

**Policing Terrorism in Nigeria:
Challenges for the 21st Century**

CHIJOKE THEOPHILIUS MBASO

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CONTENTS

	Dedication	5
	Acknowledgement	5
	Abstract	7
	List of Acronyms	9
1.	Introduction	14
1.1	The Research Context	14
1.2	Research Aims	15
1.3	Research Questions	15
1.4	The Study Context	16
1.5	Chapter Outline	17
2.	Literature Review: Policing Terrorism	20
2.1	Introduction	20
2.2	Terrorism as Crime	23
2.2.1	The Criminal Justice Model	25
2.2.2	The War Model	26
2.2.3	Comparison of UK's CONTEST & Nigeria's NACTEST	28
2.3	Police Organisation's Role in Counter Terrorism	33
2.3.1	Police Bureaucratisation Theory	34
2.3.1.1	Bureaucratisation Theory and Bilateral Collaboration	36
2.3.1.2	Accountability and Oversight in Counter Terrorism	40
2.3.2	Police Independence: The UK & Nigeria Context	46
2.3.3	Challenges to Counter Terrorism: UK & Nigeria Context	48
2.4	Legal Definition of Terrorism in the Post 9/11 Era	50
2.4.1	United Kingdom Definition of Terrorism	51
2.4.2	Terrorism and Suspect Community	53
2.5	Terrorist Investigation	55
2.5.1	High and Low Policing	56
2.6	Surveillance and Intelligence	58
2.6.1	Surveillance and Intelligence, UK Perspective	59
2.6.2	Surveillance and Intelligence, Nigeria Perspective	63
2.7	Stop and Search Powers	64
2.8	Conclusion	67
2.9	Framing the Project	68
2.9.1	The Social Construction of Terrorism as a Crime	68
2.9.2	Social and Legal Definitions and Understandings	69
2.9.3	The Organisation of Counter Terrorism Policing	70
2.9.4	Counter Terrorism Policing Methods	71
3.	Research Methodology	72
3.1	Abstract and Introduction	72

3.2	Research Design	73
3.3	Mixed Research Methods	74
3.4	Data Collection and Process	78
3.5	Data Analysis	82
3.6	Ethical Issues	84
3.7	Limitation of Study	86
3.8	Conclusion	87
4.	Boko Haram Terrorist Group	89
4.1	Boko Haram (BH) Introduction	89
4.2	Evolution of Boko Haram	89
4.3	Boko Haram Modus Operandi	91
4.4	Nigeria's Response to Boko Haram	92
4.4.1	Buhari's Government Response to Boko Haram	93
4.5	Conclusion	95
5.	The Nigeria Police Force	97
5.1	Introduction	97
5.2	NPF Overview - Colonial Policing	97
5.2.1	Post-Colonial Policing	99
5.3	Nigeria Police & Policing	100
5.3.1	NPF in Modern Times	100
5.4	Preventing and Deterring Terrorism in Nigeria by NPF	104
5.4.1	Role of Counter Terrorist Training in Nigeria	105
5.5	Future of Policing	110
5.5.1	Cyberterrorism	110
5.5.2	Future of Policing in Nigeria	117
6.	Data Presentation and Analysis	119
6.1	Abstract & Introduction	119
6.2	Nature of Terrorism in Nigeria	120
6.3	The Structure of Counter Terrorism Policing in Nigeria	124
6.4	The Scope of and Resources for Counter Terrorism	134
6.4.1	Geographic Area of the War	134
6.4.2	Human & Financial Resources	137
6.4.3	Lack of Adequate Logistics	141
6.4.4	Proliferation of Small Arms and Weapons	143
6.4.5	Nigeria Porous Borders	145
6.4.6	Interagency Collaboration	147
6.5	NPF Responses to the Counter Terrorism Challenges	152
6.5.1	Providing Adequate Financial & Human Resources	152
6.5.2	Interagency Collaboration	154
6.5.3	Border Controls	157
6.5.4	Integrated Measures	159
6.5.5	Repressive Measures	161
6.5.6	The Role Media/social media in Terrorism in Nigeria	162
6.5.7	Terrorist Finance	168

6.5.7.1	The Role of Financial Action Taskforce	171
6.6	NPF Training and Development Reforms	179
6.6.1	Justice Administration & Counter Terrorism Policing Unit (CTU), Training Programme	182
6.6.2	International Collaboration	184
6.6.3	EU-Nigeria-UNODC-CTED Partnership Project III	185
6.6.4	UNODC-Nigeria Handbook on Counter Terrorism Investigations	194
6.7	Evaluation of NPF Training Methods	203
6.7.1	Sambisa Forest	204
6.7.2	De-radicalisation Program	208
6.8	Concluding Analysis	209
6.8.1	Understandings of Terrorism and Counter Terrorism	209
6.8.2	Resources for Counter Terrorism	211
6.8.3	Collaboration in Counter Terrorism	212
6.8.4	The National Counter Terrorism Strategy (NACTEST)	213
7.	Conclusion, Key Themes and Recommendations	215
7.1	Introduction	215
7.2	Key Concluding Themes	215
7.2.1	Understanding of Terrorism and Counter Terrorism Policing in Nigeria	216
7.2.2	Organisation of Counter Terrorism Policing in Nigeria	218
7.2.3	Challenges to Counter Terrorism Policing in Nigeria	219
7.2.4	Training and Evaluation in Counter Terrorism Policing in Nigeria	220
7.2.5	Comparison of Nigeria & United Kingdom	221
7.3	Recommendations for Policy and Professional Practice	223
7.4	Areas of Future Research	225
Appendix A	NPF & UNDOC Interview Guide	227
Appendix B	Participant Information Form	229
Appendix C	Application for Security Clearance for Research Project in Nigeria	234
Appendix D	Returned Letter of Request for Research	237
Appendix E	CSSF Nigeria Serious Organised Crime Programme	238
Appendix F	CSSF Nigeria & Justice Sector Reform Programme	240
Appendix G	Northeast Nigeria Security, Conflict & Stabilisation Programme	242
Bibliography		245

Dedication

This thesis is dedicated to my Mother and my Late Father for all your love and support. I draw inspiration from your words and love. I miss you Papa.

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Declaration of Authenticity

I declare that this thesis is entirely my own work of research. This thesis contains no material preciously published or written by another person, except where due reference has been made. Moreover, this thesis contains no material which has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma in any university and is less than 80,000 words in length.

Chijioke Theophilus Mbaso, London

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Abstract

The Policing of terrorism is a global issue. Terrorism up to date continues to destroy lives and property globally. The response to terrorism can be described as ranging from lacklustre approach to a systematic/comprehensive approach. Terrorism and Counter Terrorism research continues to present extraordinary challenges due to the secretive nature of terrorism and indeed, issues of national security by those charged with preventing and disrupting it. It means evaluating what works in terrorism and counter terrorism policing is inherently, difficult. A question of effectiveness arises as to what is it that works, whether it is working and how best to achieve it.

This is evident in Nigeria, where counter terrorism policing was not fully understood, and a lacklustre approach was applied to its understanding and response. The implications are the thousands of lives that continue to be lost, humanitarian crises in the Northeast of Nigeria and insecurity which has hindered foreign investment and continues to impoverish the country.

The thesis goes beyond policy documents, literatures, theories and approaches by providing original accounts of the policing challenges faced by the Nigerian Police Force (NPF) and the collaborative nature of the organisation with international organisations like United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), in capacity and capability building. Their views were significant in understanding policing approach and practice in the prevention and response of terrorism in Nigeria. The research project identified and analysed problems of policing terrorism from the country's precolonial era to 2018. The study focused particularly from the emergence of Boko Haram (BH), around 2000.

The findings confirm the NPF did not take the issue of terrorism seriously and ascribed it to a local issue requiring a local response. The findings demonstrate issues of collaboration, under funding, inadequate resources, porous unsecured borders and lack of training present serious challenges to the prevention and disruption of terrorism in the country. In addition, the findings confirm that the NPF and similar agencies know they lack the skill set needed to bring the issue of terrorism to a minimum.

Hence, training needs have been identified and embarked on. The findings confirm that international and regional organisations continue to play a big role in capacity and capability building with NPF and other LEAs in Nigeria. The findings confirm the big gap that exists between Nigeria and the United Kingdom (UK) in terms of the overall fundamental principles of policing, like evidence-based research, policing doctrines, criminal investigation, counter terrorism strategy, training and police professionalism geared towards policing terrorism.

List of Acronyms

AFSF	Armed Forces Special Force
AI	Amnesty International
AIGP	Assistant Inspector General of Police
ANC	African National Congress
AU	African Union
BAME	Black And Minority Ethnic
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
BH	Boko Haram
BHC	British High Commission
CBN	Central Bank of Nigeria
CFR	Council on Foreign Relations
CID	Criminal Investigation Department
CJS	Criminal Justice System
CJM	Criminal Justice Model
CLEEN	Centre for Law Enforcement Education in Nigeria
CNI	Critical National Infrastructure
COAS	Chief of Army Staff
COIN	Counter Insurgency
CONTEST	Counter Terrorism Strategy
CT	Counter Terrorism
CTC	Counter Terrorism Centre
CTU	Counter Terrorism Unit
CTIU	Counter Terrorism Intelligence Unit
CTITF	Counter Terrorism Implementation Task Force

CSSF	Conflict Stability and Security Fund
CVE	Counter Violent Extremism
EOD	Explosive Ordnance Disposal Unit
EU	European Union
DFID	Department for International Development
DIGP	Deputy Inspector General of Police
DSS	Department of State Services
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
FATF	Financial Action Task Force
GGSTC	Government Girls' Science and Technical College
GPOI	Global Peace Operations Initiative
GIABA	Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West Africa
GCHQ	Government Communications Headquarters
HRW	Human Rights Watch
HUMINT	Human Intelligence
I-ACT	Integrated Assistance for Counter Terrorism
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
ICC	Intelligence Community Committee
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IGP	Inspector General of Police
IMN	Islamic Movement in Nigeria
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IVTS	Informal Value Transfer System
INTERPOL	International Criminal Police Organisation
IPCC	Independent Police Complaints Commission

IPOB	Indigenous People of Biafra
IRA	Irish Republican Army
ISIS	Islamic State in Iraq and Syria
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
JIB	Joint Intelligence Board
JTF	Joint Task Force
KYC	Know Your Customer
LEAS	Law Enforcement Agencies
MIDAS	Migration Information and Data Analysis System
MNJTF	Multi-National Joint Task Force
NACTEST	National Counter Terrorism Strategy
NCA	National Crime Agency
NEMA	National Emergency Management Agency
NFIU	Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit
NGOS	Non-Governmental Organisations
NIA	Nigeria Intelligence Agency
NIMS	National Identity Management System
NOPRIN	Network On Police Reform In Nigeria
NPCC	National Police Chiefs' Council
NPR	National Public Radio
NPS	Nigeria Prison Service
NPF	Nigeria Police Force
NPA	Nigeria Ports Authority
NSA	National Security Adviser
NSCDC	National Security and Civil Defence Corps

NSC	Nigeria Customs Service
NIS	Nigeria Immigration Service
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
ONSA	Office of the National Security Adviser
OPSC	Operation Safe Corridor
PACE	Police and Criminal Evidence Act
PISCES	Personal Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation System
PLO	Palestinian Liberation Organisation
PNR	Passenger Name Record
PTA	Prevention of Terrorism Act
PSC	Police Service Commission
RAF	German Red Army Fraction
RIPA	Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act
SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons
SARS	Special Anti-Robbery Squads
SIGINT	Signal Intelligence
SO15	Special Branch
SSS	State Security Service
STTEP	Specialised Tasks, Training, Equipment and Protection
SSR	Security Sector Reform
SST	Security Sector Transformation
SWAPO	South West African Peoples Organisation
TI	Transparency International
TOC	Transnational Organised Crime
TRAC	Terrorism Research & Analysis Consortium

TSCTI	Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism Initiative
UN	United Nations
UNCAC	United Nations Convention Against Corruption
UNDIR	United Nations Institute for Disarmament
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNR	United Nations Resolution
UK	United Kingdom
US	United States
WAPIS	West African Police Information System
WISPI	World Internal Security and Police Index

Introduction

1.1 The Research Context

Nigeria, Africa's most populous nation, is a former British colony. The history of modern Nigeria dates to 1914, when the British Protectorates of Northern and Southern Nigeria, were joined together. Independence from the British came on October 1, 1960, with the British disengaging from all formal affairs (CIA, 2017). Nigeria is located in West Africa bordering the Gulf of Guinea, between Benin on the West and Cameroon on the East (Britannica, 2017). The United Nation's population estimate for Nigeria in 2019 is 198, 896,929 (Worldometers, 2019). Nigeria is a multinational state, with up to 250 ethnic groups with different languages, regions, customs and cultural traditions. The Hausas in the northern part of Nigeria make up 29 percent, the Yoruba in the southwest make up 21 percent, while the Igbos in the southeast makeup 18 percent (Nations Encyclopaedia, 2017).

Although, Nigeria's different ethnic languages, customs and geographical regions provides rich cultural diversity, it also presents social, economic, political and security challenges. The problems of insecurity, terrorism, transnational organised crime, cybercrime, corruption, unemployment, marginalisation, social disorder, religious intolerance between ethnic groups, and of political and economic representation, make the task of enforcing law and order particularly challenging in Nigeria (Nigeria National Security Strategy, 2014, 2019). The responsibility of enforcing law and order, maintaining civil, social and political unrest, rests on no other than the NPF.

It has been almost two decades since the 9/11 attack on the US by Al Qaeda, but its impact lives on. Nigeria has witnessed terrorist attacks and kidnappings, particularly by Boko Haram (BH) group. The group has in recent times, attacked various police stations, bombed the United Nations building in Abuja, kidnapped 276 Chibok schoolgirls and attacked various villages and towns, killing thousands of people and destroying lives and property (CFR, 2019). Additionally, insurgency in the Niger Delta and Southern region from various groups clamouring for a piece of the oil revenue has limited the revenue the country so badly needs to generate (Onuoha, 2016). On the other hand, the NPF faces extraordinary challenges to its capacity and capability in the fight to police terrorism in Nigeria

1.2 Research Aims

The dissertation seeks to identify the problems associated with policing of terrorism in Nigeria, in order to critically analyse how these problems are addressed. This was achieved by exploring policing professional practice in crime fighting and how it relates/impacts counter terrorism policing in Nigeria. The analysis focused on the NPF problems, records and practice in order to investigate how it affects the policing of terrorism in Nigeria. The analysis led to recommendations for professional practice for NPF in counter terrorism policing.

1.3 Research Questions

1. What is the nature/magnitude of the counter terrorism challenge confronting the NPF?
2. How are these challenges being met?
3. What training and development programmes are in progress/completed?
4. How are these various training initiatives being evaluated?

1.4 The Study Context

The research project commenced in 2017, with identifying and analysing relevant primary and secondary documents needed for building a thorough understanding of the research study. The study concentrated on issues of policing terrorism in Nigeria like inadequate resources, inter-agency collaboration, inadequate training, corruption, porous unsecured borders, understanding of terrorism and proliferation of weapons from 2000 to 2018. As the policing of terrorism is a global phenomenon, it was important to identify appropriate documents within the United Kingdom, United States and Nigeria. The research project is set in Nigeria and the study aims to identify problems of policing terrorism in the country and how it is being addressed.

In 2018, interviews were conducted in Nigeria with senior NPF officers on the challenges of terrorism and how it was being countered. At the time, the NPF was battling with various terrorist attacks in the Northeast of Nigeria by BH and other ongoing challenges like the Fulani herdsmen attacks in certain regions of the country which impacted the organisation's financial and human resources. The organisation was additionally, reeling from the kidnapping of 110 schoolgirls in Dapchi, that occurred in February 2018, due to a breakdown in communication between the Nigeria Army and the NPF. In 2021, the sample size was expanded to include international organisations/agencies that work with the NPF. That led to another interview with UNODC Representative in Nigeria on the extent of collaboration with NPF in capacity and capability building training. At the time, the world was battling a global pandemic that had infected and killed millions, causing a slowdown of the global economy. The thesis concludes with areas of future research and recommendations for policy and professional practice.

1.5 Chapter Outline

The dissertation is organised into seven chapters including this introduction. Chapter 2, the literature review, discusses the theoretical framework of the project from a sociological and criminological perspective. It examines relevant conceptual aspects of the policing of terrorism, including bureaucratisation theory, high and low policing and the idea of the suspect community.

The chapter additionally, analyses the notion of ‘terrorism as crime’s, the role of the police organisation in policing terrorism, accountability, counter terrorism strategies, investigation, surveillance, collaboration, intelligence and community engagement. The chapter examines UK practices in counter terrorism policing and how they relate to Nigerian practices, analysing similarities and differences in theoretical and professional practice. The chapter acknowledges that the policing of terrorism is a global issue, requiring a holistic approach by all charged with its prevention and response and a work in progress.

Chapter 3 identifies the research methodology adopted for the project, which uses mixed techniques, combining documentary analysis and semi-structured interviews. The chapter is structured into seven subtitles that were employed in the identification, collection and analysis of data for the entire project. The nature of the study under investigation informed the use of a qualitative design method by using documentary analysis and semi-structured interviews. The combination of both techniques allowed for background and evidential information to be generated in the research project, leading to the design of a detailed interview guide for further probing during the interviews. This was important in informing the analysis in Chapter 6, by

clarifying, supporting, disproving and triangulation of the data generated. The chapter concludes with the strength of the research methodology used, ethical issues encountered and the limitations of the study.

Chapter 4 discusses BH and the impacts of the group's attacks and presence on the Nigerian scene. The chapter explores the origins and evolution of the group, its modus operandi and attack history. The chapter focuses on the efforts by the Nigeria government to tackle the group and the continuing challenges being faced by the Nigeria government and its law enforcement agencies in disrupting the group. The chapter informs the analysis on Chapter 6, by providing collaborating evidence of strategies and policies adopted by the Nigeria government and law enforcement agencies in the country.

Chapter 5 describes the development of the NPF from colonial to post-colonial policing. The chapter analyses the challenges the organisation has faced, since its formation, exploring the issues of underfunding and inadequate training and development which have impacted the organisation's capacity and capability to police terrorism. As the subject of study in the research, the chapter on NPF is important in understanding the context and variables at play in the policing organisation. The chapter informs the analysis on Chapter 6, by providing concrete evidence to the systematic problems of corruption, underfunding, inadequate training, porous unsecured borders, criminalised and brutalised policing inherent, within the policing organisation and how it has affected the policing of terrorism.

Chapter 6 presents and analyses the data and findings of the research project. It focuses on the key issues identified by documentary analysis and the interview responses from senior NPF officers and UNODC. The chapter is structured into seven subtitles; The nature of terrorism in

Nigeria; The structure of counter terrorism policing in Nigeria; The scope of and resources for counter terrorism; Responses to counter terrorism challenges; NPF training and development reforms; Evolution of NPF training methods and Concluding analysis. The first four subtitles explore research questions 1&2, whilst, the other two subtitles, explores research questions 3&4. The last subtitle concludes with four key themes that underpins the chapter. The understanding of terrorism and counter terrorism; Resources; Collaboration and the National Counter Terrorism Strategy, (NACTEST).

Chapter 7 presents the Conclusion, Key Findings and Recommendations. The chapter integrates the research questions, the key themes, theoretical framing from the literature review and data analysis/findings of the completed research project. The chapter is structured into four subtitles; Introduction; Key concluding themes; Recommendations and Areas of future research. The key concluding themes is further broken into five subtitles which summaries the whole research project. The understanding of terrorism and counter terrorism in Nigeria; Organisation of counter terrorism in Nigeria; Challenges to counter terrorism in Nigeria; Training and Evaluation in counter terrorism policing in Nigeria and Comparison of Nigeria counter terrorism strategy.

Literature Review

2.1 Introduction

Terrorism has become a major security issue around the world. The atrocities of Al Qaeda on United States (US) of America in 2001, killed about 3000 people and left thousands injured. The attack signified the evolution of terrorism has dawned the globe. The attack led to major US and International Community response to the policing of terrorism around the world (Deflem, 2010; Martin, 2010, Jackson et al., 2011; Nigerian National Strategy, 2019).

In the aftermath of the attacks on the US, other countries have suffered terrorist attacks across Europe, Middle East, Asia and Africa. The attacks have killed, injured and damaged millions of pounds of infrastructure. Thus, the impact of these attacks has demonstrated the importance of law enforcement response to the policing of terrorism globally. In Nigeria, as in other parts of the world, the emergence of BH terrorist group, has led to hundreds of people kidnapped, injured, and killed. This has added more pressure onto the challenges the NPF is already facing. The impact of their attacks continues to destroy lives, causing damages worth millions and creating insecurity in the country (NACTESH, 2016; Nigeria National Security Strategy, 2019).

The importance of policing terrorism across the globe and in Nigeria cannot be over emphasised. Research in counter terrorism policing is plagued by a lack of primary data due to the inherent secretive nature of terrorist groups and indeed, law enforcement response to terrorist atrocities. This continues to present on going challenges to police organisations globally (Broduer, 1983; Broduer and Depeyron, 1993; Silke, 2003; Thiel, 2009 Deflem, 2010). This is

evident in Nigeria, where research in counter terrorism policing, is simply rare. Most of the works that exist deal with police corruption, brutality, reform, welfare, operations, logistics, community policing and problems of policing (Tamuno, 1970; Hills, 2008; Alemika, 2010; Human Rights Watch, 2010; CLEEN, 2011; Forest, 2012; Akinlabi, 2013; Owen, 2014; Cilliers, 2015; Transparency International, 2017; Amnesty International, 2017).

Consequently, the chapter will focus on the aspects of the literature on policing in Nigeria, which will be linked to counter terrorism analysis within the UK and US. The chapter will identify and analyse various policing terrorism contemporary issues. These will be compared to issues of policing terrorism in Nigeria and how it relates/supports the research objective. The literature review will be theoretically framed and analysed from a socio-political and criminological point of view. The literature review explores bureaucratisation theory by Max Weber, Hillyard's (1993), work on suspect community, Hall et al., (1978), work on social control and Brodeur's (1983), work on High and Low policing in the framing and analysing of the literature.

Terrorism as crime analyses the debate on terrorism and its connection to crime. It explores the various conceptualisation of terrorism and its complex understanding in the academic and international arena and how best to police it. The issues of definition, resources, collaboration, legal and how best to counter it. This is related to the research objective in terms of the nature of the counter terrorism challenges faced by the NPF, how it is being countered and training and development needs for the NPF. How can the NPF fight a war on terrorism, when they do not understand the nature of the threat they are facing. Do they have the required training and resources? How is terrorism conceptualised by NPF and policy makers?

Legal definition of terrorism highlights the issues of a legal framework of terrorism so policy makers can be able to proscribe it. It means that with a legal framework, law enforcement agencies can disrupt and investigate terrorism without being worried of infringing on fundamental human rights. In addition, the analysis leads to the idea of suspect community and social control. This is related to the research objectives in terms of the challenges of policing terrorism and how it is being countered in Nigeria. The public mistrust of the police in Nigeria, has hindered intelligence collection and collaboration effort. To win the war on terrorism globally, wining hearts and minds is vital.

Terrorism Investigation analyses the complex nature of investigating terrorism not just in Nigeria, but globally. The issue of surveillance, intelligence collection and analysis, and the secretive nature of both the affairs of terrorist and those charged with countering it, makes evaluating terrorist investigation complex. This meets all the research objectives, as it highlights the challenges like the nature of the terrorism threat, training, collaboration efforts, capacity building efforts and the issues of training intervention from the UK and US in Nigeria. Surveillance and Intelligence which are part of terrorism investigations features the issues of intelligence collection and surveillance techniques and the impact it has on suspect communities in the UK especially the Muslim community. It identifies the issues of intelligence sharing and collaboration amongst law enforcement agencies (LEAs). In relating this to the research objectives, it is the lack of surveillance and intelligence and inter agency rivalry, which impacts LEAs in Nigeria, in countering terrorism. It indicates the lack of logistics, skills and training needed to challenge the threat.

Stop and Search highlights the controversial use of the power in the UK and minority groups who feel they are being targeted. It also deals with issues the power of stop and search is causing in terms of damaging police/public relations. In relation to the research objectives, the use of this power by police in Nigeria has led to extra judicial killings and corruption at police and military road checkpoints which has hindered intelligence collection from the public in the fight to police terrorism.

2.2 Terrorism as Crime

Crenshaw (2007:127), remarks that “terrorism is a complex and contradictory phenomenon. It has no single model, type, structure or organisation.” She further remarks that the oversimplification of the terrorist threat cannot lead to an effective response. An effective response to terrorism would depend on how terrorism is perceived and approached by those concerned with addressing its nuisance.

Deflem (2010), is of similar view, and believes that terrorism is not just complex but involves multiple domestic and international forms. Importantly, this suggests that terrorism has many dimensions to its understanding and cuts across different socio-political and geographic dimension. Schmid (2004), remarks that terrorism has implicitly, been defined in various contexts to include, as crime, politics, war, propaganda, communication and religion. He contends that activities commonly carried out by terrorist are mostly illegal due to its illegitimate use of violence on civilians. This implies that terrorism can be perceived as a crime and both the criminal justice model, and the war model can be used to counter and disrupt the activities of terrorist. This has led to debate in the academic and professional circle, about what model is appropriate for conceptualising and countering terrorism.

According to Crelinsten (2009), how terrorism is conceived determines largely how it is countered and the resources, money and framework devoted to the effort. He remarks that if terrorism is conceived as a type of criminal activity, states would likely tackle it through policing and legal measure. If it is conceived as a result of oppression and political conflict, states may try to bring in reform and negotiate with leaders of militant groups.

Crelinsten makes a valid point on the state of terrorism related violence and its place in the security architecture of law enforcement agencies and governments. He notes that some scholars have argued that terrorism is the central security threat of our time. Others like Crenshaw and Forest, argue that it is a minor security issue compared to issues of pandemic or global warming. Others have remarked that terrorism related violence pales in comparison to other forms of crimes or even the daily carnage of traffic accidents experienced in many industrial states. In Africa/Nigeria, terrorism is a serious security challenge added to other security threats like armed, social and ethnic conflicts the continent is grappling it.

According to Crenshaw (1993: xiii), terrorism is not an “*isolated phenomenon in Africa*”. She argues, that in Africa, terrorism has always manifested in the form of insurgencies, civil wars, communal conflicts, military coups and government repression. Forest and Giroux (2011), supports Crenshaw’ s view and further remark that terrorism in Africa, is just one of the several types of political violence states and their citizens have to grapple with. They also remark that terrorism in Africa, may not be the greatest security challenge the continent faces.

The challenge of endemic poverty, corruption, famine, drought, disease, and other man-made disasters have been on the forefront of security challenges in Africa. According to the Nigeria Security Strategy (2014, 2019), terrorism from BH is just one of the challenges the country

faces, poverty, corruption, armed robbery, kidnapping, Fulani herdsman conflict, religious/communal clashes and the rise of militancy in the Niger/Delta region all count to the numerous challenges the country faces.

According to Crelinsten (2009:44-48), getting the conception of terrorism wrong, leads to what he calls “*wrong-headed approach*”. He notes that approaches to the response of terrorism varies and should be considered to find the best option in light of the kind of terrorism. In his study, he identifies five approaches to counter terrorism which should be considered depending on the context of the terrorism event. The study categorises the approaches in opposites: short-term/long-term (tactical/strategic), coercive/persuasive, offensive/defensive, reactive/proactive, local/global (domestic/international). Importantly, it is worth looking at the two main traditional models of counter terrorism tools adopted by most states. The criminal justice model and the war model relies on coercive capacity of the state (Martin, 2003; Crelinsten, 2009; Jackson et al., 2011). The models will be considered below as it plays an important role in the policing of terrorism in Nigeria.

2.2.1 The Criminal Justice Model

In the criminal justice model of counter terrorism, the police carry the primary responsibility with other elements of the criminal justice system like the prisons and courts involved as well. According to Crelinsten (2009), the criminal justice model treats terrorism as crime. This is because most of the terrorist acts constitute crime already defined in criminal codes of various nations. This model places emphasis on the criminal intent of the terrorist act not the political or ideological motive, thereby, removing any special status the atrocity of terrorist attracts. Crelinsten, remarks that, apart from the criminal justice model performing a delegitimization

function, it also, performs various functions like an educative function, rehabilitative function, an incapacitation function to name but a few.

2.2.2 The War Model

In the war model, the military carry the primary responsibility. The war model relies on the maximum use of power designed to overcome the enemy. According to Crelinsten (2009), the war model treats terrorism as if it was a war or insurgency. It is worth noting that treating terrorism as a war legitimises terrorism and treats the terrorist with the status of equal partner. Traditionally, military option was used as a last resort until recently. It is worth asking if a war on terrorism can be won given that terrorism is not a state or person rather a strategy or an ideology. How can progress in the war on terrorism be measured, given that success in a war is mostly defined by a win or defeat.

The war model presents extraordinary challenges due to the unconventional nature of the war, fighting an enemy imbedded in the civilian population with no identifiable uniform/insignia, and what due process to accord those enemy combatants when captured? Nevertheless, policy makers consider this model to be quick, effective and suited to new threats posed by decentralised ideological terrorist groups who are not deterred by the traditional criminal justice model (Crelinsten, 2009).

In analysing both models, it is evident that both models rely on the use of force. Whilst it can be argued that the criminal justice model relies on legitimate use of state violence, the war model can be said to rely on illegitimate use of state violence. Whilst the former deals with arrest, bail, interrogation, trial, imprisonment, execution and counter terrorism, the latter deals with abduction, extortion, torture, targeted killings, kangaroo court, forcible confinement, extra

judicial killings, war crimes, drone attack, and state terrorism to name but a few. English, (2009), remarks that in counter terrorism it is more important to look at longer term solutions rather short-term violence solution of an eye to an eye type. He notes that despite frequent assumption that military retaliation can deter future terrorist events, the reality seems very different. According to Silke (2003), defeating or diminishing the overall threat of terrorism is not something that either small or large-scale military retaliation have yet been able to achieve.

In Nigeria, for instance, the battle between BH and Nigerian LEAs as described by the Nigeria National Security Strategy (2014, 2016) policy document is viewed as a war that requires the use of the military power to counter the group. Even though, both the war and criminal justice model are used in the country in the policing of terrorism. The police in Nigeria and policy implementers on the other hand, view terrorism as a new form of evolving crime, which they are trying to grapple with. Hence, they lack the required skills and resources to prevent and disrupt terrorist related violence gripping the country (Azazi, 2012; Udounwa, 2013; Nigeria National Security Strategy, 2014; NACTEST, 2016). According to the Nigeria National Counter Terrorism Strategy (NACTEST 2016), terrorism in its current form is relatively new in Nigeria, even though terrorism in Nigeria, dates back to the 1950s in Kano. The use of suicide terrorism by BH and the devastation the group causes makes their atrocities the most serious security threat confronting the country. The use of suicide terrorism by BH, took terrorism in Nigeria, by private actors to a level never seen before.

In contrast, in the UK, and the US, where they have some history of terrorism, the threat is perceived differently. Terrorism in the UK is viewed as a crime of national security that requires special attention. It involves all stakeholders like academia, private sector, law enforce-

ment, local and regional government officials, NGOs and indeed, the community in its prevention and disruption. It highlights the importance of the police organisation, security services and the community in the fight to counter terrorism. According to the UK Government (2009), Counter Terrorism Strategy (CONTEST), it reinforces the need that counter terrorism cannot be carried out in isolation. It is an issue that affects the public and all communities, hence, the public should play a part in fighting it. The latest UK Government (2018), CONTEST, continues to evolve to meet the changing terrorist threat especially, after the London and Manchester terrorist attacks in 2017.

2.2.3 Comparison of UK's CONTEST & Nigeria's NACTEST

In comparing and analysing the UK CONTEST and Nigerian NACTEST, it is worth mentioning that most counter terrorism strategies across the globe all aim to achieve the same purpose in theory. In summary, to prevent terrorism and disrupt the atrocities of terrorist from happening and indeed, when a terrorist attack happens, to manage the incident and bring perpetrators to justice in the most effective and efficient way possible through state power. Both the UK CONTEST and the Nigerian NACTEST, share this overall objective (HM Government, 2018; NACTEST, 2016). CONTEST and NACTEST share similarities in terms of preventing and disrupting terrorism, countering terrorism finance and building capacity and capability through bilateral/multilateral cooperation and information exchange as adopted by UN resolution (1269 1999; 1368, 1373, 2001).

As noted by Silke (2011), counter terrorism by the state can take a variety of forms, from the use of special counter terrorism legislation to the creation of specialist police, military, to repressive, negotiated settlement and otherwise (Martin, 2003; Crelinsten, 2009; Silke, 2011).

Looking at both strategies an immediate difference is noticeable. Whilst CONTEST is organised around four key principles known as the four P's (Prevent, Pursue, Protect and Prepare), NACTEST is organised around five key principles (Forestall, Secure, Identify Prepare and Implement), (NACTEST, 2016; HM Government, 2018).

Interestingly, like most counter terrorism strategies across the globe, the key difference is in their manner of implementation, which is what distinguishes CONTEST from NACTEST. Martin (2010), remarks that the key in every counter terrorism measure is the practicality of the measure, in other words, will the measure work and what will be the effects of the measures. The practise of counter terrorism is very different in both countries. The UK in implementing CONTEST uses the criminal justice model, which involves the police, judiciary, the courts, the intelligence agencies, private initiatives and members of the public. The policy gives the mandate of countering terrorism in the country to the police supported by the intelligence agencies, which is an indication of the confidence placed in the policing organisation in the country. The policy in practise through integrated relationship brings together various partners like LEAs, private sector, academia and the public in other to better protect the country (Theil, 2009; HM Government, 2018).

The role of academic research is paramount as it continues to improve the understanding of terrorism and counter terrorism policing across the globe. However, CONTEST has had its problems especially with the Prevent strand, which commentators argue has become a “toxic brand” or as one scholar put it, *a toxic legacy* (Theil, 2009; Innes et al, 2011:18:20; The Guardian, 2015). Lowe (2017), remarks on the divisiveness of the Prevent strand in the UK and argues for a re-branding of Prevent which has been used as a surveillance tool on BAME communities.

As noted by UK Counter terrorism chief, to win the fight against extremism, the country must improve community cohesion, social mobility and education (The Guardian, 2019). The implementation of CONTEST has left BAME groups frustrated, as they have become the new suspect community. The implementation of Prevent has hindered intelligence collection from BAME communities due to the distrust that exist between the police on the one hand and these communities on the other hand. Nonetheless, the policy and indeed, the practise of CONTEST continues to be evaluated and reformed to meet changing time through dialogue, training, research and evidence-based practises (Thiel, 2009; Innes et al 2011; HM Government, 2018).

In drawing a closer parallel, just as in the UK Prevent strand, with what is happening in Nigeria, it can be noted that similar distrust exists between LEAs and the public. Whilst, the UK's, can be said to be more targeted at certain groups, the distrust that exist in Nigeria is not on any targeted group but on the general masses. It is worth stating that the distrust is not new, it has existed for decades limiting public and LEA's partnership which is vital for information and intelligence sharing.

The key difference is the use of repression and disregard for civil liberties by LEAs. As noted by Deflem (2010), the counter terrorism practises by LEAs in the West, do not come close to attaining the level of repression and ruthlessness in counter terrorism practises in states that are less committed to democratic principles. The level of repression and disregard for civil liberties has marred the war on terrorism in Nigeria, as widespread pattern of torture and ill- treatment in both police and military custody has occurred and documented by AI and other NGOs. Deflem (2010), further remarks that counter terrorism police operations in countries with less commitment to democratic principles takes on a militaristic character dominated by military operations. This is no different to what is happening in Nigeria.

As stated in NACTEST (2016), the Forestall strand, aims to create opportunity and hope for people in the affected communities and restore their faith in the government. The Secure strand aims to improve protective security for crowded places such schools, motor parks, shopping malls, marketplaces and worship centres. Ironically though, none of these aims have been actualised as the people have lost faith in the government, due to the terrorist atrocities and LEAs repressive tactics. Kidnapping for ransom has increased gradually, not just in the Northeast but all over the country. Atrocities as documented by AI (2015), notes that since 2011, Nigeria Security Forces have arrested up 20,000 people of which most were men and boys rounded up during house-to-house raids and at checkpoints. Reports indicate boys as young as nine years old were detained and women and girls. This cast serious doubt to the overall objectives of the NACTEST strategy.

The implementation of NACTEST on the other hand, is torn between the War model and the CJM, which makes its implementation confusing in comparison to CONTEST. The policy does not specifically state the overall lead agency in the operation of the policy rather hands out roles to various agencies like the Military, Intelligence and Police coordinated by the ONSA (NACTEST, 2016; Falode, 2019). One would have expected the NPF to be the lead agency in counter terrorism given the country's move from military dictatorship to democratic dispensation and the police being in a better position to use their civil policing skills within the community to flush out terrorists who are embedded within the population. This would show confidence in the policing organisation and improve the much-needed capacity and capability of the organisation (Falode, 2019). Martin (2010), notes that the police usually, takes the lead role in terrorist investigation with other LEAs playing a support role because acts of terrorism are criminal behaviours which have been defined within the CJM.

The difference in implementation between CONTEST and NACTEST is so clear-cut that NACTEST needed another strand (Implement) to remind policy makers on how to implement the policy. Why NACTEST needed an Implement strand is baffling, given that all formulated policies are there to be implemented at some stage. In addition, the UK has the office of an Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation that reviews the conduct and application of terrorism legislation in the country by LEAs which Nigeria doesn't have. The role is an interesting one because it allows for some review to be carried out by an independent person supported by academic advisers with all the necessary information from LEAs in the country. In the end, recommendations are made to the government to adopt.

Another key difference in the practise of the two policies is the difference in their geographic operation and the context that goes with it. The UK is a first world country and Nigeria is a third world which means implications for politics, security, economic transformation, rule of law, corruption, accountability and otherwise. Whilst, CONTEST has its problems, the policy operates in a more stable environment compared to Nigeria where the instability of insecurity, militancy, repression, unsecured border, infrastructure decay, corruption, poverty, religious, cultural and ethnic clashes has marred the operation of the policy (NACTEST, 2016; Falode, 2019; Nigeria Security Strategy, 2019).

In putting this into perspective, is the role of international organisations and collaboration in the fight to counter terrorism. The UK, regional and other international organisations like International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), International Organisation for Migration (IOM), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), European Union Agency for Law Enforcement (EUROPOL), Financial Action Task Force (FATF), Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA), UNODC and

otherwise, have and continue to play a part in capacity and capability technical assistance to the NPF and other agencies in the country. This is not to say that NACTEST is not fit for purpose, to the contrary, its formulation and implementation has exposed the realities and inadequacies that exist on the ground.

In conclusion, both CONTEST and NACTEST share the same main objectives and rich in theoretical ideas however, they vary in the context of their implementation added to the issue of the effectiveness of both strategies. Evaluating what works or what is working in both strategies and indeed, most counter terrorism strategies across the globe remains difficult to evaluate. Not to say, there has not been success stories but research in this area remains thin due to the lack of transparent and rigorous method for tracing the effects of a particular counter terrorism measures/policies (Townsend, 2002; Lum et al; 2006; Silke, 2011).

The UK has had years of experience in the area of counter terrorism under her belt whilst, NACTEST, formulated in 2014, was Nigeria's foremost counter terrorism strategy, a lot in the area of technical expertise, security infrastructure upgrade, good governance, professional practise and otherwise, remains to be expected and achieved. Nevertheless, both strategies contends that intelligence, information sharing, innovation and collaboration of LEAs who play a big role with their expertise of responding to crime and terrorism is essential. Hence, the role of the police organisation in policing terrorism is vital and demands scrutiny.

2.3 Police Organisation's Role in Counter Terrorism

Police organisations all over the world play an important role in the prevention, disruption, investigation and bringing offenders to prosecution that have committed crime. Today's realities of terrorism related violence further, puts the importance of their role in the forefront of

counter terrorism policing. Kelling and Bratton (2006), remark that police organisations play an important role in defeating terrorism, which is no different to crime. They argue that counter terrorism should be woven into the everyday workings of every police department. Consequently, the new role should be imparted to police officers on the street so that terrorism prevention becomes part of their everyday thinking.

According to Deflem (2010:4), police organisations across the world are heavily involved in counter terrorism activities by investigating cases of terrorism, organising cooperation amongst various agencies across national borders. He remarks that policing activities continue to evolve even when political leaders and legislators fail to implement concrete counter terrorism measures. He introduces what he calls the “*bureaucratisation theory of Policing*” from Max Weber’s work in 1922. (Weber, 1922; Deflem, 2000, 2002, 2004a, 2010).

2.3.1 Police Bureaucratisation Theory

The theory from a police perspective argues that counter terrorism is not a matter of war directed at the enemies but as a matter of crime control directed at criminal suspects approached from a professional standard of policing. The theory maintains that police organisations have over their existence, gained a position of relative independence by execution of their duties and expertise in crime prevention and disruption.

This has been achieved by the use of modern, sophisticated means of criminal investigation, which is an expression of police autonomy, specialisation, professionalism and development in the function of crime control and order maintenance. It means that for countries like Nigeria,

and other third world countries, acquiring professional training, development and policing expertise remain paramount in order to meet daily policing duties and challenges of preventing and disrupting terrorism in a changing global world.

