and politics have roles to play, the respondents claim that the role of failure of the government to eradicate poverty, marginalization, misrule are all government-related actions that have political underpinnings. This does not, however, negate the role of religious fanaticism in any way, but a way of subsuming religious activities and provocative preaching as fall out of party politics. That but for politics or the role of politicians, the evolution of Yussuffiyi movement which later changed to Boko Haram may have been averted. Nevertheless, the commonalities of opinions on the causes of Boko Haram, by popular ranking centred on illiteracy and other social issues like poverty and unemployment. These findings mirrored the results from the quantitative analysis. Put in another way, the most popular findings are explanations surrounded by strain of illiteracy, poverty, joblessness and grievances borne out of frustration, religious motive and exploitation.

To further corroborate the findings from the questionnaire, the key informant interview and the In-depth interview, the theme generated from the NVivo in respect of the responses from the case files were presented regarding those that were offered with money, job or livelihood to

join the group. The responses were diverse and presented in a manner (as stated in the methodology) to remove elements of any bias thus:

Excerpt 13

That since I don't have money that he has a job for me that will give me fast money... he gave me N5,000 after this, he employed me as their spy. – A Boko Haram Suspect. Male.

Lack of money to the extent of collecting N5,000 (less than \$16) to join Boko Haram is indicative of poverty. Poverty portends a person's inability to meet his basic needs. That, the reaction of the respondent to the offer clearly shows his status in society.

Excerpt 14

I engage in Boko Haram activities because of poverty. – A Boko Haram Suspect. Male.

The above statement directly ascribed the action of the respondent to be caused by poverty. The next respondent was also given a meagre N5,000.00 (\$16) as incentive to join the group.

Excerpt 15

That I was together with Babawo Musa Kalla, Modu Walle and Sanni Hussaini on the day we killed Awana Ngala... There, he gave us N5,000 – A Boko Haram Suspect. Male.

Boko Haram regards Western education as a sin. One respondent, who was in paid employment, destroyed his college certificates and joined the group. It speaks volumes of his reason for the decision thus:

Excerpt 16

... I am a civil servant with Konduga local education department. I can remember in 2013 when I joined Boko Haram, I decided to tear off my documents... I was given twenty-five thousand Ak-47 to supply my people which I also did... – A Boko Haram Suspect. Male.

The researcher will be cautious to suggest that the certificate, which is a symbol of Western education, is of no relevance and cannot guarantee any meaningful future; hence his decision to join the extremist group. The same lack of faith in Western education may have driven the next respondent to state thus:

Excerpt 17

I can remember in the year 2013 I decided to leave the school. I mean the polytechnic and join Boko Haram... First, I was given the sum of two hundred thousand to go and kill my father which I also did it. For the first time, after I have killed my father, I was given a sum of one million naira (N1,000,000.00). – A Boko Haram Suspect. Male.

Apart from the lack of faith in Western education, there could be influence of peer group in the action of the respondent. However, one cannot see the reasonability for the merciless killing of his father, even as N1,000,000 (\$5,000) was an incentive. It also shows the group using the money to induce and recruit new followers.

Another statement of Boko Haram suspect that seems similar to this is:.

Excerpt 18

That, since I don't have money that he has a job for that, will give me fast money by being a spy in the town of Maiduguri because they are the ones that have been doing the killings in Maiduguri metropolis, that was a year ago. The first time I met with Konto he gave me the sum of N5,000 after that, he employed me as their spy – A Boko Haram Suspect. Male.

Thus, if poverty has to do with lack of material possession (like in this case money) to meet up basic personal needs, then to employ him for mere N5,000.00 (\$20) to act as a spy could be attributed to poverty. This same picture is being painted where a member was given the same

amount (N5,000) to carry out Boko Haram operations, some joined the group because of coercion exemplified by the following responses:

Excerpt 19

I was alone in the house when Boko Haram launched an attack on a military base in our area and they were exchanging fire and I ran into the house and suddenly one man a member of Boko Haram sect with his AK47 rifle in a car was firing, he saw me on top of our house fence trying to cross to our neighbours' house he stops and gripped me and forced me into his car.... – **A Boko Haram Suspect. Male.**

While the next case, akin to the above is:

Excerpt 20

... the Boko Haram members took me forcefully to Gwoza and detained me ... and asked me to work for them – **A Boko Haram Suspect. Male.**

However, an interesting theme that emerged is that for a woman to belong to the group, it is mainly through marriage in either lawful union or having been abducted after a village was raided. This is exemplified by the following excerpts:

Excerpt 21

It was during the invasion of the Boko Haram insurgency in our place that all the villages were captured by Boko Haram members... that is how my husband Alhaji Ali married me – **A Boko Haram Suspect. Female.**

Excerpt 22

... I had no option but to follow as a wife – **A Boko Haram Suspect. Female.**

The two examples signified abduction as the reason for joining the group, while the following typified a lawful union to a Boko Haram member without prior knowledge of his status.

Excerpt 23

We got married five months ago, after our marriage we came to Maiduguri and settled at Jidari polo ward in a hired house. I never knew he is a member of Boko Haram and he did not discuss that with me – A Boko Haram Suspect. Female.

From the excerpts above it is clear that some women arrested as Boko Haram members entered a relationship with members of the group and these members kept back their identity from their spouses. The other case involved conscription of young men to fight for the group and abduction of women to use them as sex slaves (forced marriage) as could be suggested from the Chibok girls' abduction.

Just as there are reasons for joining the Boko Haram group, there are also reasons for leaving the group. The reasons include lacking necessities of life such as food and medicines, not willing to go back to the bush again and developing the unwillingness to fight. A case of unwillingness to fight can be gleaned from the following excerpt:

Excerpt 24

The reason why I left Boko Haram is that I saw that there is too much blood; I killed and was disturbing me – A Boko Haram Suspect. Male.

Thus, the summation of the finding from the In-depth and key informants interview that Boko Haram causal factors are characterized with peculiarities of strains of poverty, joblessness and other identified disadvantageous factors that pushed the Islamic sect into engaging in religious violence, tantamount to act of terrorism. In other words, terror driven acts as in the case of Boko Haram are committed as retaliation or vengeance for a perceived wrong as a result of continuous strain, which has provided fertile ground to germinate seed of terrorism.

4.3.1. Relationship Between Boko Haram Insurgency and Other International Terrorist Groups

This section is considered to be very important as it presents findings on the relationship between Boko Haram insurgency and other terrorist groups in the world. The approach adopted will be useful in unravelling whether Boko Haram relates with other international terrorist groups.

Table 4.3.1

Boko Haram allegiance to ISIS was a clear indication of the relationship between Boko Haram and another international Terrorist group	Frequency	Percentage
Strongly Agree	11	8.3
Agree	28	21.1
Undecided	10	7.5

Disagree	43	29.3
Strongly Disagree	39	32.3
No response	2	1.5
Total	133	100
Modus Operandi and attacks of Boko Haram are similar to that of the other international Terrorist groups	Frequency	Percentage
Strongly Agree	12	9.0
Agree	19	14.3
Undecided	17	12.8
Disagree	33	24.8
Strongly disagree	50	37.6
No response	2	1.5
Total	133	100
Intelligence reports are linking Boko Haram and other international terrorist groups	Frequency	Percentage
Strongly Agree	71	53.4
Agree	43	32.3
Undecided	9	6.8
Disagree	2	1.5
Strongly Disagree	6	4.5
No Response	2	1.5
Total	133	100.0

Data presented in Table 4.3.1 depicted the relationship between Boko Haram and other international terrorist groups. Relationship between Boko Haram and other terrorist groups has not been fully established as (61.6%) of the respondents disagreed mildly and in strong terms on the open allegiance of the group to ISIS. However, significantly, the majority (85.7%) of the respondents agreed in both strong and mild terms that there is intelligence report linking Boko Haram with other international terrorist groups, while a small part (6%) of the respondents disagreed both in strong and mild terms. The inference deduced from this finding is that Boko Haram has a significant link with other international terrorist groups. On the modus operandi of attack by Boko Haram, more than six out of ten, that is 62.4% of the respondents disagreed of any

similarity. This finding also indicates that there are no strong ties between the group and other International Terrorist Group.

However, the findings from the result of the qualitative analysis (KIIs and IDIs) from the four themes coding in the NVivo contrasted somehow with the quantitative findings suggesting that Boko Haram received technical support and training from international terrorist groups (Theme 1). The group is connected with other terrorist groups i.e. Al Qaeda and ISIS (Theme 2). The group received other types of supports from international terrorist group thereby their increasing confidence and their efficacies (Theme 3), only (Theme 4) is different, believing that Boko Haram has no relationship with other international groups (Theme 4). See Appendix K.

A male IDP had expressed his view on whether Boko Haram has a relationship with other international terror groups;

Excerpt 25

They use to get the support of other countries. There is a leading Boko Haram arrested with seven different international passports. If he has no relationship with foreign countries, where did he get them? – A male IDP in an IDI at the Teacher's Village. Male.

A Civilian JTF had this to say:

Excerpt 26

...we had a confession of one of the suspects that they used to receive supplies from Chad... they have foreign backing – **A member of the civilian JTF in an IDI in Adamawa State. Male.**

The Police Officer respondent had this to say:

Excerpt 27

Yes, from all indications because they paid homage to ISIS and they even use their flag – **A police officer in an IDI in Adamawa State. Male.**

Another Police Officer responded in the following way:

Excerpt 28

Looking at the ISIS war, no doubt they have hardware or transfer of information. There is a direct connection between them. They even changed their name to the Islamic State of West Africa (ISWA) – **A police officer in Borno State. Male.**

Meanwhile, comparing the police officers' responses and those of the civilian JTF, the responses are in corroboration that there is a relationship between Boko Haram and other terrorist groups. The two groups all agreed on the role of other terror groups in Boko Haram's sophistication and the effect of the open declaration by the group to the relationship with ISIS.

There are, however, some deviations in responses in Theme 4 which indicate that there is no relationship between Boko Haram and other international terrorist groups; just as was the case with the quantitative data. Meanwhile, in Theme 5, it points to a treacherous relationship between the group and some Nigerian Army officers. Concerning all the responses, the most dominant responses indicated a relationship with other international terror groups such as ISIS and Al-Qaeda including a wide range of foreign support in the group's operations.

The use of outside technicians, the sophistication in the method of operation, receipt of support from neighbouring countries, access to huge sums of money, payment of homage to ISIS, arrest of foreign fighters by security operatives, conspiracy by the West to instigate a crisis and sell off their arms, acquiring of foreign support are some reasons advanced by the respondents on the relationship between Boko Haram and other terrorist groups. The overall picture which emerges from both the quantitative and qualitative findings still gives the impression that Boko Haram has a link to or relationship with other terrorist groups. Based on the findings, it is suggestive that religious fundamentalism uses global forces linked to radicalisation and violence.

The homogenous nature of the behavioural and action traits of Boko Haram has semblance with other international terrorist group. One possible explanation for this, is that the idea of Jihad involved intensification of radicalisation which is often attributed to spectre of disorientation, a sort of social strain of negative influence and blocked opportunities. Consequent upon the notion of this social strain and blocked opportunities on the group, the need to overcome these obstacles by way of seeking a coalition and alliances with stronger or more established groups becomes a ready option. This connotes a relationship between groups for mutual benefit or to achieve some common purpose even with or without any explicit agreement between them. For example, the Boko Haram will gain financial or instrument assistance from ISIS or AQIM while in return the later will advance this to establish a base in West Africa as evidenced by Islamic State of West African Province (ISWAP) getting a foothold in the Lake Chad region.

4.4. Sources of Arms and Funds

This section presents participants' responses on findings on the sources of funds and arms by Boko Haram. Data on the sources of funds are core issues in this study. This is despite the efforts of the Nigerian security forces, the fight against Boko Haram continued unabated. This is suggestive of

a source either of arms or funds or both from a particular person, group or country that has continued to prolong the war.

Table 4.4.1: Boko Haram's Sources of Arms and Funds

Boko Haram Sourced Money and Arms from Nigerian Government	Frequency	Percentage
Strongly Agree	28	21.
Agree	30	22.6
Undecided	12	9.0
Strongly disagree	19	14.3
Disagree	40	30.1
No response	4	3.0
TOTAL	133	100.
Boko Haram Sourced Money and Arms from National and International Sympathizers	Frequency	Percentage
Strongly Agree	33	24.8
Agree	42	31.6
Undecided	16	12.0
Disagree	14	10.5
Strongly Disagree	21	15.8
No response	7	5.3
TOTAL	133	100
Foreign Countries as Sources of Arms and Funds to Boko Haram	Frequency	Percentage
Strongly Agree	53	29.8
Agree	35	26.3
Undecided	19	14.3
Strongly Disagree	8	6.0
Disagree	11	8.3
No response	7	5.3
TOTAL	133	100
Boko Haram Produced Their Arms or Led and Sourced Money from Criminal Activities Like Armed Robbery, Kidnapping and Cattle Rustling.	Frequency	Percentage
Strongly Agree	54	40.6
Agree	35	26.3
Undecided	11	8.3
Strongly disagree	11	8.3
Disagree	11	8.3
No Response	11	8.2
TOTAL	133	100

Table 4.4.1 presents data on Boko Haram's sources of arms and funds. Data presented in the Table indicate that less than half, that is 43.7% of the respondents agreed in both strong and mild terms that Boko Haram gets a supply of arms and funds from the Nigerian Government, 44.4% of the respondents disagreed in both strong and mild terms while the rest 9% were undecided. Furthermore, the table shows that that majority of the respondents, 56.4% agreed in strong and mild terms that international terrorist groups constitute sources of arms and funds to Boko Haram, while 26.3% disagreed in strong and mild terms. It is revealed that 12% of the respondents were indifferent. The deduction from this finding is that international terrorist groups were providing funds and arms to Boko Haram.

Furthermore, data presented in the table indicate that more than half, that is 56.1% of the respondents agreed in both strong and mild terms that there is involvement of foreign countries in the issue of funds and arms to Boko Haram, while 14.3% disagree in both strong and mild terms, while the rest (14.3%) of the respondents were undecided. Lastly, data presented in the table show that majority (66.9%) of the respondents agreed in both strong and mild terms that Boko Haram sourced their arms and funds through armed robbery and other criminalities while 16.6% of the respondents disagreed, the rest, 8.3% of the respondents were either undecided or non-registered view. Thus, the inference to be drawn from these findings is that Boko Haram used armed robbery as one of the avenues to source for funds and arms for the insurgency. However, these findings imply that there is a convergence of opinions that Boko Haram accesses funds and arms from multiple sources.

Findings from the In-depth and Key Informant interviews further provide illumination on the quantitative results. From the NVivo coding of the KII and IDI it is apparent that Boko Haram groups commit crimes such as robbery, kidnapping, and extortion to acquire arms (Theme1),

attacking the military and police to sustain their arms (Theme 2), the group is funded by foreign groups and sponsors (Theme 3), Boko Haram is funded by local groups and sponsors (Theme 4), the group is supported by the government and military officers (Theme 5), and the group has its arms transported across international borders (Theme 6).

