


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
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
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


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3



**VALUES IN EDUCATION POLICY-MAKING WITH
SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE FE TEACHERS'
SALARIES STRUCTURE AND TO THE
MACFARLANE REVIEW OF 16-19 PROVISION**

KATHRYN ANN CUNNINGHAM MA. Cert.Ed.

Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for a Ph.D

Sponsoring Establishment: City of London Polytechnic

**Collaborating Establishments:
Association of County Councils
Coombe Lodge, the FE Staff College.**

April 1988

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ABSTRACT

In the period covered by the thesis (1945-87), teachers' salaries were negotiated between representatives of the local authorities and the teachers' associations in the Burnham Committees. This study explores how far the results of those negotiations, the Burnham Reports, have shaped 16+ education provision by reference to the 1950-51 Further Education negotiations on the one hand and the 1979-80 Macfarlane Review of 16-19 provision on the other. A contribution is made to the debate on the theory of policy-making, based on the observed influence of the values of policy-makers on the final outcomes within those two studies.

The thesis is organised into four main parts. Part I introduces the work as a whole; Parts II and III present and analyse original empirical data; Part IV provides the theoretical underpinning.

First, the context for the research is outlined. The methodology is described at the outset, since it explains why the two major studies were selected as providing the best sources for the work. The major developments affecting 16+ provision since 1945 are then summarised.

The second part sets out the detail of the negotiations leading to the 1951 Burnham (FE) Report, the source of the current FE salary structure, and gives a commentary on their implications. Part III explores the issues raised in the Macfarlane Review.

The theoretical section of the study is developed in Part IV, where the new, distinctive contribution of this study to the theory of policy-making is presented.

The thesis provides new data on two areas of policy-making of great interest to contemporary education policy-makers. Additionally, in its conclusion it makes a contribution to the theory of policy-making, suggesting that the values of individual policy-makers and contingent factors - including, particularly and principally, the dimension of time - have the greatest impact on policy outcomes.

ABBREVIATIONS

ACC	Association of County Councils (see also CCA)
AEC	Association of Education Committees
AMA	Association of Metropolitan Authorities (see also AMC)
AMC	Association of Municipal Corporations (see also AMA)
AMMA	Assistant Masters and Mistresses Association
AP	Authorities' Panel (see also MP)
ATCDE	Association of Teachers in Colleges and Departments of Education
ATTI	Association of Teachers in Technical Institutions
CLEA	Council of Local Education Authorities
CCA	County Councils Association (see also ACC)
CEO	Chief Education Officer
DES	Department of Education and Science
FE	Further Education
FT	full-time
HE	Higher Education
HMI	Her Majesty's Inspectorate
ILEA	Inner London Education Authority
LAA	Local Authority Association
LEA	Local Education Authority
LI	Lecturer I
LII	Lecturer II
LCC	London County Council
MP	Management Panel (see also AP)
NAHT	National Association of Head Teachers
NAS/UWT	National Association of Schoolmasters/Union of Women Teachers
NUT	National Union of Teachers
POP/COW	Proportions of Posts/Categories of Work
PSR	Post of Special Responsibility (see also SRA)
PT	part-time
PL	Principal Lecturer
RSLA	Raising the School Leaving Age
SA	Senior Assistant
SHA	Secondary Heads Association
SL	Senior Lecturer
SRA	Special Responsibility Allowance (see also PSR)
TES	Times Educational Supplement
THES	Times Higher Educational Supplement
TP	Teachers' Panel
WJEC	Welsh Joint Education Committee

PART I - THE CONTEXT OF THE RESEARCH

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

The issues explored in this research are central to the debate on the policy and values of 16-19 provision that has extended over the last two decades. Indeed, the character of 16-19 provision has been a major public issue since this study commenced in 1979. Policy cannot be explained without reference to the values of the policy-makers and the culture they inhabit. Only by examining the ideas and factors that influence people when they are deciding the framework and shape of provision do the policies become explicable.

Fundamental to the debates on where the 16-19 year old should study - in a sixth form at school or in FE, sixth form or tertiary college - is an 'academic skew': by this term I mean the tendency to promote full-time, academic and advanced courses rather than part-time, vocational and non-advanced courses.

Academic-Skew and the Burnham Reports

The phrases used to describe 'academic-skew' come from the FE culture, the starting point for the research. The late 1970s saw a dramatic rise in unemployment, particularly marked for adolescents. Why did so many young people seem to prefer the dole to further education? Why was the FE system not making more suitable provision? The conventional answer was that the incentives of the FE system - described later in this

Introduction - encouraged those working in FE to concentrate on increasing the provision of the more academic, advanced courses. If that were true, what was the source of those incentives? The answer lay in the FE teachers' salary structure, essentially conceived in the 1950-51 Burnham negotiations. Part II of the thesis describes how - and why - the current FE salary structure came to contain the academically-skewing incentives.

Similarly, the 1970s agenda for 16-19 provision led directly to the decision to launch a detailed investigation culminating in the Macfarlane Report. By the late 1970s, there was a general recognition that the numbers of 16+ students in full-time education increased wherever either a sixth form college or, even more markedly, a tertiary college was established in place of school sixth forms. The tertiary college could provide courses that Schools Regulations prevented sixth forms or sixth form colleges from offering.

Since the concentration of post-16 education in institutions with no 'lower school' increased the 'age participation rate', and since tertiary colleges could also offer vocational studies in addition to all those available in sixth form colleges, the relative scarcity of sixth form and tertiary colleges, particularly the latter, was intriguing.

The conventional explanation, again, was that the

incentives of the Schoolteachers' salary structure, as determined by the Burnham (Primary and Secondary) Report, reinforced a presumption that school pupils should be encouraged to pursue post-16 studies in school sixth forms.

The logic was that since heads and deputies of 11-18 schools gained higher salaries, and teaching staff had better chances of promotion, on the basis of the numbers of older pupils, there was an inbuilt incentive within the Burnham (P&S) Report for secondary schools to resist any proposals for sixth form or tertiary college reorganisations.

The research into the sources of the academic-skew within the Burnham Reports does not, however, explain its durability. The implicit values of negotiators of the 1950s were still reflected in the Burnham Reports of the late 1970s. Those values appeared stronger than the changes in actual and potential clientele that had occurred over the intervening quarter century.

Academic-Skew and Cultural Values

The Crowther Report (1959) had warmly endorsed John Dewey's observation that:

"What the best and wisest parent wants for his own child, the community must want for all its children". (1)

16-19 provision has been significantly affected by the perception of a substantial proportion of parents that

the best course for their children would be the opportunity to join the professional classes, the route to which lay through academic study. Thus 16+ reorganisations that might endanger the sixth form of the 11-18 school, the time-honoured route to the professions, have not been immediately acceptable.

A proposal in the late 1960s for a tertiary, rather than sixth form, college re-organisation in Surrey led to strong, and successful, opposition. Much of the opposition stemmed from a presumption that the education of the academic student would have been adversely affected by social contact - note, not educational contact on the same courses - in the same college as those students following non-academic courses such as builders, carpenters, plumbers, etc. (2)

There was no more logic in this view than in the alternative one which claimed that the social contact would have inestimable value. At the same time, the strength of the view, and its effects on 16-19 provision, were sufficient to invite examination. As the research progressed, it became increasingly important to explore the values and expectations of the system.

The Macfarlane Report made explicit a good proportion of the cultural issues and values that were present in individual LEA 16+ reorganisations - the paternalism, the issue of the community-of-scholars v the technical

association (3) and, most critically, the priority always afforded the academic - the academic skew - in all parts of the education service as well as between the different competing sectors.

The study demonstrates that the education system has been in receipt of two separate messages from successive governments - on the one hand, that 'academic standards' must be maintained and, on the other, that education provision must be extended beyond the academic to include a pre-vocational orientation. It is worth noting at this point that the values that are implicit in the English education system, whether through the Burnham Reports or specific Government policies, support the first message and are antipathetic to the second.

The first principle of post-war education provision was the retention of 'academic standards', giving a priority to the needs of the traditional elite, and the second was a pressure for more vocationally-orientated educational provision which might be offered to all abilities. Where there were tensions between these two separate policies - and 16-19 education provides a clear arena for this - then, in practice, the weight of resources went towards the support of the first.

There are many explanations. The argument that policy-makers intend to be or are 'elitist' is too simplistic. Rather, those policy-makers who are

interested in making provision open to a 'mass' clientele have felt themselves required to demonstrate their credentials by demonstrating how their proposals will not endanger the education of the elite. Consequently, the provision for the 'mass' clientele has been adversely affected.

The above represents a very condensed summary of the values operating upon the post-war education system. However, they have been and remain potent in their implications.

Incentives Within the Burnham (FE) Report

The Burnham (FE) Report governs the salaries of teachers in further education establishments through a complex network of factors involving categories or levels of work and student hours which 'earn' a department and its college a number of units. Appendix I sets out in full the factors involved: what follows is a brief and selective description to highlight the ways in which the Burnham (FE) Report reinforces academic skew.

Each course is classified as belonging to one of the four 'categories of work', I, II/III, IV and V (where I covers post-graduate work and V, GCSE level and below). The total number of student hours in each category is calculated for college and department according to a sliding scale where 100 student hours of Category I work, 300 student hours of Category II/III, and 600 student

hours of Category V all count for the same number of Burnham units.

The unit total count also contains a weighting towards full-time, as opposed to part-time work, as the former is credited on notional hours, 30 per week, and the latter on actual registered hours. Very few groups of students are taught for 30 hours in any week. Those colleges with high proportions of full-time students thus earn disproportionately higher unit counts than do those colleges with higher proportions of part-time students. A high proportion of part-time work is directly vocational, and a high proportion of full-time work is general education, of a more indirect vocational relevance.

The unit totals of the college and department are translated into 'groups' and 'grades' which determine the scale and range of salary of principals and heads of department. Since the full range of salaries for principals and heads of departments is such that the top of each is virtually double the bottom, the effect of the unit total on the salaries of individual principals, vice principals and heads of department is not insignificant.

As far as salaries of staff below the level of head of department are concerned, the weighting towards both advanced and full-time work is compounded by the table which Burnham prescribes "to secure an appropriate

relativity between the standards of work and the posts of the various categories of staff in the establishment of the college". (4) The Proportions of Posts/Categories of Work (POP/COW) table provides for a higher proportion of Senior and Principal Lectureships according to the proportion of advanced, ie degree equivalent-work, within the college. The number and proportion of promoted posts depends on the proportion of AFE work. Appendix I provides worked examples. It is therefore very difficult to devise a reasonable promotion structure for the staff of a college which does not offer a significant proportion of AFE.

John Bevan, then Deputy Education Officer for FE and HE in ILEA and thereby responsible for the largest concentration of FE work in any LEA in the country, illustrated the issue of minimal opportunities for promotion for those staff teaching in mainstream further education in a 1978 address to an FE Staff College Conference. He noted ILEA's decision to establish Senior Lecturer (SL) posts beyond the Burnham and statutory-minimum for college work for the less able, the socially disadvantaged, and the under-achievers:

"... for what is in almost all cases, Category V work. That had a great deal to do with a change in perception about the importance the colleges placed on this work ... In retrospect, I would add that the change in perception brought about by the appointment of SLs was far more significant than we realised at the time. We were appointing only one SL to a college, but we didn't realise then just how significant this was to people engaged in this kind of work. It was certainly significant beyond the cost". (5)

A year later, when NFER published a comprehensive review of FE teachers' opinions about of careers in FE teaching (6), ILEA might have been more appreciative of the significance to teachers of non-advanced work: the NFER Study accurately reflected the view of the FE teacher that, to gain promotion, one must [normally] engage in advanced level work.

The Burnham (FE) Reports following the 1951 settlement always acknowledged that 'level of work' was not the sole criterion for higher graded salaries, that the Reports described the minimum statutory requirement for promoted posts, and that LEAs were free to exceed that statutory minimum: what is salutary, however, is that Bevan, who had also been national president of the ATTI, should have been so surprised at the significance for teacher perceptions of an Authority positively exceeding the statutory minimum for promoted posts for Category V work. It suggests that the national negotiators on both management and teacher sides may have been somewhat remote from the realities of the incentives of the salary systems they were negotiating.

The foregoing paragraphs deal with the proportion of graded posts available for the college establishment as a whole: they do not relate to the salary of the individual lecturer. Lord Alexander went to some lengths to emphasise in successive Commentaries (7) that the fact that an individual was teaching a high proportion of

advanced level courses did not, of itself, mean that that individual had any right to one of the college's promoted posts which were earned for the college by those same courses.

However, since the Houghton Report's recommendations were implemented in 1975, a Lecturer Grade II who is responsible for a significant amount of Category I or II/III work can be transferred to the Senior Lecturer scale by automatic progression. This single modification to the general principle - that the level of the teacher's work does not determine his own grade or salary - has added yet another incentive in the FE system to increase the volume of advanced level work. The above provision, the 'Houghton SL', reduced the likelihood that other LEAs would follow ILEA in exceeding the Burnham statutory minimum requirements by creating SLs for non-advanced work: the additional salary bill for 'Houghton SLs' reduced the scope for this type of additional expenditure.

Part II describes how the Proportion of Posts/Categories of Work mechanism was introduced into the FE teachers' salary reports. As Kogan notes in his review of Dr Saran's work on the Burnham negotiations:

"... salaries entail valuations of the social worth according to different educational activities: infant against sixth form teaching or running a vast polytechnic compared with working as a very top person. Money not only buys goods but also reinforces status". (8)

Values are made explicit only when questioned. Why did the Burnham negotiators, employers and employees, opt for an academically-skewing salary structure? Was that their intention, or a by-product of other aims? The research into the Burnham negotiations provides some answers.

Structure of Thesis

This introductory chapter demonstrates the importance of the initial intentions of the research - to test the assumptions that the Burnham (FE) Report skewed the FE provision and that the Burnham Reports, (P&S) and (FE), skewed 16-19 provision. The remainder of Part I deals with methodology and how it was developed (Chapter 2) and provides a summary of the major developments in 16+ provision since the war as a context for the research (Chapter 3). Parts II and III explore the empirical evidence of the two case studies, and Part IV provides the theoretical underpinning of the thesis. Part IV includes a discussion of established models for educational policy-making, and offers a model which provides a new theoretical perspective for governmental and LEA policy-making.

CHAPTER 2: METHODOLOGY

The thesis explores the values expressed in the education system by reference to the negotiations that created the FE salary structure with its incentives and by reference to the issues raised by LEA reviews of their 16-19 provision.

By the early 1970s it was generally believed that the Burnham (FE) Report positively inhibited the responsiveness of the education service in two ways. First, within FE colleges the incentives of the Burnham (FE) Report on the salaries of FE teachers were perceived as distorting FE course provision in favour of advanced work. Second, within the Local Education Authority (LEA) the separate provisions of the Primary & Secondary and FE Salary Reports under the Burnham statutory settlements were considered to hinder LEA attempts to review their 16-19 provision as between 11-18 schools and sixth form, tertiary and FE Colleges.

I was stimulated to investigate the validity of the two assumptions by a wish to understand why, and how, the FE system had come to express the values of 'academic skew'. Did the Burnham Reports actively and positively promote academic skew? Did the Burnham negotiators consciously intend to create academically-skewed incentives? What were their values?

As the research progressed the significance of the

implicit values of Burnham negotiators, and other policy-makers, for the shape of the post-16 educational provision became increasingly clear. The many tensions between explicit policy and explicit practice could be comprehended only through an awareness of the implicit values of the policy-makers and of the education service.

It is acknowledged that identifying policy-makers' underlying values and perceptions does not of itself answer the question, 'why?'. Why did the Burnham negotiators settle on such an academically-skewed salary structure for FE teachers? Why did the members of the Macfarlane Review, themselves involved in Burnham negotiations, not exercise more influence in seeking to neutralise, if not counter-weight, the existing incentives of the Burnham Reports? Such questions remain even when their root, the values of the policy-makers, is fairly identified. (9)

To some extent the questions become circular and the answers beg new questions of the same order. 'Why have the Burnham negotiators continued to reinforce the 'academic-skew' of the English educational system?' 'Because they felt, or perceived their constituents as feeling, that the existing weights/incentives were appropriate'. 'But why?' 'Because those were the values ...' And so it goes on. (10)

There is a genuine epistemological problem. There is,

however, a pragmatic solution. No one would question the statement that policy-makers are affected by the personal values that they bring to their activities. This thesis does not attempt to untie the methodological Gordian Knot. Rather, it should be noted that the intention has been to research the 1951 Burnham (FE) Report and Macfarlane Review of 16-19 provision and that, for each of these policy-making scenarios, the values of the individual policy-makers were stronger than the evidence available to them.

Since both the Primary and Secondary (P&S) and Further Education (FE) Reports were to be reviewed, the underlying values of the current systems were of particular interest. At the time of registration I was employed at the Association of County Councils (ACC), the LEA organisation representing the majority of employers on the Management Panel of the Burnham Committees. I was also aware of Dr Saran's work on the Burnham (Primary and Secondary) Reports.

In the light of the strength and unanimity of the views of current practitioners on the assumptions - that the Burnham (FE) Report inhibited FE provision and that that Report and the Burnham (P&S) Report inhibited 16-19 review - it seemed that a classic hypothetico-deductive (H-D) methodology (11) should release evidence to clearly demonstrate the validity or invalidity of the assumptions. If the incentives of the Burnham Reports

were as powerful as assumed by the professionals, it should be comparatively easy to demonstrate their influence: if not, then alternative sources for the academic skew should be pursued.

The plan of work, therefore, included proposals for case studies of comparable FE Colleges on the management and direction of individual colleges and of comparable LEAs on 16-19 reviews. The original research proposal included the recognition that the totality of research activities was, if anything, too inclusive, but noted the likelihood that the activities of the Secretariat of Burnham FE would either pre-empt or prohibit one or more of the areas of investigation. A report on the progress of the research, and the methodological issues involved, was given at the 1981 SSRC/BEMAS Research Conference (see Appendix II).

Initial analysis had concentrated on two related activities - the perusal of the Burnham archives, mainly from the Employers' Panel, and interviews with current and recent leading members of both Panels, concentrating here on members of the Teachers' Panel to counteract a potential employer bias.

I had also explored the perspectives of practitioners - principally LEA FE officers, principals of colleges and leading NATFHE members - through interviews and published material (see Appendix III).

The criteria in choosing interviewees was to identify, first, leading members of both current Negotiating Panels and, then, to interview those they recommended. Additionally, I interviewed some of the leading negotiators active in the 1950s and 1960s. I then invited comments on early drafts of the chapters of the thesis. In this way the composite conclusions being developed were tested against some of the original sources of those tentative conclusions.

I was concerned to test the hypothesis that the Burnham Reports affected 16-19 provision. As the work progressed, it became clear that evidence for the disproof, as for the classical H-D methodology, was not available. Indeed, the methodology proved inappropriate.

Why was this the case? The point at which clear and explicit evidence for academic-skew - in Burnham Committee negotiations, in FE college development, or LFA 16-19 reorganisations - would have been found was not reproduced within archival material. By definition it resided in the pre-archival stage of any policy-making, as King has noted;

"... but there is no record of telephone calls and talks at the golf club or over drinks at the pub".(12)

The quotation refers equally well to the pre-archival stages of college academic board, LFA Committee and Cabinet-level consideration of a political issue. By definition, such evidence does not appear in archives.

Further, it became clear that the academic-skewing features of the Burnham Reports were constituents of a whole cluster of skewing inputs - eg mandatory grants for students on degrees, discretionary ones for those on NAFE courses - into the education system. The impossibility of disentangling the effects of the Burnham Reports from those other constituents of the cluster argued against an H-D methodology.

In the above circumstances, the criterion of 'soundness' (13) became relevant. A wide spectrum of the 'elite' of current and previous Burnham Panel members had endorsed the accuracy and appropriateness of the 'academic-skew' hypothesis, and had advised against the viability of the H-D methodology. Further, the 1981 SSRC/BEMAS seminar had been sceptical of the suitability of the H-D methodology. Since a significant proportion of those consulted had first-hand knowledge of the Burnham (FE) incentives, the advice appeared well-founded.

The research then became firmly based upon a variety of methodologies. These were, first, the primary sources of the Burnham Committee archives, interviews with Burnham and Macfarlane participants, LEA working papers and Committee agenda; the secondary sources of others' perspectives in academic papers and contemporary (educational) journalism; and, third, the 'participant observation' of a researcher who had worked on Burnham negotiations and continued to work on LEAs' 16-19 reviews.

The academic-skew within the FE system originated with the 1951 Burnham (FE) Report. Research concentrated here on the Burnham archives and the perspectives of some of those active in the further education system. Their feedback proved invaluable.

The research into the inhibitions of the Burnham Reports on 16-19 provision focussed upon the 1979-80 Macfarlane Review. Access to the Macfarlane working papers provided one source of data which was amplified by the access afforded, as a fellow LEA officer, to the working papers of other LEAs. While fascinating in themselves, the LEA papers did not provide any data to support - or counter - the hypothesis that the Burnham Reports inhibited 16-19 provision. Indeed, they provided much evidence of the creative use of the flexibility that the Reports permit. The Macfarlane papers, on the other hand, proved a highly relevant resource since the process of the Review entailed that officers - and, in the event, Ministers - made explicit their assumptions, and values, on 16-19 provision.

The research was intended to be limited to the inhibiting features of the Burnham Reports as far as 16-19 provision was concerned. However, as Parts III and IV of the thesis indicate, the nature of 16-19 education provision has been settled in a wider context than the Burnham Reports. The Reports echo a wider, cultural, impetus.

In hindsight, the research would have been seriously deficient had I not had access to the perspectives of current practitioners. The vexed methodological issues of 'participant observation' - its benefits and its drawbacks - are recognised. Being a participant affects one's perspective. At the same time, the status of participant provided a privileged access, almost on a daily basis, to other participant perspectives that would not be available to the ordinary researcher.

CHAPTER 3: MAJOR POST-WAR DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING POST-16 PROVISION

This Chapter will not provide a comprehensive survey of the changes in educational policy and provision since the 1944 Act: such a survey would be a major work in itself. The purpose of this Chapter is limited to setting the context for the research and concentrating only on those issues which have impinged on the shape of post-16 provision. The major developments affecting schools, universities and further education over the first post-war decades will be described. The issues of the mid-1970s are then noted.

Maclure's Learning Beyond Our Means? provides a comprehensive analysis of changes in education provision from 1945 to the late 1960s. He notes that, between 1947-48 and 1966-67 spending on education as a whole had increased in real terms to about four and a half times the 1938-39 level.

The net effect of the various post-war policies on the explosion of pupil and student numbers in schools, FE colleges and universities is set out in the table (15) overleaf:

Students Over Compulsory Leaving Age (000s)

	1948-9	1951-2	1954-5	1957-8	1960-1	1963-4	1966-7
(1)	194.9	200.5	288.6	290.3	379.0	635.3	653.1
(2)	N/A	46.6	55.2	79.1	117.5	175.6	202.4
(3)	N/A	N/A	9.7	16.28	26.8	44.8	54.5
(4)	N/A	848.4	937.3	1070.1	1200.9	1392.4	1514.4
(5)	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	77.5	95.6	107.9

N/A - Not available

- (1) Schools - pupils over compulsory school leaving age.
- (2) FE full-time (FT) and sandwich students [including (3) until separately identified].
- (3) FE - advanced FT and sandwich students [included in (2) until separately identified].
- (4) FE - part-time (PT) day and evening students [including (5) until separately identified].
- (5) FE - advanced part-time and evening students [included in (4) until separately identified].

This research has led to the hypothesis that, at least within Britain, policy-making is more a composite of discrete strands than an integrated whole: the hypothesis will be developed in Part IV below. Given that perspective, it is worth noting at this point that it has proved impossible to provide a chronological summary of post-16 developments. What follows has been, perforce, subject to a 'schools', 'universities', and 'further education' categorisation because a simple chronological summary would have rendered the account, devised for ease of background context, incoherent. Many initiatives, quite simply, contradicted each other.

It is worth noting, too, at this point that the 'discrete strands' facet of educational policy-making cannot necessarily be attributed to a particular civil service philosophy or to the possibility of competition between

branches of the Department of Education and Science or its predecessors. It would require a further academic study to investigate how far Government Ministers received, and if so, ignored, advice from their senior civil servants as to the compatibility of their several political imperatives.

Schools - The First Decades

The 1944 Act made secondary education, as a separate sector of education, free for all. Before the 1939/45 war, maintained schools were either 'elementary', providing for the whole of the age group to be compulsorily educated, or 'secondary'. Secondary schools were fee-paying, though with an increasing proportion of free, local authority supported places for pupils who were successful in entrance examinations.

The first major point of note for this study is that the 1944 Act did not, as popularly believed, create secondary education's tripartite structure of grammar, technical and secondary modern schools. Butler's Act simply inherited the selective and differentiated prescriptions of the pre-war years. In this respect, most significant were the recommendations of the 1926 Hadow Report that secondary education should take place in one of three discrete groups of secondary school.

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The Spens Report of 1938 reinforced Hadow's recommendation for a differentiated system of secondary

education. Since Spens had the brief to consider particularly those secondary pupils who did not remain at school after 16, it is not surprising that the Spens Report recommended an expansion in the number of technical secondary schools.

Raising the School Leaving Age

Successive post-war Reports stressed the inappropriateness of an academic curriculum for those who were not academically-orientated, but there was also a consistent rejection of narrowly-vocational courses. (14) Furthermore, for the first two decades following the 1944 Act the educational consensus favoured increased years of compulsory, general education rather than an extension of part-time education.

A decade after the 1944 Act, there was concern at the high proportion of those leaving school as soon as legally possible. The 1954 Gurney-Dixon Report included recommendations for better grants for post-compulsory pupils, for family allowances for all school children and for an increase in the proportion of grammar school places. Thus the Gurney-Dixon Report tackled the practical barriers to a high 'age participation rate' following statutory compulsion.

The Crowther Report of 1959, however, attempted to counter what were perceived as the intrinsic reasons why a large percentage of 15 year olds chose to leave

full-time education at the earliest opportunity. On the basis of an impressive litany of factual and statistical evidence, the report concluded that the raising of the school leaving age to 16 should take priority over the implementation of the 1944 Act's requirements for County Colleges (para 222). Notwithstanding the acknowledgement that the current voluntary post-compulsory attendance level was too low (para 466), the fact that a high proportion of those with the highest ability left at the earliest opportunity (para 182), and the fact that school was not considered appropriate by some 15+ (para 620), the Report rejected the option of part-time compulsory education (paras 184-5) for 15+ in favour of a year's additional full-time attendance in school.

It should be noted that the Crowther recommendations were deliberately their best prescription for the 15-18s. The Report had argued that the implementation of the County Colleges should be delayed to the early 1970s to ensure that they would make good provision - that the staff would be well prepared and that the accommodation was of a high standard. The fact that the County Colleges were never implemented provides an example of the best being the enemy of the good.

The 1963 Newsom Report, Half Our Future, considered the education of 13-16 year olds of less than average ability and recommended an additional compulsory year. It explicitly rejected the alternative of part-time, or

full-time attendance at FE colleges.

Selection

An issue that dominated post-war secondary schooling was the 11+ selection necessitated by the tripartite system. It became discredited since the route to professional employment lay through the grammar schools, and the number of children whose parents believed that they would benefit from such an education exceeded the number of selective grammar school places. The demand always exceeded the available places.

The Labour Government of the 1960s was committed to ending selection in secondary education and Crosland, then Secretary of State for Education, issued Circular 10/65 which invited Local Education Authorities (LEAs) to submit proposals for non-selective secondary reorganisation according to one of six patterns. Since approval of capital building programmes depended upon Secretary of State approval of the reorganisation proposals, the vast majority of LEAs concurred. The earliest tertiary colleges of Devon, Hampshire and Lancashire were a direct result of those LEAs' secondary reorganisations.

Higher Education - The First Decades

Major developments have included the rapid expansion of student numbers and the creation of the 'binary' system of higher education.

The 1945 Percy Report recommended the designation of Colleges of Advanced Technology, and the establishment of Regional Advisory Councils to co-ordinate the provision of full-time technical courses of degree standard. The Barlow Report of 1946 recommended that universities be expanded to increase, in particular, the numbers of graduate scientists: there were 50,000 university students in 1938-39 and 100,000 by 1958-59. By the early 1960s, that increase was considered insufficient. The 1963 review of full-time higher education in Great Britain, the Robbins Report, pressed for a further expansion from the 216,000 students of 1962-63 to 560,000 by 1980-81 and for the Colleges of Advanced Technology to receive full university status.

The Robbins principle - that courses of higher education should be available for all those who were qualified by ability and attainment to pursue them and wished to do so - was made achievable by the earlier (1962) enactment of the 1960 Anderson Report which had recommended mandatory awards for those granted a place on a first degree course at a university.

The 1966 White Paper, A Plan for Polytechnics and Other Colleges, established the 'binary policy'. The thirty polytechnics were to provide a clear alternative to the university route to higher education. The intention was to concentrate full-time advanced courses offered outside the universities into a limited number of more

vocationally-orientated institutions.

Further Education - The First Decades

The 1956 White Paper, Technical Education, demonstrated the case for expanding opportunities for technical education. The 20,000 full-time student load of 1937-38 had risen to 45,000 in 1946-47 and 64,000 in 1954-55. Similarly, part-time day enrolments had moved from 89,000 to 200,000 to 402,000, and evening only from 1,094,000 to 1,166,000 to 1,575,000 for those same three years.

The 1959 Crowther Report had recommended an expansion of the further education service to complement grammar schools and higher education provision for young people over the age of compulsory schooling.

The 1961 White Paper, Better Opportunities in Technical Education, recommended the creation of courses for junior technicians, craftsmen and operatives, and the 1964 Henniker-Heaton Report, Day Release, recommended a doubling of the number of young employees released to attend day release classes by 1969. The 1964 Industrial Training Act reiterated the LEAs' duties to provide vocational and industrial training, and required employers to ensure that their employees received adequate training.

Agenda for the 1970s and 1980s

The most critical factor for education provision in the

1970s lay within the overall context of public sector spending. Real reductions in the Rate Support Grant, the central government contribution to local authority expenditure, have significantly reversed the trend of ever-rising public spending on education. Within that general trend, there have been priorities.

Another major concern of the 1970s was the dramatic increase in youth unemployment. The 1977 Holland Report recommended an immediate programme of work experience and related education and training, the Youth Opportunity Programme, with a guaranteed place for all unemployed 16-18 year olds. That young people were choosing unemployment rather than either of the Crowther choices of school or college added weight to the arguments of those who believed that the curriculum needed to be made more relevant. In the late 1970s, the instinct to review the nature of the provision was reinforced by, on the one hand, the Prime Minister's Ruskin speech and, on the other, the Royal Society of Arts 'Education for Capability' movement.

The Government, having established the Manpower Services Commission (MSC) under the 1973 Employment and Training Act, chose to spend an increasing proportion of the public money allocated to vocational training through a body reporting to the Department of Employment, rather than through the LEAs who have statutory duties to make that provision. At the same time,

"The advent of the MSC has ensured that a substantial amount of national resources have been devoted to the 16-19 age group, which would not have accrued to this group had provision been left to the DES [Department of Education and Science] - whose White Paper, Education - A Framework for Expansion (1972), proposed the major features of the next decade's education service without reference to non-advanced FE. Thus MSC resources have benefited the FE service in ways that the DES has been neither willing nor able to do". (16)

The above reference to the 1972 White Paper's priorities is, perhaps unintentionally, ironic: those parts of the education service given attention in A Framework for Expansion considered the title a misnomer; the White Paper argued for a contraction. FE arguably gained from that policy neglect, gaining resources diverted to the MSC.

In very many respects the 16-19 landscape of the 1970s reflected the fulfilment of Crowther's post-compulsory schooling ideal - the good school sixth form complemented by the good County College whose characteristics were expressed by the FE or tertiary college. But there was concern that the pattern was not attracting a sufficient proportion of 16+ students. Too many of the age cohort were rejecting the differentiated provision.

Furthermore, the size of the 16-19 age cohort was due to start to reduce in the early 1980s. The size of a number of sixth forms, and their teaching groups, was already too small - for educational and economic viability - by the mid-1970s. (17). Professor Fowler, then Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Higher Education, advised the 1976 Summer Conference of the

Society of Education Officers that the Government intended to take action. In the event, it was not until 1979 that successive governments issued three Consultative Papers on the education and training of young people, and the Council of Local Education Authorities (CLEA) issued its invitation to Government for a joint study of the issues of 16-19 provision. That joint study culminated in the Macfarlane Report, explored in detail in Part III.

Finally, the issue of differentiation in provision has a peculiarly topical flavour. The Government has introduced into the 1987 Education Reform Bill - at a very late stage - a clause whose effect would be that of preventing sixth form colleges from developing a tertiary dimension. (18) The conflict demonstrated by the late stages of the Macfarlane proceedings, between those favouring a differentiated provision and those favouring comprehensive provision in tertiary colleges, has re-appeared at the point of drafting amendments to the 1987 Bill in the spring of 1988.

References to Part I

- (1) Crowther Report, (1959) 15-18. HMSO, para 163.
- (2) Surrey County Council Archives. (1972 and 1973). Education Reorganisation in the Reigate Area. Appendix F to 25 September 1972 Education Reorganisation Sub-Committee agenda; and 13 March main agenda, pp914-5 and 980-1. Also confidential interviews with County officers.
- (3) King, R. (1976). School and College - Studies of Post-Sixteen Education. Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- (4) DES. (1983). Scales of Salaries for Teachers in Further Education, England and Wales. HMSO. Appendix II, para 3, p16.
- (5) 'Teacher Questions in the FE Service' from Current Developments in FE. FESC Report Vol 11, No 12, p471.
- (6) Bradley, J. & Silverleaf, J. (1979). Making the Grade - Careers in FE Teaching. NFER Publishing Co.
- (7) Lord Alexander as Secretary of the Authorities' Panel issued commentaries on each Burnham Settlement: these drew attention to any new statutory provisions.
- (8) Kogan, M. (1986). 'Money Reinforces Status', TES, 17 January.
- (9) Lukes, S. (1977). The issue of the relative weights of the individual versus inevitable historical trends is fully analysed in Lukes' 'Power and Structure' in Essays in Social Theory, Macmillan, pp3-29. Lukes concludes - convincingly - that agents consist in "a set of (expanding and contracting) abilities, faced with (expanding and contracting) opportunities". The proposed reconciliation of the dichotomy between 'individual' and 'historical trends' is convincing.
- (10) Barry, B. (1979). Sociologists, Economists & Democracy. The University of Chicago Press. See especially pp89-98 and 179-189.
- (11) The hypothetico-deductive (H-D) methodology attempts to adapt Karl Popper's 'Law of Falsifiability' to the social sciences. Popper's falsifiability principle was that whatsoever was not open to potential disproof could not be regarded as scientific. That principle has been used as a demarcation of sense and nonsense within the conceptual framework of the social sciences. For reasons ably argued by Barry (see (10) above) and Phillips (see (13) below), the methodology is deficient.

- (12) King, R. (1976). Op Cit, p172.
- (13) Phillips summarises the methodology issues in (1987) Philosophy, Science and Social Inquiry. Pergamon Press. He postulates a criterion outside the then sterile grounds of 'verifiable' and 'falsifiable', of soundness, ie where an idea can be demonstrated as true and/or useful.
- (14) Crowther Report (1959). Op Cit, paras 108 and 497.
- (15) Statistics relevant to the thesis were extracted from the more comprehensive Figure 8, 'Pupils and Students', in Maclure, S (1968) Learning Beyond Our Means? Councils & Education Press Ltd., Beals & Sons Ltd, North Cheam, p15.
- (16) NATFHE (1980). College Administration. Victoria House, Printing House Square (TU), 25 Cowcross Street, London EC1, Section 4.19.
- (17) Table 10 of the Macfarlane Report (1980) describes sixth form teaching group sizes in maintained schools in England for 1978-79 in some detail.
- (18) 1987 Education Reform Bill, Clause 104 (as at 31 April 1988).

**PART II - THE MAKING OF THE FE TEACHERS'
SALARIES STRUCTURE**

CHAPTER 4: BACKGROUND TO THE 1950-51 NEGOTIATIONS

There are three substantial reasons for concentrating upon the 1951 Burnham negotiations. First, it was the 1951 Burnham (Technical) Report that set the salary structure that still obtains today. The current structure is essentially the same as that of 1951. By contrast the Burnham Report governing school teachers' salaries has undergone major changes, significantly on at least two occasions within the same period. (1)

Second, and most fundamental to the thesis of this study, the process of negotiating a new salary structure for 1951 provides an illuminating expression of the values of post-war society (2) which, to a certain extent, both Teachers and Management Panels shared. The negotiations highlight the normative values of 1951 and their implications for the incentives and the priorities of schools and FE colleges. Certainly the incentives of the education service support an 'academic skew'; there is a Burnham weighting favouring 'academic' as opposed to 'vocational', full-time study as opposed to part-time study, and advanced work as opposed to non-advanced. It is clear that vocational education that is not related to the professions has suffered by the academic orientation of LEAs, successive Ministers and Secretaries of State and, apparently, of the teachers themselves. The processes leading to the 1951 FE teachers' Burnham Report demonstrate quite vividly the considerations which

operate to produce academic skew.

Third, the 1951 settlement and the processes that led to its achievement illuminate the relationships between the groups within the Management Panel (called "Authorities' Panel" until the mid-1960s) and the influence of particular individuals within those groups. For example, the 1951 salary settlement exemplifies both the movement between initial management offer or teachers' claim and the final settlement, and the way in which the intentions underlying the initial offer or claim can be significantly modified by the process of negotiation. (3)

Part II will amplify these judgments through evidence from the negotiations and the eventual 1951 Burnham Report settlement for FE teachers. However, before moving to the detail of the 1950-51 negotiations, it is necessary to understand the membership of the Burnham Committees.

Before the 1965 Remuneration of Teachers' Act gave central government direct representation, the Burnham (FE) Committee consisted of the Management Panel, composed of representatives drawn from the employers' associations, the Teachers' Panel, composed of representatives of the employees' associations, and an Independent Chairman appointed by the Secretary of State. The Secretary of State controlled the number of members permitted each constituent but the constituents appointed their own representatives.

At the time of the 1950-51 negotiations the Management Panel were drawn from representatives of the County Councils Association (CCA), the Association of Municipal Corporations (AMC), the Welsh Joint Education Committee (WJEC), London County Council (LCC) and the Association of Education Committees (AEC).

The inclusion of the last group was contentious. AEC after all, represented the Education Committees of Councils, and two other constituents of the Management Panel, the CCA and AMC, represented the County and Metropolitan Councils. Since teachers were employed by Councils, not Committees of those Councils, the CCA and AMC had good constitutional grounds for preferring that AEC be not included within the employers' body. The fact that, for a long period of post-war Burnham negotiations, the Secretary of the AEC was also the Secretary of the Management Panel compounded the constitutional issue (4).

To appreciate the significance of certain events within the 1950-51 salary negotiations it is necessary to know the normal Burnham practice. Dr Saran's comprehensive study provides a synopsis:

"The normal sequence of activities is as follows: teachers formulate a salaries claim through their own organisations and the Teachers' Panel; the claim is then presented to the employers at a Burnham Committee meeting. The employers respond, usually after meetings in private of the Management Panel - ie at withdrawal meetings. Discussions may continue over a period, at the Burnham Committee and at withdrawal meetings, as and when either or both

sides wish to hold these. Eventually a provisional agreement emerges, which both Panels accept for submission to their own constituent organisations for ratification. At that stage each individual organisation will give consideration to the provisional agreement. Eventually the Burnham Committee is reconvened, and representatives inform their own Panel whether their organisation is willing to ratify; if there is disagreement within a Panel, ratification is by majority vote. The Leader of each Panel then informs the Burnham Committee as to whether their Panel is ratifying the agreement". (5)

Only one other point is worth emphasising in this context-setting section. Whenever a major change in the salary structure was envisaged by the employers it was normal practice for the Burnham Committee to establish a working group of officers to 'work up' the structure to be proposed: that process could take months or, even, years.