The theory of police bureaucratisation also accounts for police development at national and international levels. This is in terms of police organisation acting unilaterally, through transnational liaisons in foreign countries. International cooperation amongst police organisation takes place bilaterally between one police force and another. Finally, international cooperation amongst police organisation around the world is of a collaborative type rather than the formation of some “supranational force”(Deflem, 2010:20).

This theory is significant because it points to the independence and professionalism of police organisation around the world. It indicates that police organisations have acquired the training and development needed to carry out their duties especially, in counter terrorism policing. Therefore, police organisation in times of insecurity such as terrorist atrocities, should be allowed to use their crime fighting expertise and training in disrupting and responding to the terrorist threat by using the principle of the criminal justice system, which they understand and deal with on a daily basis.

However, Deflem (2010), stresses on the political context in which terrorism exists. He contends that the political treatment of terrorism as an issue of national security puts pressure on police organisations to align their efforts to government policy but also enables expansion of police powers in counterterrorism. The theory stresses the independence of police organisations professionally and how police organisations through their knowledge and experience of dis-

rupting other forms of crime, have stood them in good stead to address terrorism. This independence of knowledge and expertise is expressed when western police organisations share their crime fighting experience and knowledge by bilateral collaboration in Africa, Asia and the rest of the world.

2.3.1.1 Bureaucratisation Theory and Bilateral Collaboration

In Nigeria, bureaucratisation theory accounts for the British and American governments signing memorandum of understanding to aid in training the NPF and the military in counter terrorism capacity building and terrorist insurgency tactics. Between 2002 and 2009, the Department for International Development (DFID), has channeled some £37 million to reforming or improving Nigeria's security and justice sector to include programmes like community-based policing, problem-oriented policing and police-public partnerships (Tilley, 2003; OSCE, 2008; 311–339; Udounwa, 2013).

Furthermore, in (2012), the United Nations Counter Terrorism Implementation Taskforce (CTITF) unveiled three projects under the Integrated Assistance for Counter Terrorism (I-ACT) program to support the Nigerian government in addressing the problems of terrorism in the country. The projects aim to educate and create awareness in Nigeria and finding the most appropriate preventive measures to issues of terrorism by promoting peace.

Additionally, other Non-Profit Organisations, international organisations and domestic ones have all played a part in technical assistance, humanitarian assistance, training, research, compliance, oversight and monitoring of government counter terrorism strategies ensuring that the rule of law is always upheld. These organisations like the UN, UNODC, INTERPOL, IOM, ECOWAS, EUROPOL, FATF, GIABA, DFID, USAID, Human Rights Watch (HRW), AI,

Transparency International (TI), Network on Police Reform in Nigeria (NOPRIN) and Centre for Law Enforcement Education (CLEEN), have collaborated with the NPF and other LEAs in the country on research, security reform, capacity and capability programmes.

Technical assistance has occurred in the areas of joint training, terrorist investigations, terrorist finance, border control, provision of equipment, justice sector reform and importantly research which continues to improve understanding in security, policing and counter terrorism in Nigeria and across the globe. According to Amnesty International (2015), report, Nigeria has signed MoU with seventeen other countries on military cooperation for joint military exercises and exchange of training programmes. These countries are Belarus, Brazil, China, Democratic Republic of Korea, France, Germany, Ghana, India, Liberia, Pakistan, Romania, Russia, Sao Tome and Principe, Serbia, Turkey, UK, and the USA (CTITF, 2012; FATF, 2013, 2016; GIABA, 2014, 2016, 2020; AI, 2015, 2016; HM Government, 2018; HRW, 2010, 2016; UNODC, 2019; NOPRIN, 2010; CLEEN, 2012).

In 2019, Nigeria and INTERPOL signed a MoU on implementation of the European Union-funded West African Police Information System (WAPIS) programme. This is a welcomed development as the initiative aims to increase the capacity of West African law enforcement authorities in disrupting transnational organised crime and terrorism through enhance information management and sharing (Europa, 2019; INTERPOL, 2019). The UNODC continues to provide and collaborate with the NPF in various project. In November 2019, the organisation in partnership with the EU and the NPF launched a handbook on counter terrorism investigation in Nigeria. The launching of the handbook is a longstanding EU-Nigeria-UNODC-CTED Partnership Project to support Nigeria to strengthen criminal justice measures for preventing and countering terrorism and violent extremism in the country (UNODC, 2021b).

Importantly these organisations continue to drive academic research in all areas of security, crime, corruption, justice sector, humanitarian assistance, public sector reform and government policy. The importance of academic research cannot be overstated especially in the security and counter terrorism area where reliable and concrete information is hard to obtain. Academic research and training from these various organisations continue to improve understanding and evidence-based practises. These organisations continue to fund academic research and development, providing original and empirical work that provides insight into issues that would otherwise, be unknown to the public. AI and other NGOs, over the years have documented human rights violations and abuses in Nigeria and provided information on cases of human rights violations and proposed recommendations to the government (HRW, 2010; AI, 2015, 2019).

International Organisations have helped in oversight responsibilities, compliance and holding the Nigeria government accountable. This has in no doubt, provided the needed pressure on the Nigeria government and her LEAs to comply and abide by the rule of law otherwise, risk international sanctions, damage to bilateral cooperation, further damage to the country's reputation and withdrawal of funding from various funded programmes (OECD, 2007; CTITF, 2012; DFID, 2013; UNODC, 2019). According to Forest (2012), Nigerians prefer the involvement of NGOS in resolving disputes or addressing security problems due to the brutal use of force, criminal policing and endemic corruption by agents of the state. As noted by DFID (2000), it is important to improve civic awareness of security issues by monitoring, dialogue and provision of assistance from specialist external campaigning groups or think tanks providing research and analytical support to government and the public where necessary. These NGOs continue to document repressive measures by the Nigeria Security Services through research in the ongoing counter terrorism fight.

According to a (2015), AI Report (*stars on their shoulders, blood on their hands*), on the Nigeria Military, the report documents human rights abuses which constitutes international war crimes. The report noted that the military had extrajudicially executed more than 1,200 people, 7,000 deaths in detention, 20,000 arrested, committed countless acts of torture, enforced disappearances, extreme overcrowding and denial of due legal process. The report is based on more than 412 interviews with victims, their relatives, eyewitnesses, human rights activists, doctors, journalists, lawyers and military sources. As the report noted, in 2014, one of the most horrific mass extrajudicial executions by the military happened on 14 March 2014, in Maiduguri, Borno State. In the aftermath of a BH attack on the military detention facility at Giwa barracks during which the detainees were released, the military killed at least 640 men and boys, most of them recaptured detainees.

This report also remarks on the corruption which has undermined the fight to counter terrorism in Nigeria due to high level corruption that has led to diversion of funds, shortages and poor maintenance of military equipment/logistics to soldiers being underpaid (AI, 2015). The report goes on to note that due to shortage of troops, the mandatory six-month rotation term that was in place for the JTF was no longer respected – some troops have stayed for two years or more. The combination of all these factors, low morale, corruption, lack of resources, impunity for violence, human rights abuses, has created a wedge between LEAs and the civilian population hindering the fight to disrupt terrorism in the country (Musah, 2009; Police Reform, 2008; HRW, 2010; AI, 2015).

These organisations in Nigeria and elsewhere in Africa, provide a voice for the people in a system where corruption, human right abuses and impunity go unpunished. The role AI and other NGOs play in advocacy hasn't endeared them to the NPF, the military and those in power.

According to Guardian (2018), report, the Nigerian Government is concerned about the role AI is playing in the war against terrorism in Nigeria. The report remarks, that it appears the Nigeria Government is fighting two wars, one on BH and the other with AI. The organisation was being accused of fictitious allegations of alleged human rights abuses against the Nigerian security forces which was damaging the troops morale. Hence, calls for the offices of the organisation in Nigeria to be closed, continues to be echoed by the military and some in Government (The Guardian, 2018; News24, 2018).

2.3.1.2 Accountability and Governance in Counter Terrorism

As the literature indicates, counter terrorism practises of NPF and the military is marred with criminal policing and repressive measures which has led to distrust with the public, lack of intelligence and inter agency feuds between various agencies. Accountability or lack thereof, is an important element in day-to-day policing activities. Ekemenah (2019), remarks that the public views LEAs in the country as lawless entities because they consider themselves above the law in their behaviours and actions. He remarks that there have been little structural changes in civil-military relations over the years. The relationship is still characterised by overt and covert hostility.

In the fight on counter terrorism in Nigeria, the ONSA is responsible for planning, coordinating and monitoring the activities of the JTF however, in reality the body has no such powers and is usually by passed by the military making any accountability difficult to enforce. International and Regional Organisations such as AI, TI, HRW, UNODC, DFID, ECOWAS, FATF, GIABA, continue to play a part in advocacy, provision of equipment, capacity and capability building, oversight and holding the government accountable for the atrocities of its LEAs in the fight to counter terrorism in Nigeria (NACTEST, 2016; Ekemenah, 2019). According to UNODC

(2011: iv), *accountability is defined as a system of internal and external checks and balances aimed at ensuring that police carry out their duties properly and are held responsible if they fail to do so.*

Accountability is important because it ensures that police organisations and other LEAs in the country do not misuse their powers and privileges with impunity. Accountability ensures police professionalism, standards and code of ethics are always upheld. This on the other hand, breeds public confidence and trust in the system. As noted by UNODC (2011:7), *achieving public confidence is key to effective policing where police functions can be carried out on the basis of legitimacy rather than force.* Accountability in practise involves different bodies, like governmental agencies/ministries, parliament, industry professionals, civil society, police service commissions, independent agencies and advocacy groups playing a part on how police organisations perform their role in society. This is especially so, in the way police and other agencies conduct themselves and, in the way, force is used (UNODC, 2011; Lawal, 2020).

According to Okenyodo (2016), the absence of a functional accountability mechanisms has allowed corruption to persist within the NPF. He notes that oversight functions are marred by partisan appointments to key management posts. Nonetheless, the country continues to face numerous security challenges of violent crimes, terrorism, organised crime marred with corruption and human right abuses which in recent times, has thrust the issue of police and LEA accountability on the forefront. The war on terrorism in Nigeria has exposed the atrocities of the NPF and the Nigeria army's involvement in extrajudicial killings, human rights abuse, corruption with impunity, calling into question whether any oversight of these institutions exist (HRW, 2010; Okenyodo, 2016; AI, 2009; 2015; Lawal, 2020).

Amnesty International (2009), notes that internal investigations which can lead to disciplinary actions lacks any transparency and independence which has entrenched LEA's impunity in the country. Calls for police and military accountability in Nigeria are arguably, a nonstarter due to the political vested interests associated with it. The history of military dictatorship in Nigeria makes any civilian oversight and accountability difficult as the military will not take orders from civilians, are secretive about their operational dealings and flout the rule of law especially in Nigeria and elsewhere in Africa with weak democratic institutions (UNODC, 2011 Okenyodo, 2016; Lawal, 2020). The requirements for effective accountability in Nigeria would include legislations that specifies the functions of police and military powers, the ability for the public to express their concerns, adequate reporting and monitoring channels, supervision and monitoring of police action by police leadership, and civilian and independent oversight. (UNODC, 2011; Lawal, 2020). Accountability and governance bodies can assist and are assisting in counter terrorism in Nigeria in various areas.

UNODC and DFID provide training in capacity and capability in justice and security sector reform. UNODC continues to work with the NPF, other LEAs and CJS to strengthen and improve the capacity of these agencies to tackle the terrorism menace in the country. This has been achieved through various legal ratification and criminal justice response to terrorism and violent extremism. In other words, countering terrorism whilst, guided by the rule of law and respect for human rights. Also, a Conflict, Stability and Security Fund (2016), programme which ended in March 2020, by DFID in Nigeria, focussed on improved legislative oversight and accountability of Nigeria's security sector through citizen participation in legislative processes.

According to the key findings, there has been improved engagement by the National Assembly on security sector governance and legislation and an improved inter agency coordination on election security management which reduced violence in targeted areas. There is also the introduction of Community Safety Partnerships in four targeted locations which has provided forums for communities to raise community security concerns to the NPF and other LEAs directly. However, issues remain. Issues of military coordination with other policing agencies and voting down of the Police Bill by the lower house of Parliament (CSSF, 2016).

In Nigeria, several civil and government oversight bodies exist, but most of these bodies are toothless and powerless. These are the Police Service Commission, the Ministry of Interior, and the Police Council and other oversight bodies led by the legislative and judicial branches of government. In practise, Nigeria's Police Service Commission (PSC) is the main civilian supervisory and oversight body of the NPF. It should be one of the most powerful bodies in the country responsible for appointments, promotions, and disciplinary action in the NPF, but this is not the case. As noted by Amnesty International (2009), Okenyodo (2016) and Ekemenah (2019), the issues of political interference, resources, budgetary constraints, and the inability of the commission to set up and maintain a functional investigative unit—have affected its disciplinary functions over the NPF, thus, robbing the PSC of its importance. This contrasts with the apparatus in the UK.

In the UK complaints and discipline are key to police accountability. The system that operates in the UK has over the years been a topic of political scrutiny leading to reforms in 2014 and 2020 (Brown, 2020). The new reform transforms the previous Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC), into the new Independent Office for Police Conduct (IOPC); the intro-

duction of Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) into the complaints system; the simplification of the complaints system and the introduction of some independence into the police discipline system.

The findings of 2019/2020 crime survey in England and Wales indicated 60% of respondent had been dissatisfied with the police in the last five years and only 10% of respondent complained in that time period, raising concerns of lack of public confidence in the police complaints system (Office for National Statistics, 2020). Ojo (2021), believes that the preceding years of austerity between 2010-2019, has had a range of effects on community safety in the UK. He notes that persistent cuts have led to cuts in frontline services, voluntary and compulsory redundancies, restructuring and increased workload, leading to the prioritising of core, mandatory services to the detriment of other deemed nonessential services. Roycroft (2016), study on Police Chiefs in the UK, supports the above argument and notes that the structure and level of accountability in UK has changed considerably in the last five years leading to increased accountability with fewer resources. The UK system hasn't been perfect hence, the latest reforms, but the system works through recording, referral, handling and review of complaints.

In counter terrorism there is also the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation (IRTL) in the UK, whose role is to inform the public and political debate on anti-terrorism law, overseeing implementation of counter terrorism laws as fair, necessary and proportionate. The IRTL is completely independent from the government with access to national security information from all LEAs. Findings and recommendations are prepared for the Home Secretary for discussions in parliament and for the government to adopt (Home Office, 2019b, 2021).

It is hard to measure the effectiveness of the role or whether the IRTL is truly independent. Lynch (2012) and Blackburn (2014), note that there has been limited academic critique of the role of the IRTL. It has to be noted that the independent reviewer's recommendations are not binding to the government but most of its recommendations have been adopted by the UK government. There have been instances where the government has favoured the opinions of the independent reviewer over those of the Joint Committee on Human Rights (JCHR) and the courts and instances where they have rejected some of the recommendations of the IRTL (Blackburn, 2014).

Australia has adopted this model of independent reviewer of terrorism legislation which gives credence to the role. Perhaps, this may be of benefit to Nigeria. Although, counter terrorism in the UK is different from Nigeria, an independent reviewer would help in the scrutiny of legislation, operation of the Terrorism (Prevention) (Amendment) Act, 2013, human rights abuses, repressive measures, the role of ONSA which has become redundant, the use of force, defense budget on terrorism, intelligence collection and coordination. However, civilian oversight like an independent reviewer in Nigeria would struggle to work. This is because of the powerful Nigeria military that would hardly be reined in by civilian bodies or even by ONSA that is headed by a retired army chief.

Another issue is the weak democratic institutions and corruption that allows political and military elites to operate outside the law without any serious consequences. Nevertheless, an independent reviewer might possibly work in Nigeria, if all the right measures were put in place. It would work best if it was a committee of academic experts and practitioners in the field reporting to ONSA with total independence. In the UK, the role is carried out by an individual supported by academic advisers on a part time basis, but given the size, context and challenges

in Nigeria, the role of the independent reviewer on terrorism legislations would work best as a small committee of eight to twelve individuals on a full-time and continuous basis.

Apart from accountability, bureaucratisation theory stresses the independence of police organisation all over the world, which does exist to a certain degree in terms of professional expertise, policy formation and implementation. However, police organisations around the globe do not have unlimited independence in today's predicament. Most, if not all police organisations are part of the Nation State. Therefore, police organisations around the globe depend on the state for funding, policy guideline and policy implementation. Most police chief and heads are appointed and removed by the state representatives.

Besides, times have changed, with the public taking centre stage on how they are policed. The public in the 21st century, plays a vital role in how they are policed within their various communities. Today's communities expect police accountability to be upheld. In the UK, since November (2012), chief constables report to an elected police and crime commissioner. The police reform and social responsibility act (2011), gives the public greater influence in deciding local police priorities and local policing bodies more flexibility to respond to them. The idea of police independence can only go so far as it is allowed to.

2.3.2 Police Independence: The UK & Nigeria Context

In the UK, the police enjoy a certain independence in terms of their operational capability but not unlimited independence though. In Nigeria, it is rather different. The police are perceived as agents of the state doing the bidding of the state when asked to do so. The police in Nigeria are viewed by some members of the public as corrupt, inept and unprofessional, lacking the capacity and capability to counter terrorism and other forms of crime. It does remain to be seen

how many of these members of the public have had direct involvement with the police or if their views are based on hearsay/actual events (HRW, 2010; Owen, 2014). The issues are so serious that various police reform committees have been set up in the past to tackle all issues affecting policing in Nigeria. According to the Report of the Presidential Committee on Police Reform (2008), the committee in all cases found issues of corruption, lack of training, poor welfare, command and structure issues, public mistrust, operational issues, logistical issues, issues of political involvement/nepotism to name but a few.

Even so, after the committee's work was done, most of their recommendations have not been adopted. This is obviously not new in Nigeria where policy never matches practice. There exist a lot of political involvement from the state/elite on policing policy and procedures in Nigeria. This political involvement of the state has left members of the police organisation playing lip service to politicians (Tamuno, 1970; Pierce, 2006; Smith, 2007; Police Reform, 2008; Alemika, 2013; Agbiboa, 2015).

According to Ibidapo-obe, (2003), there is a distrust between the public and the NPF. He remarks the police is feared by the populist but not respected due to the force's poor record on job performance and accountability. Additionally, Nwachukwu (2012), remarks that the NPF is marred by ineffectiveness and inefficiency in carrying out their constitutional responsibilities. He further remarks that they are poorly trained, poorly equipped, poorly paid and deeply corrupt. Lukeman, (2014), supports the above assertions and adds that the NPF are becoming notorious for human rights abuse, corruption and lack of efficiency.

2.3.3 Challenges to Counter Terrorism: UK & Nigeria Context

Countering terrorism continues to present challenges in western democracies as well as in third world countries like Kenya, Somalia and Nigeria to name but a few. The issues of resources both human and financial, surveillance and intelligence, terrorist investigation, inter agency collaboration, conceptualisation of terrorism, training and development and indeed, corruption which continues to hinder the fight by the Nigeria government to disrupt BH continues to present serious challenges to LEAs across the globe (Deflem, 2010, NACTEST, 2016).

LaFree (2012), makes a valid point on the challenges of policing terrorism. He remarks that the greatest challenge remains how police organisations use scarce resources to fight a crime of terrorism that is sometimes uncommon, that has a national, sometimes international that may require intelligence that may be limited or altogether unavailable. It worth mentioning that terrorism is not the only crime police face today. Police face other challenges like homicide, cyber-crimes, organised crime, drug crimes and other social vice to contend with. This has placed pressure on both human and financial resources of police organisations across the globe.

In Nigeria, as in the UK, the issue of human and financial resources, intelligence, poor training, human rights abuse, capability and capacity building for the NPF has long been as issue even before the advent of the current terrorism related violence plaguing the country (Ibidapo-obe, 2003; Nwachukwu, 2012; Forest, 2012; Udounwa, 2013; Lukman, 2014; Aghedo and Osumah, 2014; Owen, 2014). At the crux of the problem is the problem of corruption, which is an endemic problem in Nigeria with a long history. In tracing the history of policing unprofessionalism and brutality, Tamuno (1970), research remarks that the NPF has had a long history of engaging in unprofessional, corrupt, and criminal conduct. He remarks that this is usually achieved using excessive and often brutal force.

The problems of corruption have compounded challenges confronting the police in Nigeria. In a study carried out by Amnesty International (2011), it reveals that counter terrorism efforts are crippled by the inability of the police to gather intelligence and undertake forensic investigations. This is because most police stations do not have crime databases, fingerprint databases and do not have a systematic way of investigating crime, documenting and recording police work. The police tend to rely on confessions, which is usually obtained from torture (Amnesty International, 2011; Solomon, 2012; Okonjo-Iweala, 2012; Amnesty International 2016).

Owen (2014), notes that performance of the NPF is stretched by operational challenges and issues of resources. The human and material resources, which do exist, tend to be concentrated towards the centre due to the centralised police command structure. He agrees that the torture is widely used by the NPF, and its use is closely related to lack of other means to obtain evidence. The research notes that NPF training, needs to be addressed at the level of training institutions, short-term skills deficits, and ongoing relationships with partners if the security challenges in the country is to be met. Owen's study is significant because it supports other empirical research carried out by NGOs like the Centre for Law Enforcement Education in Nigeria (CLEEN) and Amnesty International. Owen's study looked at the NPF predicaments and possibilities in policing crime in Nigeria. He remarks the lack of research on actual conditions and factors affecting the NPF, its personnel and their performance. He notes that, there is a big public debate on policing in Nigeria, but little of it is based on actual evidence.

Regardless, it is fair to say that the issue of corruption is not just pervasive in Nigeria but all over the world. As the world grapples with the issue of corruption and its effect, counter terrorism policing continues to present challenges in Nigeria, the UK and the rest of the globe. Some scholars' remark that counter terrorism policing can be criminological analysed as a form

of social control including the framework and institution that responds to terrorism (Deflem, 2004a, b; Constanza, Kilburn, and Helms, 2009). According to Jackson et al., (2011), the discipline of terrorism studies began to converge as a recognisable field in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Before then, terrorism by states and non-state actors was part of the study of insurgency, repression, war, and revolution (Jackson et al., 2011). Zulaika and Douglass, (1996), support this assertion and further remark, that the acts were described as ordinary crimes of kidnapping, bombings, hijackings and political assassinations. Thus, terrorism was part of political science, international relations, law, military studies, and criminology (Silke, 2004). This notion of terrorism having different components and framework to its understanding and response is vital. It is vital because it shows the complexity of how terrorism should be conceptualised in order to address its menace nationally and internationally. It then means that for terrorism to be prevented and disrupted, it needs a legal definition. Finding a legal definition of terrorism has and continues to divide opinion in the academic and international arena (Schmid and Jongman, 1988; Faluso, 2004).

2.4 Legal Definition of Terrorism in the Post 9/11 Era

The definition of terrorism has for long divided opinions. The meaning of terrorism depends on who is doing the definition and for what purpose. There is no acceptable academic definition for the term. Jackson et al., (2011), remarks that the lack of definition hinders progress in academic research and analysis and has left the field of terrorism studies in disarray. Equally, there is no acceptable definition of terrorism amongst the international community (Ganor, 1999). Any attempt to come to an agreement on what terrorism is has left the international community more divided. At the core of the division is the distinction between terrorist and freedom fighters. Secondly, is if the definition of terrorism under international law should cover states acts or not (Friedrichs, 2006).

2.4.1 United Kingdom Definition of Terrorism

The UK has had experience of dealing with terrorist atrocities in its past. Recently though, the terrorism act 2000 was its foremost anti-terrorism act with various amendments in 2001, 2005, 2006, 2008, 2010 and 2015 to 2017. The act states that terrorism is:

The use or threat of a specified action where the use or threat is designed to influence the government or to intimidate the public or a section of the public, and the use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause. The action is a specified action if it involves serious violence against a person; involves serious damage to property; endangers a person's life, other than the person committing the action; creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of the public; or is designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an electronic system (Home Office, 2000).

The act was enacted to deal with terrorist atrocities in the UK, associated with Northern Ireland and other forms of terrorism from various groups. The Terrorism Act (2000) provides permanent UK-wide counter-terrorism legislation and reforms and replaces the (Northern Ireland), Prevention of Violence (Temporary Provisions) Act 1939, the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Acts 1973-98, and the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Acts 1974-89. The Temporary Provisions were a series of emergency Acts from 1974 to 1989 that allowed police to tackle issues of terrorism emanating from the Irish troubles. The Temporary Provisions Act dealt with Proscribed Organisations, Exclusion Orders, Financial Assistance for Terrorism and Police Powers to Arrest, Detain and Control of Entry (Northern Ireland, 2011; Walker, 2011, 2016).

According to Punch (2012), the Temporary Provisions Act were solely to deal with the IRA against its armed struggle with the British State. He argues that the UK did not foresee the act being used against international terrorism. Hence, the act is narrow as regards to what actions amount to terrorism. Pantucci (2010: 254), supports this assertion, and further remarks that the British were solely, focused on the IRA on the one hand, whilst, granting safe haven to international jihadi supporters in the UK on the other hand. These Jihadi support networks were raising funds in the UK, in addition to granting them asylum and state benefits. This UK unbalanced situation led to London being labelled as “*Londonistan*” by the French intelligence. (Blair, 2009: 14; Panntucci, 2010; Curtis, 2016)

That said, subsequent amendments to the Temporary Provisions Act, from 2000, focuses on the actions deemed at advancing a political, religious, racial or ideological cause (Lowe, 2016). It is obvious that the widening of the definition of terrorism was so far right groups, jihadi groups and the wider communities can come under law enforcement focus. Overall, one of the most controversial sections of the amendment has been the interpretation of the courts to what amounts to a religious cause and evidence of religious cause.

This is particularly difficult given that terrorism itself exists in different forms. How can one tell the difference between a religious cause from a nationalistic, ideological, or political cause? Groups like Hamas, Boko Haram, IRA, Hezbollah and even Al Qaeda, all had some form of political, religious, nationalistic and indeed, ideological cause (Sedgwick, 2004). The courts in UK, will dismiss most cases arising from a religious cause, arguing that evidence relating to religious cause must be shown to have a significant impact on encouraging or influencing others to a terrorist cause or any material possessed by a person will significantly, assist a person committing or preparing acts of terrorism (Lowe, 2016).

The debate on the legal definition of terrorism and what amounts to a religious cause has divided opinions amongst political opponents and scholars alike. According to Hall et al., (1978), work on “*social control*” the whole idea of wider police powers is so that the hegemony of the criminal justice system, which the police is part of, can be maintained. He further argues that states use the law as an instrument of class domination (Hall et al., 1978:196). Cohen, (1985), agrees with this assertion and goes forward to argue that social control is there to create scapegoats amongst those deemed as a threat to the safety of the state and its citizens, which in return reinforces social solidarity with the wider public. This observation reinforces *Hillyard’s* (1993), work on “*suspect community*.”

2.4.2 Terrorism and Suspect Community

In his (1993), work on the growth of the secret state and the impact of the prevention of terrorism act (PTA), Hillyard focused his research on individuals in UK at the receiving end of the PTA measures between 1971 to 1991. He remarks that:

a person who is drawn into the criminal justice system under the PTA is not a suspect in the normal sense of the word. In other words, they are not believed to be involved in or guilty of some illegal act [...] people are suspect primarily because they are Irish and once they are in the police station, they are often labelled an Irish suspect, presumably as part of some classification system. In practice, they are being held because they belong to a suspect community. (Hillyard 1993: 7)

Hillyard (1993), further noted that based on a certain classification system, people of Irish decent were held by the police in the UK, because they belong to a suspect community. It is

worth noting that the study on “*social control*” and “*suspect community*” are related and significant because the actions of one lead to the other. The failure of social control by the states/agents of the state leads to the creation of a suspect community.

Both parties are suspicious of each other’s intention. Just as in the UK, where BAME group/Muslim community have experienced knock-on effect in the counterterrorism fight, in Nigeria it is rather different. The public in Nigeria, are subject to police suspicion all the time and vice versa, which has led to poor police and public relations for decades. This has been attributed to the history of the Nigeria police during its colonial days and paramilitary mentality, which it inherited during the three decades of military dictatorship (Tamuno, 1970; Owen, 2014). Owen (2014) remarks the NPF has survived severe previous challenges during years of military rule in Nigeria. He contends that military rule did a lot of damage to the police profession in Nigeria. It is no secret to say that the NPF is still grappling to find its path after years of police cuts, police infrastructure meltdown, inadequate training, corruption, inadequate welfare package and political interference.

For Pantucci, the idea of aligning a religious cause to the legal definition of terrorism makes the government look disingenuous in its prevention strategy. He remarks that it is suggestive that the government chooses to engage with those it deems as “*good Muslims*” and those who have not been engaged as “*bad Muslims*” (Pantucci, 2010:262). This view is shared by some in the Muslim community in the UK, who feel targeted and discriminated against in the counter terrorism fight (Thiel, 2009). One is tempted to ask who indeed, are the Muslim community. Does this mean that anybody who is Muslim is part of this Muslim community analogy? What qualifies a person to be a member of the Muslim community? Is it based on religious affiliation,

race, geographic, economic, cultural, national or otherwise? Terrorism is not a face, religion, community, or race; it is a strategy that can be adopted by anyone from anywhere.

The so-called Muslim community if it does exist must be seen as partners who can play their part in the prevention and disruption of terrorism. It is essential that government and law enforcement in an attempt to disrupt terrorism does not alienate the same community it seeks to gather intelligence from. According to Grieve (2009), it is important to make intelligence non-threatening to communities, if communities are to be partners in the fight to prevent and disrupt terrorism. Grieve's remark is well connected in that, it points to the importance of the community and intelligence in the criminal investigation of terrorist atrocities.

2.5 Terrorist Investigation

An important aspect of preventing and disrupting of any terrorist atrocities is the use of terrorist investigation before and after a terrorist attack. Terrorist investigation involves activities carried out by the police aimed at preventing, monitoring and investigating and bringing to justice the perpetrators of terrorist attacks. It is worth noting that terrorist investigation starts with preventive measures which ultimately leads to the disruptive measures taken by LEAs to bring the affairs of terrorist to an end.

In the UK, this is carried out by the department called Special Branch (SO15) and MI5. This is coordinated by the Metropolitan Police Service Counter Terrorism Command (CTC). Around the country, there are a total of eleven regional units covering different parts of the country called Counter Terrorism Unit (CTU) and intelligence units (CTIU). These units, fuse together intelligence, operations and investigation functions, engaging with a range of partners to prevent terrorist and disrupt terrorism (NPCC, 2018).

It is right to state that terrorist investigation has for a while, eluded the rigour of academic research (Gill, 1994; Innes and Thiel, 2008). This is mainly due to its covert nature. Thus, men and women behind the shadows carrying out covert investigation by collecting intelligence, surveillance, intercepting and analysing communication of those they deem as threat to the security of the state. In any case, Sheptycki (2007), believes that the lack of transparency due to secrecy of high policing agencies has hindered the development of critical perspective on contemporary high policing. This, he argues, has hindered the academic world's understanding of terrorism investigation. This statement implies that terrorist investigations can be conceptualise into two forms, high and low policing.

2.5.1 High and Low Policing

The idea of high Policing was coined by Brodeur (1983), who believed that policing should be divided into high and low policing. In his analysis, high policing is that which is national in nature, dealing with issues of national security. He remarks, high policing agencies collect and process data, enabling them to generate intelligence used to forecast and disrupt threats concerning the state on a need-to-know basis.

Low policing on the other hand, deals with everyday individual crime carried out by persons/groups with criminal intent which the police aim to prevent by maintaining law and order. Consequently, low policing involves everyday uniformed police officers walking down the streets or in their fast cars responding to various public incidents. As remarked by Ratcliffe (2008), the activities of low policing are primarily reactive. Innes and Thiel (2008), further remark that low policing is the public face of policing dealing with micro crimes. The difference between high and low policing is attributed to the scope of their purpose. Whilst both need intelligence, the scope of the intelligence is very different. High policing intelligence is

national, and its analysis is holistic and used to get a clear picture of events and threat assessment regarding the whole country. Low policing intelligence is narrow and used by the police to build criminal cases and obtain convictions on individuals or small groups (Gill. 1994:145-151; Brodeur, 2000, 2003, 2007).

In Nigeria, high policing activities is mainly carried out by the Department of State Services (DSS). However, other agencies like the NPF, the Army, the Navy do have their separate intelligence collection units. According to NACTEST (2016), the DSS is the lead agency in the collection and collation of intelligence in all non-military components of internal security as well as the prevention and disruption of terrorist related activities/crimes. The agency is also in charge of liaising with religious bodies, academia, and ministry of information in designing policies/de-radicalisation programmes aimed at sanitising the public. It is worth asking if indeed, high policing operatives should be involved in sanitising the public/collaborating with academia. It is fair to say their job should be concentrated on surveillance, working under cover, intelligence, and sharing the intelligence with other collaborating agencies. The NPF (low policing) who patrol the beat every day and who are the lead agency in internal security of the country should be leading the public engagement/academia collaboration on the prevention and disruption of terrorism.

Nonetheless, activities of high and low policing in Nigeria should be geared towards working for a common goal. Rather, the '*wall*' continues to exist. Omeni (2018), remarks on the importance of the DSS in the counter terrorism/counter insurgency war. He observes that the DSS does not play an isolated role in the fight to counter terrorism. He notes that the DSS contributes to the Joint Taskforce by surveillance and monitoring of BH activities, procurement and shar-

ing of actionable intelligence, participation in joint intelligence briefing, participation in psychological operations, monitoring of displaced BH members, and media sanitisation. As both high and low policing grapple with effective ways of collaboration, the importance of intelligence gathering in terrorist investigation remains unquestionable. So, is the way the intelligence is collected and analysed. The critical question in the process of collecting of intelligence, then becomes what is good and bad intelligence? How is the intelligence collected filtered, analysed and interpreted to make sense of it? Surveillance and Intelligences are key tools needed to prevent and disrupt terrorism atrocities.

2.6 Surveillance and Intelligence

The UK statutory powers allow for gathering intelligence in terrorism related offence for covert surveillance to be used. As a vital investigative tool, LEAs must work within the rule of law to ensure that their practice is legal and proportionate. According to section 28 (3) Regulation of investigatory Act 2000 (RIPA), which allows the court to grant when needed, in the interest of national security, in preventing or detecting crime, and authorisation to certain agencies including the police and security agencies to conduct covert surveillance. It is worth stating that in today's reality, the importance of surveillance and intelligence collection and analysis has enhanced international sharing of intelligence between counterterrorism policing and various national security agencies. According to Lowe (2016), sharing of intelligence between the UK and US has increased greatly.

This is evident in the Edward Snowden's case, in which Britain's Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) and America's National Security Agency (NSA) were working as one organisation by collecting and analysing information of thousands of US citizens on the PRISM project which was also accessed by GCHQ. The revelation reveals that covert, vast and

indiscriminate surveillance programmes are not in conformity with European Human Rights Law and cannot be justified by the fight against terrorism. The revelations of the practices of NSA and GCHQ resulted in wide condemnation of counter terrorism agencies (MacAskell et al., 2013; Lowe, 2016).

Martin (2010) highlights the importance of intelligence agencies in the counter terrorism policing. He remarks that the purpose of intelligence is to construct an accurate activity profile of terrorists. According to him, data are collected from overt and covert surveillance and evaluated by expert intelligence analysts. The process of intelligence collection and analysis is at the heart of counter terrorist intelligence. The goal of high-quality intelligence collection and analysis can be used to construct the profile of terrorist organisation, to tracking and preventing terrorism attacks. On the other hand, collecting bad intelligence can lead to LEAs playing catchup to terrorist and unable to prevent and disrupt attacks. It is worth mentioning that intelligence collection consists of Signal Intelligence (SIGINT) and Human intelligence (HUMINT). Whilst the former deals the interception of electronic signals like financial data, monitoring communications, like mobile phones conversation, social network sites, emails, satellite imagery, the latter deals covert use of law enforcement officials, spies, and informers to gather intelligence which is shared with LEAs.

2.6.1 Surveillance and Intelligence, UK Perspective

According to Martin (2010), and Deflem (2010), the central issue under pinning intelligence collection and analysis is coordination of the intelligence collected. Martin remarks that due to the nature of covert intelligence collected, it becomes difficult to share and collaborate with domestic intelligence communities due to bureaucratic rivalry. Deflem on the other hand, notes that inter agency partnership both domestically and internationally is an important strategy of

counter terrorism policing. He remarks that cooperation is achieved between federal and other LEAs in view of establishing swift systems for information exchange which helps to strengthen investigative and intelligences effort.

However, Lowe (2016), sheds more light on the importance of surveillance and intelligence collection in the UK. He remarks that in counter terrorism investigations, surveillance of targets by CTU officers is not just to keep certain identified persons under surveillance but also the population are being watched for any signs of deviance or threat that may threaten the stability of the nation. This includes members of extremist political parties, or organised crime groups. According to him, most CTU investigations commence with an intelligence report from MI5, which is then analysed by a CTU team, and a decision made on what kind of surveillance to use.

He stresses that surveillance has a wide connotation and is not about occupying a building and watching targets rather; a big picture is obtained, by monitoring emails, telephone, debit and credit transactions, vehicle navigation system, benefit accounts and travel details to name but a few. Importantly, this suggests that surveillance and intelligence collection is not just targeted at offenders and criminals but on various communities that are deemed suspect/match, the terrorism profile. In the UK, surveillance has been focused on the Muslim community and BAME (Black and Minority Ethnic) groups leading to these groups to be disproportionately stopped and searched (Home Office, 2014).

Lowe (2016), points out that the primary focus of counter terrorism investigation in the UK has changed from watching the Irish community to predominantly watching the Asian Muslim

community. Some scholars and practitioners alike, have echoed the view of the state, who believe that to keep the state safe, extreme measures, is necessary to meet the needs of national security. Others disagree and believe that the experience of policing terrorism in Ireland has not been learnt. Whatever the debate, the state has an obligation to protect its citizens from the scourge of terrorism related violence. Finding that balance between hard power and soft power will always be a challenge.

According to Lowe (2016:105), *for CTUs, the first stage of any surveillance, is building up a personal data pattern on the target and their associates*. He stresses that this process involves officers carrying out static surveillance from safe premises, video and photographic evidence gathering, to include a surveillance log that records time, dates, description of targets and associates. He further remarks that the *activities of counter terrorism unit (CTU) in the UK, has to comply with the law* (2016:101). Not complying with the law in terrorism investigations means that CTUs, risk the possibility of those terrorist arrested being freed by the courts. As a former detective in the CTU command, Lowe's research was based on participant covert observation. The data was collected through different techniques. One such technique was through covert recordings using the department's equipment to record officer's conversation where possible.

In addition, he would record officer's conversation on his notes without raising suspicion. Lowe's research is vital because it does provide significant insight into the activities of counter terrorism policing which is lacking due to issues of national security. Nevertheless, the study does present some ethical dilemma on the one hand and issues of researcher bias, since data collection by Lowe, was carried out when he was a serving CTU detective. According to the Social Research Association (SRA) (2003), ethical guideline, social researchers must aim to

protect subjects from undue harm arising because of their participation in research. This requires that subjects' participation should be voluntary and as fully informed. Holdway, (1983:13), who conducted covert participant research of the uniform police in UK, calls this a *calculated deception of trust*.

Lowe does admit to betraying the trust of his colleagues but believes that in the interest of no other sound ethical way of collecting data, the benefit of the study is justified. On the other hand, is the issue of researcher bias in terms of how the data is collected, reported and evaluated. It is always difficult to keep an open mind in qualitative research due the researcher's belief, culture, feelings, emotions and in this case professional experience, which can distort research findings. Lowe remarks that at the time there were no other research methods available to him, however, would his findings be different if he had used interviews as methodology, or if he had used the same observation techniques but by overt means.

In any case, Lowe's study fills significant knowledge gap in the activities CTU in the UK, and policing terrorism generally in terms of how CTUs have to conform to the rule of law and in the manner, they collect intelligence. Indeed, there has been progress in understanding of CTU activities, but intelligence collection challenges remain. Clark (2007), remarks that the UK, must increase the flow of intelligence coming from within the British communities if terrorism is to be prevented and disrupted. Hence, the integration of counter terrorism into community and neighbourhood policing in the UK (Aziz, 2014).

As the UK police grapples with issues of surveillance, human rights and intelligence collection and analysis to accomplish its terrorist investigative duties, the situation for the NPF in terms

of carrying out terrorist criminal investigation is rather bleak and disjointed. A counter terrorism strategy formulated and administered by the Office of National Security Adviser (ONSA), in which the military and the intelligence arms are the lead partners with the police left to pick up the crumbs.

2.6.2 Surveillance and Intelligence, Nigeria Perspective

The Nigeria constitution gives the NPF the power to prevent and detect crime, apprehension of offenders, preservation of law and order, protection of life and property, enforcement of all laws and regulations as well as military duties within Nigeria (Nigeria Constitution, 1999). According to the Nigeria Counter Terrorism Strategy (NACTEST), all law enforcement and security agencies have responsibility of gathering of intelligence and investigation of terrorism cases (NACTEST, 2016).

As noted by a (2011), report from Amnesty international remarks that the NPF is struggling to fulfil its required duties. The report goes on to highlights the lack of skilled staff that lack the capacity to gather intelligence and carry out scientific investigation. In addition to poor training, police stations in the country are poorly maintained and equipped, leading to poor data analysis and management (AI, 2009; 2011). The study identified issues of chronic lack of resources within the NPF, which limited the capacity of intelligence collection and scientific investigations; Undertrained and unqualified police officers which has left a large number of police officers lacking key skills and under equipped; Poor working conditions due to lack of funding which has led to corruption and inefficiencies; Poor public image resulting in mistrust from the public and reluctance to cooperate or help in providing information needed to solve crimes and the unlawful killing, torture and enforced disappearances in police custody.