The majority of the respondents (Civilian JTF, politicians, police officers, religious leaders, traditional leaders) offered that the group sourced its arms and funds through smuggling, helicopters dropping arms from the sky, arms smuggling following the fall of Gaddafi, laxity by government/security agencies, corruption by security agents, kidnapping, extortion and armed robbery. Thus, the response of one of the security agents (police officer) stated thus:

Excerpt 29

They got some of the weapons through the borders, Chad, Cameroon and the Niger Republic and most importantly the Chad border... Similarly, the Libyan crisis led to the proliferation of firearms which entered into the hands of Boko Haram... – **A Police Officer in an IDI in Bauchi State. Male.**

Another respondent stated that,

Excerpt 30

As militants, they use force and brutal means to get the money they need for all their activities... Look at how they attacked the army and take away their arms... – **A Police Officer in an IDI in Borno State. Male.**

Comparing some of the categories on sources of arms (Police Officers against other respondents) suggests that no substantial variance in the pattern of responses from the key informant interview as they all agreed that arms are sourced by means of “direct criminal

activities”, like smuggling, armed robbery, attacks on military formations, kidnapping, extortion, etc.

Some of the religious leaders blamed the government when asked on how Boko Haram acquires its arms and funds. One of them remarked:

Excerpt 31

... Look at how the largest cattle market in the region was destroyed, a market surrounded by three military formations and they did not respond and many other things like this happened which shows the government is interested in the violence and can go any length to supply them with weaponry’ – A religious leader in an IDI in Yobe State. Male.

A police officer stated that:

Excerpt 32

‘The dethronement of Gaddafi led to the proliferation of firearms from Libya and Boko Haram has access to it, coupled with the porous nature of our borders...’ – A Police Officer in an IDI in Taraba State. Male.

While another police officer respondent remarked that:

Excerpt 33

For a group to sack the whole military formation there must be foreign backing. There was a time when they paid allegiance to ISIS. So, we can’t rule out the possibility of international support ... – A Police Officer in an IDI at the Teachers’ Village. Male.

There is a noticeable variation in the responses between the Police Officers and religious leaders. While the Police Officers pointed to the issue of the group (Boko Haram) acquiring their arms through porous borders after the fall of Gaddafi, they also identified successful attacks on military

formations and carting away of arms as other source of arms. However, the religious leaders have also identified attacks on military formations as one of the sources of arms but blamed the army for the abdication of duty by not rising to the occasion when such attacks were made.

The variation in responses may be due to the position of Police Officers as employees of the government who may not blame the government nor their Army Officers counterpart. For religious groups, they have no reservations for the government apparent laxity to protect its people and relayed the facts as they observed them. Also, stealing of arms from security formations is not limited to army formations alone as even police stations are equally vulnerable when it comes to attacks by Boko Haram. At least not less than six police divisions were attacked when the researcher was the Commissioner of Police in Borno State in 2012 and some cases the arms carted away. On a general note, Boko Haram sources their arms/funds from foreign sources/sponsors, porous borders, and attacks on targets like military/police formations and others. This can also be gleaned from the word clouds. (See Appendix L).

Findings from the police case files are hereby presented to corroborate the findings from the survey, Key Informant Interview and In-depth Interview.

One of the Boko Haram suspects stated thus:

Excerpt 34

... one Kaka Ali Modu introduced me to Boko Haram when they attacked Koko barracks and Konduga LGA. When we get to Wawa Barrack (Not real names) we broke their armour... – A Boko Haram suspect. Male.

One other suspect stated thus;

Excerpt 35

... my friends and myself planned and armed ourselves with one Ak-47 rifle, two pistols and went to a house near University Teaching Hospital, Maiduguri and shot one Policeman on guard and carried away his Ak-47 rifle. it was Ba 'ana that brought the three arms from the Chad Republic – A Boko Haram suspect. Male.

The purpose of the attacks was to secure arms for Boko Haram operations. Attacks on army barracks, police stations, and policemen on guard being typical cases. The last textual statement dealing on bringing of arms from the Chad Republic is also suggestive of porous nature of our borders and also the involvement of foreign groups.

A suspect's statement from the police file contains the following:

Excerpt 36

'I was born and brought up at Gasauri village I am a businessman. I bought many donkeys from one Hama who is a cow dealer of Boko Haram I am a Boko Haram member – A Boko Haram suspect. Male.

This suggests that Boko Haram engages in some shady business transactions to raise funds for its operations. One of the suspects from the police case file has this as part of his statement:

Excerpt 37

I and my friends stole a motorcycle from one house along Abiya Ward, Gambiru Ngala to assist our sect members of Boko Haram to carry out attacks within some of the Local Government Areas across the State. But unfortunately, we did not succeed that day but we were arrested... ' – A Boko Haram suspect. Male.

The above examples suggest that funds are sourced by way of “criminal victimization.” In the same vein, a wife of a runaway Boko Haram member who was in custody stated thus:

Excerpt 38

... I have never known him as Boko Haram all this while, not until last week when I started seeing new faces as visitors and they started bringing items recovered (stolen) in our house when I saw those things, I cautioned my husband....’ – A Boko Haram suspect. Female.

The above further suggests the use of criminal victimization to get funds by Boko Haram. This could be with knowledge of their families or sometimes by keeping their membership of Boko Haram to themselves alone like as stated in extract 37. However, an interesting theme that emerged is the place used as an armoury by the Boko Haram group. It is apparent that the sectional leaders (Amirs) keep their guns and distribute them for operations and collect same thereafter as can be gleaned from the following responses:

Excerpt 39

I can remember when myself Babagana Habib... armed ourselves with dangerous weapon AK47 and attacked different places within Maiduguri, actually our Almir the leader, he is the one who used to keep our arms his house – A Boko Haram suspect. Male.

From the above presentation, Boko Haram acquires its funds and arms from criminal victimisations like armed robbery, kidnapping, cattle rustling, and illegal across-the-border activities. Also, arms stolen are closely guarded and protected by the ‘Amir’ and only issued out when there is a major operation. Thus, unlike conventional army or security forces where arms are in custody of a junior officer named armourer, for the Boko Haram the leader of the group called ‘Amir’ has the responsibility. From all indications, the epitome of both the quantitative and qualitative study findings, reflect a strong conception that strains may significantly increase the likelihood that a group may be lured to engage in all sorts of criminality to achieve its desired goal. Thus, it can be inferred that Boko Haram sources its funds and arms via criminal activities like

kidnapping for ransom, armed robbery, attack on police and military formation, arms smuggling, extortion and criminal conspiracy with international terrorist groups.

4.5. Prevalence of Boko Haram Insurgency in the North-east than in Other Geopolitical Zones of the Country

This section presents findings on the prevalence of Boko Haram in the North-east than in other geopolitical zones of Nigeria. The data presented here addressed why the activities of the sect were more pronounced in the North-east zone of Nigeria than in other regions of the country.

Table 4.5.1: Prevalence of Boko Haram insurgency in North-east Nigeria

Prevalence of Boko Haram in the North-east is due to the North-east being the poorest geopolitical zone in Nigeria	Frequency	Per cent
Yes	57	42.9
No	76	57.1
Total	133	100.0
Prevalence of Boko Haram in the North-east is due to the North-east being the most porous geo-political zone in terms of inhabitancy and entry	Frequency	Per cent
Yes	84	63.2
No	49	36.8
Total	133	100.0
Prevalence of Boko Haram in the North-east is due to the North-east being the political zone with the highest illiteracy rate in Nigeria	Frequency	Per cent
Yes	90	67.7
No	43	32.3
Total	133	100.0
Prevalence of Boko Haram in the North-east is due to the North-east being the political zone with different Islamic sects in Nigeria	Frequency	Per cent
Yes	81	60.9
No	52	39.1
Total	133	100.0
Prevalence of Boko Haram in the North-east is due to the North-east being the political zone with the most potent history of Maitasine in Nigeria	Frequency	Per cent
Yes	73	54.9
No	60	45.1
Total	133	100.0
Prevalence of Boko Haram in the North-east is due to the heterogeneous nature of the North-east geopolitical zone	Frequency	Percent
Yes	95	71.4
No	38	28.6
Total	133	100.

Table 4.5.1 contains data on the prevalence of Boko Haram insurgency in the North-east than in other geo-political zones of the country. The table shows that 42.9% of the respondents stated that the prevalence of Boko Haram in the North-east was due to the North-east being the poorest geopolitical zone in Nigeria. However, 57.1% stated otherwise. With respect to the statement if the prevalence of Boko Haram in the North-east is due to the North-east being the most porous geo-political zone in terms of inhabitancy and entry, the tables show that 63.2% of the respondents stated that prevalence of Boko Haram in the North-east is due to the North-east being the most porous geo-political zone in terms of inhabitancy and entry. However, 36.8% had a contrary view. On the statement if the prevalence of Boko Haram in the North-east is due to the North-east being the political zone with the highest illiteracy rate in Nigeria, the data presented in the tables show that 67.7% of the respondents stated that prevalence of Boko Haram in the North-east was due to the North-east being the political zone with the highest illiteracy rate in Nigeria while 32.3% did not agree with this position. The data presented in the table show the percentage distribution of responses on if the prevalence of Boko Haram in the North-east is due to the North-east being the political zone with different Islamic sects in Nigeria. Findings revealed that 60.9% of the respondents stated that prevalence of Boko Haram in the North-east was due to the North-east being the political zone with different Islamic sects in Nigeria while 39.1% stated otherwise.

With respect to the percentage distribution of responses on if the prevalence of Boko Haram in the North-east was due to the region being the political zone with the most potent history of Maitasine in Nigeria, data presented in the table show that 54.9% of the respondents stated that prevalence of Boko Haram in the North-east is due to the North-east being the political zone with the most potent history of Maitasine in Nigeria while 45.1 stated otherwise. Lastly, the table presents the percentage distribution of responses on if the prevalence of Boko Haram in the North-

east is due to the heterogeneous nature of the North-east geo-political zone. It was indicated that 71.5% of the respondents stated that the prevalence of Boko Haram in the North-east was due to the heterogeneous nature of the North-east geopolitical zone while 28.6% expressed a contrary view.

Relatedly, there is concurrence between the qualitative and quantitative results on the area of localisation of Boko Haram to the North-east (Research Question 4) regarding unemployment, poverty, potent history of insurgency and the status of Maiduguri as the centre of Islamic religion. This can be seen from some of the themes generated by NVivo coding in respect of the qualitative data (from KIIs and IDIs) regarding localisation to North-east thus:

Theme 1: Maximising the lack of education and awareness of the citizens in the North-eastern part of Nigeria.

Theme 2: Being founded by a leader from the North-eastern part.

Theme 3: Stemming from the religious upsurge in the area.

Theme 4: Triggering the violent nature of individuals in the area (from crimes and violence).

Theme 5: Maximizing the unfortunate conditions of poverty and unemployment in the area.

This can also be gleaned from the word cloud (See Appendix M). The interview excerpts (a mix of KII, IDI and extract from the case files) further buttressed these findings. A female IDP interviewed spoke thus:

Extract 40

It is an ideology formed by a native of the region and his people followed him – A female IDP in an IDI in Borno State.

A respondent from the general public had this to say:

Excerpt 41

Poverty: if you are poor, you can easily follow whoever offers to give you money because poverty is a very serious problem. And I never have an interest in it – A female respondent from a community in Yobe state.

Another respondent from the general public viewed the issue of the prevalence of Boko Haram in the North-east thus:

Excerpt 42

This is because of fanaticism... you know religion means a way to teach others what God has said and people actually in Borno State are mostly illiterates. If you are with any form of religion, they will accept it. The word religion is the most important thing to them so that is why you will find a religious crisis in Maiduguri – A male respondent from a community in Borno state.

Furthermore, another respondent from the general public looked beyond the people when he stated thus:

Excerpt 43

The terrain of the area favours this kind of activities. They have a vast area that is mainly uninhabited like Sambisa forest, Gwoza Hills, Alagarno bush in southern Borno and Gujba – A male respondent from a community in Borno state.

Comparing the responses of the two groups – IDP and General Public – it appears majority agreed that illiteracy, poverty, ignorance by the youth of religious extremism and the rugged and

uninhabited terrain makes the North-east a veritable location for the emergence and sustenance of the terrorist group.

A follow-up excerpt on localisation by one of the respondents in police case file indicates:

Excerpt 44

*... I was born and brought up in Maiduguri. On Sunday at about 05:00hrs I went to one filling station where food is being sold and bought Maltina and drinks. From there I saw Borno Express. I came nearer the vehicle with the hope of getting someone I know from Maiduguri. I heard someone from vehicle calling me to come in Kanuri, I told him I don't understand Kanuri. From there he said for so long they have been looking for me. He said I was amongst the wanted Boko Haram. I told him I was not a Boko Haram member. What happens in our area Umari, there are many Boko Haram in which a lot of Kanuri boys do come to us.... they think we are having the same doctrine – **A Boko Haram Suspect***

From the above statement, it is apparent that the speaking of Kanuri language resonates Boko Haram identity. Similarly, that there were so many Boko Haram in their area with a lot of Kanuri boys portrays that once one is from the Kanuri tribe he would be branded as a Boko Haram member, depending on the prevailing situation. Similarly, from the thematic category generated in the NVivo on the education of Boko Haram members, it is clear that majority of the members did not attend any form of Western education (Theme 1) and others who only attended Arabic school (Theme 2) and could loosely be regarded as illiterates. Thus, illiteracy of the people of the area could be linked with the localisation of the group to the North-east.

Some of their responses are as follows:

Excerpt 45:

I have never been to any modern school, but I have undergone Islamic studies I was introduced into Boko Haram activities through one Mutari who was residing with one Konto at Abbaganaram area... – A Boko Haram Suspect.

Table 4.5.2 Thematic Category on the Education of Boko Haram Members

Thematic Categories	Themes	Number of References (n=42 case)	Percentage of References (n=100%)
Thematic Category Education of Boko Haram Members	1. No Western or Modern education reported.	13	31%
	2. Having attended Arabic or Islamic schools or institutions	11	26%
	3. Having attended secondary school	5	12%
	4. Having achieved some college	6	7%
	5. Having attended primary school	1	2%
	6. No educational attainment report	1	2%

The above table (Themes 1 and 2) indicates that the majority of the respondents (from the police case files have no western education can be termed as “illiterates”.

From the above discourse, one can observe the multiple factors such as illiteracy, religious extremism and poverty that make Boko Haram localised in the North-east than other regions of

the country. By implication, the concurrence between the quantitative and qualitative findings in the area of localisation of Boko Haram to the North-east is as a result of illiteracy, unemployment, poverty, potent history of insurgency and porosity of borders are burdens associated with strains. These findings buttressed the supposition of Agnew (2010) that the spring pool of terrorism is accumulated strains which are high in magnitude and perceived as unjust. Put in a more succinct manner, when such strains are endured for a long period, they incubate beliefs favourable to violence in the region where they manifest, in this case in the North-east, with attendant risky behaviours as corrective action or redress.

