London Metropolitan University

Faculty of Applied Social Sciences and Humanities (FASSH)

John Grieve Centre for Policing, Security and Community Safety

The Role and Development of the Intelligence Function in the Nigeria Police

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By

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Dedication

To the God who made the heavens and the earth and whose glory these works proclaim to the ends of the earth (Ps. 19:1-4).

To Him who promised and gave "His only begotten Son that whosoever believes in Him (Jesus Christ) shall not perish but have eternal life" (John 3:16);

To Him who says: "Why do the nations conspire and the peoples plot in vain? The kings of the earth take their stand and the rulers gather together against the Lord and against His anointed One (Jesus Christ). 'Let us break their chains', they say, 'and throw off their fetters'. The One enthroned in heaven laughs, the Lord scoffs at them. Then He rebukes them in His anger and terrifies them in His wrath, saying 'I have installed my king on Zion, My holy hill" (Ps. 2:1-6, NIV);

To Him who made Jesus Christ, that Great Shepherd, to die and rise from the dead, according to prophecy, Him whose resurrection gives us hope in this and the life to come (1 Thess. 4:13-17);

To Him with whom there is no impossibility (Matt. 19:26); who makes everyday a Thanksgiving Day for us; and whose salvation is everlasting (Isa. 51), "the God who was, and who is and who is to come, the Almighty" Rev. 1:8).

"I will declare Your Name to my brothers; in the Congregation I will praise You" (Ps. 22:22); for this God is our God forever and ever; He will be our Guide even to the end" (Ps. 48:14). Amen.

Acknowledgements

Above everyone else, I want to appreciate the goodness and providence of God, His uncountable mercies and graces in my life, and in the course of this wonderful and unique programme; the reason the work is dedicated entirely to Him.

I also owe a lot of loving debts to many people. I acknowledge the foundational input of my father, Pa/Deacon Joseph Adebayo Adigun Taiwo, to my love for books and education in general at an early age. He aroused my desire for reading through old books which he kept and by repeated admonitions on the almost eternal value of education in modern times. He was my unofficial career and guidance counsellor. He witnessed past graduation ceremonies; how I wish he could also witness this--to crown it all. He rested from his earthly labour on 5 May 2010, at the age of ninety. Dad, I want to believe what you told me, your grand-children (Muyiwa and Dayo) and my friend, Segun Babayemi, at different times, that you were waiting for the home-call, to meet with your Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ. So, may we meet when the Lord appears (Amen). I am also expressing profound gratitude to my Mum, Madam Adewale Oluwatunmibi, for her fortitude, endurance and resilience. My prayer is that you would have many more years to live, and that old age would be a pleasure for you. My aunty, Mrs. Ebun-Oluwa Iyabode Olubowale, deserves special mention. She has been more of a twin, rather than a junior, sister to mum in her love, care and sacrificial giving. Beside her, as friend, strength, shield and life-long pillar, is the husband, Engr. / Elder

Akin Olubowale. I pray that God will reward you abundantly and may your generations be blessed.

I want to also acknowledge Goke, Muyiwa, Dayo, Abolore, Tope, and their friends, who took care of daddy while I was away; caring for grandpa and themselves has been hectic and strenuous. God will reward and bless you richly and make your old age a pleasure.

A number of friends have stood by us, especially in the last few turbulent years. They have been both financially and morally supportive. In Nigeria, the Segun-Femi Babayemis (Roycom Media) and the Akin Smith-Yemisi Adebusuyis (Printmark Ventures) have been there for us. The Seye-Dorcas Ayo Agboolas (Dortemag Ventures) have been extravagantly generous with time, space and resources. I need to mention the Ayo-Bisi Akannis (Healthguide Pharmaceuticals), and Dr. Bamidele Omitoyin, Head of Fisheries Department, University of Ibadan. He volunteered as the second referee, while Prof. Jide Osuntokun, a mentor and motivator, who has shown an abiding interest in our academic and professional development, was abroad. Dr. Mrs. Siyanbola Omitoyin, of Bowen University, Iwo, also deserves appreciation. The warmth and tenderness of brethren at New Life Baptist Church, Isolo-Lagos, and the abundant spiritual resources and blessings enjoyed at the Redemption Camp, Lagos-Ibadan Express Way, over the years, remain a point of reference for this writer. In the UK, the friendship, care, financial and material gifts of the Demola-Tola Fetugas, and Dr. Matthew and Dr. Mrs. Funmi Ayoola (Manchester), will remain indelible. The friendship and love of the Sunday Ogundeles and the Femi-Tola Onabajos, is appreciated. Our gratitude also goes to Daddy and Mummy Oluwole, for the care of our

son, Joshua-Caleb (J-C). Mr. Hakeem Ahmed, who we are yet to meet in person, but known only through Elder Ayo Akanni, surprised us with his love and giving. The warm and genuine love of Christ at Worldwide Mission Fellowship (WWMF), Upper Norwood, and the light of Christ constantly shining at the Emmanuel Centre, Central London, remains a beacon of hope for this writer and many others. May the God of the heavens and the earth richly bless and reward your labour of love in Jesus' Name (Amen).

Inevitably, the authorities of the Nigeria Police deserve some praise. Though the course, obviously relevant to the service, was not considered for sponsorship or funding, they managed to approve the study leave on time for me to attend, even when one or two staff officers, who were to push the application for study leave, appeared to be stalling. The authorities also gave letters of introduction to sister agencies, to ease/facilitate the research. The most sought-after sister agency for this work (the State Security Services-SSS), typically, remained obstinate and totally unco-operative. They dribbled and tossed the writer between their units and departments in Abuja, from mid-November to early December 2009 and December 2010 to early February 2011(for questionnaires they never collected or filled eventually!) Even the Armed Forces did much better than that! I must, however, extend my gratitude to a number of police officers. I must sincerely acknowledge and specially appreciate officer colleagues David Folawiyo, Bola Longe, Phillip Ogbadu, Sola Okediji, Bunmi Osoko, Abimbola Sokoya, Joseph Egbunike, Wale Olokode and James Oyewumi, among others. The first two also gave their time and willingly shared their insights on Nigerian police intelligence. The

senior officers, who attended the promotion courses between September and December 2010, deserve commendation for filling and returning the questionnaires. The officers being in the same place, at the same time, also afforded the writer the opportunity of distributing and retrieving the questionnaires at a much-reduced cost than would have been, if he was to go round the Commands/States of the Federation. Phillip Ogwume, leading the State Intelligence Bureau (SIB), FCT Command, Abuja, is a gem and asset in police intelligence, and he generously made this knowledge available to the writer. The relatively high response rate was also a pleasant surprise. Here is hoping this co-operation and interest in academic projects and research endeavours would continue to grow in the service. Many thanks, also, to my 'Computer Guru', Muyiwa Abel Oguntona, who spent long and laborious hours on auditing the figures, embedding the tables and consolidating the final format of the project. All this at short notice, and little or no cost. I believe there is a great future for our friendship and partnership. God bless.