Such a group had met for two years to provide the Authorities' proposals for the post-war unification of primary and secondary scales within a new schoolteachers' structure. (6) First hand experience in the late 1970s demonstrated the continuation of that convention. The Management Panel consulted its leading members, and drew on the advice of senior Chief Education Officers even when but minor changes were to be proposed. The 1950-51 FE teachers' negotiations were unusual in that no archival evidence of such consultation is available.

1945 Salary Report for School Teachers

In 1944 the energies of the Local Education Authorities' representatives on salary negotiations had been taken up with, not to say exhausted by, the tortuous business of

ensuring that the schoolteachers' salary structure reflected the provisions of the 1944 Education Act: the scales for the pre-war 'elementary' and 'secondary' (grammar) schools were integrated in a new, single salary structure for primary and secondary school teachers. Since the Authorities' Panel initially approached the 1945 Technical Report negotiations through the perspective of the Main Report governing school teacher salaries, a brief description of the latter's provisions follows.

The 1944 Act, providing for "secondary education for all", required an amalgamation of the hitherto separate salary reports for teachers in secondary (ie grammar) and elementary schools. It was significant for the later development - or, rather, lack of development - of the tripartite system of grammar, technical and secondary modern schools that the Authorities' Panel conceded an additional allowance for assistants (ie all school teachers who were not heads) who possessed a good Honours degree. The differential for graduates and the widened gap between the salaries of qualified and unqualified teachers, many of whom taught the technical subjects, inhibited the development of technical schools. (7) There was a steep reduction in the salaries of the unqualified (as teachers) instructors - £290 per annum pre-war to £180 per annum post-1945.

Correspondence within the Burnham archives (8) indicates

that within the Authorities' Panel both elected members and CEOs attempted to resist a lifetime payment for a one-off graduate qualification, and were happier that any continuing additional payment should derive from qualification as a teacher that would at least have the merit of being related to the teachers' job. On 7 September 1944 the Authorities' Panel provided Sir Maurice Holmes, Permanent Secretary at the Board of Education, with a clear statement of their views which, in the light of the final settlement, is worth quoting fully.

"We do not desire to establish a separate class of teacher - the graduate teacher - distinguished from his fellow teachers only by the fact of graduation. We desire that promotion to the higher and indeed to the highest posts shall be open to all teachers of merit. We feel that the quality of the teacher is often more important than what is described as his paper qualifications, and therefore we deprecate and do not agree to the establishment of a privileged class of teacher - privileged only by the possession of a particular type of qualification". (9).

By the end of October 1944, Brockington, Secretary to the Authorities' Panel, reported that the long struggle with the teachers was not yet over:

"There are levelling influences at work, and a great suspicion of the Authorities ... that kissing goes by favour. These two forces have knocked our Original Plan to pieces, and we are busily engaged in patching it together again so far as we may". (10)

That 'Original Plan' had expressed the philosophy quoted above, and it is interesting that it was the teachers' suspicion of employer partiality that created the straitjacket of graduate differential that itself undermined the craft teachers' salaries. It is also

significant that the LEAs had attempted to place their highest priority on skilled teaching and not on academic qualifications.

The final 1945 settlement for schools included allowances for graduates, teacher training qualifications, and a provision that 15% of (full-time) teachers should hold posts of special responsibility (PSRs) for which they were to receive an allowance of £50-£100 per annum over and above the basic scale.

As Saran (1985) has shown, the 'Joint Four', a grouping of school teachers' unions which included the head-teachers of grammar schools, had opposed many parts of the 'Original Plan' during negotiations, and had tried to retain the privileged salary levels of pre-war grammar schoolteachers. The outcome was the 'age-weighting' whereby each pupil of post-compulsory age counted towards higher salaries for the head teachers: they were to be paid an allowance of £30 per annum for each group of 100 pupils under 15, and £50 per annum for each group of 30 pupils over 15. Burnham archives include some protests from CEOs that the weighting could act as an incentive to heads to persuade their pupils to stay on at school when the advice might run counter to the pupils' own best interests. (11)

1945 Salary Report for FE Teachers

For the 1945 Burnham (FE) Report (12) negotiations,

Brockington proposed that the same level of posts of special responsibility (PSRs) should obtain in technical education since he believed that much of the provision was similar to that in schools. The FE Teachers' Panel pressed for two improvements on the Main (ie Schoolteachers) Settlement:

- (a) that the high proportion of part-time staff in technical colleges and institutes, by comparison with schools' staff, meant that the lower proportion of full-time staff in FE had wider responsibilities than their colleagues in schools, and that technical institutions had greater need of a higher proportion of PSRs; and
- (b) that the high proportion of university-level work in the larger technical colleges meant that university-level salaries were more appropriate than those of school teachers for technical college staff, and that salaries for technical teachers should be higher than those for school teachers.

A survey of 250 colleges ("a laborious investigation of technical colleges from Lands End to Berwick on Tweed" (13)), was undertaken in December 1944 to test the validity of the Teachers' Panel's claims. The result was that the LEAs proposed a 20% proportion of full-time technical staff as holders of PSRs. They also proposed that 10% of all full-time (FT) teaching staff should be 'Senior Assistants' (SAs) and recipients of salaries

virtually double those of the Assistant for teaching advanced level work. The survey had demonstrated that the proportion of advanced level work, and the incidence of employment of part-time (PT) staff, was higher than the Authorities' Panel, or the Ministry, had anticipated. The 1945 Burnham (Technical) Report contained provisions for both Senior Assistantships and special responsibility allowances.

This double advantage was gained for FE teachers as a consequence of two different factors within the negotiations. The Authorities' Panel (AP) regarded the majority of technical institution work as of school level, and wished to reward accordingly (and certainly not at a higher level than the latter). In challenging the applicability of the Main Report to FE institutions, the Teachers' Panel had tapped two, separate, AP instincts: that those doing university-equivalent work should not lose because they were working in the maintained, as opposed to the university, sector; and that, notwithstanding additions related to university-equivalent work, FT staff in technical institutions should be fairly compensated for administrative loads and responsibilities which were heavier than those of school teachers.

The final 1945 agreement contained within it the seeds of the 1951 system in that it attempted to give extra salary for extra responsibility (as in schools) and to give

extra salary for university-equivalent work, both through the same 1951 mechanism of the 'proportion of posts' table. Both the 1945 Main and Technical Reports included weightings towards academic work, the former covertly through the differential for heads of schools with post-compulsory pupils, the latter explicitly through the Senior Assistantships. Both Reports also included provision for 'above scale' allowances for special responsibility.

The 'Dog That Didn't Bark' ...

As in 1945, successive Burnham FE salary negotiations have been liberally laced with references to the salaries of the university and schools sectors: that, of itself, is unexceptional. More curious, however, is the relative paucity of references to employment in industry and commerce. For further education faces in two directions - not to universities and to schools exclusively, but rather to the more diverse worlds of education on the one hand and of general employment on the other.

In 1944, the Secretary of the Authorities' Panel had advised its Leader that heads of departments in technical colleges should be considered to have similar roles and responsibilities to those of the heads of grammar schools. While members of the Authorities' Panel were thoroughly conversant with grammar schools, heads of departments were part of a 'technical jungle' (14) whose bearings were certainly not clear to all the LEA

negotiators. Fairly or not, FE staff, teachers and principals alike, have considered that the lack of familiarity with FE continues to this day.

Later again (17 November 1944) Brockington, the AP Secretary, had expressed strong exasperation at the extent to which Teachers' Panel's claims were based on the parallelism between large technical colleges and universities (presumably, rather than with grammar schools). It was the Ministry of Education's spokesman, Elphick, who had then suggested the survey of technical colleges (referred to above) to establish the true extent of higher level work to the satisfaction of teachers, local authorities and Ministry.

What should be noted, however, is that the comparators for FE teachers used by both Panels were educational ones. Negotiations over the following 30 years have continued to be marked by the attempts of the LEAs to relate technical college work to that in schools, and by the FE teachers to use the university sector as the relevant model. The contrasting choice of models, however, may represent no more than negotiators' stances. Most university teachers are paid more, and most schoolteachers less, than most FE teachers. Both Panels could find evidence, in 1945 and in succeeding years, for their perspectives: indeed, the explicit case for the new salary structure of 1951 was to provide a continuum that stretched from the 'school level' work of

the local Technical Institute to the Higher Diploma and degree equivalent work of the larger technical colleges.

The use of the salaries paid in those areas of employment that FE lecturers taught about might have liberated the FE system from the over-academic criteria that have limited the development of the service since 1945. The categorisation of FE work has been in terms of 'school-equivalent' or 'university-equivalent' courses (15). The issue of 'level of work' as a basis for individual teacher's salaries is described briefly below.

1948 Salary Reports - FE Teachers

Chief Education Officers reported difficulties in the implementation of both schoolteachers and FE teachers Reports. Both were modified in 1948 so that the proportions of PSR appointments in schools were revised from 15% to a range of 12%-17%, and in technical institutions they were extended from the 20% level to a range of 20-27½%.

At least part of the justification for the wider PSR range in FE was active encouragement by Ministry of Education staff and HMI to concentrate advanced technical work into a limited number of 'regional' colleges. Thus the potential for PSRs or SAs became highly variable as between colleges even within the same LEA. As a consequence, even the 1948 increase in permitted PSRs for technical institutions did not solve the problems of the

lack of 'match' between course work and permitted 'above-scale' posts.

Both Authorities' and Teachers' Panels reported in the early 1950s that a sizeable proportion of LEAs had found that the Burnham Reports required them to bestow more PSRs and SAs than their total number of full-time technical teacher employees. Conversely, there were often areas within LEAs where the nationally-prescribed proportions of Senior Assistantships were too few for the number of full-time employees engaged locally in teaching advanced, degree-level work. (16)

The lack of 'fit' of the modified school teachers' salaries Report for the Technical Colleges was described in the October 1950 statement of the London and Home Counties' Regional Advisory Council (RAC). There were acute shortages of teachers capable of teaching technical work, and the RAC argued that the shortage was a consequence of the low level of salary of technical staff. The RAC noted that governors were often faced by the dilemma of either leaving a post unfilled or appointing

"... an inadequately qualified or even entirely unsuitable person [and/or] offering the position in the form of a senior assistantship or post with special allowances in the hope that the higher salary may attract applicants. This procedure ... may be most unfair to existing members of staff whose chances of advancement are thereby prejudiced and who, in consequence, naturally tend to seek positions elsewhere. The result is unsettling of college staffs and an instability which is bound to be reflected in the general standard of work". (17)

As noted in Chapter 1 above, the promotion prospects for staff not teaching on advanced courses have been blighted by the FE salary structure. The issue has remained, unresolved, on the agenda of Burnham negotiations until this day.

Problems Arising from the Post-War FE Salary Settlements

The previous section has referred to a range of difficulties that came into sharp focus through the implementation of the 1945 and 1948 Reports. There were two main problems. First, there was the inappropriateness of using the features of the schools' Burnham Report. This difficulty was accentuated by the very varied range of work described below. Second, there was a critical lack of promotion opportunities for non-advanced work.

Since the following sections draw heavily upon the work of the Authorities' Panel (18), it is interesting to note that H S Barlow's summary, in his 1 June 1952 Presidential address to the Association of Teachers in Technical Institutions, highlights the same problems:

"The previous Reports of 1945 and 1948 had produced many complaints because of their rigidity in specifying formulae to determine the number of special allowances and senior assistantships. In some cases, the number of senior assistantships exceeded the number of full-time staff engaged by the institution, and in others, the number of such posts was obviously inadequate for the needs of the institution". (19)

Clearly, there was a consensus between Authorities' and Teachers' Panels as to the issues to be addressed.

In schools, where the vast majority of staff and students were full-time, and the vast majority of the work was similar or at least comparable, a national prescription of proportions of additional allowances based on the numbers of full-time staff employed was likely to prove reasonably equitable as between schools and between LEAs. However, the average FE establishment included a variable proportion of part-time staff and neighbouring colleges, as a direct result of the need to specialise, were providing significantly different courses, particularly at the advanced level. Some LEAs offered little advanced course provision while others, particularly those covering large towns or cities, had a high level of provision of degree and degree-equivalent work.

Technical education has always employed part-timers. The various examining boards and validating bodies have consistently required that students be educated by staff who should include current practitioners. These, by definition, constitute the part-time staff in technical colleges. Thus, whatever the ease or difficulty in appointing sufficient full-time staff for specific courses, there would always be a significant proportion of part-time staff in any well-staffed technical college to provide inputs from experts currently employed in the area being taught.

The specified percentages of PSRs under the 1945 and 1948

Burnham Reports, 20% and 20-27½% respectively, set out nationally prescribed minima and maxima for colleges. Since the available PSRs could be given only to full-time staff, Procrustean strains on the post-war provision of technical education were created.

The Presidential Address to the 1952 Annual ATTI Conference highlighted a further problem - that of

"catering for small institutions doing very elementary work, and on the large technical colleges undertaking a high proportion of work of university character and requiring a teaching staff of the highest possible calibre, both in training and experience". (20)

Thus the problem of matching proportions of promoted posts to a variable proportion of full-time staff was compounded by the fact that the FE system contained very variable ranges of work.

The evidence submitted by the FE Teachers' Panel to the 1974 Houghton Committee of Inquiry into Teachers' pay describes the range of the further education service of the early 1970s; only the numbers of students and institutions would need to be amended for a fair picture of the service in the 1940s and 1950s as well as the 1980s.

"The variety of work in colleges of further and higher education can only be described as vast. In 1971, there were over 3½ million students in all establishments, of whom 288,800 were full-time, 718,022 were part-time day, and 2½ million evening only. It ranges from remedial work for semi-literates through courses for general education, vocational work at all levels - craft, technician and professional - to first degrees and higher degrees. The work overlaps that done in schools and

that carried out in universities ... The majority of full-time or part-time courses are for those between 16 and 24, but there are also many retraining courses for older workers ... The mode of attending is also very variable. Full-time students may be attending GCE 'O' or 'A' level courses. Ordinary National Diplomas in anything from Engineering to Catering or Cartography, Secretarial courses, Higher National Diplomas, degree courses across the board, teacher education, or post-graduate studies. Many of the advanced courses are paralleled by sandwich courses, block release (common for Craft and Technical Courses), day release courses in a wide variety of National Certificates, City and Guilds of London Institute Certificates, Royal Society of Arts qualifications and other examination courses. There are also evening classes, either short courses or, for the full year, sometimes short courses on specialist topics, or courses leading to one of the recognised qualifications ... ". (21)

So if the first problem of the 1945 and 1948 Reports was the lack of 'fit' of the national proportion of PSRs and SAs to the majority of local provision, the second was the range of work and varied student mix of institutions within the ambit of the Technical Report.

The second problem of the 1945 and 1948 salary Reports for teachers in technical institutions was that, as the above quotation from the RAC stated, the Special Allowances were often used to attract new staff rather than to reward those existing staff undertaking the various additional responsibilities that arose from the needs for the efficient management of the college. The national rates of pay were too low to attract sufficient new technical and craft staff, the only way to appoint new staff was to add the special allowances that ought to have been paid to existing full-time staff on the basic scale. Thus the problem of recruiting new

specialist staff was being solved by creating a different problem - reduced promotion opportunities for existing staff.

CHAPTER 5: FE SALARY NEGOTIATIONS 1950-51

Proposals from the Authorities' Panel

The Authorities' Panel (AP) had been involved in negotiations leading to the 1951 schoolteachers' settlement from May to October 1950. However, there had been no formal AP discussion of any radical proposals to reform the FE salary structure. Less than a month before the first meeting with the FE Teachers' panel, Alderman Jackson, the new AP Leader, wrote to Dr Alexander, the AP Secretary on 16 October 1950:

"I have no previous experience at all with regard to the technical machinery and I should, therefore, be glad if you would let me know on what lines the negotiations are to be conducted. I have been having a look at the present Report. I think I remember your saying that suggestions are to be made for a complete revision of this Report and for the scales to be altered. Is it possible for you to let me have a memorandum in due course as to the position, and to give me some appointment immediately prior to 3 November so that I can discuss the matter with you". (22)

Dr Alexander replied to Alderman Jackson on the next day promising a memorandum in a few days. However, the promised memorandum was not despatched until 26 October 1950 which, given Alexander's deserved reputation for 'by-return-of-post' responses to even the most abstruse queries, was an interesting delay. The lack of any archival reference, (23) other than that of the London and Home Counties RAC, (24), suggests that no Technical Report memorandum existed until 26 October.

On the same day that Jackson despatched his letter, Dr Alexander had informed Dacey, the Secretary of the County Councils Association, that the Technical Committee

meetings of the Burnham Committee would take place on 3 and 8 November. This appears to indicate that the AP Secretary believed that the 'complete revision' of the Technical scales would be completed in two sessions.

The 26 October 1950 memorandum (25) that Dr Alexander despatched to the Authorities' Panel first noted that the Teachers' Panel would make a case for the Technical Report being disassociated from the Main Report in terms of the basic grades under each Report: however, in the AP Secretary's view, there was a sufficient body of work essentially of 'school standard' in technical institutions to make it imperative that amongst the scales of salary included in the Technical Report the basic scale of the Main Report must find a place. (26)

Alexander then addressed the substantive point of the AP memorandum - the proposed solution to the problems of the 1945 and 1948 Burnham Reports. The variability of FE institutions meant that the nationally prescribed proportions of PSRs and SAs did not operate well in the FE context. Alexander proposed an alternative salary structure.

The AP Secretary noted that the staff of FE Institutions could be divided into four broad categories:

- "(i) staff engaged almost wholly on work of school character;
- (ii) staff who, while engaged to a considerable extent on work of school character, make a

material contribution to work of a more advanced character;

(iii) staff largely engaged with work of an advanced character;

(iv) staff essentially employed on courses of university standard and from whom it is reasonable to expect a contribution to research". (27)

Dr Alexander proposed that there should be four grades of staff:

- (1) Assistant Lecturers
Scale (a) £375x£18 - £630 (ie Main Report basic)
Scale (b) £500x£25 - £750
- (2) Lecturers £900x£25 - £1,000
- (3) Senior Lecturers £1,000x£25 - £1,150

It was proposed that the above four grades should be applied to the (i)-(iv) groups of technical teaching staff and that "These four scales would, it is suggested, cover the needs of the staff in institutes of Further Education".

The 26 October 1950 memorandum is significant for a number of reasons. Neither the Authorities' Panel nor the Teachers' Panel appeared to have any earlier warning of radical proposals, timetabled to be proposed on 3 November and accepted by the end of 8 November.

The proposals would have addressed the problem of nationally-prescribed ranges of above-scale posts differing from the reality of the local workload by clearly identifying level of teaching with salary. However, the assumption that the proposals would cover all FE needs ignored the implicit disappearance of the PSRs whereby, under the 1948 Report, nearly one-third of

full-time FE teachers could earn above-scale salaries for the performance of additional responsibilities.

Finally, the proposals represent the first appearance of the 'level of work' criterion as a factor in FE teachers' salaries.

Later in the negotiations, Dr Alexander was to state that a Senior Lecturer would be graded as a Senior Lecturer rather than as a Lecturer, "because of having had regard to the additional duties which he has to carry out ... he has been paid a sufficiently high salary and one would expect him to be carrying a responsibility". (28) In the context of the proposed new structure of the 26 October memorandum, that expectation became critical: certainly the original proposals do not make that expectation explicit.

Dr Alexander's October 1950 proposals would have removed the scope for promotion for additional responsibilities for mainstream staff and, instead, paid differential salaries according to levels of work alone. Under the proposed structure, promotion could have been earned only through teaching on advanced courses. With little advanced work, the local FE college would not have had sufficient senior posts for its management needs.

In the 26 October 1950 memorandum, Alexander conceded that the Teachers' Panel might not be prepared to accept

"the absolute decision" of the LEA as to the salary scale applicable to any individual. Consequently, the 1951 Technical Report should include "appropriate machinery" which "would enable a member of college staff who felt he was placed on an inappropriate scale ... to refer the matter to the Reference Committee whose ruling would be binding on both parties". The 'appeal machinery' proposal became a critical factor governing the acceptability of the total package of proposals to the Authorities' Panel.

The 1950 Burnham Committee Meetings

The above section describes the Authorities' Panel's original proposals. However, the final settlement did not include the proposed rigid identification of the individual teacher's grade - and salary - according to the level of work taught. The 1951 Report did retain the relationship of gradings and promoted posts for the establishment of the college as a whole. That was the precursor of the proportions of posts/categories of work (POP/COW) table that still forms part of the FE salary structure and which contributes towards the academic skew of post-16 education provision.

Why had the Authorities' Panel moved from its initial proposals? To answer that question it was necessary to examine the detail of the Burnham exchanges. This section provides a reconstruction of the negotiations.

In the event, there were six meetings of the Committee, not the two that Dr Alexander had predicted, on 3 and 8 November and 8 December 1950, and 16 January and 8 and 14 February 1951.

3 November 1950 Meeting

The Teachers' Panel (TP) presented a closely-argued case for higher salaries and documented (a) the extent of degree studies undertaken in technical colleges (eg Northampton Polytechnic in London had 'more students in engineering than any constituent college of the University' (of London) but 44.3% of its staff were on the basic scale); (b) a comparison of Burnham (Technical) Report salaries with those currently operative for staffs of universities, teacher training colleges and civil servants; and (c) detailed evidence compiled by the Association of Principals regarding the difficulties in recruiting suitable staff.

Wickham Murray, the TP spokesman, went on to note that the conditions of service for teachers in technical institutions were more onerous than for their school colleagues: in a three session day of morning, afternoon and evening, FE teachers could be required to teach any ten within the week. Further, in comparison with the schoolteacher, the qualifications and experience required for teaching in FE necessitated later entry to the profession and a consequent reduction - of £39 per annum - on annual pension. (29)

Alderman Jackson for the Authorities' Panel then presented the 26 October proposals - without the figures Dr Alexander had proposed for actual salary.

The Teachers' Panel withdrew to consider this completely novel approach to FE Teachers' salaries. Wickham Murray returned to report that "My Panel is not at all opposed to the suggestions", and to ask for clarification. First, what constituted 'school work'? Was it to extend to Higher School Certificate work? Only 6% of the age cohort sat Higher Certificate examinations, yet 36% of grammar school staff held PSRs. (This was a reference to the fact that the age-weighting element of the schools' Burnham Report gave school teachers much higher relative rewards for teaching 15-18 year olds than were enjoyed by the FE teachers.)

Second, was it proposed that a technical teacher's salary would "go up and down according to how he moved about on the timetable of the college?" Wickham Murray had already referred to the Association of Principals' special survey that demonstrated that 70.4% of staff were engaged in teaching advanced work at some time in the academic year. The logical conclusion of the AP proposals entailed either that individual's salaries would oscillate, or that the FE teachers' salaries report would straitjacket the normal teaching conventions of the FE service.

Third, he asked what was meant by "elementary craft work", a phrase used by Alderman Jackson as an example of school work. The AP statement had already presumed that it would count as 'schools work' while Wickham Murray had quoted in aid a recent Parliamentary Scientific Committee Report which had "specifically asked for higher salaries to be offered to people doing craft work, as they could not get them into the schools because of the competition of industry".

The fourth and fifth issues for clarification - whether research activity was to act as a precondition for the Senior Lectureship and the future position of the graduate and training allowances - were answered easily by the AP spokesman: research was not to be a prerequisite for a Senior Lectureship, and the graduate and training allowances would continue to apply to Assistants (a) and (b).

It is significant that Alderman Jackson chose, additionally, to comment on the issue of promotion prospects for mainstream staff, an area that Wickham Murray had not queried:

"On the question of the special posts, .. one of the objects behind the proposals to be put to the Teachers' Panel is the abolition of this particular scheme ...".

Thus, the AP spokesman attempted to ensure that the Teachers' Panel understood that the additional remuneration hitherto afforded by additional responsibilities, either for staff or for a body of work,

would henceforth be open only to those staff teaching a certain proportion of advanced level work, and that PSRs would be abolished.

Alderman Jackson then answered the first three questions: 'School work' - "... it is not a matter of age, rather it is a question of the standard of work'... [and] ... on the variations in the timetable, we should not want salaries to move about [and, finally on 'elementary craft work'] not, for example, printing in a school of printing, or things of that kind".

Jackson continued, with a general plea:

"Frankly, I hope you will not press us at this stage on close definitions, because one of the purposes behind this is to avoid definitions that are so rigorous that you can neither go outside them nor do anything about them".

These answers were hardly precise: indeed, they suggested that the Authorities' Panel had no clear answers to the questions. This was hardly surprising, given the novelty of the proposals for them as well as for the Teachers' Panel. Both Panels then withdrew.

On return, Wickham Murray pointed out that the Teachers' Panel had had great difficulty in grasping the new concepts without any information as to the proposed salaries to be paid in the proposed new scales. Alderman Jackson then released the salary ranges that had been proposed in the 26 October memorandum, with a modified Assistant Lecturer (b) of £450 to £700 (£50 less than the

26 October 1950 memorandum figures at minimum and maximum). Wickham Murray then requested that the Committee adjourn until the following week since the TP could not give any answer that afternoon.

However, before adjourning the TP spokesman fulfilled Dr Alexander's 26 October expectations by highlighting some of the problems consequent upon the proposed Appeals body. He warned that between 10% and 17% of the FE teaching force might appeal against the LEA proposed gradings, a reference to the volume of appeals of individual principals against their LEAs' determination of their salaries.

Later events demonstrated that the TP's reservations were shared by members of the employers' Panel and that this issue reduced the acceptability of the AP's modified December package to their own constituents, the LEAs. It is important to note, too, that at the 3 November meeting both Panels understood that the AP's proposals assumed that the appeal would be brought by an individual against the grading proposed for him by his employing LEA. Later in the negotiations there was a change of appellant: only the staff as a whole could appeal.

The reduction of £50 in the proposals for Assistant scale (b) as between 26 October and 3 November may have arisen from the following note of concern. On 3 November Sir Graham Savage, Education Officer of the London County Council, had written to Jackson:

"I think it would be very unwise for our Panel to table any figures today. I have again looked at the cost to London and I still believe it will add 50% to our Technical Salary bill. We may be able to persuade our authority to face this but I feel very sure they will not accept it if rushed.

"I suggest that we invite the teachers to suggest their figures and consider them. I am sorry about this but we have had but a copy apiece of the document and there has been no chance to discuss the proposals with our Finance people. It is imperative that we carry them with us". (30)

The message is interesting because, first, the advice of the Education Officer of the LCC was not taken - the figures were tabled - and, second, because it is clear that an experienced member of the Burnham Committee, and one whose own Authority would be the most affected by the proposed scheme, had clearly little advance warning of Alexander's thinking. It is unlikely that Sir Graham Savage would have been excluded from any officer-level consideration of any proposals for a new salary structure for Technical Teachers: that, and the lack of any archival evidence (31) to the contrary, suggests that there had been no such consideration of the 26 October proposals even in the most rudimentary sense.

8 November 1950 Meeting

The verbatim record of the proceedings of 8 November suggests that the Authorities' Panel were clearly not of a united and considered mind.

Wickham Murray as TP spokesman opened by asking for protection for those staff holding PSRs and for more information regarding the administration of the appeals

machinery. Alderman Jackson responded by asking for an AP withdrawal:

"I should hope that if I may be allowed to withdraw the Panel I may be able to come back and present or table a set of proposals with regard to administration". (32)

On return, he asked for an adjournment: "The Panel wants more time in order that we may bring before you a careful scheme". Dr Alexander rejected the following week as too early for the Authorities' Panel, and 8 December was agreed as the date for the next meeting. Meanwhile, the Authorities' Panel's confusion must have been clear to the Teachers.

The AP had withdrawn to consider a memorandum by Alexander dated 7 November on "Appeal Machinery", and were clearly very divided about its proposals. The archives are silent on what views might have been exchanged between AP members. From Burnham practice it is likely that the AP Secretary was asked to prepare a memorandum that dealt with the questions raised on 3 November. The need for an AP withdrawal to consider any memorandum and agree an AP line would have been unexceptionable. The need for a month's adjournment suggests some more fundamental difference of opinion.

The 7 November memorandum contained, first, the clear statement that:

"The ... present Report does not deal with individuals but with establishments ... The new Report equally, I suggest, is not concerned to

determine if a particular teacher is paid on the appropriate scale ... What the new Report is concerned to do is to give a guarantee to the teachers as a whole" (author's emphasis) "that the proportion of any staff paid on the different scales of salary are reasonable having regard to the work done in the particular institution. This need would be met if each LEA was required to fix an establishment for each college or institution of FE under which the numbers to be paid as Senior Lecturers, Lecturers, Assistant scale (a) and Assistants scale (b) were set out". (33)

The above runs directly counter to the assumptions of both Panels at the 3 November meeting, and marks the first breach in the memorandum of 26 October whose principles had formed a coherent, albeit unrealistic, package.

As opposed to a new structure whereby individual FE teachers would be paid according to the academic level of the classes they taught, the 7 November memorandum described the college, not the teacher, as beneficiary of the number of above scale posts 'earned' by the proportions of advanced level work. By this change the revised proposals now accommodated the working needs of the FE college. However, the 7 November memorandum made the relationship between the level of salary for the individual FE teacher and his work less direct.

The 7 November memorandum recognised the need for the 1951 Report to contain guidance to LEAs about the new salary structure: at the same time, it argued that any rigid definitions of the three levels of work that were to govern that new structure would "defeat the principle of flexibility". (34)

On the machinery to govern any appeals under the LEA-determined establishments for their FE institutions, Alexander simply proposed that the Appeal Panel should comprise the leaders and honorary secretaries of the two negotiating panels, plus three members from each panel, under an (independent) chairman.

Clearly the Authorities' Panel faced internal disagreements over their own proposals for a new FE salaries structure.

8 December 1950 Meeting

A later private briefing note, of 1 January 1951, (35) from Alexander to the AP Leader provides the explanation for the request for an adjournment of one month. The Authorities' Panel had used the 8 November withdrawal to establish a small Sub-Committee to make recommendations on the administration of the new Report with a view to clear proposals being submitted to the Teachers' Panel on 8 December.

It is not possible from available evidence to reconstruct what exactly occurred within the Authorities' Panel during that month. The AP Sub-Committee met twice and Alexander reported to Jackson:

"It was rather hard going, but we finally hammered out a memorandum which was circulated to the [Authorities'] Panel on 28 November in preparation for the 8 December meeting". (36)

The 28 November memorandum from the AP Sub-Committee to the full Panel contained a number of refinements of its 7 November predecessor, principally in emphasising the role of the LEA. Its most significant feature, however, was the inclusion of new considerations as to which of the proposed four scales should apply to individual technical teachers:

"... In fact, however, it is clear from our further discussions that the salary to be paid to an individual will not necessarily depend on the teaching work he is undertaking. It may depend additionally on other matters, such as supervisory responsibility, and the actual distribution of the various levels of work over full-time and part-time members of staff arranged by the principal". (37)

This was the second break with the initial proposals.

The 26 October scheme would have entailed that the mainstream technical teacher, unlike his colleague in schools, would have started and necessarily ended his teaching career on the basic scale. The 26 October proposals would have replaced the proportional formula for above-scale payments, the PSRs, by a demoralising and rigid straitjacket of a salary structure whereby no promotion was possible for the FE teacher not teaching advanced level classes. At least the 28 November memorandum from the Sub-Committee ensured that promotion would not be closed to the technical teacher teaching little or no advanced work after the proposed abolition of the Posts of Special Responsibility.

Finally, the 28 November memorandum advised the AP

members that the new proposals would lead to an increase of 20-28% on the technical salary bill of the country as a whole,

"although in particular institutions where a high proportion of work of university standard is carried on the increase may be 30-35%". (38)

The 28 November memorandum had at least one administrative virtue by comparison with its 26 October and 7 November predecessors: its financial implications were estimated.

In preparation for the following day's negotiations, the Authorities' Panel considered the revised proposals on 7 December 1950. When the Chairman of the Burnham Committee asked Wickham Murray whether he had seen the memorandum tabled by Sir Wilfred Martineau, acting AP Leader, at the meeting, Dr Alexander explained:

"... We are sorry we could not let you have the memorandum in advance. It was, in fact, finished last night quite late". (39)

Even a month's adjournment and the work of the AP's Sub-Committee, had evidently not created wholehearted support within AP for proposals they tabled on 8 December. Since members of the Sub-Committee would have been able to test out the implications of the proposed FE salary structure for their own authorities, that lack of consensus should, perhaps, have given the AP grounds for reconsidering the acceptability of the package to their own constituents.

The official minutes of the 8 December meeting record that

"The Committee agreed, subject to certain amendments, that the principles outlined in the memorandum of Administration tabled by the Authorities' Panel should serve as a basis for the Drafting Committee in the preparation of the full Report so as to give effect to the Committee's intentions relating to the standards of work, determination of establishments, grading of departments and appeal machinery". (40)

The minutes imply that the two Panels were of one mind on major principle, and the Draft Report was to be considered on Tuesday, 16 January 1951. However, the Verbatim Record notes some very detailed exchanges which indicate more of an exploration of ideas than would be expected at the penultimate stage of negotiations for a major restructuring of salaries.

Two of the facets of the proposed structure were still subject to clarification - the definition of levels of work, on which the colleges' establishments were to be based, and the issue of payment for undertaking additional responsibilities.

In spite of the fact that the AP's initial proposals of 26 October would have meant that the FE teacher's salary would be determined by and, under the 7 November memorandum, significantly affected by the levels of work he taught, the memorandum tabled on 8 December by the Authorities' Panel had not given any clearer definition of the three levels of work that were proposed to determine college establishments than at the first

meeting on 3 November. All that Sir Wilfred Martineau would say was that:

"... if we are going back to detailed definition, then I do not think we need waste time over appeal machinery ... but just get down to considering how we can deal with the existing Report and bring that up to date". (41)

Dr Alexander added that it was the detailed definition as to which courses constituted advanced and university-level work that had "resulted in an establishment of senior assistants greater than the number of staff in the college". (42)

The AP Secretary's statement is curious. As shown earlier, it was the nationally-fixed proportions of full-time staff who were to receive SAs and PSRs, rather than any definitions - rigid or otherwise - of advanced work, that had led in some cases to the excess of permitted posts above individual college's establishments. The available evidence fails to explain the AP's clear aversion to definition of FE courses within the AP's own three categories. The statements of the Acting Leader and the Secretary of the Authorities' Panel may indicate merely lack of clarity in the thinking within the Authorities' Panel.

The Teachers' Panel withdrew to take their first opportunity to read the AP's proposals. On return to the formal Burnham Committee proceedings, Wickham Murray noted that 'responsibility' was referred to, but not laid down as a factor in fixing colleges' establishments. The

formal acknowledgement of the need for some remuneration for additional responsibility had finally been included in the employers' proposals; however, if the issue of non-payment for responsibility could not constitute grounds for appeal against a salary/ establishment, that acknowledgement was - virtually - hollow. Dr Alexander acknowledged that it would not constitute grounds for an appeal. Then, pressed by Wickham Murray, Alexander stated:

"There is no question of an authority not being able to go above the minimum limits which the proportions of higher work would carry in staffing. There is nothing in the world to stop them in this Report from making the entire staffs senior lecturers in every institution if they so desired, but they should not go below these proportions since they are necessary if the work is to be maintained". (43)

As with the earlier exchange on the definition of levels of work, Dr Alexander's statement did not deal with the Teachers' Panel's question. Of course LEAs could exceed the statutory Burnham minimum. However, the Burnham Committee was assembled to agree definition of that statutory minimum.

The reactions of the Teachers' Panel will be considered in Chapter 6 below.

The 1951 Burnham (FE) Report

While the official record of the 8 December meeting had indicated an immediate settlement, there were three further meetings of the Committee in 1951. The first, on 16 January, was significant only in continuing to

demonstrate quite fundamental misgivings within the Authorities' Panel about their own proposals, and in imposing upon their Secretary a longer period between the date that LEAs would receive the proposals and that of their publication than had obtained for the Main Report. (44)

Then, on 8 February, the Teachers' Panel were informed that the local authorities' Associations had rejected the proposed Appeal Machinery. Dr Alexander's alternative of grading each post in strict relation to the standard of work involved (ie the original 26 October proposals), re-introduced in the light of the Associations' rejection of the Appeal Machinery, was in turn rejected by Wickham Murray on behalf of the Teachers' Panel:

"First of all, because it was completely rigid and secondly ... it would have produced one of the greatest anomalies the Burnham Committee could ever have produced - namely, it would have a rigid application of a percentage applied to the work of a particular grade". (45)

Finally, on 14 February the Technical Committee adopted the salary structure which meshed together the structures of the 7 and 28 November memoranda, without an appeals machinery. Thus, the principles of proportions of promoted posts for colleges, rather than of individual entitlement to promotion, were an agreed recommendation of the whole Committee.

Dr Alexander, as Secretary of the Authorities' Panel, issued a personal Commentary on the significant features of each Burnham Report after each round of salary

negotiations. Dr Alexander's Commentary on the 1951 Technical Report highlighted both the lack of strict relation between grade of work taught and the salary of the individual teacher, and the Burnham Committee's expectation that

"... the proportions of higher work virtually constitute the basis for determining the minimum proportion of higher posts which the college must offer". (46)

To this day these two statements have been quoted by both Management and Teachers' Panels: by the LEAs to demonstrate officially-approved flexibility, and by the teacher unions to minimise the tendency within LEAs to implement the new structure at the minimum which, given Alexander's estimate that the new structure would cost an additional 25%, was understandable.

In the light of Dr Alexander's original proposals, and the fractured process of this particular round of Burnham negotiations, it is a nice irony that the principle of 'the lack of strict relation between grade of work taught and the salary of the individual teacher' is often referred to as the Alexander argument.

CHAPTER 6: ISSUES HIGHLIGHTED BY THE 1950-51 BURNHAM (FE) NEGOTIATIONS

Before describing the effects of the 1951 salary settlement upon FE college provision and consequent incentives for school and FE teaching staff, the relationships within the Authorities' Panel and the role of its Secretary are discussed first since these contributed to the modifications of the initial Alexander proposals and, thus, to the final 1951 settlement.

The Teachers' Panel's reactions are then interpreted, and the role of successive Secretaries of State and Governments briefly noted. The implications of the 1951 Burnham settlement are then described.

Finally, the legacy of the Burnham Report for current 16-19 provision is briefly explored. Here the values implicit in the Burnham Reports are noted in the context of the other factors within the education system, all acting together to skew provision towards the academic. The influence of the universities on non-degree work is highlighted. This Chapter also, therefore, provides the background context for the issues described in Part III, the Macfarlane Review.

The Negotiators

(i) The Authorities' Panel

The preceding summary of the 1950-51 Burnham FE negotiations has already highlighted the fact that, on a

number of occasions, the Authorities' Panel was not of one mind.