Forest (2012), and Solomon (2012), agree that the capacity of the NPF to carry out high complex criminal investigations is non-existent. They further remark that the NPF lack the capacity of a modern police force to carry out terrorist criminal investigation, which require intelligence, surveillance, resources and training (Tella, 2017). As the challenges of carrying out terrorism investigation remains as ever in Nigeria, the UK, the US and the rest of the world. One of those civil liberties that is controversial and continues to drive a wedge between law enforcement agencies and the public, especially in the war on terror is the use of stop and search procedures. This procedure continues to divide public opinion as it is seen as targeting/based on racial profiling.

2.7 Stop and Search Powers

The Terrorism Act (2000) gives the police powers to stop and search any person or persons suspected to have committed a crime or terrorist act. The Act gives the police the power to stop a person and try to ascertain their movement, knowledge or involvement in criminal or terrorist incidence (Terrorism Act, 2000). Under section 43 of the terrorist act, there is a requirement that there is a reasonable suspicion that a person is a terrorist. The PACE codes of practice states that while ‘reasonable grounds for suspicion depend on the circumstances of each case, it must be based on facts, information, and intelligence that a person is about to commit a crime. The act also maintains that “*reasonable suspicion*” cannot be based on generalisations or stereotypical images of certain groups (Pace Act, 1984).

The power to stop and search is an important investigative tool for the police. Stop and Search powers allows the police to combat various crimes within the country ranging from anti-social behaviour, transnational organised crimes to terrorist related offences. It is used as a crime prevention tool, detecting crime when it is being committed and a source of assisting police

with local intelligence about community problems and issues of community safety (Pace Act, 1984; Home Office, 2014). However, it remains today, one of the most controversial aspects of UK Policing before and in the post 9/11 and 7/7 era (Scarman, 1981).

The debate on the power of stop and search continues to divide opinion. Firstly, is what constituting a “*reasonable suspicion*” which research has shown to be unclear on police officers’ discretion on the use of regulatory codes (Lustgarten 2002; Bowling and Phillips 2007; Sanders and Young 2008; Quinton 2011). In addition, effectiveness of the stop and search procedures in relation to number of search levels carried out and crime reduction seems weak (Quinton et al. 2017). The continuous existence of the stop and search procedure given that there is little or no evidence that the procedure works or deters crime has become a topic of discussion in the academic circle. The Home Office believes the procedure is a necessary tool if used fairly (Miller et al. 2000: vii; Home Office, 2014; Quinton et al. 2017). As the policy continues to divide opinion, it worth asking why there is a continuous use of the policy given its ineffectiveness.

Murray (2017) believes the policy of stop and search has become part of British policing from its early inception to the present day. She remarks that, the fact the policy continues to receive underling support, may lay in its appealing preventive principle. Reiner (2015) further adds to this idea and remarks that the policy stretches back to centuries of vagrancy legislation. He argues that the policy was created in a sense to discipline the poor and powerless people. Brogden (1985), agrees with this assertion and implies that the principle was used to harass marginal sections of the population.

In the present dimension where there has been a rise of terrorist atrocities globally, stop and search continue to divide opinion. More so, when carrying out a stop under schedule 7 officers do not require reasonable grounds to suspect that an individual is involved in the preparation and commission of terrorism. Thus, directly contravenes the European Courts of Human Rights (ECHR), that states that an individual when detained should be based on reasonable suspicion of the individual's involvement in an offence (Thiel, 2009; Lowe, 2016).

As the policy of stop and search continues to be applied, it continues to present issues that has made the policy less popular amongst BAME groups (Scarman 1981; Macpherson, 1999). Thiel (2009), believes that it is hard to measure if stop and search works. He remarks that is hard to tell if stop and search policy has led to the prevention of terrorist attacks in the UK or not. According to Pantazis and Pemberton (2009), the effectiveness of stop and search continues to elude academic scrutiny; BAME groups they argue, continue to be seen as the new "*suspect community*".

In the UK, as in Nigeria, police are doubling its effort in other to engage with the various communities around the country. Innes (2006) remarks that the police have decided to respond to this issue by being creative. He makes the point that specialist community engagement units have been set up to develop and manage relationships with strategic contacts in the community. These strategic contacts in the community would be key in establishing communication links for the purpose of harnessing intelligence from within and meeting the challenges of policing terrorism in the 21st century.

In Nigeria, the use of stop and search remains controversial. This is normally carried out at police and military checkpoints across the country's roads. It is no secret that at police/military

checkpoints commercial drivers are often stopped and asked to pay bribes, those who refuse to pay can be arrested or simply shot. Most times, the police claim that those shot were armed robbers resisting arrest. This philosophy of extra judicial killing has been carried onto the counter terrorism war, where suspected terrorists are tortured and killed to elicit confessions with impunity (Amnesty International, 2009; Abubakar, 2012; Alemika, 2013; Amnesty International, 2017; Transparency International, 2017).

2.8 Conclusion

It is obvious that policing terrorism has become a serious issue in the aftermath of 9/11. The impact of terrorist attacks in the globe has killed thousands and destroyed millions of pounds worth of properties. Terrorist violence has become a major policy issue in most countries around the globe. In the UK, the policing of terrorism presents serious challenges, and the response has been framed around the criminal justice system in order to prevent and disrupt terrorism related violence.

Crelinsten (2009), Nigeria National Counter Terrorism Strategy (2016), Deflem (2010), Lowe (2016) and Thiel (2009), Jackson et al, 2011, were the key literatures that looked at approaches to terrorism and counter terrorism. Deflem was significant on the globalisation of terrorism and the role of police organisations in counter terrorism. Lowe's work dealt with legal issues of terrorism and inside view of terrorism investigation which is hard to come by. Thiel study looked at issues of high and low policing in the UK, suspect community and the role of intelligence and surveillance in the UK. The Nigeria National Counter Terrorism Strategy (2016) is a key policy document as a source of primary data. The document details the framework on how terrorism is fought in Nigeria and the roles of various LEAs in the country. In addition,

are various UNODC and international/regional organisation documents that were key in showing the extent collaboration and other security issues in Nigeria.

2.9 Framing the Project

The literature review focuses on four key features of the criminological approach to counter-terrorist policing, which have core relevance for analysing the policing of terrorism in Nigeria.

These key features are:

- The social construction of terrorism as crime
- Social and Legal definitions/understandings
- The organisation of counter-terrorism policing
- Counter - terrorism policing methods

2.9.1 The Social Construction of Terrorism as a Crime

This project is framed within an understanding of terrorism understood as a crime, generating ‘soft power’ responses from the policing and criminal justice systems. This contrasts with an understanding of terrorism as a paramilitary threat, which generates ‘hard power’ violent and repressive responses. This is, of course, rather a simple binary; in most contexts, both understandings jockey for position in the political context, but it is important to try to establish which one may be predominant, and how that shapes the allocation of resources in a particular place and time. Hence, the project aims at establishing the predominant understandings of counter-terrorism along this continuum within the policy discourse in Nigeria, particularly among senior officers in the NPF. How do senior officers in the NPF conceptualise terrorism? Is it a Crime or war?

2.9.2 Social and Legal Definitions and Understandings

The law plays a central role in the social construction of terrorism as crime. Social and Legal definition of terrorism looks at the legislation that government has put in place in order to help law enforcement better respond to terrorist atrocities and the social context of terrorism by the wider society. Having a legal definition means that appropriate resources and strategies can be set aside for the prevention and disruption of terrorism. Social understanding frames and distinguishes between different types of terrorism. In Nigeria, this is problematic because the idea of terrorism only got recognised in 2014, even though it has existed in the country for decades.

The existence of Nationalistic groups, Single-issue groups, Islamic/Jihadi groups/Religious terrorism, Right-wing groups/Left-wing groups and Animal rights groups indicates the existence of different forms of terrorism, meaning that, understanding each group's aims, objectives, modus operandi, grievance and political/social structure leads to an effective response by policy makers and implementers. A legal definition means that terrorism can be proscribed and made illegal so law enforcement can arrest and disrupt terrorist groups within the rule of law.

The literature is framed around religious/Islamic terrorism for obvious reasons. The threat from terrorism in recent times has been from Religious/Jihadi terrorist. The use of police powers under the law reflects the idea of Muslims as a suspect community creating mutual distrust between LEAs on the one hand and the Muslim community on the other hand. This is evident in Nigeria, where suspicion of NPF actions by members of the public has affected intelligence gathering and prolonged the terrorist threat in the Northeast region of the country. Extended

police powers in Nigeria have led to extra judicial killings of BH members and poor police and community engagement due to repressive measures that has spilled over to civilians.

This is because terrorists are embedded within the civilian population and hence, police search for answers does at times lead to mass arrest of innocent family members/friends. This can inadvertently, cause local communities to distrust police intentions, not report, and take part in prevent initiatives designed to prevent terrorism and extremism. This helps the researcher frames questions like the nature of the terrorist threat in Nigeria and the challenges faced by NPF. Secondly, what training is in progress/earmarked for the NPF? In addition, to unpacking the nature of the threat, what measures have been put in place to help tackle the challenges.

2.9.3 The Organisation of Counter Terrorism Policing

The Literature on Bureaucratisation theory is significant to the research project because the theory argues that counter terrorism is not a matter of the war directed at the enemies but as a matter of crime control directed at criminal suspects approached from a professional standard of policing. The theory explores the independence of police organisations, their professionalism, expertise in crime fighting and specialised skills needed to prevent and investigate crimes. Bureaucratisation theory in addition, provides for bilateral, international and regional collaboration between various police forces in the world for exchange of professional skills and information especially with Islamist terrorism being a global threat. In this respect, the project draws from this in terms of the international cooperation and inter agency collaboration in the fight to police terrorism in Nigeria. Bilateral capacity and capability building between International Organisations, like UNODC, UK, US and Nigeria, have played a significant role in upgrading training, logistics and personnel. This frames questions like training that are in progress/completed and the confirmation of training efforts through documentary analysis.

2.9.4 Counter Terrorism Policing Methods

Counter terrorism policing methods investigates the preventive and investigative strategies that have been put in place to counter terrorism. The formulation of the UK CONTEST and Nigerian NACTEST policy documents is used to provide policy guidelines and accountability in the manner/approach the fight to counter terrorism is fought. It deals with the use of the criminal justice model (soft power approach) or war model, which requires military (hard power).

It also deals with high and low policing approaches within local, regional, national and international boundaries. This is very important for the project because it means questions like what policies/programmes/laws have been put in place to ensure that the NPF is ready to counter terrorism or if there is a counter terrorism strategy in place already. It also means that questions on skills needed can be framed around intelligence – high policing and other counter terrorism measures like protection of high value targets-low policing.

The National Counter Terrorist Strategy (NACTEST), in Nigeria plays a significant role in the fight to police terrorism in Nigeria. The policy dictates the manner and conduct of the war on terrorism allocating, managing resources and handling out roles to various agencies through the Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA). Terrorist policing methods additionally explores the manner in which the war/crime is fought. Wining hearts and mind rather than causing overreaction. The use of torture, extra judicial killings, stop and search, drones, shoot to kill policy all can lead to alienating communities that would otherwise, help in providing important information.

Research Methodology

3.1 Abstract and Introduction

This chapter outlines the research process, techniques, methodological approaches and activities that took place during the research implementation phase. The chapter sheds light into the epistemological issue inherent in researching the policing of terrorism. In addition, the chapter traces the path of the research process from the two research modules taken, to semi structured interviews conducted with the NPF and UNODC. The chapter concludes with the strengths of the research methodology, the ethical issues encountered, the limitations in the study and how each challenge was addressed and dealt with to provide richness and validity of the data.

The chapter is divided into various subtitles that were relevant in the completion of the research project. Research Design identifies the process and decision of picking and using an appropriate research design for answering the research questions. It demonstrates on why qualitative method was the appropriate design for this study. Mixed Research Methods explores the adoption and use of a mixed research methodology for the research project. The heading deals with the identification and extensive use of documentary analysis and semi-structured interviews as a preferred methodological approach in the study. It reveals the process of the research from identification and selection of key documents and generation of a topic guide for interviews, drawing from the two-research methodology taught modules taken in the course of this study.

Data collection and process explores the process of the entire research and how the data was collected. It traces the whole process from the identification of documents, selection, familiarisation process, to picking respondents for interview, to the trip to Nigeria and the obtaining of

ethics approval from the school of social sciences. Data Analysis reveals the manner data collected was analysed and diagnosed to make sense of the whole data for the study. Ethical Issues reveals the ethical issues that arose during the study and how it was dealt with by the researcher. Limitation of the study explores the limits of the study and reflects on the whole process, and what could have been done better and how the limitations were overcome. The final heading is the conclusion, which reflects on the entire process and experience of the study.

3.2 Research Design

The research project adopted a qualitative research design as a method of data identification, collection and analysis. According to Hammarberg et al., (2016), Qualitative methods are used to answer questions about experience, meaning and perspective, most often from the standpoint of the participant. Polkinghorne (2005), notes that the approach is exploratory and seeks to explain 'how' and 'why' a particular phenomenon, or behaviour, operates as it does in a particular context. Importantly, the decision to use qualitative research design was taken early in the research process due to the nature of the study being undertaken and its appropriateness for the entire project.

Due to the secretive nature of terrorism policing, access issues and sample size, it was important to use this method because it allowed the researcher to have some measure of control, ask probing questions and obtaining additional information needed for the study. It is worth stating that the use of qualitative research was the best alternative way available for the identification, selection, collection and analysis of primary data which is hard to come by in the policing of terrorism. The adoption of qualitative design best answers the research questions into the "why and how" in this particular research project, providing a reliable insight into the policing of terrorism in Nigeria.

Along the path of this research project, two research methodology modules were completed by the researcher as part of the taught modules. The importance of the modules cannot be over emphasised. The research methodology (1&2) taught modules allowed the researcher the time and opportunity to adequately identify a topic, generate research questions, ethical issues that may arise, research methods to be used and reflect on any other issues that may arise as result of the entire research project. The taught modules allowed the researcher to forecast and experiment on the method of research adopted by this project. In the end, two significant methods, documentary analysis and semi-structured interviews were adopted for data identification, selection, collection and analysis.

3.3 Mixed Research Method

The research project adopted a mixed research method by using documentary analysis and semi-structured interview to identify and collect data in order to achieve the aims and objective of the research project. Interviews are a method of data collection in both qualitative and quantitative research. In qualitative research, interviews are used to investigate and understand the views and motivations of individuals in order to gather formative information or a deep understanding of a particular phenomenon in question. This type of data collection method is important in gathering sensitive information on a face-to-face basis. Interviews seek to answer probing questions about respondent's experience about a particular event and a deep understanding of the participant's experience. This in the end, provides an increased validity in the data collected.

The researcher on the other hand, should be critical and not bias the research, he should be clear, concise and knowledgeable in the research in question. Semi-Structured Interview is a type of interview in which the interviewer asks only a few predetermined questions while the

rest of the questions are not planned in advance. Semi-Structured interviews combine both the structured and unstructured interview styles, they can offer the advantages of both. The essential makeup of semi-structured interviews is that it allows for interviewer and respondents engage in a formal interview/conversation (Kvale & Brinkman, 2009).

It allows for an interview guide which is a list of predetermined questions to be covered during the interview (Kvale & Brinkman, 2009). Questions that are not in the guide can be asked and conversations can move from the guide at any time to other connected issues. It offers a loose structure of interviewing, allowing for deep thought perspectives and experiences from key respondents who can inform the topic. However, it also presents various challenges which are time consuming, labour intensive in transcribing a vast amount of data and requires experience from the researcher. According to Legard et al., (2003), this type of interviewing makes some demands on the mental and intellectual abilities of the interviewer.

Documentary Analysis on the other hand, is a process of collecting and analysing data from existing documents without going out on the field to question people through interview, observation or using questionnaires. Document Analysis provide a rich source of primary and secondary sources in qualitative and quantitative research. These rich sources of data were collected from open sources, books, journals, media, newspapers, policy documents. According to Yanow,

Document reading can also be part of an observational study or an interview-based project. Documents can provide background information prior to designing the research project, for example prior to conducting interviews. They may collaborate observational and interview data, or they may refute them, in which case the researcher

is 'armed 'with evidence that can be used to clarify, or perhaps, to challenge what is being told, a role that the observational data may also play. (Yanow, 2007, p. 411)

Indeed, the use of documentary analysis in this project was significant in creating the research questions, interview guide and setting the parameters of this study. Both methods in this research study were mutually beneficial to each other. Identification, selection narrowing, reading, familiarisation and analysis of the various documents created the topic guide needed for further extensive investigation by the use of semi-structured interviews aided by the research questions. Through the identification of the primary sources by reading and familiarisation, related to the research questions, an interview guide was generated. The generation of the guide was important in the following ways, it allowed for further probing, participant understanding/experience, explanation, context and collaboration of the primary and secondary data acquired through the analysis of various policy and research documents.

Documentary analysis in this research project provided a rich source of information about the phenomenon of policing terrorism. The research focused on governmental, International Organisations and police policy documents on policing terrorism in the United Kingdom, United States and Nigeria. The research focused on these, because of their policy formation, policy implementation and capability and capacity roles. The policies provided first-hand information of government's policy and law enforcement response in the policing of terrorism. Through these documents, strategies, roles, departments, law enforcement agencies, logistics, training, collaboration and operations were identified. These documents provided a reliable and irrefutable source of information for the research project. These documents were used to generate questions for the topic guide.

Through reading and familiarisation of the primary sources and the guidance of the research questions, a topic guide was generated. The research questions offered the key basis of understanding for the topic guide, whilst other relevant secondary questions were generated around these key ideas. The generation of secondary questions was important in understanding and making sure the topic guide covers all the areas the research project intended to cover with participants.

Other method of research like ethnography, observation, case studies, focused interviews and survey were considered, but it would have been difficult due to, the field of policing terrorism is not a field that can be easily researched. This is because the central actors involved in the phenomenon are hard to access in a systematic way. Lowe (2016), in his research study on policing terrorism in the UK adopted various research methods in police counter terrorism investigations.

He adopted covert participant observation in one instance and semi-structured interviews in another. In the former, Lowe was able to achieve this by the fact that he himself was a Detective Sergeant in the Counter Terrorism Unit, hence, had access to sensitive information which presented ethical dilemma. In the latter, he adopted semi-structured interviews in the radicalisation process of the Irish Republic Army. He notes that before the interviews, he forwarded a set of topics areas the interview would cover to participants. This, he notes, is to focus the “subject's minds” on the topic in order to minimise disruption from the researcher (Lowe, 2016:118). The use of mixed method helped to produce enough depth in the data set in order to meet the aims and objective of this study. Another important aspect of the use of a mixed method approach is for the purpose of triangulation. Triangulation in research is the use of more than one research approach to answer the research questions. Triangulation also, includes the use of

multiple theories, data sources, methods or investigators within the study of a single phenomenon. The aim of the using triangulation in research, is to eliminate research bias and criticism of using just one method of data identification and collection. The use of triangulation helps to validate the research findings and show completeness in the data. This is especially, important in this research project due to the nature of terrorism and counter terrorism policing where reliable information is difficult to come by and verify. This research project was able to verify numerous information gathered from documentary analysis and during interviews in other to get an in-depth knowledge of the research context and analysis.

3.4 Data Collection and Process

The research project commenced in 2017, with identifying, selecting and analysing relevant primary documents needed for building a thorough understanding of the research study. The initial documentary analysis was carried out in the UK and the other part in Nigeria. The study concentrated on issues of policing terrorism in Nigeria, from 2000 to 2018. However, in other to do this, the research project had to analyse policing issues in Nigeria from colonial, post-colonial to 2018. The research project was guided by four key research questions, the research questions were used to generate themes and keywords. The themes and keywords were used to identify appropriate documents that explained the nature of the research questions and other related narratives.

As the policing of terrorism is a global phenomenon, it was important to identify appropriate documents within the UK, US and Nigeria literatures. This was important in gaining an understanding of the contemporary issues in policing terrorism in the UK and US and how it relates to policing of terrorism in Nigeria. The reason for choosing the UK and the US, is because of the similarity of the UK system to Nigeria, academic research investment in terrorism and

counter terrorism capacity building programmes by both countries in Nigeria and Africa. Policy documents, journals, newspapers, books were identified via the internet, (google scholar), university databases, libraries and some books were acquired via amazon website. In Nigeria, paper documents were sought in the Nigeria Police Library, documents were scanned and stored in a storage device.

Through reading and familiarisation, key issues in policing terrorism, arguments, and themes were identified. Various search keywords were used in the process, for instance, policing terrorism, role of police in counter terrorism, counter terrorism strategy, training in Counter terrorism, counter terrorism in Nigeria, UK and US. Through the keywords search various documents were generated, and a method of identifying, selecting and evaluating significant documents commenced.

The process lasted for a year and led to the selection of vital documents for the research project. Key documents were identified like the Nigeria National Counter Terrorism Strategy (NACTEST) Policy Document, Nigeria National Security Strategy, Nigeria Counter Terrorism Centre Strategic Report, UNODC Handbook on Counter Terrorism Investigation in Nigeria, United Kingdom, Counter Terrorism Strategy (CONTEST 2), Research Reports from Amnesty International, Transparency International, Network For Police Reform in Nigeria (NOPRIN), Centre For Law Enforcement Education in Nigeria (CLEEN) and books on policing terrorism and counter terrorism.

Identification, narrowing and selection of important documents were based on the context, understanding and relations to the research question. Documents that explained the nature, chal-

allenges and contemporary issues in counter terrorism policing made the list for further investigation and analysis. The researcher concentrated on identifying similarities and differences of policing practices in the context of the UK, US and Nigeria in counter terrorism policing and capacity and capability building. The identification, narrowing, selection and analysis of these various documents aided in the understanding and shaping of theories, research questions, research strategies and the research context. In the end, a thorough research guide was generated for further investigation.

In 2017, application for access was sent to the Inspector General of Police of the Federal Republic of Nigeria detailing the aims and objective of the study and seeking permission for the study to be carried out. The request was approved, and permission was granted. In March 2018, semi-structured interviews were conducted in Nigeria with three Senior Nigeria Police Force officers in Abuja, Nigeria. Semi-structured interviews were adopted because it combined the strengths of structured and unstructured process allowing the researcher to ask further probing questions not covered in the guide but important to the research objectives.

The selection of the respondent was based on those senior officers with a knowledge of policy formation, operations and policy implementation in the policing of terrorism. Concentration on senior police officers was based on the nature of the research which took a top to bottom approach. Senior police officers in charge of terrorism are in a better position to be aware and answer questions about policy and operational issues in the fight to counter terrorism in Nigeria. It was important to concentrate on the senior police officers with roles in the counter terrorism command.

The respondents had various key roles in the policing of terrorism in the country and were able to give insight into the fight to police terrorism from their own operational perspective, knowledge and experience. The responses of the interviews were important in connecting the dots in the policing of terrorism in the country. An interview guide and consent document were provided to each respondent. The consent forms were signed and dated by all respondents. The interview guide was important in covering all the research questions of the study and allowed the researcher to focus on the topic and ask follow-up questions.

Each interview lasted for at least an hour to an hour and twenty minutes. The responses were recorded via a recording device. This is as, Lowe (2016) notes, to avoid any distraction from the researcher. In addition, recording the interview allowed the researcher to pay attention to the responses and ask follow-up questions if need be. The responses of interview were transcribed and anonymised for the purpose of removing any identifiable elements for ethical purpose. The transcribed data were analysed, and the findings of the study was generated for analysis.

In 2021, the sample size was expanded to include international agencies that work with the NPF in capacity and capability programmes. This led to another semi-structured interview conducted with UNODC representative in Nigeria on the extent of collaboration on capacity and capability building with the NPF. Through persistent phone calls and emails for research interview to UNODC Vienna office, contact to the UNODC Nigeria office representative was shared and discussions continued via phone and emails for several weeks.

In February 2021, interview was conducted via video link (Zoom), with the respondent for UNODC Nigeria Office. Before the interview date, a zoom account was opened to facilitate

the interview. Zoom was chosen because it allowed for audio recording of more than an hour for transcription purpose. In addition, a topic guide was sent to allow the respondent to prepare for the interview by thinking of the subject matter (Lowe, 2016). The respondent was a former intelligence officer with over twenty years' experience in security, policing and crime prevention. The interview lasted for more than an hour and was recorded to avoid distraction and enable transcribing of the data. The responses were important in understanding the extent of UNODC's capacity and capability building work in Nigeria with the NPF and other LEAs. Finally, the responses of the interview were transcribed and anonymised for the purpose of removing any identifiable variables for ethical purpose. The transcribed data were analysed, and the findings of the study was generated for analysis.

3.5 Data Analysis

The research project adopted a combination of framework and thematic analysis in order to analyse and interpret the data collected. Framework analysis is a process that allows the user to either collect all the data and then analyse it or do data analysis during the collection process. In the analysis stage the gathered data is sifted, charted and sorted in accordance with key issues and themes. The process has five key elements: Data familiarisation; identifying a thematic framework; Indexing/coding; Charting/Summary; Interpretation. On the other hand, thematic analysis is a method for identifying, analysing, and reporting patterns (themes) within data. It minimally organises and describes your data set in (rich) detail. However, it also often goes further than this, and interprets various aspects of the research topic (Boyatzis, 1998).

The research project was guided by four research questions in relation to the aims and objectives of the project and research findings. A vast amount of data was generated after the interviews, which were all recorded via electronic device, transcribed and printed out in electronic

form. This led to the process of familiarisation of the data. This was achieved by listening to audio recording, reading notes and reading of the transcribed data to make sense of the data. This led to identification of direct responses to research questions and identification of patterns, themes and sub themes different from the research questions that provided further information.

Through familiarisation and identification of themes, sub themes and patterns aided by research questions, documentary analysis and findings, a coding of key themes was identified. “Coding is the process of analysing qualitative text data by taking them apart to see what they yield before putting the data back together in a meaningful way” (Creswell, 2015, p. 156). Although the act of coding can sound confusing, the term is a process of mapping data in other to make sense of it in relation to the research questions. In this study, several processes were used in other to capture respondent’s emotions, understanding, meaning, context, similarities, differences and experience. From using “in vivo codes” which captures participant’s exact words, to using process, emergent and descriptive codes.

Each transcript was printed out, read, and matched to each respondent’s answer to a particular question from the topic guide, for similarities, themes, patterns, differences and any use of descriptive words. The codes identified were highlighted with a coloured marker and noted on. These were then used to link the data, or a particular idea expressed by the respondents. In addition, the researcher used descriptive coding to capture a particular idea expressed by respondents. This process was achieved by reading and reflecting on the core meaning, context and content expressed by respondents. The process of coding led to selecting key themes, sub themes and other variables relevant to the research aims and objectives being selected and coded.

The next process in this research study was defining and refining the themes, sub themes, patterns and variables from the coding process. This process involved reflecting on meanings and sub-meaning, patterns, events, concepts, key ideas and context of the whole research. Through the coding process and the emergence of various patterns, themes and sub themes, a process of analysis was used based on the research questions and topic guide to interpret and convey the various respondent's understanding in relation to the events in question. The patterns, themes and sub themes generated, was all linked together into descriptive story.

3.6 Ethical Issues

Ethics in research is the moral principles and conduct research must follow. In conducting the research project, it was vital to consider the ethical issues of the research project especially, in this study. This research project was guided by various principles of ethics in ensuring that the research project was conducted in a safe and conducive atmosphere for the respondents and the researcher. The researcher being a security professional responsible in the identification and management of security risk, understands the importance of the duty of care and trust. An interview guide and informed consent form was provided to Nigerian Force Command Abuja, UNODC and to the respondents. The consent forms provided details of the study and the risks of taking part in the research study and their rights to withdraw at any point.

On the other hand, the data collected, were anonymised to remove any identifiable variables in order to protect confidentiality of sources. Identifiable information like rank, names, positions, command and any other relevant information that could identify the respondents were all removed. This is because all the respondents are ongoing serving senior police officers with the Nigerian Police Force and UNODC. Protecting their confidentiality remains a priority. The

study ensured that comments that could be attributed to respondents were removed. A confidential document during the interview with UNODC was shared with the researcher. The document was a UNODC Handbook on Counter Terrorism Investigations with the NPF. This confidential document was sort out via the internet and through phone calls to family and friends in academia and the police in Nigeria, but it was nowhere to be found. Some in the police in Nigeria, even claimed not to have heard of a handbook by UNODC on counter terrorism investigation, another source noted that the NPF does not need a handbook to counter terrorism in Nigeria.

Although the existence of the handbook is mentioned online, it was unavailable to view or download. The study was able to verify the existence of the handbook through phone calls to UNODC, which they refused to share. An online Portable Document Format (PDF) was eventually shared after a series of emails, phone calls and guarantee that the confidential document is not to be published and shared but can be used for research purposes only. The confidential document is not available to the public in any shape or form. The handbook is a very useful training document that shows the extent of collaboration between the NPF and UNODC.

The information collected from all interviews was stored in a secured place. As policing terrorism in Nigeria, remains an ongoing issue of national security, it was important not to ask and reveal responses that could jeopardise/harm frontline officers in the battle to disrupt terrorism in the country. However, all data collected was used including direct quotes for the research study.

3.7 Limitation of Study

This research is limited by sample size, scope, access to data, time, financial resources and the ongoing Corona Virus pandemic that commenced in early 2019. The nature of the study involved hampered the sample size and scope of the study. The study would have benefited from the responses of the Nigeria Army, Department of Security Services (DSS) and the Office of National Security Adviser on the challenges of Policing terrorism in Nigeria, rather than, from the Nigeria Police Force alone. Due to issues of national security associated in the policing of terrorism, access to data was difficult. In 2021, the study also requested interviews from international agencies working with the NPF like INTERPOL, DFID, NCA, GIABIA, IOM, FATF and UNODC. Numerous requests via telephone, contact forms, social media platforms like twitter and LinkedIn were used to sort contacts. Numerous emails were ignored and refused. Importantly, the ongoing Corona Virus (2019), pandemic also hampered access and response from these various organisations as most, if not all, were working from home or the offices were closed. Added to this, was the travelling restriction in place globally. However, the study benefitted from the input of UNODC which was the only international organisation that took part in the study.

Financial resources and time limited the study as interviews were conducted in Nigeria, which meant researcher had to travel to Nigeria, spending four weeks in order to get interviews sorted out. The researcher being a full-time worker and self-funding student, couldn't afford to stay back in Nigeria, and had to work on a tight schedule to get interviews sorted out. In addition, in 2021, financial resources challenge and the pandemic impacted the study greatly, due to loss of income. Nevertheless, the situation offered opportunity of a video-linked interview which saved the financial commitment of further travelling to location for interview. However, due

to the limitation of the sample size, a mixed research method was adopted in the identification, collection and analysis of data in order to provide richness and validity in data.

3.8 Conclusion

The chapter has identified the methodological issues that the researcher faced in this study. On reflection, the journey was a difficult one, added to the nature of the research study embarked on. The choice of topic was a hard one to research, however, through persistence, the journey has been worthwhile. The Nigerian part of the study went remarkably well. The granting of ethics and permission to carry out the study by the Inspector General of Police in Nigeria, were watershed moments for this study.

These moments gave the researcher the belief that this study after all, will be accomplished. However, difficulties were encountered in Nigeria, in trying to get other branches of law enforcement and other international agencies that work with the NPF to take part in the study. It would have been great to secure respondents' consent in the UK, prior before travelling to Nigeria, for interviews, but that was impossible. Nevertheless, given the time constraint, the pandemic, resources, access that affected the sample size, the study benefitted from the experiences of those key respondents within the NPF and UNODC in key roles, that took part in this study.

On reflection, it is fair to state that the use of a mixed research method was the best option available for this study. The combination of these two-research methodologies in this study and the expanding of the sample size to include international organisations that work with NPF like UNODC is significant. The expanding of the sample size and the use of a mixed research methods aided in bridging the problem of sample size, scope of the study and helped in the

triangulation of data. The use of the confidential UNODC Handbook on Terrorism investigations in Nigeria also helped in data triangulation as it showed the important collaboration in capacity and capability building between NPF and UNODC. Data collected from UNODC respondent was indeed verified by other secondary documentary sources from UNODC websites. This indicates credibility in the data collected and analysed. As noted above, research in terrorism studies is inherent difficult, however, this study, with all its limitations has provided an in-depth analysis into the challenges of policing terrorism in Nigeria. This study hopes to advance knowledge and change professional practise.

Boko Haram Terrorist Group

4.1 Boko Haram (BH) Introduction

BH is officially called Jama'atu Ahlus-Sunnah Lidda'Awati Wal Jihad Arabic for "*People Committed to the Prophet's Teachings for Propagation and Jihad.*" However, the terrorist group has become popularly known as BH, which means, "*Western education is forbidden*" in Hausa language (Campbell, 2014). The Islamic group grew from relative obscurity to become one of the most sophisticated terrorist group in the Western Sahara. With time, BH became the first terrorist group in Nigeria, to perfect the use of suicide tactics striking fear within the Nigerian polity and gaining an international notoriety with the kidnap of 276 Chibok school girls and bombing of the UN building in Abuja (Reuters 2011; Human Rights Watch 2012; UNICEF, 2017; NACTEST, 2016).

Nigerian law enforcement agencies continue to play catchup in the response and disruption of the group as of the end of 2018. BH in the present dispensation has split into various groups in the past and changed their name a few times. BH mainly operates in the Northeast part of Nigeria, as well as the Lake Chad Basin. Abubakar Shekau remains BH current spiritual and operational leader as of December, (2018). He took control over BH, in (2010), after the group's founder, Mohammed Yusuf, was killed in police custody in 2009. Thus, triggering almost a decade war with the Nigeria State (Simonelli et al., 2014; CFR 2018).

4.2 Evolution of Boko Haram

The precise date when BH was formed remains the subject of debate. Onuoha (2012), remarks that the emergence of BH is mired in controversy. He argues that most local media reporters

and international observers trace the origin of the group to 2002 when Mohammed Yusuf emerged as the group's spiritual leader. According to West Point Combatting Terrorism Centre, BH emerged around 2002, as the Ahlulsunna wal'jama'ah hijra sect at the University of Maiduguri, Borno State. It started as a non-violent group until Mohammed Yusuf took over the reins of the group (Cook, 2011).

According to the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR, 2018), BH was established in 2002, by its charismatic leader Mohammed Yusuf, whose aim was to establish a fundamentalist Islamic State in Northeast of Nigeria. Falode (2016), remarks that BH origins can be traced back to 1995 in a movement named 'Sahaba ' which was led by Abubakar Lawan. When he travelled to study at the University of Medina in Saudi Arabia, he conceded leadership to Mohammed Yusuf. Although, the exact date of BH emergence continues to divide opinions, there is no doubt that most agree that BH is a terrorist group that operates in Nigeria. It has killed thousands, created humanitarian crisis in the Northeast and rendered thousands homeless. On the other hand, BH menace has created insecurity in the country, reduced foreign investment and Nigerian LEAs continue to grapple with disrupting their activities (NACTEST, 2016).

Just as radical Islamic groups (Al Qaeda, Al Shabaab, Hamas) before it, BH believes in the purest form of Salafism and practicing the true teachings of Islam (Cook, 2011; Smith, 2016). Yet on the other hand, the group is prepared to kill Muslims and non-Muslims that do not adhere to its teaching and way of life, which is ironic given that Islam like every other religion emphasises on peace and tolerance. BH believes that western civilisation is the root causes of evil in the Muslim and wider community. According to Amusam and Oyewole (2014), BH believes that corruption, poverty, state failure, inequality and injustice are direct consequences of western civilisation in Nigeria. Hence, the only way forward would be religious revivalism.

Despite Nigeria, being Africa's biggest economy with crude oil and other natural resources, the country remains one of the poorest countries with basic amenities lacking and a corrupt system that has systematically damaged the economy (Forest, 2012; CFR, 2014).

It is fair to say that BH's birth and growth can be described as a product of its socio political and geographic environment. The history of Nigeria has been marred with ethno-religious, social and political conflicts since independence. Nigeria has witnessed various religious and ethnic clashes in the urban cities of Kaduna, Kano, Jos, Bauchi, Benue and other parts of the country for several decades and in recent times. In the Southern part of the country, militancy from various groups in the Niger-Delta region continues to present economic and security challenges to the country's infrastructure.

4.3 Boko Haram Modus Operandi

According to CFR (2019), BH modus operandi is mostly associated with the use of terrorism, including suicide bombing, kidnapping, and destruction of property, particularly schools, marketplaces, churches, police stations and state symbols. These indiscriminate attacks are carried out on soft targets like schools, marketplaces, car parks and rural villages with impunity. BH has in the past attacked police stations and army barracks, killing anybody that stands in their way. BH uses light and heavy arms and ammunition and indeed, the use of IEDs in carrying out attacks (Forest, 2014; CFR 2019). It is worth noting that BH just like most terrorist organisations has been hard to decipher. It is hard to analyse the true strengths of BH, its leadership structure, its funding source, its aims and objectives, its ideology, its tactics and its external affiliation. Walker, (2012) believes there are many barriers to the understanding of BH. He remarks that so little information about the group can be verified and solid information about the BH is hard to come by. Hence, sources of information on BH are unreliable.

Walker makes a valid point on the state of unreliable information available on BH, but it is also true that this is the same for most global/domestic terrorist groups. The affairs of terrorist groups have always been shrouded in mystery due to the inherent nature of terrorism. Most of what is known about terrorist groups is based on terrorist transcript, terrorist propaganda, videos, media, government documents, scholarly books and research. Some of this information cannot be verified and hence, can be unreliable. The use of terrorist propaganda for the terrorist, is to serve their own self-interest (Silke, 2004; Jackson et al., 2011).

4.5 Nigeria's Response to Boko Haram

There has been an extensive debate on the response of the Nigeria LEAs to the emergence of BH and its subsequent growth. Some commentators and scholars believe that BH birth and growth are direct consequences of poor government policy on the group. Others remark that the responses of LEAs to BH have been lacklustre and has exposed the inadequacies in the Nigerian LEAs. As Former National Security Adviser General Owoye Azazi stated in (2011), that Nigeria's security infrastructure was inadequate to deal with the BH threat. He notes that for BH to be defeated, capacity building for LEAs must be enhanced (Udounwa, 2013).

Onuoha (2012), remarks that the Nigeria government adopted what he calls a '*stick and carrot*' approach in responding to the group. He claims that the stick approach deals with the heavy handedness and brutal tactics that has become a signature of the Nigeria LEAs. In this regard, a Special Joint Task Force (JTF), known as "*Operation Restore Order*", or JTORO, was established to specifically tackle the BH threat. The task force recorded many success stories on BH but also, attracted criticism for harsh tactics that has affected not just the terrorist but innocent civilians. On the other hand, the carrot approach deals with granting amnesty to BH sect members who renounce extremism.

In addition, the carrot approach deals with addressing the issues of grievance, poverty, education, unemployment and social injustice. It is worth acknowledging that a carrot approach makes sense given that the use of force has not worked, rather, it has made things worse. For a carrot approach to work, it means government has to identify who the terrorists are. Otherwise, it will be a policy for the faceless terrorist which BH has often, been accused of. It is important to mention that terrorists will not out of courtesy, put down their weapons and take part in some carrot sharing scheme unless, they probably losing the war. Nevertheless, it is a welcome development that options like this are available which is more likely to induce incarcerated terrorist rather than the ones operationally active.

According to Pothuraju (2012), the Nigerian response has been haphazard. He remarks that BH was underestimated by policy makers and implementers. BH was treated as a local issue in the far border states of the Northeast that will be suppressed by the use of force, which is always the case in Nigeria. He claims that social economic issues like poverty, unemployment, lack of education, corruption, and political marginalisation, have tempted the ignorant, destitute, and disillusioned citizens to take up violence in the fight for justice.

4.5.1 Buhari's Government Response to Boko Haram

In (2015), Presidential election between Goodluck Jonathan and Muhammadu Buhari, one of the key issues of the election campaign was fought on the insecurity problems Nigeria faced. The issue of BH indiscriminate attack on the northern part of the country, the way the counter terrorism war was fought and how to combat the terrorist agenda was decisive in determining who the next president was going to be. Security of the country is paramount because it provides a safe and conducive atmosphere for the populist and for local and foreign business to thrive. According to Buhari (2015), a former retired military head of state, *BH is a mindless,*

godless group, who are as far away from Islam as one can think. He went further to remark that the issue of BH will be his government's number one priority if elected.

As promised by late December (2015), the state was winning the war on BH in the Northeast part of Nigeria. BH was beaten and driven away from the towns and villages back into Sambisa Forest in Maiduguri. Various towns were liberated from the grip of BH. This led the President to declare the technically defeated analogy on BH. According to Olaniyan (2018), despite LEA's achievements BH has neither been completely defeated nor degraded. He remarks that despite the government's claim, BH was still running rampant in the Northeast, carrying out attacks on soft targets like schools, markets, motor parks and IDP camps.

Falode (2015), remarks that the containment of BH was due to certain measures put in place by the Buhari administration. One of such measures was the creation of a new military formation, the 7th Division, in Maiduguri with a mission to contain and rout BH activities. He further remarks that the Nigeria government was able to turn the tide with the help of white South African mercenaries known as STTEP (Specialised Tasks, Training, Equipment and Protection). These elite officers were veterans of bush warfare with their experience and capability, help train the Nigerian officers in the tactic of 'relentless pursuit' to match BH's guerrilla tactics. It is worth noting that the Buhari's, administration response to BH has achieved some success in the first two years of the administration. Indeed, BH was reduced to pockets of attacks here and there. However, it important to state that some of these initiatives started during the Jonathan government.