4.6: Consequences of the Boko Haram Insurgency on Nigerian National Development

An attempt was made in this section to examine the consequences of the Boko Haram insurgency on Nigerian national development. According to McNamara (1966), security is development and development is security; and without security, there will be no development. How the threat to security by Boko Harm activities affects the development of Nigeria in line with the relationship between the two concepts (security and development) will be examined hereunder:

Table 4.6.1: Consequences of the Boko Haram Insurgency on the Nigerian National Development

Boko Haram has negatively affected the businesses in North-east and investment operations in Nigeria in general	Frequency	Percentage
Strongly Agree	82	61.6
Agree	30	22.5
Undecided	5	3.8
Strongly Disagree	5	3.8
Disagree	5	3.8
No response	6	4.5
TOTAL	133	100.
Boko Haram has affected food security and other agricultural production in the North-east	Frequency	Percentage
Strongly Agree	86	64.6
Agree	34	25.5
Undecided	3	2.3
Strongly Disagree	4	3.0
Disagree	3	2.3
No response	3	2.3
TOTAL	133	100.
Boko Haram has affected or led to the closure of many companies as well as industries in the North-east	Frequency	Percentage
Strongly Agree	90	67.7
Agree	26	19.5
Undecided	8	6.0
Strongly Disagree	4	3.0
Disagree	5	3.8
TOTAL	133	100

Table 4.6.1 presents data on the consequences of the Boko Haram insurgency on Nigerian national development. The data presented in the table show that an overwhelming majority, 84.1% of the respondents agreed in both strong and mild terms that Boko Haram insurgency negatively affected businesses. Only a small proportion, 7.4% disagreed while the rest 3.8% were indifferent. The picture that emerged from this finding is that the activities of Boko Haram had a devastating effect on business activities, which affected socio-economic development in the country. Also, data presented in the table indicate that more than nine out of 10, that is 90.1% of the respondents agreed in both strong and mild terms that the activities of Boko Haram deeply affected food security in the country, while only a few, 4.6% of the respondents, disagreed in both strong and mild terms. The rest, 2.3% were undecided.

Thus the inference deduced from above finding showed that the Boko Haram religious violence affected food security in the country which is an indication of the paralysis of the well-being of the people. Most people in Southern Nigeria depend on agricultural supply from the North-east, especially food products and cattle which are negatively affected by the activities of the Boko Haram group. Dickson (2018) reported that the Boko Haram crisis has displaced two million people with twice the number not having enough to eat.

Similarly, Table 4.6.1 clearly suggests that majority, 87.2% of the respondents agreed in both strong and mild terms that Boko Haram activities have led to the closure of companies, with grave implications on the economic performance of the nation. Only a few, 9.8% of the respondents, disagreed while that rest, 6% of her respondents were undecided. The patterns of findings that emerged from this study based on results in Table 4.6.1 indicate that Boko Haram activities affected business, food security, and closure of companies.

Table 4.6.2: Consequences of the Boko Haram Insurgency on the Nigerian National Development.

Boko Haram has led to the separation of families and the displacement of people as IDPs and refugees	Frequency	Percentage
Strongly Agree	100	75.2
Agree	23	17.2
Undecided	8	6.0
Strongly Disagree	1	0.8
Disagree	1	0.8
TOTAL	133	100
Boko Haram has negatively affected the educational growth and development in the North-east in recent years	Frequency	Percentage
Strongly Agree	101	75.9
Agree	21	15.8
Undecided	4	3.0
Strongly Disagree	2	1.5
Disagree	1	0.8
No response	4	3.0
TOTAL	133	100
Boko Haram has affected or led to the closure of many companies as well as industries in the North-east	Frequency	Percentage
Strongly Agree	103	77.4
Agree	21	15.8
Undecided	4	3.0
Strongly Disagree	1	0.8
Disagree	1	0.8
No Response	3	2.3
TOTAL	133	100

Also, Table 4.6.2. presents further data on the consequences of the Boko Haram insurgency on Nigerian national development. The data presented in the table shows that a large proportion, 92.4% of the respondents agreed in both strong and mild terms that the activities of Boko Haram led to the separation of families while a negligible, 1.6% of the respondents disagreed. The rest of the respondents of less than one per cent were insignificant. Deduction from this finding is that the activities of Boko Haram led to the dislocation of families in the affected areas. Also, data presented in the table depict that more than nine out of 10, that is 91.7% of the respondents agreed in both strong and mild terms that Boko Haram activities affected educational growth, with ill-effect on the country's national development. The inference deduced from this finding indicates that Boko Haram paralyzed the educational activities in the North-east of Nigeria, of which the Nigerian Educational Research and Development Council (2013) reported that, education is an instrument "par excellence" for effecting national development.

Furthermore, data presented in the table indicate that a significant majority, 93.2% of the respondents agreed in both strong and mild terms that the activities of Boko Haram led to the preponderant, loss of lives, with grave implications for national development. A non-significant, 1.6% of the respondents disagreed in both strong and mild terms an indication that majority of the respondents affirmed that Boko Haram caused the death of able-bodied people that could be harnessed effectively in agricultural and other sectors of the economy for overall national development.

Additionally, the findings from the quantitative data lend credence to the qualitative responses (traditional rulers, religious leaders, and politicians etc) which contend that the activities of Boko Haram had caused the closure of markets, the stoppage of development projects, destroyed peaceful existence, caused closure of government offices and highways – both air and road

transportation were grounded, which affected food security. All these have a direct effect on the economy of the country and indeed national development. One of the respondents, a religious leader, offered thus:

Excerpt 46

We all have the businesses that flourished and supported us before, but now to feed our family has become a problem. All our markets are not functioning because they used to constantly attack marketplaces ... minds ... – **A religious leader in KII in Borno State.**

A traditional ruler expressed a similar view:

Excerpt 47

... even the government has stopped executing its project... All our markets and local government secretariats are closed down and it has brought abject poverty and hunger – **A traditional ruler in KII in Yobe state.**

A politician reflected on how Boko Haram has affected local government administration and its implications:

Excerpt 48

We in Borno have 27 local government areas and 22 are all displaced, their businesses have stopped, hospitals, schools are locked up... it also affects our international businesses and by extension, all these countries are affected and Boko Haram has contributed to destroying Nigeria's economy – **A politician in KII in Borno State.**

Comparing the respondents across the three categories, it appears that three groups unanimously concurred that the Boko Haram insurgency has affected the economy, population, livestock, and peaceful co-existence of Nigeria. It has also disrupted the market by stopping businesses and thereby affecting foreign businesses and investments. Similarly, comparing the

responses of Female IDPs/Male IDPs and Civilian JTF, one of the respondents (Female IDP) in this category_lamented_thus:

Excerpt 49

... they kill the rich men and destroyed our markets and after starting business afresh, they came back and destroyed them again – A female IDP in an IDI in Borno State.

Another female IDP responded thus:

Excerpt 50

... we used to lead a normal life and now we are in IDP camps – A female IDP in an IDI in Borno State.

A third female IDP stated thus:

Excerpt 51

All our business activities have stopped. I am a successful woman and due to their activities, I am now living in the IDP camp – A female IDP in IDI in Bauchi State.

While another female respondent echoed the previous statements, saying: Generally, the female IDPs lamented that they had lost everything, they were just suffering, no access to their property etc. However, when the response of the female IDPs is compared with the that of the Civilian JTF, there seems to be a divergence of views on the consequences of Boko Haram insurgency on national development.

A civilian JTF stated thus;

Excerpt 52

...whoever knows Borno before, he knows we have towns like Banki, Gamboru, Baga, Damasak and others. We transport goods to far places like Central Africa. Economic activity has stopped and business is not moving, you just go and finish your capital. It has negatively affected our economy; a person who has over ₦20 million worth of capital has turned street beggar. Our education system has stopped; all our schools are occupied by IDPs – A Civilian JTF in IDI in an Borno State.

Another Civilian JTF expressed his view thus;

Excerpt 53

... it has greatly affected us. The majority of poor people are businessmen and all our highways are not motorable and under Boko Haram except Damaturu highway, their activities have paralyzed our business and that is what forced us to join civilian JTF. We are in real economic crisis – A Civilian JTF in IDI in an Yobe State.

Comparing the responses between the IDP and the Civilian JTF, it is clear that the responses of the former expressed frustration and hopelessness as brought in by Boko Haram to the people. The respondents mainly emphasised the impact of Boko Haram on them at the micro-level. Mostly, they are expressing sadness over the loss of their places of business, the farm produces, having to live in a very difficult situation in the IDP camp. In comparison, the civilian JTF, though equally affected by the insurgency have picked themselves up and joined the government to fight the menace. However, most of their responses centred on the damage done to the region and the country in the area of loss of businesses and closure of international highways.

Coded statements (responses) from the police case files (Theme 3) where Boko Haram members joined having been offered money, job and livelihood reveal how it could indirectly affect national development, thereby corroborating the quantitative and qualitative data. The

coding statement (responses) in the police case files revealed a theme that could affect National development thus agreeing with the outcome of both quantitative and qualitative data.

Thus, from both the quantitative and qualitative findings, there is a sense in inferring that the impunity in the creation of religious violence of Boko Haram with its attendant dire consequences on the Nigeria's national development can be linked to societal induced strain of poverty and unemployment. One plausible reason for this is that when young persons who are agile but with no means of livelihood are hungry, they can be cajoled and provoked to terrorism by Muslim fundamentalists or any other merchants of terror. Similarly, indices of national development are put under considerable strain with the attendant problems of food insecurity, loss of businesses, destruction of families and drop in school enrolment in a region that is very backward in education compared with other parts of the country.

4.7. Anti-terrorism and Counter-terrorism Efforts of the Federal Government and Their Efficacies.

Responses from the telephone interview, KIIs and IDIs coded on NVivo with regard to the reasons for the elongation of the war and the challenges reveal that there is a lack of effective counter-terrorism and anti-terrorism efforts due to negligence of government (theme 1), needing more time to defeat the group (theme 2), and other challenges in fighting the group (theme 3).

The respondents (KIIs and IDIs) acknowledged the efforts of the security agencies but doubt their efficacies. They opined that the war was prolonged due to the negligence of the government coupled with its interest and corruption. There was equally a lack of determination to defeat the group, and lack of adequate resources. There is also the challenge posed by unconventional warfare exhibited by Boko Haram and lack of protection of victims of Boko Haram

and a language barrier. Some coded responses in the NVivo that were selected randomly to remove any elements of bias are instructive in the following excerpts:

Excerpt 54

Training and coordination among the security agencies are needed. The next deals on collaborating between the security agencies and the populace – A police officer in an IDI in Borno State.

Excerpt 55

... it is guerrilla warfare. It is all about intelligence gathering and information sharing and in the part of the general public it is two-way traffic – A police officer in an IDI in Borno State.

A police officer on the protraction of the war stated thus:

Excerpt 56

As a policeman..., we are well trained (sic)... the government engaged the military who are not familiar with the area and failed to tackle the problem – A police officer in an IDI in Borno State.

Another police officer takes different perspective when he lamented that:

Excerpt 57

... How do you send two Hilux (Toyota Pickup) to face Boko Haram and you say you're fighting Boko Haram with all the sophistication they have. Why don't they send a bigger package, for instance, the military from the ten states to face them? – A police officer in an IDI in Borno State.

The above boils down to lack of logistics and equipment on the part of the security agencies. There is also the need to use Civil Police input instead of militarisation of the insurgency.

However, a religious leader is of the view that:

Excerpt 58

... because they are not willing to deal with them. They are making money out of it – A religious leader in a KII in Bauchi State.

Comparing the responses of the Police Officer and that of a religious leader, the whole issue boils down to the government's inability to do what is right to end the menace. The Police stated that they (the army) are not familiar with the terrain, while the religious leader is blaming those in charge of the war for turning it into a cash-cow. However, the following Table 4.7.1 reveals themes generated using NVivo in the sixth research question based on telephone interview of three senior security officers.

Table 4.7.1 The Counter and Anti-terrorism Efforts Employed by the Nigeria Security Personnel and their Efficacies (Derived from Research Question 6)

Research Question 6	Themes	Number of References
What are the counter and anti-terrorism efforts employed by the Nigeria security personnel and their efficacy?	<p>Adopting three major strategies including the deployment of the kinetic instrument, deployment of non-kinetic instruments, and sustainability counter-terrorism strategies.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Deploying non-kinetic instruments • Promoting sustainability of the effort • Deploying kinetic instruments. 	3
	Increasing intelligence on/against terrorism operations	3
	<p>Encouraging unity and collaboration in solving security issues.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Observing collaboration between public and private agencies. • Developing collaboration with other countries. 	3
	Encouraging innovations and changes to secure the nation further.	2
	Increasing public awareness of threats and terror activities	1
	Needing more effort from the government to consider terrorism	1

From Table 4.7.1. above, six themes emerged from the research question with the first, second, and third having three references suggesting that the themes have appeared in all documents connected with the phone interviews of the senior security officials. This shows the overall quality of the responses. The last three responses were included to show that there is no bias as all parts of the transcription are examined and coded. Thus, the theme with only one reference needs further research to strengthen its trustworthiness and validity further.

The content of the three documents revealed that anti-terrorism activities by the Nigerian security agencies is through the deployment of non-kinetic instruments which borders on psychological warfare to win the heart and minds of the people in the North-east. This is by dropping leaflets aerially to sensitise the people to reduce Boko Haram positive influence on them. This also serves as a tool of influence operations to confuse the terrorists on the cause of their actions. The kinetic instrument borders on the use of Special Forces (SFs) with arms and ammunition to deny the terrorist freedom of operation. This is designed to decimate and disrupt the terrorist's military capability while intelligence plays a key role through the establishment of an Intelligence Fusion Centre for timely collection, collation, processing, integration and dissemination to commanders for appropriate responses.

There is an aspect of encouraging unity and collaborations in solving security issues. This is exemplified by the training of Police Special Force (SF), Joint Military Police Operations, collaboration between army and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) like Red Cross, Medicine San Frontier, and other government agencies such as National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) to assist in bringing life back to the war-torn region through assistance in area of health, education, and alleviation of poverty. Other areas of collaboration are one between the Nigerian security forces and other countries in term of special training and provision of equipment.

The countries engaged in this are the United Kingdom, Belarus, Russia, Ukraine, and host of others. There are other areas identified such as encouraging innovations and changes to secure the nation further. For example, the introduction of a Motorcycle Battalion that can assist in reaching non-motorable areas since the terrorists have often time attacked inaccessible villages using motorcycles.

From the above discourse, securing the country from the menace of terrorism cannot be fought by the security forces alone. They must collaborate and ensure adequate specialist training, gather and disseminate intelligence appropriately, request for training and logistics assistance from other advanced countries and other non-violent strategies like winning the hearts and mind of the general public. These can be further gleaned from the word cloud in Appendix N.

One way approach by means of all-out war on Boko Haram had not provided the desired results so far in the ten years of the insurgency. Thus, using Agnew, (2006) theory the protraction of the war has resulted in blocked opportunities leading to accumulated pool of strains on the fighting forces. To redress this, the concept of adding a non-kinetic approach as contradistinct from using an all-out military campaign (kinetic approach) becomes feasible. This new hybrid approach is thus the panacea for gauging the efficacy of the anti-terrorism efforts.