The following paragraphs provide some explanation of the differences between members of the Authorities' Panel. There was an underlying context for the tension within the AP. As noted earlier, the Association of Municipal Corporations (AMC) and the County Councils Association (CCA) held the view that the Association of Education Committees (AEC) ought not to have independent representation on the Burnham Committees: the authorities in membership of AMC and CCA employed teachers; the Committees represented on AEC did not. The fact that the Secretary of AEC was also Secretary to the Authorities' Panel would act to exacerbate any other grounds for dissension. (47)

And there were grounds for dissension. There was a confidential message from Savage, LCC Education Officer, to Alexander on the reporting of his statement on the 21 July 1950 meeting of the Authorities' Panel:

"What I complained of was the combination of leakage of information and distorted information at that - I very deliberately used the word 'distortion' - since the occasion when the LCC, together with others, were in a minority was not on the point of reaching agreement to the teachers' claim". (48).

This was strong language from a man like Savage. All earlier letters, since 1945, from Savage to the Burnham Secretariat had been courteous: they had either contained detailed - and solicited - advice or enquiries. In that

context, the 3 August 1950 letter would seem to demonstrate some serious loss of confidence.

So Sir Graham Savage had grounds for concern before the 1950/1 FE negotiations. While it is not impossible that the LCC Education Officer might have been over-sensitive, Alexander himself provides evidence for Savage's judgment:

"... soon afterward [the circulation of the AP memorandum of 28 November 1950] Savage told me that although he had agreed to the memorandum as being the best possible solution to the appeals machinery procedure, he remained of the opinion that it would be unsatisfactory in working and suggested that it might lead to the rejection of the Report by the Associations". (49)

As Savage predicted, AMC and CCA did reject the 8 December 1950 proposed settlement, and the Burnham negotiators were forced to revert to first principles. Savage's judgment proved sound.

Another situation illustrating the tensions between the local authority Associations, as well as between Alexander and CEOs, concerned the publication of the schoolteachers' Salary Report. There was widespread resentment of Alexander's issuing of the proposals for the 1951 Main Salary Report for schoolteachers on 27 October 1950 to CEOs in membership of AEC and for releasing to the press on 1 November 1950. Such a tight lead-time made it clear that recipients' views on the proposals would not be taken into account. (50)

The protest of Savage and the protests on the very tight

lead time for the publication of the schoolteachers' Burnham Report should have given the Secretary of the Authorities' Panel grounds for proceeding cautiously. The 1950-51 FE negotiations demonstrate, however, precisely the opposite of caution.

The Burnham Committee archives demonstrate that the Authorities' Panel normally involved their LEA constituents, either by direct request for comment or by representation on working parties, in any proposals for salary restructuring. Despite that practice, Alexander's 26 October 1950 proposals for the restructured FE Report were produced without, apparently, any reference to constituents. One statement only, from the London and Home Counties' RAC, made any prior case for reform, and that statement argued for an increase in salary for all FE technical college teachers and not for a differential for those staff teaching on advanced level courses only.

Certainly, a lack of consultation on the proposals for a new FE Report would provide some explanation for the local authority Associations' rejection of the principles of the Authorities' Panel's proposals for the 1951 Technical Report in January 1951. (51) Quite simply, the LEAs would not have had sufficient time to take on board the concepts within the proposed structure. At the same time, to be so unanimously rejected by constituents - the LEA employers - represents a serious vote of no confidence.

The two casus belli appear to have been, first, the lack of time for constituents to consider the terms of the schoolteachers' salary Report before publication on 1 November 1950 and, second, the unilateral conception of the FE salary structure proposals. Both occurred in October 1950. Given the archival record of adverse LEA reactions on both counts, the following exchange within the formal Burnham (Technical) Committee proceedings is significant.

On 16 January 1951 the modified AP proposals had been adopted by the Committee, and Alexander had suggested that a press release of the agreement be issued on the following Monday, 22 January 1951. The Verbatim then records a clear difference of opinion as between the AP Secretary and the Education Officer of the LCC. Sir Graham Savage is reported as stating:

"It seems to me it is rather tough to put this in the hands of Authorities and let everybody know about it in four or five days' time. It is the kind of thing that gets the backs of Councils up rather badly". (52)

Alexander then suggested 27 January. Savage countered with 16 February 1951. Finally, 1 February 1951 was adopted as the date for the press release.

In the event, the meetings of the CCA, AMC and AEC on 24 and 26 January 1951 refused to adopt the Technical Committee's provisional agreement, and the Authorities' Panel were forced to renegotiate from scratch on 8 February 1951. In that context, Savage's proposed

deferment of the official press release of a Technical Committee agreement proved timely in protecting the public credibility of the Authorities' Panel. More, Savage appeared to have taken on board the adverse reaction to the early publication of the schoolteachers' salary Report and Alexander appeared to be set to repeat the same 'offence'. Further, such an altercation in the formal Committee was rare.

Alexander's initial proposal for such a short lead time between despatch of the 16 January 1951 recommendations which, as he was already aware (53), were not unanimously supported by the AP Sub-Committee that had proposed them was, at the very least, surprising.

Role of Alexander

The personal memoirs of Martin Wilson, CEO of Shropshire, contain illuminating comments on AEC and Alexander:

"Some may speculate whether the interests of education would have been worse or better served by a less power-aware organisation,"

Wilson commented on the AEC. He continued by wondering

"whether in the make-up of the Leadership a greater emphasis on the characteristics of the 'educator' would have had a subtler influence on the quality and the 'feel' of the education service, whether the misty and wayward English can absorb (and be fully and finely appreciated by) the ruthlessly logical Scot. Did the AEC by its obtrusive efficiency nurture the seeds of its own dissolution?". (54)

The initial coherent set of proposals had had to be turned on its head to ensure that it fitted the FE system that it was designed to support. The logic of the original 26 October 1950 proposals would have acted to

significantly undermine the morale of FE staff by removing scope for any promotion for the majority.

Wilson provides a first-hand anecdote as to how Alexander's personality contributed to AEC's high-profile role in national negotiations:

"Perhaps Bill [Alexander] himself didn't always quite know how forceful he seemed to others. At times he would almost monopolise a meeting or talk other people down. At a working party at the Ministry one day he did this to me, interrupting to expound his own view and reducing me to silence. I vowed that this should not happen again. At the very next meeting, Bill interrupted me once more. I raised my voice slightly and went on talking. Bill continued at normal diapason. I raised my voice again. Bill pursued his course unnoticing. To my amazement I found myself stopping - despite the Chairman's sympathetic eye - almost to admire. When he brought his exposition to a halt, I resumed with 'I must apologise for interrupting Dr Alexander'. He was plainly mystified by the burst of laughter which followed". (55)

Wilson noted later:

"Neither is he dictatorial nor as impervious as some suppose. He can listen, absorb, sympathise, adjust. You don't have to be intimidated, but you had better speak up!". (56)

However, there will have been very many within the education service without Martin Wilson's own Puckish persistence, and for whom such treatment would have rankled. (57)

In the course of the negotiations for the schoolteachers' Burnham Report in 1950 Sir Offley Wakeman, at that time, Martin Wilson's own Chairman in Shropshire, had written to Alexander to record his disappointment at the lack of modification of the proposals

"on the lines I suggested and which would have gone some way to meet the views of the CCA". (58)

Such a comment suggests that Alexander did not give a high priority to appearing to accommodate the views of his AP constituents.

From lack of archival evidence to the contrary, it has been inferred that the 26 October 1950 proposals originated in Alexander's own logical mind: that inference has been supported by prominent individuals within the ATTI. Edward Britton stated:

"Lord Alexander believed that those who taught on higher education courses, ie university and university-equivalent work, should be paid more".(59)

Tom Driver noted:

"Alexander wanted the level of work as the criterion for higher-graded staff". (60)

Finally, in a discussion on the underlying rationale of the two Burnham Reports, Lord Alexander said that:

"The Oxford graduate would come into teaching and be paid according to the level of work undertaken initially". (61)

Over more than 30 years, Lord Alexander consistently maintained the original October 1950 rationale.

(ii) Teachers and the 1951 Structure

The account of the 1950-51 negotiations given in Chapter 5 explains the concentration on the Authorities' Panel. The Teachers' Panel were not party to the conception of the 1951 structure. Two questions arise: the first, why the 1951 Teachers' Panel accepted the proposed new structure; and, the second, why their successors

continued to negotiate within it.

Chapter 5 described how, at the first meeting of the 1950-51 negotiations, Wickham Murray had presented a detailed case for a substantial rise in the salaries for all FE teachers. The AP response was not a comment on that case but, rather, the tabling of novel proposals. Given the lack of any forewarning of an alternative approach, the Teachers' Panel might have refused even to consider the scheme. Their reaction, however, was to attempt to explore the salary implications of the AP proposals.

Dr Alexander's 1950s memorandum to the Authorities' Panel had 'guesstimated' that the proposed restructuring would give something more than a 25% increase to the FE salary bill for the country as a whole:

"... although in particular institutions where a high proportion of work of a university standard is carried out the increase may be 30-35%". (62)

The answer to the first question would appear to be that, quite simply, the Teachers' Panel perceived that more money would be forthcoming via the new structure than through any percentage increase on the then current scales.

An agreement to a particularly advantageous offer in one year does not, however, explain the Teachers' Panel's continuing acquiescence in an academically-oriented FE salary structure. Whenever any past or present member of

the Teachers' Panel was asked for their own views on a more appropriate salary structure, the Teachers' Panel's submission to the 1974 Houghton Committee of Enquiry was quoted as expressing the classic Association of Teachers in Technical Institutions (ATTI) perspective. Paragraph 4.5 of that submission (63) deplores the incentive towards developing advanced work or teaching senior students as opposed to non-advanced work or younger students, and the submission argued for a neutralisation of those incentives. Why, then, did the ATTI not attempt to negotiate towards their 'official' position?

Tom Driver answered that question directly by noting that, since the LEAs were always more prepared to concede at the top of the scale than at the bottom, ATTI attempted to work with that attitude. (64) Eric Robinson amplified the pragmatic approach:

"ATTI itself was ambiguous. [Moreover] It always felt the need to hold onto its membership teaching on advanced courses". (65)

There is a continuum in the FE teachers' unions' attitudes. David Triesman, current Negotiating Secretary for the National Association of Teachers in Further and Higher Education (NATFHE), the successor to ATTI, continues the realpolitik explanation:

"However egalitarian the policy-makers, the eventual policy usually has a very basic root - demographic, ie the profile of the membership. It is demographic features (of the Association) that determine the policy [that] produce inertia, conservatism - with a small 'c'! 75% of NATFHE is on LII or above. The real answer to your question - responsiveness to the membership". (66)

The commonality of the above view with that of Dr Seeley, Secretary of the ATTI in the 1950s, is interesting:

"It is quite clear that the salary policies affect colleges' development and lead to principals concentrating on higher level work - that way comes money, prestige, and your staff are happy. Evidence? Middlesex Polytechnic used to have both higher and lower work; the latter has now been pushed out. Why did the ATTI work with that policy? We had hoped to raise salaries for each grade of work ... bound up with social attitudes to HE ... Rightly or wrongly, this country gives priority to higher specialist knowledge - and less to teaching skills. I argued against this within the ATTI, argued that staff should have the opportunity to teach at all levels as we did in Derby Tech". (67)

The final word on the FE teachers' unions' continuing acquiescence with an academically-orientated salary structure should be Tom Driver's:

"The ATTI wanted the proportion of higher graded posts to depend on the numbers of staff; Alexander wanted the level of work as the criterion - hence the proportions of Appendix IIA [ie POP/COW] Alexander wouldn't wear this ... a thousand irrelevant arguments and one real one; that such a system as ATTI proposed would compound the meanness or generosity of the LEA ... It was union policy to improve the bottom ... A political impossibility to get a single scale, therefore a long-term policy to progress to a long scale to at least the top of the (current) Senior Lecturer scale". (68)

The answers to why the FE teachers' unions first accepted and then continued to work within an academically-skewed structure are, therefore, twofold. First, the relative size of the total salary increase and, second, the perceived inadvisability of alienating a sizeable proportion of their membership, specifically those paid on the higher FE salary scales.

(iii) Secretaries of State

Sir Keith Joseph as Secretary of State frequently

expressed surprise (69) that, in his view, the English and Welsh education service was so antipathetic to the worlds of employment, industry and commerce. Whether or not his judgment be fair, any priority afforded by the education service to the academic vis-à-vis the vocational could be regarded as directly encouraged by the incentives of the teachers' salary systems.

However, the Secretary of State's predecessors have been active participants in the successive salary negotiations since 1945, initially as acceptor (or not) of the Burnham Committees' proposals and, from 1965, as a highly-weighted, voting constituent of the Management Panel under the private Concordat (70) between local authority Associations and the Department of Education and Science.

Secretaries of State cannot distance themselves from the implications of the continuum of values that they have expressed through their consistent influence on regular salary negotiations over a period of nearly forty years.

Implications for the FE Service of the 1951 Settlement

An exchange of correspondence in 1954 between Alexander and W G Stone, Director of Education of Brighton, demonstrates the strength of the hold of the 'proportions of posts/categories of work' (POP/COW) even within a few years. Stone reported that Brighton had welcomed the fact that the Authorities' Panel had proposed to provide additional allowances of up to £100 per annum for

Assistants Grade B whose duties warranted additional recognition.

"The Authority felt that at last there would be an opportunity of recognising in a practical way the work done by Heads of fairly large sections doing comparatively little work beyond school standard, whose responsibilities deserved some financial recognition, but would not be regarded as coming in the category of Heads of Department". (71)

The Authority had, therefore, been surprised that the newly adopted 1954 Report no longer included provision for these special responsibility allowances [SRAs, previously referred to as PSRs].

The 1951 Report had deleted the SRAs on the grounds that the new salary structure could accommodate reward for additional responsibility via the level of work-related promoted posts. The Authorities' Panel was made aware by such feedback as Stone's that that accommodation was not taking place. Alexander replied that the Authorities' Panel:

"...would have been very happy indeed to keep this proposal in the final Report, but the Teachers' Panel were under instruction to press for its withdrawal. It was a bargaining counter and in the course of the bargaining it had to be discarded". (72)

Why had the Teachers' Panel opposed the AP's 1954 proposals to allow Assistants Grade B to have additional SRAs? They had argued that the logic of the 1951 structure meant the additional money for additional responsibilities, which both sides of the negotiating table acknowledged, should be paid via an increase in the proportions of Lecturers.

The TP counter-proposal would have incurred greater costs than the £100 maximum additional payment to assistants Grade B, as proposed by the AP. However, the counter-proposal would have built on the general guidance of the 1951 Report:

"While, therefore, standards of work should be the essential consideration, it will be competent for an Authority to take other factors into account which they consider relevant to the grading of posts".(73)

As stated above, both Panels found consolation, not to say ammunition, in that qualification.

Logically, Eric Robinson, ATTI negotiator in the 1960s and now Director of Lancashire Polytechnic, was quite right in arguing that:

"If you really accept the Alexander argument that the level of teaching does not determine the salary of the individual teacher, which is what the '51 settlement intended, then the [1954] responsibility allowance proposal for Assistants Grade B was a nonsense ... Later concessions which permitted some higher posts for lower level work illustrate that contradiction ... because if you don't have the assumption that only those doing advanced work could be Lecturers, that concession is unnecessary. It demonstrates that they do not think you should have them ... This is the basis of a long history of muddle, conflict, anomaly and confusion throughout the system. Virtually all the higher grades in both Reports have dual or multiple functions. Thus, a Scale 2 post in a primary school is a post of seniority and responsibility. In an upper secondary school it is not. A Lecturer II post in a low-status department of a FE college is a responsibility post. In a polytechnic it is not. The grading of courses was originally based on criteria drawn from the academic (non-vocational) world ... and, in spite of modifications, has been widely regarded as prejudicial to vocational education". (74).

The logic is fair. However, the 1951 Report has already been demonstrated as not impeccably coherent.

Alexander's original October 1950 proposals were coherent, but they were abandoned in the course of negotiations.

Incentives in the FE Report

In the course of the consultations leading to the 1945 Technical Report Lester Smith, CEO of Manchester, had written:

"I have often wondered how a system of remuneration based on the number of higher grade students who can be kept on the books of a college is going to affect Regional co-operation and organisation. Will it not tend to make every college determined to keep its advanced students at all costs?" (75)

Lester Smith was a solitary voice. Twenty years later the implications of incentives were still being ignored.

Robinson reported:

"Alexander wouldn't look at the incentives argument. I argued with Alexander, with Toby Weaver [Deputy Secretary at the Department of Education and Science] and with Brown [Education Officer at the CCA]. I could never get them to take incentives seriously. When I said 'You say you want more part-time work and more non-advanced work: your Burnham Report proposals will make colleges cut it back, drop it', Bill wouldn't have it. 'They are professional people'. In the mid-1960s at the time the Government was changing the law for Alec Clegg's middle schools, Alexander proposed a change in the points scheme for schools. Gould argued that the change would give teachers a salary incentive to resist middle schools: Alexander wouldn't see it; the 'They're professional people' argument. Alexander saw himself meting out justice, not dealing in incentives. After the 1965 Woolwich speech I argued, separately, to both Toby Weaver and Crosland [Secretary of State] that if they felt it important for polytechnics to keep part-time and sub-degree work, if they meant what they said, then they needed to look at pooling, the weight for part-time students within the Burnham Report and the whole of the Burnham Report, etc. All neglected the principle. Alexander actually said in the Burnham Committee 'We are not here to discuss educational policy: we are here to talk about salaries'". (76)

The quotation from Eric Robinson is given in full since it demonstrates that at least Alexander was not alone in this apparent indifference to the force of the incentives argument. Further, it also provides an example of the way that the negotiators were responding to different perceptions of the needs of the FE service. This point will be developed later in Chapter 11.

Professor Gerry Fowler endorses Robinson's point about the importance of implicit incentives quite graphically:

"Why sweat your guts out teaching young thickos of an evening when they count for only 0.15 of a human being (or now, 0.2)? Why not instead teach someone who may even be less bright and certainly less deserving, but is full-time, has a grant, does not create the same problem of filling in registers, does not create any difficulties with that ghastly librarian about opening hours and counts as a real human being? After all, the teaching load is not going to be six or five times as great; it will probably be no more than twice as great, and it will fall within what are deemed to be 'social' hours ... Advanced work has always had an enormous advantage over non-advanced. It was greater in the days of the open-ended pool than it is today. Put simply, it was that you cost your LEA nothing, or nothing that was discernible. Councillor Bloggs and his concern about the impact of the rates on the pensioners of Swanly Ward could go get lost: there was no impact". (77)

Professor Fowler is not guilty of exaggeration in the above caricature of the way in which the Burnham differentials compound the pooling factors to intensify 'academic skew'. Fred Janes, then Principal of Yeovil (Tertiary) College, quotes the following expression of the power of the Burnham incentives.

"A colleague in my college, an engineer, had been splendidly successful in devising and teaching an Industrial Studies syllabus for PT Day CGLI lads. He came to me in some distress lest his timetable in

future included a greater proportion of such work. 'Surely', he said, 'I am damaging my promotion chances? If I am to get an LII I should be taking a greater proportion of the engineering classes in the fourth and sixth year work, rather than this low level stuff!' (78)

Janes thus provides first-hand evidence of the incentives that Robinson had predicted would operate on the FE system.

Further, it is noted that the skill shortages in the country as well as the FE system are particularly acute at the 'craft' level: there are serious shortages of plumbers, carpenters, builders, etc.

Legacy for Post-16 Provision

(i) Cluster of Separate Factors Promoting Academic Skew

"What was it that gave rise to the seemingly inexorable drift towards upgrading courses?" (79) Christopher Ball, then Chairman of the Board of the National Advisory Body for Public Sector HE (NAB) and Warden of Keble College, Oxford, was well placed to answer his own question. He noted the Burnham salary rules, and added the following factors: the prestige of the universities which largely avoid sub-degree work; the mandatory awards regulations; and the desire of many professional bodies to upgrade qualifying courses to degree level to enhance the status of their profession. Each of these factors deserves some brief commentary.

Before turning to the impact of the universities on the development of non-university educational provision, the

other factors that Ball identified deserve some brief note here. The Anderson Report of 1960 recommended an expansion in the support for students on degree courses. The Education Act of 1962 made the provision of a grant (subject to parental income) mandatory upon an offer of a place on, for the most part, a full-time three-year Honours Degree course. The coincidence of that provision with the dramatic expansion of university places following the Robbins Report of 1963 may well have distorted student demand as well as the balance of post-school provision: students would have been attracted towards courses whose places guaranteed mandatory awards.

Additionally, Ministers and some senior civil servants in the 1950s and 1960s were thought to believe that part-time degrees were 'second best'. (80) The professions were also perceived to be eager to cut off the part-time route to professional status:

"... the determination of the Professional Institutions to get rid of the part-time route to membership. For instance, the Engineering Institution phased out the Higher National Certificate route to professional membership, thereby making it almost impossible for anyone who had slipped out of full-time education to become professionally qualified. The ostensible reason was the raising of professional standards but the actual reason was much more closely connected with status". (81)

It should be noted that each of these factors was introduced after the 1951 Burnham (FE) Report, that each reinforced the skewing effects of that Report, and each represented the same priorities and incentives. Attempting to differentiate the effects of the Burnham

(FE) Report from those of the other strands would be an impossible task.

(11) The Influence of the Universities

The educational world of the early 1980s had responded positively to the Government's Technical and Vocational Education Initiative (TVEI) for 14-18 year olds of all abilities. TVEI had itself reinforced the 'Education for Capability' initiative co-ordinated by the Royal Society of Arts.

However, even after those separate initiatives the Vice-Chancellors' Committee and the 'Standing Conference on University Entrance' could still publish advice that applicants should choose conventional, academic A levels:

"Least acceptable of all', the pamphlet says, are 'subjects which involve practical skill'. However, A level design and technology is 'increasingly considered to be demanding in the way that is not true for the craft subjects' ... The same stigma of practical skill appears to apply to electronics and computer science". (82)

It takes a quite serious affliction of professional myopia to have provided such advice in the face of the RSA and TVEI initiatives, and of a government already critical of the universities .

At the 1985 Conference of the Council of Local Education Authorities (CLEA), Sir Keith Joseph had noted that

"This country greatly under-values and under-produces the skilled sort of people - craftsman, technicians and middle management - who are so vital to a successful economy". (83)

The then Secretary of State offered no explanation. Lady Warnock, a key speaker at the same Conference, identified two major problems in the education system. First, there was a highly unsatisfactory division made between education and training. Secondly, the universities had far too dominant an influence through the examination system on secondary education. (84)

Lord Alexander had earlier made a similar critique to Lady Warnock. His own explanation for the academic skewing of the education system was:

"the power of the universities. The academic tradition is the tragedy of the English educational system". (85)

Lord Alexander's own perspective will be developed below.

In his review of Correlli Barnett's recent publication, "The Audit of War", Stuart Maclure draws together the individual perspectives quoted above.

"The story of English education since 1945 as it emerges from Barnett's less than complete account, is of the failure to devise anything which can be recognised as a secondary education for all, even though this was the chosen priority. All along the best has been the enemy of the good. The 'best' in this case being the elite, university-orientated, GCE O and A level model, and its continuation even after schools were reorganised on comprehensive lines.

Barnett does not seem to recognise how much England has suffered from the emphasis which has been placed on speed - in particular, the fetish of a three-year first degree and the effect this has had on early specialisation. The fact is that most other countries don't just have a different curriculum - they have much more education, so that it is quite possible to combine a general education with appropriate forms of professional training". (86)

It is at least noteworthy that Sir Keith Joseph, when

Secretary of State, did not take the opportunity to review the role of the universities on examining bodies when he established the new GCSE.

Lord Alexander had offered his own antidote to the stranglehold of the over academically orientated universities - the establishment of a high-status technological institution. (87) In that context the commentary of Sir Edward Britton is illuminating:

"It could be argued that in 1950 there was a very real need for the country to develop full-time advanced courses. It was before the Robbins development and the new universities of the 1960s. It was before the polytechnic development. It was even before the development of the CATs. Southampton, Hull, Exeter and Leicester had not yet become universities in their own right. It could be argued that the 1951 structure met an important need for the time and met it very successfully". (88)

Many of those interviewed who have been active in education and, especially, further education, over a number of decades have emphasised that the perceived need of the early 1950s was to raise the profile of further education.

"Why not give the universities incentives [to broaden their base] rather than build up FE? Because you could move the colleges; you couldn't [move] the universities". (89)

The autonomy of the universities was a matter that the government tackled obliquely in the next next decade with its binary policy for higher education. (90). For the early 1950s, however:

"... there was a positive, determined effort to introduce salaries which would attract into Technical Colleges the people who could cope with the new demand [from ex-servicemen who could qualify for grant-aided entry to degree courses], ie that

the 1951 settlement was a positive and deliberate act of policy". (91)

As exemplified at the end of this chapter, that presumed policy proved highly effective.

(iii) The 'Alexandrine' Framework for 16+ Provision

The October 1950 proposals for FE salary reform should, perhaps be set within the larger context of Alexander's view of the priorities for the education system as a whole. He noted, and deplored that:

"For too long in this country we have accepted that an institution concerned with academic education necessarily ranks higher than an institution concerned with technical education". (92)

Alexander's way of achieving the right kind of status for technical education was to ensure that teaching on higher technical courses would be paid at university-equivalent rates. In the late 1960s he described the way forward for post-compulsory education salary structures:

"There would have to be sufficient grades to cover all needs, and no doubt different proportions of staff in particular establishments would need to be employed in different grades, but this is a necessary step if we are to achieve unity in higher education and if we are to avoid the concept of higher education being first grade and second grade". (93)

In that sense, the incentives of the 1951 Report were deliberate. The aim, and it was widely shared by those concerned with FE provision, was that of raising the FE profile and particularly that of higher technical studies.

The research through which Alexander gained his doctorate, (94) provided a scientific demonstration of

the existence of a practical intelligence which was unrelated to verbal intelligence, the tool of the professionals:

"... we may make clear the relation of verbal ability to practical ability. They have 'g' intelligence "in common. That is all". (95)

Alexander's statements over four decades confirm his concern that the education system over-valued the verbal intelligence and, by virtue of so doing, devalued the technological: "... Children of this country have suffered because of our acceptance of the idea that intelligence was a matter of words" (96) and "... Too many children in the past have been sacrificed on the altars of a purely academic teaching". (97)

At the end of the war, Alexander had extrapolated from a relatively constant School Certificate pass rate of about 12½% of the age cohort to argue that, in future, local junior or young people's colleges could provide an alternative route to university entrance to sixth forms.

"In 10 years, or it may be 20 years, ... transfer sixth form courses to these young people's colleges. ... Are we not in danger of forming judgments because of our desire to protect the institution which is the grammar school rather than to form a judgment which solely has regard to the best interests of the pupils?". (98)

Alexander's war-time analysis of the needs of the 16-18 year olds provides an accurate summary of problems which have continued through to the 1980s.

(iv) Implications of POP/COW

The Government Departments' over-riding concern for,

first, the total cost of a salary settlement (99) and, second, for differentials, is well-attested through archive evidence and contemporary Burnham Negotiations. (100) The 1951 settlement demonstrated a choice in favour of a high differential for the highly-qualified as opposed to a FE modification to the then more egalitarian model of the Burnham (Main) Report for schoolteachers. The 1951 FE Report certainly introduced the promotion differential for those teaching advanced-level work.

At the same time, it is possible that that same differential acted as a necessary and sufficient spur to the virtual explosion in post-war FE provision

"The number of full-time and sandwich course students has increased most rapidly from 9,660 in 1954 to 54,500 in 1966. The numbers of full-time and sandwich course students taking non-advanced courses has also risen rapidly from 46,000 in 1954 to 145,000 in 1966". (101)

Maclure's statistics demonstrate an expenditure increase of 2,200% [£6m in 1945-46 to £29m in 1955-56 and £142.5m in 1966-67] "FE's share of LEA current expenditure has risen from 4.3% in 1945-46 to 7% in 1955-56 and to 11.2% in 1966-67. (102)

The further education system certainly flourished under the Alexandrine aegis. As Tom Driver freely acknowledged:

"Alexander did more to get money for education than anyone else. He persuaded the Government to spend. AEC were unanimous about one thing and that was 'more money for education'. In a time of percentage grants in a time of expansion, in terms of Burnham, Alexander went beyond the Authorities' brief". (103)

Had the educational establishment accepted the Alexandrine framework for 16+ education provision, LEAs' difficulties in reconciling the underlying competition as between sixth forms, sixth form colleges and FE colleges would not have been on the agenda for the 1970s and 1980s. However, institutions generate their own loyalties; once created, sixth forms prove curiously resistant to removal from their 'host', the secondary school. That said, the role of the Department of Education and Science in reinforcing the academic role of the sixth forms and sixth form colleges by very limited revisions to the Schools Regulations is an issue to be considered later.

The Alexandrine framework for 16+ provision may seem to sit somewhat oddly with the clearly hierarchical proposals of October 1950. However, Alexander's view that it was right to pay more for higher level work is entirely consistent with his belief that the English educational system over-valued the academic vis-à-vis the technological. Alexander believed that teaching on the higher level technological courses should be remunerated at the same - higher - level as were university courses because he believed that both were of equal worth. In his advocacy of technical education at a time when, for reasons explored in Chapter 10, the English culture was not yet sympathetic to the technological 'imperative', Alexander deserves much credit.

References to Part II

- (1) See Saran, R. (1985). The Politics Behind Burnham. Sheffield City Polytechnic Papers in Education Management No 45 for a full picture of schoolteachers' salary negotiations from 1945-85.
- (2) See, for example, Lodge & Blackstone (1982) Educational Policy and Educational Inequity, Martin Robertson, Oxford and King (1976) School and College - Studies in Post-16 Education, Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- (3) Saran, R. (1985). Op Cit, pp81-7.
- (4) Saran, R. (1985). Ibid, pp34-38
- (5) Saran, R. (1985). Ibid, p59
- (6) Saran, R. (1985). Ibid, p91.
- (7) Box 17, File No 48. Correspondence with LEAs, 1944-47. Burnham Archives (since 1986, held by Brotherton Library, Leeds University).
- (8) Ibid.
- (9) Box 18, File No 49. Correspondence with Ministry, January 1944-45, December 1950. Burnham Archives.
- (10) Box 17, File No 48. 26 October 1944. Letters from Brockington to Sir Edward Le Breton, CCA member. Correspondence with LEAs 1944-47. Burnham Archives.
- (11) Saran, R. (1985). Op Cit, pp95-102 and Box 17, File No 48. Op Cit, Burnham Archives.
- (12) 'Technical' was a Burnham term for 'FE' in the 1940s and 1950s.
- (13) Box 19, File No 50. 26 February 1945 letters from Brockington to Miss Casswell, Headmistresses' Association. Correspondence with TP 1944-47. Burnham Archives.
- (14) Box 19, File No 51. 10 November 1944 letter from Brockington to Kenrick, AP Leader. Correspondence with Kenrick. Burnham Archives.
- (15) The grading of [coal]mine deputies' courses was a matter of long dispute between the teachers' and employers' representatives on the Grading of Courses Working Party: the employers argued for senior schools equivalence on the grounds of the lack of academic qualifications required of a student; the teachers pressed - successfully - for a higher grading on the grounds that any student would have considerable experience and responsibility, and that the course content included aspects of management.

- (16) File B7, Correspondence with Authorities' Panel, 1950-51. AEC Archives, at Brotherton Library, University of Leeds and in Burnham Archives.
- (17) Ibid File B7, para 4 of 120/10.50. London and Home Counties Regional Advisory Committee (RAC) Statement.
- (18) The concentration on the Authorities' Panel, rather than on the Teachers' Panel is explained in the discussion on the teachers' reactions to the 1951 settlement in Chapter 6.
- (19) ATTI (1952). The Technical Journal, pp146-7.
- (20) Ibid.
- (21) Submission of the FE Teachers' Panel to the Houghton Inquiry, extracts from pp3-5.
- (22) 16 October 1950 letter from Jackson to Alexander. Correspondence with Authorities' Panel 1950-51. Burnham Archives.
- (23) Despite a thorough search of Burnham and AEC archives, I could not find any reference to the proposed FE restructuring before Alderman Jackson's 16 October 1950 letter. There were consultations with, and unsolicited comments (and criticisms) from, LEAs on major and minor changes in both Burnham Reports. The lack of any correspondence on the FE restructuring proposals suggests that no formal consultation had taken place. That said, there was a consensus amongst those I interviewed who were most active in the 1950s that those teaching on advanced courses should be paid more than those teaching on non-advanced courses.
- (24) See (17) above.
- (25) Correspondence with AP May 1950-January 1951. Burnham Archives.
- (26) See (25) above.
- (27) Dr Alexander is credited with the proposal since, see (23) above, no evidence of a wider authorship is available.
- (28) The Verbatim Record of 8 December 1950. Burnham Technical Negotiations, p46. Burnham Archives.
- (29) Material and quotations not separately referenced in the account and analysis of the Burnham Committee meeting held on 3 November 1950 are taken from the Verbatim Minutes of the 22nd meeting of the Burnham (Technical) Committee of that date. Burnham Archives.

- (30) Correspondence with AP May 1950-January 1951.
Burnham Archives.
- (31) See (23) above.
- (32) Verbatim Report of 23rd meeting of the Burnham
(Technical) Committee held on 8 November 1950;
p4. Burnham Archives.
- (33) Correspondence with AP May 1950-January 1951.
Burnham Archives.
- (34) Ibid.
- (35) 1 January 1951. Correspondence with Authorities'
Panel 1950-51. Burnham Archives.
- (36) Ibid.
- (37) Correspondence with AP May 1950-January 1951.
Burnham Archives.
- (38) Ibid.
- (39) The Verbatim Record of the 24th meeting of the
Burnham (Technical) Committee held on 8 December
1950. Burnham Technical Negotiations, p2. Burnham
Archives.
- (40) Minutes of 8 December 1950 meeting as in (39)
above. Burnham Archives.
- (41) Ibid, p8.
- (42) Ibid, p9.
- (43) Ibid, p13.
- (44) The Verbatim Record of 25th meeting of Burnham
(Technical) Committee held on 16 January 1951.
Burnham Archives.
- (45) The Verbatim Record of 26 meeting of Burnham
(Technical) Committee held on 8 February 1951, p2.
Burnham Archives.
- (46) Alexander, Dr W P. The Burnham Report (1951) for
Further Education. A Commentary. Councils and
Education Press Ltd, p8.
- (47) See Saran, R. (1985). Op Cit, pp34-38.
- (48) Box 24, File No 60 (listed as 61). Correspondence
with LEAs, April 1947-31 December 1950 and
Correspondence with AP May 1950-January 1951.
Burnham Archives.

- (49) 1 January 1951 letter from Alexander to Alderman Jackson. Correspondence with Authorities' Panel 1950-51. Burnham Archives.
- (50) eg Letters from Mason, Chief Education Officer, Nottinghamshire, Newbury [St Helens], Spink, [Northumberland], Stone [Brighton]. File B134(a). AEC Archives.
- (51) 29 January 1951 letter from Alexander to the Authorities' Panel. Correspondence with AP 1950-51. Burnham Archives.
- (52) Verbatim Record of 25th meeting of Burnham (Technical) Committee, p45. Burnham Archives.
- (53) "... It was rather hard going, but we finally hammered out a memorandum which was circulated to the Panel on 28 November ... As neither Woodhead nor Gittins [the other members of the Sub-Committee] had been very wholehearted in their support...". Extract from Alexander's 1 January 1951 briefing note to Jackson. Correspondence with AP 1950-51. Burnham Archives.
- (54) Wilson, Martin. (1984). Epoch in English Education - An Administrator's Challenge. Sheffield Papers in Education Management, No 39, pp84-85.
- (55) Ibid, p83.
- (56) Ibid.
- (57) TES. (1974). 1 March, p1.
- (58) Correspondence with AP, 1950-51. Burnham Archives. 4 May 1950.
- (59) Interview with Edward Britton, 3 April 1980.
- (60) Interview with Tom Driver, 7 April 1980.
- (61) Interview with Lord Alexander, 22 October 1984.
- (62) Correspondence with AP 1950-51. Burnham Archives.
- (63) Driver, T. ATTI, APTI, NSAE, NPTCA, Submission of the FE Teachers' Panel to the Houghton Inquiry. Victoria House Printing Co (TU).
- (64) Interview with Tom Driver, 7 April 1980.
- (65) Interview with Eric Robinson, 20 January 1981.
- (66) Interview with David Triesman, 18 December 1984.
- (67) Interview with Dr Seeley, 20 June 1984.

- (68) See (64) above.
- (69) Education. 21/28 December 1984, p523.
- (70) By the Remuneration of Teachers' Act the Government imposed its own representatives on the Authorities' Panel. The Concordat gave the Secretary of State the highest weighting within the Authorities' Panel.
- (71) W G Stone to W P Alexander. File B150A in AEC Archives.
- (72) Ibid.
- (73) The 1951 Burnham (Further Education) Report. HMSO, Appendix K, para 2.
- (74) See (65) above.
- (75) 8 December 1944 letter to AP Secretary. Box 21. File No 53. Correspondence with Members of the Technical Committee 1944-47. Burnham Archives.
- (76) See (65) above.
- (77) Letter to author from Professor Fowler, 21 February 1983.
- (78) Letter to author from F Janes, 3 September 1981.
- (78) Education. 6 April 1984, p279.
- (80) "Eccles pronounced the death of part-time degrees in 1956 and it was this that led the CATs to concentrate on full-time work". Derek Weitzel, Past-President and Negotiating Secretary of NATFHE, letter to author, 18 June 1985. Other interviewees made the same point - that while part-time degrees were acceptable if there were no other alternative provision, HMI and the Ministry of Education were perceived to believe that the preferred scenario was the three year FT (residential) Honours degree.
- (81) Letter to author from Sir Edward Britton, 11 June 1985.
- (82) Report in Times Educational Supplement, 24 May 1985, p3.
- (83) Reported in Education, 26 July 1985, p89-90.
- (84) Reported in Education, 26 July 1985 p90.
- (85) Interview with Lord Alexander, 22 October 1984.
- (86) Times Educational Supplement, 11 April 1986, p4.

- (87) Interview on 22 October 1984.
- (88) Letter to author (see (81) above).
- (89) Interview with P T Sloman, previously DES representative on the Burnham Management Panel and later Education Officer, Association of Metropolitan Authorities, 15 May 1985.
- (90) Elliott, D. (1985). "Higher Education: Towards a Trans-Binary Policy?" in Hughes et al Managing Education. Holt, Rinehart & Winston Ltd, p202.
- (91) Interview with J Sturgess, Principal FE Officer, Hampshire, 26 August 1985.
- (92) Sir Wm Alexander. Towards a New Education Act (1969). An Education Paperback, Council and Education Press Ltd, p44.
- (93) Ibid, pp43-44.
- (94) William Picken Alexander. (1934). Intelligence - Concrete and Abstract - A Study in Differential Traits. University of London, May 1934.
- (95) Ibid, p273
- (96) Dr W P Alexander. Educational Needs of Democracy 1940, p14.
- (97) Ibid, p30.
- (98) Dr W P Alexander. Some Problems Confronting Administrators Consequent upon the New Education Bill, (NUT Conference, Easter 1944), p14.
- (99) Frank Walton, Joint Secretary for Authorities' Panel in the 1970s, letter to author 17 August 1985 "... it would be a further illustration of the distortion of cost in which the Authorities' Panel's officers had to indulge in order to try to ensure that the DES representatives did not reject it as adding more to the pay bill than their political masters were prepared to accept. That kind of manoeuvre was a constant feature of all Burnham proposals. It would be no exaggeration to say that, over issues like that, negotiations with the DES at officer-level were much more difficult than anything which took place in Burnham itself and nearly always focussed on cost to the total exclusion of practical consequences. It is no wonder that the few changes which took place were fudged, with the emphasis on doing something, whatever it was, rather than continually saying 'No' to the Teachers' Panel simply because the DES thought it would cost more than could be accommodated as a marginal or insignificant addition to the pay bill".