The achievement of these success stories was due to different measures put in place like the creation of a joint task force comprising of the army, intelligence, police, immigration service,

and the civilian JTF. Added to this was a Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) comprising of Nigeria, Cameroon, Niger, Chad and Benin. Their mission was to disrupt the activities of BH in the West African sub regions as BH terrorist activities cuts across this region (Forest, 2012; Falode, 2015; CFR, 2019).

4.6 Conclusion

In analysing government response between the Jonathan and the Buhari government, it is worth stating that progress has been made and is still ongoing. However, critical mistakes and issues remain. One of the main issues has been the planning of policy, implementation and continuation of policy from one government to another. Issues of National security should be nonpartisan as operated in most western democracies like the UK and US. Reports claims billions of dollars was spent under the Jonathan administration on BH, yet when the Buhari administration came to power, there was still cries from various LEAs in the country for more resources.

Campbell (2014) remarks that despite a projected defence budget of nearly \$6 billion, BH regularly outguns security forces. Lack of adequate planning and resources has led to resurgence from BH. Terrorism in Nigeria has intensified under the reign of Buhari. BH has over the years carried out multiple attacks that has resulted in thousands losing life and property. BH activities has ravage parts of Northeast Nigeria and parts of Niger, Cameroon and Chad. The impact of their attacks has created humanitarian crisis in the Northeast and continues to challenge the Nigeria LEAs.

The rise and growth of BH caught the security agencies napping, especially the NPF that has suffered from decades of neglect, corruption, and political interference by the elites in Nigeria. The emergence of BH has shown that the NPF lacks the appropriate skills and training needed

to disrupt the activities of BH. The lack of capacity and capability on the part of the NPF led to the Nigeria Army being adopted as the lead agency in the policing of terrorism in Nigeria. Although a joint, task force exists amongst all the security agencies in Nigeria, the NPF ranks third in the partnership after the Army and Department of State Services (DSS).

The research project is framed around the premise on the importance of the police organisations in the countering of terrorism in Nigeria and globally. The role of police organisation is pivotal in the prevention and disruption of terrorism due to local knowledge, local intelligence gathering and community engagement efforts through community policing efforts. It is worth mentioning that having an effective police force can be a counter terrorism measure. Hence, the research project aims to identify and evaluate the challenges of countering terrorism in Nigeria from the NPF perspective.

The Nigeria Police Force

5.1 Introduction

The chapter traces the history of the NPF and presents an overview of the police organisation. The chapter investigates the problems, issues and challenges the organisation has faced from its inception to the present day. As an organisation that has been mandated in the prevention of crime and enforcing the law, the NPF is an important institution in the Nigeria polity. The organisation has been constantly battered by members of the public for its corrupt practices and ineffectiveness. The NPF has over its inception to the present day, gone through numerous challenges and issues, yet Nigeria with its multi-cultural, tribal, religious and geographic landscape remains a challenge to police. This is especially, important in the present dispensation of terrorist atrocities occurring in Nigeria and the globe. Policing terrorism in Nigeria, by the NPF and other security agencies remain a challenge. The chapter aims to analyse the issues and problems of policing in Nigeria and how it has directly or indirectly affected the NPF ability to police terrorism in Nigeria.

5.2 NPF Overview - Colonial Policing

The NPF is an important organisation in the lives and consciousness of every Nigerian, just like Her Majesty Police Service is to every Brit. However, the birth of the NPF came not as a result of community policing as in 1829, when Sir Richard Mayne, set forth the ethos on which the Metropolitan Police Service was founded. In contrast, policing in Nigeria, came about as a protection force, known for its oppressive, brutal and corrupt practices in enforcing the British mandate. Thus, these marked the beginning of police and community disconnection, which would continue unabated and would have profound effect to policing in present day Nigeria

(Metropolitan Police History 1829; Tamuno 1970; Ahire 1991, 1993; Rotimi 1993; Alemika 1993a). The formation of the NPF in 1861, reflected the needs of the colonial masters for bureaucratic and administrative reasons in other to maximise cost of running the colony.

According to Alemika (1998), the British played and compounded the cultural differences that existed and exploited it in order to maintain the structure of colonial exploitation and oppression. One is tempted to ask if colonial policing was that bad, and the indigenous people frowned at it, why has the framework and attributes been carried over to present day policing in Nigeria? Alemika (1998), believes that the economic exploitation, gross power and injustice that existed during the colonial era has not been done away with, but simply, carried on by the elites in power for economic, power and financial consolidation.

In evaluating policing in the colonial era, it is important to mention that policing in that period was not established in the interest of the colony, neither was the NPF created on the same ethos as that which existed in the British mainland. What existed in Nigeria, in the name of policing went against the model and ethics of policing established by Peel (1829). Peel believed that the police always should maintain a relationship with the public and that the police are the public and the public are the police. Nevertheless, the colonial police in Nigeria, was a brutal force, that often-used brutal means to achieve its goals. It was in addition, unaccountable and corrupt. Simply put, colonial policing was the subordination of the national interests of the people to the political and economic interest of the British. This mentality of policing will carry on long after the colonial masters left and still felt in today's Nigeria.

5.2.1 Post-Colonial Policing

The end of British mandate in Nigeria in 1960, would have been expected to usher in a new style of policing in Nigeria, but to the contrary. Post-colonial policing in Nigeria, marked a transfer of the same style of policing where police officers served and did the bidding of their pay masters and political elite (Ikuteyiyo and Rotimi, 2010: 4). Mann and Roberts (1991:5), remarked that due to “colonisation, Nigeria lost its traditional institutions, rules, structures procedures and meanings.”

This explains why the status quo existed even after the British left. However, it doesn't explain why if the framework was unattainable, it was not abandoned for a more acceptable form of policing. Mann and Roberts (1991:5), argue that those Nigerians who took over from the British were mere “colonial stooges without any traditional values and inherited hegemonic policing policy”. It is important to mention that policing in Nigeria, will go through a transformational change after Nigeria independence. Multiple military coups, a civil war and military dictatorship changed policing in Nigeria for the worse. Today, the organisation is still trying to crawl back those lost years.

The military move into politics in Nigeria was fundamental in changing the framework of democratic principles and framework of policing in Nigeria. The constitution of a civil democratic country was torn up, political parties and civil organisations disbanded to make way for military dictatorship that lasted for more than 30 years. In analysing that period of military dictatorship, Jemibewon (2000), remarks that military rule affected every stratum of society and penetrated the psyche of the people. He notes that obnoxious decrees such as the State Security and Detention of Persons Decree, under which persons could be detained indefinitely and with-

out trial, were promulgated. The rights of the citizens were subordinated, opposition to government was quickly crushed and the basic human rights of individuals were not only ignored but abused (Jemibewon 2000; Presidential Committee on Police Reform, Vol II (2006:18).

5.3 Nigeria Police & Policing

The NPF is made up about 371,000 police officers, various reforms are in place already to double the numbers given the enormous challenges of policing a country of more than 180 million people. The police organisation is headed by an Inspector General of Police (IGP), who is appointed by the president. He is supported by six Deputy Inspector Generals (DIG) and six Assistant Inspector Generals (AIG), all in charge of various divisional headquarters. In addition is 36 police commissioners in charge of the affairs of their individual states. The NPF is made up of twelve zones and 9 departments consisting of finance & administration, operations, investigation, logistics & supplies, training, research & planning, information & communication, force secretary and force intelligence bureau. The IGP oversees all administrative and operational control of the NPF (NPF 2019).

5.3.1 NPF in Modern Times

The NPF has over the years suffered from numerous challenges that has impacted on how the organisation polices crime in Nigeria. Some of the issues confronting the NPF are as follows: corruption, police brutality, poor public relations, poor recruitment practices, poor training, poor working environment, poor equipment and facilities, political interference and poor welfare package for officers (Ikuteyijo, 2008; Human Rights Watch, 2010; Ojo, 2014; Owen, 2014). The NPF in modern times has struggled to adapt to the shifting changes in the globe. The rise of globalisation, the internet, innovations in science and technology, cybercrime, organised crime, innovations in crime science and criminal investigation expected of a modern

police force in a digital age (Folami, O. et al, 2017; Davis, 2003). This can partly, be blamed on military incursion into politics in Nigeria and the subsequently, under funding of the NPF.

According to Davis (2003), globalisation is a multidimensional phenomenon. He notes on the remarkable state of growth in science and technology, the internet, air travel, telecommunication, finance and the interdependence of most aspects of people's lives which provides opportunity for economic, socio and political prosperity around the globe. The dawn of globalisation has opened the globe, especially the internet which has allowed a person in point A to communicate with a person in point E. However, the rise of globalisation has been welcomed, it has also created problems. Davis (2003), notes that globalisation has created critical vulnerabilities, social fragmentation, and sown the seeds of violence and conflict. These violence and conflicts across the globe mean that policing organisations must rise to the challenge by ensuring that their capacity and capability are beefed up to meet new trends of crime.

In Nigeria, globalisation has led to the rise of the internet, communication, like the introduction of mobile phones in 2002, social networking websites used for business, and everyday essentials from sending mails, to chatting to a family member in a faraway country. As Nigeria and the rest of the world reap from the proceeds of technological advancement in economics, communication, finance, trade and internet, it has created other issues that was never anticipated. Davis (2003) remarks that globalisation is responsible for increases in arms proliferation, cyber-attacks, ethnic violence, global crime and trafficking. In Nigeria, there has been a rise in cybercrime, fraud, communal clashes, clashes based on economic deprivation, terrorism, transnational crime and the proliferation of small arms and weapons (NACTEST, 2016).

Onuoha (2012), believes that the nature of politics in Nigeria, helps to drive arms and weapons into the wrong hands. He remarks that politics in Nigeria has become “a do or die” affair, leading politicians to sponsor political thugs, cult members and gangs in the attainment of their selfish goals. In addition, corruption has also helped in the proliferation of these weapons in the country through the bribery of custom officials, who are bribed to turn a blind eye. This is prevalent within the army, NPF, and other security services, who have been known to sell government weapons to criminals (Ayissi and Sall, 2005:68). As the issue of globalisation continues to present extraordinary challenges, one important challenge imparting the NPF, is the issue of corruption in the country. The issue of corruption in Nigeria, is not just peculiar to the NPF, but to other institutions in the country.

According to Kahn (2004; 2006; 2010; 2012; 2013), corruption thrives in developing countries like Nigeria, due to the development and processes of economic transformation. The act of creation and entrenchment of wealth which the state plays a pivotal role in. According to Ibrahim (2015), corruption is far the greatest problem of governance in Nigeria. He notes that the impact of corruption has eaten deep into the fabric of Nigeria and threatens the socio-economic stability of the country.

Adetoro (2012), goes further to remark that the NPF is the worst of all governmental organisations involved in corruption in Nigeria. Corruption in NPF has affected effectiveness and efficiency of the organisation. It has created poor public relations between the public and the police organisation and impacted on intelligence collection. It has also impacted on the policing of crime and the war on terrorism, hindering the organisation ability to disrupt the fight with BH due to lack of inadequate modern training and development needed in a globalised world.

According to a (2008), presidential report on policing in Nigeria, by a former Inspector General of Police, the report concluded that policing in the country is marred by unlawful arrest, detention, extortion, torture, rape, extrajudicial killings and other forms of brutality (Presidential Committee on NPF Reform, 2008). It is worth stating that the challenges of policing in Nigeria, has been made more daunting due to the nonexistence/fractured processes that has prolonged the status quo. NPF enjoys a remarkable license to do whatever it likes without consequence. According to the Network on Police Reform in Nigeria (NOPRIN 2010), there is a lack of transparent mechanism of internal control and discipline which leads to unaccountability and weak governmental oversight. This lack of internal control means that corruption, police brutality and other abuses of power thrives in the organisation with impunity (Human Right Watch, 2010; CFR, 2014).

Research carried out by NOPRIN between (2007 and 2009), found a culture of criminal policing and extensive corruption involving police officers of all ranks. The spate of corruption was not only amongst lower rank officers but extensive amongst senior officers as well (NOPRIN, 2010). Criminal policing has become the hallmark of NPF. Human Rights Watch (2007) estimated that NPF killed over 10,000 in eight years spanning from 2000 to 2007. Research indicates that these deaths, occur from police hands and are simply labelled as armed robbers killed in action. Research also shows that some of the dead bodies have been tortured to elicit confessions since the organisation lacks the capacity to conduct evidence-based investigation (Human Rights Watch 2007; NOPRIN, 2010). The activities of the NPF have given the organisation a bad name around the globe and criticism from international observers. It has also exposed the inadequacies prevalent in the organisation. Most agree that the organisation needs reform and restructuring.

5.4 Preventing and Deterring Terrorism in Nigeria by NPF

There has been development and a cultural shift in the understanding of terrorism and security in the country. The enhancing of intelligence collection and sharing of information by all collaborating agencies which is important in disrupting terrorism and organised crime. The Nigeria government has adopted a whole-of-Government and a whole-of-society approach by all government ministries, the public, stakeholders, LEAs and private initiative as expressed in NACTEST (NACTEST, 2016; National Security Strategy, 2019).

The whole society approach means addressing the root causes of radicalisation, grievances, creating security awareness amongst population, media sanitisation and indeed, investing on academic research. According to NACTEST (2016), deterring and disrupting terrorism will be achieved by identifying conditions that make people susceptible to terrorism, creating an effective counter narrative, the formulation of programs to identify the underlying issues of radicalisation, disrupting terrorism before they happen, increasing the capabilities of security agencies to deter and disrupt terrorism and so forth.

The introduction of NACTEST, is a step in the right direction because it has mandated the NPF and other LEAs to work together, pulling resources, sharing intelligences, working with the media/public and in addition, bring about international collaboration with other western agencies in improving the capacity and capability of the NPF (NACTEST, 2019; National Security Strategy, 2019). The Terrorism Prevention Act (PTA), (2011) was amended in 2013 which makes provision for extra-territorial application of the Act, strengthens terrorist financing offences and gives OSNA the authority and mandate for the formulation of a counter terrorism strategy and building capacity amongst all collaborating agencies. Various specialised units like the Counter Terrorism Unit that responds to terrorist atrocities across the country and for

protection of judges involved in terrorist cases has been established (PTA, 2013; NACTEST, 2016).

Nonetheless, it has to be noted that the NPF in terms of terrorism and counter terrorism has not had the experience, technical knowhow, and security infrastructure measures as compared to likes of the UK and the US. Fighting terrorism in Nigeria is as recent as 2012 to 2014, when the PTA and NACTEST was formulated. It is worth noting, that a lot of on-the-job training is occurring within the NPF and other LEAs in the country as they battle to disrupt and deter terrorism in the country. The legislation on terrorism in Nigeria has proscribed terrorism and made those that aid terrorist groups directly or indirectly a criminal offense.

Given the lack of capacity and capability that exists in Nigeria, international and regional collaboration continues to improve the ability of the NPF and other LEAs to deter and disrupt terrorism and organised crime in Nigeria (Forest, 2012, PTA, 2013; Owen, 2014; NACTEST, 2016). International agencies and organisation like UNODC, INTERPOL, FATF, EUROPOL, THE EU, ECOWAS, IOM, GIABA and DFID have at some point, played a role in capacity and capability building in order to enhance the ability of the NPF to meet its obligation in law enforcement (FATF, 2013, 2016; NACTEST, 2016; UNODC Handbook, 2019; UNODC, 2021a; 2021b).

5.4.1 Role of Counter Terrorist Training in Nigeria

The role of counter terrorism training has helped in the understanding of terrorism and organised crime in the country. This has been achieved by training and capacity building amongst the NPF and other agencies. However, counter terrorism training is just one aspect of the security challenges in the country. Basic means of criminal and terrorist investigations is still

lacking in the country. This is because of lack of evidence-based practises and a reliance on confession-based investigations from the use of torture. Hence, a recent handbook on counter terrorism investigation in partnership with UNODC, addresses basic issue of evidence collection, evidence storage, finger printing, case preparation, rule of law, terrorist groups, concepts in terrorist investigations, special investigative techniques, legal framework, terrorist crime scene preservation, coordination between intelligences and LEAs in terrorist cases and otherwise. The role of collaboration from international organisations and regional agencies has been valuable in the development and practises of counter terrorism and organised crime in Nigeria (NOPRIN, 2010; Forest, 2012; Owen, 2014; UNODC Handbook, 2019).

A recent collaboration on countering organised crime and corruption between the National Crime Agency (NCA) and the NPF, started in 2015 and ended in March 2020. The programme consists of two components; A Joint Border Task Force (JBTF) and Project INSTINCT- which is an anti-kidnap capacity building project. The first project hopes to strengthen Nigeria border integrity through the development of the JBTF, in conducting complex investigations into types of serious and organised crime impacting Nigeria borders. The NCA will work with Nigeria LEAs in capacity building and reform in other to prevent and disrupt organised crime and the threat from terrorism, reducing the threat on UK interest. The second project aims to deliver capacity building in the management of kidnapping cases. The project aims to increase public confidence in the NPF by reducing the physical risk and psychological harm to victims and hostages of kidnapping (CSSF, 2015).

Another project being funded by the British (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), is the Nigeria Security and Justice Reform Programme (SJRP). The programme commenced in April 2016 and ended in March 2020. The project had three components; Strengthening Security & Justice

(S&J) Accountability through the Media; Supporting Democratic Oversight and Accountability of the Nigerian Security Sector and Nigeria Policing Programme (NPP). The project aims to support wider constructive public dialogue around key security and justice sector reforms; Enhance legislative oversight of the security sector by supporting the National Assembly in holding the defense, security and justice officers to account; Strengthening the NPF's strategic planning and operations by supporting democratic policing, delivery of service, coordination and use of external and internal accountability mechanism at the local and federal level (CSSF, 2016).

Another interesting programme which ended in March 2021 between the MoD, Foreign Commonwealth Office (FCO) and Nigeria focused on key issues like: Stabilisation Facility; Defections, Demobilisation, Disengagement, Deradicalisation and Reintegration; Public Safety and Security; Community Reintegration; Reconciliation and Research. The programme provided capacity building support to the Nigeria Army and the Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNTJF), through train the trainer packages, pre-deployment training, advice on institutional reform. The programme provided support to the NPF in conflict management, stabilisation, demobilisation and community reintegration in areas recovered from the terrorist, to allow displaced persons return to their various communities. The programme also, provided support aimed at restoring basic services and livelihood opportunities to those displaced persons (CSSF, 2019).

It is important to state that a lot of projects and collaborations is taking place in Nigeria to support the efforts of the NPF and other agencies. This is because of the insecurity that exist in the country and the lack of capacity and capability that has affected the ability of the NPF to deter and disrupt terrorism. The role of counter terrorism training has helped to bring about

regional, national and international collaboration in the building of capacity and capability in Nigeria. It is also a wakeup call for the NPF, other LEAs and the country.

The role of counter terrorism training in Nigeria has exposed the poor neglected infrastructures that exist in the country, the lack of understanding of global security issues, lack of technical knowhow, the poor investigative tools that exist, corruption, criminal policing, absence of rule of law, unaccountability, impunity amongst LEAs and otherwise (HRW, 2010; NOPRIN, 2010; Forest, 2012; Solomon, 2012; Owen, 2012; Amnesty International, 2015). Due to police brutality and lack of trust, intelligence collection from local communities has suffered significantly, making any effort to prevent and deter terrorism in the country difficult.

A lot in capacity and capability training in counter terrorism is happening, but the reality on the ground is that the problems are much more than just counter terrorism policing. Other issues exist, which affects other areas of the society, from corruption to porous unsecured borders to cultural and ethnic clashes, to lack of research and means of evaluation. These issues do have an impact on the security situation in the country. As noted by Eji (2016), there is no evidence of any comprehensive review of Nigeria's response or strategy to counter terrorism either by policy makers or researchers (Osoba, 1994; Alemika 1997, 1998; Forest, 2012; Solomon, 2012; Owen, 2014; AI, 2015; Eji, 2016; NACTEST, 2016).

It is worth noting that Nigeria has a large population, and the Nigeria government has been receptive to the various projects and security reform in the country. However, issues remain, absence of rule of law, academic research, corruption, infrastructure decay, porous unsecured borders, resources, lack of training, technical expertise and otherwise. These continue to choke

any progress made. Corruption in the country has crippled the economy and unemployment of youths and marginalisation continue to create various agitations in the country.

According to the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) Labour Force Survey, Nigeria's unemployment rate was 27% in the second quarter of 2020. That has risen to 33.3% in the fourth quarter of 2020 (NBS, 2020; Nairametrics, 2021). It is worth noting that Nigeria is not a welfare state, which means a lot of jobless youths with nothing to do and with time on their hands to commit crime. Research in Nigeria suggests unemployment to be the root causes of violent crime in Nigeria (Okafor, 2011; Ajaegbu, 2012; Guza et al., 2019). In 2021, there has been a spike in kidnappings from BH and local bandits. This has led to numerous school children across the country kidnapped for ransom. One report notes that since December 2020, more than 600 students have been kidnapped (The Guardian, 2020; BBC NEWS, 2021; HRW, 2021).

The challenges for the NPF and other LEAs remain, the security challenges from terrorism, organised crime, armed bandits, pastoral clashes and otherwise has not ceded. To deter and disrupt terrorism and other crimes in the country, a whole new approach is needed, capacity and capability building and system reform. The capability and capacity of the NPF and other agencies is not close in comparison to that which exists in the UK and US. Hence, the measures being put in place to strengthen and support LEAs in the country is funded by western nations and organisations. Importantly, Nigeria should put their money where their mouth is by investing in academic research, fighting corruption and promoting good governance and accountability if the various training and measures are going to work. As noted by CSSF (2019), Nigeria has not addressed the long-term drivers of the conflict and violent extremism in the Northeast. Overstretched security forces and absences of a coordinated and combined response from State

and Federal Government has exacerbated the problem. There is also the issue of chronic underinvestment and drought in the Northeast which has left the population without any income. Whether these measures are going to work remains to be seen, it will indeed, require a cultural shift and a change from all those concerned which takes time. Nevertheless, one important aspect is the process and conversation has indeed started.

5.5 Future of Policing

As terrorism and organised crime continues to evolve, policing in the globe will have to move with changing times in order to meet the challenges of the 21st century. In the 21st century, the rise of the internet and information technology has given rise to new forms of threats like cybercrimes and cyberterrorism. Cyberterrorism has become a contentious issue in the 21st century and will require a global effort to tackle its menace.

5.5.1 Cyberterrorism

Cyberterrorism is an emerging issue. The phenomenon is a contested concept. The concept has multiple definitions by Scholars, Professionals in cyber domains and indeed Government/Policy makers. It must be noted that terrorism itself, is a contested concept and a pejorative term with no clear definition. Bringing Cyber and Terrorism together has only led to further confusion in public discourse with no clear sign of abating (Hoffman, 2006; Silke, 2011; Munk, 2019; Broeders et al., 2021). Broeders et al., (2021), remarks that there exist widely differing views on what constitutes a cyberterrorist act.

According to Lewis (2002), cyberterrorism is the use of computer network tools to shut down critical national infrastructures or to coerce or intimidate a government or civilian population.

Cambridge Centre for Risk Studies, (2017) defines the concept as an act of politically motivated violence involving physical damage or personal injury caused by a remote digital interference with technology systems. Denning (2000) defines the concept as unlawful attacks and threats of attacks against computers, networks, and the information stored therein when done to intimidate or coerce a government or its people in furtherance of political or social objectives. There are those who define any use of cyber technology by terrorist as cyber terrorism. Kohlmann an internet terrorist expert, refers to cyber terrorism as any application of terrorism on the internet (Kaplan, 2009; Broeders et al., 2021). Gordon and Ford (2002), take a similar view and note that terrorists targeting computers, networks and the information stored therein can be considered “*pure cyberterrorism*”.

Although there is disagreement on a precise definition of cyberterrorism, most would agree that the phenomenon involves the use of the internet, computers and individuals bent on using terrorism to further their agenda. As definitions and research goes, without a proper definition, how then, can this concept that evokes so much fear of the unknown be addressed? At the crux of the problem are issues of intent, political, ideological, religious and otherwise and the impact of the event (Weimann, 2004; Broeders et al., 2021). As noted by Denning (2000), an attack must have an impact in the “*real world*” that goes well beyond damage to data or information technologies to be referred as cyberterrorism. Importantly, it is worth not confusing cybercrime and cyberterrorism. Whilst, both are crimes, the key difference is the intent or motive. As noted by Brenner (2006), cybercrimes are personal involving personal need/gain and cyberterrorism are political, ideological and otherwise. However, some cybercrimes have been classed as cyberterrorism adding to the confusion the phenomenon generates.

Moving beyond definitions, the idea of Cyberterrorism was coined around the 1980s by Barry Collins, a senior research fellow at the Institute for Security and Intelligence in California. The concept is made up of two elements cyberspace and terrorism. Cyberspace may be conceived of as *that place in which computer programmes function and data moves* (Collin, 1999; Conway, 2002). Martin (2010:525, 2013:514), calls this *Tech-Terror* and notes that the feasibility of terrorist using emerging technologies to cause terror can be obtained by the terrorists acquiring the technical knowledge. Hoffman (2006), notes that new rationales, motivations and new adversaries have emerged in today's world to challenge some of the conventional wisdom on terrorism and terrorist.

The idea of cyberterrorism was based on imaginary scenarios of terrorist groups, organised crime groups and rogue states somehow, acquiring the technical skills needed to attack critical infrastructure of various governments like the power grid, financial networks, transport network, water systems and so forth for the purpose of terrorism (Conway, 2002; Lewis, 2002; Weimann, 2004; Martin, 2010; 2013). Weimann (2004), notes that the fear of cyberterrorism may be manipulated and exaggerated, however, it can't be denied nor ignored.

To put this into perspective, the same kinds of scenarios have been put forward by scholars, professionals and policy makers about Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN), weapons falling into the hands of terrorists, private actors and rogue states. As noted by Hoffman (2006), CBRN terrorism is not the most likely threat the world faces, but it is a salient threat. Indeed, not too long ago, a war to get rid of weapons of mass destruction was waged on these hypothetical scenarios in Iraq (Weimann, 2004; Hoffman, 2006). Martin (2010, 2013) notes that the scenario of terrorists acquiring weapons of mass destruction is no longer

the stuff of novels and films. On the other hand, there has been the use of Sarin gas attack in 1995, by religious cult, Aum Shinrikyo in Tokyo, Japan (Martin, 2010; Silke, 2011). As reported by BBC NEWS (2018), the toxin struck victims down, leaving them choking and vomiting, some blinded and paralysed. Thirteen reported deaths and at least 5,800 were injured in five coordinated attacks on three train lines.

Lewis (2002), believes that the evidence of a frightening scenario of terrorist and rogue states taking out critical infrastructure of entire states by the stroke of a mouse, simply, doesn't exist. He notes that terrorist indeed, use the internet for various reasons like recruitment, online chat, fraud, training and otherwise. However, for cyberterrorism, it will be difficult to achieve the political, carnage and terror that real terrorism evokes. Conway (2002:6), notes that *terrorist 'use' of computers as a facilitator of their activities, whether for propaganda, communication, or other purposes, is simply that: 'use.'*

It worth mentioning, that although Lewis's study was carried out nineteen years ago, not much has changed in terms of real-life evidence of a cyberterrorism attack. That is not to say there hasn't been an increase in cybercrime, to the contrary, increased innovation in technology has created increased vulnerabilities for cybercrime to flourish. Kostadinov (2012), believes that depending on the context, cyberterrorism may overlap considerably with cybercrime or ordinary terrorism. This raises concern and confusion when terms like cyberattack, cybercrime, cyberwarfare, cyberterrorism, hacking and hacktivism is used interchangeably.

In a (2017), study carried out by the Cambridge Centre for Risk Studies, the findings remarked that different types of cyber-attack are becoming more common, however, the relevant cyber

terrorist actors currently pose a low likelihood of inflicting severe physical destruction through digital means before 2020. The report further notes that major terror groups like Daesh and Al-Qaeda, that pose a threat to the UK, have failed to demonstrate advanced skills in ‘*Disruptive*’ and ‘*Destructive*’ capabilities required to inflict carnage in a real cyberterrorism event (Evan, et al; 2017:13).

As cyberterrorism has become an emerging threat due to technological advancement and rise of the internet, scholars and professional have echoed the inappropriateness of the existing laws to deal with the threat. As noted by Brenner (2006), the 1990 UK Computer Misuse Act outlawed hacking and other online variants of traditional crime, but it does not address Distributed Denial of Service attack (DDoS), attacks which is a new form of cybercrime. In the UK, reports indicate that the Nation’s cyber-defences are endangered by the outdated 1990, Computer Misuse Act (CMU). According to the Criminal Law Reform Now Network (CLRNN), (2020), report, the UK Computer Misuse Act is outdated and needs reform. The report notes that the Act hasn’t kept pace with rapid technological advancement and hence, the country remains vulnerable to cyberattacks (CLRNN, 2020).

The report identifies issues of computer misuse, like hacking, use of computer malware to disrupt services, stolen information for extortion purposes, a confused legal framework with ambiguous terminology, the lack of clarity in some CMU offense that punishes, professionals, journalist and academics from testing, defending, and researching cyberthreats to systems and society in general. The group recommends, reforming of existing laws to reflect changing times, new sets of sentencing and prosecution guidance, better involvement in cyber defense from professionals, journalist and academics and improvement in modern systems in line with UK international obligations. In a related (2021), report the UK Government announced, it will

work on reforming the 31-year-old CMA of 1990. Plans to launch a consultation to gather input and guidance from stakeholders will begin in 2021 (Computer Weekly, 2021).

In Nigeria, the use of the internet by terrorist and organised crime groups for various reasons like fraud, fake news, hate speech, identity theft, radicalisation, recruitment, raising funds and so forth has been on the increase due to advancement in global technology. According to the Nigeria National Cybersecurity Strategy (2021), seven major cyber threats are of concern, cyberterrorism, cybercrime, online child abuse, elections interference, online gender exploitation, pandemic induced cyber threats and other cyber threats. Nigeria has established a cybercrimes (Prohibition and Prevention, ETC) ACT, 2015. The Act provides an effective, unified and comprehensive legal, regulatory and institutional framework for the prohibition, prevention, detection, prosecution and punishment of cybercrimes in Nigeria.

The (2015) Act, also ensures the protection of critical national information infrastructure, promotes cyber security, protection of computer systems, networks, electronic communications, data, computer programs, intellectual property and privacy rights (Prohibition and Prevention, ETC, 2015). ONSA remains the coordinating body in charge of the country's National Cybersecurity. The body is tasked with the implementation of Nigeria's National Cybersecurity Programme in accordance with provisions of relevant laws and international principles (Nigeria National Cybersecurity Strategy (2021)). As the threat to cyberterrorism grows, Nigeria aims collaborate with other international countries, civil society, academia, private sector and other stake holders in incident management, digital safety training, software and hardware systems development and online safety.

In the concluding analysis, it is worth noting that cyberterrorism has become an emerging security threat. How real is the threat of cyberterrorism remains a matter of controversy? Nonetheless, till date, there is no record of a cyberterrorist incident using computers to cause deaths of hundreds of people, creating the havoc and psychological trauma real terrorism evokes. There are records though, of various cyberattacks from terrorist, organised crime and rogue states using computers to commit fraud, attack websites, deface websites, email phishing attacks, espionage, Distributed Denial-of-Service attacks (DDoS), malware attacks, extortion, recruitment, intelligence collection, information blackmail, recruitment, propaganda, fake news, child abuse and so forth (Conway, 2002; Lewis, 2002; Brenner, 2006; Martin, 2010; Evan, et al; 2017; Broeders et al., 2021).

It can be deduced that compared to thirty years ago, the threat has increased significantly due to changing times and increased technological innovation. The threat is more pronounced for advanced countries like UK, US and the rest of the industrialised states due to their technological advancement compared to countries like Nigeria and other third world countries where technological advancement is at a slower pace. But it also means that the likes of the UK and the others have more capability and capacity to counter the threat of cyberterrorism compared to Nigeria and the rest of the third world countries still grappling with economic transformation. There is much work to be done, the UK, as the literature has shown needs to reform its outdated laws to meet the growing threat of cyberterrorism and the consultation is in progress.

For the terrorist, organised crime groups and rogue states the use of cyber technology is a no-brainer because it is cheap, fast, anonymous, remote, offers a variety of targets and can cause severe damage to critical national infrastructures. Countering cyberterrorism will require the updating and legislation of old/new laws needed to deal with the changing and growing threat

that incorporates new forms of cyberattacks. It will require a precise definition to address the definitional quagmire for effective LEA's disruption and prosecution across national, regional and international boundaries. International cooperation amongst states is needed in information sharing and experience in preventing, protecting, mitigating and investigation of cyberterrorism atrocities. Regulations and multi stakeholder cooperation are needed regarding terrorist abuse of the internet. Research, training, collaboration and development in cyberterrorism by LEAs, academia and practitioners is needed in the field on emerging cyber threats and system vulnerabilities.

The policing of terrorism in the 21st century has focused on the countering of real live terrorism compared to cyberterrorism. However, it is right to say that the dynamics has changed. Policing must grapple with the cyber dimension of terrorism and its impact on the real world. This is because of the opportunity cyberspace presents to terrorist as well as to LEAs in tracing and tracking the digital footprints left behind by cyberterrorist. As noted in Rycroft's (2016) study, cyber facilitated crime in the UK and the globe has become a big issue and will require the IT and internet companies help in curbing its menace. As for Nigeria, the country has formulated various laws and legislation to tackle cyberterrorism and cybercrime in the country. Policing in Nigeria is marred by various challenges. To meet the challenges of policing in the 21st century in the cyber domain, a cultural shift, training and technical expertise would be needed to detect, prevent and disrupt this emerging threat.

5.5.2 Future of Policing in Nigeria

NPF is characterised by police corruption, police brutality and resource and management inadequacies (Alemika 1997, 1998, Osoba 1994 and Balogun 2003). Yet, the organisation remains an important institution in the lives and consciousness of Nigerians. It is important to

remark that even though, Nigerians distrust her police force, they are still called upon for assistance in the prevention and disruption of crime and other civil societal issues for deliberation. It therefore means that, despite, the status quo, Nigerians believe and trust in the institution of policing (Owen, 2012; 2014).

The recent atrocities of BH in Nigeria, has put the issue of terrorism and its response by the NPF at the fore front of policy in Nigeria. This is because security of Nigeria, is paramount to the wellbeing of the populist, providing for a conducive atmosphere for local business and foreign investment to thrive. Terrorism has become a major security and policy issue in Nigeria. The atrocities of BH, militants and other terrorist groups continue to polarise the country and affect physical security, businesses and foreign investment.

It is worth mentioning that terrorism is just one of the issues plaguing the country at the moment. The issues of Fulani Herdsmen clashes, kidnapping, murder, banditry, armed robbery, theft of crude oil, proliferation of small arms and weapons, cyberterrorism and organised crime are some of the problems the NPF are grappling with (HRW, 2010; Ukoji, 2016; Okoli, 2019). The rise of terrorism and transnational crime is a major challenge globally within all police organisations. This is especially, a daunting task for third world countries like Nigeria, still grappling with corruption, democracy and socioeconomic transformation. As the world continues to globalise and technological transformation continues to speed up, new forms of crime will continue to emerge.

Data Presentation and Analysis

6.1 Abstract & Introduction

The chapter analyses the policing of terrorism in Nigeria and how the challenges of terrorism are being met and UNODC's collaboration in capacity and capability building with the NPF. The chapter draws from the literature review, documentary analysis and the data collected from respondents in NPF and UNODC in order to identify and analyse issues of policing terrorism in Nigeria and how it is being tackled. The chapter draws from the responses of interviews conducted in Nigeria in 2018, from senior police officers in the NPF and further interview with UNODC in 2021. The chapter features key issues and themes in counter terrorism policing in Nigeria, analysing these various issues and themes in order to give context to the data collected.

As of December 2018, the atrocities of BH terrorists in Nigeria had not receded but has continued to grow. Attacks continue to happen with loss of lives, property damage and insecurity ever present in the Northeast part of the country. According to Nigeria Security Tracker, the total number of deaths measured from (2011), to December (2018), stands at 36,222 (CFR, 2018). This is the number of people killed including BH fighters, law enforcements operatives and civilians over a ten-year period. On the other hand, there has been remarkable improvement from the NPF and other agencies, who are more aware and more in tuned to the threat BH and other terrorist groups continue to pose in Nigeria.

The chapter looks at the history of terrorism in Nigeria and the lacklustre approach applied to its understanding and response. Why was terrorism not taken seriously in Nigeria, given the lessons of the 9/11 attacks on the US and given that terrorism has always existed in the past in

Nigeria before the events of 9/11? The chapter aims to identify and analyse the issues of terrorism and the NPF response to policing terrorism in the country. The chapter looks at the history of terrorism in Nigeria and its understanding amongst senior police officers in the country.

The chapter is divided into various themes, in other to identify and understand counter terrorism policing in Nigeria, especially amongst senior police officers. The chapter notes that terrorism is not new in Nigeria but has existed for a while. The chapter is divided into various subheading: Terrorism in Nigeria, looks at the nature and understanding of terrorism and counter terrorism policing in Nigeria. The structure of counter terrorism policing in Nigeria, looks at the framework and construction of terrorism in Nigeria.

The introduction and implementation of the National Counter Terrorism Strategy (NACTEST), which is the foremost counter terrorism policy document ever implemented in the country. The scope of and resources for counter terrorism, looks at the human and financial resources available for preventing and responding to terrorism. It looks at the challenges of inadequate resources, dilapidated infrastructure and poor training. Responses to counter terrorism in Nigeria, looks at the measures put in place by the Nigeria Government in other to meet the challenges of terrorism in the country. The final themes look at training in progress and how the various training is evaluated by senior police officers and policy makers.

6.2 Nature of Terrorism in Nigeria

Terrorism is not a new phenomenon; it has existed in various forms. During the Roman era, terrorism was used by the Romans Empire to punish and warn Roman enemies. This was mostly achieved by the use of torture and crucifixion as a form of communication to those who

wish to challenge the might of the Roman Empire (Martin, 2010). In Nigeria, the Niger Delta militants blew crude oil pipelines, kidnapped foreign oil workers, and killed security operatives for the sole reason of communicating their grievance to the Federal Government. Repressive measures were taken by the government in order to bring the activities of the militants to an end (Ogundiya, 2009; Tobor, 2016).

Critically though, the Niger Delta militants then, were never referred to as terrorists. Even though their methods involved the use of terrorism, it was rather, described as a war for economic control of natural resources in the oil rich part of Nigeria by the Nigerian government. Perhaps, this was convenient for political reasons or simply, a lack of understanding. Hence, processes and policies weren't put in place for future occurrence of this sort of terrorist atrocity, leading to a lack of planning and unreadiness in the fight to police terrorism in the country.

The attack by Al Qaeda on the US in 2001, changed the history of terrorism and the response to it by law enforcement and government agencies across the globe. The attack signified a new era of terrorism has emerged and changed counter terrorism policing measures across the globe (Deflem, 2010; Martin, 2010). The importance of police organisation in policing terrorism cannot be overstated. In Nigeria, the issue of terrorism has always existed domestically in various forms through various military dictatorships, ethnic and religious clashes, clashes for control of economic resources and militancy in the Niger Delta region (NACTEST, 2016). The emergence of BH in Nigeria around 2000 was never anticipated and initially, not taken serious by the NPF- the lead agency for internal security of the country. Hence, according to Respondent B,

I think in the beginning, we looked at terrorism as an emerging crime, evolving in the society, before we could grasp what was happening, terrorism atrocities became a serious and enlarged issue in the country.

This is a very significant statement coming from a high-ranking police officer in NPF. The idea that terrorism was looked at as an emerging crime that engulfed the country suddenly, is debatable. Terrorism in Nigeria has always existed in terms of military dictatorship, communal and ethnic conflicts and indeed, the Niger Delta militants, who blew up crude oil pipelines, kidnapped foreign oil workers for ransom and murdered law enforcement officers (Forest, 2012; NACTEST, 2016). It is certainly true that most countries in Africa and around the globe did not have a systematic or coordinated efforts towards preventing and fighting terrorism before 9/11. The exception are countries like Israel with their experience of Palestinian terrorism and the UK with their experience within the British Empire. According to Deflem (2010), counter terrorism pre 9/11, developed in a piecemeal fashion not focusing on terrorism broadly, but on terrorist activities like high jacking, kidnapping and bombing. He notes that the 9/11 attack, changed perspectives, leading to new counter terrorism agreements, legislation, international collaboration, new policies, and reorganisation of police practices (Deflem, 2010).

As Crenshaw (2007), notes, terrorism is a complex and contradictory phenomenon. It has no single model, type, structure or organisation, so that oversimplification of the terrorist threat cannot lead to an effective response. The complexity of terrorism may, have been problematic for the NPF to understand and tackle due to the Police not possessing the required skill to secure a crime scene, conduct efficient evidence gathering, no credible criminal database, no capacity to use forensic science in solving crime, and so on. Terrorism on the other hand, as

noted above by Crenshaw, presented a different challenge that needs a holistic approach. According to Respondent B,


It has not been easy, especially when we the police are playing catch up. Terrorism was not anticipated as a serious issue. We are at the stage, where we are trying to make up lost ground.