I must register my wholehearted appreciation to the initiators, visionaries and managers of the John Grieve Centre for Policing, Security and Community Safety, Faculty of the Social Sciences and Humanities (FASSH), London Metropolitan University, London, UK. This Professional Doctorate (PD) programme has satisfied my long-held desire to do a professional/policing course at a doctorate level, in view of the lack or total absence of such programmes in Nigeria. Our gratitude must go to the tutors and course coordinators: Professor J.G.D. Grieve--retired Deputy Assistant Commissioner (DAC) of the Metropolitan Police, after whom the centre is named, and whose writings and actions portray him as

truly 'lawfully audacious'; Prof. Allyson MacVean--academic matriarch, serene, indefatigable and resilient; Dr. Clive Harfield--young, energetic, and robustly up-to-date, who has exercised his right to a 'paradigm shift' beyond the UK academia; and Dr. Nick Ridley--astute, dynamic, rigorous, and compassionate, yet candid. Lest I forget; many thanks to Monica Pilawtoska, a rare polyglot, Conference and Seminar Manager till 2009, for her reminders, encouragement and usual cup of coffee. The various guest lecturers: Prof. Barry Rider ('riding' every bit as a professor); knowledgeable and prolific, but apparently conservative Dean Godson (yet to send the books he promised!); brilliant, energetic and high-flying Cressida Dick (why would Prof. Grieve moderate and modulate our questions?); Nick Gargan (thanks for your RIPA/Police Bureaucracy talk), Adrian Lee (Police Management and Reforms) etc, all brought stimulatingly fresh perspectives to policing and security studies. As usual, time was the enemy and major limitation. At this juncture, my supervisors, Mr. Robert McCusker, Drs. Chris Rhodes and David Silverstone, including Dr. Ridley, deserve special commendation. They have been very understanding, perceptive, generous and co-operative. I am humbled by their tenderness, and the authority that comes with simplicity. One could not have wished for a better team of supervisors. I want to believe you would oblige us in future, when your specialist professional resources and academic facilities are required. I need to say more on Dr. Ridley, however. He has been instrumental a number of times in calling this 'prodigal son' back home. I wish you and your team would be available in future to share with police intelligence operatives in Nigeria, perhaps through the auspices of the Department for International Development (DfID). I might not have made the course at this time, but for his care,

diligence and perseverance. Here is the story. I was on a peace-keeping mission (African Mission in the Sudan-AMIS), in Darfur, Sudan (Sep. 2006-Oct. 2007). Knowing the paranoia and anxieties of the public and other government agencies in this place, I took the open envelope containing the original application form, down-loaded from the London Met website, to the private courier service in El-Fasher, to vet and post. It was sealed in my presence and weighed. I paid extra dollars for the weight and fast service. Providentially, I kept a photocopy of it. I took it for granted that the application was received in London, and the courier service confirmed it was, while it was not. It was Dr. Ridley's phone calls to my London number and e-mails that made me realize the courier service was lying. Eventually, I shared this knowledge with the courier people, seriously threatening to take them to court both in Khartoum and London. Faced with an unusual and determined 'foreign element', but cunning in their schemes, they agreed to re-post, free of charge, if I had another copy. I gave them the photocopy and they were surprised, perhaps dismayed, but still obliged with free service. Somehow, I believe the courier service was in league with the notorious security service in Darfur/Sudan. The mobile number I gave to the security desk at the Khartoum airport, earlier on (Dec. 2006/Jan 2007), when coming from London, never fully regained its usefulness till I left Sudan, early October 2007! How did I come so close to being deprived of my basic freedoms and human rights? How?

I must acknowledge my Civilian Police (Civpol) Commissioner in Darfur then, Daniel Monyana, from South Africa, who graciously and generously wrote the first reference. Similarly, I wish to express my

profound gratitude to the doctors and nurses at St George's Hospital, Tooting Broadway, London. Initially (March-June 2008), they suggested we forget our long-held desire for a baby, marshalling all the available scientific/ medical evidence to support this position. They concluded the removal of my wife's womb would be the best solution, and a date was to be chosen for this. We stood only on the platform of faith—an intangible thing the best of science/scientists may not know or see. Can David still beat Goliath in today's world? Is there really God somewhere? Is it sane (or insane) to believe in *this* God? Does *this* God answer prayers? It was truly a tough, trying and terrible time. The matter was concluded in three months, however. The Almighty God showed up, so to say! When conception was confirmed in July, however, no one could wish for better attention and care for the expectant mother and baby, who came in 10 March 2009. It is extremely gratifying and soul-lifting, that the medical experts now call our son 'a miracle baby'. We will continue to appreciate your love, attention and care for J-C. May this God bless and reward you all; may you *see* this God, who is invisible, and believe.

These acknowledgements cannot be complete without a good mention of my wife, Adenike IbukunOluwa, and son, Joshua-Caleb (J-C). The former has had to bear the increasing financial and emotional burden in the last couple of years, especially with the coming of J-C. The latter himself has had to endure an absent-minded dad, who seems more interested in books than his long-awaited son. I have wondered why J-C wants me and not his food or toys; now I know: we need these, but love is richer and more satisfying than food and toys. I love you both; I really do.

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

7/7- 7 July 2005 terrorist (bomb) attacks on London

9/11- 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre (New York)

AC- Audit Commission (UK)

ACPO- Association of Chiefs of Police (England and Wales-UK)

AFP- Australian Federal Police

AGF- Attorney- General of the Federation (Nigeria)

AIO- Area Intelligence Officer

AIU- Area Intelligence Unit

AO- Administrative Officer

AoR- Area of Responsibility

APCOF-African Police Consultative Forum

BA- Bachelor of Arts

BBC- British Broadcasting Corporation

CCR- Central Criminal Registry (Nigeria)

CCTV- Closed Circuit Television (Also known as Public Space Surveillance-PSS)

CHISs- Covert Human Intelligence Sources

CIA- Central Intelligence Agency (USA)

CIA's- Community Impact Assessments

CIB- Criminal Intelligence Bureau

CID- Criminal Investigations Department

CIO- Criminal Intelligence Officer

CLEEN- Centre for Law Enforcement Education in Nigeria

COP- Community-Oriented Policing/Community Policing

CONPOSS- Consolidated Police Salary Structure

CP- Commissioner of Police

DIA/DMI- Defence Intelligence Agency/Directorate of Military Intelligence

DfID- Department for International Development (UK)

DIKI- Data, Information, Knowledge and Intelligence (Ratcliffe 2008)

EFCC- Economic and Financial Crimes Commission

EHRC- European Human Rights Commission

EU- European Union

EUROPOL- European Police

FCS- Federal Civil Service

FCT- Federal Capital Territory, Abuja

FFS- Federal Fire Service (Nigeria)

FHQ- Force Headquarters (NPF) Abuja

FIB-Federal Intelligence Bureau (Nigeria)

FIIB- Federal Intelligence and Investigations Bureau (Formerly Force Criminal Investigations Department)

FPRO- Force Public Relations Officer

FRSC- Federal Road Safety Commission

GD- General Duty (Officers)

GIWG- Global Intelligence Working Group (US)

G6 States- Group of six states comprising FCT-Abuja, Kogi, Plateau, Kaduna, Niger and Nassarawa

HMIC- Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary

HRW- Human Rights Watch

IACP- International Association of Chiefs of Police

ICT- Information and Communication Technology

IGP- Inspector-General of Police

INGENPOL- Inspector-General of Police

INTERPOL- International Police Organisation

ILO's- Inter-departmental Liaison Officers

ILP- Intelligence-Led Policing

JIB/ICM- Joint Intelligence Board/Intelligence Committee Meeting

KBP- Knowledge-Based Policing

KSAs- Knowledge, Skills and Abilities

LIO(s) - Local Intelligence Officer(s)

MA- Master of Arts

MIS- Management Information System

MoU- Memorandum of Understanding

MAPPA- Multi-Agency Public Protection Agreements

MI5-Secret Intelligence Service (UK)

MPS- Metropolitan Police Service (The Met-UK)

MSc- Master of Science

MSD- Management Services Department (of the Nigeria Police)

NA- Nigerian Army

NAF- Nigerian Air Force

NASI- Nigerian Army School of Intelligence

NASS- National Assembly

NBA- Nigerian Bar Association

NCAA- Nigerian Civil Aviation Authority

NCB- National Central Bureau (Interpol-Nigeria)

NCIS-The National Criminal Intelligence Service (UK)