- (100) Saran, R. (1985). Op.Cit, pp63, 137 and 158.
- (101) Maclure, S. (1968). Living Beyond Our Means. Councils and Education Press Ltd, p17.
- (102) Ibid. p15.
- (103) Interview with Tom Driver, 7 April 1980.

PART III - 16-19 AND THE MACFARLANE REVIEW

CHAPTER 7: 16-19 PROVISION - VALUES AND INCENTIVES

Earlier chapters have described how the academically-skewing POP/COW weightings within the FE Report were achieved, and have commented on the incentive for each FE College to aspire to offer courses graded at a higher academic level. However, FE provision for students over post-compulsory school age co-exists with that offered for 16-19 year olds in schools and sixth form colleges, which operate under the Burnham (Primary and Secondary) Reports with its age-weighted provisions. Part III sets out some of the concerns raised by LEAs arising from their attempts to review 16-19 provision in institutions governed by the separate salary reports, and the response of the Macfarlane Review to those concerns.

This second major study of the thesis also describes, first, why the Macfarlane Report was chosen as the best source of data on the issues within the 16-19 arena, and draws on the published literature to illuminate the underlying values of policy-makers. The terms of reference of the Macfarlane Report are described.

The mixed, and adverse, reception of the Report is noted and, as part explanation, the reports of internal divisions within the Macfarlane Group and the late revisions to the Report, are provided. Then, from an analysis of the issues highlighted by the revisions, and a comparison between these and the issues highlighted by

the LEAs when consulted by the Macfarlane Group, it draws some conclusions about the values underlying the system.

The Macfarlane Review

The review of educational opportunities for 16-19 year olds conducted under the chairmanship of the then Parliamentary Under Secretary of State at the Department of Education and Science, Neil Macfarlane, in 1979-80 provides excellent data for any consideration of the issues involved in 16-19 rationalisation. This chapter draws on that data, which is of particular significance for several reasons.

First the Review Group was composed exclusively of the representatives of those who had the power to execute policies. King, having noted the various interests among the professional groups involved in post-16 educational provision, stresses the important role of LEAs and DES.

"Interest groups differ in their power to implement their ideas. [But] The power to decide the form of post-16 education rests at the level of the local education authorities and at the Department of Education and Science". (1)

The composition of the Review Group as exclusively provider-driven and not including teachers, parents or students, meant that what was achievable and what would be acceptable would count as important criteria when considering new policy initiatives. Further, the power of the employee associations to influence policy according to sectional interests was thereby reduced. At the same time, and for the same reasons, the power of the

Review Group to implement its proposals was thereby enhanced.

The final significance of the composition of the Review Group was that the Government was fully part of the proceedings. It would be that much more difficult for the Government to ignore the Report's final recommendations. That fact may perhaps explain the hyperactivity in the closing months of the Review Group's activities.

Second, the Review Group invited all Chief Education Officers (CEOs) to specify the principal barriers to the rationalisation of 16-19 provision, and what the Group should do to minimise these difficulties: the responses of 92 of 104 LEAs were available for perusal and provide a unique 'snapshot' of the perceptions of relevant Chief Officers at a particular point in time. These are summarised below under the [1980] consultations in Chapter 9.

Third, the Macfarlane Group tapped the expertise and experience of a high proportion of LEA and DES staff who had been wrestling with the problems of 16-19 provision, and the Ministerial-steered group was composed of leading LEA elected members. For Government and local authorities the Review Group acquired a high profile and, overall, arrived at a consensus view on post-16 provision. This threw into sharp relief the last minute

political interventions which almost led to a set of conclusions which would have been very nearly opposite to those contained in the final version.

Finally, and of most significance for this author's study, the negotiations leading to the 1951 FE Salary Report and those within the Macfarlane Group have marked parallels: in both cases the penultimate stages nearly led to outcomes that would have had opposite results to those which actually occurred. The very late attempts to modify the outcomes of negotiations in both cases made explicit the values of negotiators: these values are usually merely implicit, but nevertheless mould the shape of decisions about educational provision.

Incentives for 16-19 Schools and Colleges

Before moving to the Macfarlane Report (2), however, it is necessary to describe briefly the salary Report governing salaries of all teachers employed in schools and sixth form colleges (3). The thesis originated with the wish to explore whether or not the provisions of the Burnham Reports did, as generally believed, distort 16-19 provision. The structure of the FE Report has been described already. It is necessary now to summarise the Schools Report as it operated in the late 1970s.

The first post-war settlement included additional allowances for head teachers of £50 per annum for each

group of 30 pupils over school leaving age. The Secretary of the Authorities' Panel in 1945 defended this age-weighted differential in the following terms:

"The advantages of the unit system [ie the age-weighted system] seem to me two-fold. It disarms criticism. It does differentiate (which the mere counting of heads does not) the grammar schools from the modern school by the character of the work which the former is doing at the upper end - except, of course, for those strange beings who hold that the head of a kindergarten should receive the same salary as a University Professor". (4)

That one differential has been modified through successive Burnham negotiations.

In 1979, Dennison (5) summarised the schools' unit total salary system in the following simple table

<u>Each Pupil</u>	<u>Units</u>
Under 14 counts	2
Between 14-15 counts	3
Between 15-16 counts	4
Between 16-17 counts	6
Over 17 counts	8

Dennison's article demonstrates how this weighting discriminates against the Primary or Middle School with 400 pupils by comparison with the sixth form college with the same number of pupils on roll. The latter has a higher unit total and this enables it to offer promoted posts at higher salaries to many more of its teaching staff.

Tudor David, then Editor of Education, described the implications of the schools' age-weighted salary report for 16-19 reorganisations:

"Where separate sixth forms or tertiary colleges have been established or are planned, it means 11-16 schools. An NUT [Head] teacher of an 11-18 mixed comprehensive was fully aware of the implications: 'my defence of the sixth form will surely be influenced by my agonised experience of the Burnham Triennial Review of salary points [units]. Every sixth former adds eight points ... every 12 year old ... two points. When all these are added together, I then have some idea about how many above-Scale 1 posts I can offer ... Crude, yes; non-educational - perhaps. However, until Burnham manages to reform its system ... it is unlikely that many heads or Governing Bodies of comprehensive schools will leap forward with alacrity when a break at 16 is proposed'". (6)

The above quotation is unusual only in that its author was prepared to make available for publication the fact that head teachers of 11-18 schools are not disinterested parties when proposals for sixth form or tertiary colleges would mean that the secondary school would lose its sixth form.

Dennison's article reinforces the quoted views above:

"Take for example the education of 16/19 year olds ... It is all very well discussing the relative merits of small and large sixth forms ... the leadership role of older pupils, or whether courses are better in sequence or in separate institutions, but it must be remembered these are essentially secondary factors. It is the unit score calculation and the effects it has on teaching career prospects which is of prime importance ...". (7)

Dennison concludes that the only reason for the continuance of the age-weighting system in schools is that both Teachers and Management Panels have a vested interest in continuing to use it.

The response to Dennison of A G Gronow, then Under Secretary at the Local Authorities' Conditions of Service Advisory Board (LACSAB) which acted as Secretariat for

the Management Panel, should be noted here:

"Finally, and perhaps in a spirit of mischief that could be criticised as unfair, I would put forward a question for Dr Dennison to consider. If he really believes that the Head Teacher of a 450-strong Middle School should be paid as much as the Head Teacher of a 450-strong sixth form college, and that equality of treatment should stretch within the service, does he equally concede that the rewards to a class teacher, be that person working with reception class infants or University undergraduates, should be remunerated on an equal basis?". (8)

The above provides a useful public statement of the values perceived to be acceptable that were operating in the late 1970s.

There is an interesting continuum in the values of the Secretaries of the 1945 (9) and 1979 Management Panels. Both used the assumed perceptions of a contrast between appropriate remunerations of University and 'rising 5s' teachers. They both defended, by choice of extreme examples, Burnham Reports that employ the same basis for differentials. The presumed judgment is that the actual sharp contrast between the remuneration of University Professors and Nursery Teachers justifies a much more obviously discriminatory remuneration for a much more obviously similar workload, that of the Head of a middle school and of a sixth form college. The rhetoric is legitimate, but it obscures the fact that the differential expresses a cultural assumption of the relative values of the contrasted teachers. A different culture could, equally validly, reverse the differentials.

In the same year as the above exchange of views (1979) in the educational press, Sir William Pile, former Permanent Secretary at the Department of Education and Science, was describing non-advanced Further Education as one of the two sectors of the educational service - nursery education was the other - that had advanced least in the period of post-war expansion.

"A systematic nation-wide scheme of part-time attendance at Colleges for all those under 18 who are not in school is the only major objective of the 1944 Act that has proved unattainable ... The only judgment must be that the results remain unsatisfactory ... When 40% of boys and girls leave school with no qualifications and have no further contact with either education or training, it is clear that this is an area to which priority must be given ...". (10)

Sir William Pile's concern was widely shared.

In the same year and with the same concern, the Government issued three separate consultative papers - 16-18: The Education and Training of 16-18 Year Olds, Providing Educational Opportunities for 16-18 Year Olds and A Better Start in Working Life. (11) The Council of Local Education Authorities (CLEA)

"approached the Government with the suggestion that together they should form a joint group to consider the problems faced by local education authorities in providing for 16-19 years olds". (12)

Thus local and central government providers demonstrated, and acted on, the same concerns as Sir William Pile's. The joint group under Neil Macfarlane worked between Autumn 1979 and December 1980 on the issue of educational provision for 16-19 year olds.

Additionally, the Central Policy Review Staff's 1980 Report, Education, Training and Industrial Performance, included recommendations on 16-19 education. Regarding policy towards the overlap between schools and FE Colleges for the 16-19 age group, the Report recommended that:

"attention be given to the scope for rationalisation of small sixth form courses, to the need to remove anomalies between teachers and FE Lecturers' pay ... and [to] the advantages of a break between schools and sixth form colleges". (13)

On the last point the Report stated:

"Even where tertiary colleges combining FE Colleges and sixth form provision are impracticable, there is gain in setting up separate sixth form colleges. This way the 11-16 school has no vested interest in diverting children towards academic courses rather than vocational ones and the natural inertia which leads people to stay in the same institution would be broken". (14)

The 'vested interest' of the 11-18 school which the Central Policy Review Staff notes corresponds to Dennison's inference that it is the existence of the 11-18 school that impairs LEAs' scope for rationalising 16-19 provision.

It should be emphasised that the identification of undoubted vested interests does not mean that the proponents of 11-18 schools were merely protecting their own interests in resisting a 'break at 16'. Sixth form or tertiary college reorganisation will mean that heads of 11-18 schools will lose their sixth forms - the 'break at 16' - and thus the source of additional promoted posts for the school and salary for the head. It does, however, illustrate clearly that there is an intrinsic

association of self-interest with educational values for those schoolteacher associations that protest, on educational grounds, at 16-19 reorganisation proposals.

King provides a powerful description of the centrality of the concept of the 11-18 school as a community (15) to the English educational tradition, and how its supporters denigrate the more limited cohesion of the Technical College

"Where they [the students] need only to attend lectures ... Education needs to concentrate principally on the problems of living together in a community as well as the liquidation of ignorance". (16)

However, his attempts to represent fairly the altruistic and disinterested motives of the proponents of the integrated sixth form within the 11-18 school precedes an analysis of precisely those same vested interests that Dennison and the Central Policy Review Staff have also highlighted.

King noted, additionally, the need for a process to unmask "covert intentions". (17) Certainly the head teachers and staffs of 11-18 schools lose disproportionately when the schools lose their sixth forms. Perhaps only interviews with that statistically-minute proportion of ex-11-18 head teachers who are now heads of 11-16 schools might provide the mechanism to disentangle the disinterested principles from self-interest. However, the Secondary Heads Association (SHA) provided some useful data on this issue in its 1979 survey of 16-19

provision: of 170 heads of 11-16 schools, the majority were satisfied that their schools had not suffered as a result of their lack of sixth forms. (18)

The Open University's The Politics of Educational Policy-Making has provided a useful discussion on the difficulties of distinguishing between the 'sectional' and 'promotional' interests of any pressure group which helps to illuminate the 'self-interest' from the altruistic or disinterested concerns. While "sectional groups aim to protect and advance the collective interests of their members (a section of society), promotional groups ... advocate some more altruistic (promotional) cause". (19) The Unit notes that the Society of Teachers Opposed to Physical Punishment (STOPP) provides a relatively clear example of a 'promotional' group: STOPP members would not benefit personally from achieving their aim of the Society. Even this example does not provide an absolute discriminator as between the concepts of sectional and promotional. STOPP members would benefit by not being required to perform disciplinary acts of which they did not approve. However, there is a clear difference between the two concepts in that they occupy the extreme ends of the spectrum of interest and disinterest which includes them both.

The Unit summarises the inter-changes between the members of the House of Commons Expenditure Committee and

representatives of the National Union of Teachers (NUT) and the National Association of Schoolmasters/Union of Women Teachers (NAS/UWT) on the issue of whether their organisations had ever found the functions of professional association and trade union in conflict. NUT and NAS/UWT were clear that there was no issue: since they claim, properly, that they perform both functions, perhaps they could hardly have been expected to state publicly that those functions might ever be in conflict.

However, there is a real issue which those whose work involves the evaluation of the promotional cases of sectional pressure groups should always keep in mind. The research concerns the perceptions of the LEAs and government, rather than the views of head teachers of 11-18 schools, on the educational issues of the 'break at 16', and on tertiary provision, for the 1980s. It is essential to draw attention, at this early point in the exploration of values implicit in the Macfarlane Review, to the fact that some of those representatives of the LEAs and government may have interpreted the sectional stances of individual teachers and of teachers' professional organisations as promotional.

King's analysis of the 'school-as-community' and the 'technical college-as-association', provides an explanation for Pile's concern - precisely why non-advanced Further Education has received such low priority:

"The idea of educational organisations as communities is very strong in England. For those who hold it, it is thought to be natural and the best; the Technical College model receives less approbation - a second class model for a second class institution ... Each form of post-16 education has an associated ideology which is used to justify and to defend it. These ideologies are held and propagated by individuals and, more particularly, groups associated with different organisational forms". (20)

Whether or not each form of post-16 education has an associated ideology, it is certainly true that the proponents of the 11-18 school have pressed the concept of the 'school-as-community' in their attempts to resist any break at 16, and that technical colleges have prided themselves upon providing the 'second chance' route.

King's categorisation of the 'school-as-community' and the technical college-as-association is given a fascinating corroboration in the National Association of Schoolmasters' Committee for Technical Education, Educational Objectives in Further Education. The paper argues that further education institutions have four inherent disadvantages as far as providing a liberal education for their students is concerned:

"In the first place, the college community is divided by conditions of attendance, only a minority attending full time ... This makes it difficult to acquire a sense of partnership in the college community, and without a feeling of 'belonging' a full liberal education cannot be enjoyed". (p4)

That judgment, from a teachers' Association not noted for over-liberal views, is categorical, and reflects the assumptions of professional educators of the 1960s.

It took the crisis in youth unemployment of the late

1970s and the examination of why the 16+ were not choosing to stay on for a full-time education, to start to shake the professional assumption that belonging to the full-time education community and a liberal education was necessarily appropriate for the whole age cohort.

What is critical for the shape of 16-19 education provision is that the technical college form of post-16 provision has suffered in public esteem merely by virtue of the existence of the sixth form. Quite simply, sixth forms in schools have had a higher cultural profile than have technical colleges.

In setting the Macfarlane Report in its historical context, it should be noted that Crowther's concern that in the late 1950s the sixth form acted as (merely) processor of

"an academic elite for higher education and high-status occupations ... through the intensive study of a few subjects. (21)

was justified, too, for the late 1970s. The issue of the differentiated provision of post-compulsory education as between the professional and the academic, and the vocational and the technical, had been on the agenda since the 1940s.

The problem that Crowther faced in 1959 and Macfarlane wrestled with in 1979 and 1980 was, quite simply, a result of a 16-19 provision which included (at least) two distinct types of providing institutions, the sixth form

on the one hand and the further education or technical college on the other. Further, by the time of the Macfarlane Review, there were added the sixth form college and the tertiary college.

Each of the two forms of provision, schools and sixth form colleges under Schools Regulations and technical and tertiary colleges under FE Regulations, were presumed to have a distinct ethos, and the ethos of the sixth form and the sixth form college was presumed to be that of the more academic. As with grammar, technical and secondary modern schools, most parents wanted their children to experience the ethos of the higher status establishment. In one sense at least, the issue of the differentiated 16+ provision of the late 1970s mirrored the issues of the selective secondary provision of the first post-war decades.

There is a tendency for participants to regard whatever system they are operating in as inevitable. However, it is not self-evident that sixth forms and Technical Colleges should have co-existed as competing providers for 16 plus full-time education. Indeed, Alexander's 1944 (22) and 1969 (23) proposals would have led to a universal system of 'junior' colleges that provided all post-16 general education and vocational provision.

Had Alexander's 1969 proposals been adopted, the Macfarlane Review Group would not have been struggling

with the implicit competition between sixth forms, technical and tertiary colleges a decade later in its attempt to address the problems of the predicted demographic decline which would make many remaining sixth forms educationally-unviable, the comparatively low participation rate in post-compulsory education, and reduced public expenditure.

However, in 1980 there were still serious reservations about the passing of the sixth form from the English educational landscape. Disinterested assessors might have perceived some connection between the concerns of the Macfarlane Review Group and the activity of sectional interest groups, eg the sixth form lobby. It is significant that the consensus of the Group became distorted, at a very late stage, by the pressure from the proponents of the 'integrated sixth form' ie the 11-18 school with sixth form.

The effectiveness of the 11-18 lobby suggests that something rather more than the power of vested interests and, rather, that a cultural priority was active. Indeed, the issues that the Macfarlane Group considered, and the late 'putsch', provide some indication of why Alexander's proposed junior colleges had and have not been universally adopted.

At the end of this introduction, it is important to recognise that the Burnham Reports for School Teachers

and FE Lecturers have differing bases which do not cohere as far as 16-19 provision is concerned. John Bevan expressed the difference succinctly:

"A strong contrast between schools' and FE's 16-19 provision is that in the schools' sixth form the pupils doing 'A' levels, 'O' level repeats and CSE/CEE will all count the same towards a school's unit total, whereas in FE the three kinds of students have different values for the college's unit total: in schools it is age-weighting, regardless of academic level; in FE it is academic weighting, regardless of the age of the student". (24)

Both 11-18 schools and FE Colleges will have some incentive towards providing for 16-19 year olds. However, the 11-18 school has a much stronger incentive.

The existence of a sixth form is popularly regarded as a proxy for academic quality, but the sixth form also has practical benefits for the 11-18 school, or sixth form college. The school gains higher age-weighted points for its 16 plus students than for those of compulsory schooling age whatsoever courses are studied. At the same time, the incentives of the FE College are to increase its proportion of students on only the more academic courses such as 'A' level and university-equivalent courses.

Would schools have pressed for the Certificate of Extended Education (CEE), a version of the CSE for 16 plus students, had the Burnham Report for schoolteachers not weighted all 16 plus students so - relatively - highly? (25) It is a nice conjecture. However, King's work and the analysis of material which follows on the

Macfarlane deliberations would indicate that, notwithstanding salary incentives, the proponents of the 'school-as-community' would have still attempted to press for a longer exposure to the presumed benefits of a liberal education in school for the 16 plus age group.

The 'sectional' interest of the 11-18 schools lobby has a nice symmetry with the 'promotional' case for pastoral care for the adolescent. The issue of the pastoral care of the adolescent will arise as an issue in the context of the Macfarlane Review.

Perhaps it is worth re-emphasising at this point that the incentives of the Burnham FE salary structure, and all other facets of the FE system, will encourage FE colleges to increase their degree and degree-equivalent work, at the expense of 16-19 provision if necessary.

CHAPTER 8: THE MACFARLANE REPORT

The terms of reference for the Macfarlane Group, established in 1979 at the request of the local authority Associations working jointly through the Council of Local Education Authorities (CLEA), were:

"To review the educational provision made by LEAs for the 16-19 age group in England and Wales, with due regard to factors affecting the demand for this type of provision and to the impact of related types of provision; and to report to the Government and the LEA Associations. Within this general remit:

- (a) to take account of the effect on the demand for various types of education of:
 - (i) the expectations of young people and their families;
 - (ii) the perceived requirements of employers and industrial training boards;
 - (iii) expected technological change and levels of economic activity;
 - (iv) co-existent training and apprenticeship provision;
 - (v) known demographic trends to the mid-1990s;
 - (vi) geographically and socially disparate rates of participation in 16+ education;
 - (vii) the financial policies of central and local government;
- (b) to consider, from the point of view of the providers of education, the relationship between education and training agencies;
- (c) to examine the relationship between schools and further education, and in this connection:
 - (i) the compatibility of the legislative framework associated with the sectoral divisions in education; school and college structures, articles of government;
 - (ii) manpower;
 - (iii) LEAs' allocation of resources to secondary and further education;

- (iv) provision of systematic vocational guidance, careers education and information;
- (v) to survey work already done by LEAs and groups of LEAs in rationalising 16-19 education and to assess the evidence of cost-effectiveness of existing provision". (26)

With that comprehensive brief, CLEA's 12 July 1979 meeting agreed to the establishment of a DES/Welsh Office/LEA Group to review educational provision for 16-19 year olds.

The Review was conducted at two levels, Ministerial and Officer. The Sixteen to Nineteen Education Officers' Group (SNE(O)) under Messrs Bird and Walker from the Department of Education and Science included representatives from four Counties, three Metropolitan Districts, one London Borough, ILEA and the Welsh Joint Education Committee (WJEC). The Officers' Group's Secretariat included the Under Secretaries (Education) from both local authority Associations and the Department. The Officers' Group included, additionally, representatives from other government departments, including the MSC.

The Officers' Group responded to requests for briefing and forwarded their reports to the political level of the Minister's Group which was chaired by Neil Macfarlane, Parliamentary Under Secretary of State at the DES. The Sixteen to Nineteen [Minister's] Group (SNE(M)) included leading elected members of the Association of

County Councils (ACC), the Association of Metropolitan Authorities (AMA) and the Welsh Joint Education Committee (WJEC), some CEO advisers to both Associations' Education Committees and senior staff from the DES and Welsh Office. Essentially, the Officers' Group acted as a source of technical expertise and advice to the Ministerial Group on the detail of 16-19 issues. A high proportion of the officers were also involved in Burnham negotiations.

At this point, it should be noted that the brief of the Macfarlane Group was not, in any respect, fulfilled on the second of the three areas for attention, viz "to consider, from the point of the providers of education, the relationships between education and training agencies". Notwithstanding the inclusion of Manpower Services Commission staff within the Officers' Group, there appeared to be a deliberate avoidance of the contentious issue of MSC-funded activity, certainly by the MSC officers and, perhaps, by DES staff, within the local 16-19 provision. The pressure of Councillor Horton, AMA representative, to open that Pandora's box was frustrated by various technical devices. However, the Macfarlane Group's third brief - the relationships between schools and further education - provided sufficient tension in itself.

The Report's Recommendations

The Macfarlane Report was published, a little later than had been intended (since it was officially dated '1980') on 26 January 1981. Briefly, it reviewed the problems of the 16-19 demographic decline - about 30% on average, but up to 50% in some areas, from 1982 to 1994 - and of the low 'age participation rate'. Its clear message was that:

"There are indeed powerful arguments in favour of educating 16-19 in fairly large groups, and [we] are clear that a scatter of small sixth forms offering an inadequate range of options at high cost must wherever possible be avoided. In some areas, sixth form or tertiary colleges may be the best solution both educationally and financially". (27)

The Report ended with the unequivocal statement:

"We are convinced ... that 16-19 provision needs to be examined carefully, area by area, by individual authorities, in terms of the range and quality of opportunity offered to young people and the ways in which they are guided to the choices that will affect them for the rest of their lives". (28)

LEAs were thereby given a clear brief to review their 16-19 provision and some indication that government would give sympathetic consideration to any reorganisation proposals involving the removal of small sixth forms.

To achieve such simple conclusions, and explicit recommendations for LEA action, the Macfarlane Groups had considered a veritable encyclopaedia of all facets relevant to the provision of 16-19 education: the administrative and legal framework (statutory arrangements, local authority structures, charges in further education, central government funding (the block

grant), examining and validating bodies, training agencies, articles of Government, part-time attendance in schools and sixth form colleges, capital expenditure and accommodation), the differences between schoolteachers and FE Lecturers pay and other conditions of service, and the issue of qualified teacher status for FE Lecturers.

The areas listed above are covered in paragraphs 52-79 of the Report, and are listed here to demonstrate that the approach of the Macfarlane Group was not simplistic: there had been a consideration of, and report upon, the significant areas affecting LEAs' 16-19 provision.

Further, the Report provided a summary on the 'effectiveness and costs' of the various forms of 16-19 provision - the integrated sixth form (paras 84-6), co-operative arrangements as between contiguous sixth forms and/or FE Colleges (paras 87-8), co-existence of 11-18 and 11 or 12 to 16 schools (para 89), the sixth form college (para 91-3), and the tertiary college (para 94). There was also a section on Further Education Colleges (paras 95-6), which coexist with all forms of 16-19 provision noted above, and a section on the effects of a break at 16 on 11 or 12 to 18 schools.

The above paragraphs would appear to describe a thorough review of both the contextual constraints upon 16-19 provision and, additionally, the advantages and disadvantages of each form of that same provision. The

Report also closed with clear advice to LEAs on action to be taken. In the light of that clear execution of its brief, the antagonism of the reception afforded the Report was curious.

The Report's Reception

It should first be noted that the Report was eagerly awaited. A number of LEAs had suspended their own 16-19 reviews so as to take account of the recommendations of the forthcoming Report. Further, the sectional interests of most of the professional teachers' associations were involved.

Less than a month after the press launching of the Report, the Secondary Heads Association (SHA) was reported as pressing for the Report's withdrawal: the Report was too much in favour of concentration, and had overlooked 'one of the most promising models for falling rolls - the community school, extending part-time and adult education and giving young people a view of life-long education before they left school'. SHA was concerned at the proposal that LEAs should tighten their control over the school curriculum. (29)

SHA did not make clear why those then choosing to leave school at the earliest age possible according to the law of the land should wish, under SHA's model, to return for part-time education: indeed the later discussion on part-time schooling for 16 plus suggests

that an interest in retaining healthy enrolments ran counter to both the belief in the intrinsic value of a full-time 16-19 education, and to the distaste for the 'marginal' educational experience of the part-time experience of further education.

That said, SHA was representative of a majority of secondary heads, one of the 'interested parties', and such a prompt request for the withdrawal of the Report from that professional Association would indicate that the apparently-mild proposals of the Report touched a raw nerve of that particular interest group.

The Report had recommended that the 1945 model articles of government for schools might be revised to

"require Governing Bodies to exercise their powers within the framework of the policies adopted by an authority and subject to any directions it might give for their implementation". (30)

While there was no explicit reference to the curriculum in the above recommendation, the danger perceived by SHA was that of a challenge to the de facto autonomy of the school to offer whatsoever courses head teachers authorised. It is a nice irony of the 1980s that, under the 1987 Education 'Reform' Bill, the Secretary of State is now intending to take for himself those powers that SHA feared LEAs or governing bodies might exercise.

The statutory position for both schools and FE Colleges is that the individual institution determines its

curriculum within the LEA's overall strategic plan for the locality. (31) Traditionally, LEAs have exercised a course approval system over FE college courses but not over those at school, the potential scope in the latter being more restricted. The issue of the autonomy of the school will be considered later.

SHA was alone in criticising the Macfarlane Report for potentially invading too far the then current distribution of powers over the school curriculum. Most reactions were strongly critical that the Macfarlane Report did not go far enough in that, and other, areas. It has been compared adversely with the Crowther Report as:

"... an altogether meaner document ... Where the whole tone of the Crowther Report had been expansionist, Macfarlane's key notes were rationalisation, resource-management and cost-effectiveness". (32)

Of particular interest are the comments of officers whose LEAs had been involved at the Officer-level deliberations of the Review Group. Barry Taylor, CEO of Somerset, wrote:

"In a County served by three tertiary colleges ... as well as other FE Colleges, a sixth form college and all-through schools, the Macfarlane Report makes strange reading. Not because tertiary colleges are condemned or denigrated at the expense of the alternative, but because the obstacles to their establishment envisaged by the presenters of the Report - or those standing behind them - are so patently at variance with our own experience". (33)

Comish of Lancashire, another participating Authority, reinforces the point:

"Indeed, there are those who would have welcomed a stronger lead from Macfarlane [a point of particular interest in the consideration below of the later stages of SNE(M)'s activities] ... but the major disappointment ... is on the question of the institutional basis of 16-19 provision. The report is not merely inconclusive but somehow manages to be so splendidly even-handed that 16-19 educators of all persuasions can find something to endorse their particular prejudices. Concentration of 16-19 students is applauded but small sixth forms are also given a pat on the back. Running a small sixth form puts undue pressure on the staffing of 11-18 schools; but, it is said, HMI have found staffing problems in the 11-16 schools". (34)

These criticisms of the Macfarlane Report have special significance since both Taylor and Comish had some first-hand comparative experience of the actual 'effectiveness and costs' of the various forms of 16-19 provision. Both Somerset and Lancashire were unusual in that they then contained some tertiary colleges, but also maintained sixth forms and sixth form colleges.

The 'effectiveness and costs' (paras 80-98) sections of the Macfarlane Report, which purported to describe the advantages and disadvantages of various forms of 16+ organisations, do not quote any evidence on effectiveness and costs - apart from a passing reference to NFER's objective survey of 16 plus provision (35) - in spite of the fact that holders of that evidence were available as part of the technical support to the Ministerial Group; rather, the "splendidly even-handed" treatment of the variety of 16-19 providers reads as though the paragraphs were designed to be even-handed. The Macfarlane Report's lack of reference to even the little available evidence

that existed on effectiveness and costs of the various types of 16+ providing institutions made the Report somewhat banal to those hoping for a lead from Government.

Six years later, the Report is still "utterly disappointing [in that] so many intelligent people spent so much time to achieve so little". (36) It is clear from the fact that the above criticisms contradicted each other that significantly differing hopes and expectations had been aroused by the Review.

Reports of Political Tensions

It is important to note here the political tensions which came to light during the last few months of 1980 before the Macfarlane Report appeared.

The critics who considered the Report insufficiently radical had been anticipating something more along the lines of the Chairman's comments, reported in October, three months before the Report was published:

"The end of the traditional sixth form is in sight ... The Macfarlane Report ... would mark the greatest shift in the education service since the war ...". (37)

However, the following week the same journal, Education, reported that Mrs Angela Rumbold, Chairman of CLEA and member of SNE(M), was pressing for the retention of that same traditional sixth form:

"... I don't think children have changed that much in recent years. They think they prefer a college of further education and giving up school uniform

and so on. But sometimes they make a mistake. There are many children who need the security of a school sixth form to grow through those rather difficult years. Some children would like tertiary colleges, but not for all children, please". (38)

The more recent press report is interesting on three counts. Most obviously it is noteworthy because Mrs Rumbold had been a participant within the Ministerial Group, yet chose a public platform to press a view that was central to the Ministerial Group's agenda, only eight weeks before the Report was due to be published. She was also Chairman of the Education Committee of Kingston Upon Thames, one of the very few LEAs still committed to secondary selection.

Second, the issue she highlighted is that of the appropriate institution for 16-19 year olds and is not concerned with the content of their educational experience.

Third, the use of the terms 'children' and 'security' suggests a hitherto unnoted facet in the 16-19 debate, an antithesis between the 11-18 school and the FE or tertiary college of dependency on the one hand, and personal autonomy of the 16+ student on the other. The ethos of the former is one where the 16-19 year old is still dependent on the wisdom and care of the staff; the ethos of the latter pre-supposes student autonomy within a 16+ institution where the principal exercises less absolute autonomy than heads of sixth form colleges or 11-18 schools conventionally enjoy. These two concepts

of dependency and autonomy are compatible with, but not identical to, King's 'school-as-community' and 'FE College-as-association'.

By November 1980 both Education and the Times Educational Supplement carried major stories on the Ministerial Group's activities. Education reported a Ministerial split between Lady Young, Minister of State, and Dr Rhodes Boyson on the one hand and the Secretary of State, Mark Carlisle and Neil Macfarlane on the other. The former Group

"object to the tertiary basis of the Report and want it further watered down - possibly even beyond the re-writing asked for at Monday's meeting; [the latter grouping] was said to believe that the report should be strengthened rather than weakened and the establishment of sixth form colleges as centres of excellence encouraged". (39)

The Times Educational Supplement devoted its Leader to the reported disunity among Ministers:

"The Macfarlane report will not now appear until next year ... because of a rear-guard action by the defenders of the traditional sixth forms who felt that it was in danger of coming down too strongly on the side of the tertiary colleges and a break at the age of 16. It seems that Lady Young and Dr Rhodes Boyson have reinforced the traditionalists who reckon they can count on Mrs Thatcher's sympathy also - against the Further Education solution ... [by way of explanation of the latest turn of events] ... it is not possible to spend 80 or 90 years making the academic sixth form the jewel in the crown of secondary education without creating a professional presumption that every secondary school should have one ... But potent as these academic instincts may be, there remain the uncomfortable statistics about the size of the sixth form collected by the DES for Mrs Williams when she looked into this in 1977 ... Everything points to the tertiary solution, making use of the flexibility of the Further Education system ...". (40)

This was unambiguous and direct, as was the leader's final sentence:

"It was always on the cards that a committee of insiders would be nobbled by those with a vested interest in the status quo. It is to be hoped that the report, when it appears, will prove the critics wrong, but the present omens do not look promising". (41)

A fortnight later, Education reported rifts between Councillors Merridale and Lawton of Hampshire and Kent respectively, the former favouring tertiary and sixth form colleges and the latter 'a die-hard defender' of school sixth forms. (42) Those reports of dissension appeared when the final draft of the report was to be considered in the following week.

The Official Record - Late Revisions

Press reports represented informed public conjecture. The minutes of the Officers' and Ministerial Groups confirmed the press reports. The Ministerial Group on 21 October 1980 had welcomed the "thrust and style" of the draft of the final report, (43) and the final meeting had been booked for 17 November.

The minutes of the Officers' Groups' ninth meeting on 31 October 1980 had described a general agreement on refinements of a 27 October 1980 redraft as reflecting the 21 October discussions. Whilst there was a record that, in the "effectiveness and costs" section, 'care should be taken to avoid appearing to be biased against the 11-18 school' (44), that refinement represented but

one of a number of apparently uncontentious modifications to be made following the Ministerial Group's discussions. Up to the end of October 1980, then, the minutes of both Officers' and Ministers' Groups indicated a smooth move to the planned (1980) publication date within a broadly-agreed consensus that had operated for over a year of very detailed deliberation.

There were fundamental shifts in position at the Ministerial Group's meeting on 17 November 1980. The 'thrust and style' of the 27 October re-draft were no longer welcome, and the Officers' Group were required to redraft again according to a new principle:

"The impression should not be given, even accidentally, that except in special circumstances a break at 16 was preferred". (45)

The section on "effectiveness and costs" was, at that stage, a discussion on the educational and economic arguments favouring larger teaching group sizes than could be were sustained in small sixth forms and, therefore, broadly, favourable to a break at 16. That whole section

"should be revised so as to reflect the advantages and disadvantages of each form of organisation".(46)

Thus, the 'splendidly even-handed' treatment of the institutional basis of 16-19 provision that Comish had derided was deliberate, and the commentary of 21 November 1980 Times Educational Supplement editorial entirely apposite.

The Ministerial Group met again on 9 December 1980 to consider a further (1 December) revision to the draft report. Members' attention was drawn to significant re-writing of the Foreword, the required revision to the section on effectiveness and costs and the Conclusion. A succinct summary of the differences between the 27 October and 1 December versions of the draft report was provided. The minutes of the meeting record the views of one participant who noted that, whilst feeling

"... that institutional options should be left more open [than in the 27 October version], the balance appeared to have tilted too far in the direction of the sixth form [in that of the 1 December]. The framework of the report had suffered in consequence". (47)

The Ministerial Group was clear that the report should say something about the types of institutional provision, and believed that the issues should not be presented as a debate between the relative merits of the sixth form versus a separate post-16 provision:

"A balanced appraisal was essential... Many authorities, however, were hoping for a lead, (author's emphasis) and some, especially in metropolitan districts, were looking for help in presenting locally the case for some form of institutional change". (47)

With these conflicting priorities, the Ministerial Group agreed to preface the 1 December version on the "effectiveness and costs" section with the opening paragraphs of the earlier, 27 October version, and to use the original conclusion.

Thus there was a late attempt to undermine the consensus that had operated within the Ministerial Group until the

end of October 1980, but that attempt had been resisted. The final Report had retained the original conclusion - with its clarity - on both the need for LEAs to review, and keep under review, their 16-19 provision and the likely lack of educational or economic viability of 'a scatter of small sixth forms'. Tertiary or sixth form colleges were commended. The essential original messages of the Macfarlane Group had been retained. While the body of the Report retained the redrafted 1 December 1980 casuistry of the theoretical advantages and disadvantages of the different modes of institutional provision (paras 84-6 inclusive of the Macfarlane Report), the conclusion - a more significant position for any policy statement - had retained the original thrust that the Ministerial Group had welcomed in October 1980.

As further evidence of the survival of that October 1980 message, the Department of Education and Science's press release issued on the day that the Report was published stated:

"The Group concludes that because of the variety of local conditions there can be no situation which would be everywhere appropriate, but consider that educational considerations point strongly though not without exception to the concentration of 16-19 year olds and students into larger groups ..." (author's emphasis) (49)

That was the message of the section of the 27 October draft that had been replaced by the "effectiveness and costs" paragraph of the 1 December version and final report; the original intentions had been honoured.

Issues Highlighted by Revisions

A careful comparison of the versions of 27 October, 1 December, and the final Report revealed only a limited number of modifications. These are noted as evidence of what the members of the Ministerial Group considered to be critical issues and, where they differed from those arising from consultations with LEAs, described later, they deserve particular attention.

(i) Appropriate form of institution to meet 16+ needs

A "splendidly even-handed" effectiveness and costs section was substituted for the paragraphs that had provided cogent arguments for the conclusions, which (see above) were emphasised in both the published Report and in the Press Release. That choice of treatment of the information implied that the different types of 16+ institutions, each experiencing various problems and each providing some benefits, were equally suitable. However, by contrast with the descriptions of other post-16 institutions, the brief paragraph on tertiary colleges - para 94 - which had been introduced with revision of the effectiveness and costs section designed so as 'to reflect the advantages and disadvantages of each form of organisation' (50) - appears to treat the problems that sixth form colleges and FE colleges also experience as more significant for tertiary colleges.

(ii) Staying-On or 'Age Participation' Rates

The explicit October statement that a break at 16 would

have positive effects on staying-on rates was made more obliquely in para 95 of the December draft and appeared finally under a reference to the NFER research and HMI statistics under the sixth form college section in para 92. It would, however, be fair to note that those references are not drawn to the attention of the reader of the Report. Given the priority the Report paid in its early sections (paras 5-48) to the need to raise the age participation rate, this is noteworthy.