According to Olojo (2013), before 2009, BH activities were not regarded as a major security threat in the country rather as a radical organisation with occasional tendency of violence. This is important because it suggests that terrorism perpetuated by BH grew from an unknown local group to maturity under the gaze of the security agencies who did not understand the threat they were dealing with. The NPF perceived the threat from BH as a local issue and paid no serious attention to the group and the threat it would later pose (BBC NEWS, 2014; Sahara Reporters, 2017).

The inability of the NPF and other law enforcement agencies to grasp and identify the threat that terrorism by BH would pose increased the scope of the counter terrorism challenge the NPF and other agencies would face and continue to face. The literature review identified that an effective response to terrorism would depend on how terrorism is perceived and approached by those concerned with addressing it. How terrorism was perceived in the early formative days of BH in Nigeria continues to affect the war on terrorism to this day.

6.3 The Structure of Counter Terrorism Policing in Nigeria

Figure 6.3 Nigeria National Counter Terrorism Strategy



Policing terrorism unlike policing crime is different. It is different because of its political motive and the resources required to prevent and disrupt the activities of terrorism. Policing terrorism requires everybody in the society from private sector, academia, governmental agencies and the public to buy into any preventive and disruptive measures formulated by government to address the menace. In addressing terrorism, it important to have policy document in which government sets out the means and manner it aims to employ in the fight to counter terrorism (Hamm, 2007; Jackson et al., 2011; Lafree, 2012; NACTEST, 2016).

In 2014, the Nigerian government formulated a counter terrorism strategy policy document, the first of its kind in the country. This was later revised in 2016, by the Nigerian government. The policy aims to drive the process, provide a holistic approach and drive institutions to build their capacity and capability in mitigating the terrorist threat (NACTEST, 2016). According to Respondent A,

NACTEST, is used as a guide and if it is policy, it must be followed. We don't want to be seen infringing on certain rights.

It is worth stating that policy formulation in Nigeria is normally aspirational and always lacking implementation. Policy formulation is sometimes formulated in other for government to show the public that something is being done without necessarily having the framework for achieving the said policy. The first NACTEST policy that was formulated by the Jonathan government in 2014, was formulated in other to show the country and international community that Nigeria, was serious about tackling terrorism and human right abuses in the country, yet it was an avenue for government official to embezzle the appropriated security funds for their personal use (Udounwa, 2013; Azazi, 2012; BBC NEWS, 2014; Sahara Reporters, 2017).

This remains so, with the ongoing trial of the former NSA of the Jonathan government accused to embezzling billions of dollars from the security funds. On the other hand, a new reversed counter terrorism policy in 2016, has exposed the inadequacies with policing in Nigeria. The policy document in trying to implement its recommendations, has exposed the state of the rule of law in the country, criminalised policing, corruption, lack of training, dilapidated infrastructure, human rights violations and the poor capacity and capability of the security forces in the country. One important aspect of the NACTEST policy is it charges all participating agencies

to carry out their operations within the rule of law and not to infringe on the fundamental human rights of the members of the public. This because the security services in the country have in the past being accused by human right groups of torture, extrajudicial killings and abuse of power (HRW, 2010; Forest, 2012; NACTEST, 2016; Sahara Reporters, 2016).

NACTEST, as presented in (Figure 6.3), is the overall lawful strategy and guideline that the NPF and other agencies must follow in order to tackle the threat from terrorism in the country. It outlines various duties and obligations of all agencies in the fight to police terrorism in the country. NACTEST is organised around five key principles: (See Figure 6.3):

- **Forestall**, which aims to stop people from becoming terrorist
 - **Secure**, which aims to strengthen protection capacity against terrorist attacks
 - **Identify**, which aims to pre-empt terrorist acts through early warning and ensuring that terrorist acts are properly investigated
 - **Prepare**, which aims to mitigate the impacts of terrorist attack and build resilience to ensure business continuity
 - **Implement**, which is the mobilisation of coordinated cross government efforts
- (NACTEST, 2016).

NACTEST being a policy document was formulated so all security agencies, governmental agencies and other private initiatives are familiar with roles and individual organisational responsibilities. Additionally, the document aims to win the battle of hearts and minds by making sure that in fighting terrorism, NPF does not infringe on the human rights of the civilian population and indeed, the terrorist caught up in the fight by always upholding the rule of law. This

is achieved by community engagement and affording captured terrorist fair and speedy trials without dispelling jungle justice. According to Respondent B,

NACTEST comes into play because it spells out the duties of all collaborative agencies and exchange of ideas is fused together.

Crelinsten, (2009:44-48) has suggested that getting an incorrect conception of terrorism wrong, leads to what he calls “*wrong-headed approach*”. The introduction of NACTEST, as a policy guide was the first time the government decided to tackle the issue by formulating a policy to address all the components of counter terrorism. This is because the approach to the war on terrorism was ill-conceived and practically, was not yielding the expected results on battlefield and within the country. The importance of NACTEST is it unites all the security agencies like the police, the military, DSS, immigration and the civil defence together to work as a team and pull financial and human resources together for a common goal (NACTEST, 2016). NACTEST remains a step in the right direction, however, implementing the recommendation of the policy remains a continuous challenge by those charged with its implementation. According to Respondent B,

In the Nigeria situation, we all compare notes, policies are formulated and brought out and the joint NACTEST Consultative Forum decides what strategy/policy is to be formulated, whilst our role is to see how the policy can be practically adopted to meet our counter terrorism needs.

Through (NACTEST) consultative forum ideas are formulated, and roles handed out. This is made possible by the ONSA. The Office of the National Security Adviser is the body that coordinates all counter terrorism affair in the country on behalf of the Federal Government and advises the government directly on measures taken and progress through National Security Council (NSC), the Joint Intelligence Board (JIB) and the Intelligence Community Committee (ICC). The Office of the National Security Advisor is the principal officer of the National Security Council. The ONSA falls under the supervision of the Federal Ministry of Interior.

According to NACTEST (2016), the ONSA is to provide requisite leadership role in all national counter terrorism effort and drive NACTEST. The ONSA maintains a comprehensive list of the country's Critical National Infrastructure (CNI) and formulates policy for its protection. The body's other role is to drive and ensure synergy amongst DSS, the NPF, the Armed Forces and other Stakeholders and coordinate all efforts including the sanitisation of the public and working out the modalities of Nigeria's joint patrol efforts with other regional countries. The position of the Office of National Security Adviser in Nigeria was first established in 1993, by the then military regime of General Ibrahim Babangida. In Nigeria, the position of ONSA has almost become exclusively reserved for ex-military officers, with one former military officer holding the position three times. Appointing ex-military officers is thus the rule rather than the exception. According to Respondent B,

The ONSA, coordinates all activities due the heavy financial requirements needed to carry out the operations and constant review of training and retaining of officers.

ONSA is overriding body that oversee counter terrorism policy, strategy and its implementation.

As presented in (Figure 6.3), the importance of the ONSA cannot be over emphasised, it controls all the aspects of the counter terrorism process especially, the allocation of resources and roles. The ONSA, is filled with present and ex-military officials which automatically, makes them the lead agency in policy formation and implementation. The ONSA decides what strategy, policy, and manner of the counter terrorism fight. According to Respondent B,

We have a strategy in line with other agencies. Every operation is done in consultation with other agencies. The NPF is the lead agency, operations are planned based on the intelligences collected by DSS, and also the directives from the ONSA.

Everything is done in collaboration with other agencies. NACTEST is a key strategy.

Collaboration in Nigeria is achieved by joint patrol amongst the various agencies, joint use of training facilities, joint training exercise, joint use of specialised units, like the NPF Counter Terrorism Unit (CTU) and use of NPF Explosive Ordnance Disposal Unit (EOD), joint use of the command centre, joint sharing of intelligence collected, joint use of other units like emigration service, civilian joint task force and the Nigerian customs. According to Respondent A, on the extent of collaboration, he notes,

We also, have the Explosive Ordnance Disposal Unit (EOD), which is an anti – bomb Squad used for sweeping landmines. The military relies on this unit. In addition, there were plans to train 1500 police officers and 1500 Civil Defence Unit together. The training facility was visited to ensure everything was ready for the commencement of the training. This shows we work together.

Collaboration amongst agencies continues to improve nationally, and internationally. Border security responsibilities are shared among the NPF, DSS, Customs, Immigration, and the Nigerian military. The Nigerian government continues to participate in United States capacity-building programs, working with the FBI to investigate specific terrorism matters, through the DSS, and provide IED components to the FBI for analysis at the Terrorist Device Analysis Centre. The Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC) and NPF also received crime scene training relevant to counterterrorism investigations (Country Report on Terrorism, 2018). According to respondent B,

It is important to understand the Nigeria Structure. We have the Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA), the Department of Security Services (DSS). Physically, the NPF is meant to be the lead agency, but due to the nature of terrorism where covert operations/intelligence is a key factor, I would say the NPF is not the lead agency. The lead agency would in that case, be the ONSA and the DSS. The DSS obtains all the intelligence that they can get, and the NPF gets any little further intelligence required and coordinate the practical aspect of the operations.

Respondent A sees it differently,

We are very much involved in counter terrorism policing because we are in charge of the internal policing of the country. That simply, means that if anything happens within the country, national wise, we are in charge. But at times when it is beyond us the police, we call in the Military. Due to the level of sophistication, and the war is asymmetrical in nature, the army takes the lead, due to, it's more of a civil war, but the police is very much involved.

Respondent C expands the role of the NPF further,

The acts of terrorism in Nigeria started between 2009 and 2010, these were originally in four States, but demands for the unit (CTU) increased and our presences cover the Northeast part of the Country, here in Abuja, and some major cities in the country. We have been in involved in the counter insurgency in the Northeast in conjunction with the Military and other sister agencies. We all go out and conduct joint patrols of towns and cities, both internal and border patrols, Cordon and search of properties and vehicles, day to day operations and recently, the protection of IDP camps.

In analysing the above comments from all three respondents, it is important to understand how the Nigerian dynamics works. According to NACTEST (2016), the NPF is the lead agency for the maintenance of law and order and the prevention and detection of crime in the country. The NPF is the first respondent in the five strands of NACTEST with support from other agencies. The DSS is the lead agency on information/intelligence collection/collation on all non-military components of internal security as well as prevention and detection of terror related activities/crimes. The Army under the remit of the Defence Headquarters establishes a robust counter terrorism (Special Operations Force) and coordinate the counter terrorism efforts of the Armed Forces of Nigeria. The Defence Headquarters will coordinate and implement the mandate of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) involving the Armed Forces of Nigeria, Niger, Chad, Cameroon and Republic of Benin.

The implementation of NACTEST spells out roles and duties for individual agencies in the country, but as well, it assigns same roles to two or more agencies, for instance, the NPF is the lead agency in internal security and first respondents in the fives strands of NACTEST yet, the

DSS apart from collecting intelligence is responsible for preventing terrorist related activities/crimes. This duplication of roles has often resulted in conflict between agencies fighting for elite status and resource allocation. There is duplication of duties and roles amongst all collaborating agencies especially, amongst the big three, (Army, DSS and NPF) and other smaller agencies, like the civil defence, emigration service, prison service, civilian joint task force and the border agency. This duplication of roles and duties have in the past being the source of conflict leading to infighting lawlessness, tension, violence, and insecurity (Odoma, 2011, 2014; Odoma & Aderinto, 2013; NACTEST, 2016; Innocent, 2018).

However, in Nigeria, the central theme is collaboration amongst all the agencies, best described as a joint task force of all agencies working together. The ONSA, directs all activities, this is achieved by a joint command centre that fuses all information and planning. According to Respondent A:

All the agencies in the country are involved because sometimes we work together. For example, we have a fusion centre where we share ideas. If you go to the Northeast part of the country where these terrorist attacks are prevalent, you would see the presences of the NPF, the presences of Nigerian Army, the presences of the Civil Defence. Even the Emigration Service are involved. We are all working harmoniously.

This idea of collaboration and a command centre amongst all agencies in the fight to counter terrorism in Nigeria is important given the infighting that exists among the agencies. The command and fusion centre allow for exchange and dissemination of information and intelligence data related to criminal activity, criminal enterprises and suspected terrorist activity in the

country. The idea of joint collaboration amongst the agencies is believed in future, will lead to better planning and coordination amongst all the security agencies and set the stage for future joint coordinated working amongst security services in Nigeria (NACTEST, 2016). It will also, help to cement personal relationships and create a degree of professionalism amongst all collaborating agencies. The establishment of joint command centre means all can work together for a common goal. According to Respondent B,

The command centre is used for coordination, to bring and fuse together all the efforts of all the agencies. Counter terrorism in Nigeria is not the work/job of only one agency. The intelligence aspect is there, the physical approach is there, the combat approach is there as well. In essence the command centre coordinates all the various agencies, the various police units relating to the command where the scene of the incident is. We go to the place of incident and open a command centre which feeds the NPF Headquarters. Directives are jointly controlled from the NPF-Counter Terrorism Unit (CTU) headquarters to various police units/command centre in the country on how to proceed.

Policing terrorism is not the work of one agency, it involves several agencies and various governmental and non-governmental agencies working together. In the UK and US policing terrorism involves several agencies working together for common goal (Thiel, 2009; Deflem, 2010; Lowe, 2016; NACTEST, 2016). The command and fusion centre in Nigeria, involves all agencies including the army working together and making operational decisions on the way forward. Decisions on intelligence collected, special operations, search and cordon strategies, roadblocks, checkpoint, joint patrol operations, military and air force raid operations are agreed

upon jointly by heads of each command before setting out. This is regarded as the hub of information analysis and dissemination to other units in the country on how to proceed.

In concluding, it is necessary to mention that even though the war model in policing terrorism has been adopted in Nigeria, it does dominate to a certain extent but not totally. All the agencies do play a role in the fight to counter terrorism in Nigeria. This because of the nature of the terrorism threat in the country and the huge resources required to counter it. The nature of the threat requires not just the army bringing their expertise in conflict management, it requires the police, the intelligence unit, the border unit, emigration service and civil defence, each bringing their expertise to the table (NACTEST, 2016; Nigeria National Security Strategy, 2019).

6.4 The Scope of and Resources for Counter Terrorism

The scope of and the resources for the counter terrorism challenges experienced by the NPF are daunting. This is because the organisation had just come out of years of neglect by successive military regimes that lasted over thirty years until 1999 (NOPRIN, 2010; Owen, 2014). With the emergence of new forms of crime, terrorism and other crimes plaguing the country like organised crime, militancy, various communal clashes and armed robbery, the policing of the country remains a challenge for the NPF in charge of internal security of a vast country (NACTEST, 2016; Nigeria National Security Strategy, 2019).

6.4.1 Geographic Area of the War

The nature and magnitude of the counter terrorism fight in Nigeria remains intricate and complicated given the socio-political and geographic makeup of the country. With the NPF underfunded, reeling from lost years of decay, and grappling with other crimes in the country, it was

impossible for the organisation to be on top of the terrorism situation plaguing the country in the last two decades. According to Respondent B,

The geographic territory is wider than we thought. The theatre of war is in the Northeast of Nigeria. But also, here, in Abuja, where we have experienced terrorism atrocities and I don't know if I can classify the Herdsmen clashes in Nigeria as part of terrorism as those are areas we think, the magnitude of the problem is larger than what we expected/think.

Terrorist atrocities by BH have ravaged the Northeast part of Nigeria, thousands have been killed and millions displaced, which suggests a lack of understanding and intelligence on BH and its capacity and capability. BH was able to blow up the United Nations building in the capital, Abuja, with a car bomb explosion in August 2011, that killed at least 21 and wounded 60. BH was underestimated to the point where the group was running rampant in the far north-east of the country away from the bureaucratic wrangling in Abuja (Pothuraju, 2012; NACTEST, 2016).

The Northeast is one of the geopolitical zones in Nigeria comprising of six states: Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba. and Yobe State. Abuja is the capital of Nigeria, with all the arms of government, federal ministries and non-governmental bodies situated in the capital. Referred as the Federal Capital Territory, it consists of the National Assembly, the House of Representatives and all other Federal and Defence ministries. The attack on a United Nations building in 2011 in Abuja, by BH, brought the threat close to the seat of government power and indicated the extent of the terrorist group's capacity and capability. According to Respondent A,

When we talk about the nature and magnitude, don't forget there was a time the terrorist almost conquered the whole of the Northeast and they, the terrorist, were in control. I was at Bama local government - Borno State and I saw the devastation there. They brought down virtually all the houses and they took over.

This points to the failure of the NPF and other agencies, to predict, prevent and disrupt the activities of BH, with severe consequences for the socio economic and political development of the Northeast part of Nigeria. According to Respondent A,

The terrorists were there for three years and it took us a lot manpower to get them out of that place. So, for now the terrorist manpower has been reduced. In the Nigeria newspapers, it was written that the terrorist had taken over everywhere in the Northeast.

According to Amnesty International (2014), from July 2014 to January 2015, town after town fell to BH. On 6 August 2014, BH attacked Gwoza, Borno State. They overran the 350 soldiers stationed in Gwoza and killed at least 600 civilians, although the true number is likely to be higher. Respondent A puts this into perspective,

Unlike before, when they occupied the town and even collecting taxes, they renamed the streets, I saw it myself, not that I was told. They were collecting tolls and took farms.

In January 2015, BH took control of Baga, Kukawa LGA, Borno State. Soldiers stationed just outside Baga received warnings that BH intended to attack Baga and requested reinforcements

from their superiors. No reinforcements were sent (Amnesty International 2014). Many towns and cities decided to form state-sponsored militias, known as Civilian Joint Task Forces (Civilian JTF), to combat BH. BH subjected these communities to particularly violent treatment. The reality was a part of the country was controlled by BH. The disruption of the group would require extensive human and financial resources.

6.4.2 Human & Financial Resources

As discussed in the literature review (Challenges to Counter Terrorism: UK & Nigeria Context) section, terrorism is different from ordinary crime because of its political and special status and involves and relies on substantial human and financial resources, at the local, regional, national and international levels. It requires, the community, private initiatives, government, NGOs, Intelligence (High Policing), police organisation (Low Policing & Criminal Justice Model), the military (War Model) and various policies and strategies (Bayley & Weisburd, 2007; Crelinsten, 2009; Deflem, 2010).

Terrorism is an in issue of international and national security around the globe. To disrupt terrorism, a substantial human and financial commitment is needed (Deflem, 2010; Lafree, 2012; NACTEST, 2016). In Nigeria there was a manifest lack of understanding of and adequate planning for the situation which developed in the 2000s as BH flourished. Without an adequate understanding of the threat, it was impossible to plan, organise and pilot a well thought out strategy on the means and method of the counter terrorism war, whether in the short-term or in long-term (Crelinsten, 2009).

The prevailing idea in early formative days of BH in Nigeria, was that BH was going to be crushed by the Nigeria military in the short-term. Naturally, this is true if the war was a conventional one. This is because of the ample resources a state can afford in comparison to the resources a terrorist group can afford. Terrorist groups in a conventional war are no match for the state, hence, the use of terrorism as strategy to achieve their aim. Silke (2011), notes that there is always a massive disparity in economic strength between a state and terrorist groups. The state eventually triumphs over the terrorist because its officers are better paid, better trained, better equipped and have access to more human and financial resources compared to the terrorist. According to Respondent B,

Human resources is quite an outstanding challenge, as we did not anticipate the magnitude of the problem in the Northeast, that we have committed a lot of our officers in the Northeast.

According to NACTEST (2016), certain pitfalls and regular crimes has helped in worsen the security situation in the country. These are armed banditry, kidnapping, smuggling, assassinations, religious extremism, money laundering and bombings requiring a concerted effort by all law enforcement agencies. This explains the use of different agencies in the country in the fight to counter terrorism and other crimes plaguing the country in other to boost capacity in the joint task force. The broad and complex nature of the conflicts in these states has led to heavy commitment of human and financial resources by NPF and other agencies. It also means the recruitment of new officers to replace those officers that have lost their lives in the battlefield and the needed training that goes with it.

Consequently, the Fulani herdsmen clashes in the country has been ongoing for more than three

years now. According to reports 3,641 people killed between January 2016 and October 2018, 57 percent of them in 2018 alone. Amnesty International has documented 312 incidents of attacks and reprisal attacks in 22 states and Abuja the capital between January 2016 and October 2018. As a result of these attacks, Amnesty International estimates that at least 3,641 people may have been killed, 406 injured, 5,000 houses burnt down and 182,530 people displaced (Amnesty International, 2018). According to Respondent B,

We have had some financial challenges. Equipment used in counter terrorism is not just as easy as going to buy an AK 47 Rifle. The men need to be sustained for longer period, as fighting terrorism is a long-time business and this is not a normal warfare.

The finance and the appropriate equipment needed for counter terrorism are interrelated because you need one to be able to acquire the other. Reports have indicated substandard equipment making their way to officers on the frontline in the war on terrorism due to corruption by those charged with providing supplies to the troops. According to ISS (2020), and OECD (2017), report, despite huge financial allocations for arms procurement and logistics supplies, military sources blame the death of 83 soldiers in a (2016), BH ambush and a similar 2018, attack on the 157 Task Force Battalion in Metele, Borno State, on equipment shortfalls, poor weapons and logistics supplies, and low morale among combatant officers, who sometimes haven't been paid.

To add to this is the failure by the Nigerian government to secure arms supplies due to human rights issue in the country (Crisis Group, 2015). In 2015, the Obama government refused to sell cobra attack helicopters to Nigeria to help the country fight terrorism due to human rights concerns by the Nigerian Army.

According to Crisis Group (2015), report, some soldiers and units refuse to fight because they claimed that they were ill-equipped; some commanders complained that they lacked equipment such as helicopters needed for the fight (Crisis Group, 2015). In other reports (Reuters, 2018), soldiers claimed to be afraid of the insurgency and wouldn't leave their stations at night. Others claimed that they had ran out of ammunition, or their wages and welfare packages had been embezzled by their commanders; some had been in the northeast for two years without seeing their families. The troops were thus, overstretched (Reuters, 2018; Financial Times, 2018). The continuous over stretching of the troops is not just down to lack of finance, equipment and welfare issues but also the strength and sophistication of BH, thriving in their stronghold of the Sambisa Forest. According to Respondent A,

The terrorists have been driven into Sambisa Forest. Unfortunately, Sambisa Forest is almost the size of Abuja. We flew over the forest we can see them running. So, it is really, a big task for the military to get rid of the terrorist totally.

In the context of the Nigerian situation, BH see Sambisa Forest as their stronghold. This offers them a level of protection that the Nigerian security services did not anticipate. They have the advantage of knowing the terrain. Sambisa Forest, located in Borno State in northeast Nigeria, has become synonymous with BH terrorism. BH has waged a bloody war against the Nigerian security services in a bid to impose its own brand of religious order on Nigeria. Sambisa Forest was once a thriving game reserve that attracted tourists from far and wide until its recent predicament (Kayode 2014). The Forest has been described as an ideal hideout for BH because it's large, thinly populated that has a lot of tree cover which minimises aerial surveillance. It also has few roads and a rocky, hilly terrain, making access by land difficult and nearly impossible (ACAPS, 2016).

6.4.3 Lack of Adequate Logistics

Inadequate logistical support in terms of equipment, welfare, training, weapons and communications gadgets continues to debilitate the war to police terrorism in Nigeria. Logistics is the detailed organisation and implementation of a complex operation. In terms of military operations, it involves the acquisition, storage, distribution, use maintenance, construction, disposal, provision, sustenance, planning and directing of every essential component of a combat operation. This can range from, food, shelter, welfare, transport, medical, supplies, administration, engineering, military hardware and any other necessity needed to sustain a large law enforcement entity. According to Wissler (2018), Logistics is regarded as the life blood of law enforcement power in military operations. Inadequate funding, and corruption by officials that have misappropriated funds meant for the war on terrorism have led to claims that logistical support and equipment meant for the war are simply, not there or inadequate (Crisis Group, 2015). According to Respondent C,

I think a lot needs to be done in terms of logistics, more needs to be done. Also, the training needs to be broadened, most times trainings are merged/compressed due to inadequate funds and time limitation. I think training should be given the required time, so all aspects of the training is effectively carried out for adequate cohesion of all the activities of the programme.

It is important to note that inadequate funding and the lack of appropriate training has over the years existed for the NPF. Hence, the terrorists are better trained and equipped than the NPF and other agencies, prolonging the counter terrorism war in Nigeria (Forest, 2012, CFR, 2014). According to Respondent A,

Crime is dynamic, this is really not a new thing, it's being on for some time, but the truth is that we lack adequate logistics, if we can get the right logistics then we are ready to fight. It is very frustrating and depressing when you are fighting such a war, of this magnitude and you don't have what you need to fight. This is a major problem hindering our progress in the fight to counter terrorism. We need to be well funded so as to be to meet our operational challenges. We do not have leadership issues, like I mentioned, this is the operations department, and it is the engine room of the operations happening all over the country. If you know the effort, we put in individually, it would be clear to you that there is not a leadership problem.

The above comments from respondent A, who has vast experience in the operations of the NPF, indicates the lack of funding that has existed in the NPF for decades. As noted above, it is not a question of low morale or the troops not wanting to fight. But a question of not having the right logistics and other needed essentials to carry on the fight. It has to be mentioned that the troops have shown courage in continuing the fight even when it is obvious, that they are lacking the necessary logistics and essentials needed, leading to losses in the NPF and other agencies rank and file. According to Onuoha et al. (2020), the morale and fighting spirits of the soldiers in the battle fields have been broken due to institutional corruption which has resulted in shortage of arms and ammunition and poor reward system.

Moving forward, counter terrorism needs investment in intelligences capabilities and capacity with community policing initiatives rather than just relying on hard military power approaches. Community policing is a doctrine of policing that places policing at centre of the communities. It ensures that the community through community engagement initiatives play a role in how various communities are policed in other to tackle community concern, crimes and various

antisocial behaviour. It also helps through enhanced police engagement initiatives to generate intelligence which is needed to police crime (Innes, 2006; Thiel, 2009; Deflem, 2010; Bayley, 2016; Lowe, 2016). In Nigeria, there has been the movement and proliferation of small arms and weapons which has to some extent exacerbated the terrorism issue in the country ((Innes, 2006; Bayley & Weisburd, 2007; Thiel, 2009; Deflem, 2010; Lowe, 2016; NACTEST, 2016).

6.4.4 Proliferation of Small Arms and Weapons

An underlying issue is the proliferation of small arms and weapons in country, putting arms in the hands of terrorists and criminals through porous borders and other illegal means. Porous borders in Nigeria, arise due to government's inability to secure or control various land borders in the country (NOPRIN, 2010; Forest, 2012; NACTEST, 2016; Nigeria National Security Strategy, 2019). Globalisation has given rise to proliferation of the illegal small arms and weapons trade on the internet and international market hubs. Nigeria has seen significant rise of these illegal weapons in the hands of terrorist, militants, criminal elements and the civilian populations due to corruption, rise in communal clashes, local arms production and porous borders, enabling the smuggling of weapons into the country (UNIDIR/2005/7; NACTEST, 2016).

Some arrests and discoveries made by the Nigerian security services shows that some of the weapons being used by terrorist in the country and criminals made their way into the country through the fallout of the 2011, Libyan war that ended the rule of Maummar Gaddafi. In addition, conflicts in neighbouring countries like Mali, Chad and Niger have been blamed for creating fertile ground for arms traffickers in the country (Marsh, 2017; Egbuta, 2019). The availability of these illegal weapons to terrorists, criminals and militants has fuelled and exacerbated

the war on terrorism and other crimes in Nigeria. As the NPF continues to grapple with inadequate equipment needed to counter terrorism, the consequence, is that the terrorist group is well armed with sophisticated weapons, making the fight to counter terrorism and other crimes in the country more difficult and challenging. According to Respondent C,

One of the challenges facing the NPF is the proliferation of small and medium firearms in the country. Sometime last week, the Inspector General of Police (IG), gave a mandate to all police commissioners across the country to mop/flush out all the illegal arms in the country including those with legal firearms. Legal arms holders have been asked to come forward and revalidate their firearms.

The causes of proliferation of small arms and weapons in Nigeria, varies from smuggling in, local manufacture of, and theft of weapons belonging to individuals and law enforcement authorities. The Deputy Comptroller-General of the Nigeria Customs Service attributes the growth in smuggling to staff shortages, the lack of modern surveillance equipment and a shortage of vehicles. In other cases, many people supply criminals with weapons. Criminals also obtain the arms they use by means of theft. Between 1998 and 2000, 196 weapons were registered as “lost” by the Nigerian police. Other reports refer to corrupt officials involved in these criminal activities (UNIDIR, 2005; NACTEST, 2016).

The problem of illegal small arms and weapons continues to present extraordinary challenges in Nigeria and across the West African region. BH’s ability to acquire these weapons through the porous border states in the Northeast and other sources has ended up killing thousands of security operatives. The Controller General of the Nigerian Emigration Service noted in (2018), that the organisation’s major challenge is the inability to control the 140 borders in the country.

We still have unsecured borders, and this administration is trying to manage that (The Guardian, 2018; NACTEST, 2016; Nigeria National Security Strategy, 2019).

6.4.5 Nigeria Porous Borders

Nigeria is a country on the coast of West Africa, bordered by the Bight of Benin and the Gulf of Guinea in south. Nigeria is bordered by Benin, Cameroon, Chad and Niger it shares maritime borders with Equatorial Guinea Ghana, and Sao Tome and Principe (Nationsonline, 2020). Nigeria has hundreds of unsecured borders which facilitates illegal movement of goods, people and services. Reports notes that the unsecured borders have aided human and drug trafficking and facilitated the proliferation of small arms and weapons which has fuelled communal clashes and terrorism in the country (THIS DAY, 2019; UNIDIR, 2005). Consequently, unsecured borders have led to not just the movement of goods, services, weapons and contrabands into the country, it has provided an opportunity for illegal aliens and terrorist to come into the country and carryout hit and run attacks across borderline. According to Respondent C,

Another issue is that in Nigeria, we don't export terrorist, we import terrorist. They come to us, and we know where they come from. If those routes can be blocked, then we can be able to stop the flow and try tracing those already inside.

This is vital because it points to the inadequate security measures in the country which has allowed BH carry out attacks not just in Nigeria, but other neighbouring countries like Cameroon, Chad and Niger. BH was designated by the United States as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation in November (2013). The group is not just responsible for numerous attacks in Northeast Nigeria, but also in the Lake Chad Basin in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger that have killed thou-

sands of people since (2009), (Country Report, 2017). BH is able to carry out hit and run attacks, disappearing through the porous borders into neighbouring countries. The ability of BH to disappear into neighbouring countries with impunity has caused a lot of frustration amongst the neighbouring countries (Elkaim, 2013). This has led to the formation of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) by the African Union amongst the neighbouring member States (NACTEST, 2016).

The MNJTF was established by the Lake Chad Basin Commission in 1998 to fight highway banditry and other cross-border crime, the MNJTF was reactivated and authorised by the African Union to conduct combat operations against BH, intercept trafficked weapons, free hostages and encourage defections in 2014 (African Peace Facility, 2014). The MNJTF, is a combined multinational force, comprising, mostly military personnel from Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria. The MNJTF is mandated to respond to transnational terrorism and restore regional peace and security. Due to the humanitarian situation, the approach goes beyond military intervention. The structure hopes to achieve success by encouraging and facilitating the conduct of joint/simultaneous/coordinated patrols and other types of operations at the borders of member countries (African Peace Facility, 2014, NACTEST, 2016).

According to Frontex (2017), Nigeria, with Syria and Ivory Coast were among the top three nationalities for detections of illegal border-crossing at the EU's external border (FRONTEX, 2018). Nigeria since 2002, has been working, based on a Cooperation Agreement, with International Organisation for Migration (IOM). IOM has been supporting the efforts of the Federal Republic of Nigeria to manage migration through capacity-building, advisory services, and technical assistance on migration matters, including migration health and information, assisted voluntary returns, and counter-trafficking (IOM, 2018).

Importantly, IOM works to strengthen Nigeria Immigration Service's (NIS) capacity to oversee and manage cross-border movements at the country's land and sea borders, reducing incidences of irregular migration and human trafficking.

The organisation provides the Migration Information and Data Analysis System (MIDAS) to facilitate digital data collection and storage, and in addition, has trained Nigeria immigration officers for sustainability on the use of the technology (IOM 2018). Nigeria currently has MIDAS installed at nine border control posts. In (2019), a total of 15 land border control posts have been equipped with MIDAS and supported by solar power. A MIDAS installation at one additional border point between Nigeria and Niger was also supported by a solar power system. The project is also aimed at providing structured opportunities for enhanced cross-border co-operation at and near the newly equipped Border Control post between Nigeria and Niger. These plans aim to check illegal migration, trafficking in goods, services and BH's cross border attacks and block escape routes to Cameroon, Chad and Niger (NACTEST, 2016; Nigeria National Security Strategy).

6.4.6 Interagency Collaboration

Going beyond the 'war' model, effective counter terrorism requires various agencies coming together for a common purpose. This is difficult to accomplish because agencies have different roles aims, targets, and most at times, competing for funding allocations and elite status. They are, as the literature has shown, reluctant to share intelligence with sister agencies even when required by policy makers to do so (Crelinsten, 2009; Thiel, 2009; Deflem, 2010; Lowe, 2016). In Nigeria, years of rivalry between the military and the police has always created tension with the military assuming elite status in the country through years of military dictatorship (NOPRIN, 2010; Forest, 2012; NACTEST, 2106). According to Respondent C,

The success of any counter terrorism strategy lies in synergy. The police alone cannot do it, the military alone cannot do it. So, we need to come together, pull our resources and energy together to achieve one common goal which is the fight against terrorism.

Due to the nature of the war on terrorism in Nigeria, as stated above by Respondent C, an integration of resources is needed by all parties, if progress and success is to be achieved. One important issue plaguing such cooperation of agencies is the inability of the security agencies to work together. One of the issues plaguing the security agencies, is ego.

According to a recent report in (2019), no Inspector General of Police (IGP), Chief of Army Staff (COAS), etc, wants to report to the ONSA, answer his call or anything when they have direct access to the President of Nigeria. The system of command is administrative which they are not bound to comply with or respect; and nobody is going to query or crucify them for not obeying it. So, the ONSA is always on its own because it can easily be by-passed at will without any adverse consequence either on their jobs or career paths (Ekemenah 2019). In addition, the ONSA, is usually occupied by a retired army general, requiring active service chiefs who may have a higher rank to report to ONSA, this is a difficult task except if ONSA, has a direct and close access to the office of the presidency of the country.

Accordingly, Adekanye (1998), Wali (2010), and Okereke (2016), have identified issues like unhealthy inter-agency rivalry and lack of synergy/information sharing which had sown seeds of mutual distrusts especially in the conduct of inter-agencies operations. Odoma (2014), posits that one factor that has given rise to the escalating inter-agency animosity in Nigeria is envy

by other security agencies against their sister agencies over perceived exclusive privileged job specification. According to Respondent A,

We all tend to work together, we share ideas together, and we work practically together. Like I said we work on the field together. Like recently, there was plans to train 1500 policemen and 1500 civil defence officers together. I visited the school to inspect it to make sure everything is fine. This shows that we work together. There is no place you go to in the Northeast that you won't see all the agencies fused together. There are bound to be differences, even amongst family members there exist differences. Sometimes we have issues cropping up, but these issues are swiftly resolved and dealt with. But amongst the senior officers we have an existing cooperation.

It was identified that policy makers made great effort to ensure that all agencies work together for a common purpose. The various agencies are working together as identified as well. However, issues of infighting and communication were hampering the interagency collaboration (NACTEST, 2016). According to Respondent B,

The last NACTEST meeting we had, emphasis was how to de-emphasise superiority, infighting within all the agencies, and individual agencies trying to take credit for whatever success at the expense of other agencies and playing the blame game. The main problem is enlightenment, improving inter agency relationship, and reminding all that they are all on the same side. Big communication gap between all agencies exist.

This issue of inter-agency cooperation continues to play out in the battlefield between the various agencies leading to officers and civilian loss of deaths due to communications gaps. In the Nigerian case, it is particularly difficult given that each agency in the country have their separate intelligence unit. In addition, ego and envy is a big issue due to duplication of roles and duties, leading to infighting and a lack of communication (Adekanye, 1998; Wali, 2010; Odoma, 2014; NACTEST, 2016). According to Respondent B,

Also, in operations communication is also lacking, as every agency don't want to take directives from another agency which slows operation down. The command Structure needs improvement, so all agencies can work as a unit.

Serious communication gaps exist between law enforcement agencies in Nigeria. One such instance was the kidnapping of schoolgirls in Dapchi. On February 19, 2018, at 5:30 pm, 110 schoolgirls aged (11–19) years old were kidnapped by BH from the Government Girls' Science and Technical College (GGSTC). Dapchi is in Bulabulin, Yunusari Local Government area of Yobe State. In the aftermath of the kidnapping, the blame game started between the army and NPF. The army maintained it pulled out of Dapchi because calm had returned to the area. The army claimed it handed over security control to the Yobe State police command and blamed local officers for the bungle. Yobe's Police Commissioner, however, denied any handover took place and says the army failed to inform him of its intention to withdraw. According to Respondent C:

It is quite unfortunate that incident happened, the policy before now, has always being that, every liberated area after a military operation should be handled over to the Police. In the case of Dap-chi, I think that issue should be kept aside for the policy

maker to decide what actually, happen and what went wrong. But normally, after liberating an area, it should be handled to the NPF, maybe in conjunction with the civil defence. But that issue is still being dealt with as we speak. The reason the Army needs to hand over after liberation is that, it is presumed that the internal civil security falls under the mantle of the NPF. The NPF deals directly with the public and as such based on the threat and risk assessment carried out, if it is deemed that the risk is low/medium, then it is handed over to the NPF in order to safeguard and maintain security of the area against further intrusion.

The Dapchi saga illustrates the unfortunate situation of poor communication gaps and inter-agency rivalry that exists amongst the army, police and other partner agencies. In addition, there is the poor communication breakdown between the law enforcement and the Nigerian populace. According to a report by Amnesty International (2018), calls were made to the army and police about an impending attack by BH in Dapchi, but Security forces failed to act on warnings about BH attack hours before the abduction of the schoolgirls.

Interagency cooperation is a work in progress in Nigeria, marred with ego, envy and poor interagency communication amongst each agency. This was noted by the Military, Police and Paramilitary Public Relations Officers Forum (MILPOPPOF, 2007). In theory, the importance of working together and sharing information is understood, yet in practice, agencies continue to scramble and compete amongst each other. The Dapchi incident shows the extent of non-communication between the Army and the NPF which led to the abduction of 110 schoolgirls without any serious consequences to the army and police hierarchy.

6.5 NPF Responses to the Counter Terrorism Challenges

This project has identified various challenges that have plagued the NPF's ability to fight terrorism in Nigeria. They range from a lack of funding to resource issues, collaborative issues, logistics and issues of proliferation of small arms and weapons. Some of the above issues mentioned were being addressed. However, the respondents suggest that not enough is being done in terms of resources and meeting the other challenges mentioned above.

6.5.1 Providing Adequate Financial & Human Resources

The issue of financial and human resources is a universal challenge for most police organisations in the globe. As identified by (Lafree 2012), in (*Challenges to Counter Terrorism: UK & Nigeria Context*) the greatest challenge remains how police organisations use scarce resources to fight a crime of terrorism that is sometimes uncommon, that has a national, sometimes international, and that may require intelligence that may be limited or altogether, unavailable. In the Nigeria context, this is particularly important due to lack of adequate funding of the NPF, and the entrenched corruption prevalent in the system (NOPRIN, 2010; Forest, 2012; Owen, 2014; NACTEST, 2016). According to Respondent B,

Firstly, there has been a proposed bill to the National Assembly which is needed to beef up the finances of the force.

The NPF has suffered from years of underfunding, leading to inadequate training and other necessary logistics needed for policing terrorism. Issues of corruption and lack of accountability in the NPF, over the years has led to gross misappropriation of financial resources. The literature identified issues of funding which supports the data collected. However, the question remains, if funding issue is a result of corruption, misappropriation or simply, the government

not providing adequate resources to cover NPF operations (NOPRIN, 2010; Transparency International, 2014; HRW, 2017). Thus, it may not be an issue of government under funding alone, but also issues of corruption and misappropriation of resources by those charged with allocation and dispensation of the resources. According to Respondent B,

This has not been easy, the level of enlightenment of those in government does need to be solicited so they understand the magnitude of the challenges we face. They may not see the issues from the point of view of NPF, therefore more budget needs to be appropriated.

The legislative powers of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, are vested in a National Assembly for the Federation which consists of a Senate and a House of Representatives. The National Assembly has been vested with the power to make laws for the peace, order and good governance of the Federation or any part thereof with respect to any matter included in the Exclusive Legislative (Nigeria Constitution, 1999). Nonetheless, trying to convince the National Assembly for more funds given the magnitude of the security challenges the country was facing, shows the extent of a dismissive attitude and a lack of understanding of the security and terrorist challenges the country was facing then. According to Respondent B,

It is important also, to let the law makers know that fighting counter terrorism, needs and require more capital, it is capital intensive, we require a bigger budget. A lot goes into training and intelligence gathering. In terms of communication/communication gadgets, today, what we have got, is better than what we had five years ago. But I must add that more needs to be done.