NCISP- National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan (US)

NCS- Nigerian Customs Service

NDLEA- Nigerian Drug Law Enforcement Agency

NFIU- National Financial Intelligence Unit

NGO- Non-Governmental Organisation

NHRC- National Human Rights Commission

NIA/DIA- National Intelligence Agency/Defence Intelligence Agency

NIM-National Intelligence Model (UK)

NIPOST- Nigerian Postal Services (Formerly Posts and Telecommunications)

NIS- Nigerian Immigration Service

NJSP- New Jersey State Police (US)

NN- Nigerian Navy

NOPRIN- National Organisation for Police Reform in Nigeria

NP/F- Nigeria Police (Force)

NPS- Nigerian Prison Service

NPS- Norwegian Police Service

NSA- National Security Adviser

NSC- Nigerian Security Committee

NSCDC-Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps

NSS- National Security Strategy

O/C- Officer-in-Charge

IOO- Intelligence Operations Officer

PAR- Police Annual Report

PCPRs- Presidential Committees on Police Reform

PCRC/PPRC- Police Community Relations Committee/Police-Public Relations Committee

P/FMT- Police/Force Management Team

POP- Problem-Oriented Policing

PSNI- Police Service of Northern Ireland

PD- Professional Doctorate

QC- Queen's Counsel (Equivalent of Senior Advocate of Nigeria)

SAN- Senior Advocate of Nigeria

SARA- Scanning, Analysis, Response and Assessment

SB- Special Branch (Nigeria, since defunct)

SC- Supreme Court

SCQ- Self-Completion Questionnaire

SHQ- State (Command) Headquarters

SIB- State Intelligence Bureau

SO- Station Officer

SOCA -Serious and Organised Crime Agency (UK)

SS- Surveillance/ Suspect/ Special Squad

SSS- State Security Services (Nigeria's internal security service; also known as Department of State Services, formerly National Security Organisation)

SPO/SUPOL- Superior Police Officer

SPY- Supernumerary (Police)

UCO(s) - Under-cover Officer(s)

UKBA -United Kingdom Border Agency

VOA- Voice of America

VP- Vice President

WW II- World War II

ZIB- Zonal Intelligence Bureau

Abstract

There is no doubt that the challenges of policing in today's world have put police leaders and authorities in a dilemma and there appears little respite for many police organisations. Speaking generally, however, the advanced countries of the world (the UK, the USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, etc), have shown considerable understanding of the issues involved and are responding accordingly. One of the ways is through intelligence-led policing (ILP), which has come to be regarded as one major philosophy or model of policing in the 21st century, with some positive results to show. In light of this, it should not come as a surprise that developing countries (Nigeria is one), are clamouring to join the ILP bandwagon.

The conception, understanding and the efforts of the Nigeria Police Force (NPF) in relation to ILP, are the kernel of this project. Suffice to say, that, based on the comparison and juxtaposition of generally acceptable tenets and conceptions, and the processes and practicalities of ILP, evolving as they are, with those of the NPF, it is clear the latter is yet to come to grips with the meaning and true nature of ILP. In essence, the NPF, its leadership in particular, appears fixated on the ILP model, but sounds more as a broken record or disc with so much monotony and little sense or direction. Crucially, what the NPF needs to domesticate or practise ILP--the skills, competencies, the capacity and knowledge, etc, are grossly lacking and sometimes totally absent. It is strange, therefore, that the NPF is attempting to fly, when it has not learned to run. The project concludes by examining some ways the NPF would not only run, but fly on the wings of ILP.

Introduction: Who is talking intelligence!

> "[T]he [NPF] has been unable to find out where it is coming from to enable it know where it is going... [so there is need for its] modernization... "
>
> - Ex-IGP Atta (1993)

> "Any futuristic internal security plan for Nigeria must involve a paradigm shift, not only in terms of methodologies and strategies, but also in terms of acquisition of modern tools..."
>
> - IGP Ringim (2010)

The Nigeria Police Force (NPF) is in the limelight, due mainly to the return to civil rule (1999), the Presidential Committees on Police Reform (PCPRs-2006 and 2008), and the general security situation. Against this backdrop, the project comes as an insider's attempt at documenting, or recording, for the first time in a systematic and academic fashion, the history, role and development of the intelligence function in the NPF. It also examines the nature, scope and problems of inter-agency co-operation between the NPF and sister agencies, and concludes by identifying some recommendations for embedding intelligence-led policing (ILP) in Nigeria.

The condition of the NPF is universally known. There is little argument as to its professional inadequacies, political vulnerability and technical incapacity. As the quotes above indicate, this condition has prevailed for decades, impacting negatively on the image and operations of the organisation. These pressures and challenges appear to be increasing

in recent times, forcing the authorities to respond. Whether these responses are appropriate or adequate is another matter. What have the police and political authorities been responding to?

A cursory examination of the Nigerian crime scene reveals a fearful and pathetic picture; one that no law enforcement organisation would be proud of and no political authorities would approve of. Today, there is hardly any crime category that is not represented: from petty theft and stealing, to large-scale corruption; pipeline vandalization to big-time oil-bunkering; from communal clashes to political assassinations; to electoral frauds and armed robberies. A senior officer once lamented how police personnel were 'totally being assaulted in robbery related situations [sic]' (Ehindero 1998, p. 113). In 2009 alone, armed robbers reportedly killed 300 officers (**The Dawn**, 21-27 Sept. 2009; **Daily Trust**, 5 May 2010). While a State Governor from the eastern part of the country was lucky to escape an attempt on his life (**Voice of America** 24 July 2008), former Attorney-General of the Federation (AGF), Bola Ige, was not so lucky, in December 2001! Organised crime, prostitution on an international scale, money-laundering, human trafficking and child slavery, the Niger Delta insurgency, etc, (Okiro 2009, p.109-114), also dominate Nigeria's crime scene. The escapades of Nigerians in advanced fee fraud (aka '419'), (Chawki 2009; Glenn 2008), and counterfeit drugs, are well known (Ridley 2008a). The spate of ethno-religious riots sweeping across the country, especially in the once-peaceful Jos, Plateau State, where initially 200 people were killed in late 2009 (Human Rights Watch, in **BBC World Report**, 1 Jan. 2010), is another example. Other disturbances before and on the Christmas Eve of 2010 in the same city; the Boko Haram ('western education is taboo')

upheavals in Maiduguri, Borno State, and other parts of the north, are still fresh in the minds of Nigerians.

Recently, the authorities had to clamp down on cyber criminals, by 'shut[ting] down some 800 fraudster e-mailers [sic]' and arresting those behind '18 high profile cyber crime syndicates', in their effort to take 'Nigeria out of the top ten list of countries with the highest incidence of fraudulent e-mails', according to the head of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), Farida Waziri (**BBC World Report**, 23 Oct. 2009). Nigeria is now regarded the sixth among 'the worst 10 countries in the world where people could be easily kidnapped', according to Castle Rock Global Corporation report (2008), 'a licenced international insurance agency' (in **Newswatch** Sunday 18 July 2010). Perhaps the most damaging to the image and status of both the government and police/ security agencies, are the bomb blasts in many areas of the south-south and the dastardly occurrence in the nation's capital city, Abuja, on 1 October 2010, during the country's 50th independence anniversary. The incident reportedly led to the death of twelve people, injuring 36, including eleven policemen, and destroying six vehicles. The nation was, however, fortunate in this regard! The original plan was to bomb the Three Arms Zone, the seat of the nation's armed forces, the Aso (Rock) Villa (the Presidential Lodge), the National Assembly (NASS), and the Supreme Court (**The Nation** 5 Oct. 2010).Had this plan succeeded, the nation might not have remained the same. Unfortunately, the lessons have not been learned, and similar incidents have since followed; scars that will remain indelible in Nigeria's policing and security landscape for a long time to come.