(iii) Small sixth forms

It is important to recall that one of the reasons for the Macfarlane Review was the concern that small sixth forms were neither educationally nor economically sound. The strong case against small sixth forms in para 93 of the October draft becomes the relatively milder message of para 86 of the final Report. An illustration of the modifications is provided in the Report where the statement:

"It seems to us that sixth forms will [author's emphasis] still be needed in the future, particularly in sparsely populated areas where large concentrations are impracticable ...". (51)

The October draft had been less categorical by virtue of a 'may' for 'will': the Report stated that sixth forms would continue to play a part in 16+ provision; the wording of the earlier draft had left the future of sixth forms open. However, the conclusion of the published Report did retain the original consensus against 'a scatter of small sixth forms'. (52)

(iv) Size of Teaching Groups

Para 96 of the original October draft had stated firmly:

"A major determinant of 16-19 teaching costs [author's emphasis] is teaching group size. Thus the educational case which we see for review of that aspect is reinforced by economic considerations. We believe that in general both kinds of consideration call for larger teaching group sizes in the future".

That message became the milder assertion of the published paragraph 82:

"We conclude that educational considerations point strongly though not without exception towards the concentration of 16-19 pupils and students into large groups".

Thus the published version referred only to educational considerations. The economic considerations were removed from the public arena - and, presumably, from the attention of LEAs who were clearly exhorted to review their 16-19 provision on educational grounds alone.

The Arthur Young, McClelland, Moore & Company Consultancy, who had been commissioned to derive a methodology that LEAs could use in costing their 16-19 provision, reported on the basis of discussions with seven LEAs with experience of various forms of 16+ organisations:

"None of the LEAs visited regarded cost as the most significant factor in determining the organisational structure for the education of 16-19 year olds. In general, they maintained that decisions are made primarily on educational grounds, and that costs flow from these decisions. Provided the costs then calculated are acceptable to the local authority, they play little further part in decision-making". (53)

Perhaps, then, the fact that economic considerations were dropped as a relevant factor for review of the size of

teaching groups was an acknowledgement of the reality of operation within those LEAs who had already executed some 16-19 rationalisations. The consultants had reinforced the political dimensions of the issue:

"... education is often a sensitive issue in local politics and talk of closing particular schools as a means of cost-cutting or saving tends to be unpopular". (54)

and, the consultants might have added, counter-productive. A local community may be persuaded to accept changes on the grounds that the educational provision for their young would be improved by so doing. An argument based on cost-cutting is interpreted locally as the locality suffering for the potential good of another area; parents tend not to see such arguments in other than parochial terms.

These four areas - appropriate 16+ institutions, staying on rates, small sixth forms and the size of teaching groups - constitute the total of the significant differences as between the October draft and the final Report. Essentially, the differences are of tone rather than content. Whilst the 1 December draft would have given a more muted message to LEAs, even that milder version did not radically amend the messages of the October draft. The press reports, however, had indicated quite fundamental differences between the members of the Ministerial Group. If indeed their differences were of a fundamental nature, the issues analysed above provide the best clues as to the content of those conflicts of judgement and priorities.

The lack of reference to available experience within the Group and to published statistics and research have been noted above. The Group had access, additionally, to the responses to three different consultations, and the evidence of the concerns of - inter alia - LEAs will now be noted, with particular reference where possible to the four issues noted above.

CHAPTER 9: CONSULTATIONS AND MACFARLANE RESPONSES

There is a fascinating contrast between the issues highlighted by the Macfarlane revisions and those noted by the providers when responding to the formal consultations of 1978-1980. The 1979 consultations were open to any interested party: those of 1978 and 1980 were directed to LEAs. The dissonance was not between the responses from the various constituencies, but between the gist of all the responses on the one hand and the responses of the Macfarlane Report to the feedback on the other. Simply, the Macfarlane Report did not respond to the articulated concerns of the service.

LEAs had responded to three separate consultations on their experiences and/or views on 16-19 provision in as many years. The two local authority Associations whose members had educational responsibilities, the Association of County Councils (ACC) and the Association of Metropolitan Authorities (AMA), had issued a joint consultation in 1978 stimulated by their membership of the Expenditure Steering Group (Education). ESG(E) was concerned about imminent falling rolls, and information public about sixth forms which were already vulnerable.

In 1979 the Government issued three separate consultative documents on areas central to 16-19 education and, finally, the Macfarlane Group authorised its own consultation in the light of the responses to the 1978 and 1979 consultations.

1978 Survey of LEAs

The 1978 survey invited LEAs to comment on:

- participation rates in schools and FE and the composition (ie as between A level and the 'new sixth formers' including Certificate in Extended Education (CEE) candidates);
- criteria of sixth form viability (ie minimum size of A level teaching groups in free-standing sixth forms, minimum numbers of A levels to support a sixth form, minimum size of teaching groups in minority subjects, etc);
- co-operation, rationalisation and reorganisation.

LEAs were invited to respond; there was no requirement to do so. In that context, it is fair to assume that the fact that 24 (of a potential 104) LEAs responded meant that the 1978 survey provided a substantial sample of views of at least those LEAs who were already seized by the issues.

The Ministerial Group received a report of the 1978 LAA Survey, Progress Towards Rationalising 16-19 Provision in October 1979. In the light of the issues highlighted above, certain paragraphs are reproduced.

"This reluctance of some member LEAs to answer very general questions provides an important insight into the difficulties faced by LEAs in any review of 16-19 provision. In 1978, many authorities were in the process of implementing approved schemes of comprehensive reorganisation. Schools with sixth forms have considerable pride, and other reasons for vested interest, in that form of organisation. There is covert, and sometimes overt, rivalry

between schools, and between schools and colleges. In these circumstances, it can be a major effort for an authority to achieve even a modest recognition of the problem by those concerned". (55)

"... Some felt that [co-operation, rationalisation and reorganisation were] quite impossible given the strength of entrenched interests ... Most recognised the need to associate schools and FE in this process, but were inhibited by a combination of rules and regulations and the traditional jealousies between the sectors". (56)

"In 1978, consultation and co-operation were seen as necessary ends in themselves, but a few respondents reported that the decline in numbers will cause this to be a means to a more radical concentration of 16+ in tertiary, sixth form or FE colleges, or 'mushroom' schools. Overall, however, there was little evidence that LEAs were planning major schemes of reorganisation however clearly they saw the bad effects of declining numbers on the standards of service given to 16-19 year olds (author's emphasis). (57)

Points of note here are the references, in the first and second quoted paragraphs, to vested interest in, specifically, sixth forms; the awareness of the deleterious effects of rivalry between competing 16+ institutions and, of later significance for the author, the reference in the first quoted paragraph to the then current implementation of approved comprehensive reorganisations. The reported judgment was that schools which had recently experienced the changes and traumas of adjustment from selection to comprehensivisation should not be expected to experience too immediately a further reorganisation.

It is worth noting that the assumptions of the educational world when proposing schemes of secondary reorganisation, and the leisurely approach adopted by the Department to those proposals, could not take account of

factors unique to the late 1970s - specifically, the unforeseen dramatic increase in the youth unemployment of the late 1970s, the Unified Vocational Preparation and Youth Opportunities Programme schemes, and the fact that an increasing proportion of 16+ would be encouraged to stay on at school for non-academic courses.

Crowther had warned of the changes needed to provide properly for the 'new sixth former', the non-academic young person choosing to stay at school after the age of compulsory attendance there: at the same time, the working assumption of those planning LEA provision in the early 1970s did not normally include an awareness of the later orthodoxies that 16+ resources in schools would be spread over a smaller number of students with a wider ability range and who would, therefore, be taking a more differentiated curriculum.

The quoted passages also demonstrate the need, acknowledged at the 9 December 1980 meeting of the Ministerial Group, that LEAs' experiences and responses to the Survey necessitated a national lead: the problems should not have had to be faced by LEAs standing alone.

1979 Consultations with All Interested Parties

In 1979, the educational world was consulted three times on areas concerning 16-19 provision - on Education and Training for 16-18 Year Olds (February 1979) (58); on

Providing Educational Opportunities for 16-18 Year Olds
(April 1979) (59); and on A Better Start in Working Life
(April 1979) (60). The Ministerial Group received a
report (61) on the responses to the three papers in May
1980.

The responses to the second consultation are most
directly relevant to this study, and are dealt with in
more detail below. The first and the third consultations
concerned the needs of the 16-19 age group in the context
of increasing youth unemployment and the lack of an
enforced system of compulsory day release. Broadly, they
foreshadowed the introduction in the early 1980s of the
two-year Youth Training Scheme (YTS) as a universal
'traineeship' for all 16-18 year olds not receiving
full-time education. It is worthy of note that, in the
section devoted to the responses of major 'educational
bodies' to the first document, the summary reads:

"moves should be made towards the development
of a universal scheme of education and training
opportunities ... Greater co-ordination is
needed between the education and training worlds
and, within education, between schools and FE
colleges". (62)

The Macfarlane Group Secretariat, as noted above,
certainly appeared to have worked to ensure that the
Group did not address the interface between separate
education and training provisions.

On the same first consultation it was reported that

"The ACC asks whether a unified tertiary system
for 16-18s would not be better than the present
overlapping systems of schools and FE". (63)

That response, and the fact it was highlighted in the report to the Ministerial Group, is particularly interesting in the light of the political tensions of the later activities of the Macfarlane Group.

The ACC had considered its response formally through its Education Committee and was therefore reporting the consensus of the views of County Councils who provide for about two-thirds of the population of England and Wales. Philip Merridale, supporter of separate sixth form and tertiary colleges, was Vice-Chairman of the ACC Education Committee and Alistair Lawton, reported as supporting the [11-18 school] sixth form lobby pressure, was Chairman of that same Committee: both were, additionally, Chairmen of Education Committees of substantial Counties, Hampshire and Kent respectively. The reported ACC response to the 1979 consultation demonstrates that the consensus within the Macfarlane Group towards rationalising small sixth forms in favour of sixth form or tertiary colleges had already been achieved within the representative body (ACC) of the majority providers of 16-19 education.

The agenda of Providing Educational Opportunities for 16-18 Year Olds, the second of the 1979 Consultative Papers, was nearly identical to that of the Macfarlane Group, and the summary of responses reported to the Macfarlane Group are therefore dealt with more fully (and the third is omitted as not pertinent to this study). The summary of the responses noted reports on 66 from a

potential 104 LEAs, and is therefore significantly more representative than the 1978 survey.

The summary included sections on the effect of

- examinations on young people and their families,
- perceived requirements of employers and Industrial Training Boards,
- expected technological changes and levels of economic activity.

Views on the co-existence of training and apprenticeship provision, on demographic trends to the mid-1990s, and on geographically and socially disparate rates of participation in post-compulsory education had been invited. On the last issue, it was reported:

"The emphasis on academic subjects in schools (ACC) is seen as a deterrent. It is also thought that school structures may have an effect. A move away from sixth form colleges and into consortia or centres is advocated by NUT and NAHT, and ACFHE link the move from sixth forms to a trend towards a longer educational life. The FEU sees new curricula approaches as a means of selectively increasing participation from lower socio-economic groups".(64)

There were further sections on the comments made on the financial policies of central and local government, the relationship between education and training agencies and the relationship between schools and FE.

The issue of the schools/FE relationship had generated the greatest volume of responses, and the summary below notes points which became particularly charged within the Macfarlane Group (author's emphasis throughout):

"There is universal agreement on the need for action to change the present position but prescriptions vary with the viewpoints of the respondents. One thing is clear: the issue of tertiary colleges is the central theme [and not the issue of a break at 16]. NATFHE and ACFHE are pro-tertiary for all (NATFHE moved from mild support in early 1979) APC and AVPC are also pro-tertiary (APC in favour of all post-16 education to be given to the FE Sub-Committees). ACC Education Committee favours a tertiary approach, but calls for DES research into the relative merits of tertiary systems, sixth form colleges and 11-18 schools.

"The Associations representing schools staff do not favour the tertiary system, and argue for collaboration between schools and FE colleges, and consortia of sixth forms as the best way to meet local needs and preserve availability of choice. However, both Surrey LEA and one Headteacher say that school autonomy has prevented or hindered attempts at collaboration. NAHT propose a universal application of consortia for 16-18s in both education and training institutions. NUT, NAS/UWT and SHA are in favour of schools providing part-time courses of various sorts - for adults, 16-19s in employment, vocational.

"There is widespread agreement on the need for changes in the legislative framework. The NUT, SHA and NATFHE, each from their different viewpoints, call for common regulations for the two [schools and FE] sectors. (65)

Finally, it was reported that on the issues of staff mobility between the two sectors, conditions of service and 'qualified teacher (QT) status', SHA would accept FE teachers who did not have that QT status to teach vocational courses in schools, and favoured comparable conditions of service as between schools and FE staff involved in teaching 16-19. The Regional Advisory Councils [consortia of LEAs established to co-ordinate advanced FE on a regional basis] and LEAs also supported comparable conditions of service for the two sectors. NUT opposed the use of FE teachers without QT status on schools' vocational courses. (66)

The Ministerial Group were therefore informed that two-thirds of LEAs and the representative bodies for schools and FE teachers agreed on the need for action, specifically for changes to the legislative framework; that the issue of tertiary colleges as the appropriate 16+ institution - and not the subordinate issue of a 'break at 16' where 11-18 schools lost their sixth forms to either sixth form or tertiary college - was central to more respondents; and that a substantial body of school teachers' organisations favoured a change in the regulations to permit schools to provide part-time courses for those over 16. The issue of the autonomy of the educational institutions, specifically schools, as an inhibitor of 16-19 review had also been placed firmly on the agenda of the Macfarlane Group.

1980 Survey of LEAs

In the light of the limited response to the 1978 survey the Ministerial Group had authorised a new survey, which was dispatched on 20 March 1980 for a response by 21 April 1980.

The survey made explicit that it was concerned with both the local factors and the local perceptions of the implications of those factors:

"One essential step in SNE(M)'s work is to survey the perceptions [author's emphasis] of LEAs about the form and scale of the problems they face in the 1980s, and to collect information on the progress being made in consideration of those problems". (67)

Questions were posed concerning LEAs' plans for the decline in numbers of those over the statutory leaving age, the nature of local participation rates in post-compulsory education and details of co-operative arrangements (if any) with neighbouring LEAs. Most significantly for this author's investigations, the fourth question asked,

"What are the principal barriers to the rationalisation of provision? What assistance might be given at national level and how do you feel the work of the Macfarlane Group could assist review of this important area?"

The responses of LEAs to this last question provide a unique source of data of the varying perceptions at a specific point in time on the then current problems of 16-19 provision, and provides a checklist for judging the final Report of the Macfarlane Report.

Earlier paragraphs have reported the general perception that the Macfarlane Report did not propose sufficient changes or provide a sufficiently clear lead to enable LEAs to meet the problems of 16-19 provision in the 80s and 90s. However, that 'general perception' represents the views of an informed minority. Journalists rarely contact LEAs through structured samples: they, understandably, concentrate on those whose Chief Officers are involved in the various national and negotiating and consultative bodies. The results of the 1980 survey provide a fairer base on which to evaluate the final Report.

The report of the 1980 survey to the Ministerial Group, LEAs Consideration of Provision for 16-19 Year Olds - The Report of a Survey by the Local Authority Associations, was based on 69 responses. A further 23 LEAs responded before the Report was finalised and these reinforced the messages already passed by those on whom the summary was based. The responses to the 1980 Survey have the additional virtue that respondents knew that their replies were to be considered within a major Review.

The 69 responses were analysed before the report to the Ministerial Group was referred to. Since the summary reported to the Group was found to provide a full and fair account of the responses to the survey, that summary is drawn upon fully.

The principal concerns of respondents were summarised as follows:

"Of the 69 respondent LEAs, and excluding those which already had a break at 16, only six expressed a determined view that they were not engaged (and some saw no reason ever to be so engaged) in considering some form of rationalisation".(para 4.6)

"From a number of written comments it was clear that some LEAs are trying co-operation between institutions [author's emphasis] as a first step and without much more detailed investigation it is impossible to say what might be done if that does not succeed. Overall the response reveals: widespread concern about how best to meet the educational needs of the 16-19 year olds as numbers decline; considerable movement towards the least disruptive forms of rationalisation; very many working parties and, in some LEAs, the first steps in a massive programme of consultation". (68)

Thus the Macfarlane concerns were central to the majority

of LEAs who, through working parties, were already involved in the normal preliminaries to the formulation of policy proposals for reorganisation strategies.

Principal Barriers to 16-19 review

The local authority Associations, the Secretariat to the 1980 Survey, reported that the six principal barriers to the 16-19 rationalisation, as perceived by 69 Chief Education Officers, were:-

- " (i) a commitment to the traditional roles of schools and FE colleges;
- (ii) the protection of institutional autonomy and in particular the scope for governors to frustrate attempts by the LEA to secure rationalisation between a number of institutions;
- (iii) rules, regulations, pay and other conditions of service;
- (iv) the attitudes of teaching staff, chiefly stemming from (ii) and (iii) above, but described in strong if understandable terms by CEOs as 'blinkerred' or 'self-interested'; such attitudes are, of course, exaggerated by the defensive posture of the principal unions;
- (v) an unwillingness to disrupt schools and whole parts of LEAs recently reorganised along comprehensive lines; many responses express concerned understanding of the problems facing schools as sixth forms decline or even fail to materialise but there is an overwhelming desire for stability on the part of parents and hence of elected members;
- (vi) the very strong and widely held criticism of what the official group has come to call the educational offering presently available to young people". (69)

Again, as with the 1978 survey, the issues of institutional autonomy, and the Regulations and

conditions of service come high on the list of problems that LEAs considered as principal inhibitors to 16-19 review. The 'self-interested' or 'blinkered' attitudes of the interested parties ((iv) above) relates to those issues King noted. The 'unwillingness to disrupt schools ... recently re-organised along comprehensives lines' was an unexpected reinforcement to the message of the 1978 survey. The issue of particularity, ie the implications of the specific moment for policy-making, will be considered in a later chapter.

The report of the 1980 survey noted LEA recommendations for Ministerial Group action according to a 'hierarchy of intervention' which, given the uniqueness of the survey, is worth reproducing relatively fully.

"There are those who seek a basic restructuring of the system and believe that SNE(M) [the Ministerial Group] should point the way to a break in educational provision at the end of statutory schooling; this view is represented by demands for a strong legislation-based initiative by central government. There is a wider preference for some sort of firm lead towards rationalisation, as one CEO put it 'not only to conserve resources but to preserve and possibly enhance student opportunity'. In its less radical form such a lead would represent a requirement for LEAs to review 16-19 provision and, at the top of the centralist hierarchy, that development plans should be prepared and submitted to the Secretary of State. The submission of development plans is not a necessary consequence of the requirement to review and SNE(M) may wish to consider that suggestion at a later date". (70)

"Among the more detailed legislative changes sought are the matters of rules, regulations and conditions of service to which the official group has already given a great deal of time. CEOs suggest that an interesting, if obvious, recommendation by SNE(M) might be that the Burnham pupil-weighting should be changed so that pupils aged 11-16 were given greater value at the expense of those over 16. There are loud and frequent pleas for LEAs to have greater

power to overrule governing bodies: 'some thought must be given at national level to those legal and administrative aspects of the education service which strengthen the institution at the expense of the authority and which can frustrate an authority's attempts to secure greater rationalisation'". (71)

"... Many LEAs want 'a clearer understanding of what should be available to 16+ students, so that local provision may be compared to it'. They seek a statement of aims, a curriculum which is available to all students regardless of their institutional base and a nationally validated 16+ examination which is both credible with employers and useful to pupils. Here LEAs are highly critical of the sectoral boundaries between schools and FE and seek one examination which looks like CEE as described by Keohane, added to the FE-type examination described in the Mansell Report and which is available both in schools and FE colleges". (72)

"At the very least LEAs want SNE(M) to change the climate of opinion towards 16-19 rationalisation. They believe that parents, teachers and the media need to understand 'the desirability indeed the inevitability of a flexible approach to 16+ organisation', hence they believe that SNE(M) should be engaged in 'generally tilling the ground to encourage receptiveness to local initiatives'. There is among many CEOs a clear belief that SNE(M) could greatly assist a campaign for the hearts and minds of the consumer of the education service, at the lowest level in order better to inform any over-passionate defence of institutional autonomy when course sharing is proposed". (73) [author's emphasis throughout]

Thus there was a clear message that LEAs were seriously considering 'breaks at 16' and wished for some firm national lead regarding the need to rationalise 16-19 provision: such a lead would be a valuable tool to reinforce LEAs already engaged in the preliminary - and, inevitably, disruptive - work on 16-19 review. Certain LEAs had recommended that the Burnham age weighting for schools should be revised to reduce the incentive for schools to increase their 16+ numbers.

Further, the powers of governing bodies, which acted to

reinforce institutional autonomy, were perceived as inhibitors of 16-19 reviews. Finally, LEAs pressed SNE(M) to change the climate of opinion towards 16-19 rationalisation.

Macfarlane Response to Issues Raised in Consultations

The responses to the various consultations had pointed to the need for action on the following 16-19 issues: changes in the statutory framework - ie amending the Schools Regulations, specifically to permit part-time schooling (ie part-time attendance of 16+ students); and a modification of the Burnham (Primary & Secondary) Report to reduce the age-weighting differential and, thereby, the incentive for schools to attempt to retain 16+ pupils when the pupils' interests might not be best served by so doing. From the LEAs there was clear pressure to reduce the de facto autonomy of the school over its curriculum.

Requests for non-statutory action included, first, the need to pass from the centre the message to all LEAs that 16+ review was desirable and, second, the need for central and local government to recognise that areas which had recently experienced re-organisation of their secondary schools needed further time before they should be submitted to 16+ re-organisation.

How did the Macfarlane Report respond to the requests for action? The issues will be taken in turn.

On the 'non-statutory' areas of concern, the Macfarlane Report was exemplary in its response to its constituents. The Report, taken as a whole, emphasised the need for all parts of the English and Welsh 16+ provision to be reviewed. At the same time, it acknowledged that there was no one perfect solution for the country as a whole, and that areas would differ as to their ability to move to an ideal solution.

On the response to the requests for statutory reform, however, the Macfarlane Report was less than helpful. Indeed, since the 'statutory framework' lies entirely within the remit of the providers - principally, the government consulting or responding to its employer partners within the LEAs - this area of (lack of) action may explain the general disenchantment with the Report. At this point, it should be noted that the paragraphs of the Report dealing with Articles of Government recommended review:

"Local education authorities must be able to secure compliance with policies designed to avoid unnecessary duplication of courses and teaching groups that are unduly small. We, therefore, consider that the 1945 model articles should be reviewed and that authorities may meanwhile wish to propose amendments to the articles of county secondary schools. Such amendments might require governing bodies to exercise their powers within the framework of policies adopted by an authority and subject to any directions it may give for their implementation ...". (74) [author's emphasis]

A nod is as good as a wink and, as noted above, SHA was early in condemning this proposed change in schools' de facto autonomy. Thus far, at least, the Macfarlane

message was unambiguous, and represented a clear response to the reported concerns of LEAs.

On the other proposals to amend the statutory framework, however, the Macfarlane Report achieved nothing. There were two facets - first, the review of Schools Regulations for pupils over the age of compulsory school attendance to permit part-time schooling and, second, the proposals to modify the Burnham (Primary & Secondary) Reports age-weightings.

The Macfarlane Report's recommendations on the age-weightings of the Burnham (Primary & Secondary) Report were unambiguous.

"We believe that the calculations which are involved need to be examined carefully with a view to avoiding the incentive in schools to increase the number of older pupils and, in further education, to give priority to post-'A' level courses. The aim should be to make the calculations neutral between sectors as regards the standing of similar courses ... Having reviewed this range of issues concerning pay and other conditions of service, we strongly recommend that negotiators in Burnham and other joint fora should seek to minimise the differences [as between schools and FE] within their field which exist at present and which can cause problems for authorities seeking to achieve closer inter-sectoral collaboration". (75)

Since the Ministerial Group included members of the Burnham Committees for Schoolteachers and FE salary negotiations, it is somewhat surprising that they appeared not to heed their own advice.

The later 1980s' review of the structure of schoolteachers' salaries did not include the full

adjustments which were initially proposed for a revision of the age-weightings and the Secretary of State imposed a salary settlement. Apparently early proposals to minimise the differentials were overtaken by issues of a higher political profile - a collegiate versus hierarchical kind of salary scale. At a late date, apparently, NAHT and SHA were invited to jointly produce recommendations on age-weighting whose financial implications would lie within the 'pay envelope' that were already included within the ACAS/Coventry proposals. In the event, these two head teacher associations could not agree. This, since they were representing members with significantly different interests over the age-weighting issue, is hardly surprising. The Macfarlane recommendations for structural reform of teachers' salaries were, therefore, ineffectual.

The Macfarlane Report did recommend a revision of Schools Regulations:

"... It would therefore not seem helpful to create separate regulations for 16-19 education, at least at this stage. Nevertheless, we believe that, when under the Education Act 1980 the existing Schools Regulations and Further Education Regulations are superseded by new regulations, it would be useful for them to bring together the features that are common to both sectors". (76)

That recommendation was clear.

The 1981 Statutory Instruments were marked by a lack of any changes that would implement any of the Macfarlane

Report's recommendations. The Education (Schools and Further Education) Regulations 1981 deal with, for schools, substances and apparatus involving health hazard, inspection of hostels, transitional exemption orders under the Sex Discrimination Act 1975, duration of school year and day, and leave of [pupil] absence for employment; and for FE, approval and discontinuance of advanced FE courses, restrictions on teacher-training courses; and co-ordination between LEAs. (77)

It is not clear what pressing needs of the education service were answered by the above changes to the Regulations. What is absolutely clear is that they did not deal, in any respect, with the service's perceived needs as articulated to the Macfarlane Group and, later, by that same Group in its Report.

Why had the 1981 Schools Regulations not included any modification of the prohibition on part-time schooling for 16+ students? The Macfarlane Report's clear recommendation was that, notwithstanding some contrary arguments:

"... the possible effects on the character of the school, perhaps affecting especially the position of younger pupils, and there is a risk that pupils might undertake courses which might be less useful to them than those which can only be provided effectively in colleges of further education ... Nevertheless, we think that there is a case for enabling authorities to provide part-time education in schools if they judge it appropriate in the light of their local circumstances". (78)

So, on balance, and in spite of some dangers, the Group

had concluded in favour of the possibility of part-time schooling for the 16+. This, indeed, had been the position of the two largest school teacher associations, NUT and NAS/UWT, and of the Secondary Heads Association (SHA). Why then had the Report's recommendation on this apparently uncontentious proposal not been executed through the 1981 revision of the Schools Regulations?

There are two different explanations, each with its own validity and neither mutually exclusive. The first is that the revision of the Schools and FE Regulations coincided with a time of undue legislative activity on the part of Departmental staff - the 1981 Education Act governing special education provision was a matter of contemporaneous activity with a very 'high profile' - and the reported divisions between Ministers as to the overall thrust of the Macfarlane Report could have led civil servants to give low priority to the execution of the one of its few firm recommendations that lay within central government's power to execute. According to this argument, the recommendation had dropped too low in the hierarchy of Ministerial interests and, therefore, in the administrative priorities of DES staff.

A second, alternative, explanation would complement the first. It is possible that the recommendation was not enacted at an unusually convenient time [ie when the Regulations were already under review as a result of the Education Act (1980)] because the recommendations

conflicted with a Departmental view - within the senior civil service or between Ministers, or both - and thus the lack of action was deliberate.

There is some evidence for the second explanation within the Macfarlane papers. The 30 January 1980 'Status Report', drafted by the Officer Group as a summary of progress on relevant issues for the Ministerial Group stated:

"It is already clear that the Official Group will recommend that the statutory bar on part-time tuition in schools be removed for pupils over the statutory age [of compulsory attendance at school]". (79)

but

"... while disposed to favour the relaxation of existing school attendance regulations to bring the school sector in line with existing FE regime, the Group wishes to identify clearly the legal impediments, how they might be overcome and the implications of so doing". (80)

The desired identification of the relevant legal issues was provided in a detailed paper, 'Legislative Provisions, Teachers' Pay and Other Conditions of Service'. The paper dealt first with the advantages of fully utilising [spare] space and teachers, and with the fact that several major teachers' associations supported a change. Then:

"Furthermore, by acting as a catalyst for other changes, part-time schooling could help to make the regime in schools less restrictive for [presumably, full-time] 16-19 year olds. On the other hand, the loss of communities of full-time participants might be regretted, [author's emphasis] and some students persuaded to undertake courses which might be less useful to them than those available in FE". (81)

The second reservation is understandable within the

widespread belief that the age-weighting provisions of the school teachers' salary report might be actively distorting student choice.

The first reservation, "the loss of communities of full-time participants", is more significant. It draws attention to the importance of 'school-as-community' composed of full-time scholars and its effect on the ethos of the school sixth form and sixth form college. It gives context to the concern about the potentially-adverse effect on the 'character of the school' (82) of part-time students who would have allegiances and loyalties outside the sixth form boundaries and beyond the authority of the head or principal.

King's critique of the schools sector as resisting potential threats to the 'closed system' of the school community is particularly apposite here, as is the Report of the Working Group of the Association of Principals of Sixth Form Colleges (APVIC) which appeared to regard the more multi-faceted loyalty of the FE student body and, in particular, that of its part-time students as inhibiting 'a corporate community ethos like that of a secondary school or sixth form college'. (83) It is worth noting the APVIC's Working Party appears to have worked solely on the basis of the advice of NATFHE's Handbook to (FE) College Management, and one would have been surprised if the Working Party would have given such similar credence to a Handbook for school management published by the

National Union of Teachers, had such a document existed.

It is nevertheless interesting that a Working Group of sixth form college principals, established as a result of the Macfarlane activity to explore the implications for sixth form colleges of tertiary re-organisation, should be reinforcing King's 1976 perception of 'school-as-community' and 'PE college-as-association'. However accurate APVIC's perceptions were for the 1980s, the fact that the 1981 revision of the schools Regulations did not follow the Macfarlane recommendations on part-time schooling meant that the dichotomy of role was thereby reinforced.

There is a nice irony in that the perceived dichotomy was clearly potent in reducing the possibility of modification of the Regulations to permit part-time schooling. Those who considered the dichotomy to be valid had sufficiently influenced those on the Macfarlane Group to stop that Group doing precisely what SHA, NUT and NAS/UWT had wished them to do.

The Ministerial Group's May 1980 paper, 'Legislative Provisions ...' had noted that schools were legally inhibited by Pupils' Registration Regulations 1956 and Schools' Regulations 1959 regarding registration, maximum daily instruction and leave of absence and while the current Regulations permitted a limited attendance of part-time students

"... the legal validity of these devices [ie young unemployed attending school on a part-time basis and other part-time attenders] is not beyond dispute [author's emphasis] Primary legislation would be needed to put LEAs' capacity beyond doubt and would be essential if it were expected to become wide-spread". (84)

It is interesting that the Macfarlane Report becomes very categorical on a matter viewed rather more open to the Group itself:

"Such [ie part-time schooling] provision is outside the scope [author's emphasis] of the Education Act 1944 and would run counter to current regulations ...". (85)

The motive of those who became so categorical could have been that of attempting to minimise the incentive of schools to divert their school leavers from more appropriate FE college course. The issue is, however, interesting since it demonstrates the potency of the normative over the factual.

The 'Legislative Provisions ...' paper dealt with a related issue, 'transfer to tertiary colleges below 16', that was not included in the published Report with all its caveats. The issue was simply that a 15 year old in advance of his peers could transfer to a sixth form college, which operates under schools regulations, while only in very exceptional circumstances would that 15 year old be permitted to transfer to the FE or tertiary college, both under FE regulations. Since tertiary colleges were intended to provide sixth form education for their areas, the spread of tertiary colleges was acting to highlight the logical nonsenses of this legal

discrimination as between sixth form college and tertiary college.

The 'Legislative Provisions ...' paper outlined the implications of potential change - the first sections argued essentially on the 'first breach in the dyke' principle that it might be difficult to contain early transfers to 15 year olds once a precedent had been set. The implication is that such a containment would be either difficult or undesirable or both. The paper described obstacles to changes within the law - first, that there would be a resistance to a lowering of the school leaving age

"which had been raised in the conviction that whatever their academic standing, young people would benefit from school up to the age set by law; [second] school teachers' associations would see it as exacerbating for schools the problems of falling rolls (though a negotiating link might be possible with the permitting of part-time education in schools for the over 16s); [and, third,] FE colleges and associations of FE teachers might be unwilling to accept students subject to compulsory attendance requirements". (86)

None of the arguments have much force.

The raising of the school leaving age had been determined at a time when a relatively lower proportion of full-time 16-19 year olds were attending FE colleges and, since then, the concept of a choice between schools and FE institutions had been pressed:

"On the other hand, some authorities were of the opinion that 'any thorough-going division of functions ... between sixth forms and FE would eliminate the element of choice [author's emphasis] for pupils as to the setting in which

they prefer to pursue post-sixteen studies ...
This element of choice is seen by many as being in
itself desirable". (87)

The rise in the perceived importance of choice has coincided with the threat to the sixth forms presented by falling rolls. For example, the Education Committee of Surrey County Council amended a comprehensive set of principles to govern its 16-19 provision. They inserted the phrase "maintaining some variety of establishments within each locality where this is possible and desirable" [to precede the officers' draft of

"in areas where more than one establishment may offer education for 16-19 year olds, ensuring that a clear relationship exists between such establishments, with defined responsibilities for course provision". (88)

How far the issue of choice of institution at 16+ provides an example of a covert agenda, or whether the issue merely illustrates the tension between sectional and promotional interests, will be considered later.

To return to the Officers' Group's advice on transfer before 16, the schoolteachers' associations would certainly have seen such change as multiplying their 'falling rolls' problems; however, whether the providers, the LEAs and government, should have been inhibited by such an argument is an open question.

The section of the 'Legislative Provisions ...' paper concludes with a recommendation that, if the Ministerial Group wished to pursue the issue of transfer to tertiary college for the under 16s, HM Inspectorate advice on the educational implications should be invited.

"In considering a possible change in the law, the Official Group would regard the ability of LEAs to plan the overall provision for their areas as of critical importance in view of the implications of changes listed in the paragraphs above". (89)

This was a curious avoidance from an increasingly important issue: the Department of Education and Science was, at that time, strongly resistant to proposals from those few LEAs who wished to revise their schemes of further education. The effect of the advice of the Official Group was to sink the issue of early transfer to tertiary or FE colleges below the Macfarlane agenda.

It was probably practical considerations that explain the lack of further consideration, or inclusion in the final Report, of this issue. No particular interest group was pressing for the resolution of the problem of early transfer to tertiary or FE colleges, while the Ministerial Group's agenda was already full with a large number of other issues which one interest group or another, or the providing LEAs, believed should be settled through the Macfarlane Review.

In summary, therefore, of the response of the Macfarlane Report to the issues articulated by LEAs and teachers' associations to the 16-19 consultations, it would be fair to say that the Report was over-cautious. The LEAs in particular had positively invited a relaxation of the legislative framework and more explicit support for 16-19 reorganisation. While the Report did press LEAs to review their 16-19 provision, it did not tackle firmly

enough those legislative inhibitors to review, and the Government singularly failed to act on the Macfarlane recommendations when the opportunity to revise the Schools Regulations was easily available. The problems remain. (90)

CHAPTER 10: EVALUATION OF THE MACFARLANE THEMES

The final section of this analysis of the 1980-81 review of 16-19 education provision seeks to highlight the educational values implicit in the processes of the Macfarlane Review and, then, to use the wider historical context of the post-war years to draw some conclusions regarding the values that have contributed to the scale and form of post-16 education and training provision.

The previous chapter has summarised how the Macfarlane Report responded to the issues articulated in the 1978, 1979 and 1980 consultations, and has noted the effect of some of the Macfarlane recommendations. Chapter 8 considered which issues the Ministerial Group considered of such importance as to warrant the substantive re-drafting at a very late stage in the Group's programmed activities - the appropriate institution for the education of 16-19 year olds; whether or not an institutional break at 16 threatened the validity of the education of the full-time academic 16 year old; and the educational and economic viability of small sixth forms.

Of these 'late redraft-worthy' issues, the second and third are subordinate to the first; they are concerned with issues that arise if and only if there had been a prior tendency to favour 11-18 schools with sixth forms. However, as was reported to the Ministerial Group, the (1979) consultation had highlighted the fact that the critical issue to the LEAs was that of provision via

tertiary colleges, as opposed to sixth form colleges or 11-18 schools with sixth forms (91): the LEAs had moved on from the position that the Ministerial Group perceived to be still the concern of the system.

It is clear that the Macfarlane Group was less than energised by the available evidence from published research, or the experience of LEA officers within the Officers' Group, or by the results of several consultations. Rather, the perceptions of the Ministerial Group were affected, late in the Review process, by a normative evaluation of the critical importance of sixth forms for schools to the academic and social validity of 16-19 education.

There is a nice parallel between the pro-sixth form advocacy of Spooner and Sutton, the first published soon after the Macfarlane Report was finally released, and the second five years later. In 1981, Bob Spooner explained the motivations of the early advocates of comprehensive schools. The priority, as he saw it, was for education

"... to be less socially-divisive ... We planned for large 12 form entry schools because we foresaw that a large base would be necessary for the development of varied sixth-form courses designed to suit diverse abilities ... We knew, even then, that the choice of institution mattered more than choice of subject, and that for many 16 year olds, the opportunities to extend their education of their own free will, would depend on the capacity of the schools they were in to cater for their needs". (92)

Spooner, like the Secondary Heads Association in its

response to the Macfarlane Report, assumed that sixth forms within 11-18 schools were the forms of organisation most likely to attract those who would otherwise leave as soon as school attendance was no longer compulsory: the factual basis of such a belief is obscure; there is no doubting Spooner's conviction or sincerity.

The same article contains the following statement on tertiary colleges:

"... which, no doubt, have some merit for those secure and mature enough at 16 to make a break [from school], but can hardly be regarded as a universal panacea". (93)

This commentary on the suitable clientele for the tertiary college - "those secure and mature enough at 16" implies the identified characteristics are not possessed by the normal 16 year old. It also contains echoes of the earlier quotation from Angela Rumbold which illuminated a hitherto unremarked dichotomy of, 'dependency' in the sixth form or sixth form college versus student 'autonomy' in the FE or tertiary college. Such a dichotomy would complement King's own analysis (94) that the opposition to tertiary colleges among 11-18 head teachers was related to the fact that 16-18 student choice would then lie outside the boundaries controlled by the heads of the schools.

There is a 'sectional' facet to Spooner's views. At the same time there is clearly an altruistic or 'promotional' dimension to Spooner's Canute defence against, in his

perception, the tertiary tide. There is no doubt that some educationalists still perceive 16 year-olds as too immature to choose wisely, and as such still necessarily dependent upon the wisdom of their teachers. This is not to argue that the view is valid but to note that, even for those for whom it may be true, delayed dependency may delay maturity.

In a much more recent polemic for the retention of the sixth form, John Sutton, Head of an 11-18 school and now General Secretary Designate of SHA, asserted:

"The headlong rush to set up tertiary colleges ... is based more upon the arguments of administrative convenience and supposed economic advantage than upon any serious analysis of educational grounds". (95)

Sutton's case was, essentially, that the sixth form which had contributed so much should not be thrown aside. Its endangered virtues were

"a high level of academic achievement and scholarship ... a sound basis for higher education and for recruitment into the professions, industry and business at the age of 18 ... [the provision for many young people] with an additional year of development [author's emphasis] and achievement between 16 and 17". (96)

Sutton described the endangered virtues of the sixth form within the 11-18 school - the quality and continuity of teaching for the 16-18 year olds; the quality of teaching in the main school; and the continuity of pastoral care. He presented the case for the 11-18 school, for 'no break at 16' on the basis of his own experience in Corby, Northamptonshire, of 11-18 school/FE college co-operation.