The significant implication of these findings suggest the need for the security agencies to develop new hybrid approach of non-kinetic type of psychological counter strategy to redress the accumulated pool of strains, which have prolonged the religious violence of Boko Haram in North-eastern Nigeria. More importantly, the new non-kinetic, instead of the traditional kinetic method involving strict militancy and warfare will not help the efficacy of the anti-terrorism and counter-terrorism actions of the federal government security agencies.

Before the section on the discussion of findings, tables are presented depicting synopsis of sources of data and the results as presented in the preceding section.

4.8. Synopsis of Sources of Data and the Results

Table 4.8.1 Breakdown of Sources

	Questionnaire	IDIs and KIIs (Interviews)	Case Files	Interviews with Senior Security Officials
RQ1. What are the causes of the Boko Haram insurgency in North-eastern Nigeria?	✓	✓	✓	X
RQ2. What are the sources of funds and arms of Boko Haram insurgents in North-eastern Nigeria?	✓	✓	✓	X
RQ3. What is the relationship between Boko Haram insurgents and other international terrorist groups?	✓	✓	X	X
RQ4. Why is Boko Haram more localised in the North-eastern part of Nigeria than other geopolitical zones?	✓	✓	✓	X
RQ5. What are the consequences of Boko Haram insurgency on Nigeria's national development?	✓	✓	X	X
RQ6. What are the counter and anti-terrorism efforts employed by the Nigeria security agencies and their efficacies?	✓	✓	X	✓

The above table is a synopsis of the contribution of the questionnaire survey, the IDI, KII, police casefiles and telephone interviews in answering the six research questions, while the summary of the result of the study is as indicated in Appendix O.

4.9. Discussion of Findings

This section presents the discussion of major findings. The discussion has been done comparing the degree of conformity or otherwise of the study findings with the available literatures on the Boko Haram religious violence. In addition, an overview of the significance and implications of the study findings as related to the global view on terrorism were discussed.

4.9.1. Causes of Boko Haram

Consistent with the findings in the literature, the present study has suggested that Boko Haram was caused by multi-dimensional factors such as social factors like unemployment, poverty and corruption. These findings on the causes of Boko Haram corroborated the UNDP report (2017) and bore semblance to the findings of Smith (2016) and Aro (2013) which documented relative impoverishment of the key states where Boko Haram has emerged and gained influence, compared with the national average. The findings similarly affirmed the assertion of Olonisakin (2019) that the challenges of illiteracy and unemployment have made some youths to be susceptible to terrorist ideology and made them opt for crimes against the Nigerian state. This was reinforced by Oweh (2020) who reported the contention of President Buhari that Boko Haram members are scavengers, who are hungry and desperate for food.

These empirical findings supported the issues of ‘strains’ logic and threw light on the causes of the insurgency, that the majority of those engaged in the Boko Haram religious violence are people who have no decent means of livelihood and with blocked opportunities to good quality of well-being in life.

Although, Ayegba (2015) concurred that unemployment and poverty are not sufficient variables in explaining heightened insecurity in Nigeria vis-a-vis menace the of Boko Haram, he established a strong connection between unemployment, poverty, and prevailing insecurity in

North-eastern Nigeria. He asserted that while unemployment reinforces poverty, violent conflicts and extremist desirability are often spurred by endemic vicious poverty level.

This finding also agrees with the views of Onuoha (2013) and Obiyan (2013) that Boko Haram arose due to the failure of the Nigerian government to halt extreme poverty among the people. Wright (2006) asserted that radicalism will thrive when the population is young and idle. This is because crimes are more likely when the strains become excessive beyond which the young ones can cope. Strains include not only negative interpersonal relationships but also situations, conditions and events that are objectively expressed or subjectively perceived to be negative, such as chronic unemployment, homelessness, discrimination and the immediate need for much more money (Jang & Agnew, 2015). Furthermore, Apamshan et al (2017) opined that not only poverty and unemployment motivate terrorism but also religion, ethnicity, and political interest. This view, no doubt reinforced our findings that causes of Boko Haram are multi-dimensional. However, the findings of this present study seem to refute Apamshan's view on the issue of ethnicity and neither did it find any relationship with Almajiranci as part of the causes of Boko Haram. Although, the composition of Boko Haram has been found to contain mainly persons from one ethnic group (Kanuri), their mode of attack does not discriminate targets as persons from all tribes have suffered from their more than a decade-old insurgency. Just as their recruitment may not be based on ethnicity, neither is their choice of targets. But the fact of having a majority of the members pooled from the Kanuri tribe could be due to the apparent localisation of the group's activities to the North-east which may be due to what the UNDP (2017) in its report; *Journey into Extremism in Africa* referred to as an "accident of geography."

As to the non-involvement of Almajiranci, as found by this study, one could look at it within the context of enlargement of the qualitative data by use of a large sample. Even at that,

responses from the qualitative data did not attribute causes of Boko Haram to Almajiranci despite the large sample size and from the demographic characteristics of the Boko Haram suspects from the police file – not even one of the 42 suspects in custody claimed to be an Almajiri. The empirical evidence that emerge from the study deviated from Fagge 2011 who attributed Boko Haram to Almajirici with a study showing that there are over 9.5 million Almajiris in Northern Nigeria, with 25% of these in the North-east, the epicentre of the crisis. (Awofadeji, 2014). Therefore, the distribution of the remaining 75% will be heavily skewed towards the North-west geopolitical zone with its highest Muslim population in the entire North. Thus the North-west with its highest Muslim population will have proportionately more Almajiris even as an issue of Boko Haram is insignificant there. This has thus contradicted Fagge’s findings.

Of significance is that this study has found out the role of politics and politicians in causing Boko Haram insurgency. Thurston (2018) reinforced this when he remarked that the mix of foreign political competition and unaccountable politicians translated into bitterness among Boko Haram core constituencies. The role of politics is further linked to a former Governor, Senator Modu Sherriff, who manipulated the group to achieve his second election as the Governor (Kyari, 2009). Fabiyi and Akasike (2016) also reinforced this view when they reported that the insecurity by Boko Haram is caused by bad governance, illiteracy, lack of respect for rule of law in the administration of the former governor Ali Modu Sheriff.

However, empirical evidence from our finding has shown that it is erroneous to assume that politics may be a sole factor towards the cause of Boko Haram. This is because other states in the North, with the same political conditions at play, with their political thugs comparable to “ECOMOG” of Ali Modu Sherriff, did not transmute into Boko Haram to unleash violence after the election. This is even as other parameters like poverty, unemployment, religious extremism,

illiteracy and porous borders were mostly at play in the majority of states in Northern Nigeria including the adoption of 'Sharia' in 2000. But relating our findings on causal factor of Boko Haram to the views of other scholars mirrored the contention of Meagher and Mustapha (2020) that the Islamic extremism is not about religion neither is it a result of global terrorist network. It is a result of domestic economic forces, abject poverty, regional inequality, environmental stress and youth unemployment. The summations of these factors are nothing short of strains of injustice.

4.9.2. Relationship between Boko Haram and other International Terrorist Groups

Findings from this study in the quantitative analysis did establish a linkage between Boko Haram and other international terrorist groups in the area of intelligence security reports gathering. This has also been corroborated by findings in the qualitative analysis which suggests a similar relationship between Boko Haram and ISIS and other terrorist groups. This concurs with the work of Pham (2012) which suggests expanding links between Boko Haram and international terrorist organizations and further reinforces the assertion of Olonisakin (2019), Nigeria Chief of Defence Staff, that the terrorist formed alliance with other international terrorist organization and transformed itself to Islamic State in the West African Province (ISWAP). This is equally apparent at the level of modus operandi of the two groups. The linkage of the Boko Haram and ISIS by way of the method of operation can be gleaned from the viciousness of their attacks on civilians and members of the security forces. The leader of ISIS, Abu Musab al Zarqawi had been dubbed as "Sheik of Slaughterers" for openly decapitating his victims, as he did to an American journalist, James Foley, using it to win support among hardened jihadists and to sow fear among the general populace (Warrick, 2015).

The relationship of Boko Haram and ISIS in terms of modus operandi is evident in the use of YouTube as the trademark of Shekau in issuing death threats to the authorities as he did to President Buhari; just as al-Zarqawi was shown warning the then American president while justifying the use of torture. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was quoted saying that:

Hard days are coming to you. You and your soldiers are going to regret the day that you stepped your foot into Iraq and dare to violate Muslims... You will see nothing from us except corpse after corpse... (Warrick, 2015, P221)

The two groups are equally related as found by this work in terms of kidnapping, robbery and “destroying the gates”. Destroying the gates is a strategy used by ISIS to attack Tirikit, Abu Ghraib, and many other prisons and free their detained members. Boko Haram has applied this in attacking Bauchi prison and several other detention centres across the country. This is not surprising as, according to Onuoha (2013), terrorist groups follow a “learning and responding curve” to deal with similar challenges or situations. The motive was to free their members from prison custody and probably in the case of Boko Haram to gain more hands in carrying out what they called “Aikin Allah” meaning God’s work. Comolli (2015) had equally reported communication and weapon links between Boko Haram and foreign terrorist groups, thereby corroborating findings on the relationship between Boko Haram and other international terrorist groups. This finding further affirmed the assertion of Amdii (2012) that Boko Haram terrorist group has adopted methods used in the Middle East and North Africa using information technology to communicate which is a product of globalisation. As espoused by Nassar (2006), this explosion of information may have contributed to tensions and even violence which is a trademark of Boko Haram.

In sum, the findings of the qualitative data agreed to a relationship between Boko Haram and other terrorist groups. This claim has been strengthened by Comolli (2015) and Walker (2016)

that Boko Haram even used the relationship with other terrorist groups to gain and increase influence and profile in the minds of the populace. This is further supported by making an oath to their adherents promising to free Muslim members from tyrannical regimes by creating a just society, and ordered according to “godly principles.” Undoubtedly, the present research had established linkage between Boko Haram, ISIS, and also other international terrorist groups. This is gleaned from the open declaration of allegiance to ISIS by Shekau in the year 2015 which is suggestive of linkage between ISIS, Al Qaeda, and Boko Haram. Similarly, the evidence from “modus operandi” of the groups also attests to the relationship established and concurred with the findings of other scholars like Uhler (2017), Comolli (2015), Olasile (2015), Forest (2014), and Copeland (2013) which established linkage between the group and international terror groups in areas of arms supply.

4.9.3. Sources of Arms and Funds

Without the provision of arms and funding, the activities of Boko Haram would have whittled down from when it started in 2002. However, findings from the qualitative data absolved the Nigerian government from directly providing the group with those forms of assistance. Despite this, some of the respondents interviewed, wondered why the government did not deal with the group decisively if it is not supporting the crisis. That, the Boko Haram crisis lasted for this long, may be due to the ineptitude of the government of Goodluck Jonathan, and not in any way caused by direct provision of arms or funds to the group.

Ker (2012) suggested that the poor government of that period contributed to the crisis. This was further buttressed by International Crisis Group (2014) that impunity by government officials as having contributed to the menace of Boko Haram. There is also a lack of transparency and accountability on the part of the government (Ayegba, 2015). This further reinforced the issue of

centrality of strain (poverty and chronic unemployment) as causal factor of the insurgency and that the government did not adequately address these problems which led to Boko Haram's escalation.

Although the finding of literature as offered by Ayegba and International Crisis Group are at variance with our finding on the role of the government in fuelling the crisis. The kidnap of 113 Chibok girls in 2014 at a girls' secondary school in Borno State revealed a lack of government will to protect the people. This is also evident from a media report that \$40 million meant for the rescue of the abducted Chibok girls has been misappropriated by the officials of government (Sahara Reporters, 2016). Thus, the actions of the government in the two scenarios-the abductions and misappropriation of the fund to rescue the girls – in a way suggests government complicity or docility in the Boko Haram crisis.

Another way the government can be seen to be fuelling the crisis indirectly is buttressed by Walker (2016) who remarked that with the government, budgeting a huge amount of money for defence and security to the tune of \$5.8 billion (N2.08 trillion) in 2014; it is an incentive for the top brass of the army not to be effective. In one peculiar case showing government's complicity and lack of sincerity, the writer remarks that:

Cash was flown up from Abuja to Maiduguri airport, direct from the Central Bank, still, in its plastic wrapper, where it was unloaded and taken in an armed convoy to a government house. Later that day the same convoy returned with the money again, loaded it back onto the plane which then took it to Abuja. This was not done secretly; everyone who worked at the airport saw it. (P185)

This is believed to have been perpetrated by top army officers in collaboration with political leaders. Some of the army chiefs have been arraigned by the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) by the current Nigerian government over high-level embezzlement to the tune of millions of dollars. So, by not buying arms or honest appropriation of funds to address

the insurgency, this attitude of the erstwhile government had in a way invigorated the crisis. However, this is not to suggest that the army top brass in the present dispensation is free of misappropriation. Only recently an army general was arraigned before an army court-martial over a missing 400 million naira which is well over \$1 million under his care (Aluko, 2019)

However, findings from the study confirmed that international terrorist groups have been linked with the provision of arms and funds to Boko Haram. This has been corroborated by the work of Comolli (2015) that due to better planning of the attack, made possible by increased resources is suggestive of external support. This support could be in the form of arms or funds as asserted by Olonisakin (2019) that the Boko Haram terrorist group is gaining logistics and moral support from ISIS thereby becoming capable of conducting a daring attack against the Nigerian state. This study also linked other sources of arms and funds to armed robbery. Boko Haram carried out the robbery of banks, raiding of army formations and attacks on police stations, making extortion to raise funds and robbing policemen reporting for or off duty or attacks on military bases as happened in Maiduguri. Some of the suspects involved in the research stated how they took part in the attack on Wawa Barracks where arms were carted away from the armoury.

Similarly, the source of funds by Boko Haram is reinforced by Smith (2015) when he offered that the group finance itself through illegal activities, including kidnapping for ransom and bank robberies. That it had stolen weapons from the Nigerian military and would not find it difficult to buy arms in the region's black market. He identified the link between Boko Haram and AQIM and to a lesser extent Al-Shabab as another sources of arms.

Findings in this study also shed illumination and buttressed the result of previous research conducted by Chibuke (2016), Zenn (2016), Asfura Hein and MC Quaid (2015) and Ogbuabor

(2012) on Boko Haram's sources of funding and arms. Abdulhamid (2020) reported the conviction of six (6) Nigerians in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) for wiring the sum of \$782,000.00 to Boko Haram. This underscores the international dimension of the group's sources of funds.

As revealed in our study of findings, other sources of funds and arms have been found to come from kidnapping or smuggling through the vast and porous Nigeria-Chad, Nigeria-Niger, and Nigeria-Cameroon borders and also as confessed by some of the arrested Boko Haram members. Walker (2016) reinforced this when he stated that when JTF stormed a house in Damaturu, the capital of Yobe State, they uncovered a cache of arms; high calibre automatic weapons, rocket-propelled grenades and launchers, AK 47 and dozens of ammunition.