As the literature indicates, the policing of terrorism demands adequate planning, training, collaboration and intelligence collection. Collecting intelligence requires trained specialist, communication equipment and most importantly, the cooperation of local communities. In the Nigerian context, this is particularly difficult given the distrust that exists between the populace on the one hand, the NPF and other security services on the other hand. This is linked to corruption and police brutality on communities (Suspect Community) over the years which has led to the public and law enforcement to be suspicious of each other's intentions.

According to Amnesty International (2020), Nigerian military burned and forcibly displaced entire villages in response to an escalation in attacks by BH since December 2019. Arbitrary detention, torture and other ill-treatment of communities and those suspected of being BH members has been noted as the hallmark of NPF and the Nigerian army. Hence, it has affected intelligence collection from the community, hampering and prolonging the war with BH. Interestingly, one such area that continues to hamper progress is the issue interagency collaboration.

6.5.2 Interagency Collaboration

The research respondent, in the scope and resources for counter terrorism have all identified interagency collaboration as a big issue in policing terrorism in Nigeria. The issue of interagency collaboration is not just peculiar to Nigeria, but globally, as well. The literature review in High and Low policing notes that 9/11, was the result of the failure of the various security agencies unable to work together and connect the dots (9/11 Commission Report, 2004). The research respondents noted that joint command centres, joint task forces, joint training and joint NACTESH consultative forums were all established by the ONSA, in order to bring agencies together and fuse information. Hence, according to Respondent B,

The NPF has a strategy in line with other agencies. For example, the issue at moment happening in Nigeria-(Dapchi), the Deputy Inspector General of police (DIG), is already in Abuja. Every operation is done in consultation with other agencies.

There were serious issues of infighting amongst the agencies for resources, elite status and personal reasons as noted by all respondents. However, the research also, identified that the relationship between various agencies was not perfect, but a work in progress. According to Respondent A,

Because the war is taking place in the Northeast, we have a command centre in the Northeast part of the country and it is occupied by various agencies. This is where information is disseminated, and when the information does come in, it is shared amongst all the agencies.

It was identified that joint strategy and planning, joint patrols, joint training, joint operations, joint command centres, and other initiatives were in place to enhance better collaborations amongst all agencies. According to Respondent B,

All strategies are implemented by collaboration of all the agencies and key roles are handed to each agency.

Interagency collaboration seems to be a big problem in the fight to counter terrorism in Nigeria. However, a lot has been put in place policy wise, and in practice to smooth working relationships between various agencies. This has been achieved by joint operations, joint patrols and joint training. In a (2015), report it was noted that the Nigerian Army had yet to pay more than

700 soldiers making up the Armed Forces Special Force (AFSF) who were in 2015, sent to Belarus and Russia for training as snipers to strengthen the fight against BH.

The special snipers were chosen after rigorous screening was carried out to select the best. The selection was done from the Army, Police, Navy, Air Force, and State Security Service (SSS) before being flown to Belarus. The report noted that some members of the AFSF accused senior army officers of seeking to corruptly embezzle their remaining allowances (Sahara Reporters, 2016). The research data, indicates that changes are ongoing in joint working, joint training, issues still exist and bridging the gap between various agencies continues to be a work in progress.

It is worth stating that due to the nature of the terrorism threat in Nigeria, interagency collaboration with NPF and other agencies like border control officers, army, DSS continues to improve domestically. Additionally, the NPF and other international and regional organisations like the NCA, INTERPOL, UNODC, ECOWAS and US Department of State's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) continue to increasingly, work together on intelligence sharing and coordination on terrorism, border control, cyber and organised crimes. According to a 2018 report, West African Police Chiefs Committee (WAPCCO), are increasingly meeting on trans-border crime collaboration in the region. The committee remarks on the increased threats from transnational crime, cybercrime and terrorism and noted criminal intelligence and information sharing are the key to disrupting the menace of transnational crime and terrorism in the region (ECOWAS, 2018).

It is worth stressing that the recent partnership with INTERPOL on information sharing and intelligence cooperation with NPF and other regional African countries has led to success in

crime detection and improved information sharing and coordination. In a related development, three suspects were arrested in Lagos, Nigeria following a joint INTERPOL, Group-IB, and Nigeria Police Force cybercrime investigation team. The investigation, by INTERPOL's Cybercrime and Financial Crime units worked closely with NPF to identify and locate threats, which ultimately led to the gang's arrest. The group is responsible for distributing malware, carrying out phishing campaigns and extensive Business Email Compromise scams in more than 150 countries (INTERPOL, 2020).

Collaboration has occurred between the US Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), the US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the US Department of Defense (DoD), the NCA, and UNODC to support the establishment of several vetted units within Nigeria's National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) and to help build the agency's capacity to conduct complex investigations, collect and share intelligence, and successfully prosecute suspects arrested during the course of investigations (State Department, 2021). NCA and UK border agency are also assisting in provision of equipment to help fight drug trafficking and kidnapping (CSSF, 2015; Vanguard News, 2021).

6.5.3 Border Controls

Border control measures are problematic in Nigeria, especially in the vast geographic area of the Northeast which has led as discussed above to a proliferation of small arms and weapons in the hands of terrorist, militants and criminals in Nigeria. The issue of porous borders and corruption among those protecting the border has allowed BH to evade capture and carry out cross border attacks in the Lake Chad Region. Respondents referred to foreign criminals and terrorist fighters using the porous borders to enter and exit the country at will, adding to the complexity of the war on terrorism in the country. According to Respondent C,

There should be a proper check from the influx of migrants from our porous borders. We need an effective border control and emigration. In addition, there is a unit in collaboration with border patrol officers/sister agencies who have been mandated to keep an eagle eye out and stop the influx of undocumented emigrants.

The use of emigration officers and other border patrol agencies is significant, indicating that the government is trying to tackle the issue of illegal migrants using porous borders, but there remains high level corruption in the country and amongst security service operatives and government officials taking bribes to turn a blind eye. A (2019), Guardian news investigation notes, illegal aliens coming through Nigeria unsecured borders after paying corrupt border security officials. The investigation notes the ease in which illegal migrants get in and out of Nigeria, by paying a certain amount of money to custom and emigration officers at various Nigeria borders (The Guardian, 2019).

In Nigeria, law enforcement is suffering from poor capacity and capabilities. The lack of a formalised digital system across the nation has hampered progress in using fingerprint records, biometric records, records of crimes, border records, as well as the lack of forensic science services. Western collaboration in Nigeria and Africa, has aimed to improve the capacity and capacity of various nations in border security by collecting and analysing Passenger Name Record (PNR) data and the provision of PISCES border management system.

The Personal Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation System (PISCES) is a sophisticated border management tool which helps in the global war against terrorism. This data base system is based on biometrics supported by the U.S. Department of State Terrorist Interdiction

Program. Additionally, in Libya, Mali, Niger and Nigeria, the United States has extended INTERPOL's (I-24/7), information sharing platform (US State Government, 2019). This will help law enforcement in the region to quickly identify and share information about terrorists. Hence in Nigeria, a digital crime registry on a central data system, where all acts of terrorism and insurgency is recorded has been established. It collects and records number of lives lost, nature of the attack, perpetrators and any other relevant data. These systems and databases only came into existence in Nigeria recently.

Consequently, there has been progress in the right direction in terms of border control, with the realisation of government's obligation to ensuring a secure and effective border management not just for the country but also across the West African region. The impact of unsecured borders has been devastating to the security of the country and the economy. Measures put in place are working, however, corruption, and lack of capacity and capability of the NPF and other collaborating agencies continue to hamper progress made.

6.5.4 Integrated Measures

The data on measures to tackle the counter terrorism challenge in Nigeria, discussed above, indicates that numerous measures have been put in place to meet and curb the terrorism threat. Policing terrorism requires several integrated and holistic measures in other to prevent and disrupt terrorism in the long term. The Nigeria situation has led to the integration of several measures like international collaboration, joint operations, joint patrols, sharing of training facilities and logistics, public and media awareness to name but a few. According to Respondent A,

The challenges are met through the cooperation of agencies, through the provision of

military hardware, through the provision of logistics. The forces there are actually pulling their weight and that's the truth. We also use air raids and air bombardment which they cannot afford. But generally, the terrorist has most equipment we have, because they have the money. They are being funded by various sources but there is some equipment that we have that they don't have. These are the equipment giving us a bit of edge over them like the helicopters, and the jet which we use in spotting and bombing them.

BH is well equipped, well-funded and sophisticated with the advantage of knowing the terrain of the Northeast. Hence, government's commitment to ensure the NPF and other agencies are well equipped and well-funded continues in the present dispensation. This has led to a holistic approach by policy makers ensuring that different parts of the policy, strategies, logistics, intelligence, community engagement, hard power and soft power are all integrated to together for a common purpose. According to Respondent B,

People are more aware and conscious of terrorist atrocities and that this has come to stay. Collaboration is key amongst all agencies and the country, by and large. Coordinated effort is required as this issue is different and requires long-term plan if we are to succeed. This has to be done meticulously, so that the NPF can have a very advanced database. Terrorist finance is an issue, we need to improve on the methods and sources of terrorism finance and money laundering.

Indeed, the Nigerian public is more aware of terrorist related incident happening in the country. This was mostly, achieved by their experience of being directly/indirectly impacted by the

events of BH and law enforcement repressive measures. Especially, 276 kidnapping of Chibok schoolgirls in 2014 and various suicide bombings in and around the country. Any public engagement as spelled out by NACTEST started in 2014 and that has led to some repressive measures in the name of national security on the public, even though NACTEST 2016, spells out that counter terrorism in the country will operate within the rule of law and work with the communities.

6.5.5 Repressive Measures

There has been an increased repressive measure by law enforcement operatives on civilians, media organisations, NGOs and various social political groups in the ongoing war on terrorism in Nigeria. Recently, an NGO (Action Against Hunger), was ordered to close and accused by the Nigeria Military of aiding BH and other terrorist groups in the Northeast (Reuters, 2019). In addition, various media outlets in the country have been raided and accused of leaking sensitive military strategy on BH via their newspapers. This calls into question how military strategy on BH, can end up in a newspaper in the first place (BBC, 2014; ARTICLE 19, 2020).

According to ARTICLE 19 (2020) study, 60 journalists were affected in 51 incidents. The trend has more than doubled in 2020, compared to the same period in 2019. At the minimum, 19 journalists and media professionals suffered attacks, including arrests, detention, assaults, threats, and seizure of equipment. Majority of these cases were committed by the Nigeria security services. Thus, the role of the media and indeed social media in terrorism and in the spread of radicalisation in Nigeria is important and demands to be examined.

6.5.6 The Role of Media/social media in Terrorism in Nigeria

Terrorism is a form of communication beyond the immediate victims of the act itself but also for those watching. It means shaping the narrative is as important as winning the battle on the field (Hoffman, 2006; Silke, 2011). Payne (2009) calls it, the battle of hearts and minds. It has often been stated that information is power and thus, those that control the message, shape the perspective to promote their own agenda. Hence, the role of the media as a weapon is an important concept that reflects today's realities (Hoffman, 2006; Martin, 2010; Silke, 2011). The relationship between media and terrorism has always been described as one of symbiosis in which both groups feed off and exploit each other for their own benefits. As one former British Prime Minister stated, terrorist should be starved of the oxygen of publicity on which they depend (Thatcher, 1985; Hoffman, 2006; Jackson et al., 2011).

The importance of the media and the battle of information cannot be overemphasised, because the media can also play the role of shaping and controlling the terrorist propaganda and choosing to self-regulate itself on what to report (Hoffman, 2006; Martin, 2010). However, technological advancement in communication has given rise to the internet and social media making the role of the media organisation less important as terrorists can now make their videos, create their own platforms, websites, blogs, chatrooms and use social media platforms like Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and so forth. Through these new platforms, terrorists can recruit online, raise funds online, change and challenge the narrative and radicalise new members to their cause with less scrutiny and anonymity (Hoffman, 2006; Martin 2010). In addition, the use of the internet is cheap, fast, easy to access and for gathering of intelligence (Bowman-Grieve, 2010). This can be for instance, the use of google earth and maps to locate targets. In Nigeria, the growth of the media, electronic and print has always been marred with repressive measures especially during the over three decades of military dictatorship. This ranged from repressive

laws, to arrest, torture, intimidation/assassination of journalist, to burning down/closure of media organisations. These repressive measures on the media, have been carried onto the current war on terrorism in Nigeria. Through the Terrorism (Prevention and Prohibition) Act (2013), several journalists have been charged under this Act (Media Rights Agenda, 1997; Popoola, 2012; ARTICLE 19, 2020).

Journalists were also denied bail when taken to court on charges of simply, doing their jobs (Media Rights Agenda, 1997; Popoola, 2012). It is worth mentioning that before military rule in Nigeria, the country enjoyed an independent media/press that was envied across the region. It was one of the only avenues used to hold the government/public servants to account (Media Rights Agenda, 1997). Consequently, any analysis on the role of the media in terrorism in Nigeria, must be viewed from the vintage point of a repressed media. Even though, Nigeria operates democratic governance, the rule of law is not supreme.

Martin (2010), remarks that to understand the role of the media in terrorism, it has to be viewed from two perspectives-the media and the government perspective. The media wants to report the news as objectively as they can without spin and bias. The government on the other hand, wants to shape public discourse when issues of terrorism arise. Hence, this creates animosity between the two groups. The role of the media in terrorism has always been a contentious issue because of the way media reports terrorist incidence. Hoffman (2006), Martin (2010), Jackson et al., (2011), notes that the media helps to inflame terrorism through its sensationalist reporting, however, on the other hand, the media has a duty to inform and report terrorist incidence as accurately as they can. This is not peculiar to Nigeria alone. Terrorist incidences has always picked the interest of the global media. For instance, the Black September kidnapping of Israeli athletes at the 1972 Olympics drew a worldwide audience of half a billion, 13% of the world's

population at the time (Jackson et al., 2011). Although the media in Nigeria has a duty to report accurate and reliable information on terrorist incidence, it has also, the moral and professional duty to shape the narrative and ensure self-regulation for the good of society.

However, as noted, the rise of the internet and social media has enabled terrorist to simply, do their own media. Social media in the globe has become a force for good as well as a force for evil, a sort of a double-edged sword (RAND, 2018a). BH media has moved from using leaflets, public lectures and public announcements to the internet. The group uses online platforms like Twitter, Facebook and YouTube to spread its message, share videos and for radicalisation purposes. According to reports, BH popularity grew after its online allegiance to ISIL and the expansion of its media strategy which positively shaped youth's view of the group (RAND, 2018a). The allegiance to ISIL, allowed improvement in BH's online propaganda, especially after the kidnapping of the 276 Chibok schoolgirls, which made global headlines and thrust BH to a global audience.

As noted by RAND (2018a) study, BH use of the internet and social media platforms has propelled the group in so many ways like for communicating their propaganda message, coordination with other terrorist groups and for radicalisation and recruitment purposes. Nevertheless, the extent of radicalisation online and whether it has led to recruitment in the real world is not clear cut. BH depends on personal relationships from militants, conscription, kidnapping to replenish their ranks. The economic situation that exists in the Northeast, means owning a mobile device, paying for data is beyond the reach of most unemployed youths.

The use of audio cassettes, video messages and preachers has been the influencer in radicalisation of youths. According to CLEEN (2014) study, it found that 21% of youths in Borno state

in Northeast Nigeria identified audio and video messaging as a significant influence on radicalisation, only second to the influence of independent preachers. RAND (2018a) study notes that there is little evidence of engagement by social media users with BH within Nigeria and the African region (CLEEN, 2014; RAND, 2018a). This departs from studies in the West and in Kenya where the internet is the major source of radicalisation in youths (Schmid 2013; Botha 2013).

BH has focused its efforts on online radicalisation, for instance, tweeting a link of BH members motivation for joining the group, it seems BH use of social media is less overt compared to the likes of Al Shabaab and ISIL. Between the two other groups, it is believed that BH to a lesser extent uses social media for recruitment purposes (RAND, 2018a). Another study by Mercy Corps (2016), found that in all cases respondents interviewed who were former members of BH stated, a friend, family member, or business colleague as a factor in their joining BH. The report notes that many recruits received loans or the promise of loans to help their business or start one (Mercy Corps, 2016; Omenma, 2020).

In the concluding analysis, the media in Nigeria and across the globe play an important role on how they choose to report terrorism atrocities. The relationship between the media and terrorist is a complex one, however, media staff/journalist have been kidnapped and even murdered by terrorists in the past which makes them a target as much as the public (Clark, 1984; El Mundo, 2006; Lopez, 2016; Reporters Without Borders, 2018). There is evidence that the way the media reports terrorism can help create the publicity the terrorists seek, create a negative impact on the public on how the narrative is shaped and can lead to imitation of terrorism (contagion effect). This refers to the influence of mass media on future behaviours of other terrorist groups

(Martin 2010; Jackson et al., 2011; Silke, 2011; White, 2020). This can be put into perspective with the kidnappings in Nigeria. After the Chibok kidnapping in 2014 and the global coverage it received, another happened in 2018 in Dapchi Nigeria, where 108 schoolgirls were kidnapped, this has continued into 2021.

In addition, there is no evidence to suggest coverage of terrorist incidences by media causes an increase in terrorist attacks (Martin 2010; Jackson et al., 2011; Silke, 2011; White, 2020). As the rise of the internet has allowed BH and other terrorist groups to do their own media leading to radicalisation online, Nigeria has also been marred with the rise of misinformation (fake news), leading to other types of extremism on social media platforms. Fake news on social media has and is causing numerous ethnic and cultural clashes in Nigeria. Reports indicate several religious, ethnic, and the recent 2020 #EndSARS protest started by misinformation with various groups exploring the situation (Commonwealth Security, 2020).

According to Nigeria Information Minister, fake news on social media is destroying the media industry and sowing the seeds of hate and disunity in the country. The minister notes that fake news is a time bomb waiting to happen as it threatens the security, peace, unity and corporate existence of Nigeria (ISP, 2019; BBC NEWS, 2020). Fake news and incendiary images on social media platforms especially, on Facebook was noted by the NPF as causing a dozen deaths in Plateau state, Nigeria (BBC NEWS, 2018).

Radicalisation on the internet and social media is a global issue. In Nigeria, steps have been taken to curb the activities of BH and other terrorist groups online, nevertheless, the real issue on the internet/social media in the country has been the problem of fake news and the damage it is causing in the country by inflaming ethnic, cultural and religious clashes. A new antisocial

media bill was proposed in 2019, which criminalises the use of social media in peddling false and malicious information, though, a welcome development, commentators claim the law is an attempt to further censor the media (The Washington Post, 2019; CPJ, 2020). Whether this remains a continuation of the repressive measures on the media remains to be seen. A recent workshop in 2019, on anti-terror law for journalists, security agencies was organised in Abuja, Nigeria by the UN to highlight issues on repressive measure by the use of new police powers and new terrorism laws. Professionals, including investigators, public prosecutors, human rights lawyers, and journalists met under the auspices of UNODC for three days to discuss *Incitement to Terrorism through the Media* (UNODC, 2019b).

The workshop raised concerns on question of incitement which criminalises *incitement to commit a terrorist act through the internet, or any electronic means or through the use of printed materials or through the dissemination of terrorist information* without precisely defining what exactly constitutes incitement. Yet, the offence is considered sufficiently grave to potentially warrant the death penalty. Loosely drafted counterterrorism laws and weak human rights protections for journalists have both been cited by UN human rights agencies globally as causes for serious concern (UNODC, 2019b).

Various NGOs have accused the Nigerian military of resorting to unlawful tactics that have had a devastating effect on civilians and may amount to war crimes (Amnesty International, 2020). This on the other hand, have led to calls to expel certain NGOs from the country like Amnesty International and UNICEF. The Nigerian Army accused UNICEF of training BH spies in the northeast. The military briefly, suspended UNICEF's operations before reversing course after an outcry from rights activists (Amnesty International, 2018). According to a UNICEF (2016) report, hundreds of minors, some as age as five years old were arrested in the

Northeast for collaborating with BH. The UN remarked that 418 children were detained in (2018) by the Nigerian Army against 1,900 the year before. The United Nations had to negotiate the release of more than a thousand children detained by the Nigerian Army in its operation against BH (HRW, 2016).

The repressive measures on the public, media and NGOs goes against the recommendation of the NACTEST strategy which reinforces on the need to work with the media, public, local and foreign NGOs in other to create much needed security awareness and gain the support of the NPF and other security agencies in the war against BH and terrorism in the country. Repressive measures by law enforcement in the country has been noted as one reason intelligence collection is lacking in the country.

6.5.7 Terrorist Finance

The concept is broadly defined by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) as “*the financial support, in any form, of terrorism or of those who encourage, plan or engage in it*” (World Bank, 2006:1). According to Respondent B:

Terrorist finance is an issue, we need to improve on the methods and sources of terrorism finance and money laundering.

In 1999, the UN General Assembly adopted in Resolution 54/109, the suppression of the financing of terrorism. This Resolution obligates states parties either to prosecute or to extradite persons accused of funding terrorist activities and requires banks to enact measures to identify suspicious transactions (UNR54/109, 1999). Terrorist financing is an important aspect of every

terrorist organisation. Indeed, terrorist groups are familiar with different methods of sourcing and raising funds.

Terrorist finance provides funds for terrorist to carry out the day to day running of a terrorist organisation. Funds raised by terrorists are needed for food, recruitment, payment of terrorist members, for buying arms and other terrorist group essentials. These finances can come from legitimate sources like donations, charities and businesses. It can also come from illegitimate sources like drugs, smuggling, trafficking, organised crime, armed robbery and kidnapping for ransom which the likes of BH and other terrorist groups use to raise funds (Levitt and Jacobson, 2008; FATF, 2013, 2016, 2018).

As stated above, not enough was being done by the country on the issue of terrorist finance and money laundering to identify where the BH and other terrorists are getting funding from. According to reports BH finance came from some corrupt politicians/government officials illegally funding the group for selfish reasons, exploitation of alms giving/street beggars, sales of goods, theft of livestock, robbery, BH taxing of communities, the paying of ransom for kidnappings carried by BH and other cross border smuggling in arms in the Northeast (Forest, 2012; FATF, 2013, 2016). According to Forest (2012), BH financing has also been allegedly linked to specific individuals with power and access to resources in Nigeria. Some of these politicians were arrested and others died in a shootout with NPF authorities (FATF, 2013, 2016). According to BBC NEWS Report (2011), a Nigeria senator Ali Ndume was linked to BH and arrested by the security services, the report also notes the involvement of other regional politicians linked to BH.

Indeed, reports by Terrorism Research & Analysis Consortium (TRAC, 2019), indicate that

BH collaborates with organised crime syndicates for its operations in drug trafficking, kidnappings, bank robbery, and cyber scams, not to mention continuous theft from Nigeria's security establishment. In addition, BH raids rural towns and villages; by terrorising civilians, they can implement random taxes at any time to quickly fill depleted coffers (International Business Times, 2014; FATF, 2013, 2016; Fanusaie & Entz, 2017).

According to FATF (2016), BH financing comes from within Nigeria and bordering areas. However, collaboration with other terrorist groups and organised crime groups do exist. Notably, in the form of training, organised crime and terrorist finance (FATF, 2016). This was affirmed in a United Nations' Security Council (2014), report. The report notes that BH and the likes of Ansaru, Al Shabaab and AQIM have all benefited substantially from the kidnapping of foreigners for ransom and narcotics trafficking in the Sahel. Importantly, BH has been involved in the theft of livestock especially cattle in the northeast of Nigeria leading to closure of various cattle markets in Nigeria, Cameroon and across the Chad Basin. Livestock is the main income generating activity for most people in the Chad Basin.

According to FATF (2016), before the insurgency, a medium size cow exported to Nigeria ranged between EUR 500 to EUR 1500. In one incident in 2016, BH members rustled 20,000 cattle from one village to another in Maiduguri, Borno state. It is estimated that the value of this rustling was to the tune of NGN 3 billion or USD 10 million (FATF, 2016). BH was able to achieve this by creating its own market to sell stolen cattle in BH controlled territory; Scattering and selling cattle in smaller numbers at distant markets to avoid detection by LEAs; Selling cattle in small local markets and hiding cattle in neighbouring countries to be sold at a later date (FATF, 2013, 2016).

As stated by Respondent A, BH at the peak of their power in the Northeast were collecting taxes, collecting tolls and took farms. The challenge of countering terrorist financing requires identifying information, intelligence and documentary evidence. It requires political will and international cooperation by various governments and there is the problem of religious and cultural believes which varies from one region to another making international agreement and cooperation difficult (Clunan, 2006; Levitt and Jacobson, 2008; FATF, 2013, 2016). Hence, the work of the Financial Action Task Force in tackling money laundering and terrorist finance continues unabated. Unfortunately, identifying and investigating terrorist finance is difficult due to the specialist knowledge required in this area which is lacking within the NPF and other LEAs in the country. According to FATF (2013, 2016) authorities in West Africa admit to the lack of skills, resources, legal and infrastructural support in identifying suspicious transactions related to the financing of terrorism.

6.5.7.1 The Role of Financial Action Taskforce

The FATF was established in 1989 by the Ministers of its Member jurisdictions as an independent inter-governmental organisation that develops and promotes policies which protects global financial systems against the menace of money laundering, terrorist financing and the financing of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (FATF, 2016). In addition to FATF, is the existence of the Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA). The organisation was established in 2000 by the ECOWAS authority of heads of state.

The regional organisation is responsible for strengthening the capacity of member states towards the prevention and control of money laundering and terrorist financing in the region; Improve measures and intensify efforts to combat the proceeds of crime and strengthening

cooperation amongst its members. The organisation became an Associate Member of the FATF in June 2010. Nigeria is a member of GIABA to include 15 other African States. It is worth noting that FATF recommendations has become the global acceptable measured standards for Anti Money Laundering (AML) and the Countering of the Financing of Terrorism (CFT), thus countries must comply or be sanctioned and blacklisted (FATF, 2016; GIABA, 2020).

This has led to the creation of the Nigeria Financial Intelligence Unit (NFIU), the unit became operational in 2005, as a unit of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC). The NFIU mission is to safeguard the Nigerian financial system fight against money laundering, terrorism financing and related crimes (NFIU, 2005). The EFCC was formed in 2003 in response to the pressures of the FATF on Nigeria's non-cooperation on money Laundering. The commission is mandated to investigate and fight economic and financial crimes (EFCC, 2004). These organisations continue to work with the NCA, UNODC, FATF, GIABA and ECOWAS to tackle the issues of organised crime, terrorism finance and money laundering in the country.

Although, FATF measures varies from country to country, countries are expected to adopt the recommendation to meet their circumstance. FATF recommendations urges states to Identify risks, develop policies and domestic coordination; Pursue money laundering, terrorist financing and the financing of proliferations; Apply preventive measures for the financial sector and other designated sectors; Establish power and responsibilities for the competent authority to include investigative, law enforcement agencies, supervisory authorities and otherwise; Enhance the transparency and availability of beneficial ownership of legal persons and arrangements and finally, facilitating international cooperation (FATF, 2012, 2016).

According to FATF (2016), report, terrorist atrocities in Africa has become a source of concern, noting that West and Central Africa are particularly vulnerable to terrorism. This can be attributed to the atrocities of BH, Islamic State, Al Qaeda affiliates and other terrorist groups in the Chad and Sahel region. It is also worth stating that apart from terrorism, the region is suffering from corruption, poverty, geopolitical domestic clashes along ethnic and religious lines (OECD, 2006; FATF, 2013, 2016; UN, 2018). The report remarks on the devastating impact of extremist violence from these groups in the region and the instability they cause. Importantly, the report highlights the prevalence and profitability of cattle rustling, as a key feature of rural and cross-border criminality in the Chad Basin. It additionally, highlights the role of cash, especially foreign currency in terrorist financing in the region (FATF, 2013, 2016; BBC News, 2016; Bloomberg, 2016).

The role of cash in Nigeria and Africa is important because African's economies are cash-based economies rather than cashless economies. Whilst the former deals with economies in which financial transactions are carried out in cash, the latter deals with digital modes of transactions including credit and debit cards (FATF, 2013, 2016). The use of cash in Nigeria and African region has exacerbated the problems of organised crime, terrorism, trafficking and smuggling of contra band across the region's porous unsecured borders. This because of the prevalence of cash transactions in day-to-day business activities which does not raise suspicion, hence, evades suspicion from LEAs. In Nigeria, there are no credit cards, credit scores or credit checks, cash is carried in bulk on business/trading operations, totally different to the way cash and credit facilities are used in the UK or elsewhere in the west.

There is a cultural difference on how cash is used and carried in the African region versus Western countries. BH members are not walking around with debit and credit cards in Sambisa

Forest, looking for ATMs to draw cash from, they operate in tangible goods in the informal sector, which FATF measures fall short of. Terrorist designations, Know Your Customer measures, monitoring and reporting of suspicious transactions by suspicious persons/non-profit organisations are all good measures more likely to work in the formal sector and yield more success in the western countries where these tools are ingrained in the financial system of these economies. According to FATF (2013), report there are numerous terrorist groups not based in West Africa but derived a significant amount of financing through their activities in the region. This, the report notes, is evident in the narcotics trafficking, which is often funnelled to Europe via pre-existing routes in West Africa. This has made the challenges of countering money laundering and terrorist finance in Nigeria and Africa more daunting. Hence, the reliance of cash in African economies means more needs to be done in the informal sector.

One of the much talked about challenges in combatting money laundering and terrorist financing is the supposedly link between organised crime and terrorist groups. Although research in this area remains contested on the extent of collaboration between the two, it is understood that some form of tactical/strategic relationship exist between organised crime groups and terrorist in West Africa and other parts of the world (FATF, 2013, 2016; TE-SAT, 2020). One of the aspects of the much talked about link is in the area of convergence-activity and organisational convergence. The former occurs when terrorist employ criminal activities or criminals use terrorist tactics to achieve their economic and political objectives. The latter occurs when terrorist groups and criminals work together (Shelley and Picarelli, 2002; Mullins, 2009; Lacher, 2012; FATF, 2013, 2016; TE-SAT, 2020).

The lack of security presence and porous nature of the Sahel and Sahara region makes collaboration and BH cross border criminal activities hard to counter, thereby providing avenues for

money laundering and terrorist financing. The Sahel and Sahara region has been an ongoing source of concern to the regional African states, the African union and indeed, Western governments. This has been blamed on the weakness of state control in the region that has allowed the likes of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), other jihadi groups and organised crime groups to dominate the area, creating a safe haven (Lacher, 2012; World Economic Forum, 2019).

Until recently, the line between terrorist groups and organised crime groups has become blurred as both groups increasingly work together. AQIM, Al-Shabaab and indeed BH, collaborate with criminal networks, kidnapping local and foreign nationals for ransom, smuggling and trafficking of contra bands (cigarette, drugs) and cattle/livestock rustling within the Sahel and Sahara region (Lacher, 2012; FATF, 2013, 2016). Research also, indicates a strong link between terrorism and drugs due to the nature of the profit margins generated from the drug trade (Levitt and Jacobson, 2008).

It is believed, the likes of Hamas, Hezbollah, AQIM, The Taliban, ISIL and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia People's Army (FARC) are heavily involved in the drug trade/serving as global drug traffickers (Levitt and Jacobson, 2008; TE-SAT, 2020). West Africa has become an important transnational route for drugs especially cocaine from South America. The UN estimates in 2008 alone, around 14% of Europe's cocaine at a wholesale value of \$1 billion passed through West Africa on its way to Europe (Lacher, 2012; FATF, 2013, 2016; Dechery et al., 2015).

It worth mentioning that terrorist finance is a hard nut to crack due to the rapid changes in

globalisation and the constant evolution of terrorist financing methods making financial agencies, and LEA's work on detecting illicit activities difficult to tackle. The internet provides a fast, cheap and efficient way of transferring and remitting funds globally. The use of cash couriers, bulk cash smuggling and trade-based money laundering continues to make the activities of terrorist and organised crime groups difficult to detect (Levitt and Jacobson, 2008; FATF, 2013, 2016). This is specially so in Nigeria, where BH activities and cross border attacks has not ceded but continues to grow. Starving BH of funds can help curb the activities of the group by ensuring that sources of the group's finance are disrupted. Disrupting legitimate sources of BH finance can starve and help narrow the group's sources of funding to a pocket of activities like robbing various villages for food, livestock, army depots for arms and other desperate measures. These desperate measures will allow law enforcement to zero in on the group's activities.

One measure taken, was the denying of territory to BH. The denying of territory by the NPF and the MNJTF has been key in disrupting BH's finances, reducing the flow of goods and services by BH kidnapping and bank robberies (FATF, 2013, 2016). This was achieved by joint operations, joint patrols and arrest of BH members generating intelligence on the group's activities. Respondent A noted, BH has most equipment that the NPF and the army have, because they have the money and being funded by various sources.

The importance of countering terrorist finance in Nigeria, cannot be overstated. This is because disrupting BH's sources of finance can help to build intelligence and dismantle the group. One of the Nigerian government's measures for cutting off BH funding was the shutting down of cattle markets due to theft of livestock by BH around the Northeast. The Nigerian government's use of financial intelligence led to the discovery of BH sale of stolen cattle throughout northern

Nigeria. In response, in early 2016, the Nigerian government closed numerous cattle markets in northeast Nigeria to cut off this source of funding (Blanchard, 2016; BBC NEWS, 2016; FATF, 2016). Another measure taken by the Nigerian government was the movement of the army special operations headquarters to Borno state. This measure has helped to curtail BH funding in the Northeast as their activities are easily tracked and monitored by the security services (FATF, 2016).

Nevertheless, Nigeria is amongst 23 countries blacklisted by the European Union (2019) and the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) for not doing enough to counter money laundering and terrorist finance. The Commission assessed the level of existing threat, the legal framework and controls put in place to prevent money laundering and terrorist financing risks and their effective implementation. It concluded that 23 countries have strategic deficiencies in their anti-money laundering/counter terrorist financing regimes. This includes 12 countries listed by the Financial Action Task Force and 11 additional jurisdictions (FATF, 2016; European Commission, 2019).

It is worth acknowledging that some progress in the globe, has been achieved in the formal sector of banking like the new KYC measures (know your customer) and monitoring investigating large suspicious transactions (Levitt and Jacobson, 2008). However, not enough has been done in the informal sectors which frankly, most terrorist organisations use. Critically though, Nigeria and most African states are cash-based economies with unsecured porous borders which has allowed the likes BH to move money anonymously without detection. Thus, making the disruption of terrorist finance in the informal sector difficult in the region (FATF, 2013, 2016).

The use of informal value transfer systems (IVTS) and Hawalas which to this day remains unregulated ensures that terrorist organisations like BH and other organised crime groups would always find means of raising and moving funds for their activities (Shah, 2007; Clunan, 2006; FATF, 2016). It is worth noting that many Africans in diaspora around the world, use this method of transfer to send money to families, these same measures are exploited to finance terrorism across the region and globe (FATF, 2016). Much remains in this area to be achieved if the money trail of BH and other organised crime groups is to be defeated.

Western Nations have also been complicit with illicit gains from organised crime and corruption ending up in foreign banks. According to Transparency International (2014) report, many of the G20/OECD DAC countries are also the main destination for illicit financial flows from developing countries. It is no secret that London, is a destination for dirty money. This is especially so from countries like Nigeria, Russia, Ukraine and China where illicit gains from money laundering and corruption were facilitated by the UK service sector (Transparency International, 2019).

Therefore, the countering of terrorist finance and money laundering is a global issue, not only peculiar to Nigeria and other African countries in the region. To tackle the issue, the demand and supply side of illicit funds must be addressed equally. According to a GIABA (2014) report, Nigeria is marred with porous unsecured borders, weak laws, poor law enforcement and systemic corruption. This in no doubt, continues to derail the fight to counter terrorism finance and money laundering allowing terrorist and criminals to continue to exploit the situation.

6.6 NPF Training and Development Reforms

Training and Development is a necessary and required ingredient in any profession. Some form of training is needed to ensure work is completed. This helps to expand knowledge and performance of employees leading to efficiency and effectiveness of service. Police organisations like the NPF require a lot of training to be able to police crime. This is more so, in today's global world of technological innovation. The nature of globalisation has created new problems and new waves of crimes that was never thought of. The advent of the internet has given rise to cybercrime, and even the recruitment of terrorist via the internet. In counterterrorism policing the nature of intelligence collection and analysis, surveillance, use of arms and weapons, terrorist investigation requires training and development for law enforcement operatives.

The literature identified that through “*bureaucratisation theory of policing*” (Deflem 2010:4 - 5), police organisations have gained years of expertise and professionalism in crime control and order maintenance. Therefore, police organisations across the world are heavily involved in counter terrorism activities by investigating cases of terrorism, providing and funding training programmes, organising cooperation amongst various agencies across national and international borders in helping to build the capacity and capabilities of third world countries in the areas of policing crimes and terrorism. The findings indicate that the NPF and other security agencies in the country, have benefitted from the expertise and professionalism of other policing organisations across the globe. According to Respondent C:

There are a lot of training programmes that has been carried out. I must say that the NPF has gone into so many bilateral arrangements with some countries like Italy, Algeria, and also training and retraining of our officers in counter terrorist. We have a training programme been run by the Nigerian Army Peacekeeping Centre. This is

run every quarter and our officers are being sent there for counter terrorism training.

There were various training and development programmes that were on going and some scheduled for the future for NPF. Most of these trainings were either jointly, local, national and international in nature. Some of these trainings were carried out by foreign and international partners like UK, US, and other international agencies. There were numerous ongoing trainings both classroom and field based being undertaken by the NPF to improve the skill set needed to police terrorism and community engagement programmes. According to Respondent C:

Also, we have our own training centres where we send our officers to a compulsory one-month counter terrorism refresher training in (Rivers State.) There is nothing new there, they haven't been trained on before. This is a refresher course carried out through the year. They train on combat manoeuvre, tactical movements and most especially weapon manoeuvres. These trainings are ongoing, and others occur at specific planned time during the year

The importance of the various trainings is to improve the capacity and capabilities of the NPF which was lacking over the years in terms of terrorist criminal investigation, intelligence collection and analysis, rule of law, democratic principles of policing and the justice sector. According to Respondent B:

There has been improvement to our training compared to previous years. Presently, we established cells of 50 well trained men who rapidly can be deployed to any terrorist incident anywhere in the country.

Trained cells of officers have now been established to be deployed across the country in the event of a terrorist incident. The research respondents identified the establishment of an elite trained unit called the Counter Terrorism Unit (CTU). According to Respondent A:

There are a lot of training that is ongoing, we have, recently sent our officers overseas for training which, we call, train the trainer course. When they are trained there, they come back and disseminate whatever they have learnt. We also have international bodies/NGOs training our men, Counter Terrorism requires special attention/special operation. We sent our officers to train in Belarus for special training. Our Mobil officers are being trained in various training camps in the country. Our counter terrorism unit CTU are also undergoing numerous trainings. You cannot send these officers to the fields without training them. Therefore, training is very consistent.

As indicated by the data, some of the training is still marred by various issues like, inadequate training, misappropriation of training funds, compressed training, lack of training materials and various allowances owed to officers who have travelled abroad for training (Sahara Reporters, 2016). Hence, bilateral partners have helped and funded various training initiatives in and outside the country. The British and American governments signed memorandum of understanding to help in training the NPF and the military in counter terrorism capacity building and terrorist insurgency tactics. Additionally, the British funded community police initiative, and reform of the Justice sector via Department for International Development (DFID).

6.6.1 Justice Administration & Counter Terrorism Policing Unit (CTU), Training Programme

Programmes are also being implemented to protect the Criminal Justice System involved in the terrorist investigation cycle. According to Respondent B:

We also rolled out a program in the Justice Administration System for counter terrorism policing. A training exercise has just been completed for protecting Judges who handle cases of incarcerated terrorist to be able to provide a safe and conducive environment where justice can be dispensed without fear. The officers have been trained in counter terrorism protection detail in order to provide safety of the judges and enable them to speed up incarcerated terrorist awaiting trial. Their main duty is they are assigned to federal High Court judges who handle sensitive counter terrorism issues.

The training of a counter terrorism unit has just been completed, for the purpose of protecting Judges involved in the trial of incarcerated terrorists. Interestingly, the training was carried out and funded by a foreign partner. According to Respondent C:

In 2014, a unit was created for the protection of judges - Not all the judges - this are specific judges that deal with sensitive cases involving counter terrorism. The NPF signed an MOU with the British High Commission (BHC). The BHC, took charge of the whole training, provision of office and residential accommodation, our instructors were invited from the Royal Military Police London. I think they just left the country this week, the first set were trained in 2014. The instructors came back this year (2018) and commenced training on 5th of February and ended on the 28th. The

officers had their graduation last week, they were trained in so many aspects, like Physical fitness, Weapon Handling, and weapon manoeuvring.

The British Royal Military Police carried out the training of an elite CTU called the Strike Force in Abuja, Nigeria. The training was ongoing and further training earmarked for the future. All training needs, welfare, equipment and allowances were taken care of and handled by the British. Elements of the training were two-fold, both classroom and field based. According to Respondent C:

Two weapons were involved, the long AK 47, and Pistol. All officers underwent a thorough training which lasted for 4 weeks. They spent one week in the classroom and three weeks in the field. I coordinated that programme and at the end of the day, 31 officers scaled through, two officers didn't make it and they had to be dropped. They are already in the field but, we planning to call them on refresher training.