However, the 'endangered virtues' of the sixth form that Sutton described could be protected within a provision with a break at 16 where separate 11-16 and 16+ establishments permitted joint appointments. It is interesting to note that where LEAs considered such appointments (97) the opposition has come from the heads of educational establishments. However highly the head teachers' value Sutton's 'endangered virtues', it would seem that the virtues rate lower in their priorities than does the issue of the autonomy of head teachers to appoint, and direct, their staff.

The perception that the issue of the break at 16 is more about headteacher and principal autonomy than the nature of 16+ students' experience is reinforced by the response of Austin, now Chairman of the Tertiary Colleges Association, to Sutton's case. Austin noted Sutton's advocacy for the co-operation as between Corby's schools and colleges, then argued:

"If, in such arrangements, relationships are close, there would seem to be no reason to eschew the obvious step of confirming the closeness and making a single institution, with a single admissions policy, a single set of aims and objectives, and the opportunity of establishing parity of esteem for all students. If the relationship is not so close, it is clear that nothing has been achieved". (98)

Austin may, therefore, be considered to have countered at least a substantial part of Sutton's argument.

Sutton's arguments are shown to be related more to the working conditions of head teachers and staff than to

educational provision for 16-19 year olds. Again, King's analysis that a high proportion of the arguments for sixth forms are 'sectional' rather than 'promotional' proves apposite.

Finally, a recent article describing events of over a decade ago, and on a different tension between educational institutions, provides a more disinterested context for the arguments about the desirability (or not) of sixth forms. Bruce Lockhart, a retired head teacher of an independent school, described how his school's sixth form had moved from single-sex to co-educational. At an early stage he had consulted the heads of neighbouring girls' schools. Lockhart reported the substance of the head teachers' unambiguous opposition:

"Experience showed how they [the sixth form girls] needed quiet and seclusion to steer a safe course through the most difficult years of adolescence, and to make the best of the key learning years ... continuity between 'O' and 'A' levels teaching was vital ...". (99)

Before describing how the co-educational project had not fulfilled the gloomy predictions of the heads of the girls' schools - indeed, on all known educational criteria, had proved successful - Lockhart noted

"While not entirely unexpected, the ferocity of the broadside induced some shell-shock. It was hardly reasonable of us to expect the girls' schools to accept, in the sometimes difficult financial climate of the 70s, the diminution of their sixth forms without spirited resistance". (100)

Herein Lockhart, from the relative security of retirement, notes the intrinsically 'sectional' flavour

of the arguments of the heads of the girls' schools. This is in no way to impute that the heads were arguing what they did not believe: rather, that what they believed was, thanks particularly to Burnham's age-weighting provisions for school teachers' salaries, a rather perfect coincidence with their own interests.

The similarities of the arguments deployed by Lockhart's heads of girls' schools in defence of their own sixth forms echo those of Spooner and of Sutton. There are "special tensions [between self-interest and policy] which are peculiar to professional unions ...". (101) Lodge & Blackstone's analysis of the role of unions and pressure groups in educational policy-making includes comment on the National Union of Teachers' support for the additional year of compulsory secondary education entailed by the Raising of the School Leaving Age (RSLA) to 16:

"It [NUT] did not consider whether the most obvious method of extending opportunities for this age group - the expansion of part-time education for 15-18 year olds, possibly on a compulsory basis - might be a more desirable use of the resources. It was, however, hardly in the NUT's interest to do so. The union represented schoolteachers, and the alternative policy would have meant expanding the further education sector rather than the secondary schools". (102)

The example, with those provided above, illustrates the problem of attempting to isolate the promotional from the sectional aspect of the comments of the professional associations on policy proposals.

The above reference reinforces, too, the choice of the Macfarlane Review as the source for the values underlying educational provision for the 16+: while the providers were not demonstrably skilled themselves in separating the professionals' promotional arguments from the sectional ones, at least the LEAs and the Department were not themselves interested parties in the outcome. Their aim was the more effective provision for the 16+, and not protecting schoolteachers' jobs at the expense of the FE sector, or vice versa. The disinterested partners in the Macfarlane Group had intended, and achieved, LEA review of 16-19 provision. (103)

This commentary on the professional defences of the sixth form has concentrated on the sectional bases of those arguments. It has not, however, explained to the author's satisfaction the strength of the belief that the sixth form provides the best quality education.

Obviously, when the educational landscape contained only two variants of 16-19 provision - nearly two-thirds of all 17 year old pupils in the late 1950s were in maintained grammar schools (104) - the sixth form acted as a route to universities and the professions and the technical college as 'second chance' for some and first opportunity for craft and technician education. In those circumstances the sixth form held a clear edge on life-chances. The issue becomes more problematic when 16-19 education can be offered via sixth forms, further

education and technical colleges, and sixth form and tertiary colleges.

When the school sixth form is compared, on the one hand, with the sixth form college which ought to include all the academic advantages of the former within a more effective unit and, on the other, with the FE tertiary college which should contain all sixth form colleges' advantages and additionally, offers more vocational provision, the sixth form is shown to be relatively deficient.

However, the late redraftings of the Macfarlane Report concerned the value and validity of sixth form education. The sixth form was still believed, by some of the Ministerial Group, to be worth the special measures involved in redrafting the Report to reduce the threat to sixth forms.

More recent government statements on 'proven worth' run directly counter to their exhortations to rationalise 16-19 provision. When there is such confusion of policy, either some entrenched vested interest with which no government wishes to tangle is being threatened or, in combination with some vested interests, some raw nerve of a high cultural priority is being touched. The co-ordinated weight of the Secondary Heads' Association, so clearly an interested party in the 16-19 debate, was not a sufficiently powerful lobby itself to cause the re-drafting of the Macfarlane Report at such a late

stage. The actions taken indicate that the sixth form represents a high cultural priority and that tertiary colleges are seen as a threat to that cultural value.

Succeeding paragraphs of this Chapter set the Macfarlane activity on 16-19 education within a wider historical context, and within the wider educational context of 5 to 18+, and attempt thereby to explain the cultural norms that the Macfarlane redraftings illustrate.

Implicit values are thrown into high relief by what governments actually do when choosing between competing priorities. Lodge & Blackstone compare the actions of government as against the rhetoric. For example:

"Eccles chose expansion of university places rather than either RSLA or reductions in the number of over-sized classes". (105)

and again:

"In 1964 Boyle stated that RSLA would affect 350,000 pupils (at an estimated cost of £60m per annum) and that acceptance of the Robbins Report would cost £3,500m over 10 years (for an extra 174,000 students by 1973/4). Thus in crude terms over a 10 year period, the Robbins Commitment meant spending nearly six times the RSLA resources". (106)

Thus, the over-riding educational priority of the Government in practice in the early 1960s was that of increasing access to higher education. It chose to do so via a policy of extending support via student awards unlike most comparator countries with their loan schemes, and through the creation of new universities. The latter would have been costly enough; to the cost of additional

universities the government added a student support system for all qualified students accepted onto the increased number of university places.

In the 15-18 educational arena, the same Government's priorities were for the addition of a compulsory year of secondary education rather than, an equally-valid alternative on the face of it, compulsory part-time education for all 15-18 year olds. The Government shared the priorities of its Reporting Committee:

"Crowther dismissed the idea of part-time further education as an alternative to RSLA, chiefly because a full secondary education was taken to be an essential basis for subsequent part-time education. (107)

As Lodge & Blackstone note, Butler had promised in 1944:

"to tighten the [1944 Education] Bill to make the establishment of county colleges a duty for LEAs within three years of a leaving age of 15". (108)

That promise was not fulfilled.

Similarly, Fisher's 1918 Act provided for a right to compulsory day release and was also postponed - in the event, indefinitely:

"Fisher was forced to make a fundamental concession to the industrial lobby, by which [day] continuation schools for 16-18 year olds would not be introduced for seven years. In Fisher's view, had this concession not been made, the Bill would have fallen. ... [Yet] Fisher described the proposal as the most novel feature of the Act. (109)

So, when governments have a choice, they have opted for the full-time, general education provision rather than the part-time and technical provision.

Yet Fisher wanted compulsory day continuation schools, and Butler had pressed for the county college which would provide for the part-time study needs of the 15-18 year olds. Crowther had been strongly torn between the alternative policies of part-time further education for 15-18 year olds on the one hand and one full-time compulsory additional year of secondary education on the other before finally opting for the latter. Why have the successive Governments so consistently given priority to full-time general education as opposed to the technical alternative?

Some illumination may be found through the example of one occasion when the government of the day ostensibly gave equal priority to technical education. The 1944 Act provided for free secondary education for all, and the Circulars of advice to LEAs on the implementation of the Act, gave implicit backing to the tripartite system of secondary education in which three different forms of secondary school - the grammar school, the technical high school and the (secondary) modern school - should be resourced equally. The technical high school was to have equal status to the grammar school and entry for both would be governed by ability tests, the '11 plus'. It was intended that there would be equal numbers of grammar and technical schools: in the event, only a few LEAs included technical schools as part of their secondary provision. Why?

The current Government's 'Technical and Vocational Education Initiative (TVEI) for 14-18 year olds and its intention to create a limited number of 'City Technology Colleges' for 11-18 year olds activated the memories of some participants in the creation of the post-war secondary education system to offer explanations for why the technical schools had not flourished.

John Hudson, Deputy Secretary in the DES from 1969 to 1980, noted that many LEAs did prepare development plans including junior technical schools which failed to materialise for the following reasons. By their recruitment at 13, the grammar schools already provided a second chance for 11+ failures; the junior technical schools were not encouraged to support sixth forms and did not prepare pupils for the prized secondary examinations, virtually the exclusive domain of the grammar schools; and the Ministry commitment to technical education was concentrated mainly on the development of technical colleges. Hudson concludes:

"To sum up, the early secondary technical schools were weakly transplants competing with more vigorous, established growths [the grammar schools] ... In a wider sense, perhaps, they were casualties of the dichotomy which has long roots in English educational history. Many thoughtful people were exercised about efficiencies in technical education in the nineteenth century and in 1837 the government provided modest funding for a school of design. This developed into the Department of Science and Art at South Kensington which continued throughout the century, but as a separate organisation from the main education department. In 1899 the Board of Education Act brought both Departments together under the Board, but their historical apartheid cast a long shadow ... The

separateness of the two traditions may have been both a force of strength in the development of non-university higher education and an obstacle to the penetration of technological and vocational concepts of secondary education". (110)

Thus Hudson's explanation for the lack of development of technical schools was, essentially, related to the structure of the Government Department responsible. However, he invited staff from LEA or technical schools to contribute their own views as to why junior technical schools had not flourished.

A fortnight later the TES published a number of responses to Hudson's article. Don Porter, retired HMI, drew attention to the fact that:

"... so many LEAs were able to get development plans approved that did not make sufficient provision for secondary technical schools," (111)

and thus highlights the role of the Ministry. By not exercising its power to refer back development plans which did not include technical schools, the Government thereby illustrated that its own priorities did not, in fact, include technical education. However, Porter's answer to Hudson's question was that the interest of the educational world was diverted towards the implementation of comprehensive schools.

Max Morris' contribution provides an alternative explanation for the demise of the tripartite secondary education system. He argued from his first-hand experience as a teacher in a secondary technical school that:

"There was (and is) in fact no 'technical type' at either 13 or 11 plus and so no place for a school based on the mythical theory. We were in practice a grammar school with a technical bias". (112)

The tripartite system of grammar, technical and modern secondary schools was predicated upon the belief that technical ability was not synonymous with verbal ability: the selection tests for entrants to the grammar school thereby excluded those whose technical abilities were high, but whose verbal abilities were relatively low; these would attend the technical school. (113) Don Porter's letter had noted that the very first of the pamphlets published by the new Ministry of Education, The Nation's Schools, had stated that the academic bias of the pre-war secondary [grammar] schools had "robbed industry and commerce of their fair share of talent". There was a general recognition of this deficiency of the grammar school, and a consensus that technical secondary schools would remedy the problem. (114)

Morris argues that the secondary technical schools had failed to materialise on any significant scale because they were based on a false premise. The tripartite system presumed that the top 15% of 11 year olds with technical ability would be a different top 15% to those with verbal ability. The system failed to recognise that, in practice, there is a significant overlap. Morris' letter demonstrated that the overlap was very high, and that the system which had been designed to raise the profile of technical education had the effect

of placing it as second to academic education in a three-tier system:

"Grammar schools flourished because of social and education pressure based on their legacy from the public schools. Technical schools failed to catch up because they were a 'second-tier' selection". (115)

Since there was not an administratively-convenient set of 11 year olds who were clearly gifted practically and not academically, parents tended to prefer their children to experience an academic schooling which provided a route to higher education and the professions.

Morris' explanation for the failure of the tripartite system is given support by Tudor David, former Editor of Education:

"... The secondary technical schools had long since effectively transformed themselves into grammar schools. They were forced to do so by the English examination system; that is to say they became 'O'- and 'A'-taking schools because 'O' and 'A' levels, in the view of parents and employers, had long since become the only examinations worth taking". (116)

By "worth taking", David means that it was the GCE examination passes that had general currency as public statements of ability. The context of the above judgment was a commendation of the recent Technical and Vocational Education Initiative which was designed to ensure that all 14-18 year olds in full-time education experience some technical education.

The post-war attempts to reduce the over-academic orientation of the education system ran counter to other

policies. There was a long-standing assumption within the Board of Education that:

"the Board should encourage the transfer of pupils from one kind of school to another [then elementary to secondary] rather than attempt to educate all types of pupils in a single school". (117)

The supposition that the comprehensive nature of primary education could not be replicated in the secondary sector has, until the introduction of TVEI, condemned further generations to an over-academic educational diet.

A fascinating insight into the value assumptions of senior civil servants is provided by Savage in her summary of the 1937 debate within the Board of Education [predecessor to the Ministry of Education] on whether or not technical high schools could be deemed 'secondary'. The issue was critical since the answer to the question would determine whether technical high schools would enjoy the higher resourcing of secondary schools, or the lower level of staffing and other facilities that the elementary and technical institutes experienced.

"... Board officials did agree on certain minimum attributes of a secondary school. These included recruitment by examination at 11 plus, an extended course of study lasting at least five years that prepared the students for university, and a professional staff G G Williams (CI Secondary Schools) noted that technical high schools would lack a sixth form - another traditional characteristic of secondary schools. R S Wood (Principal Assistant Secretary in charge of technical schools) argued that secondary schools did not provide 'vocational' education, and that Technical High Schools would do just that. Board officials finally concluded that Technical High Schools should be administered by Further Education rather than secondary regulations thus ensuring them a lesser status". (118)

In the event, the regulations for pre-war secondary schools gave equal weighting to all three facets of the post-war tripartite system. However, their administrative equality did not create or lead to any public recognition of technical education as having equal status to grammar schools. Parents opted for grammar schools first, and secondary technical schools second, and as the basis for the selective 11 plus came increasingly under fire, the pressure for comprehensive education was intensified.

However, having achieved a policy that gave technical education an equal recognition to the academic education of the grammar school, the (by then) Ministry was not to be shaken from its commitment to the tripartite system:

"The decision to have a tripartite system (1945-48) was the logical culmination of a view which had been taken in the Department over a good many years and this was not going to be easily overthrown by such wide-eyed men as R H Tawney". (119)

The above adds weight to those who have considered the civil service as too wedded to selection. It does not, of itself, demonstrate that the civil service was partial to grammar schools at the expense of the technical schools.

It is the Department of Education and Science's more recent policies in the 16-19 debate that provide certain evidence that the civil service has reinforced the academic tendency of English education. The earlier summaries of the consultations on 16-19 in Chapter 9 have

provided evidence of the perceived short-falls of 16-19 education provision. However, in 1984 David Hancock, Permanent Secretary at the DES, described the Department's strategy to improve 16 plus education provision: since three-quarters of the most able students dropped either science/maths or arts subjects and specialised, the Government would introduce qualifications in complementary or contrasting studies - the Advanced Supplementary (AS) levels. That was all.

The Macfarlane Committee might never have reported on the problems of demographical decline and the consequent need for a review of 16-19 education. All that the Permanent Secretary suggested, some three years later, was a commitment that the top 15% of the ability range would be offered the opportunity of complementary academic studies. In this context, Hancock's justification for the limitations of the introduction of AS studies is worth note.

"The Department is not proposing any more radical move in the direction of the Scottish Higher or the French Baccalaureat or the German Abitur because this would call into question our specialised three-year degrees". (120)

Notwithstanding any evidence that the Permanent Secretary had appreciated the concerns of the Macfarlane Review, the above was a quite unusual public statement. First, the universities' control of the public examination system of schools was generally regarded as a matter of concern and not a matter for accommodation. Second, as the Department's sole policy for the 16 plus in schools,

it reinforced the perception that the Government's only concern was the academic diet of the academic 'top soil' - rather than, say, that of increasing the participation rate so that a much higher percentage stayed on at school or college.

The lack of Government commitment to the Macfarlane recommendations had been a matter of note:

"... In the event, the Report was not followed by a White Paper, and Circular 4/82 (para 4) made the point 'that the Secretary of State would not approve changes of use which would close sixth forms that 'have already proved their worth''". (121)

The "proven worth" issue had arisen with Sir Keith Joseph's rejection of Manchester's reorganisation proposals, and had fed the public perception that the Government's only interest was in preserving the academic 'top soil' of provision.

It would be unfair, however, to attribute to the civil servants a continuum of policy from the 1930s to the 1980s. Certainly, the "proven worth" issue - and, perhaps, Sir David Hancock's own limited perspective - owed more to a recent radical Conservative Government. The foregoing report of the Macfarlane Committee's activities provides evidence that the civil service was as active as were the local authority representatives in formulating proposals that would help to create a 16-19 provision that did not cater exclusively for the academic high-flyers. That said, it would not be unfair to note that the Government's own policies have not evinced any

sign of taking on board the concerns of the Macfarlane Report, and that the local education authorities have been as active in tackling the Macfarlane issues (122) as the Government's more recent priorities - eg protection of schools of 'proven worth', the majority with small sixth forms - have permitted.

The paragraphs above give some reasons why the secondary technical schools were not embedded into mainstream post-war secondary education provision: civil servants did not give sufficient priority to their inclusion within LEAs' proposed development plans, and parents tended to opt for grammar school provision for their children where they had the option.

Both tendencies raise the same question. Why was technical education relatively under-valued by both the providers and the consumers? A fashionable explanation for the myopia of successive Governments to the need for a technological dimension to education provision is provided by Martin Wiener (123). Wiener's argument is, simply, that the English culture is antipathetic to trade and industry. Although Wiener is not successful in explaining the cultural values which underlie that antipathy, he does provide an admirable description of them. This thesis has been largely concerned with the effects that those same values have had, amongst other consequences, on the provision of education and training for 16-19 year olds.

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PART IV - POLICY AND VALUES

CHAPTER 11: POLICY-MAKING MODELS

This chapter will first refer to some recognised models of educational policy-making and then, in the light of the dominant themes of the two case studies of the 1950-51 FE teacher salary negotiations and the more recent Macfarlane Review of 16-19 educational provision, propose that an alternative perspective for the analysis of educational policy-making is used.

An alternative perspective is required since the established models do not sufficiently illuminate the policy-making process unravelled by this study. They do not provide the means to explain why it was that one policy was adopted and not another, or why some policy issues never even reach the political agenda. The proposed perspective would accommodate the particular problems of the established models described below, and would provide a new tool for analysis of current educational policy-making. Chapter 12 provides a development of the alternative perspective which arises from this particular research.

A Critique of Established Frameworks for Analysis of Education Policy

In the introduction to Managing Education (1), Meredydd Hughes provides an excellent and panoramic overview of the various theories of educational management that have been influential over the last 40 years. Hughes

identifies three principal policy-making frameworks - "Easton's political systems model, Simon's modified rational model and Lindblom's incremental model" (2) - in his summary of policy-making models.

The systems model adapts the systems approach to the arena of political decisions: this model first identifies the parameters of the system to be considered and, then, the system's various inputs and outputs.

The systems framework is useful in identifying the components of political decisions and, thereby, enabling deductions to be made as to the values and the intentions of the policy-makers. For example, the government, the local authorities and the teachers' unions have continued to support a high differential for resourcing as between the education of five-year olds on the one hand and the 16+ students on the other: that differential input into the funding of the education system provides sound evidence from which deductions may be drawn as to the policy-makers' relative priorities.

The framework is certainly also useful to the practising administrator or educational policy-maker. By making explicit what the actual 'outputs' of the system are, it does provide a tool for evaluating the priorities of current policies and, therefore, facilitates a more objective review of current priorities than normal working conditions encourage. It does not, however,

provide any explanation of why certain decisions have come to be taken and not others.

The 'modified rational' approach is similarly limited. March & Simon (1958) identify three phases of decision-making - problem recognition, the search for a solution and the choice of a particular solution. It is true that these are three elements in decision-making. However, the rationality of the political decision-makers is necessarily limited by contingency. A medieval definition of God included the attribute of omniscience. Very few decision-makers would claim that they could, or did, entertain all possible options in their search for solutions to the 'recognised' problem. Indeed, Simon's 'modified rational' approach is an explicit recognition that decision-makers do not 'entertain' all possible options.

Further, the identification of the problem by decision-makers will be limited by their own perception of relevance. The political balance that the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) seeks to achieve in its current affairs programmes usually excludes the National Front and Communist perspectives, both providing particular interpretations of the political scene but both perceived as outside the spectrum of British politics as conventionally interpreted. The constraint which the BBC's charter imposes relates to the acceptable spectrum and not to the actual spectrum: viewers are

aware of the cultural or conventional constraints under which the the BBC operates, and most approve; the exclusion is a decision taken by the BBC. Educational policy-makers similarly exclude what they perceive to be unacceptable to their relevant current political constituencies.

There is, however, a more fundamental limitation to the 'rationalist perspective'. Prior to Einstein, the Newtonian explanation provided the theoretical limits to scientific discourse: the implications of the law of relativity were outside the appreciative frameworks (3) of the most objective scientists. Hughes notes Vickers' criticism of the 'rational' model in the context of the sheer difficulty of achieving an omniscient recognition of the problem: Vickers' own perspective, which is explored later, also recognises the impossibility of achieving a value-free recognition of the problem - and, indeed, his own theory acknowledges that policy-analysis must incorporate the limitations in policy-maker's perspective.

There is a yet further and more fundamental problem with the 'rational' framework: all who are not Certified or Certifiable under the common or criminal law are assumed to be rational. To say that a policy is 'rational' does not provide any basis for discrimination as between those policies which are 'good' solutions to the recognised policy problem and those that are 'bad', for each

solution will have its own rationale. The Spring 1987 statement of the Hillgate Group (4) was predicated upon very different assumptions and priorities from those of the architects of the 1944 Education Act: a year later, the Hillgate Group's views are likely to be translated into education law. The Secretary of State is now proposing a prospectus for compulsory education which differs from the current system by as much as Newtonian physics differs from Einsteinian. However, the Hillgate Group's analysis of the problem and proposed solutions are entirely rational. The differences between the Group and those who defend Butler's legacy do not relate to relative rationality but, rather, to the perceptions of the problem and the values which underlie the choice of preferred solution.

The point that the reference to the Hillgate Group's statement attempts to exemplify is that the use of the term 'rational' does not add to policy-analysis. All - or, at least, most - policies are rational; protagonists and antagonists of any particular policy would differ on whether all relevant facts are accommodated by the proposed policy. And, most relevantly, they would dispute what were the relevant facts. The Vicker's approach, described later, does accommodate these issues.

March & Simon's 'rational' approach, therefore, is fundamentally flawed as a tool for analysing policy-making. The rational model, like the 'systems model' has

a utility in that it reminds the active policy-maker and administrator of the ground rules that they ought to be working to. In that, the rational framework is essentially didactic. That said, the 'rational' framework of policy-making does not add new perspectives for the policy analyst.

Similar criticisms were made of the systems approach to policy-making analysis which dominated American education administration from the 1950s. The 'New Movement' was based on the ideal of

"a general theory of human behaviour, within which the theory of administrative behaviour in education would be a sub-system". (5)

The New Movement's systems-derived approach was pre-eminent for two decades in the English speaking world. T Barr Greenfield's advocacy of a phenomenological approach to educational administration which acknowledged the

"invented social reality [of organisations] reflecting the values of people with access to power" (6)

attacked the fundamental basis of the New Movement's perspective. Greenfield's case was a plea for educational administrators to take on board the fact that systems, all systems of which people are components, are essentially human constructs and not subject to universal laws which are independent of the human beings that invent them.

The rational approach has been the subject of the same

criticism. Jenkins demonstrates how the rational actor's actions are modified by, on the one hand, the political vested interests of the actors and, on the other, the weight of organisational and administrative structures.

(7) The vagaries of the specific interests of the political actors and of institutional inertia are essential features of policy-making. Both factors can be accommodated within Vickers' framework, described below.

The third framework for policy-making analysis, identified by Hughes is Lindblom's 'disjointed incrementalism', essentially a modification of the rational approach. Here, political priorities are established through the bargaining of the interested parties so that decision-making is based on small, incremental shifts towards a desired policy rather than any radical re-orientation.

Disjointed incrementalism is superficially attractive in that it certainly bears a closer correspondence to normal policy-making conditions than does the rational framework. Very rarely is any individual or group able to completely scrap existing structures that were designed to fit earlier policies and circumstances. Where the brief includes radical change, it is normal practice to propose modest changes that will re-orientate an existing structure towards a new end rather than to propose the abolition of existing structures and thereby invite solid opposition and the defeat of the proposals.

However, the disjointed incremental theory is subject to the criticisms already noted of the rational framework. Merely to use the small discrete components within an overall policy re-direction as the basic unit for policy-analysis means that the framework is more modest. That 'modesty', however, raises the issue of whether the approach contributes anything at all to policy-analysis. A theory ought to be able to illuminate why one decision, however modest, was taken and not another. However, any series of events, however bizarre, can be accommodated within the disjointed incremental framework.

Disjointed incrementalism is a classic case of the kind of theory that Popper's 'falsifiability criterion' would demarcate as outside the bounds of scientific theory. Popper argues that if any event can be accommodated within a theory, and, there are no instances where the theory can be falsified, then the theory becomes vacuous. It may also be dangerous: the easy identification of a rational or disjointed incremental interpretation may cause the policy analyst to ignore more significant messages from the data. This point is illustrated later by reference to recent analyses of 16-19 educational provision.

It is important to emphasise here that there is no intent to argue that the established frameworks have no utility for the policy analyst but, rather, to assert more modestly that the use of the models by current policy

analysts is suspect where the models do not fulfil the policy analysts' claim and do not add to the illumination of the data - as was found in this research and particularly in respect of the two major case studies.

Applications of Established Models to 16-19 Policy-Making

The following pages concern the application of the above models to recent 16-19 policy-making. It has not been possible to refer to the use of the models to the Burnham (FE) salary Report(s) since that area of policy-making has not enjoyed much attention from education policy-analysts.

From research into post-war 16+ developments and a detailed investigation of the Macfarlane Committee's progress, the evidence does not support the identification of any 'systematic and defensible strategy' (8) which is the basis of the incrementalist framework. Rather, the policy imperative of vocationalism has come into conflict with the policy for defending and intensifying the academic diet of the upper quartile of the ability range, and the result is that the education service experiences conflicting imperatives. This point is noted at the outset of the discussion on the application of existing models to 16-19 policies, since the papers below all presume some strategy.

(i) Ranson's review of government policy towards 16-19 educational provision (9) leads him to deduce that,

"there was nevertheless an underlying consensus of policy; to prepare a more vocational curriculum; to rationalise resources; and to differentiate opportunities". (10)

Ranson bases his interpretation of recent government policy on the presumption of an 'underlying consensus' of policy, notwithstanding the evidence he notes of:

"formidable clashes of interests between the sectoral traditions of the schools and FE branches over Departmental strategy. (11)

The underlying cohesion which Ranson asserts, however, sits uneasily with his own evidence. Further, the detailed investigation into the Macfarlane Review, summarised in Chapter 8, confirms the 'formidable clashes' that Ranson reports.

An alternative analysis would lead to the conclusion that Government policies for 16-19 are the results of separate and discrete policy imperatives that are, coincidentally, intrinsically contradictory. The policy has hardly seemed rational to non-governmental participants in 16-19 policy-making and provision.

Over the last decade the government, under both Labour and Conservative administrations, has given highest priority to the then currently-held consensus of the needs of the A level and university students, the academic 'elite'; at the same time senior civil servants have pressed a different set of policy aims for the whole of the 16-19 age group, within which Departmental staff have consciously and properly included the

'elite'. There have been tensions between the two sets of policies.

Ranson has rightly noted the three themes of Government policy towards 16-19 provision - the pressure on schools and universities to permit a more vocational orientation within the curriculum; to rationalise resources; and to differentiate opportunities. However, he fails to convince that there is an 'underlying consensus on policy'. Those three themes are certainly present, but for very different reasons and, sometimes, leading to contradictory conclusions.

Ranson himself acknowledges the tension between the senior staff of the Department and, equally significant, the tension between Government Ministers, as to the appropriate scenario for 16-19 general education provision. That tension is borne out by the policy to replace Certificates of Extended Education (CEEs) by the Keohane-preferred Certificate of Pre-Vocational Education (CPVE) catering, as does TVEI, for all abilities within the 14-18 age range, which exemplifies the re-orientation towards a more vocational curriculum for all. At the same time, successive governments required schools to publish their public examination results, and instructed the Higginson Committee on GCE A levels to take as given the retention of these public examinations and make recommendations accordingly. (12) These separate measures served to shore up the over-academic orientation

of secondary education and thus ran counter to any vocational imperative.

The policies quoted above serve but to illustrate the problems of identifying any underlying coherent policy. It would be difficult to weigh the effects of the 'vocational' and the 'academic' policies to be able to draw conclusions as to which more properly represented the priorities of the government who made the policies. What is certainly true is that these policies gave contradictory messages to those within the education service.

Similarly, the other two themes that Ranson identifies - pressure to rationalise resources and encouragement to differentiate provision - can be easily seen as giving opposite messages to the education system: if an LEA differentiates provision, particularly at a time of demographic decline, then it is less able to rationalise its resources; the Government's Rate Support Grant contribution to local government has been predicated upon an assumed loss of primary, secondary and 16+ 'places': at the same time, the same Government has been dilatory in passing those same messages to local constituencies and the country at large when any proposals for rationalisation start the journey from LEA proposal to LEA consultation to, finally, reach the Secretary of State's desk for approval. LEAs have, therefore, experienced the difficulty of attempting to follow

'administrative' guidelines on rationalising provision while, at the same time, government has played its own part in the execution of those guidelines.

Thus, while Ranson can detect an 'underlying consensus on policy', the study points to contradictory messages which can only be accommodated within a - new - theory of discrete and unrelated strands of policy-making. This new facet of policy-making lies outside the models for policy analysis and outside Vickers' model which, as argued later, provides a better tool for analysis than do the systems, (modified) rational and disjointed incremental models. It is important to emphasise here that the research bears out the presence of the three themes Ranson isolates. What is disputed is that they constitute - or, indeed, could - a coherent policy.

Further, Ranson's raw data is derived from a relatively-limited framework of interviews with senior Departmental staff which took place fairly soon after the Macfarlane Committee's review of 16-19 provision. Moreover, it does not take on board those other policies that the Department was simultaneously pursuing: Ranson was explicitly concentrating on the Macfarlane Committee's Report and its aftermath. The contradictory compromise cobbled together in the Macfarlane Report, through the processes described in Chapter 8, certainly do lead his respondents to highlight the three themes that Ranson notes.

A wider contemporary context, however, would have led the interviewer to pause before concluding that there was an underlying cohesion. Those interviewed would have acknowledged the separate pressures - the disparate views as between Government Ministers on 16-19 provision; the pressures from the Treasury within a Monetarist ideology; and, a latecomer to the feast, the new criterion of 'choice' whose only virtue appeared to be that of protecting, and increasing, differentiated opportunities. The civil service were subject to all three pressures: that the separate pressures did not, and do not, cohere into a tidy consensus on Government policy towards 16-19 education was hardly the civil servants' fault. It is, however, the reality of the situation for the LEAs as providers of 16-19 education.

Thus Ranson's conclusions as to the three expressions of the underlying policy consensus must be noted with interested caution. The material on which he bases his conclusions - the civil servants' interviews - were related to a more limited context than Ranson's own.

(ii) In the same year that Ranson's analysis of Government policy on 16-19 appeared, Cordingley published an account of the Inner London Education Authority's [ILEA's] progress towards a 16-19 policy framework for that Authority (13). Separate researches (14) into ILEA's 16-19 policy reinforce Cordingley's analysis of events. The single but critical caveat against

Cordingley's astute account is that it presumes an underlying policy consensus in ILEA's policy development similar to that inferred by Ranson on behalf of the government.

Cordingley's analysis is anchored within the rational analysis of policy-making. She states:

"Proposals were developed through papers explaining options and objectives, optimum solutions were selected, negotiations took place and the policy was disseminated formally. This pattern apparently follows closely the generally accepted model of rational policy development (Jenkins 1978) which, however challenged in the literature, remains closely in tune with the expectations of education officers". (15)

Cordingley's description of events is a fair account of the implementation of a policy that had already been given official Authority status. However, Cordingley is describing a rational implementation process and not a rational policy-making process. [It should be noted, additionally, that education officers do not hold the rationality of policy development as one of their highest expectations: they experience a policy-making environment which includes the values and character of the policy-makers].

Research undertaken for this thesis has highlighted the absence of the 'rational' policy-making process that March and Simon describe, and Cordingley assumes in ILEA's 16-19 framework. The question to senior ILEA staff in Spring 1984 (16) was why, with so much clear

evidence of the educational need to rationalise 16+ provision, had so little action been taken? The clear consensus of responses in 1984 was, first, that the perceptions of senior ILEA politicians were such that they gave high priority to the 11-18 school, including sixth forms, as an essential mechanism for opportunities for the whole of the 16+ age range; second, that the group of ILEA politicians who took office in 1981 had proved less wedded to the Spooner-type Weltanschauung. Further, the ILEA elected members in office until 1981 were perceived to have been strongly influenced by the NUT who, until more recently, had espoused the 11-18 school and opposed any 'break at 16': the NUT's own general standing had been weakened. (17)

The above evidence does not give any grounds for the identification of any continuum of rational policy-making but, rather, shows that a significant policy change was dependent on a change in political leadership, and on the difference between the 'value assumptions' of the pre-1981 administration and those of the post-1981 leadership in ILEA.

Indeed, Cordingley's own account provides further confirmation of the above policy-making perspective. She notes how ILEA decided not to consider structural reorganisation in the mid-1970s

"but in 1978 undertook a full review of the existing [16-19] offer ... [so that the] Tertiary Education Boards ... were established in September 1983. (18)

For the late 1970s, five years is a rather elongated period for any LEA review to be translated into new initiatives Indeed, from various interviews (19) it is deduced that, notwithstanding the clear evidence of the need for 16-19 rationalisation within ILEA, the pre-1981 leadership were perceived to be unwilling to countenance any questioning of the absolute right and propriety of the existence of the 11-18 school, inevitably large as a result of the perceived need for a sixth form.

The reference above to the perceptions of the views of the leading members is deliberate, and important. As stated earlier, policy-makers exclude what they perceive to be unacceptable to their political constituencies: this is as true a description of the behaviour of the local authority officer or civil servant as it is of that of the councillor or Secretary of State.

Cordingley describes the policy vacuum between 1978 and 1983 as a rational continuum. As stated above the characteristic of rationality is rightly ascribed to the implementation of ILEA's 16-19 policy. The earlier policy-making stages, however, were significantly affected by the perceptions of the policy-makers and, as all interviewed for this study noted, it was the change in the perceptions of the policy-makers, as a result of the change in the identity of ILEA's senior politicians, that moved the Authority from an 11-18 policy to (at the

very least) an open mind on the structure for 16-19 provision. That process was certainly rational, but hardly 'rational' in the sense used by March and Simon.

In the late 1980s the perceived unwillingness of pre-1981 ILEA leadership to entertain an alternative 16+ mode to the 11-18 school sixth form may appear surprising. But it should be appreciated that a large number of LEA politicians, both within ILEA and in all other parts of the country, had expended large investments of energy in attempting to ensure that the secondary reorganisations consequent upon Circular 10/65 permitted the comprehensive to maintain a sufficient 'mass' of pre-16 pupils to support a reasonable sixth form. Political investment in the 11-18 school had been very high and, with the virtues of hindsight, it was unrealistic to expect that elected members who had 'lost blood' in the defence of secondary reorganisations for LEA 11-18 schools could be readily sympathetic to 16+ reorganisations which entailed the dismembership of the schools whose continued existence they had fought to ensure in an earlier era.

(iii) Slater in, yet again, 1985 provided an ambitious analysis of the institutional, government and curricular issues that have contributed to policy-making for 16-19 education since 1944. (20) Slater's summary of events is broadly acceptable, and constitutes an excellent

distillation of what has happened in 16-19 policy over the last four decades.

Where Slater fails to convince, however, is in his re-interpretation of the issues according to the decision-making model of disjointed incrementalism, again presuming a policy-continuum. McNay (1986) in his review of the volume in which Slater's analysis is published, shares these misgivings:

"... and a valiant attempt is made to impose coherence on the emergence of a policy for 16-19 provision by the use of disjointed incrementalism".(21)

Indeed, the late introduction of the model within Slater's essay - 16 pages on within a text of 20 pages - gives the reader an impression of an almost desperate search for some mechanism that could provide coherence. Perhaps that is the problem.

It is difficult either to endorse or to refute Slater's detailed exemplifications of disjointed incrementalism at work in 16-19 policy. This is due to the logical status of the model. Where the model itself is not falsifiable, where any event may be brought within a very incremental interpretation, then examples of the application of the model ought to be subject to scepticism.

The succession of Government policies for the 16-19 year olds had certainly been disjointed, and Slater's presumption is that that characteristic is a constituent

of within one systematic strategy. However, this study indicates that government policy has been disjointed because no systematic strategy underpinned the policy-making: had there been such an over-arching strategy, then the various sub-policies - maintenance grants for students, Burnham rewards, etc - would have acted together to form a coherent 16+ policy.

The work of the Macfarlane Committee describes an attempt to integrate the various strands affecting 16-19 provision. This was undermined. Slater notes the late attempt by the schools lobby, led by junior Ministers, to modify the Committee's recommendations, and how the Government's response to the Macfarlane Report contradicted its main thrust; nevertheless, he still clings to the presumption of a policy-continuum. (22)

A policy-continuum is precisely what those involved in 16-19 provision were pressing for, and what the Government failed to deliver. Through Circular 4/82 the Government introduced a new criterion for LEA reorganisation of schools, that of protecting schools of 'proven worth'. It appeared that the Secretary of State identified a school's 'proven worth' with its provision of sixth form opportunities. That Government policy was more recently reiterated by the issuing in August 1986 of a draft Circular, Providing for Quality: the Pattern of Organisation to Age 19 and, 9 months later, the final Circular 3/87. (23) This presented directly

contradictory messages, pressing LEAs to both rationalise provision and to preserve provision that, on the Circular's own criteria, would have been judged unviable.

The messages continue to be mixed. The current proposals for open school admissions and schools opting out from the LEA system within Baker's Education Reform Bill, introduced in November 1987, will certainly inhibit any coherent LEA strategy for 16-19 education provision. These most recent examples (at time of writing) may lead to one of two separate conclusions - either that the Government has significantly revised its 16-19 policy, since the current proposals would undermine LEA planning, or that the Government had not had a coherent 16-19 policy. What the examples fail to illustrate is a progression of small incremental steps within a systematic strategy.