The result of this study equally linked source of arms and funds to "direct criminal activities" involving robberies and kidnapping. Significantly, Boko Haram gets funds and arms both from within and outside the country, out of emotive frustration and anger to accomplish their terrorist act which is symptomatic of failure of the Nigerian state to convey to their citizen the good quality of life. Agnew (2010), opined that being socially marginalized makes people sensitive to strain and more attractive to risky behaviour. This increases the likelihood of maladaptive coping (e.g. criminal offending) which may include but not limited to arm smuggling, kidnapping, bank robbery, attack on army and police formations for their arms and funds.

4.9.3. Prevalence of Boko Haram in North-eastern Nigeria Compared With Other Geopolitical Zones

The study findings have linked Boko Haram prevalence to the North-east region due to its porous and expansive border running into thousands of kilometres, compared with the North-west region. Although, the North-west equally has porous expansive borders, the Boko Haram activities are

made easier in the North-east due to the most uninhabited areas around the Sambisa forest with rugged terrain at Mandara Mountains, Gwoza Hills and an expansive border running through Chad, Niger and Cameroon. Osakwe (2017) reinforced this when he raised big concern over the porosity of Nigeria's border which fuels terrorist activities in the North-east. The Minister of the Interior, General Dambazau, further reaffirmed the existence of porous border and its threat to national security (Onani, 2018). The porosity of Nigeria's border was further confirmed by Akinyemi (2013) where he posits that it gives Boko Haram easy entry to operate in North-eastern part of Nigeria.

However, other reasons like the presence of Islamic religious extremists in North-eastern Nigeria may have precipitated the crisis and made the region more vulnerable than in the North-western part of the country. The findings from both quantitative and qualitative data sources indicate Islamic groups (extremists) contributing to the crisis in the North-east. The founder of Boko Haram, Mohammed Yusuf, was from the North-east. His father was said to be fanatical. The group started from Gaidam in Yobe State before moving to Maiduguri, the epicentre of crisis then swelled in ranks and transformed from a simple terrorist group to one of the most dangerous terrorist organisations in the world. A documentary on Boko Haram members being addressed in local Kanuri language preparatory to an attack on army formation was shown on Voice of America (VOA, 2016). This further reinforced the 'North-easternization' and 'Kanuralization' of the Boko Haram conflict. In fact, with the North-east being a centre of Islamic religion for centuries, Mohammed Yusuf's extremist ideology became a fertile ground to indoctrinate his numerous followers as one respondent from the Key Informant Interview (KIIs) observed:

All the leaders of the group are from the region. The founder started moving good people from the area into the ideology and they used an insider to fight from within...

This further corroborated the results of analysis from the Police files which shows that majority (67.7%) of those arrested are from the most populous ethnic group in Borno (the Kanuri tribe). This and also Ehrhardt and Umar (2020) further reinforced the “North-easternization” and “Kanurilization” of the Boko Haram conflict. This finding does not connote that Boko Haram insurgency has any ethnic colouration. Earlier results from the quantitative had indicated that Boko Haram is not about ethnicity. These agreed with the findings of Barkindo (2014), which confirmed that Boko Haram is not Kanuri uprising nor is it fought like Kanuri’s ideology; that Kanuri and Kanuri heartland provide the space and local network; fishing unions, market groups and farming commodities for recruitment and mobilization. Findings from this study have thus been buttressed by this assertion of Barkindo (2014).

However, Weate (2014) believes that North-eastern Nigeria had been a harsh country long before the emergence of Boko Haram. He traced the emergence of the group to the long political and economic decline of Nigeria’s North-east and enduring Kanuri opposition to the northern power structure. The economic decline may be due to the drying up of Lake Chad that had been a source of fishing, farming and business activities to many. This has further buttressed the role played by unemployment and poverty which are outcomes of strain as offered by this study. The findings also reinforced “Maiduguri” the state capital like a local base for Boko Haram, thus, re-affirmed the group’s localization in the North-Eastern part. This was mirrored by Thurston (2018) who posited that Boko Haram occupies a localised niche in Maiduguri where most of its key

moments take place. He argued that ideas and environment interacted to produce and sustain Boko Haram. On the uprising and localization to the North-east, he reasoned that:

Geographically... the sects lay in Maiduguri, but it had a formidable presence throughout the North-east... (P107)

He contended that with Maiduguri as his (Yusuf) base, he built a mass of followers and the political clout where he advocated confrontational and uncompromising religious activism.

There is also the status of Maiduguri as an Islamic centre for centuries which may have implanted in it “extremist tendencies”. With the porosity of North-eastern Nigeria along its borders with Niger, Chad and Cameroon, the economic decline and the emergence of the former leader Muhammed Yusuf from the region, the seed for the localization of the Boko Haram group had been sown. Similarly, UNDP (2017) conferred the zone the appellation “accident of geography” for being one of the peripheral regions in Africa having borders with two or more countries. This shaped the individual’s worldview and vulnerability to join extremist groups. Those affected lacked exposure of peoples of their religions and ethnicity, Thus, with Boko Haram key moments and localized niches in Maiduguri (Borno State), it is settled that the group will have more of its boots on the ground – as well as its roots – in North-eastern Nigeria than elsewhere.

It is also argued that it is safer for Boko Haram to stay around in groups outside the capital in the bushes and around the North-east region. This is to make it easy to mix with the local communities and escape arrest by security forces. They will also not risk moving to the capital where they were chased out by the military and Civilian JTF since 2013. The groups mostly have tribal marks that can give them away outside the North-east which can be regarded as their “comfort zone”. Even within the North-east, the majority of the Muslims do not buy their ideology

as every moderate Muslim is being regarded as ‘kafir’ or unbeliever and get killed by group members. Thus, the killings by Boko Haram is indiscriminate, prompting Thurston, (2018) to even remark that the group had killed more Muslims in ten years of the insurgency than other religious groups in Nigeria.

Boko Haram having been chased out of the cities, only operate from the bushes in remote local government areas and the Sambisa forest and cannot push further to other parts of the country. This probably explains why the conflict is regionalized now to countries bordering Nigeria like Niger, Cameroon, and Chad. This can be attributed to ease of “melting with the crowd” in these countries due to a large Kanuri population there. Apart from Nigeria where the Kanuris are mostly in the North-east with a population of 6,980,000, they are in Western Chad with 1,100,000, South East Niger with 850,000, and Northern Cameroon with 56,000 (Wikipedia, 2018). Another reason is for the group to use the neighbouring countries as safe havens and also to launch reprisal attacks on the Multi-National Task Force pooled from the regional military in fighting the group alongside Nigerian forces.

However, and most importantly, Boko Haram repeated incursion into territories of Cameroon, Niger, and Chad, may be due to tactical reasons to escape the pressure mounted by the Nigerian military on Boko Haram’s positions. Extending this with Boko Haram key moment and localised niche in Maiduguri, it is a matter of survival for the group to have more of its boots on the ground in North-eastern Nigeria than elsewhere. With the “special circumstances” of the region as confirmed by “accident of geography”, the current insurgency may not have “a second circle” in any part of Nigeria if the government security agencies eventually defeat the insurgents. By and large, the localization of Boko Haram to the North-east as a result of porosity of border, potent

history of insurgency and associated endemic strains of poverty and chronic unemployment are morphological reasons for the prevalence activities in the geographical neighbourhood.

4.9.4. Consequences of Boko Haram on Nigeria's National Development

Findings from the study showed that Boko Haram negatively impacted on Nigerian national development as an overwhelming majority of the respondents agreed that the insurgency has a grave effect on the economy, population, food security, livestock, businesses and foreign investment. Furthermore, the result of the study has clearly shown the side effects of Boko Haram on food security. Thus, agricultural products for consumption and sale to other parts of the country had grossly been affected. The activity of the sect also resulted in the closure of international highways which linked Nigeria and other neighbouring countries. Their continued attacks on border posts and road infrastructure had led to slowing down of both local and international businesses. These findings mirrored the views of Bloomberg, Hess and Orphanides (2004) who observed that the impact of terrorism on economic growth is negative. Also, a report on "Journey into extremism" sees it same way:

Tourism and direct foreign investment have been impacted in affected countries such as Kenya and Nigeria. Borders between countries such as Cameroon and Nigeria have been intermittently closed in response to insecurity which further impacts on those whose livelihoods depend on cross border informal trade. (UNDP, 2017, P15)

Most Nigerians depend on food supply from the North-east like fish, beans, etc. As people of the area are mostly farmers, the loss to agricultural production due to the effect of Boko Haram has been put at ₦107 billion (an equivalent of \$3.5 billion) and generally ₦274.5 billion (\$9billion) (Buratai, 2017). Tari et. al (2016) reported Boko Haram attacks having a serious challenge on agriculture and food security. Comolli (2015) reported that Borno State alone lost \$6 billion as a

result of activities of Boko Haram. Also, Sandler and Enders (2005) comparing the impact of terrorism in developed and underdeveloped countries offered that terrorism has a less economic impact on the diverse economy of developed countries. Thus, Nigeria not being a diverse economy feels much of the impact of Boko Haram on the economy. This is reflected in the huge economic loss to the crisis.

This study also found that Boko Haram had caused the closure of companies, separation of families, negative educational growth and loss of lives and businesses. Onuoha (2016) reported that a whopping ₦15.9 billion (\$44.5m) is needed to replace damaged base stations through the bombing of communication infrastructure by Boko Haram. The acts affected businesses and banking services in North-eastern Nigeria. Most banks outside the state capital of Maiduguri were closed to business as a result of activities of Boko Haram as the group incessantly attacked banks to get funds for its operations. At a time, even those in the cities do close for business by noon to minimise the risk of attacks. Many police officers have been killed while engaged in bank “specie escort” of bullion vans conveying millions of Naira across the urban centres.

The study found unemployment to be one of the causes of Boko Haram which could further be worsened by the closure of companies. The concomitant effect of this strain experienced by individuals as espoused by Jang and Agnew (2015) could be increased in poverty terms thus swelling the ranks of those that could join the group. This affirmed the position of Kester (2012) on Nigeria’s poverty index which he said that despite the abundance of oil, the country ranked the poorest among countries in the global ranking with over 70% of the population as poor and 35% in absolute poverty. Sanni (2009) asserted that Northern Nigeria has reported more than 76 per cent of the people earning a daily income of less than the equivalent of one American dollar. The North-east where Boko Haram holds sway is even poorer with the largest concentration of those

Frank Fanon would call the “wretched of the earth” due to unemployment and underemployment (Adibe, 2012). In essence, what has emanated in the context of the findings of the study is that, the closure of companies occasioned by the activities of Boko Haram had increased unemployment and raised the level of poverty. As such, being socially and economically marginalised makes individuals sensitive to strain and more attracted to risky behaviours such as entrenched in the Boko Haram activities. Furthermore, the unemployment situation is further worsened when the few companies that operate in the area were closed due to insecurity.

Furthermore, the impact of the activities of Boko Haram on national development can be gleaned from the work of Walker (2016) who posit that over \$5.8 billion (N2.08 trillion) was earmarked for defence in 2014, money that could have been appropriated to other sectors of the economy for the overall national development. This agreed with the finding of Obaremi 2014 cited in Awojobi on the role of the insurgency on economic development thus:

Economic affairs is already depleting due to a massive departure of people and financial institutions from the Northern region. But if the government delays in implementing a comprehensive plan to tackle insecurity from its roots, then, not only will the Northern region be an economic desolation, but the country as a whole risks losing billions of dollars in foreign direct investment. (Awojobi, 2014, P.8)

Other works by Ohiole (2014), Shuaibu and Abdullahi (2015), Isokpan and Durojaiye (2016), Baiyewu (2012), and Okereocha (2015) are all in agreement with our findings that the activities of Boko Haram have caused loss to industries, education, human capital, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), tourism, businesses and agricultural potentials. See also word cloud as in Appendix P on impact of Boko Haram on national development

4.9.5. Anti and counter-terrorism activities of the Federal Government and Security Personnel and Their Efficacies.

Findings from the present study revealed that the anti and counter-terrorism efforts of the federal government have been invigorated through various strategies by the security forces. This is despite the express of pessimism by some respondents interviewed (KIIs and IDIs) that corruption and lack of equipment, political will and strategies to fight the war have negatively affected the success of the campaign.

However, the other Key Informant Interviews (the three senior security personnel) revealed that there is tremendous progress in the war following the change of strategy by carrying out pre-emptive strikes on enemy positions. The formation and deployment of Special Forces (SFs) had helped greatly in this regard. The new strategy adopted had equally forced Boko Haram to change their modus operandi. Other strategies include the deployment of non-kinetic instruments and promoting sustainability of efforts. This agrees with the finding of Matfess (2016) who suggested a new approach to counter Boko Haram's resilience. Although direct dialogue had not been the strategy since the past government of Goodluck Jonathan, however, a non-kinetic strategy of using psychological warfare to dissuade the terrorists could be yielding results with the launching of Operation Safe Corridor in Gombe State, North-east, in 2016.

The essence of Operation Safe Corridor is to rehabilitate Boko Haram members and get them re-absorbed into the mainstream of Nigeria's society after a 12-month de-radicalisation training. No fewer than 155 such militants were released by the Nigerian Army recently after rehabilitation (Adeyeye, 2018). The strategy of non-kinetic approach agrees with the findings of Tella (2017) that this "soft power" approach can win the hearts of the terrorists, the general public

and dissuade potential recruits. On reflection, the non-kinetic approach makes a good sense because fairness promotes peace and gives rise to desirous corrective action, while the strain of militancy grows a climate of retaliation and vengeance acts. The extreme anomaly and irrationality of the Boko Haram sect is interlocked in spectacle of severe strain of deprivation which may possibly be tamed through dialogue and non-kinetic approach instead of entire full-fledged war.

Also, the research identified the deployment of kinetic instruments as a counter-terrorist strategy that equally involves increasing intelligence on terrorist operations. In this regard, the establishment of the Intelligence Fusion Centre where intelligence is centrally shared from the centre to various commanders within the security services has been found invaluable in the counter-terrorism efforts. Finding of Mainasara (2016) that the establishment of the co-ordination centre as exemplified in the Intelligence Fusion Centre has been a quantum leap on the counter-terrorism efforts. The protection of potential targets and integration of technology have also been identified as part of the counter-terrorism efforts.

This study also found that encouraging unity and collaboration in solving security issues is important in counter-terrorism efforts. This is achieved through observing collaboration between public and private agencies as another strategy in the counter-terrorism efforts. This agrees with the finding of Makukwi (2016) who identified the multi-agencies approach in the handling of counter-terrorism efforts. This, in his view, will reduce rivalry, bottleneck and bureaucracy in tackling the challenges. This strategy also involves the partnership with other agencies like the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA), the Red Cross, Medicine Sans Frontier to assist in the fight against the militant group.

Finally, the study found that developing collaboration with other countries like the United Kingdom, Belarus, USSR, and host of others had greatly helped in the training of its soldiers and the establishment of Special Forces (SFs) that had assisted greatly in neutralizing and degrading Boko Haram's continued threat to security in the North-east. Mainasara (2016) offered that 10,000 military personnel from member countries of Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) with Headquarters in N'djamena, Chad reinforced the collaboration efforts of Nigeria security agencies with other foreign governments in the war on terror. Also, this study equally found that there are innovations that are geared towards further securing the nation. The innovations include, but are not limited to, the introduction of a motorcycle battalion to carry the battle to members Boko Haram who normally seek sanctuary in the various mountains and difficult terrains from where they periodically emerge to carry out their terrorist activities.