Thus, a lot of effort has been expended to get this training going by both parties. In the training, efforts were made to clean the image of the NPF after issues of human right abuses committed on civilians and terrorists by NPF and other security agencies. The trial of terrorists by sitting judges, who, otherwise have been exposed to jungle justice and torture, was a welcome development in upholding the rule of law and allowing terrorist a fair trial. This is in line with the Counter Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF)-UNODC project in Nigeria, which embarked on capacity-building of criminal justice and law enforcement agencies. The overall objective of the proposed activities is to strengthen the domestic capacity of Nigerian criminal justice institutions to implement the international legal framework against terrorism effectively, in compliance with the rule of law and human rights standards (CTITF, 2012). Apart

from the protection of federal judges in terrorist cases, the CTU's other function is to attend critical incidents all over the country when a terrorist atrocity happens.

6.6.2 International Collaboration

International and Regional collaboration in counter terrorism policing in Nigeria continues to play a significant role on how the NPF and other agencies prevent and deter terrorism in the country. This is because Nigeria continues to face unprecedented security challenges from terrorism, organised crime, kidnapping, armed bandits, Fulani Herdsmen clashes, various agitations and so forth. In addition, NPF and other agencies lack the capacity and capability to disrupt terrorism and the problems of crime facing the country (Forest, 2012; Solomon 2012; NACTEST, 2016; National Security Strategy, 2019; Ijide, 2020). Since 2012, Nigeria has signed MoU with seventeen countries on military cooperation for joint military exercises and exchange of training programmes.

The US has also played an important role in Nigeria and the African region in capacity and capacity programs. According to RAND (2018b), the US, through the US Africa Command (AFRICOM) has provided security sector assistances in counter terrorism to Nigeria and other regional African countries. This is because of the poverty that exist in the region, corruption, poor governance, inadequate resources, lack of technical know, infrastructure decay and so forth as noted by Forest, (2012) and Solomon, (2012).

Crucially, US security sector assistance in the region grew sharply from 87 million dollars in 2010 to 381 million dollars in 2015 (RAND, 2018b). Nigeria did benefit from US assistance through the procurement of US C-130 military transport aircrafts. The aircrafts reportedly fell

into disrepair due to lack of maintenance expertise and facilities. This led to repairs, pilot training and technical assistances to the Nigerian Military. The NPF continues to receive capacity and capability training from the UK, US and other agencies like UNODC, NCA, INTERPOL and so forth.

Above all, UNODC as an important organisation continues to play an essential role on technical assistance in supporting a universal legal framework against terrorism globally (UNODC, 2018b; 2021a; 2021b). The organisation has affirmed that for governments to effectively counter terrorism, there is a need to enhance their legal and operational frameworks at national and regional levels. This would strengthen governments criminal justice structures in addressing the threat of terrorism and ensuring terrorist are brought to justice (UNODC, 2018b). UNODC operates in more than 150 countries to include Nigeria, through its regional and country offices. The agency works with NPF and other LEAs in capacity and capability building through various EU- UNODC funded programmes.

6.6.3 EU-Nigeria-UNODC-CTED Partnership Project III

The UNODC in partnership with NPF and other agencies has been working in Nigeria for numerous years within the Criminal Justice System. According to UNODC Respondent:

The UNODC has been working on capacity and capability building with the NPF and other agencies for almost six years.

The organisation is actively involved in the global fight to counter terrorism and has been supporting the NPF and other agencies in various areas of counter terrorism. UNODC's work aims

to strengthen the criminal justice capacity for an effective rule of law-based investigation, prosecution, and adjudication of terrorist cases; promote inter-agency collaboration on counter-terrorism matters, strengthen the national legal regime against terrorism, strengthen international cooperation against terrorism and ensure respect for human rights. As noted by UNODC (2018b), since 2003, the organisation has trained over 28,000 criminal justice and law enforcement practitioners through technical assistance initiatives on a broad range of legal and criminal justice aspects pertaining to terrorism prevention.

The last six years has seen the organisation involved in a major project in Nigeria (UNODC, 2018b; 2021b). In the last six years, the organisation has been involved in a major project named: *EU-Nigeria-UNODC-CTED Partnership Project III Support for Criminal Justice Responses to Terrorism and Violent Extremism* (UNODC, 2021b). According to UNODC Respondent:

The UNODC has had one major EU funded project and it is focused on capacity building. What makes this project a uniquely, valuable project from a capacity building point of view is that it covers all aspect of the criminal justice system, which is really rare.

It is worth noting that this project is the third and final phase of the project cycle. Phase 1 and Phase 2 commenced in 2015 and ended in 2018. Phase 3 of the project commenced in 2018 and ended in March 2020. The main objective of the project remains to achieve a strong criminal justice system which addresses terrorism and violent extremism in Nigeria. This is because Nigeria lacks an effective CJS to tackle BH terrorism and other incidence of violent extremism

in the country. What makes this project valuable is because it does not only deal with policing training, but it also includes Judges, Prosecutors, National Assembly, the National Human Rights Commission, the Nigerian Prisons Service, the Nigeria Customs Service, the Nigerian Intelligence Agency, the Nigeria Immigration Service, the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Aviation & related agencies, the Federal Ministry of Education, the Federal Ministry of Health, the Federal Ministry of Information and Culture, the Federal Ministry of Youth Development, the National Orientation Agency, the Civil society organizations working the field of women's rights and child protection (UNODC, 2021b). Thus, UNODC project aims to make sure the system works. As stated by UNODC Respondent:

This project is unique and different because it covers all aspect of the criminal justice system compared to past programs that covers aspects of the CJS. This programme provides assistance across a broad spectrum.

The work of UNODC in Nigeria is important because of the lack of capacity and capability of the NPF and other agencies, infrastructure decay that exist and a CJS that is not working (Amnesty International, 2008). It is no secret that for years the Nigerian CJS has not been working. The issues are numerous from lack of resources, to decayed infrastructure, outdated laws to innocent citizens languishing in prison without charge (Osasona, 2017). According to 2015 report, the CJS is marred with corruption, incompetence, crippling bureaucratic gridlock to an outdated and counterproductive style of policing and a correctional service that locks up people without trial (The Guardian, 2015; Osasona, 2017; Page, 2018). As stated by UNODC Respondent:

The project aims to fix the CJS, so it works by taking a holistic approach in dealing with the problems in the CJS from investigation, prosecution, and adjudication of terrorism offences. Additionally, the project addresses issues of training, all other related issues like financing and maintenance of infrastructure decay.

It is worth mentioning that capacity and capability programs have been going on in Nigeria for years by different countries, different agencies and different organisations all trying to make an impact in the country's economic, social, and political sectors. The DFID has been working in Nigeria for years in security and justice sector reform in order to help fix a broken system. However, it seems success and progress in these endless programs and trainings never seems to be achieved. This in the end, makes the work of these organisations futile given the corruption that exist in the system which chokes any progress made. The CJS in Nigeria is weak and vulnerable, in 2016, security operatives seized a total of \$800,000 in a rare crackdown on eight judges including a Supreme Court justice implicated in fraud and money laundering (Channel Television, 2016; Page, 2018, 2019). The UNODC (2021a), notes that coordination between the police, civil organisations, and other branches of CJS remains complex, hence, the need for a holistic approach that addresses all the issues. According to UNODC Respondent:

The project aims to change and establish Police professional practise, change habits by doing things in the right way, establish a system of order-a cultural shift. The project has five pillars- Crime Scene, Exploitation of Evidence, Case Preparation, Adjudication and Detention.

Importantly, this project aims to establish a system of order by changing the culture of policing in Nigeria which is marred with criminal policing, human rights abuses, and confession-based

evidence from torture rather than from evidence-based practices. The current fight against terrorism in the country is marred with numerous human right abuses and lack of evidence-based approaches to crime and terrorist related offences. Amnesty International, (2014, 2015), reports document human right abuses by the NPF and the military and the use of torture and other ill-treatment to extract confessions as a shortcut to solve cases. UNODC Respondent puts this into Perspective:

The big problem with Nigeria LEAs is that everything is confession based. All the police do is they grab somebody and beat the person until they confess to be used in court. The typical LEA capacity building approach, is give them more tools, help them learn how to use evidence/evidence-based approach, and that's what we want to do.

According to UNODC (2021b), the program will strengthen capacity building for effective investigation, prosecution, and adjudication of terrorism offence. This will be achieved by the in-depth training of 105 prosecutors, 40 legal advisers, 124 investigators and 21 federal judges and staff, providing them with the enhanced skills and knowledge to facilitate a transition from confession-based to evidence-based prosecution of terrorism cases (HRW, 2010; CTITF, 2012; Forest, 2012; Solomon, 2012; Amnesty International, 2014; 2015; UNODC, 2021b). UNODC Respondent puts this into Perspective:

If you can help the criminal justice system leverage what is possible on the ground, from having no evidence, to having provenance evidence to forensic evidence. Then when we get into the habit of evidence moving around the country from a police station to a courtroom and prosecutors expecting to see evidence, then we can start worrying about forensic exploitation. But that's a huge step up and it is too big a step to take in

one single leap. What one is talking about is compressing 50 or 60 years of police development into a three-year funding cycle. When the PACE Act was brought in England in the 1980s, that was a huge cultural shift, these things take time, and can't just be done in one place or accomplished by the click of a finger

The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE), was introduced in England and Wales as a response to several high-profile miscarriages of justice. The Act replaced a complex array of common law and legislative provisions. The aim of the PACE Act was to regulate police powers and protect public rights. The PACE code covers areas such as stop and search, arrest, detention, investigation, identification and interviewing of detainees. The Act ensures police have the powers they need to do their jobs effectively and efficiently on the one hand and on the other hand, finding a balance by making sure there are reasonable grounds for their actions, ensuring that adequate records of encounters are kept and operating within the limits of the law (Home Office, 2020). The Act continues to be reformed to meet changing times.

In the context of this, is getting the NPF and CJS to start doing things in a professional and ethical manner that respects and protects public rights. Thus, moving policing in Nigeria from criminalised policing to democratic policing that protects the rights of the public remains an ongoing process that will require a huge cultural shift and adequate oversight. In taking a holistic approach, UNODC project aims to address not just the issues of human right abuses, torture, training, criminalised policing but also issues of inadequate resources, infrastructure decay, corruption, reform and so forth. UNODC Respondent puts this into perspective:

Things have clearly got worse since 2010. Everywhere I go I can see there is a fault line since 2010, if you look at the library at the police station, that's when the updates

on law stopped arriving you know. I've never seen new materials after 2010, and if you look at the degradation, you can see no one has had equipment since 2010. You know the computers are that old, the cars are that old. I mean, it's pretty clear, it's like a meteorite hit Nigeria in 2010 and froze everything.

The fault line in Nigeria is very significant because in February 2010, Nigeria lost her democratically elected President, the first civilian President without any past military connections. The late leader was diagnosed with acute pericarditis, an inflammation of the membrane around the heart. He ran as a reformist, promising to fight corruption, reform the power sector and the violence gripping the country from terrorist and militants. He negotiated with the then Niger Delta militants leading to amnesty, which curbed the violence in the country. He was known as Mr Rule of Law because of his favourable disposition to the judiciary. Months before his death, there was a power vacuum in the country as he was away on treatment and not seen in public for months. This eventually led to transfer of power to his deputy by the National Assembly to avoid any military coups (Independent News, 2011; Daily Trust, 2020). Whether the death of the former President and the eventually election of another, both without any military past connections helped to entrench the status quo remains to be seen.

Nonetheless, the data supports the research findings on the lack of equipment, inadequate welfare, training, logistic, porous unsecured borders and resources that has marred the fighting of terrorism in the country. These problems did not start in 2010, they were there before, they are systemic and perhaps, probably gotten worst over time. Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, Regional bodies, local think tanks, scholars and indeed, UNODC have all documented the corruption in the system which on the other hand has led to equipment shortages, poor investigative skills, infrastructure decay, unaccountability, embezzlement of funds for police

welfare and training and so forth (HRW, 2010; NOPRIN, 2010; Forest, 2012; Owen, 2014; Amnesty International, 2014; 2015). *Chapter Two & Five* addresses these issues in more detail.

Interestingly, Nigeria and other West African countries struggle from infrastructure problems as deliveries of services become overstretched requiring more resources for policing and indeed, other sectors of the economy (Williams, 2007). International collaboration in terms of capacity and capability building continues to fill the gap in terms of providing adequate training, supply of equipment, infrastructure development, organisational support, awareness raising and technical assistance to NPF and other agencies.

Apart from UNODC work with the NPF, other agencies like INTERPOL and NCA have provided various trainings and technical assistance to the NPF and other LEAs. INTERPOL implemented the European Union-funded West African Police Information System (WAPIS) programme, for which the EU provided €210 million. The programme aims to create national criminal data with 15 ECOWAS countries with Mauritania and Chad. The programme will increase global information sharing between the NPF and the global law enforcement community and increase capacity of law enforcement agencies to collect, share and manage police data regionally.

It worth stating that capacity and capability building has become an essential ingredient for security sector reform in Nigeria. UNODC work with NPF and other agencies continue to improve the security infrastructure in the country. However, various challenges remain in the partnership. According to UNODC Respondent:

The project has numerous challenges in Nigeria - Infrastructure decay, Basic needs for NPF are lacking or not available, Lack of maintenance culture, Inadequate rule of law, Corrupt system, System of Patronage, Lack of continuity because of six months transfer policy which means partners keep changing.

According to Page (2019), previous political leaders have postponed the much-needed security sector reform, whilst corruption persists in the sector sustaining an ineffective security apparatus. He notes that reform is needed due to failings in strategic, operational planning, endemic corruption, procurement fraud, racketeering by deployed police and soldiers and failings from top government officials. These top officials have created multiple overlapping agencies which has led to opportunities to enrich themselves through patronage, increased overhead cost and embezzlement.

As noted by UNODC Respondent, the numerous challenges confronting the organisation's work in Nigeria with the NPF and other agencies, these challenges are not new in the country. They have existed for a while, hence, the need for capacity and capability building in the country. This raises the question of why these challenges continue to exist with all the security assistance happening in Nigeria and elsewhere in Africa.

This is because of the corruption that exists in the country that has led to mismanagement of the country's resources and the lack of political will. Political leaders and security officials in Nigeria maintain a strong hold on power and security affairs in the country through weak legislative and oversight control. Thus, without political will challenges like infrastructure decay, corruption, inadequate rule of law, lack of maintenance, patronage and so forth will continue to exist despite international collaboration. Accountability in terms of capacity and capability

as research has shown, tends to be a difficult area in which to achieve results because of vested political interests that can block change (DFID, 2015). Nonetheless, as challenges remain, UNODC partnership with NPF has led to the formulation of a handbook to help with terrorist investigation in Nigeria.

6.6.4 UNODC-Nigeria Handbook on Counter Terrorism Investigation

UNODC in 2019, launched a handbook on counter terrorism investigation in Nigeria in partnership with the NPF. This confidential handbook addresses the professional skills needed by the NPF to investigate and prosecute terrorism incidence in the country. According to UNODC (2019ai), the handbook is designed to help NPF investigators to develop the skills and approaches necessary to ensure that evidence at crime scenes is recovered and analysed, that investigative leads are effectively identified and pursued, and that potential intelligence opportunities are leveraged and exploited (UNODC, 2019a; 2019ai). As stated by UNODC Respondent:

The document is a best practise/standard guide for NPF and other LEAs to use. It is a great training document.

This important document addresses basic issues like collecting of evidence at crime scenes, bagging of evidence, recovery of evidence, crime scene preservation, good practices in collection of evidence from terrorist crime scenes, terrorism and terrorist groups, terrorist finance, Nigeria legal framework, cooperation between investigators and prosecutors, approaches to counter-terrorism investigations, human rights-based approach to terrorism investigations, gender dimensions of terrorism investigations, basic concepts in counter-terrorism investiga-

tions, special investigation techniques, search powers, arrest strategy, collection of oral evidence in terrorism cases, international cooperation in terrorism investigations, social media and the internet, collection and exploitation of digital evidence and generally good practises in all areas covered and so forth (UNODC, 2019a; 2019ai).

The handbook is so detailed, well informed, and as well complex. Indeed, it addresses good practises in policing crime and terrorism as well as human right issues. However, putting the theory into practise in this case, would require a systematic way of policing and a cultural shift within the NPF and other agencies. A shift towards an efficient, professional, and democratic policing that respects human rights. The Handbook does not reflect the realities on the ground, and it is impracticable in Nigeria, given the status quo. Capacity building is not just about the transfer of skills and knowledge. It is a social and political transformation process with winners and losers. It must reflect the socio-political dynamics in the country and tailored to their needs (DFID, 2015). According to UNODC Respondent:

This is one of those instances where we produced a document that I think was a very good document, but probably wasn't as helpful as it could be for the Nigerian police force. Part of the challenge we have as an organisation as the United Nations, is that we have our own standards we have to adhere to, and sometimes they're pitched a little too high.

Although capacity and capability building assistance in Nigeria and Africa has increased in the security sector over the years due to violent clashes and terrorist threat in the region, evaluation in terms of what works and if the trainings are working remains difficult to assess. DFID (2015), study suggests a weak relationship between capacity building and improved security

outcomes. Even when positive outcomes are acknowledged, it has only led to limited change. There has been a heavy reliance on international and regional bodies/donors in security assistance, which raises the question of what happens when the partnerships end, and the resources stop flowing in? The DFID study notes that when these resources are removed, there would likely be a reversal in any gains made (DFID, 2015).

This is the case with the NPF and other agencies, where lack of resources, corruption and unaccountability means that any gains made cannot be sustained in the long run. Even though, the handbook is an essential best practise document, it remains difficult to achieve the measures set out in it. The handbook on counter terrorism investigation is too intricate for the NPF as it does not reflect the political context in the country. It addresses the problems of policing in Nigeria and how these issues should be tackled however, this is difficult to achieve because of the systematic issues that exist in the organisation and the country in general. The Handbook deals with issues of evidence collection, storage, retrieval, forensic, bagging of evidence, use of cell phone analysis, use of digital evidence, yet most police stations in the country do not have computers, basic means of collecting evidence and investigation (NOPRIN, 2010; HRW, 2010; Forest, 2012; Solomon, 2012). For more details of NPF problems see “*Chapter Two & Five*”. As noted by UNODC Respondent:

Collecting evidence is one step of the criminal justice system, but one the thing you will quickly realise in Nigeria if you spend a little more time there. There is no effective postal service in Nigeria, there is no way for the police to move evidence from a police station to a forensic lab, that's even if there is a forensic lab to move evidence to. The only way basically for most police stations to move evidence is to get in a car or plane and take the evidence there and they have no money for that. No money for petrol, they

don't have pencils, computers, they really don't have anything. Then you realise that there is no point collecting evidence because it's just going to sit on the desk of the person who collected it or in the evidence locker so there is no way to take the next step.

The issues dealt with in the handbook are important to policing in Nigeria, however the security infrastructure and the police culture does not exist to achieve the issues addressed in the handbook. The handbook for obvious reasons, is more appropriated in a western context like the UK and US where the police culture, accountability, infrastructure and rule of law exist to a greater extent. The handbook defines the use of Special Investigative Techniques (SITs), like the use of informers and undercover officers as human intelligence assets and their usefulness for terrorism prevention and investigation. But does not address the role of intelligence gathering from community policing to undercover officers, informants and prison intelligence. Whether this is deliberate or excluded for its importance remains to be seen, but on balance the handbook will make a good training document for the NPF and other agencies in the future.

The UNODC programme and handbook are one of the same in terms of improving the CJS in Nigeria and making it work by integrating all the agencies to work for a common purpose. According to Independent Commission for Aid Impact (2015), report on UK security and justice development assistance, the sector struggles to make an impact because institutions like the CJS are generally resistance to external influence or reform due to the political nature of the sector and those in power. The report also notes on the existence of vested interests and differences in organisational culture with hardly any collaborations. For instance, policing culture within the NPF, the army, navy, air force, courts, prisons, customs, DSS and so forth, are

all different to one another, meaning security assistance have to cater for the individual needs of these multiple agencies. UNODC Respondent puts this into perspective:

I mean basic concept of what we do is a bit like building an island in the ocean. You come along with scoops of sand, like the Chinese do in the South China Sea, you dump a lot of rocks in the ocean, a lot of sand in the ocean and for the first two or three years, all you see is water, but if you dump enough of it and enough of it stays in one place, eventually you're going to get a little island build up and you can build upon that. That's the theory of this. That's the theory of change. A lot of it is going to get washed away, you know, a big storm might turn up and flatten the island again. But basically, the only way forward is to try and nurture positive progress. When we get a little bit of success, we try to water it, support and plunk stuff next to it. And that's all you can do. And you know, at the end of the day the amount of money we're talking about, it sounds like a lot, but it isn't really. You know, \$3 or \$4 million is nothing in the cosmic scheme of things. And it's very hard to affect change. But I'm not sure that having more money would make a difference. It's not just about money. It's about leadership, leadership in the country.

Although, various challenges remain between UNODC work in Nigeria with NPF and other LEAs in capacity and capability building, there has been success in improving the CJS in Nigeria. The work of the UNODC in security assistance is transformational because it has taken a people's centric approach rather than a state centric approach. The doctrine emphasises a human development approach through multilateralism reflected by good governance, democratic principles, rule of law, environmental protection, human rights and social justice (UN Millennium Summit, 2000; Ebo, 2010). Thus, UNODC's work with NPF and other agencies

in capacity and capacity building has adopted a comprehensive security agenda strengthen by national ownership. As noted by the Chief Judge of the Nigerian Federal High Court, UNODC's contribution continues to strengthen the capacity of Nigeria's CJS to deal with the threat of terrorism while respecting human rights through specialised training workshops (UNODC, 2017b).

The work of UNODC in Nigeria in CJS, has led to the release of thousands of suspected BH terrorist held in Wawa Cantonment and Giwa barrack in Nigeria. According to reports, in 2009, a major uprising led to violent clashes between BH and security forces, with mass arrests and detention of suspects. The mass arrest by the NPF and Military led to thousands locked up for years without trial and not accorded due process. As noted by the Institute for Security Studies report, the trials exposed significant issues in Nigeria's CJS. It was tainted by weak investigations, arbitrary arrests, unlawful detention and the absence of legal aid and evidence. This is bad not just for counterterrorism in the region and in Africa, but also for Nigeria's ability to deliver justice for other offences generally. Human Rights Watch (2018b) calls the trials a flawed process (HRW, 2018b; Ngari and Olojo, 2020). UNODC Respondent put this into perspective:

In Wawa Cantonment, which is in kainji- that was something that was paid for by us two years ago, and it was a very flawed process, but it did at least lead to about 1600 cases being reviewed, of which 800, half were dismissed. So, in theory those 800 people should have been released. The judge did not think the army would release them if she just made that order. So, she said the cases were dismissed, but they should be released after rehabilitation program. Now there is no such rehabilitation program, so these

800 people have sat there for another two years. When we found out that this was happening, we tried to come up with a solution for the Nigerian government.

The Kainji trials commenced in October 2017, in Kainji, Niger state. The trial was an effort by the Nigeria Government to address the issue of over 6,600 people accused of being members of BH that were held without charge (BBC NEWS, 2017; HRW, 2018b). According to HRW (2018b), that observed the trial, the proceedings were very short, with some lasting less than 15 minutes, raising several fair trial and due process concerns. Most charges were couched in ambiguous and vague terms without the crucial information Nigerian law requires, like the specific date, place, and details of the alleged offense. Although, there has been numerous criticisms of the process and the CJS in general, it must be noted, that it is a success story because it led to the release of hundreds of people that would otherwise be in jail and the sentencing of those found to be guilty of committing an offense. Nonetheless, UNODC Respondent notes that:

This is evidence of a policy process addressing an issue that is critical and embarrassing to Nigeria government and trying to resolve it in a way that actually gets people out of prison. And that's credible. It's not as good as it could be by any stretch of the imagination, but it's a lot better than most states would have done. I mean and I'll give you an exact analogy Guantanamo Bay. And there are still people locked up in Guantanamo Bay, but the Americans can't release them because they can't bring a case against them. So, you know, it's not like Nigeria is uniquely, backward in dealing with something like this, the US can't deal with it.

According to Amnesty International (2020) report, the Nigerian military detained thousands of boys and girls coming out of BH territory, often with no evidence the children were part of BH, much less committed crimes against civilians. In many cases, no charges are brought, even as children are held for months or years. Due process is routinely flouted and whilst, the military has released several large groups of children between July 2018 and March 2020, its unlawful detention of children has continued.

This is obviously an embarrassing situation for the country as this indicates the failure of the CJS and rule of law in the country. As noted by Ngari and Olojo, (2020), much of the evidence examined during the trials were based on confessions, weak interrogation of the cases constituted one of the major criticisms of the process. This in addition, shows the importance of UNODC's work with the NPF and CJS. It indicates progress and a lot of work remains to be done. According to UNODC Respondent:

We've definitely introduced concepts that are thought about and form opinions, inform policy decisions, or at least influence policy decisions. That's pretty significant. We have physically got more than 1000 people out of prison and buying away more than 300 children out of prison. And we're in the business of trying to convict terrorists, not necessarily trying to get people out of prison. I don't work for the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, but that's still an outcome. A successfully adjudicated case whether the person is found innocent or guilty is a successful outcome. So, I think that's positive, I think we have achieved some things.

Although, the trials were a flawed process, it led to the release of unlawful detainees by the Nigerian government which indicates some credibility in tackling the issue. UNODC work

with NPF and CJS has changed the thought process on how policing and terrorism investigations should be embarked on.

Indeed, UNODC's work with the NPF, other LEAs and CJS continues unabated as well as challenges that plagues such partnerships. In terms of evaluation, it has been noted that the various projects have undoubtedly been relevant and responded to the needs identified by the Nigeria Government in general, and Nigerian criminal justice actors, and by representatives of key stakeholder agencies, including the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED). There has been more active cooperation between UNODC and the NPF, DSS, DPP and the judiciary because of targeted training. On the other hand, partnerships with the intelligence community, the military (to strengthen the intelligence/evidence interface) and the Nigerian Bar Association have been minimal (UNODC, 2016).

As international collaboration between NPF and other LEAs continue in terms of capacity and capability building, the hope is that it will eventually lead to security transformation in Nigeria. The kind of transformation that ensures security, police professionalism, respect for human rights, accountability and good governance. However, numerous challenges to the NPF professionalism continue to plague the organisation's and CJS ability to attain that height. On the balance, UNODC work in Nigeria with the NPF, and other agencies indicates the important role international collaboration has and continues to play in the fight to prevent and deter terrorism in the country.

The findings confirm that UNODC is an essential partner in the fight to counter terrorism in Nigeria by training, improving and reforming the CJS so it works. In meeting the objectives of

the research questions, UNODC partnership has been essential in capacity and capability building in counter terrorism policing in Nigeria, bringing about training, infrastructure improvement, human rights consideration in counter terrorism investigations and leading to the release of unlawful detainees in the process. The hope is that this process of security transformation will continue in the near future.

6.7 Evaluation of NPF Training Methods

Years of neglect and infrastructural decay destroyed the capacity and capability of policing in Nigeria, leading to a reliance on torture to solicit confessions and brutalised criminal policing. This led to mistrust between the NPF and the public, which continues to hamper relations between the two to this day. With the inception of democratic civil rule in 1999 efforts to recruit, retrain and reform the NPF have been carried out. Training in counter terrorism is dominated by field base training rather than classroom based. The respondents identified a lot of training that is in progress and planned for the future in Nigeria and by foreign partners. There are no specific performance indicators used to measure training efficiency and effectiveness, rather, training is evaluated by the ability of officers to complete field exercises, the progress in the war on BH in the battlefield and restoring adequate security in the country. According to Respondent A:

It is a matter of perception, those terrorists occupying various towns in the Northeast are no longer there. They have been driven to the forest that is a sign of success.

Practically, we can see that the towns have been liberated and the terrorist is no longer there. Once in a while pocket of attacks happen, but that is to be expected.

6.7.1 Sambisa Forest

Progress in counter terrorism is evaluated ultimately by winning the war on the battlefield, internet and in the media, by integrating hard power and soft power approaches. In evaluating progress, BH was driven out from various towns by law enforcement agencies into the Sambisa Forest. Whether driving BH to the forest of Sambisa is a sign of success remains a contentious argument. On the one hand, it is a sign that the joint forces are winning the war but on the other hand, it shows that war has not ended, and more is expected from the Nigerian joint forces.

Driving BH to the forest has allowed the group to regroup and retrain, and to carry out hit and run attacks on law enforcement and local communities, inflicting heavy casualties. In 2016, the military captured the terrorist stronghold in the forest, but attacks continued to happen. Capturing a part of the forest led to displacement of the group to another part of the forest. The inability of Nigerian military to gain a foot hole in the forest has led to the use air raids on the forest which has resulted in killing more civilians rather than the terrorist (Economist, 2017). According to Respondent A,

In order to monitor the progress/effectiveness of the training carried out so far, it is when you are in the field. Areas that were uninhabited due to the terrorist presences, have now been repopulated. The people at the IDP camps are being taken back to their villages as those areas have been liberated, these are signs that the trainings are effective and working.

Hence local communities in the Internally Displaced Person (IDP), camps were able to go back to their villages after NPF re-established authority in the conquered communities. However, attacks continue to happen by the terrorist use of hit and run tactics. Although, some people

have returned to their villages, further attacks on those communities by BH have been reported, questioning the idea of sending communities back given the risk. According to reports, in Borno alone, 16 out of 38 hospitals have been destroyed or looted, and 214 primary health care centres shut in 2016. Bama was the second largest city in Borno until 2014, with a population of 600,000. Today it lies in ruins and is deserted. State authorities say it will require millions of dollars to reconstruct. In February (2019), suicide bombers killed more than 50 people and injured dozens in attacks on a site holding some 50,000 IDPs at Dikwa in Borno, the state hardest hit by the BH insurgency (UNHCR, 2016). According to Respondent A,

There are places where we have established civil authority, we have set up schools and hospitals. For example, what happen in Chibok, we have officers protecting every school in the Northeast now. We have also our action centres within the areas, in case any problems arise, Police will be there to assist.

The NPF has adopted new counter terrorism measures, putting what was learnt in training into practice. These include not just counter terrorism measures, but anti-terrorism preventive measures to keep the public abreast of the security situation in the country. According to Respondent B,

Firstly, the NPF has improved its capacity-by doing this it means, we are more alert than we used to be and also, we have created awareness by enlightening the populist on security related issues happening in the country. Examples are like securing a building, how to sieve intelligence. Also, terrorism atrocities have reduced as result of this.

There has been progress in the fight to counter terrorism in Nigeria, but the measures adopted are working at a slow pace. According to Respondent B,

Steady progress has been made, the terrorists are not having a free run. This is because of all the new measures the NPF has established which shows that the training programmes, policies and laws are working. These are all the templates, we use here in NPF to evaluate our progress in training and development of our counter terrorism unit.

Due to the training of the NPF and other agencies, measures like direct engagement with the media, the public, digital engagement on social media to counter BH online activities and propaganda and use of terrorism finance measures are in place. According to Financial Action Task Force (FATF, 2016), two recent government interventions and initiatives have had a significant impact on the terrorist groups operating in West and Central Africa and their respective financing. The Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF) (aimed at controlling the criminal activity near Lake Chad) was strengthened to respond to the rise in BH activity. The attacks undertaken by the MNJTF have put pressure on BH and have reduced the territory in which it operates. There has been an acknowledgement in the understanding of the terrorist threat in the country, better use of intelligence and better use of weapons/communication gadgets. According to Respondent B,

There is no performance indicator used, but rather evaluation in terms of progress

has led to response time been improved. Better weapon handling, better understanding of the terrorist strategy and ideology, number of attacks has drastically reduced, understanding of the intelligence cycle and better coordination of intelligence, incident management.

Joint training programs between various forces has helped in the disrupting the threat from BH. There was acknowledgement that apart from field exercises which is necessary for any operations, some classroom work is needed. According to Respondent C,

I mentioned earlier that part of the training has to do with tactical manoeuvre and weapons handling training and this are two vital aspect in every operation. How you manoeuvre not to be seen or attacked by the enemy and how you can get on your enemy without him getting back at you. These are how we measure the effectiveness of the training. Also, most of the trainings are field based training. More of field-based activities rather than classroom work. For example, in the weapon manoeuvre training, we have stripping and assembling, the officer is timed and is required to complete the task in the set time. In terms of weapon handling and shooting, there are targets for the officers to aim at. Those who hit the required targets are marked through and those who fail to, are reassessed until they can pass through.

The research respondents asserted that training has remarkably improved the capacity and capability of the NPF and further training on community engagement is ongoing.

6.7.2 De-radicalisation Program

Radicalisation has been defined as a complex interaction of factors that does not necessarily leads to violence but can lead to violent terrorist tendencies (Carpenter et al. 2009). It is a process that leads people to support terrorism and extremism directly or indirectly. There is no one-size-fits all theory to radicalisation as some situations and issues that apply to certain groups will not to others (Hutson et al. 2009). The extent to which BH were radicalised or motivated by grievances within Nigeria, is not clear, but having a de-radicalisation programme is important in countering the terrorist ideology and narrative. This is specially so for young recruits who have been conscripted to the group either willingly, or forcefully. According to Respondent C,

Also, to add, there is a classroom-based training known as the de-radicalisation of repentant BH elements. The course is being run by the Nigerian Army Peace Keeping Centre which is sponsored by the Japanese Government in collaboration with the EU. The course has to do with de-radicalisation and rehabilitation of repentant terrorist. Those that have been de-radicalised are then integrated into society and offered an opportunity to see the new reality of their situation.

The Nigeria de-radicalisation program coordinated by ONSA aims to change the ideology, beliefs and attitudes of violent extremist prisoners, not just their disengagement from violence. Intervention has been focused on changing BH prisoners' radical or extremist beliefs and views, as well as ensuring that BH prisoners renounce the use of violence to achieve their objectives. This process aims to reinforce the introduction of soft power approach rather than the reliance on only hard power (NACTEST, 2016).

According to Institute Global (2019), Nigeria has three main de-radicalisation programmes. One is in Kuje prison, Abuja, and was set up by the Nigerian government in 2014. Participants are combatants convicted of violent extremist offences and inmates awaiting trial. The programme aims to combat religious ideology and offer vocational training before being reintegrated into communities. There is the Yellow Ribbon Initiative, which is located in communities in Borno State, in the epicentre of the BH insurgency in the north of the country. This is organised by a not-for-profit organisation, the Neem Foundation. It was set up in 2017, and targets women, children and young people associated with BH. The third is Operation Safe Corridor (OPSC), set up in 2016, by the government. It targets BH combatants who have surrendered targeting three key issues: religious ideology, structural or political grievances and post-conflict trauma (Institute Global, 2019). Importantly, these three de-radicalisation programmes are run differently, and is a welcome development in terms of rehabilitation efforts. Nevertheless, a question of evaluation remains, on whether the programmes are working.

6.8 Concluding Analysis

This chapter has focused on the respondents' perspectives and other data on the key themes of the dissertation, namely: understandings of terrorism and counter terrorist policing in Nigeria; resourcing counter terrorism; interagency collaboration; training needs, programmes and implementation.

6.8.1 Understandings of Terrorism and Counter Terrorism

It is clear that terrorism prevention and counter terrorism policy, programmes, laws and responses were not fully grasped by the NPF and other agencies. This was due to a lack of leadership, planning, training, capacity building and funding. This lack of understanding continues to affect the war on terrorism in Nigeria, in the present dispensation. However, there has been

progress in the understanding of terrorism and counter terrorism in the country as the war rages on yet, casualties on the side of the public and law enforcement continues to rise.

The understanding of terrorism and counter terrorism by those charged with its prevention and response determines how much resources both human and financial is allocated to the fight. It determines what strategies, policies, laws, training should be adopted in prevention and disruption terrorism in the country. Understanding terrorism and counter terrorism determines, what law enforcement agencies are best placed to disrupt terrorism, the manner and conduct of the counter terrorism fight, whether in the short-term or in the long-term. It also, calls into question whether the various agencies have the required training and if the security infrastructures on the ground are fit for purpose. As confirmed by the findings of the research project, NPF and other security agencies lacked the capacity and capabilities in the fight to counter terrorism in Nigeria. This in no doubt, has prolonged the war on terrorism in the country.

Nigeria law enforcement's understanding of terrorism and counter terrorism policing has remarkably, improved. This has been achieved by better training, better coordination, better collaboration, better planning and better organisation of law enforcement resources. Yet, gaps in understanding of the terrorist menace continue to exist. This is expressed in the lack of academic research in the field of terrorism and counter terrorism in Nigeria, poor intelligence management and inadequate tackling of terrorism finance.

Academic research in the field of terrorism and counter terrorism remains elusive in Nigeria, only carried out by non-governmental organisation. This contrasts with Western countries like the UK and US who continue to invest heavily on academic research and best practice in coun-

ter terrorism policing. Hard power approach is not enough to win the war on terrorism. Integrating other soft power approaches and academic research will help in understanding various terrorist groups, aims, objectives, motives, ideologies, sources of finance, tactics, strategies, grievances, modus operandi and otherwise.

6.8.2 Resources for Counter Terrorism

Both financial and human resources are required in the fight to counter terrorism. In the case of the NPF no matter the resources allocated, policing organisations across the globe will always require more resources. It is worth acknowledging that most countries including Nigeria, has seen their defence budget rise steadily, due to the counter terrorism fight. The digital age of new technological innovations has remarkably, changed the dynamics of security in the globe. Advancements in weapons, transport, communication, internet and science has made transnational crime and groups more widespread, sophisticated and hard to counter. It also, means that these organised crime and terrorist groups will always remain a step ahead of law enforcement agencies due to the element of surprise, leaving them, playing catchup.

Hence, resources will always be an issue, because it is required to build and enhance law enforcement capacity and capability in changing situation of crime in a digital age. Nevertheless, no resources can ever be enough for law enforcement agencies, rather, how whatever resources obtained can be maximised to achieve the required goals. In the Nigeria context, the problem of resources is extensive due certain variables. Due to a lack of understanding of the terrorism threat, it led to poor planning and coordination by NPF and other agencies which was remedied in 2014 & 2016, by the adoption of a counter terrorism policy. In addition, the security systems in the country were not adequate to handle the terrorism threat.

The findings of this research project confirm that the NPF was under funded leading to poor training, poor infrastructure, inadequate logistics and welfare. It led to poor capacity and capability of the NPF.

6.8.3 Collaboration in Counter Terrorism

Collaboration is a very important aspect of terrorism and counter terrorism because it brings together all relevant agencies together for the purpose of achieving a common goal. This is because terrorism and counter terrorism require various components of security like intelligence, surveillance, community policing, academic research, military, non-profit organisations, public and private initiatives. Operational collaboration has not always been consistent or mutually beneficial in the globe until recent lessons were learnt. Collaboration can be domestic or international in nature. Domestic collaboration involves all security agencies in a country, working together for same objective. International collaboration involves two or more countries working together through international treaties, laws, and bilateral agreements in other for all parties to achieve set goals.

Collaboration in Nigeria within law enforcement agencies before the advent of BH was non-existent or limited. All agencies saw themselves as rival forces and competing for resources and elite status. Collaboration in Nigeria has been marred with infighting, ego and envy within the security agencies. But this was not just happening in Nigeria, it was happening in other parts of the globe. It was happening between the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in United States. Their non-cooperation led to failures in intelligence in the 9/11, attack that could have been prevented if they were working together. In Nigeria, non-collaboration between the agencies has cost a lot of lives. This is specially so, between the military and the NPF.

International Collaboration has remarkably, improved the capacity and capability of the NPF and other agencies. This has been achieved in the areas of training, provision of equipment joint regional forces and military assistance within Nigeria and international shores. UNODC, DFID, INTERPOL, FATF and other agencies have and continue to partner with the NPF and other LEAs in the country in improving the CJS, border security, research, oversight, terrorism investigations and organised crime in the country. UNODC partnership has aided in the formulation of a handbook on counter terrorism investigation in Nigeria to be used by NPF and other agencies as a best practise guide in criminal and terrorism investigation.

International collaboration is an important variable in countering terrorism due to the transnational nature of certain terrorist groups. As in the case in Nigeria, international collaboration is even more important due to the nature of BH attacks in the Northeast that borders other African countries like Cameroon, Chad and Niger. This has led to the creation of a Multi-National Joint Taskforce with Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon and Niger stationed in the porous unsecured borders across the Lake Chad Basin.

6.8.4 The National Counter Terrorism Strategy (NACTEST)

The National Counter Terrorism Strategy was first formulated in 2014 and later revised in 2016. The document was the first time the Nigeria government finally, woke up to the terrorist attacks plaguing the country and through this document aims to address every part of the terrorist menace. The importance of this policy document is critical, if the fight to counter terrorism in the country is to be won. The success of this policy document would depend on all parties playing their specific roles as spelled out in the document. It depends on all parties joining resources and making sure that the rule of law is adhered to, whilst, carrying out their respective duties. The document addresses issue of law enforcement roles, response, resources,

strategy, community engagement, collaboration, rule of law, terrorism finance and other relevant variables in the fight to counter terrorism.

Across the globe, western nations have all had or developed a counter terrorism policy for preventing and responding to terrorism. This is so, joint efforts can be coordinated at all levels of society in terms of resource allocation and accountability. NACTEST, calls into question the planning, capacity and capability of the Nigeria security system. It reinforces the need to work together and update the dilapidated security systems in the country if the war on terrorism is going to be won. It is fair to say that NACTEST is here to stay and would continue to direct future terrorism and counter terrorism initiative in the country.