In the West African sub-region, Nigerians are also known as 'the culprits of the cyber crimes' (Alemika and Chukwuma 2009, p.128). Mark Shaw (1998) reports that Nigerians have become the ring leaders of the South African underworld, and Ridley says the same of them within the European Union (EU), 'as well as in groups throughout the rest of the world' (2008b, p.132). Strange as it may sound, Nigerians are now receiving military training in Afghanistan (**BBC World Report**, 2 Sep. 2009); with more terrorist threats now reported in the country than ever before (**Daily Sun**, 1 Aug. 2008, p.8).The case of Abdulmutallab, 'the bomber' in Detroit, US (2009 Christmas), is significant. Nigeria, undoubtedly, has become a 'theatre of crime' and 'the broadway of...financial fraud' (Glenn 2008, p.210, 198).

In a survey by one of the country's leading newspapers, 746 out of 1,178 respondents (about 64 percent), said they had lost confidence in the NPF (**The Guardian**, in Sani 2006, p.19). Dr. Robin Campbell, Police Communities Pilot Project Manager, however, puts this at 80 per cent (in Dibang 2008, p.11). One time Minister of Police Affairs laments:

> "Police duty is to prevent crime but we are not seeing much of this. This is not because [the] police are not making efforts. The problem is that their strategies deterrence [sic] through a visible patrol presence and through prompt apprehension and punishment of criminal[s] are not working. What then do we do? What should progressive police approaches to crime prevention be? What form should the approaches take? How successful have those approaches been in preventing crime where they have been employed?"
>
> (Jemibewon 2007, p. 9)

Another commentator has expressed similar sentiments:

> "...No more hanging on traditional policing in a society in which crime innovations have become untraceable, intractable and unmanageable. All rules, policies, and principles of policing operations rarely work now. This is not because police personnel are not rising up to the challenges of their calling. The reason is that the system we run has grown too old and far from modern. Besides, the criminals are one step ahead of the police.[Other] serious and enlightened societies are moving fast towards building new approaches in, and strengths for, their policing systems. But we remain stagnant and still. We operate a system that can be likened to a square peg in a round hole."
>
> (Kupolati 2007, p. 7-8)

Within the NPF, Zarewa reports that 90 per cent of his respondents emphasized 'the importance of intelligence' and the need for police to 'embark on a deliberate plan to improve intelligence gathering in combating crime' (2008, p. 72-73); while Dega calls for a more scientific 'intelligence gathering strategy' (2004, p.53).Yar'adua believes 'the police occupation/profession has continued to fail to attain the level of professionalism...it so desperately needs'; that 80 per cent of his respondents agreed the NPF 'is not faring well'; that all the respondents said 'there was no attempt at professionalism whatsoever'; and 'no reform has [ever] been implemented fully' in the NPF (2008, p.49-50)! For this project, however, 85 (62 per cent) of 118 respondents agree there is crisis in Nigerian policing; 29 (21.2 per cent) say there is none, while 10 (7.3 percent) and 4 (2.9 per cent) are not sure or don't know. Significantly, 59 respondents (about 43 per cent) agree there is crisis in the police intelligence function.

Perhaps, the time is ripe for the police and political authorities to re-assess the NPF model and philosophy of policing. The NPF is seen or perceived by many in negative ways. Ibidapo-Obe calls the organisation

a 'gamekeeper...turned poacher' (2003, p. v-vi); others see them as 'gorillas', 'dignified watchmen' and 'dignified messengers', to 'be pushed around...like the dogs they handle' (Adeniyi 1980, p.3-5). Those with some regard for them prefer they become more of 'peace officers' rather than 'law officers' (Alemika 2003, p.19-32). Kupolati describes police activities and performance as 'the outworn shibboleths of [the Nigerian] criminal and security system' (2007, p. 115). The Vice President, Namadi Sambo, has most recently advised the NPF to change their 'archaic operational strategy' (**Vanguard** Aug. 8, 2010). Not surprisingly, the NPF has become 'the most abused, criticized, despised, ridiculed and hated public institution in Nigeria' (Aransiola 2005, Preface); explaining why some vigilante (unofficial neighbourhood watch) groups have sprung up in Nigeria, to compliment and/or compete with the NPF (Nwankwo and Udeh 2006; also **BBC World Report** 28 April 2009). All this portrays a disoriented, dysfunctional and overwhelmed police; what Tamuno aptly refers to as 'the police predicament' (1996, p. viii).

Essentially because of this outcry and the return to civil rule, both the police and political authorities began to find ways of managing the crime situation. The NPF's initial efforts were in Community Policing (COP), ably and generously assisted by UK's Department for International Development (DfID), especially from 2004.The COP concept was taken 'as a guiding philosophy and pragmatic approach' to policing, intended to move the NPF from 'traditional policing that was reactive and incident-based', to 'a problem-solving oriented policing that is proactive', where the community is 'the cornerstone of policing objectives' (AIG Yusuf, in *NPF Community Policing Handbook*, [n. d.],p. 3). This entails five strategic elements: service

delivery, partnership, problem-solving, empowerment and accountability (p.1-7). The highlight is in the acronym SARA--Scanning, Analysis, Response and Assessment. The NPF has reportedly made some progress in this (Iwar October, 2010). The point, however, is, before intelligence or intelligence-led policing, the NPF had been engaged in some form of re-engineering of its philosophy and *modus operandi*. In view of this development (taking intelligence on board) the police authorities seem to agree with Grieve, that intelligence is 'an important aspect of current thinking about policing at a time of great challenges for and to the service' (2008, p. ix); an attempt by the NPF to 'modernize' and 'manage' the increasingly 'changing patterns of crime and criminality' (Sani 2006, p. 18) in the Nigerian society. In other words, the police authorities are trying to 'understand objectively the current state of affairs within the organization', by 'taking cognizance of the external pressures, limitations, opportunities and threats', in order 'to analyse the past and the present performance levels and make reasonable projections of what could be expected under the present circumstances and what could be done' (Ogunbameru 2004, p. 284). These are the external pressures and threats; what are the NPF's responses, projections and analyses? What are these intelligence-related efforts of the police authorities?

Following from Grieve's observation above, the concept of intelligence-led policing (ILP) can be seen as a response of the police to social change; the answer of the NPF to manage and control the effects of pressures and challenges on the policing landscape (Ratcliffe 2008). That intelligence-led policing has attracted attention is not news. However, police organisations in developing countries like Nigeria are following after

what Harfield and Harfield (2008) call the 'sound bites' of intelligence-led-policing, without really understanding its import and ramifications. This is evident from a survey of their agendas and programmes, which manifest more as individual, or leadership campaigns, than organisational and cultural re-orientation.

First among these proactive police practitioners in Nigeria is Tafa Balogun. Appointed IGP in February 2002, he initiated an Eight-Point Strategy (Nwolise 2004, p.114; Arase and Iwuofor 2007), which, one must admit, perhaps for the first time since independence, gave the NPF an intellectual framework and a professional foundation upon which to build and operate. Though the 'fire-for-fire' content of the programme has been, rightly, severely criticized, the strategy on the whole entailed a 'comprehensive training programme conducive for qualitative policing', 'community partnership', 'fast and decisive crisis management', and 'inter-service/agency co-operation at all levels down the line'; all very relevant concepts in intelligence and modern policing. The programme also emphasized 'a people's police' (Arase and Iwuofor 2007, p.11-20). This writer believes the greatest impact of this strategy is that successive IGPs have found it necessary, if not mandatory, to come along with their own programmes and agendas as they assume office; a manifestation and acceptance of the fact that policing, even in Nigeria, could acquire a thoughtful and scientific element. However, the strategy had little visible impact and Balogun's manner of exit from the Force put the lie to his modernizing streak. In came Ehindero, who has written that 'managing the dynamic change in the 21st century is the biggest challenge for the Police leader'. He adds: 'Crime patterns change, legislation changes, the society

we police changes, public expectation of the police alter [sic]', and '[s]o also must [the] police service face not mere change but accelerated rate of change'. He concluded that the police need 'a visionary leader, messianic in his ability to combine a duality of roles of vision and leadership', a leader 'that is constantly moving, improving and changing...[who] thinks strategically' (1998, p.160-161). As IGP (March 2005-May 2007), Ehindero also had his Ten-Point Programme.