Lastly, this chapter which dealt with data presentation and discussion of findings was employed to complete the summary, conclusion and recommendations of the study in the final chapter.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1. Summary

Attempts have been made to explain the issue of terrorism in Nigeria, focusing on the spectres of activities of Boko Haram religious violence in North-east Nigeria. The background to the study was presented and research problems stated. Specifically, the purpose of the study was to put the Boko Haram religious violence under the crucial In-depth examination by exploring its causal factors, relationship between the insurgents and other international terrorist groups, sources of funds and arms localisation to North-eastern Nigeria, consequences of the religious violence on national development and the counter- and anti-terrorism efforts employed by the Nigerian security agencies and their efficacies. These were to ascertain previous assertions and explanations in order to validate or invalidate findings which will assist in taking appropriate measures of eliminating the religious violence in the North-eastern part of Nigeria.

Various available literatures which have a relationship and are pertinent to the study were reviewed. Both the conceptual, empirical and theoretical reviews focused on the study objectives, except that the empirical review portrayed that there was paucity of In-depth research on the Boko Haram religious violence. Also, relevant theories that gave credence and necessary explanation to the study were discussed. Six (6) related theories based on the research questions were used on a complementary basis and to provide requisite background for the study, while strains theory is the focal point, on the which the study was anchored.

The research methodology discussed the research design which is a descriptive type. It also provided information on a brief introduction of the study, the study area, sampling procedure,

research instrument, methods of data collection and analysis, ethical consideration quality assurance, validity and reliability, researcher's background, beliefs and biases, ethical issues and problems encountered in the field. Both quantitative and qualitative methods were used in data collection. Primary data was collected using questionnaire survey, In-depth interviews and key informant interview, which were complemented with secondary data extracted from the police case file and other documentary sources relevant to the study. A total of 352 respondents with an additional three (3) senior security officials, participated in the study, selected through the use of Purposive Sampling techniques. Out of this number (133) respondents were used for the questionnaire survey while 219 respondents participated in the In-depth Interviews (IDIs) and Key Informant Interview (KIIs) The Three senior security officers participated in a telephone interview as KIIs. Quantitative data collected were analysed using appropriate statistical techniques (simple percentage analysis and non-parametric Chi-square analysis) while the qualitative data was analysed using NVivo 12 QSR. Of particular importance was the use of a triangulatory process in the data presentation and analysis. The discussion of findings was carried out with the summary of work, conclusion and recommendations made.

5.2. Summary of Findings

In general, the following findings emerged from the study. Based on the results obtained from the analysis of data, it is evident the age of the respondents ranged between forty (40) years and below. The gender distribution of the respondents showed that the study was male-dominated. On the issue of religion, the data shows that Christianity and Islam remained the two popular religions among the respondents. Findings also showed that majority of the respondents possessed at least Islamic education with (Qur'anic background). On the distribution of respondents, the majority of the participants for the study were from Borno followed by Yobe and Adamawa states. The

findings further revealed that social issues such as poverty and unemployment with illiteracy/lack of Western education were the mix of factors responsible for the actualisation of Boko Haram. This mix of factors accentuated by injustice in a country endowed with vast range of natural resources can be counter-productive on the teeming populace. This put the majority of the citizens under considerable strain which is redressed by resorting to violence and terrorism. These called attention to the huge plight of suffering and class of people involved in the Boko Haram insurgency.

Evidence from the study also confirmed the relationship between Boko Haram and other international terrorist groups. Also, additional finding indicated that apart from international terrorist groups providing arms and funds to Boko Haram, the group further sourced funds through armed robbery, extortion, attack on police and military formations, kidnapping for ransom and other criminalities.

On the prevalence of Boko Haram in North-eastern Nigeria compared with other geopolitical zones of Nigeria, findings indicated that porous extensive borders and “strong Islamic belief” stemming from the frequent religious upsurge in the area, illiteracy and the social issues were responsible for the prevalence of Boko Haram in North-eastern Nigeria. Furthermore, findings suggested that the menace of Boko Haram activities were a threat to peace, national security and overall development of Nigeria. The Boko Haram activities had an adverse effect on the economy and grossly affected food security, scuttled industrial development, putting domestic and foreign investment in limbo. It also disrupted educational activities and caused monumental loss of lives and properties. Additional findings revealed that the anti- and counter-terrorism strategies of the federal government security agencies personnel had been modified both the kinetic

and non-kinetic approaches inclusive of sustainability of efforts, but the government is yet to get the soft counter-terrorism approach (non-kinetic strategy) right.

5.3. Conclusion

Boko Haram has become a metaphor for terrorism in Nigeria, which has greatly deteriorated the security situation and overall national development of the country. The phenomenon is more of a symptom of the crisis in the socio-economic transformation of the country, (Nigeria) where about 70% of the population lives in abject poverty. The poverty profile is exacerbated also by the problem of youth unemployment and illiteracy. This explains why the destructive and deadly operations of Boko Haram have a large turnout of underaged, unemployed and illiterate youths. As such, the Boko Haram uprising had been analysed to do with the accusation and allegation of abject poverty, a high youth unemployment rate and massive illiteracy. However, while one can say poverty and unemployment seldom lead to terrorism, we can say that they make people, particularly the youth vulnerable within this context. Terrorism does take advantage of misery and hunger knowing that de-humanising conditions create a favourable climate for terrorist project and actions. These aside, the development status of contemporary Nigeria breaths atmosphere of frustrated expectations and fosters widespread inequality among the people.

There is no doubt that Boko Haram has remained a controversial small fraction of a militant Islamic group which is largely Nigerian in nature but linked to several organisations having a strong relationship with international terrorist groups. The group enjoyed the effective support of some international donors and also has relationships with other international terrorist groups. In essence, the Boko Haram sect seems to be a destructive political tool with a cosmetic pretension of being a religious fundamentalist sect. The indiscriminate bombings and various destructive activities of the group qualify the sect as a contemporary terrorist group. Relatedly, funds and arms

are crucial sources of strength of any terrorist organisation. It has also been analysed in the present study that Boko Haram source its funds and arms through illegal means both internally within Nigeria and from foreign donors and suppliers. These funds come from donations from various Nigerian politicians, the contribution from Boko Haram members both locally and in diaspora and organisation with similar ideologies. Other sources of funds and arms come through, organised crime, such as robbery, kidnapping for ransom and attacks on security formations and other nefarious engagements. In the same token, the protracted and prolonged Boko Haram insurgency boils down to the inadequacy of the anti- and counter-terrorism strategy employed by federal government security personnel.

Thus, Boko Haram's activities have punctured peace, truncated industrial and educational development and also impacted negatively on socio-economic advancement particularly in the North-eastern part of Nigeria. In this connection, the group members have been motivated by the convictions that Nigeria as a sovereign country is an arena of social vices.

5.4. Recommendations

The following recommendations, therefore, are made:

In the light of the findings that the Boko Haram insurgency flows from injustice by the ruling class resulting in unemployment, poverty, illiteracy and lack of Western education, it is recommended that:

The Federal Government of Nigeria should ensure that the rate of unemployment in the country, especially the North-eastern part, is properly addressed. This is by providing gainful employment to the youths and those in the active working age. Unemployment weakens social safety, turning youth into deviants in the society.

Since illiteracy exposes the youth to religious extremism, the various states governments in the North-eastern states are to moderate the “teaching” of religion in order to minimise excessive indoctrination of youths into violent extremism. Illiteracy is one of the main causes of insecurity and illiterates could easily be indoctrinated with terrorist ideology.

In the light of the finding that poverty is a major cause of the Boko Haram insurgency, the Federal Government must intensify poverty alleviation programmes and wealth creation to reduce the choice of joining Boko Haram as an alternative to gainful employment.

As the research has found that the disdain for Western education made parents shun Western education for their children, the Federal Government must provide free and compulsory education, especially in the North-east. This would cater for children and thousands of orphans affected by the insurgency. In all the above recommendations the government must exhibit values of honesty, truthfulness, commitment and sincerity to remedy the situations.

Given the findings that official corruption had contributed to the Boko Haram insurgency, the Federal government should also ensure transparency in governance and intensify its war on corruption. This will guarantee funds appropriated for the security of the people and other development projects are properly utilized.

Since research findings suggest porosity of border as one of the causes of Boko Haram, the Federal Government must strive to police and monitor all border towns, not only in the North-eastern states but throughout the country, with full surveillance equipment.

In view of the colossal damage done to the North-east by the ten-year-old insurgency, the Federal Government needs to ensure quick rehabilitation of over two (2) million displaced people. This requires collaboration with various state governments of the affected region.

The study recommends that the Federal Government of Nigeria should intensify regional collaboration with Chad, Cameroon and Niger to jointly put an end to Boko Haram activities. The collaboration should include, but not be limited to, tightening of border security by ensuring entry to the country is limited to only designated border posts. This is given the findings that porous borders have a role in the activities of Boko Haram unfettered movement of persons.

The Federal Government should place less emphasis on violent means (kinetic approach) of defeating Boko Haram and intensify the de-radicalisation of the youths to take them off from the influence of extremist ideology. Dialogue should go side by side with the current war option. Thus, the non-kinetic approach should be given equal or greater emphasis to cut the line of supply of new entrants and win the hearts and minds of the general populace.

The findings have shown the relationship of Boko Haram with other international terrorist groups, thus the Federal Government should strengthen diplomatic and military ties with Afghanistan, Kenya, Somalia, Algeria, Syria, Iraq, Mali, etc. to monitor and frustrate any link or relationship between any existing extremist groups in these countries with Boko Haram.

Going by the finding that shows a relationship between Boko Haram and other terrorist groups in terms of funding, the Federal Government should ensure full implementation of its “cashless policy” that discourages use of cash in commercial transactions and also to ensure that the Economic and Financial Crime Commission (EFCC) conducts constant monitoring of banks to enforce Terrorism Financing Laws. This will diminish avenues for terrorist financing, curb corruption and the flow of “black money”; this is in line with the anti-terrorism strategy.

Combating terrorism is a continuous process: The Nigeria government should establish an indigenous counter-terrorism centre in the country with a focus on special operation capacity.

Provision of a capacity building programme that is adaptable to local need to enhance sustainable development and criminal justice capacity for effective rule of law. Constraints in policy implementation make counter-terrorism efforts inadequate and ineffective. The present methods being adopted are not very effective enough, thereby creating a paradox of counter-terrorism efforts. The country's security apparatus must be transformed and various security agencies adequately equipped with the required combat and intelligence-gathering skills and equipment necessary for all types of operations.

The Federal Government should intensify efforts on the use of both soft and hard strategies of "enemy centric doctrine" by effective operational strikes of the armed forces and intelligence agencies and the "population-centric methods" hinging on capacity building, economic development and counter-radicalisation.

The Nigerian government should come out with deliberate policies, through the National Orientation Agency (NOA), to inculcate the value of peaceful co-existence through peace education among the youth. This will keep them away from being easy pawns to terrorists who can easily indoctrinate them to achieve their selfish objectives. In this regard, peace education should be integrated into the national educational curricular.

The Federal Government of Nigeria should re-invigorate the current inter-service cooperation between the agencies as the establishment of the Intelligence Fusion Centre (IFC) is merely cosmetic, as the agencies charged with the responsibility of fighting the war are all competing for recognition from the central government thereby heightening inter-service rivalry.

In the course of the study, it was found that the activities of Boko Haram had caused colossal damage to the entire North-east region resulting in \$3.5 billion loss in agricultural

production and over 400,000 housing units destroyed. It is hereby recommended that the newly inaugurated North-east Development Commission (NEDC) be sufficiently funded and tasked with the rehabilitation of the entire region within a given timeframe. This is to ensure that normalcy returns to the region in no time to ameliorate the suffering of the people.

Nigeria's security agencies especially the police and the Department of State Security (DSS) should trace the families of the Boko Haram members on rehabilitation under "Operation Safe Corridor" and involve them in the rehabilitation process. This is a way of making families change their belief system and interpretation of the Islamic religion and also dissuade innocent younger members of the family from joining the group. It could also get those undergoing rehabilitation fully reintegrated into society.

In view of the porosity of the borders between Nigeria and its neighbouring countries which allows free movement of the insurgents in and out of the country, it is recommended that a properly equipped surveillance unit should be established to monitor enemy positions within a 30 kilometres radius. This will help intercept Boko Haram insurgents and frustrate any attack on Nigerian troops. It will also weaken the operational capability of the Boko Haram terrorists and the ease with which they bring arms into the country.

Finally, trenches should be dug around some vulnerable border points making the areas non motorable. This will further harden the targets at the Nigerian end and reduce ease of movement in and out of the country and thereby abating constant border incursions and arms trafficking.

5.5. Contribution to Knowledge

This study has made valuable contributions to the existing knowledge by providing a key insight into the emergence of Boko Haram religious violence and unravelling the cloud of gloom enveloping the activities of the terrorist group in Nigeria. Both the conceptual discussions and empirical results of the study captured the grim realities of Boko Haram religious violence as acts of domestic terrorism in the country. The study also offered significant information that Boko Haram religious violence was a response mode to pains of frustration and poverty seething with the strain of injustice which built and nourished terrorism. The study has no doubt thrown some illumination on Boko Haram religious violence as a product of an asymmetric conflict escalation in the Nigerian state.

The research complemented previous empirical studies and the combination of indigenous and foreign literature in the theoretical foundation provided an advantage for comparison in the study. This has promoted the stock of literature used in this study, making it a useful reference point and vital resource material for future researchers. In addition, the integrative approach used in the study offered an explicit complimentary aid in providing a more detailed and balanced views of Boko Haram's terrorist exploit in Nigeria.

This study examined six (6) theories of terrorism and the weaknesses of five of them prompted the adoption of the sixth (Strain Theory) as an umbrella theoretical framework to anchor the entire study. The strain theory thus provided the theoretical framework that anchored the study, thus making it an important additional contribution to knowledge.

The study further provided an empirical basis for establishing how the nexus between strains of perceived injustice and religious violence are inextricably intertwined in the global view of terrorism. In this connection, the study has successfully adopted an criminological theorising to

the discernment of Boko Haram religious violence and to better explicate the manner in which radicalisation in religious extremism incubates terrorism in the gap between rising expectations and declining opportunities. Lastly, the new mode of counter terrorism re-orientation (soft and hard power approach instead of the conventional warfare) proposed in the study as solution will serve as guides to the various stakeholders in assuaging and containing the problems of the terrorist group in Nigeria.

5.6. Prospects for Further Research

This study is one of the few pioneering research works that have exclusively, from a criminological perspective, dealt with the act of terrorism as an insurgency in Nigeria. The study has not only offered a good insight into the study of Boko Haram as a kind of religious violence but also provided an integrative framework for future criminological research on Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria. As such, there is a measure of tremendous potential for further research in this direction, more so that the present study is relatively limited in scope and restricted to the issue of Boko Haram as a form of religious violence.