Further, the disjointed incrementalists' framework minimises the responsibility of the analyst to explain why the substantial shifts in policy have occurred. As Hinds noted, the book containing Slater's essay

"does not deal with persons. And, therefore, not with the inter-relationships of the systems, roles and persons". (24) (Hinds' own emphasis)

Indeed, it is precisely that omission of attention to the individual policy-makers, to the effects of their relationships with each other and with the circumstances in which they act, that minimises the explanatory power of the established models for policy analysis.

In summary, then, the principal frameworks for policy analysis are flawed because their adherents claim greater explanatory power than the three frameworks can support.

Ranson provides the following criterion for theory:

"What we can expect from theory is the discovery of an underlying pattern which has previously been inaccessible to everyday experience and which therefore illuminates the relations of causal dependency between institutions, activities and events in ways which will allow us to explain why such and such has occurred. Theory exposes the social mechanisms which account for events". (25)

The essential problem for the three frameworks is that they do not provide that 'illumination' or that 'exposure of social mechanisms which account for events'. Taken individually, the theories are too weak for more than post-hoc rationalisation of trends which the analyst has already perceived.

The systems, the rational, or the disjointed incrementalist theories cannot explain why, for example, the Macfarlane Committee consensus was rocked at such a late stage, nor why ILEA Councillors were not minded to act on the need for 16-19 re-organisation in the late 1970s. Adherents of the theories note such significant human moves in the policy-making case studies they analyse, but their models are short of that explanatory or illuminatory power that Ranson rightly isolates as essential for theoretical models.

Re-Entry of the Human and Contingent into Policy Analysis

The remainder of this chapter will describe Vickers' particular contribution to policy-analysis as the alternative perspective noted at the outset of the chapter, and illustrate his theory by reference to major issues from the two case studies. Vickers' model leads naturally to the distinctive contribution to policy-making analysis which has developed from this research and is described in Chapter 12.

Vickers' theory of appreciative judgment (26) stands alone among contemporary policy analysis in accommodating the facets missing from the above frameworks described. Vickers' theory gives due priority to the importance of the contingent as a dimension of all policy-making, and to the influence of the normative judgments of the individual policy-makers.

Vickers acknowledges his debt to Simon's pioneering work on the applications of systems theory to administration, but the contrast he himself makes between Simon's work and his own (27) describes a difference of such an order of magnitude that Vickers' own theory could only be regarded as within the systems theory genre if the term 'systems theory' is used at such a level of generality that it would no longer discriminate as between the 'systems' framework and any other systematic analysis.

Vickers' distinctive contribution to the analysis of

policy-making lies in his identification of the values of policy-makers' as critical facets in the process of policy-making. He describes 'appreciative' judgment', the faculty all politicians, administrators and managers use, as being composed of "inseparable constituents of appreciation" (28). For Vickers, the components of appreciation are 'reality judgment', the policy-maker's understanding of the facts that s/he has identified as relevant to the issue, and 'value judgment', the policy-maker's own normative set of attitudes about the issue in question.

This careful definition of 'reality judgment' provides one of the missing facets of the rational and disjointed incremental frameworks: Vickers does not claim that the policy-maker can be omniscient, even if s/he desired to be: Vickers is careful to define the 'reality judgment' so as to make explicit the fact that the matters considered in any policy review will be limited to what the policy-maker perceives as relevant.

The more significant contribution of Vickers' theory of 'appreciative judgment', however, is the priority it gives to the policy-maker's own normative set of value and reality judgements. Both the late attack on the Macfarlane consensus and the perceptions of ILEA leaders in the late 1970s were significant for policies - those made and those not made. The Vickers' framework permits the various appropriate weight to be given to the value

judgments of individual policy-makers, equivalent to their actual impact on the decisions taken.

Vickers' theory has the separate virtue that it acknowledges the pre-eminence of the contingent. Human beings live in a four-dimensional world that is affected by the passage of time:

"Few would deny that time is a dimension of the space in which we objectively and subjectively live; but even fewer, I believe, have yet acquired the habit or drawn the conclusions of taking it sufficiently seriously". (29)

The effects of the dimension of time are too often ignored by policy analysts. The Education Management Information Exchange (EMIE) report on 16-19 reorganisations of the mid-1980s (30) demonstrated that a very large number of LEAs had reviewed their 16-19 provision since the publication of the Macfarlane Report, and that the Report had provided a welcome stimulus to such a review. Those who criticised the Report as impotent had forgotten that Macfarlane's major recommendation was that LEAs should review their 16-19 provision, and that such reviews take time to come to any fruition.

The above example relates to the lead time involved in implementation. That dimension of time also affects the policy-makers' appreciative judgements: it is possible that Alexander's original 1950 proposals for restructuring the Burnham (FE) Report might have proved

acceptable if the Authorities' Panel had had more time to assimilate them.

Vickers' identification of the 'value judgment' of the policy-maker as one of the twin prime ingredients of policy-making certainly illuminates the two case studies on FE salary negotiations and structural review of 16-19 education provision presented in Parts II and III respectively. Examples of value judgements affecting policy are provided below.

In the early post-war years, there was a general consensus within the education establishment on the need to raise the profile of technological education. The mechanism chosen for the schools' sector was to create selective technical schools equal in status to the grammar schools. This strategy failed since it ran directly counter to the fact that entry into the more prestigious employments depended on attendance at grammar schools. Where technical secondary schools were introduced, they quickly became second 'choice' to the grammar school.

The strategy did not take on board two critical facets. It was part of the realities of the situation that the tripartite system of grammar, technical and modern schools could not prevent a culturally-determined ranking of the two types of selective schools; further, there were not three distinct types of pupils clearly

demarcated by mutually-exclusive types of intelligence, as presumed by official Reports of the time. The values of the participants - parents as well as educational providers - still ranked 'grammar' as superior to 'technical', and the tripartite strategy made no inroads into that prioritisation.

The strategy of raising the profile of technological education within the further education sector was somewhat simpler. The post-war consensus on how to raise the technological profile in FE was that staff teaching on the advanced courses should receive salaries comparable to those in universities. Thus Alexander's rationale for the content of the 1950-51 negotiations was certainly based on the commonality of educationists' - employers and employees - perception as to what would be acceptable to, as well as reflect, the prevailing cultural perceptions of potential students, parents and employers. Such a consensus would help to explain the [noted] lack of archival records of any consultations: there were none because 'all' - that is all who the policy-makers considered relevant - were agreed; that noted, the initial proposal on how to achieve the shared end was contentious and ought to have been the subject to Management Panel consideration somewhat earlier.

Similarly, Vickers' identification of the fundamental nature of the policy-makers' own value judgment is helpful in the analysis of the Macfarlane Committee's

proceedings. Vickers notes how:

"Changes which would shake [the] conceptual framework are resisted with a vehemence proportionate to the extent of the threat". (31)

The Macfarlane Committee's work directly threatened those who had, over a long period of time, perceived that the large secondary schools were necessary to provide the base for reasonably-sized integrated sixth forms. As noted earlier, much political energy had been expended on secondary reorganisations for what was, essentially, a defence of the 11-18 school with 'healthy' sixth form.

On a rational model of policy-making, the arguments for the break at 16, for sixth form or tertiary college, would have been sufficient to settle policy choices. However, the analysis of policy-making must include the perceptions of the policy-makers, and a number of these continued to give priority to 11-18 schools. The vehemence and strength of the late attack on the Macfarlane consensus becomes more comprehensible within Vickers' 'value judgments' category of policy-making facets and priorities.

Finally, Vickers' commentary on the nature of the 'value judgment' accepts that:

"The value judgments of men and societies cannot be proved correct or incorrect: they can only be approved as right or condemned as wrong by the exercise of another's value judgment". (32)

One of the criticisms of the 'rational' framework is that it provides no scope for the identification of a rational

judgment as right or wrong, as 'good' or 'better fit'. The Vickers' framework does permit those issues to be raised since he incorporates normative judgements as essential components of the policy-analysis.

Further, Vickers provides a more subtle refinement of the status of value judgments:

"We need not conclude that views on these matters are merely a matter of personal taste; the entire political dialogue of the world - that is, its endless debate about policy - would be palpably futile if this were so ... We have to assume ... an inner criterion, self-set and constantly reset by every exercise; as the value judgments of ... [the policy-makers] ... were affected by the actual process of their appreciation ...". (33)

What Vickers is describing is the interaction between value judgment and reality judgement, progressively affecting the appreciative judgment of the policy-maker. That interactive process is well exemplified by the Macfarlane Committee's proceedings. The Report recommended an essential need for each LEA to review its 16-19 provision, notwithstanding the late entry of a powerful lobby who had very rational grounds for not welcoming any disruption to the status quo through LEA reviews.

That lobby had to take on board the development of the appreciative judgments of those involved for over a year in the Macfarlane Committee's work. It is significant that the subsequent Circulars 4/82 and 3/87, explicitly defending the existence of the 'proven worth' schools with sixth forms, stemmed from a successor Secretary of

State who had not been party to the Macfarlane policy-making process.

In the case studies on the 1951 Burnham (FE) Report and on the Macfarlane Reviews, the adoption of eventual policy depended on the value and reality judgments of key policy-makers and on the inter-action of those same individuals over time. Both cases were affected by the contingent, and the particular circumstances in which the negotiations and discussions took place affected the outcomes of both.

Vickers' model of policy-making analysis is more coherent with the results of the research than the systems, (modified) rational or disjointed incremental frameworks. However, the research has revealed new facets of policy-making - the importance of the characters of policy-makers (in addition to their value judgements), the 'covert agenda' and, as indicated above, the discrete strands of policy-making. These will be developed in the following chapter.

CHAPTER 12: THE HUMAN AND CONTINGENT IN ACTION

This chapter highlights the significance for policy analysis of the impact of individuals on the policy processes in which they are involved, the power of particular and contingent on the same processes and, finally, the potency of values in policy-making, as revealed in the research.

Individuals in Policy-Making

The two case studies presented in Parts II and III demonstrate the importance of individual policy-makers' own value and reality judgments. They, additionally, illustrate the importance of policy-makers themselves. While Vickers' theory provides a role for the individual, it does not lay the weight on the effects that the characters of the policy-makers have on policy outcomes that this research indicates appropriate.

Policy-analysts differ on the relative importance of 'inevitable trends' and the role of the individual policy-makers. Lukes provides an excellent discussion on the issue, and resolves the tension between the conflicting perceptions by concluding:

"... [policy-makers consist in] a set of (expanding and contracting) abilities faced with (expanding and contracting) opportunities". (34)

Lukes is close here to Vickers in acknowledging the relationship between the potentialities of the specific policy-makers, and the contingent factors of the environment in which they operate. Indeed, Lukes'

conclusion integrates the facets of personality of policy-maker and his operating environment in an analysis that corresponds more closely than does Vickers to the realities of policy-making.

This research, however, indicates that greater weight needs to be placed on the effects of the characters of the policy-makers than Lukes' analysis would indicate. A 'law of Cleopatra's nose' (35) needs to be acknowledged within the repertory of policy-analysts' tools.

The 1951 FE Report illustrates the Lukes' and Vickers' analyses and those developments arising from this research. Alexander's judgment on what should constitute the 1951 FE teachers' salary structure differed from that of Sir Graham Savage: both were well-regarded by the same influential constituencies - the LEAs and relevant teacher unions. However, those two respected, influential, and experienced LEA negotiators disagreed on the terms of the new FE teachers' salary award because they had different perceptions of the effect of that Burnham settlement on FE provision.

Certainly there was agreement in the late 1940s and early 1950s that the best means of raising the profile of technological vis-à-vis academic education was to ensure that FE teachers of degree-equivalent technological studies enjoyed the same level of remuneration as did those teaching on university studies. Sir William

Alexander faithfully reflected that perception.

At the same time, Sir Graham Savage's misgivings regarding the weighting towards higher technological studies were justified. The implementation of the original proposals would have deprived very many colleges any scope for remunerating responsibility. In the event, Sir Graham's misgivings contributed to the modification of the proposal that only teachers of advanced FE could gain higher remuneration, and with it, higher status. While the package that was finally negotiated did promise a very large differential for those working in advanced FE, it also gave LEAs some discretion to discriminate in favour of those teachers who had academic and administrative responsibilities for non-advanced FE students.

Thus, both Savage's and Alexander's separate frameworks for giving priority to technological studies in the 1950s were protected. The result bears the mark of a compromise. That is, while those teaching on higher level courses were most likely to gain the higher remuneration, this was not an inevitable outcome from the national negotiations in the Burnham (FE) Committee.

Some 30 years later the judgments of two Secretaries of State, Mark Carlisle and Sir Keith Joseph, differed quite markedly about the means of achieving identical ends. Although both were seized of the importance of raising

the quality of educational provision, and by the need to take on board the significant decline in numbers of the 16+ age group, Carlisle's name became linked with the Macfarlane pro-tertiary policy and Sir Keith's to preserving schools of 'proven worth'. The Department of Education and Science was rightly pressing for an increased age participation rate (APR), and APRs increased when sixth form and tertiary colleges were introduced. Some sort of 16-19 review was, in this context, inevitable.

When it came to the point of how to provide for the 16-19 age group, however, the Secretaries of State, Mark Carlisle and Sir Keith Joseph, came to virtually opposite conclusions: Mark Carlisle had supported the Macfarlane Report's recommendations that all LEAs review their 16-19 provision and the Report had included strong caveats about the educational viability of sixth forms. On the other hand, the Circulars published later under Sir Keith Joseph included a pre-disposition to look favourably on 11-18 schools with sixth forms rather than moving to post-16 re-organisation.

While both Secretaries of State pursued virtually opposite implementation policies to achieve an identical aim - higher quality educational provision - their chosen instrument for implementation, putting pressure on Local Education Authorities, was identical. Both stressed choice for students, but one emphasised choice

between courses, the other between institutions.

Under Mark Carlisle, the Macfarlane Report pressed LEAs to review their 16+ provision with a view to encouraging the maximum choice of courses. Under Sir Keith Joseph, LEAs were pressed to review their total provision, and were reminded that the Secretary of State would judge proposals for reorganisation of secondary education according to the priority afforded to the LEAs' 'schools of proven worth': the new criteria was choice between institutions. Since the Macfarlane Report had encouraged LEA reviews of 16+ education, and the draft Circular, "Providing for Quality", had positively discouraged the same, the Government's policy could be regarded as inconsistent.

The above paragraphs note the effects of the appreciative judgments of key policy-makers at national level. Such perceptions were, in turn, affected by those who were beneficiaries of the system under review. For example, during the 1950-51 negotiations ATTI acquiesced in the priority given to teaching on advanced technological studies, in spite of the fact that the Association had favoured a more neutral salary structure. Why? From interviews with FE teacher union officers, the answer seems to be, quite simply, that the Association perceived - probably accurately - that the employers would be prepared to pay relatively generous rates for a relatively small proportion of posts, and the settlement

ensured that that small proportion would not be restricted by statute - ie by the Burnham Report - only to those teaching on advanced courses. Through their acceptance of the 1950-51 offer, the Association was then wedded to a structure which, at least nominally, ATTI deplored. The employers could fairly claim acceptability.

The Macfarlane Review further demonstrates the interactive layers of appreciation within the policy-making process. Education's 1986 Digest, "Tertiary Colleges" stated:

"The Macfarlane Report failed to understand, or accept, the realities of the situation either educationally or economically, but the 'difficulties' [in tertiary reorganisation] were emphasised in the Report and these were the products of reactionary policies and ideas, stimulated by teachers uneasy about their personal futures and supported by the nostalgia of parents and local politicians". (36)

This contentious judgment has much in its favour, namely, that politicians, national and local, gain their perceptions on educational policy and reform from a wide variety of constituences, one of which is the head of any local 11-18 school. As emphasised earlier, heads of local schools are not disinterested.

Bevan might argue that the real antagonism of headteachers to tertiary reorganisation was based on a fear of losing their control of the curriculum; (37) Austin could state:

"What is at issue [is] the headteachers' traditional independence to establish a style and curriculum and whether that independence ever acts against the long-term interests of the pupils". (38)

Politicians might have 'appreciated' headteacher opposition to tertiary as opposition from disinterested professionals.

There is, of course, the concrete interest of headteachers in the additional weighted posts for 16+ pupils which directly benefits the head of the 11-18 school. The evidence of this study, however, shows that opposition to tertiary reorganisation was based, much more fundamentally, on the Vickers' point (39) that threats to an existing conceptual framework are resisted with proportionate intensity.

Members of the Macfarlane Committee had been engaged for a year in the consideration of detailed papers and an interactive process that had modified attitudes held before the Macfarlane process. The late attempt to minimise the already guarded Committee support for sixth form and tertiary colleges came from outside the process. As the case study demonstrated, the consensus of the Macfarlane Group was broadly held, notwithstanding the existence of those Departmental tensions accurately reported by Ranson.

The consensus held at the political level. However, full consideration of major issues has been precluded by the limitations placed on the terms of reference (40). The

continuing lack of government action to amend the Schools Regulations to permit part-time allocation for the 16+ students (41) provides an example.

It is the contention of this work that the influence of individual key policy-makers has a greater impact on policy-making than does that of the civil servants' control of the agenda. As Fowler notes:

"The Oakes Committee, for example, was part of the historic process - but it was my invention, not that of a civil servant". (42)

Since Fowler was the Minister responsible for Higher Education when the Oakes Committee was established, he is well-placed to adjudicate on the origins of that Committee.

Contingency in Play

This section of the Chapter will demonstrate how factors outside the educational issues under consideration had quite significant effects for the final policies.

Reference has already been made to the need to recognise time as a dimension of policy-making. Time is a factor both of the process of policy-making and of the environment in which that policy can be implemented. The contrast between the extremely concentrated lead-time for the 1950-51 negotiations, and the Macfarlane process which permitted thorough consideration, albeit of only those issues which the civil servants permitted onto the agenda, demonstrates the need for time to accommodate new

approaches: the former policy was rocked and very nearly rejected by the employers' constituents; the latter survived a late, quite fundamental, attack.

Time, too, was a factor in LEAs' ability to initiate 16+ reorganisations so soon after secondary reorganisations. The 1978 Survey demonstrated that it was generally perceived that the secondary schools and then the general public could not accommodate another restructuring for some time.

That said, one LEA at least decided not to refrain from 16+ reorganisation by the factor of "a partial reorganisation", merely because, comparatively recently, there had been

"a partial reorganisation just a few years earlier, whose effects were still being felt". (43)

That Authority thereby removed 2,500 surplus 16-19 places from LEA provision. Thus one LEA decided not to be inhibited by the propinquity of a recent reorganisation of secondary education. However, the time lag between 1985 and the Macfarlane Report recommending 16-19 review, and the large number of surplus places that had been removed by the 1985 reorganisation, indicates that for the LEA quoted the action was urgent: the Authority had perhaps postponed its 16+ review until the point where some such action was overdue.

The relationship between time and reality judgments is

elegantly expressed by Newsam in his review of the changes in ILEA's provision over the 1970s. He notes:

"Politically and educationally, the ILEA of the early 1970s was still deeply influenced by the vision embodied in the 1947 London School Plan and firmly committed to the 11-18 comprehensive school of at least eight forms of entry (240 pupils) a year". (44)

There are echoes here of the Spooner stance: ILEA had a commitment for a large 11-18 school as a means of ensuring a reasonably-sized sixth form. A year later Newsam evaluated the position:

"The London School Plan was a brilliantly conceived and executed document. That is why it caused such trouble later. There is nothing quite so difficult to work through as what J S Mill described as the 'tyranny of a received opinion' ... [on the 11-18 school]. Over the passage of time, the school itself came to be seen as that end [the desired educational end] rather than the means for achieving it". (45)

Newsam is describing here the power of a long-established ideal which prevents the realities of the current, and predictable future, situation being taken on board.

Time is not the only contingent constraint: the other three dimensions also impact on policy. Accommodation criteria - whether you could fit the, say, proposed middle school, into the available buildings - was a real factor in the shape of LEAs' particular proposals. The dominating effect of capital resources - buildings and their location - on educational policies was a factor reported by Hargreaves, (46) Brown (47) and Newsam. (48) The continuing constraint on public sector capital expenditure had an impact on the ability of ILEA, also,

when it attempted to match provision to the needs of the 1970s. (49) The availability of buildings is highly relevant to any review of education provision - tripartite, selective, comprehensive, 11-18, 11-16 - and, in fact, considerably limits an LEA's scope for radical reorganisation.

The scope for 16-19 policy review is limited, too, by considerations that are outside that particular brief. Tertiary reorganisations have been

"... ironically, more about [secondary] schooling and its problems than any other single issue". (50)

Tertiary colleges have been established either as a result of Circular 10/65's pressure for comprehensive secondary provision or, more recently, due to the predictable effects of demographic decline on sixth forms.

The Macfarlane Committee's brief was that of the 16-19 sector, rather than 11-19 sector, but even that Committee's conclusions were much modified by the presumed effects of a break at 16 on the integrity of the 11-18 school. As Slater noted

"the duplication of provision in schools and FE as regards the 16-19 was ignored ...". (51).

Slater's criticism is entirely fair. It is also, perhaps, unrealistic. It is not humanly possible to look in all directions simultaneously: similarly, it was difficult for LEAs, when required under Circular 10/65 to

reorganise their secondary education provision along comprehensive lines, to take into account at the same time those factors of the 1970s and 1980s post-16 education context which were not predictable in the late 1960s.

Any policy is considered within a group of policies to which it is subordinate, and within another group of policies for which it itself is the over-arching policy context. By and large, tertiary reorganisations have been consequent upon secondary (school) negotiations. More recently, 16-19 provision has been - rightly - considered within the large framework of the LEA, and government, strategies for adult education and (re)training. This fascinating area unfortunately falls outside the period of this study.

(iii) Values in Policy-Making

This Chapter has already referred to examples of a lack of coherence in policy-making for the 16+ age group. In the critiques of Ranson, Cordingley and Slater of Chapter 11 examples have been given of discrete strands of policy-making. This final section of Chapter 12 will examine certain sets of discrete strands of policy to make explicit the values that underlie certain policies.

However, first, it should be noted that the examples of 'discrete strands of policy-making' observed in the 16+ policy area are too frequent to be of relevance only to

the Macfarlane Review. Rather, it is suggested that the way in which the self-same policy-makers, faced by different briefs, propose policies for those discrete briefs that effectively counteract each other, is a universal law of policy-making.

For the Macfarlane Review, Department of Education and Science - and other Government Department - representatives would have been as conscious of the implications of the 16-19 Review on other parts of this service as were their local Authority comparators. Both local and national governments for education were represented. Why, then, were these perspectives not included in those other concurrent areas, such as secondary examinations (GCE to GCSE), reform, for policy review?

The answer lies in the categorisation of concepts. The record appears to demonstrate a tension between the liberal/academic tradition on the one hand and the vocational/technical tradition on the other. In fact, the same individuals - central and local politicians and Departmental and LEA officers - were considering as separate questions first, how to improve the quality of the former provision and, second, how to promote the latter. Both issues were addressed by TVEI (Extension) and the reform of secondary public examinations - that is, until the 1987 Government administration proposed City Technology Colleges and a

national curriculum. Again these later initiatives lie outside the study.

These examples raise general issues of policy analysis. It appears, from the research, that the categorisation of policy activity is, first, limited by the policy-makers' categorisation of concepts; and, second, limited to the Government's Departmental structures, which categorisation has the effect of reducing the scope for intra- and inter-Departmental consideration of those issues whose implications stretch beyond the Government Department that is responsible for initiating new policy. The Macfarlane process would certainly reinforce both of the above assertions.

It would be reasonable to infer that, given the way in which the review of 16-19 education provision was handled, then other issues are likely to have been considered according to historic governmental structures, and that the categorisation of the issue will leave very wide scope for the emanation of discrete and sometimes contradictory policy strands both within and between existing government departments. The ability of any organisation to create coherent policies will depend on its ability to rethink its concepts and to re-group or re-classify its functions.

The earlier critique of disjointed incrementalism included a brief reference to the danger that the

application of established models may obscure significant facets of a particular policy from the analyst. The problem of searching for an underlying coherence, coupled with a presumption that the purpose of a policy is necessarily explicit, could perhaps lead analysts down veritable blind alleys. It is clear that a recognition of the possibility of 'discrete strands of policy-making' will increase analysts' ability to resist assumptions of underlying and coherent strategies.

At the same time, the several strands of policy are worth analysis as potential keys to the - potentially several - values of a government. Further, the possibility that the policy or policies may be based, quite deliberately, upon a covert agenda should be entertained. Examples will be given below.

The concepts of discrete strands of policy-making, and of covert agenda, arose from the research which first thoroughly explored the material relating to both case studies and, only after that work had been completed, referred to the established models of policy-making. A reverse order of work might have predisposed a policy-analyst to unconsciously attempt to fit the data arising from the research, to a policy-making model which, because it has been noted in advance of the research, would have prejudiced the conceptual framework of the study.

The above points are noted in the certain knowledge that it is not possible to encounter any new data with an open mind. This research was conceived with the aim of not presuming the tenets of the various established policy-making analyses and, insofar as it is possible to do, 'receiving' the information gained from interviews and archives, with an open mind. While the aim was not, logically-speaking, possible, it raised some interesting questions, as noted below.

The essential problem for this study was that all the established models fitted the facts of the two case studies. Indeed, that recognition led to the critiques in Chapter 11. Essentially, where a theory appears to fit the circumstances of a particular policy process, and where all of three competing theories fit equally well, then the theories may be regarded with some scepticism; if under no conditions any of the theories is falsifiable, then each may be regarded as vacuous for the circumstances in question.

Both of the case studies could be 'explained' within a systems model, a (modified) rational model or a disjointed incremental model: none of the perspectives added to the data already accumulated by the Analyst; none of the alternative explanations acted to demarcate one from the others.

An alternative methodology was then deployed - to

identify those aspects of each case study that, notwithstanding possession of all relevant data, were still problematic. The outstanding issues are noted in the final section of this chapter.

Outstanding Issues

The focus of the study into the 1950-51 FE Teachers' salary negotiations was that of identifying the source and the purpose of the salary Report whose academically-skewed structure still affects the FE provision of the 1980s. However, the archives did not explain why either the Teachers' or Authorities' Panels should have been prepared to consider, at no notice, such a radical change in the salary structures.

Extensive consultations on an early draft of the case study and interviews with those active in the early 1950s revealed a consensus of those within the Ministry, LEAs, FE colleges and professional associations towards discriminatory pay for higher level work. The final settlement managed to accommodate the need for responsibility allowances throughout FE and, at the same time, give differential rewards for those teaching on higher level courses. There was no problem for those in the service at the time. The new salary structure fitted the consensus within each of the negotiating groups that, as long as there was some scope for those teaching on non-advanced work to progress to the highest salaries, then it was right for those teaching on advanced work to

gain higher chances of promotion. The concept of a pay structure undifferentiated by level of classes taught was not an issue for the FE world of the 1950s.

For the secondary schools, a high differential as between the salaries for grammar and secondary modern heads was maintained, covertly, via an amendment to the age weightings. The sectional interests of the grammar school lobby had succeeded in ensuring differentiation: at the same time the heads of the old elementary schools, some now heads of secondary modern schools, also gained. As with the later 1951 Burnham (FE) settlement, all stood to gain in real terms: the academically-skewed nature of the settlement was not in dispute; any dispute might remove the general gain.

From the vantage point of the 1980s, the post-war salary settlement for secondary heads introduces a new possibility - that if a hitherto unacceptable discrimination is described in 'acceptable' terms, then the previously 'unacceptable' may be accepted by the whole constituency. Hence the concept of a covert agenda.

The term 'covert agenda' does not describe only those cases where all constituencies accept new terminology for the hitherto unpalatable but also those cases where one party only - the cases below refer to the government - intentionally disguises new policies under a more acceptable terminology.

The outstanding problems of the Macfarlane Review are less easily settled than those of the 1950-51 FE Burnham negotiations. Essentially, two issues remain on the agenda of this research - why the pressure from the most interested parties for schools and sixth form colleges to admit part-time students has not - yet - been acceded to, and why the issue of choice of 16+ institutions has risen to the top of the political agenda.

- part-Time Education for the 16+

The issue of part-time education for the 16+ is the least explicable. As stated in an earlier chapter, the reasons why schools and sixth form colleges have continued to be prevented from - legally - admitting part-time students could be due to either the low priority of this issue to the government desk or because the proposal offended a cultural priority.

It would seem that the second alternative provides the answer. Recent governments have been relatively casual in adding new clauses to (any) bills if the government so wishes. In 1979 the incoming Conservative administration repealed the previous Labour government's comprehensive legislation, almost as its first administrative act. More recently, the 1987 Government added a clause prohibiting the promotion of homosexual education to a Local Government Bill, even while an Education Bill was in progress through the Commons. Where governments have wanted to act, the legislative conventions have not

deterred, at least recently. Hence it may be deduced that Government does not consider that 11-18 schools or sixth form colleges ought to be allowed to admit part-time students.

Indeed, a late Government amendment (52) to the 1987 Education Bill would have the effect of ensuring that sixth form colleges concentrate on general education and do not permit part-time students. That fact reinforces the above deduction that this Government at least is acting to reinforce the bifurcated cultures of post-16 education provision - of school-as-community on the one hand and FE college-as-association on the other. That dichotomy shores up the academic skew of the maintained education service.

- choice

The rise of the issue of choice to the top of the education agenda is similarly intriguing. In the process of investigating the context for the Macfarlane Review, the first reference to the concept of 'choice' as related to 16+ education provision was in the November 1979 Report, "Local Authority Arrangements for the School Curriculum". Following Callaghan's Ruskin College Speech in 1976 the Departments of Education and Science and Welsh Office had issued Circular 14/77 which required LEAs to report on their curricula policies. The Report which summarised the responses includes the following statement:

"... On the other hand, some authorities were of the opinion that any thorough-going division of functions ... between sixth forms and FE would eliminate the element of choice for pupils as to the settings in which they prefer to pursue post-sixteen studies ... This element of choice is seen by many as being in itself desirable". (53)

First-hand experience suggests that the above summary could relate to (a number of) LEAs whose officers wished to protect GCE provision within FE colleges.

When the implications of the demographic decline projects for the early 1980s were 'appreciated' (in Vickers' sense), there was some political pressure towards concentrating GCE studies into sixth forms and sixth form colleges. The argument used to protect the continuation of the FE option, the alternative provider of GCE studies, was that 16-19 full-time students should have a choice of venue or 'ethos'. More pragmatically, it was noted that since, under the 1944 Act, FE colleges needed to provide general education to the 19+, a provision denuded of a potential 16-19 full-time 'market' would make that provision uneconomic.

There is evidence that young people who have transferred to FE or to tertiary colleges would not have remained within the 11-18 environment. Angela Rumbold, Minister of State with responsibility for 16-19, noted that:

"The percentage of those taking 'A' levels in FE in 1974 was 12%; today it has risen to 17.5%". (54)

She corroborated evidence offered by NFER in 1979 (55) and by the more recent TES report on tertiary colleges -

that an increasing number of 16+ students were consciously opting for a 'more adult environment'. (56)

However, both surveys, one highly structured and the other a journalist sample, also revealed that 16+ students regarded the location of the course rather than the nature of the institution offering the course, as the prime consideration. Mrs Rumbold's figures are likely to be an under-estimate of the total number of 16+ students who would have moved into FE for their post-16 studies.

At the same time, as was noted in Part III, the desirability of offering a choice of institutions as providers of 16+ education was used to defend the continued existence of small sixth forms in single-sex 11-18 school. In Surrey, for example, where a potential tertiary review for the Redhill/Reigate area was in progress in the early 1980s, there was particular opposition from a group within the Conservative-controlled Council. The opposition was based on an assumption that 'tertiary colleges' entailed a comprehensivisation of 16+ provision. (57)

By the early 1980s, support for tertiary colleges had become identified with the Labour and Liberal parties, and the Conservative party was noted for its defence of Grammar and 11-18 schools. This does not mean that the local political parties had such a conveniently categorised predisposition. Indeed, some of the earliest

political protagonists of both sixth form and tertiary colleges were Conservative LEAs. However, in one Parliamentary constituency within one part of an LEA only those Conservatives who believed in a selective system of secondary education were adopted as official Party candidates; in another part of the same LEA no such Party line was required. (58).

The early pages of Terry's (1987) advocacy of the tertiary college provides an excellent source about the political reverberations of 'decapitating sixth forms' and of 16+ reviews, and new research data on the views of teaching staff. It contains a reasoned rebuttal of the concerns that activated the Macfarlane Committee members to refrain from a clear pro-tertiary policy. It also demonstrates, significantly, how little cognisance has been taken of research evidence, and how much the policies of a government, central or local, depend on the reality and value judgements of the leading policy makers. (59)

Thus, the late 1970s saw the 'choice of institutions for the 16+' argument used for two, almost contradictory, reasons - to defend the FE colleges' right to continue GCE provision alongside that of the sixth form and the sixth form college on the one hand, and to defend the continued existence of small sixth forms against 16+ reorganisations that would have otherwise led to the establishment of 16+ colleges on the other.

The above paragraphs indicate the way that 'choice' was used in the late 1970s and early 1980s. They do not explain why that value has risen to take priority over the two prime values of the Macfarlane Report, educational effectiveness and efficiency, as evidenced by the government's more recent exhortations to LEAs to rationalise their education provision while maximising choice of institution. (60)

In 1985 the National Foundation for Educational Research held a symposium on parental choice. Reference was made to the avowal, through the 1970s, of both major political parties that parents wanted choice. Yet it was later suggested that:

"... there seems little evidence that this was based on anything more than a small number of people arguing against being refused the specific schools they sought. [But] ... the attractive element for parents [of individual schools] is often relatively small school size or class size, but with unlimited choice, such schools and classes would become overfull and that attraction would soon disappear". (61)

If promotion of choice of institution is given priority over educational effectiveness and efficiency, there is a strong possibility that those qualities about a school which parents are believed to want for their children, would be undermined.

Why, then, was choice of institution such a high political priority for the 1970s and 1980s? Quite simply, choice was appearing on the central and local government agenda because the concept was deliberately

placed there. It was one of a group of concepts which were to constitute the dominant ideology of one of the major political parties:

"In 1975, Margaret Thatcher and Sir Keith Joseph set up the Centre for Policy Studies ... to create a conservative think tank to review strategy and 'think the unthinkable'. In 1980, Caroline Cox became chair of the Centre for Policy Studies Education Study Group and John Marks its secretary. The brief, recalls Baroness Cox was 'to translate ideas like diversity, choice, freedom and accountability into coherent political programmes' ... In December last year the Hillgate Group published 'Whose Schools?' ... The key proposal of 'Whose Schools?' was that ownership of the nation's schools should be transferred from the LEAs to independent self-governing trusts. Schools would receive a fixed grant from the government for each pupil enrolled". (62)

The above has the merit of quoting directly the sources of the new values.

An expression of the values of the Centre for Policy Studies is provided in Professor Scruton's defence against the attack on the Hillgate Group, 'The Challenge of Choice'. Scruton's article makes a number of assertions - the lack of accountability of Her Majesty's Inspectorate; the assumption that 'élites are a necessary outcome of education'; the belief that 'university teachers are in a better position than anyone to measure the actual level of knowledge achieved in school', etc - but there can be found only one reference to choice, and that implicit -

"Our proposals do not necessarily involve the abolition of comprehensive schools ... We are in favour, not of state-controlled selection among pupils but natural selection among schools [Scruton's emphasis]. Some schools will be better than others, and to these the better pupils will

naturally tend to go. Only the bad schools would suffer, but they would suffer terminally". (63)

The categorical error inherent in the above was identified by one of Scruton's critics:

"Schools do not suffer, people do, and I for one could not tolerate the plight of those last remaining pupils who would be condemned to an education in a school which was, to use Professor Scruton's words, suffering 'terminally'". (64)

The above criticism rightly concentrates on the central point - that the education proposed by Scruton is one where abstract, and humanly-conceived concepts, are absolutes and where the concept of the school takes priority over the education of the young people in it. There are other issues here, but the main point to note is that the title "Challenge of Choice", is used to conceal a number of contentious issues. 'Choice' appears to have a covert, and capacious, agenda.

All political parties believe in choice: however, the ways in which the concept may be expressed differ widely in the practicability, realism and desirability. As the 1985 symposium on parental choice demonstrated, a too-high priority given to one acceptable value may minimise other, more desirable, values. Words like 'freedom', 'choice', 'diversity' and 'accountability' all reflect values which are highly esteemed in most cultures and, particularly, in the British representative democracy whose characteristics include an antagonism to state control.

In that context, it is illuminating that the key proposal

of the Hillgate Group's radical manifesto was a move from local to national control. Baroness Cox listed the key ideas of the new Conservative strategy. What, however, if the chosen means of translation of those key ideas actually resulted in less freedom, less choice, less diversity, less accountability?

The provisions of the 1987 Education Reform Bill itself are heavily dependent on the Hillgate Group's philosophy. They have been criticised in the following terms:

"By appealing to 'variety' and 'choice', Baker is utilising an old-established Tory ploy. In the past, this argument was used to legitimate the tripartite system, as well as to give support for voluntary (church) schools when these were under attack. Today it is used to legitimate a variety of types of levels of schools, subsidised from public funds in various, often hidden, ways (eg through the assisted places scheme), sometimes charging fees, and designed for intermediate social strata - professional, business and technocratic. [Why?] Fundamentally, the objective is, through downgrading and by-passing local authorities, to establish a whole mini system of quasi-independent schools between the prestigious 'public' schools on the one hand, and local systems of primary and secondary schools on the other". (65)

Simon is convinced that the covert agenda of the various provisions of the 1987 Education Bill is that of deliberately reducing the power of local government.

In this context of central versus local government control of local education provision, it is salutary to note the fears of an earlier era:

"... that to place all education under a Government Department would deaden it until it became mechanical, that it would fall under the influence of party politics, and that the transient politicians who were at the head of the Department would inevitably concede power to the permanent officials. (66)

While the reporter of the above concerns acknowledged that the then newly-created Board of Education had not, in practice, generated the feared abuses (67), very few of the current educational constituencies of LEAs, teachers and professional associations could not echo the quoted fears when faced by the likely increase of Secretary of State's powers consequent upon the Hillgate-inspired 1987 Education Bill.

In a wider context than education, the following evaluation of the current Government's agenda was made:

"The new Government set about narrowing power, not dispersing it. It put in hand a programme of radical change designed in each particular to curtail the opportunities for local authorities, school authorities, university authorities, health authorities or housing authorities to exercise any mediating power between Parliament, for which read the Prime Minister, and people. Elected dictatorship is like Presidential power without the Congress". (68)

The particular mechanisms with which the Government has chosen to promote choice, diversity, freedom and accountability would, in practice, serve to increase the powers of the state by, first, deliberately reducing the balancing powers of local government and, second, not effectively increasing the powers of the majority of parents and students over education provision.

The effects of the proposed legislation, it is predicted,

would also promote an elitist education provision. (69)
Both Spooner (70) and, it is interesting to note, Scruton
(71) would concur with that analysis.

It is arguable that the explanation for the rise of
choice as a prime criterion for education provision is
that the currently-dominant group within the Conservative
Party are deliberately using the acceptable terms of
'choice' etc to re-introduce a differentiated provision
which would be, tautologically, elitist.