The highlights are, 'effective crime prevention and control through intelligence-led policing', 'conflict prevention and resolution', 'community policing and police-public relationship' [sic],and 'the re-organization of the investigation outfit...to ensure prompt and timely investigation of cases' (**Police News Vol.1 No. 3**, p.3). He elaborated on his understanding of intelligence-led policing: he was 'determined to strengthen the intelligence, detection and investigative capacity of the Force through training'; 'embarking' on the improvement of the criminal database through the Research and Planning Department of the Force, 'in order to ensure... reliable crime statistics are produced and disseminated', and making available 'adequate and reliable information for intelligence, planning and operation'. He also campaigned to 'improve the quality and quantity of intelligence needed for effective policing' by sending officers on training 'locally and abroad in intelligence gathering'; 'the provision of intelligence and investigation equipment', improving criminal record data base, promoting co-operation and collaboration among security agencies, and ensuring 'an efficient deployment of officers and resources', which was expected to enhance 'capacity for investigation, detection and apprehension of criminals' . He later alleged that 'this has yielded great

dividends in the successful investigation of the murder of Ayo Daramola and Hajia Saadatu Rimi' (in **Police News Vol.1 No. 5**, p.35), two among many murder cases still hanging on the NPF as an albatross. He echoed the phrase 'paradigm shift' many times, but in the end nothing shifted in Nigerian policing under him. His campaign for the NPF 'to serve and protect with integrity' lacked passion, the necessary dynamics, strategy and visionary leadership, and so failed woefully.

While Ehindero's campaign emphasized intelligence, Okiro appears to have taken it to another level, at least in the theoretical context of Nigerian policing. As IGP (31May 2007-Aug. 2009), Okiro came in with his Nine-Way Test or the Nine-Point Programme of Action (Okiro 2007; 2009). He wanted the NPF to embark 'on a deliberate plan to improve intelligence gathering in combating crime', for 'the capacity of the Force Criminal Department (FCID) as well as the Criminal Intelligence Bureau (CIB)' to be 'upgraded and enhanced to take up the challenges of combating crime through intelligence gathering (2009, p.287-288). He popularized a knowledge base for the NPF, a professional re-orientation along human rights, rule of law, and co-operation, partnership and 'inter-dependency' among security agencies (Okiro 2007; 2009, p. 283-292). As IGP, Okiro sought to work with the general public and to present papers at various fora. He also laid the foundation for the Nigeria Police Research School in Imo State, in the south-eastern part of Nigeria, initiated some 'e-policing policies' regarding lost and found vehicles, and tentatively sponsored to the National Assembly (NASS), a bill to register all global system of communication (GSM/Mobile) SIM cards (Okiro Aug. 2009). Nevertheless, Okiro's claim that the Nine-Way Test was a 'new National Security

Strategy', an agenda with 'new ideas', which has 're-focused the nation's Policing System' and 'one of the most important security management documents for a long time' to come (in *Police Annual Report 2007*, p.19), is an exaggeration. The 'strategy' introduced some ideas, but they were not really new or novel, neither were they radical nor transformational; the major reason why policing in Nigeria remains largely lethargic, undemocratic and inefficient. Furthermore, the NPF is yet to think out--at a holistic, organisational and universal (not only personal or leadership) level--the theoretical and pragmatic (not to say political and ethical) implications of policing in the 21st century. So, the nation does not yet have 'a national security strategy', whether new or old; nor is there any policing system that has been re-focused. Recent developments in Nigeria bear this analysis out (see also Danlami 2010/2009).

In light of the previous IGP's outings, Ogbonnaya Onovo (IGP from 24 July 2009-8 Sep. 2010), remains perhaps the most enigmatic and inscrutable. This may partly explain why he has the shortest tenure in recent memory, despite the excitement and expectation that greeted his appointment. He spoke very passionately on intelligence and intelligence-related matters, but his actions contradicted what he espoused. He stated that community policing will 'attract my attention', and added that 'I'm also interested in intelligence-led policing'. Like others before him, he had his Three-Point Agenda. The pillar of this agenda was 'renewed commitment to combating violent crimes and other forms of criminality', based on 'intelligence-led policing', and supported by 'community policing, and consultative and strategic partnership' (*Police Annual Report 2009*, p. xiii; **POLIS Vol.1 No. 2**, 2009, p.35). Hear him:

> "We are in a scientific world today and if you don't have the requisite knowledge you will live in perpetual ignorance. Let me try to explain this further. [Policing] has gone beyond yesterday's shield and baton policing. Science and technology has made terrifying input into criminology. Cybercrime is there...bio-terrorism...Proliferation of arms transnationally organized crimes These problems go beyond the past knowledge [of the Nigeria Police]. We must adapt ourselves to the reality of the moment".

Who would argue that modern policing has gone beyond the simple and traditional model? He added:

> "I do realize the importance of intelligence as an effective tool in checkmating criminal activities. Without the necessary intelligence, crime detection would be a mirage. The [Nigeria] Police will embark on a deliberate plan to improve intelligence gathering in combating crime..., the capacity of the Force Criminal Intelligence Department (FCID) as well as the Criminal Intelligence Bureau (CIB) will not only be upgraded but will be enhanced to take up the challenges of combating crime through intelligence gathering. No effort would be spared to acquire and provide the necessary tools needed to meet the challenge."

He then concluded, on inter-agency co-operation, information management and data base:

> "In the same vein, we will intensify efforts at upgrading the criminal record data base [sic] by empowering the Police Planning and Research Department. A synergy will also be fashioned with other security agencies with proper networking to allow for assessing of criminals records [sic] from their retrievable systems. The challenges of the modern information age are quite enormous and demand such inter-service co-operation and sharing of information on crime and criminal activities. This I feel is absolutely necessary for an effective and qualitative performance in order to fulfill the critical essence of crime prevention and detection".

(POLIS Vol. 1 No. 2, 2009, p. 35)

Incidentally, Onovo was ushered in as IGP during the Boko Haram religious upheavals in August 2009, and this sect was one of the major reasons for his premature exit. By the time he left, early September, 2010, it was clear

the NPF was sliding more and more into disrepute, with perhaps the lowest professional image and respect in recent times; and not the slightest hint that 'intelligence' or 'intelligence-related' policing was being practised. The IGP himself at one time became an object of ridicule (**Nigerian Tribune** Editorial Thursday, 6 May 2010). All this was contrary to his claim, that he had 'already commenced the implementation of intelligence-based policing with the aim of making the Police more pro-active than reactive' (**POLIS Vol. 2 No. 3** 2010, p. 25).