Conclusion, Key Themes and Recommendations

7.1 Introduction

The research project commenced in 2017, and it is fair to say that not much has changed in the policing of terrorism in Nigeria and across the globe. However, steady progress continues to be made in the policing of terrorism across the globe. In Nigeria, steady progress in counter terrorism policing continues to be made, amidst, BH continuing attacks in the Northeast part of the country. BH attacks in the Northeast part of Nigeria has not ceded but has continue to grow creating humanitarian crisis in the Northeast of the country. The research project aims were to identify the problems of policing terrorism in Nigeria and how it is being tackled from the perspective of the NPF. This was achieved by identifying and analysing relevant policy and scholarly documents and responses from Senior Police Officers and UNODC into the events and challenges of policing terrorism in Nigeria. The analysis led to some key themes/findings in research project which were relevant to understandings the challenges of policing terrorism in the country.

7.2 Key Concluding Themes

The research project in concluding, has identified five key themes that summaries the entire project: These have been framed around the research questions, theoretical framing and data/findings.

1. Understanding of terrorism and counter terrorism policing in Nigeria
2. Organisation of counter terrorism policing in Nigeria
3. Challenges of counter terrorism policing in Nigeria

4. Training and evaluation in counter terrorism policing in Nigeria
5. Comparison of Nigeria and the United Kingdom

7.2.1 Understanding of Terrorism and Counter Terrorism Policing in Nigeria

Understanding terrorism and counter terrorism policing is important not just in Nigeria, but around the globe. It is important because it helps policy makers and implementers define the parameters of the war on terrorism in terms of legal and social construct. It helps to allocate appropriate resources, strategies, planning, agencies and otherwise, needed for the fight to counter terrorism. Not understanding the concept/nature of terrorism and counter terrorism in theory and practice can have dire consequences as has been illustrated in Nigeria, by the atrocities of BH and the lacklustre approach to the terrorist response by the NPF. The lack of understanding in Nigeria, led to poor planning and inadequate execution of the strategies. The war on terrorism in the country was never envisaged to last a decade, but it has. The war on BH is a decade old as of 2020, as the war continues to rage on.

Chapter 2 in framing the project, analyses the social construction of terrorism as crime and social and legal definition. Scholars like English and Crelinsten, remark on the importance of taking a long-term view rather than a short-term view in the policing of terrorism. Jackson et al., notes that the way states and LEAs respond to terrorism depends on how terrorism is defined culturally and politically. This was significant in the framing of the research project in the policing of terrorism in Nigeria. Even though, issues of terrorist atrocities have to be addressed in the short-term due to the nature of terrorist attacks, it is important to have a long-term view which leads to the analysis of hard power versus soft power, local versus global, reactive versus proactive, tactical versus strategic.

The finding of the research confirms the evidence of a lack of understanding not just by the NPF, but by other security agencies in the country, who believed that this was a local issue that would be crushed by military hard power as has been done in the past. The literature, analysis of data and finding reveals terrorism in Nigeria is framed as war requiring both the criminal justice and war model to police. This presents serious dilemma on how senior police officers view the policing of terrorism in the country. At what point does the criminal justice model begins/ends? And when does the war model step in/vice versa? The literature and findings indicate the war model dominates due to the sophistication of the terrorist threat, requiring use of hard power and collaboration of all agencies. However, other aspects of the criminal justice model play significant role in terrorist operations, investigation, arrest, trial and incarceration. Perhaps, the criminal justice system should dominate in this sense, but due to a lack of capacity and capability by NPF, the military (war model), dominates.

The study indicates that the NPF lacked the capacity and capability to police terrorism and other serious crimes in the country like organised crime, investigating murder and emerging crimes. The literature and findings reveal that policing in Nigeria is marred with inadequate funding and resources, leading to lack of training and other short comings that has deprived the force, meeting its law enforcement obligation in the 21st century. As noted in chapter two, (bureaucratisation theory), the importance of the police organisation in counter terrorism and role the police play. The findings reveal that the NPF play an important role in the fight to counter terrorism in Nigeria through their expertise and mandate by the constitution of the country. However, the military and the intelligence branches play a more significant roles in the fight to police terrorism in the country. This does not negate the significance of the NPF in the fight to police terrorism in Nigeria but points to other interrelated issues that has hindered

the organisation from performing at the highest standard as noted in Chapter two & five.

7.2.2 Organisation of Counter Terrorism Policing in Nigeria

Before the emergence of BH in Nigeria, the country had no counter terrorism laws, model, strategies, theories and policies that tackle terrorism and counter terrorism. Although, terrorist atrocities had existed in Nigeria, as far back as 1950s and as recent as in the 1990s with the Niger Delta militants over oil revenues and economic disparity in the region, an organisation of counter terrorism policing never existed as confirmed by the literature/findings.

The findings indicate that all the necessary ingredients necessary for policing terrorism in the country were lacking or non-existent. Due to the lack of understanding of terrorism and counter terrorism in Nigeria, even after 2001, Al Qaeda attacks in the US and the subsequent war on terrorism, Nigeria, did not have the framework/infrastructure to be able to tackle present and future terrorist attacks in the country. The literature indicated that apart from a few countries like the UK and Israel, most countries did not have a systematic framework for tackling terrorism until after 9/11. The literature indicates as noted by Deflem, counter terrorism policing developed piece meal by piece meal across the globe. The literature and findings confirm that in the war to counter terrorism in Nigeria, international collaboration has played an important part in building the capacity and capability of the NPF and other agencies in the country. This was achieved by funded training and provisions of equipment.

The formation and implementation of the National Counter Terrorism Strategy (NACTEST), in 2014, started the process by the Nigeria government in implementing a systematic way of tackling terrorism in the country. Implementation of NACTEST as demonstrated by the literature and findings, allowed the Office of National Security Adviser (ONSA) to plan, coordinate,

direct and fund the counter terrorism war by handling out roles and responsibilities to individual agencies. The findings reveal interagency rivalry has led to inadequate communication between various agencies. The findings documented the breakdown of communication between the Army and the NPF leading to the Dapchi kidnapping in 2018. The organisation of counter terrorism policing in Nigeria, is a welcome development in the policing of terrorism in the country. Although, its implementation is marred with various problems, it is a work in progress and will set forth the ethos of future counter terrorism policing initiatives in the future.

7.2.3 Challenges to Counter Terrorism Policing in Nigeria

The findings of this research reveal the numerous challenges to the policing of terrorism in Nigeria. These challenges have hindered the fight to counter terrorism in the country. The challenges are especially, daunting for the NPF which has suffered decades of police cuts and infrastructure decay by numerous former military regimes. The literature and findings indicate issues of resources both human and financial, interagency rivalry, inadequate training, proliferation of small arms and weapons and porous unsecured borders, have impacted the fight to counter terrorism in the country. Years of BH atrocities in the Northeast of Nigeria has impacted on the country's economic development and security framework of the country. The continuous attacks have kept officers on the frontline for longer than expected, leading to battle fatigue and a long time away from their individual families.

Chapter two identified the trial of a former NSA head, being incarcerated for diverted resources appropriated for the counter terrorism war leaving frontline officers with inadequate equipment. Chapter five identified the trial and incarceration of a former Inspector General head of the NPF for misappropriating police funds, impacting on NPF force hardware, welfares, training and other policing essentials. Chapter two additionally, indicates the issue of investigating

terrorism in Nigeria, which is marred with lack of intelligences, public distrust (Suspect Community), and torture due to a lack of capacity and capability. The literature and findings indicate all agencies are charged with investigation of terrorist atrocities in the country which has led to duplication of roles and confusion amongst various agencies, leading to infighting. These and many more issues have directly or indirectly impacted the policing of terrorism in Nigeria. The challenges continue to prolong the fight to defeat BH in the Northeast, costing thousands of lives, insecurity and humanitarian crisis in the Northeast of the country.

7.2.4 Training and Evaluation in Counter Terrorism Policing in Nigeria

The findings confirm the importance of training in counter terrorism policing and the remarkable achievements in terms of domestic and international ongoing collaboration in the country. Importantly, training has occurred bilaterally and funded especially by the EU, UK, international organisations and other countries. Training has helped to breach the gap in professional knowledge and practice in the policing of terrorism.

Chapter five reveals the systematic underfunding of the NPF by successive military regimes for decades. This in the end, affected the professionalism and integrity of the NPF, leading to corruption, criminal policing, political interference, public distrust and lack of skills. As the shift in policing moved on, due to the emergence of globalisation, NPF was left behind with its crude practices, expressed by the lack of scientific methods of crime detection, torture as a means of eliciting confessions, a lack of databases for recording, storing and managing crime figures, poor investigative skills and otherwise.

Chapter two analyses the theory of bureaucratisation and its importance to police organisation across the globe in the fight to police terrorism. The theory notes on the professionalism and

expertise of police organisations in crime fighting which has been acquired from years of professional training in the management and resolution of conflict. Another important aspect of the theory is the collaborating aspect of police organisations across the globe.

This collaborating aspect of the theory has aided police organisations across third world countries like the NPF in acquiring the needed training and skills from other police organisations across the world that are better trained and technically experienced. The findings reveal different trainings like the creation a CTU elite unit for the protection of judges involved in terrorist cases and trainings in de-radicalisation programme. In addition, is the important work being carried out by UNODC and other agencies in capacity and capability with the NPF and other agencies in the country. UNODC and other agencies have not only provided training, but they have provided equipment, fixed decayed infrastructures, provided material support, helped to draft new legislations, provided technical advice and other security and oversight services. The finding confirms that international and regional collaboration has been and is a key element in the counter terrorism fight in Nigeria.

7.2.5 Comparison of Nigeria and the United Kingdom

The policing of terrorism in Nigeria is different compared to how terrorism is policed in the UK. The difference is one of *a developed* versus *the developing*. One of respect for *civil liberties* and disregard for *civil liberties*. Chapter two indicates that the policing of terrorism in the UK, is framed around the rule of law and the criminal justice system. In no uncertain terms, the mandate to counter terrorism is given to the Police organisation with support from other agencies, academia, public and private initiative. There is no confusion of who is in charge. The processes are there, the expertise exist, the infrastructures exist, the rule of law exists, there is no impunity, there is accountability and a review process in case things go wrong. There is

also investment on academic research which is fundamental to the understanding of terrorism and counter terrorism policing. The policing of terrorism in the UK is not, and has not been perfect, issues remain on prevent strategy, introduction of control orders, the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures (TPIMs), stop and search, early release and monitoring of terrorist convicts from prisons, legislations on foreign travellers and removal of British Nationality and so forth. But despite all that, there is a process of review and debate at the local, national, and the judiciary, if need be, to address and curtail the powers of the police, the government and indeed, any actions deemed repressive that infringes on fundamental human rights.

In contrast, Chapter two and Chapter five indicates that the policing of terrorism in Nigeria is framed around the war model and less of an extent, the criminal justice system, leading to the use of hard power and repressive measures on the terrorist and the public. The responsibility of countering terrorism is given to multiple agencies leading to confusion and competition for resources. The NPF is ranked third in the partnership, casting a doubt on the capacity and capability of the policing organisation. Nevertheless, as the literature and the findings indicate, the policing of terrorism in Nigeria is marred with various issues like corruption, lack of resources, absence of rule of law, repressive measures, poor technical knowhow, poor investigative tools, lack of training, lack of investment on security infrastructure, absence of academic research, unaccountability, impunity, infrastructure decay, absence of a review process and so forth.

As the literature and findings indicate, the practise and context of counter terrorism policing in both countries are totally different. As indicated, the importance of the UK, other international

organisations, like UNODC and NGOs in capacity and capability training and oversight mechanism has been essential in improving the capacity of the NPF and other LEAs in the country. This shows that a lot can be borrowed from the UK in terms of putting the right processes in place, technical expertise, adequate civilian oversight, strengthening the rule of law and a review process that will ensure good governance and improve the insecurity in Nigeria.

The literature and findings indicate that the UK, is already playing this role and it is left for Nigeria, to begin to do things the right way or risk the country falling into further chaos. As 2021, indicates, the UK and the global world is battling a global pandemic, whereas, in Nigeria apart from the global pandemic, mass kidnapping of school children is on the rise from terrorist and bandits in the country, thousands have been kidnapped casting doubt on the capacity and capabilities of the NPF and intelligence agencies in the country to prevent and disrupt this mass kidnappings and other security related issues in the country. It is clear that the security situation in the country has gotten worse compared to when this study commenced in 2017.

7.3 Recommendations for Policy and Professional Practice

Policing terrorism is a global phenomenon and has become increasingly, transnational in nature. Disrupting the atrocities of terrorist across the globe will require evidence-based practice and a holistic approach if progress is to be attained in prevention and disruption of terrorist activities. Specifically, the following are recommendations for policy and professional practice:

1. The investment on training and development in counter terrorism policing by policy makers in other to build capacity and capability of the NPF and other agencies and addressing issues of police professionalism.

2. The investment on research by policy makers on issues of terrorism and counter terrorism across the country to help in evidence-based approach in the policing of terrorism.
3. The adoption and effective management of community policing in Nigeria, defining the parameters of the doctrine for the future of policing in the country.
4. The yearly review of the National Counter Terrorism Strategy, addressing areas of the strategy that are working and throwing out the elements that are not working.
5. The reforming and retraining of Nigeria border force charged with looking after Nigeria's porous and unsecured borders.
6. The establishment and empowerment of various ethics departments outside the police charged with dealing with police responsibility and accountability.
7. The adoption of terrorism and counter terrorism policing for all rank and file, making this an essential element of training.
8. The adoption of community engagement exercises and reforming policing image from criminal, brutalised policing to a professional community engagement police force.
9. The reforming and reorganisation of the Nigeria security services to a more democratic and interrelated organisation working for the same aims and objectives rather than individual self.
10. The adoption of a soft power approach to the ongoing war on terrorism, bearing in mind

all aspects of counter terrorism policing, especially winning the battle of hearts and mind.

11. The upgrading of all security infrastructure and facilities in country essential for policing in the 21st century.

12. The adoption and formation of an independent reviewer of terrorism legislation in Nigeria just like that which applies in the UK, to review the manner and operation of terrorism legislations in the country.

7.4 Areas of Future Research

Further research in terrorism and counter terrorism policing is required across the globe especially in Africa and Nigeria, where there has been a rise in terrorism atrocities.

- Research will help in understanding the theories, history, strategies and motives that underpin terrorist groups and their modus operandi.
- Research in the methods of policing terrorism is another area of interest that would aid in the understanding of policing terrorism. Areas like the use of the war model or the criminal justice model would be particularly informative on the best appropriate measure to employ by states in addressing terrorism.
- Research in terrorism finance is another area of terrorism and counter terrorism policing that needs further research. This is because of the important role finance plays in every organisation especially, terrorist groups who need finance for the day to day running of

the terrorist organisation in terms of paying members, welfare, feeding, sources of funds and methods of remittance.

- Research in the role of intelligence and how best to utilise the intelligence collection, analysis and management especially, in Nigeria would shed more light into the value of intelligence and management of the intelligence cycle.
- Research on the impact of public distrust in terrorism and counter terrorism policing would help to shed light into the issues of public distrust between law enforcement agencies and the public. Addressing the appropriate model of policing that enhances police and public engagement and role of policing in future policing missions.
- Research on corruption in counter terrorism policing especially, in Nigeria would shed light into the impact of corruption on terrorism and counter terrorism policing. How does corruption impact counter terrorism policing?

Appendix A

Interview Guide for Policing Terrorism in Nigeria

1. Is the Nigeria Police Force involved in counter terrorism Policing?
2. What is the nature of the NPF involvement in counter terrorism Policing?
3. Which agencies apart from the NPF, are involved in counter terrorism
4. Is the NPF the lead agency in counter terrorism policing?
5. Does the NPF have a strategy for policing terrorism?
6. What is the nature of the Strategy?
7. How is the strategy being implemented?
8. Has a counter terrorism command centre being established?
9. What are the functions of counter terrorism command centre?
10. What policies/programmes/laws have been put in place to ensure that the NPF is ready to counter terrorism?
11. Are there any issues of cooperation between all the agencies in counter terrorism?
12. Terrorism has become a global issue for law enforcement all over the world. Can you please describe in detail, the nature/magnitude of the counter terrorism challenge faced by the NPF?
13. How are the challenges, you have mentioned being met?
14. What training and development programmes are in process?
15. What training and development programmes specific to counter terrorism are designed for the future?
16. Are these programmes being evaluated for effectiveness, and if so, how?
17. Can you please summarise what the future holds for the NPF in terms of counter terrorism.

18. In terms of counter terrorism, how can the NPF better meet its policing responsibility?
19. Has a digital crime registry been established?
20. Has a comprehensive information sharing database being established?

UNDOC Interview Guide-2021

1. What is the nature of the UNDOC collaboration with the Nigerian Police Force?
2. What capacity and capability programs has UNDOC established to aid the NPF?
3. How is/are the programs established going to help/improve counter terrorism/security in Nigeria?
4. What challenges have the UNDOC encountered in the partnership if any?
5. In November 2019, UNDOC launched a handbook on Counter Terrorism Investigations to aid the NPF in counter terrorism. Can you please elaborate on the key issues the handbook addresses and how its strengths/supports the NPF work?
6. How are the challenges mentioned being tackled?
7. In your view, has there been any progress?
8. Are there any future programs on way been planned?

Appendix B

Participant Information Form

-Invitation-

You are invited to take part in this research project. Before you decide to do so, it is important you understand why the research is being done and what it will involve. Please take time to read the following information carefully. Please feel free to ask us if there is anything that is not clear or if you would like more information. Take time to decide whether or not you wish to take part. Thank you for reading this.

-Introduction-

I am Chijioke Theophilus Mbaso, a current research student with London Metropolitan University in the United Kingdom.

I am a part time self-funding Professional Doctorate Student in Policing, Security and Community Safety and presenting, writing my doctoral thesis. This study is supervised by Emeritus Professor Norman Ginsburg and Dr. Adebola Ojo. The conduct and methodology of this research is on constant ethical review from the ethics committee of London Metropolitan University London led by Professor Klaus Fischer.

-Title and Purpose of Research-

“Policing Terrorism in Nigeria: Meeting the Challenges of the 21st Century”

The research study is set-in modern-day Nigeria. The study seeks to address issues of terrorism impacting the country and find solutions to the challenges of insecurity confronting the Nigeria Society. In addition, the aims and objectives of the thesis would be as follows:

- To identify the problems of Policing terrorism in Nigeria, in the 21st Century.
- To analyse how these problems are being tackled.
- To evaluate methods of training within the Nigeria Police.
- To provide solution/recommendations for policy and practise implementation

The study hopes to answer the following important research questions:

- What is the nature/magnitude of the counter terrorism challenge confronting the Nigeria Police Force in the 21st Century?
- How are these challenges being met?
- What training/development programmes are in progress/completed?
- How are these training/development programmes being evaluated?

-Participants Involvement-

The study aims to interview high ranking Police officers involved in counter terrorism policing within the Nigeria Police Force. The study aims to achieve this by the use of semi-structured interviews and documentary analysis. The interview will be conducted in neutral locations where participants feel safe and conformable to be interviewed. An Interview guide will be provided, the interview will be audiotaped, and the interview shouldn't take more than an hour to administer.

The interview is voluntary, and participants can withdraw from the project at any time without malice, now or in future. In addition, the study will provide some degree of confidentiality to participants and anonymise identifying variables that may directly/indirectly harm participants of this study. The researcher will always act ethically, and as such, has a duty to report candid information of illegal/corrupt activities arising as a result of revelation from participant's interview. Participants can contact the supervisory team/university ethics committee at any time, if they feel the conduct/manner of the study is unethical. The data collected from this study is for academic research purpose only. The data collected will be stored and secured at all times. All identifying information will be removed and anonymised. The study will be published and stored in the university library. The Nigerian Ministry of police affairs will also receive a copy.

-Benefit of the Study-

This study is timely, given the impact of terrorism and insecurity in Nigeria. The overall objective is to influence knowledge and professional practice in building the capacity and capability of the Nigeria Police Force in meeting its 21st century challenges.

-Contacts for further Information-

Lead Supervisor: Emeritus Professor Norman Ginsburg School of Social Science London Metropolitan University. 166-220 Holloway Road London N7 8DB. Email: n.ginsburg@londonmet.ac.uk

Secondary Supervisor: Dr Adegbola Ojo, School of Geography, University of Lincoln, Brayford Way, Brayford Pool, Lincoln LN6 7TS. Email: aojo@lincoln.ac.uk.

Chair Ethics Committee: Professor Klaus Fischer, London Metropolitan University. 166-220

Holloway Road London N7 8DB. Email: k.fischer@londonmet.ac.uk.

Please all participants should sign the informed consent form on the next page.

Thank you all for participating in this research project

INFORMED CONSENT FORM

I, the undersigned, confirm that (please tick box as appropriate):

1.	I have read and understood the information about the project, as provided in the Information Sheet dated _____.	<input type="checkbox"/>
2.	I have been given the opportunity to ask questions about the project and my participation.	<input type="checkbox"/>
3.	I voluntarily agree to participate in the project.	<input type="checkbox"/>
4.	I understand I can withdraw at any time without giving reasons and that I will not be penalised for withdrawing nor will I be questioned on why I have withdrawn.	<input type="checkbox"/>
5.	The procedures regarding confidentiality have been clearly explained (e.g. use of names, pseudonyms, anonymization of data, etc.) to me.	<input type="checkbox"/>
6.	If applicable, separate terms of consent for interviews, audio, video or other forms of data collection have been explained and provided to me.	<input type="checkbox"/>
7.	The use of the data in research, publications, sharing and archiving has been explained to me.	<input type="checkbox"/>
8.	I understand that other researchers will have access to this data only if they agree to preserve the confidentiality of the data and if they agree to the terms I have specified in this form.	<input type="checkbox"/>
9.	Select only one of the following:	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• I would like my name used and understand what I have said or written as part of this study will be used in reports, publications and other research outputs so that anything I have contributed to this project can be recognised.• I do not want my name used in this project.	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>

10.	I, along with the Researcher, agree to sign and date this informed consent form.	□
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Participant:

Name of Participant

Signature

Date

Researcher:

Name of Researcher

Signature

Date

Appendix C

Application for Security Clearance for Research Project in Nigeria

CHIJIJOKE MBASO

London Metropolitan University, UK.
Tel -+44 (0) 7854880790, jioke22@msn.com

12th January 2018

THE INSPECTOR – GENERAL OF POLICE

POLICE FORCE, NIGERIA.

Dear Sir,

***RE: APPLICATION FOR SECURITY CLEARANCE FOR RESEARCH PROJECT ON
POLICING TERRORISM IN NIGERIA.***

The above caption refers.

I am Chijioke Theophilus Mbaso, Nigeria, a part time, self-funding Professional Doctorate Student in Policing, Security and Community Safety at London Metropolitan University. I am seeking Security Clearance for interview and research work with your office for my dissertation on policing terrorism in Nigeria.

The reference is to x-ray the emergence of the counter terrorism command policing model and gather information on theoretical framework of qualitative methods on security counter measures through interviews and content analysis.

The dissertation is meant to through interviews examine prevent-activities methods and proceed to contextualise counter terrorism policy in Nigeria to wit viz:

THE RESEARCH PROJECT

The title of the project is *Policing Terrorism in Nigeria: Meeting the Challenges of the 21st Century*.

The research study is set-in modern-day Nigeria. The study seeks to address issues of terrorism and find solutions to the challenges of insecurity confronting the Nigeria Society. In addition, the aims and objectives of the thesis would be as follows:

- To identify the problems of Policing terrorism in Nigeria, in the 21st Century.
- To analyse how these problems are being tackled.
- To evaluate methods of training within the Nigeria Police.
- To provide solution/recommendations for policy and practise implementation.

PARTICIPANTS' INVOLVEMENT

The study aims to interview senior police officers and governmental officials involved in policy making and practice in the Nigeria Police Force. The study will use semi-structured interviews. The interview will be conducted in your locations where participants.

This information sheet will be provided. Interviews will be audiotape and may not take more than an hour. Respondents can withdraw from the interview and from collaboration with the project at any time. Respondents will be anonymised throughout the data collection and analysis process.

The data is being collected for academic research purposes only. The data collected will be stored securely at all times. However, the researcher is ethically required to report information about possible criminal activity, which might require official investigation. The final dissertation will be stored in the university library and the Nigerian Ministry of Police Affairs will receive a copy.

The school has approved of my trip to Nigeria in March 2018, pursuant to the dissertation project. Thus, I will be most appreciative of a prompt and positive responses to this application to enable me to have a perspective of my working timetable with your good selves on the project.

Please, accept the assurance of our highest regards and esteem.

Yours faithfully,

Chijioke Theophilus Mbaso

N:B

CONTACTS FOR FURTHER INFORMATION

Barr. Chijioke Nzekwe- Crown Counsellors & Co. of No. 11, Ukpo Close off Oro-Ago Crescent, Garki 2, Abuja, F.C.T, Nigeria. – crownconsellers@yahoo.com. – 08033127706

Appendix D

Returned Letter of Request for Research

Telegraphic Address: **INSPECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE**
INGENPOL ABUJA
Telephone Nos: **08075390126** 22 JAN 2018
08075390127
E-mail: ingenpolsecabuja@npf.gov.ng
ingenpolsecabuja@yahoo.com

In reply please quote:
Ref No: **CB:3380/IGP.SEC/ABJ/VOL.67/179**

THE INSPECTOR-GENERAL OF POLICE
THE NIGERIA POLICE FORCE,
FORCE HEADQUARTERS,
LOUIS EDET HOUSE,
SHEHU SHAGARI WAY,
CENTRAL AREA,
ABUJA.
22nd January, 2018

Mr. Chijioke Theophilus Mbaso,
London Metropolitan University,
United Kingdom,

RE: REQUEST FOR APPROVAL FOR RESEACH WORK

I refer to copy of your letter of request sent through Hon. **Raphael Nnanna Igbokwe** on the aforementioned subject dated 18th January, 2018 refers.

2. Your request has been directed to the Deputy Inspector-General of Police, department of Operations for necessary action, please..

usman aep

ACP Usman A.K. Umar
Principal Staff Officer
To
Inspector-General of Police

Appendix E

Annual Review - Summary Sheet

PROGRAMME TITLE: CSSF Nigeria Serious and Organised Crime (SOC) Programme			
Country and Region:	Nigeria, Togo and Benin		
IATI Unique ID:	CSSF-03-000006		
HMG Partners (LEAD in bold)	National Crime Agency (NCA)		
Total Budget :	ODA: £13.58m	Non-ODA: 0	
Budget this FY	ODA: £3m	Non-ODA: 0	
Spend this FY	ODA: £3.44m	Non-ODA: 0	
Original Programme Start Date: April 2015		Planned End Date: March 2020	
Outputs			Score
1. Joint Border Task Force – creation of vetted multi-agency units which are capable of conducting effective SOC investigations, act in compliance with human rights standards and prosecute offenders promptly and effectively in compliance with domestic legislation.			A
2. NCA increases probability of safely recovering the hostage/s taken in criminal kidnap events by establishing viable coordination units within both Nigeria Police Force (NPF)/Department for State Security (DSS) and further providing capacity-building training and mentoring to these specialist units in accordance with the UN Guidance Manual on Countering Kidnap and Extortion.			A
Overall output score			A
Outcome Assessment: Progress towards increasing Nigerian law enforcement capacity to prevent, disrupt and counter SOC and reduce the threat to the United Kingdom's interests is being achieved by creating pockets of excellence in local agencies, and allowing increasingly high-level criminality across a range of networks to be targeted in compliance with best practice and international human rights standards.			
Outcome Score: A		Risk: High	

Summary of Programme Performance

Year	2015/16	2016/17	2017/18*		2018/19*	
Programme Score	B	A	A+	A+	A	A
Risk Rating - low/medium/high	Medium	Medium	Medium		High	
*output/outcome scores						
How has the programme changed during this period? Risk: The risk is now more clearly defined as operational outputs cover a wider geographical range. Changes: As the units become more established their regional co-operations is increasing, as are their operational successes targeting a higher level of criminality.						

What support did the UK provide in FY 18/19?

- This programme tackles corruption and builds Nigerian law enforcement capacity at borders. It also helps improve the Nigerian response to kidnapping. The programme budget for 2013/19 was £3,000,000. It funded the:
 - **Joint Border Task Force (JBTF):** builds capacity and mentors the Nigerian operational team. Supports investigations into SOC activities.
 - **NCA projects (BENIN) and (TOGO):** Vetted units using human intelligence, digital forensics and surveillance to gather evidence for prosecutions.
 - **NCA Project:** Anti-Kidnap Capacity Building project.
 - **Criminal Justice System Adviser (CJA):** delivers training and mentoring on organised crime cases helping to improve case management and outcomes with increased transparency and accountability.

Key results for FY 18/19:

1. SOC tackled more effectively by vetted units across the country to the benefit of Nigeria, the UK and others.

2. Increased understanding of Nigerian criminal networks and their operations across the region and into Europe, support wider UK Government SOC programming.
3. Reduced times for defendants awaiting trial, good conviction rates and the development of a panel of specialist SOC Judges in Lagos Federal High Court and Benin High Court.
4. Operational successes targeting and convicting those involved in the trafficking of persons, particularly girls, from Nigeria to the UK and Europe and in counter narcotics operations destroying laboratories which produce methamphetamine in Nigeria.
5. Operational anti kidnap units helping others through their work to recover kidnap victims and identify and arrest others who are involved.
6. Incremental development impacts (i.e. instigating changes to bureaucratic and procedural processes, resulting in institutional change). For example, improvements to judicial processes for handling SOC cases is improving the effectiveness of the Nigerian judiciary to process such cases.

Summary of progress and lessons learnt/actions taken since last review

- The SOC programme continues to align with the wider UK NSC strategy for Nigeria and fits closely with strategies on Modern Slavery/Human Trafficking, Prosperity and International Development.
- SOC work gives the UK a leading role amongst other donor countries and thought should be given to how elements can be used to target criminality funding terrorist groups in NE Nigeria.
- Elements of the programme progressing well should expand their geographical reach and continue developing capability to target an increasing range of criminality and slowly filter out improved standards into neighbouring law enforcement individuals and units.
- The programme team have learnt lessons in relation to infrastructure builds, procurement and how one should design a programme to achieve a sustainable outcome.
- The need to ensure sustainability by building local capacity e.g. training JBTF network administrators to provide an in-house and sustainable network support solution at the facility.
- Understanding the incentives of different departments and agencies e.g. DSS and NPF Anti Kidnap Units and mentoring them to work collaboratively and avoid duplication of effort.
- Despite women benefitting from the successful operations against human trafficking networks, more still needs to be done to ensure a sufficient gender balance is achieved/ maintained within the units operational teams (similar to prosecutors where a 50/50 gender balance has been achieved).

Summary of recommendations for the next year

- NCA to share lessons learned from other ODA funded vetted units around the world.
- The projects JBTF, OKRA, BODKIN and to a lesser extent INSTINCT need to identify how they will realistically achieve sustainability on a sufficient scale to justify continued investment.
- The progress of Draft Proceeds of Crime legislation has currently stalled due to resistance to tackling corruption too effectively. CJA advice is needed on hiving off less contentious elements of the Proceeds to Crime Bill so that the part which allows seized assets to be split with the seizing law enforcement agency can be passed into law. This would provide a means of sustainable funding for the units.
- Whilst mentoring has been highly successful in delivering results, the teams should also develop/ enhance systems to manage the running of operations/ targeting/ detentions in order to minimise the long terms risks of corruption, misuse and human rights abuses.
- All units would benefit from greater leadership and strategy training.
- The programme has to date functioned well without a programme manager. Going forward and particularly as staff rotate out, consideration should be given to the programme manager role being filled.

Appendix F

Annual Review - Summary Sheet

PROGRAMME TITLE: Nigeria Security and Justice Reform Programme (SJRP)			
Country and Region:	Nigeria, West Africa		
IATI Unique ID:	CSSF-03-000007		
HMG Partners (LEAD in bold)	Foreign and Commonwealth Office(FCO) , Department for International Development (DFID)		
Total Budget :	ODA: £23.14m	Non-ODA: 0	
Budget this FY	ODA:£5.5m	Non-ODA: 0	
Spend this FY	ODA: £5.97m	Non-ODA: 0	
Original Programme Start Date: April 2016		Planned End Date: March 2020	
Outputs			Score
Improved legislative oversight and accountability of Nigeria's security sector, including through increased citizen participation in legislative processes			A
More informed, inclusive and constructive public dialogue on security and justice reform issues			A+
The Nigerian Police Force (NPF) in target areas, and targeted oversight and accountability mechanisms, are perceived to be more capable, accountable and responsive by key stakeholders			A
Increased awareness and capability of Nigerian defence agencies (particularly the Air Force) to identify and reduce corruption risks, and of civil society organisations to raise public awareness and engage on this issue			A
SJRP is a coherent and impactful programme, which is well-managed, adapts to the context and capitalises on UK Government political engagement (incl. via Office of the Vice President advisers)			A+
Overall output score			A
Outcome Assessment: The programme is performing well overall with different strands combining at outcome level to begin to deliver higher level change. Examples include gradual improvements in accountability and establishing effective mechanisms to improve co-ordination/coherence which are leading to improved security and justice (S&J) policy and delivery.			
Outcome Score: A		Risk: Medium	

Summary of Programme Performance

Year	2015/16	2016/17	2017/18*		2018/19*	
Programme Score	N/A	A	A	A	A	A
Risk Rating - low/medium/high	N/A	Medium	Medium		Medium	

*output/outcome scores

How has the programme changed during this period?

SJRP was launched in 2016 and was originally approved as a three-year programme to finish in March 2019. It was extended by one year to March 2020 to bridge the February 2019 national elections.

What support did the UK provide in FY 18/19?

The programme budget for FY18/19 was £5.5m to support four individual strands of the programme focusing primarily on policing and legislative accountability. Each strand was delivered by an implementing partners with the CSSF Team leading a cross-cutting strand:

- Legislative and Executive Accountability (implemented by Policy Legal Advocacy Centre - PLAC- and Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance - DCAF)
- Public Engagement and Accountability (implemented by BBC Media Action)
- Policing (Nigeria Policing Programme, delivered by Coffey)
- Defence Agency Accountability (implemented by Transparency International – TI- and Civil Society Legislative Advocacy Centre -CISLAC)
- Coordination, Political Engagement, Learning and Adaptation (led by British High Commission -BHC)

Key results for FY 18/19:

- Improved engagement by the National Assembly on security sector governance and legislation.
- UK support for civil society helped influence and positively lobby the Nigeria Senate to pass the Police Bill. Although, voted down by the lower House of Representatives, substantial awareness of its critical importance was raised.
- Public hearings on the Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS) increased public awareness on security and justice and held a highly sensitive security institution to account.
- The President appointed a White Paper Committee to recommend how proposals for SARS reform should be implemented.
- Improved inter-agency coordination on election security management reduced violence in target areas. Anecdotal evidence of improved Nigerian Police Force responsiveness in target communities.
- Community Safety Partnerships (CSPs) in 4 target locations have helped enhance coordination between policing providers (state and non-state), between policing providers and state authorities, and between security providers and community groups. They have provided a forum for citizens to raise community security concerns directly with the NPF and other security providers.

Summary of progress and lessons learnt/actions taken since last reviewResponses to strategic-level recommendations from the last ARNorth East

- There is now a revised SJRP Borno strategy, which is aligned to the North East Strategy.
- Nigeria Policing Programme (NPP) has been working with the British Military Assistance Training Team (BMATT) to influence the Nigerian Military to expand joint operations coordination to include other policing providers in the NE.
- CSSF is designing a new Public Safety and Security (PSS) Programme for the NE for implementation in FY19-20.

Elections

- SJRP has been extended into FY19/20 to ensure the project does not end shortly after the election.
- CSSF team is convening partners to ensure continued coordination across the programme and to ensure momentum generated during the election period is maintained.

Gender

- NPP has recruited a gender adviser and SJRP has advanced gender within the Police Bill.
- CSSF team is sharing materials with implementing partners on the UK Government's approach to gender.

Monitoring Evaluation and Learning (MEL)

- A MEL adviser reviewed MEL arrangements in autumn 2018 and revised the results framework and the theory of change. NPP results framework has been aligned with the SJRP programme, NPP's payment milestone and workstream systems.

Value for Money

- Contracts of the Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (working with the NASS) and Transparency International (working with Nigerian Air Force) are not being extended into FY19/20.

Summary of recommendations for the next year

- Extend the programme for FY 20/21.
- Review NPP's work in the North East.
- Consider changing the SJRP outcome statement and indicators
- CSSF and NPP in conjunction with the MEL Adviser should review how to better assess changes in citizen perceptions of policing and safety.
- Review the implementation of the NPP contract to ensure it is line with the performance criteria.

Appendix G

CSSF PROGRAMME SUMMARY

PROGRAMME TITLE: North East Nigeria Security and Conflict and Stabilisation Programme					
HMG Partners (LEAD in bold)		Ministry of Defence (MoD) and Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO)			
COUNTRY AND REGION:		Nigeria			
UNIQUE ID:		CSSF-03-000008			
DAC Code:		15230			
PROGRAMME DURATION: April 2019 - March 2021					
Start Date: April 2019			End Date: March 2021		
IF A NEW PROGRAMME FOR THIS FY, HAVE ANY ELEMENTS DERIVED FROM OLDER PROGRAMMES? IF YES, WHICH ONES? : Yes, North East Nigeria Security and Stabilization Programme FY 16 - 19					
FY 19-20 BUDGET ALLOCATION:		ODA: £5.8m		Non-ODA: £8.4m	
CONTACT DETAILS JointFundsUnit@fco.gov.uk					
PROJECT/ COMPONENT	LEAD DEPT	IMPLEMENTING ORGANISATION	Implementing Partner Type	CONTRACT START/END DATES	FY19-20 BUDGET (ODA/Non-ODA)
Defence Engagement	MoD	MoD	Government Department	April 2016 – March 2021	£0.2m / £8.4m
1) Stabilisation Facility 2) Defections, Demobilisation, Disengagement, De-radicalisation and Reintegration 3) Public Safety and Security 4) Community Reintegration and reconciliation 5) Research	FCO	1)UNDP 2)International Organisation for Migration (IOM), 3)USAID, Civilians in Conflict (CIVIC) 4)International Alert	Multilateral International NGO Other public sector - US Government NGO	August 2019 – March 2021	£5.6m/ £0.0m
WHAT SUPPORT IS THE UK PROVIDING?					

Defence Engagement: the principal effort of British military in Nigeria is training and capacity building support to the Nigerian Army (AFN) and the Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF). This includes delivering train the trainer packages, advice on institutional reform, and pre-deployment training, designed to enhance their ability to engage and defeat enemy combatants, and defend territory, whilst complying with the law of armed conflict and positively engaging with marginalised groups.

Conflict Management and Stabilisation: supporting the Nigerian Police Force and other security and justice actors in their efforts to protect civilians and uphold the rule of law in areas recently recovered from insurgent groups by the AFN.

Demobilisation and community reintegration: support to Operation Safe Corridor, to allow displaced people and former insurgent group fighters to return to their communities. As areas are recovered from insurgent groups and the security environment stabilises, the programme will provide support to early recovery efforts aimed at restoring basic services and livelihood opportunities.

The programme complements other UK Government work in NE Nigeria, notably DFID's ongoing humanitarian support and longer term recovery and development programming, and the CSSF-funded Security and Justice Reform Programme, which is working with the police across four states in Nigeria, including in the NE.

A proportion of this programme is ODA eligible under the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee's revised directive on peace and security. The UK aid strategy (2015) sets out the UK Government's objectives to use its ODA budget to strengthen global peace, security and governance by investing more to tackle the causes of instability, insecurity and conflict, and tackle crime and corruption.

WHY IS UK SUPPORT NEEDED?

The Nigerian military campaign against Boko Haram and other insurgent groups is unwinnable without a political solution. Continued insecurity in the NE restricts the ability of the Nigerian authorities and others to access the NE and promote recovery and puts Nigeria's long-term stability and prosperity at risk.

The Nigerian Government has not yet implemented a recovery plan to address the humanitarian crisis in the NE or allowed the police to resume full responsibility for areas under military control. Chronic underinvestment coupled with the effects of climate change are leading to drought and crop failures. The population has little access to public services and sources of income.

The long-term drivers of conflict and violent extremism in the NE have not been addressed.

Overstretched security forces, and the absence of a coordinated and combined response from State and Federal Governments have exacerbated the problem.

The UK approach to the NE aims to encourage the Nigerian Government to address the conflict in a comprehensive manner, and find a permanent solution.

The UK has a substantial and broad relationship with Nigeria which allows us to take a comprehensive, cross government approach to both the immediate crisis and the longer-term issues. The UK has particular experience and expertise in stabilisation approaches.

WHAT HMG OBJECTIVE AND WHICH SDG'S (IF SPENDING ODA) DOES THIS CONTRIBUTE TO?

This programme contributes to the delivery of HMG's new strategic approach to Africa (2018) objectives on conflict and stability.

The ODA element of the NE programme works towards SDG 16, which involves promoting peaceful and inclusive communities and also strengthening of security institutions in targeted areas.

WHAT RESULTS DOES THE UK EXPECT TO ACHIEVE?

Through this programme's integrated civilian-military approach, the following results are expected:

- Increased ability and willingness of the Nigerian Army and the Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF) to engage and defeat insurgents; and positively engage with marginalised groups and women; and comply with the law of armed conflict.
- Improvements in the level of protection civilians living in targeted areas receive from the police, military, and other security actors.
- Improvements in the support provided to reintegrate low-risk former fighters and conflict-affected women and children.

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