As further research, the quantitative data, which involved 133 members of the security forces, should also involve politicians, traditional rulers and religious leaders etc, as was in the case with the qualitative research. Also, the research being more male-biased, there is a need for more representation of females in the study. Similarly, direct interview of Boko Haram detainees should be concentrated upon in subsequent research instead of relying only on suspected terrorists from the police case file. Although, the analysis of the police case files is one of the strong points of this work and has opened the window, for subsequent research but using direct interview with the detained Boko Haram or former Boko Haram members will enhanced future research findings.

In this connection, the theme of this study can be replicated by either using the same integrative approach or a more quantitative oriented research instrument. This would no doubt produce an opportunity for a more detailed study within a much wider scope and over an extensive period. However, to accomplish this, the research effort will be more strenuous and will require a team-based approach with more hands and material resources than those currently available for this study.

Furthermore, this study is more or less a static research; there is thus the need to employ a longitudinal method of study to explore the issue of Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria. Therefore, the study still opens up a fresh challenge in realms of terrorism both at the domestic or international level.

5.7. Limitations of the Study.

There are some limitations to the study. This research is liable to the general limitation of cross-sectional studies that are responses and recall biases. Self-reported data may reflect perceived observation rather than actual knowledge. The duration of the study also created its problem because Boko Haram activities were at the highest peak during the period of the research and this made it very difficult to collect data that will cut across all the IDP camps in North-eastern Nigeria.

Another limitation is that most of the available research on Boko Haram were based on documentary and anecdotal evidence, as there is still paucity of empirical studies carried out locally in Nigeria. The depth of the empirical research in this area of concern makes it difficult to strengthen the theoretical base of our empirical analysis. Furthermore, conducting a research on Boko Haram religious violence poses lots of constraints because of restrictive regulations,

protocols and problems of gaining access to official documents which are highly classified in nature.

In addition, the scope of the study covered six states where Boko Haram had a permanent insurgency. Despite these limitations, this study is considered as a modest and valuable contribution to a few existing works on the activities of the terrorist group named as Boko Haram in an emergent nation like Nigeria. There is still scope for further research since all the activities of Boko Haram have not been fully exhausted in this study.

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

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APPENDIX A:6

Map of Nigeria showing the location of study in the North-eastern part of the country.



- Shaded area of the map shows the location of the study.

APPENDIX B

CONSENT FORM

Project Title: Religious violence in Nigeria: A case study of Boko Haram in North east Nigeria

Primary researcher: Bala Abdullahi Hassan (Retired Assistant Inspector General of Police)

Additional researchers:

Name of Participant:

(To be represented by a number or figure)

1. I consent to participate in this project, the details of which have been explained to me.
2. I understand that the purpose of this research is to investigate the concept of Boko Haram in North east Nigeria.
3. I understand that my participation in this project is for research purpose only
4. Participants will be told to keep in mind not to incriminate themselves or others while participating in this research as there is a duty in the research to report serious crisis.
5. I acknowledge that other possible effects of participating in this project have been explained to my satisfaction.
6. In this project I will be required to allow my voice to be recorded in a tape or my interview recorded on a sheet of paper.

7. I understand that my participation is voluntarily and that I am free to withdraw from this project at any time without explanation or prejudice and to withdraw any unprocessed data that I have provided.
8. I have been informed that the confidentiality of the information I provide, will be safeguarded, my data will be password protected and accessible only by the named researchers.
9. I understand that given the large number of participants involved in this study, my anonymity is guaranteed.
10. I understand that after I sign and return this consent form it will be retained by the researchers.
11. I agree to the use of anonymized quotes in publications

Participants Signature / Thumbprint

Source: research.unimelb.edu.au

APPENDIX C:

LETTER OF INTRODUCTION

Gwarmipa Housing Estate,,

Abuja, Nigeria.

6/2/2016

Dear Sir/Ma

LETTER OF INTRODUCTION: TO CONDUCT A RESEARCH

I am a post-graduate student undergoing a research on the topic:

“Religious Violence in Nigeria: A story of Boko Haram Insurgency in North east Nigeria”.

It will be appreciated, if you can give me all the necessary assistance to carry out this research.

Yours sincerely.

Bala Abdulahi Hassan

APPENDIX D:

**TERRORISM IN NIGERIA: A STUDY OF BOOK HARAM RELIGIOUS VIOLENCE
IN NORTH-EAST NIGERIA**

Interview Guide For Key Informants Interview (Telephone Interview)

Q1. Combating terrorism is an evolving process which requires innovations. How far have we adopted innovative process on continual basis? -----

Q2. Please, kindly give specific examples:

Q3. Generally, what are the counter and anti-terrorism efforts employed by the security forces to douse the abrasiveness of Boko Haram insurgency? -----

Q4. What are the roles of intelligence in counter terrorism efforts/operation? Can we say, we are still complacent in our

Intelligence gathering mode? -----

Q6. Do we really make use of unified intelligence gathering or use the individual agency-intelligence? -----

Q7. Do you think the establishment of individual center is preferable to the central intelligence processing from the centre? -----

Q8. What will be your rating of the level of public awareness and support for counter-terrorism operations? -----

Q9. How effective is inter-agency collaboration on counter-terrorism?

Q10. What are the logistics management supports in counter-terrorism operations? -----

Q11. To what extent have we complied with the UN global counter-terrorism strategy in terms of socio-economic well-being and socio-economic activities of the affected areas in North-East Nigeria?

APPENDIX E:

INSPECTOR-GENERAL OF POLICE
FORCE HEADQUARTERS

05 FEB 2016

Telegraphic Address:

INGENPOL ABUJA

Telephone No: 08075390126

08075390127

E-mail: ingenpolsecabuja@npt.gov.ng

ingenpolsecabuja@yahoo.com

In reply please quote:

Ref No: CD:3380/IGP.SEC/ABJ/VOL.54/408

The Assistant Inspector-General of Police
The Nigeria Police Force,
Zone 1 Headquarters,
Onikan,
Lagos State.

THE INSPECTOR-GENERAL OF POLICE
THE NIGERIA POLICE FORCE,
FORCE HEADQUARTERS,
LOUIS EDET HOUSE,
SHEHU SHAGARI WAY,
CENTRAL AREA,
ABUJA.

4th February, 2016

RE: PERMISSION TO CONDUCT A DOCTORAL RESEARCH
ENTITLED "INSURGENCY IN NIGERIA: A STUDY
OF BOKO HARAM IN NORTH EAST NIGERIA"

I refer to your letter No. CD:3380/DFA/ZN.2/VOL.T/4273/c2

dated 3rd February, 2016, on the above subject and respectfully convey the approval of the
Inspector-General of Police for your necessary action.

2. Accept my warm courtesy, please.

ACP Idowu Owohunwa

Principal Staff Officer

To

Inspector-General of Police

Telegraphic Address

AIGZON 2 LAGOS

Tel: 01-2631000

Mobile: 08174222111

E-mail: zonpol2lag@yahoo.com

in reply please quote



THE ASSY. INSPECTOR-GENERAL OF POLICE
THE NIGERIA POLICE,
ZONE 2 HEADQUARTERS,
ONIKAN,
LAGOS.

Ref No:

Date:

CD:3380/DFA/ZN.2/VOL.T/42

3rd February, 2016

The Inspector-General of Police,
The Nigeria Police Force Headquarters,
Louis Edet House,
Shehu Shagari Way,
Abuja.

Sir,

PERMISSION TO CONDUCT A DOCTORAL RESEARCH
ENTITLED "INSURGENCY IN NIGERIA: A STUDY OF
BOKO HARAM IN NORTH EAST NIGERIA"

I am a part time student of London Metropolitan

University, studying Professional Doctorate in Policing and Community Safety. I am in my final year with ID Card No. 12061531.

As part of the requirement for the award of the Higher Degree, I am conducting Q research on the above topic. The research will involve interview of Police Officers, the military, Customs, Immigration etc. and those involve in the fight against insurgency in the North east. Others include

the victims of Boko Haram, the Traditional Rulers, Religious Leaders and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). It will also involve records from exhibit keepers and other crime statistics from the Police Management Services Department (MSD).

In the light of the nature of the topic, I am requesting the Inspector-General of Police to grant me approval to carry out the project. The approval will enable the University Ethics Committee to give me the required clearance to go on with the research.

I am to add that the research is purely to improve on the body of knowledge in the area/ as well as satisfying the requirement of the school for the award of the higher degree, please.

AIG Bala Hassan, NPM, fwc, psc+

Assistant Inspector-General of Police

Zone 2 Headquarters

Onikan, Lagos

THE NIGERIA POLICE
THE STATEMENT OF ACCUSED

This image shows a full page of primary-ruled paper. It features multiple sets of horizontal lines designed for handwriting practice. Each set consists of three lines: two solid outer lines and one dashed middle line. The sets are repeated down the entire page, providing ample space for writing practice.

Interpreted by me

Signed -----

Signature/Mark of Witness/Accused:

Date-----

This statement was taken in the ----- language and read over and translated
to the Accused/Witness in ----- language in my presence and hearing

Recorded by -----

Date-----

Time taking of statement commenced -----

Time taking of statement completed -----

APPENDIX G:

QUESTIONNAIRE INSTRUMENT

I am Bala Abdullahi Hassan a Postgraduate Research Student of Professional Doctoral Degree in Criminology at John Grieve Centre for Policing and Community Safety London Metropolitan University. I am conducting a research on the Topic: **“Religious Violence in Nigeria: A study of Boko Haram insurgency in North eastern Nigeria”**. I hereby solicit for your kind cooperation to respond to the questions as your view and identity will be treated with outmost confidentiality and anonymity. Thanks for your kind cooperation.

INSTRUCTION: Tick (✓) in the appropriate box.

Section A: Demographic and Socio-Economic characteristics of the respondents

1. Gender: (a) Male ☐ (b) Female ☐
2. Age _____ in years as at last birthday
3. Which of the following security outfit do you belong ?
(a) Police ☐ (b) Army ☐ (c) Air force ☐
(d) Civilian JTF ☐ (e) Immigration ☐ (f) Civil defence ☐
4. Status: (a) Junior Officer ☐ (b) Senior Officer ☐ (c) Others Specify ☐
5. Educational Qualification
 - a. Islamiya School ☐ (e) HND/Degree ☐
 - b. Primary Education ☐ (f) Postgraduate ☐
 - c. Secondary Education ☐ (d) Others (Specify) ☐
 - d. NCE/OND

1. Place of Primary Assignment

- | | | | | | |
|-------------|--------------------------|-----------|--------------------------|------------|--------------------------|
| (a) Adamawa | <input type="checkbox"/> | (b) Gombe | <input type="checkbox"/> | (c) Taraba | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| | <input type="checkbox"/> | 230 | <input type="checkbox"/> | | <input type="checkbox"/> |

(d) Bauchi

(e) Borno

(f) Yobe

2. Religion: (a) Islam () (b) Christianity () (c) Traditional () (e) Others ()

3. Ethnicity: (a) Hausa () (b) Fulani () (c) Kanuri () (d) Igbo ()
(e) Barah () (f) Others specify ()

Section B: Causes of Boko Haram Insurgency

4. What is the major cause of Boko Haram insurgency in your opinion?

S/N	Causal factors	Tick as many as appropriate
I	Ethnicity	
Ii	Value incongruity	
Iii	Poverty	
Iv	Almafiranci	
V	Illiteracy	
Vi	Unemployment	
Vii	Corruption	
viii	Bad governance	

Please indicate your responses by making a tick (✓) under the appropriate rating scale; 5= Strongly Agree; 4= Agree; 3= Undecided; 2=Disagree; 1= Strongly Disagree to questions in 10 – 13.

5. Extra-Judicial killing of Boko Haram leader Muhammad Yusuf led the group to be violent and start attacking

- a. Agree
- b. Strongly agree
- c. Undecided
- d. Disagree
- e. Strongly disagree

6. There is a relationship between religious extremist ideology and Boko Haram insurgency

- a. Strongly agree
- b. Agree
- c. Undecided/neutral
- d. Disagree
- e. Strongly disagree

7. The Boko Haram is a recent recantation of Maltatsine movement of the 1980
- Agree
 - Strongly agree
 - Undecided
 - Disagree
 - Strongly disagree
8. There is a relationship between political economic interest and Boko Haram insurgency in North east.
- Agree
 - Strongly agree
 - Undecided
 - Disagree
 - Strongly disagree

SECTION C: Relationship between and Boko Haram and other Terrorist Group

What are the relationships between Boko Haram insurgents and other Terrorist groups?

Please indicate your responses by making a tick (✓) under the appropriate rating scale; 5= Strongly Agree; 4= Agree; 3= Undecided; 2=Disagree; 1= Strongly Disagree to questions in 14 – 18.

S/N	Relationship Variables	SD=1	D=2	UD=3	A=4	SA=5
14	Boko Haram allegiance to ISIS was a clear indication of the relationship between Boko Haram and other Terrorist groups					
15	Modus of operandi and attacks of Boko Haram in similar to that of other international Terrorist groups.					
16	The proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SLAW) through Nigeria Chad and Cameroon					
17	borders can be used to justify the relationship between Boko Haram and other Terrorist group					
18	There are intelligence reports linking Boko Haram and other international terrorist groups					

SECTION D: Why the prevalence of Boko Haram in the North-East rather than in other Geo political Zones of Nigeria?

Please indicate your responses by making a tick (✓) under the appropriate rating scale; 5= Strongly Agree; 4= Agree; 3= Undecided; 2=Disagree; 1= Strongly Disagree to questions in 19– 22.

S/N	Prevalence factors	SD=1	D=2	UD=3	A=4	SA=5
19	The porous extensive border the North-East shares with Chad, Cameroon and Nigeria made it possible for Boko Haram to be prevalence than in other places					
20	The presence of different Islamic groups in Maiduguri made it possible for the prevalence of Boko Haram in the North-East than in other places.					
21	The prevalence of Boko Haram insurgency was a result of the existence of Islam in the region order than other places in Nigeria					
22	The extensive borders and thick forest in Sambisa has contributed to the prevalence of Boko Haram to the North east than in other places.					

23.Which of the following led to the prevalence of Boko Haram in North east than in other geo-political zones?

S/N	Prevalence Factors	Tick as many as appropriate
i	It is the poorest geo-political zone in Nigeria	
ii	It is the most porous geo-political zone in-terms of inhabitancy and entry	
Iii	It is the political zone with highest illiteracy rate in Nigeria	
Iv	It is the political zone with different Islamic sects in Nigeria	
V	It is the political zone with the most potent history of Maltatsine in Nigeria	
Vi	The heterogeneous nature of the North-East geo political zone	

SECTION E: Sources of Funds and Arms Used by Boko Haram Terrorist in the North-East

Please indicate your responses by making a tick (✓) under the appropriate rating scale; 5= Strongly Agree; 4= Agree; 3= Undecided; 2=Disagree; 1= Strongly Disagree to questions in 24 – 29.