The current IGP is Hafiz Abubakar Ringim. Appointed in acting capacity (September 8, 2010), a regular ploy the political authorities adopt without specific or cogent reasons of public or national interest, in order to confirm and control the incumbent, he was confirmed in November, 2010. He also unveiled a Five-Point Agenda, embracing 'zero tolerance to crime and all forms of criminality', 'welfare', 'intelligence-driven policing', 'training and re-training' and 'recruitment and robust image or public relations' (**Vanguard** 13 Sep. 2010). Typically, his concept of 'intelligence-driven policing' was not defined or clarified. Apparently, the new IGP refurbished the ideas of his predecessors, as he has not laid out any coherent and systematic agenda or programme of action; beyond the statement, that 'futuristic internal security plan... must involve a paradigm shift not only in terms of methodologies and strategies but also in the acquisition of modern tools' (in **Sunday Punch** 17 Oct. 2010).The future is not today; today must be taken care of now! He appears not to have a compass with which to navigate the murky waters of Nigerian policing, made more delicate and

slippery with the on-going political and electioneering campaigns. The question is: if those who had a compass (even though rudimentary), could miss it, what would be the fate of one groping in the dark? This lack may be explained by his practical and pragmatic approach to policing, as opposed to the academic and intellectual orientation of his predecessors. Conversely, it may be because of his intellectual and academic inadequacies (the level of his education and professional development), and considering the circumstances of his sudden and unexpected elevation to the post. He should be reminded, however, that policing today requires a considerable degree of grappling with theories and concepts, as these are the foundation upon which solid policing structures are built and continually reviewed. Aside his spat with the authorities on the overlapping of duties between the NPF and the Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC), and his call that the latter be scrapped or merged with the NPF, nothing significant has come from his stable.

From the analysis above, one can see that the NPF attempted to identify and respond to some factors or drivers of change. The NPF agendas and leadership efforts were geared 'to... manage [these] identified changes' and pressures (IACP 2005, p.3), and to move Nigerian policing forward. These started with COP and later, intelligence-led policing. It appears the police have not achieved much success, yet, of embedding intelligence-led policing in Nigeria.

.

This work takes a panoramic look at the NPF history with emphasis on the post-independence period up to 2010. It recognizes that some

commentators argue the police in Nigeria (both at local and national level) performed very well up to the seventies (Rotimi 2001; Asemota 1993; Tamuno 1970; Okonkwo 1966).The work is structured into seven chapters and a conclusion. The first is the literature review, Getting a Perspective, a discussion on the concepts and developments in intelligence and intelligence-led policing, which gives a theoretical framework to the project and a basis for evaluating NPF concepts. Chapter two is the Architecture of Intelligence in the Nigeria Police, an examination of the history and appraisal of the structure of intelligence in the NPF. The third chapter, Knowledge Is Power, analyzes the issues of personnel and manpower, training, information management, information and communication technology (ICT), funding, etc, as they impact policing in general and the intelligence function in particular. Chapter four, Down to Earth, originally, was to describe specific intelligence (operations) and highlight reasons for their failure or success, is now merged with chapter seven, mainly to avoid duplicity and save space. Next is A Net and Its Network, or At Daggers Drawn, an in-depth assessment of inter-agency co-operation in intelligence between the NPF and other security/ intelligence agencies Chapter five, The Burden of History, .*interprets NPF history to illustrate the problems and issues in policing Nigeria and embedding intelligence-led policing. Chapter six, Pearls Before Swine?, is an assessment or evaluation of the contributions of the intelligence function to policing in Nigeria. Chapter seven, What Have Rights Got to Do with Policing?, is a brief critique of the policing landscape, illustrating the cross-roads which inevitably results between statutory police duties, law and the inalienable rights of citizens. *The work concludes with a restatement of the highlights, identifying some

recommendations for enhancing and embedding intelligence in Nigerian policing, and sketching areas for further research.

The methodology of the project involves a blend of both primary and secondary sources. The work combines the qualitative and quantitative approaches in a multi-disciplinary fashion in its data gathering and implementation, while deploying the historical/narrative style in its analysis and reporting. It has benefitted immensely from written sources, a self-completion questionnaire (see Appendix A) and a couple of interviews. The questionnaire is a blend of 'forced choice' and 'open-ended' format of sixty items. All the questionnaires were hand-delivered and retrieved between the last week of September and the last week of December 2010.There were no incentives, inducements or enticements for respondents' participation, except the guarantee of identity protection. In the course of research, however, some things were modified. For instance, the work was initially designed to incorporate five groups or categories of respondents; but is now reduced to four. Group A captures the Assistant Commissioners of Police (ACPs) and above; B, the Inspectors to Chief Superintendents of Police (CSPs); and the original group C would have focused on the Police Constables (PCs) to Sergeants (SGTs). Now, group C captures members of sister security and intelligence agencies, and D are members of the public. The writer found it necessary, indeed imperative, to reduce the original five groups of respondents to four, as a result of the massive and unprecedented promotion 'exercise [which] is behind schedule... involving 120,000 [officers and men] from the constable to the DIG [Deputy Inspector -General of Police]' (former Police Affairs Minister Waziri, in **POLIS Vol. 2**

No. 3, 2010, p.46).The effect: the bulk of this category of respondents (original group C) was merged with group B; otherwise the new set may not satisfy the crucial condition: to have a minimum service of fifteen years.

It is significant and encouraging (if not epoch-making) that for each group, the response rate is above 50 per cent, especially for group B with 76 per cent. The base or acceptable rate of response initially had been put at 30 per cent for the police, and 20 per cent and 40 per cent for sister services and members of the public respectively, as table below shows.

Table 1. No and percentage of questionnaires taken and returned by groups.

Group	Took	Returned	Percentage Taken	Percentage Returned
A	40	22	19	55
B	100	76	47.6	76
C	30	16	14.3	53
D	40	23	19	58
Total	**210**	**137**	**99.9**	

It is also significant that only 4 (3 per cent) of these have school certificate and equivalents as educational qualification; 13 (9.5 per cent) have advanced level and equivalent; 72 (52.6 per cent) are graduates; 43 (31.4 per cent) have master's and two (1.5 per cent) doctorate students, are police respondents, as shown in table below.

Table 2. No and percentage of questionnaires taken by respondents according to educational qualifications.

Qualifications	No of respondents	Percentage of Response
SSCE	4	2.9
A 'level'	13	9.5
Bachelor	72	52.6
Master	43	31.4
PhD	2	1.5
Other	9	2
Total	**137**	**100**

The Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) has been used to analyze the quantitative data. The percentages usually reported are the valid responses: the figures are calculated from the number of respondents who answered specific or relevant questions. So, sometimes, the 'missing' or 'other' categories are not reported. However, a multivariate frequency distribution by cross-tabulating the survey results, is available for those interested in further exploring other statistically relevant differences in the groups/data.

Finally, in writing this project, one appreciates Tamuno, Emeritus Professor, arguably the leading authority on Nigeria Police history, who posits:

> "The element of bias, special pleading, also, of perspectives, infects all manner of researchers and writers, no matter their respective fields of specialization. Bias, yes, if frankly acknowledged, need not do any irreparable harm. Moreover, any interpretation based on

> special interest of this kind does help to indicate that perspectives need not conform with any set of absolute standards anywhere, anytime. A point-of-view, no more, no less. Thus, the point -of- view of an insider need not be the same point -of-view of an outsider. On rare occasions, these come quite close."

He adds:

> "More important, from the point-of-view of scholarship, from the angle of researchers in the honoured tradition of 'timeliness and promise', complimentarity, rather than congruence, is a more useful desideratum. Works that are complimentary, therefore, tend to shed light on hidden areas of research and controversial aspects of analysis. Interpretations, thus, may differ even though facts seem similar to a less informed observer. It is, in these respects, that works of well-placed insiders... complement those of outsiders (research scholars)".
>
> (1996, p.vii)

In the course of research, one came across many points-of-view and interpretations (even misinterpretations), from both insiders and outsiders. Some were seen and welcome for their complimentarity and congruence, while others appeared controversial; suggesting there are no 'absolute standards anywhere, anytime'. This writer makes no claim to lack of bias, but for a bias without 'any irreparable harm'. One believes, however, that there is some value, some 'timeliness and promise', in this project. Plea or no plea, there is the need for 'a more useful desideratum', the desideratum of perspectives; and that is what the next chapter is all about.