The real criterion of a policy is what is achieved, not
what is stated. A recent penetrating analysis of the
British education system first questions the currently
fashionable explanation - the so-called anti-industrial
culture - for why the education system and, therefore,
British managers were not performing on par with
international comparators. It then notes that the
same facets of 'anti-industrial culture' were also
present in Japan and Germany, and observes that Japanese
managers were:

"... less inclined than the British, at least,
to treat people working at different levels as
superior and inferior human beings of whom the
lower orders cannot be trusted to exercise
initiative productively and must be told precisely
what to do, and how, and be watched closely while
they are doing it". (72)

Professor Charles Handy's view - that the significant
differences between UK managers on the one hand, and
Japanese and US comparators on the other, probably lay in
their education - is then noted. By comparison with

British managers those in the US and Japan "tend to be much more questioning and keen to learn about things both central to and beyond their particular job". Handy had agreed that this was probably related to UK (excepting Scotland) general education which was "the sort of education system that gets wanting to learn a bad name". The author, Dixon, then concluded:

"It would not be unfair to describe that [the education] system as a device which, for every person it qualifies for anything, disqualifies about two from everything at a cost of £16bn a year. Above all, it is a system that concentrates overwhelmingly on preparing people for the sort of society that would appear to have little chance of economic well-being in the future". (73)

Dixon described an elitist workforce, trained in their habits by the education that they experience. The majority of those in management today would have been educated under the post-war tripartite system.

There is a de facto relationship between a stratified education structure and the content of the education provided. The TVEI (Extension) scheme will entail that neighbouring schools and colleges will be working together in consortia to promote an integrated curriculum, including science, technology and design, for all 14-18 pupils and students. The proposals within the 1987 Education Bill are widely believed (74) to act directly counter to the aims of the TVEI (Extension). Whilst the education world has welcomed the content of TVEI, it has opposed the implications of the Bill.

It has not been possible to explain the tension of ideologies as between 'choice' and elitist education on the one hand and comprehensive (and egalitarian) on the other within the education context alone: it can be understood only within the larger canvas of social policies and attitudes. Reference has already been made to the establishment of the Centre for Policy Studies in 1975. In a review of the Thatcher years, Robert Harris notes:

"Mrs Thatcher came to power nearly nine years ago, determined to change us all. Not merely the way we live, but the way we think. 'Economics is the method', she said in 1981, 'the object is to change the soul'". (75).

It would not be unfair to attribute directly to the Prime Minister the re-emergence of the erst-while dominant, but implicit, value of elitism to the top of the educational agenda.

Using the study's development of Vickers' theory of policy-making, this chapter has, first, described the importance of particular individuals to policy outcomes. It has noted the impact of the contingent - for educational policy, principally time and available accommodation - on the policy-making process. Finally, it has explored the implicit values of 16-19 provision by reference to the very recent policy issues consequent upon the Hillgate Group's publication and the current Education Bill. The conclusions of the research follow.

CHAPTER 13: CONCLUSIONS

This chapter will note briefly the conclusions drawn from the research, first about the influence of values in educational policy-making for the 16+ age group and, second, about principles of policy-making.

The period covered by the research extends from the mid-1940s to the mid-1980s. In that timespan, and from within the research, certain features of policy-making stand out.

First, policy-makers are motivated more by what is generally perceived, or appreciated, by other policy-makers than by evidence, even when the evidence is easily available. Second, those perceptions, or 'appreciations', are most influenced by the dominant values of the culture in which the policy-makers operate. Third, that values - personal and cultural - change very slowly, and that the policy conflicts between those with a high personal investment in the existing system and those with intentions for radical change, will be necessarily intense. The Vickers' theory of 'appreciative judgement' provides a highly pertinent framework for these conclusions.

Further, the research has illustrated, to an extent beyond Vickers' own theory, the critical dimension of 'time' and the potency of the individual, in the process of policy-making. Additionally, the research has

introduced two facets to the analysis of policy-making - the 'covert agenda', whereby new (and potentially unacceptable) policy is introduced in terminology acceptable to the relevant constituency, and the 'discrete strands ...' principle whereby policies of the same government Department do not cohere.

Values Underlying 16-19 Provision

The research commenced with the suggestion that post-compulsory education provision was academically-skewed and sought to explore how far that might be a consequence of the Burnham Salary Reports for schoolteachers and FE teachers.

The lack of archival or documentary evidence of the influence of the Burnham Report in college or LEA records led to an investigation into the 1951 FE teachers' settlement that created the current salary structure for FE teachers. This was intended to complement researches into Burnham negotiations for schoolteachers (Saran, 1985). The aim was to identify the values of policy-makers: did the employer and employee representatives on the Burnham Committee intend the academic-skew that was a consequence of the higher weighting for advanced level work and, if so, why?

The evidence from the archives and interviews with leading members of past and present employee and employer Panels of the Burnham (FE) Committee has led to the firm

conclusion that the majority on both sides of the negotiating table concurred with the continuing differential towards higher salaries for teaching on advanced, higher level and, usually, more academic course work.

The research revealed two reasons for the continuing acquiescence with the cultural norms. First, the majority of the negotiators shared, and perceived their constituents as sharing, those norms. Second, for both sides of the negotiating table the constraints of the particular, the contingent, were powerful in modifying cases of principle. For the employers, a relatively high salary for a relatively few employees was always more 'realistic' within Treasury and ratepayers' limitations than a (more) radical review of the system that, almost certainly, would lead to a higher global salary settlement. For the employees, salary settlements which demonstrated a continuing concern for those members teaching on advanced courses was a means of preserving a near monopoly of the representation on Burnham and related negotiating fora.

The research also sought to determine how far separate salary settlements for teachers in schools and FE inhibited LEA review of 16-19 provision. The age-weighted salary structure for schools brought financial and resource benefits to schools with sixth forms. The the Macfarlane Committee had requested LEAs to identify

barriers to 16-19 reorganisation: some LEA responses had noted the Burnham Reports as barriers. The 16-19 reorganisation proposals of those LEAs were examined and, in each case, those LEAs had made allowance for Burnham-related incentives by guaranteeing that 11-18 schools would be protected at the relevant Burnham levels should a plan to establish either sixth form or tertiary college be adopted. Thus, within at least those LEAs who were most sensitive to the implications of the salary differentials for 16-19 reorganisation, direct self-interest or sectional interests had been minimised. It is likely that this occurred in other LEAs whose 16-19 reviews were not investigated.

However, while the sectional interests within 16-19 reviews of educational provision may have been met by specific LEA accommodation, the promotional interests could not have been so easily modified. Part III demonstrated the weight and power of normative values over more practicable benefits.

Indeed, a further conclusion from the investigation into the effects of the Burnham Reports on post-16 provision is that statistical and objective evidence was less relevant to the outcome of LEA reviews than were the values of the policy-makers. The London and Home Counties Regional Advisory Council, acting for its constituent LEAs, had reported to Alexander details of problems in recruiting any FE staff. Similarly, the

Teachers' Panel formally presented a summary of a survey of FE principals. Neither of the arguments which rested on evidence appears to have affected the progress of the 1950-51 FE Salary negotiations.

Similarly, the evidence about the effects of a break at 16 and tertiary reorganisation schemes was available to the Macfarlane Committee through a number of members of the Officers' Group: there is no archival indication that evidence of the actual effects of tertiary reorganisation ever dented the Committee's consideration of the issues.

The Committee, and the final Macfarlane Report, made much of the potential problems created by the decapitation of schools with sixth forms even though, in July 1979, the Secondary Heads Association had published a survey of 170 heads of 11-16 schools (76) that showed that a majority were satisfied with the arrangements and considered that their schools were able to operate efficiently without sixth forms. Such evidence, from one of the leading sectional interests of the 16-19 Review, ought to have modified the Committee's considerations: it did not. Similarly, the evidence from the disinterested NFER publication, The Sixth Form and its Alternatives, was disregarded.

The conclusion that the Burnham Reports were not the primary cause of the academically-skewed nature of post-16 education provision is based on the lack of any

evidence to support such a hypothesis, and the evidence of the interviews conducted for this research as well as participant observations.

The process of detailed investigation of the archives of Burnham (FE) Committees since the war, including those of the negotiations reported in Part II, have been 'appreciated' in Vickers' sense of the term, against first-hand Burnham experience of 1978-81. Thus the premise on which the research was based has been demonstrated to be unjustified.

The conclusion is not, however, empty. While the original premise has been found wanting, the process of achieving that conclusion has highlighted some interesting aspects of educational policy-making.

First, that a premise which now appears unjustified was, nevertheless, powerful in practitioners' appreciation of the world in which they operated. Only one piece of documentary evidence for the premise has been traced: however, in the educational world of the early 1970s (77), the belief that the Burnham Reports inhibited 16-19 review was a 'given'. Perhaps only the honesty of that Head of an 11-18 school can demonstrate why:

"My defence of the sixth form will surely be influenced by my agonised experience of the Burnham Triennial Review of salary points. Every sixth form student adds 8 points ... every 12 year old ... 2 points ... Crude yes, non-educational - perhaps. However, until Burnham manages to reform its system ... it is unlikely that many heads or

Governing Bodies of comprehensive schools will leap with alacrity when a break at 16 is proposed". (78)

Those CEOs who reported to the Macfarlane Committee that the Burnham Reports inhibited 16-19 reorganisation were accurately expressing that common belief.

So the first illuminating feature of the failure to demonstrate that the Burnham Reports inhibited 16-19 review is the exemplification of the power of 'received' wisdom in the administrative and political process. The earlier comments on the lack of cognisance taken of available evidence are pertinent here. Policy-makers are motivated more by what is generally perceived, or appreciated, by other policy-makers than by statistical or factual evidence, even when it is easily available.

The second conclusion of the failure to demonstrate that the Burnham Reports either created the academically-skewed nature of post-16 education or inhibited 16-19 review is more critical for an understanding of the source of the values underpinning 16+ provision. Simply, the Burnham Reports have faithfully reflected the dominant values of the culture.

It is important here to emphasise that the culture referred to is not that of a free-standing educational world. That world is a part of the national - or, rather, English - culture. Here, a number of strands are pertinent. In Part IV, Professor Handy's recognition that his criticisms of the educational system did not -

necessarily - extend to Scotland is worth noting.

Similarly, Sir Joseph Pope's comments should be considered:

"Sir Joseph Pope, who as professor of mechanical engineering at Nottingham University in the 1950s designed a miniature engine test-bed for the applied science laboratory at Ealing Grammar School, has also recorded his exasperation with the conservatism of the educational system. [author's emphasis] 'The educational system is such a tightly-closed loop, which we've got to break'". (79)

It is the conservatism of the English culture that has led to a continuously-reinforced academically-skewed culture.

The separate onslaughts on the anti-industrial bias of the English culture of Correlli Barnett and Martin Wiener have frequently been linked. They have asserted that the English education system has reinforced that bias. (80) However, the investigations into post-compulsory provision since the war leads to the conclusion that the source of the 'anti-industrial' culture does not lie within the public or LEA-maintained schools or even universities alone. Rather, the educational system reflects a general culture which is hierarchical and elitist.

The education system has certainly expressed the cultural norms of English society. The source of the social values cannot be easily laid at the door of the education system, but one component of that society. However, the reflected values act to reinforce. The test of any

educational reform has appeared to be its ability to ensure Oxbridge entrance: since there are a limited number of Oxbridge places, the conservatism of the culture reinforces the elitism of the provision.

However, the length of the period covered by this study makes it possible to identify a significant shift in the priorities of central government. While the policies implicit in the 1951 Burnham (FE) Report and 1980 Macfarlane Report may not have disturbed the cultural support for elitist provision, the intentions of both policies were - if anything - opposed to such support. The statutory basis for current provision, the 1944 Act, was based very largely on a consensus. By contrast, the 1987 Education Bill eschews consensus. Further, the Government has deliberately set out to strengthen some of the elitist facets of the education system. Independent providers have been encouraged so that, by implication, the LEA-maintained sector is perceived as defective. (81) The diversion of support from public to private provision is a feature of the current Government's overall social strategy.

Principles of Policy-Making

Two principles of policy-making have been amply exemplified in the research, the priority of the values of the policy-makers over the available evidence; and the power of received wisdom that is shared by other influential policy-makers. Whilst these two principles

are based on the research into the values underlying the post-war post-16 education system, it would seem reasonable to infer that they may have more general applicability.

There are four other principles which can be identified from the research:

- the interaction of an individual's reality and value judgements with those of colleagues to create a consensus;
- the 'Cleopatra's nose' (82) analysis of policy-making whereby the particular attributes of policy-makers significantly affect the outcomes;
- discrete strands of policy-making; and
- the covert agenda.

These points are considered in turn.

First, Vickers' theory of appreciative judgement provides a better instrument of policy analysis than do the didactic tablets of systems theory, rational or disjointed incrementalism. However, Vickers' theory does not provide the role of individual policy-makers' with the weight that this research demonstrates is appropriate.

The 'Cleopatra's nose' theory of history permits a high variability of outcomes dependent on the nature of the particular individuals concerned. The evidence from two

case studies demonstrate that the particular appreciative judgements of the policy-makers helped to create one outcome and not others which, on the face of it, would have been equally predictable. Alexander and Savage, Carlisle and Sir Keith Joseph, all present examples where the particular policy-makers redirected policy-outcomes.

Third, so far as significant initiatives are concerned, the policy process is likely to be affected by the 'discrete strands of policy-making' principle so that continuums of policy are difficult to identify, possibly or even usually because they do not exist.

Fourth, any policy may be based on 'covert agenda', where a new and potentially contentious policy is disguised by more acceptable and uncontentious terminology. Analysts should start investigations by examining the outcomes of the policy-decisions, and judge how far these, rather than the rhetoric surrounding policy, were intended and are indications of the real purpose behind the introduction of the policy.

It is readily acknowledged that the above do not constitute the conclusions anticipated at the outset of this study. The research has demonstrated that the Burnham Reports have acted as but one constituent of the cluster of factors operating on the shape of post-compulsory education provision. More significantly, the

research has highlighted the importance of the values of the culture in shaping its education provision, and has identified new principles within the theoretical framework of policy-making analysis.

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- (4) Whose Schools? A Radical Manifesto from the Hillgate Group, 63 Hillgate Place, London W8 (see also (63) and (64) below.
- (5) Hughes, M. et al (1985). Op Cit, p11.
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- (9) Ranson, S. (1985). Contradictions in the Government of Educational Change in Political Studies XXXIII, pp56-72.
- (10) Ibid, p56.
- (11) Ibid, p58.
- (12) Fairhall, J. (1987). "Means of Ascent" in The Guardian. 18 August, p11.
- (13) Cordingley, P. (1985). 'Crossing Sector Boundaries' in Education Management and Administration. 13, pp187-198.
- (14) Before finally concentrating on the Macfarlane Review as the best source of values in contemporary 16-19 policy-making, a number of LEAs' own 16-19 reviews were investigated. Research into ILEA 16-19 policy included interviews with senior officers and access to ILEA documentation on LEA-wide policy and the Wandsworth 16-19 reorganisation.
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- (16) See (14) above.
- (17) See particularly the exchange of views between Christopher Price 'TES, 20 April 1984, p4 and Doug McAvoy TES, 11 November 1984, p4.

- (18) Cordingley, P. (1985). Op Cit, p188.
- (19) See (14) above.
- (20) Slater, D. (1985) in Hughes, M et al (1985). Op Cit, pp173-197.
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- (40) Baratz, P and Bachrach, M. (1970). Power and Poverty. Oxford University Press, applying Schnattsneider's term 'mobilisation of bias, and Saunders, P (1987). Urban Politics. Penguin Books Ltd. Both illustrate how those who exercise power keep issues off political agenda.
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- (51) Slater, D. (1985). Op Cit, p190
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APPENDIX I

THE FE TEACHERS' SALARIES STRUCTURE

Throughout the period covered by the research, 1944-1987, FE teachers' salaries were determined by the Burnham (FE) Committee, composed of representatives of the local authorities and the teachers' associations - and, latterly, of the Secretary of State. The following paragraphs are based on the 1983 Burnham (FE) Report, and still describe the essential constituents of the FE teachers' salary structure.

Vocational FE courses are classified according to a table originally developed in 1967, which reads as follows:

Definition of Categories of Work

- "I (i) Taught courses or research programmes, or combinations of the two, leading to a higher degree.
- (ii) Courses leading to qualifications agreed to be of post-graduate standard, where a first degree or equivalent qualification in an appropriate discipline would normally be a pre-requisite for a student taking the course. (Where an extra period of time is required to bring students up to entry requirements of a post-graduate course, such a 'bridging course' will normally be graded Category II/III.)
- II/III Courses above Ordinary National Certificate standard and leading directly to degrees of Universities of the United Kingdom or degrees of the Council for National Academic Awards; and courses with entry standards equivalent to one or two 'A' levels and which lead directly to qualifications which satisfy the academic criteria accepted for graduate status for salary purposes or study of an equivalent standard but not necessarily leading to the qualifications mentioned.

(i)

- IV Study or courses above the Ordinary level of the General Certificate of Education or comparable level leading directly to the ordinary national certificate or courses or parts of courses of a comparable standard.
- V Courses other than those described above."

The Grading of Courses list classifies the vast majority of vocational FE courses according to the five groupings.

Using the above classification and the Grading of Courses List (which allocates different years of certain courses to different categories, as agreed by the Grading of Courses Working Party), the LEA calculates the unit totals of colleges and departments by first calculating the number of student hours in each category of work and then dividing the total by the following divisors:

Category of Work

- I for each 100 student hours count 1 unit
 II/III for each 300 student hours count 1 unit
 IV & V for each 600 student hours count 1 unit.

When the unit total for the college has been calculated, its group is fixed by the following table:

<u>Unit Total</u>	<u>Group of College</u>
Up to 250	1
251 - 500	2
501 - 1000	3
1001 - 1750	4
1751 - 2750	5
2751 - 3750	6
3751 - 5000	7
5001 - 6500	8
6501 - 8500	9
8501 - 11000	10
11001 - 13500	11
Over 13500	12

When the department's unit total has been established, its grade is fixed by the following table:

<u>Unit Total</u>	<u>Grade of Department</u>
76 - 140	I
141 - 250	II
251 - 400	III
401 - 600	IV
601 - 900	V
Over 900	VI

The Principals, Vice-Principals and Heads of Departments' salaries are paid according to the group or grade of their college or department.

The FE Teachers' Salary Report currently relates the college establishment to a range of proportions of (promoted) posts according to the volume of courses within each of the categories of work. This relationship is described as the 'Proportions of Posts/Categories of Work' (POP/COW) table. The current proportions are as follows:

<u>Category of Work</u>	<u>Grade</u>	<u>Proportion of Posts</u>	
		<u>Estabs of FE</u>	<u>Coll. of Educ. (Technical)</u>
I	Principal Lecturer	20-30	35-40
	Senior Lecturer and Lecturer Grade II	70-80	60-65
II/III	Principal Lecturer	10-25	25-35
	Senior Lecturer & Lecturer Grade II	75-90	65-75
IV	Senior Lecturer	0- 5	
	Lecturer Grade II	40-70	
	Lecturer Grade I	30-60	
V	Senior Lecturer	0- 5	
	Lecturer Grade II	15-35	
	Lecturer Grade I	70-85	

Thus, where a college offers, almost exclusively, Category IV or V work, there will be relatively few Senior Lecturer posts and very few Principal Lecturer posts (at least, through the statutory Burnham provisions).

It should be noted that the level of students taught does not determine the grade of the individual teacher except in the case of the 'Houghton SL' where Lecturer IIs teaching more than 50% of advanced level work move onto the Senior Lecturers' salary range.

The substantial work includes many references to the Burnham-generated difference as between colleges with predominantly advanced work and those with predominantly non-advanced work. The difference is best exemplified by comparison between two colleges which have broadly similar volumes of student enrolments operating within the same LEA policies. Their November 1985 enrolments are reproduced below with the full-time equivalent [FTE] computations in parentheses:

<u>Category of Students</u>	<u>College X</u>		<u>College Y</u>	
Full-Time	1295	(1295)	1154	(1154)
Short Full-Time	213	[191.7]	23	[20.7]
Sandwich	266	[239.4]	315	[283.5]
Block Release	171	[68.4]	155	(62)
PTDR(1)	652	[260.8]	1977	(790.8)
PTD+ER(2)	1845	[738]	804	(321.6)
PTD(3)	259	[103.6]	365	(146)
PTD+E(4)	142	(56.8)	-	(-)
Evening Only	373	[74.6]	1187	(237.4)
Distance Learning	25	(5)	-	(-)
Total	<u>5241</u>	<u>(3033.3)</u>	<u>5980</u>	<u>(3016)</u>

- (1) Part-Time Day Release
 (2) Part-Time Day + Evening Release
 (3) Part-Time Day (not release)
 (4) Part-Time Day + Evening (not release).

While College Y has a higher volume of students than College X, the position is reversed as far as the FTE count is concerned. However, the student loading on each college is broadly comparable.

The position changes quite radically when the divisors of the 'Proportions of Posts/Categories of Work' (POP/COW) table are used on the student hours in accordance with the level of work grading of their courses. It produces the following relativities of staffing:

	<u>College X</u>	<u>College Y</u>
Principal Lecturer	47	7
Senior Lecturer	4	9
Senior Lecturer/Lecturer II*	192	33
Lecturer II	65	89
Lecturer I	15	93
Total	<u>324</u>	<u>231</u>

* 'Houghton SLs', ie those who have progressed through to the Senior Lecturer grade by virtue of the proportion of Category II/III work they teach.

There are striking disparities in two related areas. First, College X has virtually half as many staff again as College Y. Second, there is a significantly higher number, and proportion of, promoted posts in College X than in College Y. That is, quite simply, a direct result of the weightings of the Burnham Report [whose simple application is currently mitigated by ensuring that Grade III Departments should have one Senior Lecturer, Grade IV and V Departments two, and Grade VI Departments three Senior Lecturers "where the standards of work in the Departments would not otherwise justify such appointments"].

The first disparity, of size of establishment, deserves commentary. The conditions of service agreement provides for promoted posts to have progressively reduced 'class-contact' hours (ie 20-22 for Lecturer Is, 18-20 for Lecturer IIs, 17-20 for Senior Lecturers and 15-18 for Principal Lecturers. Hence a college with a high proportion

of advanced work will need more staff than one with little advanced work to cover the same number of teaching hours. Further, advanced further education is paid from a national 'AFE Pool' composed of contributions from all LEAs. Until 1979 the AFE Pool was calculated according to the teaching costs of AFE work. The LEAs forwarded their individual bills, and the total was split between the LEAs for payment. This open-ended system of funding AFE has now ceased: however, it provides an explanation of the tendency for colleges with high proportions of AFE work to have larger establishments.

A second example of the incentives and disincentives of the FE system is provided by College Z. In the pre-capped AFE Pool period, College Z claimed that 33% of its work was advanced. Certainly a third of the teaching hours available to the College were employed on Category II/III work. When the National Advisory Body for HE introduced a unit funding based on FTE student count for its allocations from a 'closed' AFE Pool, the proportion of College Z's teaching time devoted to AFE work dropped initially to 30% and then, with a net increase in Category IV and V students, down to 25%. With a nice irony, the Burnham Report then penalised College Z since the reduction in its proportion of Category II/III work entailed a reduced entitlement to promoted posts: a real increase in student numbers occasioned a reduction of a number of Senior Lectureships. Of course, the LEA was free to exceed the statutory minimum of POP/COW and College Z was not required to sack or down-grade any members of staff.

APPENDIX II

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TESTING NEGATIVES: DOES THE BURNHAM (FE) REPORT IMPLICIT THE RESPONSIVENESS OF THE FE SYSTEMS?

Kathryn Burrows,
Research Student,
City of London Polytechnic.

THE CONTEXT OF THE QUESTION

A curious fact about current FE provision is that courses for a large section of the 16+ population are provided by the FE service on commission from a training agency rather than being self-generated.

One possible explanation of the lack of non-commissioned FE provision for the operative, the unqualified and unemployed is that the Burnham Report governing the salaries of individual FE teachers is biased towards the development of advanced further education (AFE) courses. An incentive towards the provision of one type of course necessarily acts, particularly within a fixed quantum of resources, as a disincentive towards the provision of other types.

The contrast between the current social and economic need for non-advanced vocational courses and the various weightings of the Burnham Report towards advanced work would appear to support the hypothesis of my research which is, that the Report governing the salaries of FE teachers has positively accentuated 'academic skew' (1). This paper will first provide some cultural evidence of 'academic skew'; it will then describe the historical roots of the weightings for advanced work; and, finally, it will note one significant problem in testing that hypothesis.

The recommendations of major educational reports or Acts which Government chooses to implement provide one expression of social values. I refer below to the 1944 Education Act and the 1959 Crowther Report since both contained recommendations for both the schools and FE sectors.

The 1944 Act represented a charter for education for all. It included provisions for the education of those of compulsory school

age, for 15-18 year olds in employment, and for all over compulsory school-leaving age. The 'first principles' of post-war reconstruction were listed by Rausbottom, Butler's predecessor, as early as May 1941 and later reported by The Times (1949) as:

- (a) raising the (school) leaving age to 15;
- (b) establishment of day continuation schools for 15-18; and
- (c) reform and expansion of secondary education of a type suitable for every child.

Gasden (1976) noted that Butler's priorities, as conveyed to Churchill, ran:

- (a) industrial and technical training, and the linking of schools more closely with employment;
- (b) settlement with the churches about the dual system; and
- (c) the future of the public schools.

It is significant that the one major point featuring in both 'short lists' that, in the event, was not tackled was the 'day continuation school'. Those reforms relating to full-time schooling were implemented and those relating to non-advanced FE were not. That there was limitation on resources is not doubted: the choice taken between options, however, is significant.

Similarly, the Crowther Report for 15-18 year olds recommended the raising of the school leaving age to 16, and the enactment of the 1944 provisions for country colleges. Both recommendations were accepted: the former was enacted but not the latter.

It might be possible to demonstrate that the weightings towards full-time advanced courses in the Burnham FE Reports do no more than reflect the cultural priorities of their period. Cuthbert (1980) would disagree: reviewing Locke's (1978) history of Woolwich Polytechnic, Cuthbert argues that the 'academic drift' rationale provides a necessary, but not sufficient, explanation for the tendency to discard part-time and lower level work; in Cuthbert's view it is the Burnham Report which is the 'skewing' factor. Similarly, Eric Robinson (1979) has stated: "I unsuccessfully tried to persuade Crosland that it was not sufficient to urge the

polytechnics to retain sub-degree and part-time education: positive incentives had to be offered to them to do so and these have been lacking", suggesting that the incentives of the Burnham Reports positively favour full-time advanced work.

THE WEIGHTING OF THE BURNHAM (FE) REPORT TOWARDS ADVANCED COURSES

Constituents of the Burnham (FE) Report

Birch and Latham (1979) argue that the provision of the Burnham (FE) Report produce undesirable incentives in the FE system. For example, the higher the level of work, the greater the number of points and the higher the salaries of principals, vice principals and heads of department. For example, six 'O' or 'A' level students, or three undergraduate-equivalents, count the same as one postgraduate towards a department's and a college's unit total of points.

The above weighting towards advanced work is compounded by the proportions of (graded) posts table which Burnham prescribes "to secure an appropriate relativity between the standards of work and the posts of the various categories of staff in the establishment of the colleges". In all colleges, the proportion of graded posts result from a high proportion - or not - of AFE work, and it is difficult to devise a reasonable promotion structure in a college not doing a significant proportion of AFE.

The foregoing paragraph does not relate to the salary of the individual lecturer. Lord Alexander's Commentaries⁽²⁾ emphasized a principle held by both Panels of the Burnham Committee: that the level of an individual lecturer's teaching load did not determine that individual's grade or salary. However, since Houghton and the 1975 Report, a Lecturer Grade II with 50% or more of Category I or II/III teaching can be transferred to the Senior Lecturer (SL) scale. The 'relativity of standards of work and posts' means that the 'Houghton SL' has reduced the scope for promotion open to the lecturer not teaching more than 50% AFE courses; further, there is yet another incentive in the FE system to increase the volume of advanced level work.

Before turning to the historical roots of the above complexities, it is worth noting that the fact that many of the rewards of the FE system go to staff involved in AFE does not, of itself, demonstrate that the Burnham provisions have acted as an incentive towards AFE provision in any specific cases. It could be that the postulated 'skewing' effects of the Burnham (FE) Report (can) operate only where there is, already, a (significant?) proportion of AFE work.

The Historical Roots of the Burnham (FE) Report Variables

While the principle of a relativity between proportions of promoted posts and volume of advanced work was first expressed in the 1959 Report, the differentiation as between level of courses existed pre-war. The 1927 Burnham (Technical) Report explicitly limited the status of 'department' to those groups of classes including 'a substantial amount of higher work'.

Following agreement between the two Panels of the Burnham (Primary and Secondary) Committee on the Report to operate after the war, the Authorities Panel (AP) attempted to devise a coherent salary structure for the rag bag of institutions whose only common denominator was their not being schools. Initially it was proposed that scales broadly similar to those for schools be adopted. The Authorities Panel offered Senior Assistant (SA) posts to cover both the schools' Special Responsibility Allowances (SRAs) and the fact that university-equivalent work was provided by technical establishments.

The Authorities Panel and the Teachers' Panel (TP) for the Burnham (Technical) Committee differed on one basic assumption. The Authorities Panel considered that most work of technical institutions was of school standard whilst the Teachers' Panel argued that an uncredited amount of 'university level' work existed. Additionally, the Teachers' Panel had argued for a higher proportion of Special Responsibility Allowances within the technical sector than in schools because the high proportion of part-time staff entailed heavy administrative burdens for full-time technical staff.

The 1945 Burnham (Technical) Report contained provisions for both Senior Assistants and Special Responsibility Allowances. The double advantage was a consequence of the Teachers' Panel tapping two, separate, instincts of the Authorities Panel: that those doing

university-equivalent work should be paid comparable salaries and, that full-time staff in technical institutions should be fairly compensated for their heavy administrative loads. The final 1945 agreement contained within it the seeds of the 1951 system: it gave extra salary for extra responsibility (as in schools) and extra salary for university-equivalent work: both through the same mechanism, the 'proportion of posts' table.

Following the 1945 settlement both Panels had received complaints that the negotiated percentages of Special Responsibility Allowances - 20% of FT staff (5% more than for schools) - were too rigid, and the 1948 Report permitted 20%-27% of FT teaching posts to have Special Responsibility Allowances. Even then, the variability of provision was so high that some LEA areas might have exclusively Senior Assistants and holders of Special Responsibility Allowances as their full-time FE staff and others none at all. However, after the Burnham (Technical) Report had awarded two different sets of rewards where only one had been offered, the FEAs curbed any attempt of exploit the double advantage by the 'proportion of posts' table. From Assistant, Assistant with Special Responsibility Allowance and Senior Assistant came the 1951 terms of 'Assistant Grade A', 'Assistant Grade B', 'Lecturer' and 'Senior Lecturer', the incidence of the latter two grades to be determined by the volume of university-equivalent work. A new section of the Burnham (Technical) Report defined (course) work as belonging to one of three categories: work of university, advanced and school standard. The following guide to an appropriate relativity between the standards of work and posts of various categories was given to LEAs:

Senior Lecturers - work of university standard
Lecturers - advanced work and/or work of university standard
Assistants Grade B - work of school standard and/or advanced work
Assistants Grade A - work of school standard

Subsequent Reports have cemented the 'proportion of posts' policy into the FE structure: the roots of the complex 'proportions of posts' table of the Appendix to the FE Report was the result of an attempt to fuse into one career structure two very separate values: 'responsibility' and level of course work.

METHODOLOGICAL APPROACHES

Any examination of whether and, if so, how the Burnham (FE) Report provisions have accentuated 'academic skew' must disentangle the effects of the Burnham Report from those of the following concomitant factors:

The AFE Pool. The fact that, until very recently, the funding for the AFE Pool was 'open-ended' may have provided a strong incentive to develop 'higher' rather than lower-level courses as the controls for the former were certainly less direct than was the annual estimate for non-advanced work by the maintaining LEA.

Conditions of Service Agreements. Birch and Latham (1979) argue convincingly that the conditions of service differential for class-contact hours for different grades of lecturer provides a strong incentive for the promotion of advanced work.

Mandatory Awards. Mandatory awards for students accepted onto degree-level courses and the Robbins' expansion of higher education places in the 1960s may have distorted both provision and student demand.

Social Attitudes. The earlier discussion, above, provides some educational expressions of cultural priorities.

Course Control. The separation of the functions of the authorisation of courses from those of the funding of courses may have contributed to 'academic skew'.

One central problem of the research is how the effects of the above five factors on the FE service can be disentangled from those of the Burnham (FE) Report. Given this problem, the methodology should perhaps be concerned with examining whether and, if so, how the Burnham (FE) Report does inhibit the responsiveness of the FE system rather than investigating whether and, if so, how far the Report promotes 'academic skew'.

Notes

- (1) I devised the term 'academic skew' since 'academic drift' was too clearly conventionally associated with HE development and, anyway, contained connotations of passivity. 'Academic skew' conveys the sense of a positive force, and one with unintended consequences.

- (2) Lord Alexander as Secretary of the Authorities' Panel (and of AEC) issues Commentaries on each Burnham settlement to assist LEA staff by highlighting any new (statutory) provisions.

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APPENDIX III - BIBLIOGRAPHY

A. PRIMARY SOURCES

A.1 Archives and Published Material

Association of County Councils (1979-81). Working files including those of the Macfarlane Committee Proceedings, E 15/26.

Association of Education Committee (AEC) Archives, donated by Lord Alexander, Secretary of AEC, to Brotherton Library, Leeds University.

Burnham (FE) Reports: 1945-1979

Burnham Management Panel Archives (1944-74), donated by Lord Alexander, Joint Secretary of the Management Panel, to City of London Polytechnic. Now transferred to Brotherton Library, University of Leeds.

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A.2 Interviews and Other Feedback

Between 1980 and 1985, a total of thirty-seven (mostly leading) Further Education policy-makers were interviewed, several of them more than once. Interviews lasted from one to three hours, were open-ended and usually conducted in the non-directive conversational style. Careful advanced preparation, drawing on archival and other data, ensured that major relevant policy issues were raised with each respondent, for comment. A major aim of the interviews was for the researcher to gain insights into respondents' views on the management of the FE system and the intentions of negotiators. Many of those interviewed expressed great interest in the research, and in consequence subsequently commented on the researcher's draft papers. Extensive written and/or oral feedback on such papers was received from a considerable number of policy-makers with first-hand experience of the particular aspects of FE policy being researched.

Interviews (* also commented on draft chapters)

Lord Alexander of Potterhill, ex-Secretary, AEC and of Management Panel, Burnham - 18 December 1984.

John Baillie,* NATFHE Executive Member and Principal of Southwark - 14 January 1981.

Dennis Bennett, Secretary, London and SE RAC and of Standing Conference of RACs (SCRAC) - 17 July 1984.

John Bevan, Ex-ILEA FE Officer, Past President NATFHE, then Secretary of NAB - 14 January 1981 and 17 June 1981.

Derek Birch,* Deputy Director, Coombe Lodge, FE Staff College - 7 March 1981.

Ted (Sir Edward) Britton,* Ex-General Secretary ATTI (NATFHE's predecessor) and NUT - 3 April 1980.

George Brosan, then Director of NELP, previously FE Officer for Middlesex - 22 December 1980 and 16 March 1981.

Peter Calvert, FE Officer, ILEA - 20 January 1984.

Phillipa Cordingly, ILEA Officer for 16-19 - 19 May 1984.

Peter Dawson, General Secretary, NATFHE - 12 and 14 February 1980.

E W Dennis, FE Officer, London Borough of Sutton - 31 January 1980 and 16 February 1981.

Tom Driver, Ex-General Secretary, ATTI in 1970s - 7 April 1980.

Bill Easton,* Treasurer, NATFHE and Principal of Southgate College - 8 May 1980.

Jean Finlayson, Report Editor, Coombe Lodge, FE Staff College - 11 October 1983.

Gerry Fowler,* Director, NELP; previously Minister of State for HE - 21 February 1983.

Alun Gronow, then LACSAB Secretariat dealing with Burnham for Management Panel - 6 January 1981.

Bert Harrison, Principal, Epsom School of Art - 12 December 1982

Joan Hooker, Senior Lecturer at Kingsway-Princeton College and ex-Regional Union Officer - 8 August 1985.

Fred Janes,* Principal, Yeovil College - 3 September 1981

Neil McClelland, Divisional Education Officer, Division 10, ILEA - 13 April 1984.

J D S McDougall, Senior FE Officer, ILEA - 20 January 1984.

David Mallen, Schools Officer, ILEA - 29 May 1984.

Jack Mansell, Ex-HOD, Paddington College, prominent in ATTI/NATFHE, then Director, FEU - 19 September 1980 and 7 January 1981.

P D Merridale,* Chairman of ACC and Hampshire Education Committee and Member of Macfarlane Members' Group - 14 July 1986.

Wilf Newbold,* FE Officer, ILEA - 20 January 1984.

David Parkes, Staff Tutor, Coombe Lodge, FE Staff College - 11 October 1983.

Eric Robinson,* then Principal, Bradford College, now Director, Lancashire Polytechnic. Prominent in ATTI/NATFHE - 20 January 1981.

David Sample, then PL in Devon FE College - 13 and 14 June 1981.

Dr Seeley, General Secretary, ATTI, late 1950s/early 1960s - 20 June 1984.

John Sellars,* Chief Executive at BTEC - 8 July 1981.

Peter Sloman,* then LEA Officer, Newham LEA, previously Education Officer at AMA; before that, DES representative on Burnham negotiations - April 1981.

David Triesman, Chairman, NATFHE's Salaries Sub-Committee - 18 December 1984.

Caroline Turney, Deputy Divisional Education Officer, Division 10, ILEA, FE Officer - 13 April 1984.

John Twining,* Director of Guildford Education Services, previously Deputy-Director, City and Guilds London Institute - 21 March 1983.

Frank Walton,* ex-LACSAB Secretariat dealing with Burnham for Management Panel (jointly with Lord Alexander of AEC) - 11 June 1984.

Derek Weitzel,* Negotiating Secretary, NATFHE - 25 March 1980.

Gordon Wheeler, Director, Coombe Lodge, FE Staff College - 11 October 1983.

In addition to the above interviews, written comments were received on early drafts of parts of the thesis from the following:

Rodney Battey, Staff Inspector (FE), Surrey County Council

Bob Challis, Coombe Lodge, FE Staff College.

Richard Clark, CEO, Hampshire County Council.

Gordon Cunningham, Education Officer, ACC.

Bryan Field, Principal, Southampton Technical College.

John Hanson, Vice-Principal, Southampton Institute of HE.

Bill Harris, formerly Assistant to Lord Alexander,
AEC/Burnham Management Panel, now Staffing Officer,
LEA Bexley.

David Hibbert, Principal, Spelthorne AEI.

R D Holgate, Vice-Principal, W R Tuson College,
Lancashire (previously FE Officer, Lancashire).

Joan Hooker, then Senior Lecturer, Kingsway-Princeton
College and previously ATTI/NATFHE Regional Officer.
Jack Latcham, Associate Staff Tutor, Coombe Lodge,
FE Staff College.

Geoffrey Melling, Principal of Coombe Lodge, FE
Staff College.

David Owen, previously Staff Inspector (FE), Surrey
County Council.

Peter Sloman, Education Officer, AMA.

Jack Sturgess, FE Officer, Hampshire County Council

Michael Watts, FE Officer, Surrey County Council.

David Whitbread, Under-Secretary (Education), ACC.

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
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