S/N	Sources of funds and arms used by Boko Haram	SD=1	D=2	UD=3	A=4	SA=5
24	Boko Haram sourced money and arms from Nigerian government					
25	Boko Haram sourced money and Arms from National and International Sympathizers.					
26	Boko Haram sourced Money and Fund from other international Terrorist groups					
27	Boko Haram sourced money and arms from foreign countries					
28	Boko Haram sourced fund and arms from domestic politicians in Nigeria.					
29	Boko Haram produced their arms or LED and sourced money from criminal activities like armed robbery, kidnapping and cattle rustling.					

SECTION F: Consequences of Boko Haram Insurgency on National Development

Please indicate your responses by making a tick (✓) under the appropriate rating scale; 5= Strongly Agree; 4= Agree; 3= Undecided; 2=Disagree; 1= Strongly Disagree to questions in 30– 36.

S/N		SD=1	D=2	UD=3	A=4	SA=5
30	Boko Haram has negatively affected the businesses in North-East and investment operations in Nigeria in general					
31	Boko Haram has affected food security and other agricultural production in the North-East					

32	Boko Haram has affected or led to the closure of many companies as well industries in the North-East.					
33	Boko Haram has led to the separation of families and displacement of people as IDPs and refugees.					
34	Boko Haram has negatively affected the educational growth and development in the North-East in recent years					
35	Boko Haram has led to the loss of lives, injuries and destruction of properties.					
36	Boko Haram has led to the recruitment of female and child militants and thereby encroaching on their fundamental human rights and destroying their destinies.					

Section G: The counter-Terrorist efforts employed by Nigerian securities to solve the problem of Boko Haram insurgency.

Please indicate your responses by making a tick (√) under the appropriate rating scale; 5= Strongly Agree; 4= Agree; 3= Undecided; 2=Disagree; 1= Strongly Disagree to questions in 37 – 41.

S/N	Counter-Terrorist efforts employed by Nigerian securities	SD=1	D=2	UD=3	A=4	SA=5
37	The political will from presidency to the officials of security agencies will greatly enhance the counter-terrorist efforts					
38	Collaboration between all the security agencies with inter-pole will assist in the counter-terrorist efforts of government					
39	Rivalry among the security agencies in Nigeria is a challenge facing the counter terrorist efforts.					
40	Poor condition of service among the security personnel is affecting the government counter-terrorist efforts					
41	The use of civilian JTF who are familiar with the North-East is a very good step in counter-terrorist effort.					

42. What is the major counter-terrorist efforts employed to avert the Boko Haram resurgences

S/N	Counter-terrorist efforts	Tick as many as appropriate
I	Use of Information Technology	
Ii	Intelligence sharing	
Iii	Provision of logistics in the North-East	
Iv	Provision of new and latest fire arms	
Vi	The training of personnel's in fighting Terrorist groups	

APPENDIX H

RELIGIOUS VIOLENCE IN NIGERIA: A STUDY OF BOKO HARAM IN NORTH EAST NIGERIA

KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENTS/NEMA OFFICIALS

INTRODUCTION

Good day,

I am/representing **baba Abdullahi Hassan** conducting a research on religious violence and Boko Haram insurgency in Northern Nigeria. Your cooperation in responding to the following questions is solicited and will be highly appreciated. Your answers will be treated as confidential and therefore your anonymity is guaranteed. The interview will take about one hour and your open and candid contributions will be highly appreciated. We want to use a tape recorder so that we can get all information better so that nothing is lost. So do I have your permission to continue?

01 Yes (continue with interview)

02 No (if no. thank them and end interview)

TIME: INTERVIEW COMMENCED: _____

LANGUAGE USED: _____

State/camp address: _____


1. How would you describe Boko Haram as a group?
2. What do you think gave rise to its becoming violent?
3. What do you see as source of their ideologies?
4. Do you think method of teaching Islamic education especially concept of jihad contributes to emergence of extremist groups as Boko Haram?
5. Do you think there is justification for their violence at beginning?
6. Do you think there is correlation between religion and religious violence in Nigeria?
7. Many people wonder how they get their weapons, training and supplies: do you have any idea of how they get them?
8. Do you think that Boko Haram has foreign backing?
9. Why has it taken you Nigerian security forces so long to deal with the group?
10. Are you convinced that you are about to win this war?
11. What do you do to the civilians you rescued from them? Probe: feeding, clothing accommodation, health care etc.
12. What do you do to the Boko Haram fighters you capture or those that surrender? Probe whether they charge then to court, detain or execute them.
13. What are you doing to help the ISPs in camps?
14. Do you see negotiation as a viable option to end these crises?

15. What challenges do you face in the course of handling the refugee situation/fighting faceless insurgents group?
16. On the whole, do you have any other information to add in order to mitigate the menace and bring a lasting solution to the problem?

APPENDIX I :

	<p>Reviewer 2</p> <p><i>Confidentiality:</i> The researcher aims to give a guarantee of complete confidentiality to research participants. This will not be possible as there is a duty to report serious crimes. Research participants need to be told that they should keep this in mind when providing information, so that they have a chance not to incriminate themselves or others.</p> <p><i>Consent form:</i> Please provide draft consent form (in English).</p> <p><i>Focus groups:</i> Please reflect on safeguards to prevent breach of confidentiality. Please reconsider the use of this research tool. Would individual interviews not be advisable given the security issues in refugee camps?</p> <p><i>Minors are research participants:</i> Please clarify whether minors will be involved. There seems to be contradictory Information in the application.</p> <p><i>Inspector General of Police's approval:</i> Please provide evidence of the Approval. It needs to show that you Don't just have access to confidential files, but that you are allowed to use them in research that will eventually be publicly disseminated.</p> <p>Accessing sites that promote terrorism: This seems to be unavoidable when researching Boko Haram. Also, on your previous application you had said 'yes' to the two questions. Will you use university computers to research Boko Harm? How will you safeguard any information promoting terrorism? Use of tape recorders.</p>
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**WORDCLOUD SHOWING RESPONSE ON CAUSES OF BOKO HARAM
INSURGENCY IN NIGERIA**




APPENDIX K:

WORDCLOUD SHOWING RESPONSE ON BOKO HARAM RELATIONSHIP WITH OTHER INTERNATIONAL TERROR GROUPS



Looking at the word cloud above, the word cloud above the words foreign, yes, ISIS, allegiance appeared more in the responses for the KII & IDI on localisation

WORDCLOUD SHOWING RESPONSE ON BOKO HARAM'S SOURCES OF ARMS AND FUNDS



APPENDIX M:

WORD CLOUD SHOWING RESPONSE ON REASONS FOR LOCALIZATION OF BOKO HARAM TO THE NORTH EAST



Looking at the word cloud above the words unemployment, Maiduguri, poverty and founder appeared more in the responses in why Boko Haram is localised to North-east.

APPENDIX N:

WORDCLOUD SHOWING CHALLENGES



From the above word cloud, words like “logistics”, gathering intelligence, equipment appeared more in the responses on challenges of fight Boko Haram that could threaten the counter-terrorist efforts of the security agencies.

APPENDIX O

Summary of Results

Research Questions	Questionnaire	IDIs and KIIs	Case Files	Interviews with Senior Security Officials
RQ1. What are the causes of the Boko Haram insurgency in north-eastern Nigeria?	1. Poverty; 2. Unemployment; 3. Corruption; 4. Bad Government; 5. Illiteracy	1. Political Factors; 2. Religious Factors and Issues; 3. Social Issues; 4. Support crime and violence; 5. Influence of Foreign Terrorist Groups	1. Poverty; 2. No Western Education; 3. Religious Extremism	-
	<p>✓ Agree: Extra-judicial killing of Boko Haram leader Mohammad Yusuf led the group to be violent and start attacking.</p> <p>✓ Strongly Agree: There is a relationship between religious extremist ideology and Boko Haram insurgency.</p> <p>✓ Strongly Agree: The Boko Haram is a recent reincarnation of Maitatasine movement of 1980.</p> <p>✓ Agree: There is a relationship between political-economic interest and Boko Haram</p>			-

	insurgency in the North.			
RQ2. What are the sources of funds and arms of Boko Haram insurgents in north-eastern Nigeria?	<p>✓ Disagree: Boko Haram sourced money and arms from the Nigeria government.</p> <p>✓ Agree: Boko Haram sourced money and arms from national and international sympathizers.</p> <p>✓ Strongly Agree: Foreign Countries as Sources of Arms and Funds to Boko Haram.</p> <p>✓ Strongly Agree: Boko Haram produced their arms or get and sourced money from criminal activities like armed robbery, kidnapping and cattle rustling.</p>	<p>1. Boko Haram groups commit crimes such as robbery, kidnapping, and extortion to acquire arms.</p> <p>2. Attacking the military and police to sustain their arms.</p> <p>3. The group is funded by foreign groups and sponsors.</p> <p>4. Boko Haram is funded by local groups and sponsors.</p> <p>5. The group is supported by the government and military officers.</p>	<p>1. Armed robbery</p> <p>2. Attack on army and police formation.</p>	-
Research Question	<i>Questionnaire</i>	IDIs and KIIs	Case files	Interviews with Officials
RQ3. What is the relationship between Boko Haram insurgents and other international terrorist groups?	<p>✓ Disagree: Boko Haram allegiance to ISIS was a clear indication of the relationship between Boko Haram and another international Terrorist group.</p> <p>✓ Strongly Disagree: Modus</p>	<p>1. Boko Haram received technical support and training from international terrorist groups.</p> <p>2. The group is connected with other terrorist groups i.e. Al Qaeda and ISIS.</p>		-

	<p>Operandi and attacks of Boko Haram is similar to that of the other international terror groups..</p> <p>✓ <i>Strongly Agree:</i></p> <p>There are intelligence reports linking Boko Haram and other international terrorist groups</p>	<p>3. The group received other types of supports from international terrorist group thereby increasing their confidence and their efficacies.</p> <p>4. Believing that Boko Haram has no relationship with other international groups.</p> <p>5. The group is supported by the government and military officers.</p> <p>6. It has its arms transported across international borders</p>		
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RQ4. Why is Boko Haram more localised in the north-eastern part of Nigeria than other geopolitical zones?	<p>✓ <i>No:</i> Prevalence of Boko Haram in the North East is due to the North East being the poorest geopolitical zone in Nigeria.</p> <p>✓ <i>Yes:</i> Prevalence of Boko Haram in the North East is due to the North East being the most porous geopolitical zone in terms of inhabitancy and entry.</p> <p>✓ <i>Yes:</i> Prevalence of Boko Haram in the North East is due to the North East being the political zone with the highest illiteracy rate in Nigeria.</p> <p>✓ <i>Yes:</i> Prevalence of Boko Haram in the North East is due to the North East being the political zone with different Islamic sects in Nigeria.</p> <p>✓ <i>Yes:</i> Prevalence of Boko Haram in the North East is due to the North East being the political zone with the most potent history of Maitasine in Nigeria.</p>	<p>1. Maximising the lack of education and awareness of the citizens in the North-Eastern part of Nigeria.</p> <p>2. Being founded by a leader from the North Eastern part.</p> <p>3. Stemming from the religions upsurge in the area.</p> <p>4. Triggering the violent nature of individuals in the area (from crimes and violence).</p> <p>5. Maximizing the unfortunate conditions of poverty and unemployment in the area</p>	<p>1. Illiteracy 2. poverty 3. religious 4. extremism</p> <p>Relevant demographic characteristics</p> <p>Religion</p> <p>Muslims 97.6% Christians 2.4%</p> <p>Sex</p> <p>Male: 83.3% Female: 16.7%</p> <p>Tribe</p> <p>Mostly Kanuri (61.9%)</p> <p>Age</p> <p>93% 44 above 62% 34 years</p>	
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	<p>✓ <i>Yes:</i> Prevalence of Boko Haram in the North East is due to the heterogeneous nature of the North-East geopolitical zone.</p>			
RQ5. What are the consequences of Boko Haram insurgency on Nigeria's national development?	<p>✓ <i>Strongly Agree:</i> Boko Haram has negatively affected the businesses in North East and investment operations in Nigeria in general.</p> <p>✓ <i>Strongly Agree:</i> Boko Haram has affected food security and other agricultural production in the North East.</p> <p><i>Strongly Agree:</i> Boko Haram has affected or led to the closure of many companies as</p>	<p>1. Lacking peace and stability in the country.</p> <p><i>1a. Destroying or destruction of properties.</i></p> <p>2. Affecting the economic activities and development of the country in a negative manner</p> <p><i>2a. Disruption of international activities and businesses.</i></p> <p>3. Freezing the development and growth of the country</p>		-

	<p>well as industries in the Northeast.</p> <p>✓ <i>Strongly Agree</i>: Boko Haram has led to the separation of families and displacement of people as IDPs and refugees.</p> <p>✓ <i>Strongly Agree</i>: Boko Haram has negatively affected the educational growth and development in the North East in recent years.</p> <p>✓ <i>Strongly Agree</i>: Boko Haram has affected or led to the closure of many companies as well as industries in the North-east.</p>	<p>4. Uncovering the solidarity among the citizens of the country</p> <p>5. Affecting the daily activities and livelihood of the citizens of the country.</p> <p>5a. <i>Presence of poverty.</i></p> <p>5b. <i>Presence of unemployment.</i></p> <p>6. Experiencing internal displacement.</p> <p>7. Affecting the education of young students.</p>		
Research Question	Questionnaire	KIIs and IDIs	Case files	Interview with Senior Security Officials
RQ6. What are the counter and anti-terrorism efforts employed by the Nigeria security agencies and their efficacies?	-	<p>1. There is a lack of effective counter-terrorism and anti-terrorism efforts due to the negligence of the government.</p> <p>2. Needing more time to defeat the group.</p>	<p>Other interesting findings outside the RQs</p> <p>1. Sectional leaders “Amir” acting as armourers (gun keepers) for Boko Haram group.</p>	<p>1. Adopting three major strategies including the deployment of a kinetic instrument, deployment of non-kinetic instruments, and</p>

		<p>3. Other challenges in fighting the group</p>	<p>2. Reasons for denunciations of Boko Haram,</p> <p>(a) member developing unwillingness to fight again</p> <p>(b) pressured by lack of food and medicine in Boko Haram camp (basic necessities)</p> <p>3. How women join Boko Haram group.</p> <p>(a) By getting abducted upon raid in the village.</p> <p>(b) By unknowingly marrying Boko Haram member.</p>	<p>sustainability counter-terrorism strategies.</p> <p><i>1a. Deploying non-kinetic instruments</i></p> <p><i>1b. Promoting sustainability of the effort</i></p> <p><i>1c. Deploying kinetic instruments</i></p> <p>2. Increasing intelligence on/against terrorism operations.</p> <p>3. Encouraging unity and collaboration in solving security issues.</p> <p><i>3a. Observing collaboration between public and private agencies.</i></p> <p><i>3b. Developing collaboration with other countries.</i></p>
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			<p>(c) By marrying Boko Haram member with full consent.</p>	<p>4. Encouraging innovations and changes to secure the nation further. 5. Increasing public awareness on threats and terror activities. 6. Needing more effort from the government to consider terrorism.</p>
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WORDCLOUD SHOWING RESPONSE ON IMPACT OF BOKO HARAM TO NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