1. Getting a Perspective: Historical and theoretical foundations of intelligence and intelligence-led policing

> "Yet, our insights, based on available evidence, are obviously limited. Our limitations extend to the germane area of perspectives".
>
> Tamuno (1996)

> "Intelligence is about thinking: making sense of the data to produce a synthetic model of the problem and using analysis to extract example that can be acted upon. It is a collaborative effort... it relies on feedback and sustainable collection...strategy is not possible without intelligence...Probable solutions come from imagination, rationality, and empiricism... a constant struggle with pre-conception and cliché (the resort of the parvenu)."
>
> Sir David Phillips (2009)

This chapter is in three sections. The first examines the origins and development of intelligence-led policing (ILP) and its driving forces. The second describes its features and components; and the concluding section is a brief discussion of emerging perspectives on intelligence-led policing. This is the current debate on knowledge-based policing, consilient thinking and intelligent policing. Space does not permit all that intelligence-led policing, filled with terms and definitions that are still 'poorly policed', entails, so the chapter will avoid some of this 'conceptual confusion' (Ratcliffe 2008, p.91, 79).

The Origins, Growth and Development of Intelligence-Led Policing

Most authorities agree that the emergence of intelligence-led policing is a recent development (Ratcliffe 2008; Harfield and Harfield 2008;

Peterson 2005). Ratcliffe calls it, 'the evolving dynamics of [a] new paradigm in policing', bringing new concepts and processes (2008, p. xiii); 'an evolving concept' whose tenets have been shifting (p. 64).Nicoll talks of the 'relative immaturity' of intelligence-led policing (ILP), or a 'profession [that] is still evolving' (2009, p.68). Ratcliffe notes that defining intelligence-led policing is one thing, but 'how it works in practice' is another; as this extends to 'the realm of the relationship between crime intelligence analysts, the criminal environment, and decision-makers in the criminal justice system' (2008, p.12-13). Coming to terms with the concept is, therefore, not sufficient, since other areas influence and impact it. Nevertheless, the value and importance of intelligence-led policing in crime fighting, that is 'guided by effective intelligence gathering and analysis', and has 'the potential to be the most law enforcement innovation in the twenty-first century', (Kelling and Bratton 2006, in Ratcliffe 2008, p.213), has been variously acknowledged, as evidenced in the establishment of the International Police Organisation (Interpol) in 1923/1956 (Deflam 2002, in Klevein and Harfield 2009, p.195). Ridley observes:

> "Over the last two decades law enforcement strategic intelligence has unquestionably made progress. The profession enjoys more resources and personnel, the innovation and implementation of technological and digital aids to handle and deploy massive amounts of data, and an overall acceptance of the value of skillful analysis".
>
> (2008b, p.141)

So, intelligence and intelligence-led policing are becoming more popular; the reason, perhaps, why Ratcliffe refers to 'the rhetoric of intelligence-led policing' (2008, p.40). As intelligence is sometimes "regarded as 'secret information'", or a clandestine process (Hawley 2009c, p.214), Grieve

argues for its reclamation 'from the secret world', transformed and 'made less threatening to communities and used in their service' (2008b, p.29). Intelligence could fall into two categories: 'theories of intelligence' ('originally military'), and 'intelligence in action' (Grieve 2008a, p. 13). Many argue that law enforcement intelligence is an offshoot of military and national security intelligence (Peterson 2005, p. 5; Christopher and Cope 2009, p.236; Ratcliffe 2009, p.6-7; and Quarmby 2008, p.178). Others, however, believe that the origins of intelligence 'are a little bit indistinct'; that it had to do with the 'environmental and managerial changes within law enforcement ', influences that are both 'local' and 'universal' (Gill 2000, in Ratcliffe 2008, p.15). Many argue that police intelligence grew from military and national security, dating back to the Chinese writings of Sun Tzu (Peterson 2005, p.5; Grieve 2008a, p.14). Peterson further incorporates the Biblical account in Numbers 13 as part of intelligence history. She then concludes that after the Second World War, security intelligence was adopted for law enforcement operations: military communication intelligence methods were used in telephone records and techniques to manage human intelligence sources and police confidential informants (2005, p. 5-6). Grieve elaborates on Sun Tzu's concepts of Foreknowledge and Estimates. Citing *The Art of War* (trans. Griffith 1963), he mentions Tzu's 'core tenets'-- 'know yourself', 'know your opposition' and 'know the environment'. These he equates with 'intelligence from human resources', which 'significantly... also highlights ...that intelligence can come from alliances such as with knowledge of the terrain and native guides', the 'covert human intelligence sources (CHISs)' (2009a, p.14) in policing.

Intelligence-led policing is now a significant movement in 21st policing, especially with the emergence of the National Intelligence Model (NIM- 2004), in the UK. Similar developments occurred in Australia (2003) and New Zealand (2002). In the US (from 2002), this occurred through the agency of an international summit, which hosted over 120 criminal intelligence practitioners under the platform of the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) (Ratcliffe 2008, p.4).Though certain other 'major intelligence initiatives' from the 1970's to early 21st century came into play, it was 9/11 that really inspired its growth and consolidation. Peterson reports that, a month after 9/11(September 11, 2001), the Investigation Operations Committee of the IACP suggested an Intelligence Sharing Summit be convened in March 2002. Accordingly, over a hundred intelligence experts came from the US and Europe to the summit, where the General Criminal Intelligence Plan and the UK's popular NIM were 'examined and studied as potential blueprints for intelligence-led policing in the United States', followed with 'key recommendations' for adoption in the US (2005, p. 5).The summit work was facilitated by the Global Intelligence Working Group (GIWG), comprising thirty experts and professionals, who later developed the US National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan (NCISP). There have been further developments over the years; while the UK has its Multi-Agency Public Protection Arrangements (MAPPA), in the US 'multiagency policing needs' are met and served by a growing number of 'fusion centers' (Peterson 2005, p.6-9).

Furthermore, the emergence of intelligence-led policing from its British roots to a worldwide phenomenon is duly acknowledged (Ratcliffe

2008, p.1; Peterson 2005). Some date the UK's intelligence-led policing history to the days of Wellington, 'who nominated Sir Charles Rowan as one of the first two Commissioners of the Metropolitan Police' (Grieve 2008b, p. 30).He adds that the 1920's CID card index on local thieves; the Special Duty Squad after World War 11; the Flying Squad, which metamorphosed into 'a new intelligence section called the C5 (2)'; and the Stolen Car Squad, the C2, London and Provincial Liaison section (C9), all of which 'eventually grew into C11', then SO 11(Grieve 2008d, p. 31, citing Laurie 1970); with its 'parts becoming components of the National Crime Intelligence Service (NCIS) and eventually the Serious and Organised Crime Agency (SOCA)', are all considered part of this history. Intelligence then became more grounded from the 1950's,when detectives 'specialised in gathering information about the activities of certain criminals regarded as potentially dangerous', by trailing 'who their associates were, their habits and their spheres of operation, and their plans for future exploits' (Grieve 2008d, p.32,citing Hatherill 1971). Sims reports that some local forces in the UK (for instance, Kent Constabulary) had 'advanced' enough to be 'pioneering a range of intelligence processes and tools', including 'dissemination of intelligence using dedicated permanent briefing officers and from prison interviews' (1993, in Grieve 2008d, p.32). Another major influence is *Policing With Intelligence (1997),* a report by Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC), which some believe (Harfield and Harfield 2008, p.21), to be a landmark now; and *Helping With Enquiries: Tackling Crime Effectively (1993*), prepared by the Audit Commission (AC), both of which are believed to be the real catalyst, speeding up the

codification of intelligence-led policing in the UK (Ratcliffe 2008, p.37). On the significance of *Policing*:

> "The immediate lesson from this report ...was that the police service had to get serious about managing and using intelligence to assist in crime detection; the long- term lesson informs us how the intelligence profession within the police service arrived at where it is today. Understanding these cultural origins should help inform adaption and transformation strategies in developing police intelligence so that it better supports all policing functions".
>
> (Harfield and Harfield 2008, p.21-22)

This document, which appears to some 'today [as] a little naïve', has become a 'groundbreaking' and 'direction setting' manifesto. However, for the UK, this 'good practice in policing' has only just started with intelligence issues taking the front burner, after almost 150 years of policing (Harfield and Harfield 2008, p.14-15). Even the Association of Chiefs of Police (ACPO) only recently, in 1975, 'unequivocally endorsed the establishment of force intelligence bureau in each force' and only in1999, that 'a voluntary code of practice for the Recording and Dissemination of Intelligence Material', was introduced (Flood and Gaspar 2009, p. 48).So, the birth of the National Intelligence Model (NIM), in 2004, makes it 'the direct descendant of those early developments in intelligence-led policing' (Flood and Gaspar 2008, p.51), 'ultimately formalised' intelligence-led policing, and 'unequivocally legitimized the concept of strategic intelligence, its requirement, analysis and application'(Christopher and Cope 2009, p. 237, citing NCIS 2000). Noting the three eras of UK policing, and the advent of NIM, Flood and Gaspar submit, that the journey has been that of 'adaptation from the lingering, attractive certainties of the pre- and post-war years to the uncertainties, info-rich, intelligence-led, 21st century world of

multi-agency law-enforcement' (2008, p.47). So, the problematic introduction of the NIM and the fact that intelligence-led policing 'in the UK...remains in its infancy' (Christopher and Cope 2008, p.244-245), should be an encouragement to countries like Nigeria, clamouring for intelligence-led policing, and an assurance that they have footprints of mentors and trail-blazers to follow.

Defining intelligence and intelligence-led policing is not straight forward. The word 'intelligence' has elicited over '70 odd definitions' and 'formal definitions' (Legg and Hutter 2007; the VETTA PROJECT [n.d.]). Kleiven and Harfield report a European police (Europol) officer/ interviewee 'still struggling with [understanding] intelligence' (2008c, p. 198-200). So, intelligence may enjoy 'a common currency' but not 'a common meaning' (Sohi and Harfield 2009, p.75). It is 'a label with...a variety of meanings', very 'widely used but not necessarily commonly understood'; which explains why there is so much 'misunderstanding, particularly in partnership and joint agency working' (Harfield and Harfield 2008, p.68), where agencies have 'different definitions' and 'various perceived levels of intelligence' (Rogers 2009, p.5-6). For Sohi and Harfield, therefore, it is important to consider intelligence definitions and 'the possible implications' for organised crime and the need for more 'practitioner and academic discourse' (2008, p.75). So, what is intelligence?

First, 'intelligence is not so much a way of working as a way of thinking' (Harfield and Harfield 2008, p.10); it 'is about thinking', which is 'devoid of sentiment', and is 'rational' (Phillips 2008a, p.25; 2008b, p. 91); 'the key to success in policing' (Grieve 2004, in Kleiven and Harfield 2008b, p.195); and it 'is used to identify risk' (Kleiven and Harfield 2009c, p.247). It

'is not information gathering'--Gill's 'naïve empiricism'--but 'information management' (Harfield and Harfield 2008, p.2). It is for everyone, and 'should support an agency's entire operation...based on all-source information gathering and analysis' (Peterson 2005, p.1). In exploring intelligence, Ratcliffe has constructed a four-layer formula: Data, Information, Knowledge and Intelligence (D.I.K.I.-2008). Harfield and Harfield have identified 'three different conceptual understandings', which indicate 'different ways of thinking about concepts of intelligence'. These are Information, Knowledge and Evidence (2008, p.50-52). They highlight intelligence 'as defined in official [UK government /ACPO documents] sources' (p.52-54); 'as conceptualized in academic sources' (p. 54-55); and 'as understood by frontline practitioners' (p. 55-58).They then conclude there is little agreement among 'intelligence professionals both within and without the police service' (p.56). They illustrate this with HMIC's 'Preface' to *Policing With intelligence (1997),* where HMIC chose a translation of Sun Tzu's *The Art of War,* which 'abbreviated and conflated the text', a clear 'illustration [of] how information can be variously interpreted into intelligence that can deliver very different messages', and 'a salutary, if unwitting, lesson in using intelligence' (2008, p.16-17). Borrowing from Legg and Hutter (2007), Stanko also breaks intelligence into three: as 'a property that an individual agent has as it interacts with its environment or environments'; what 'is related to the agent's ability to succeed or profit with respect to some goal or objective'; or, intelligence 'depends on how able the agent is to adapt to different objectives and environments' (2008, p. 227).

For emphasis, intelligence is not the same thing as information. Intelligence is 'smart information which enables police and police organizations to minimize intentional (criminal) harm to individuals and communities' (Stanko 2008, p.227). It is 'information designed for action', with the emphasis on 'action' (Grieve 2008b, p. 29). For Sir David Phillips, it is:

> "...collation and analysis of various sources of information to infer additional meaning. It is about explaining what is otherwise obscure; about making explicit or what is otherwise implicit or deliberately concealed...."a process of information analysis providing a discipline, methodology for identifying critical problems, researching their characteristics to identify weak points and tactics, identifying the networks and assets in play to facilitate considered target selections, and eventually penetrating the network to give enough advance information to select the timing of operational strikes".
>
> (2009a, p. 29, 34)

The Australian Federal Police (AFP) defines it 'as a product derived from adding value to information to provide insight and influence decision-making'. This definition emphasizes 'product': 'it can be in any form suitable to convey the judgments made by the analysts'; 'derived from adding value': 'to distil information' by 'providing meaningful analysis and comment'; and finally, to 'provide insight and influence decision-making': thereby supporting 'the executive decision-making process by providing an appreciation of the issue under consideration, and offering options and assessments of the viability of those options' (Hawley 2008, p.214). From this perspective, then, intelligence can come in different types. Intelligence necessary for disruption may be different from intelligence for problem-solving, or 'detections leading to convictions'. Thus, this three-prong activity must be seen 'in the context of desired outcome which will vary according

to organizational purpose'. This is 'information of value in relation to specific purposes', 'processed' and applied 'to inform decision-making within the context of organizational function' (Harfield and Harfield 2008, p.56). So, intelligence could 'both inform and misinform decision-making (depending upon the resources invested and the quality of evaluation and analysis)'; or 'could head in the wrong direction', however 'well-intentioned' (Harfield and Harfield 2008, p.68). So, what is intelligence-led policing?

Defining intelligence-led policing is also problematic. The word 'policing' is 'the first hurdle', since it can be 'variously defined' (Klevein and Harfield 2009c, p.240). Although 'policing' is a general, all-inclusive term 'involving processes and specific social functions' (Reiner 1997, in Ratcliffe 2008, p.7), defining intelligence-led policing is difficult, because 'most publications tend to discuss the challenges of intelligence-led policing without actually defining it' (Ratcliffe 2008, p.64).Borrowing (from Hale *et al* 2004),he adds that 'intelligence-led policing is definitionally an evolving concept', whose tenets can only be 'inferred' from 'published work', which is 'relatively detailed and well-defined' (Ratcliffe 2008, p.84-85). Specifically:

> "Intelligence-led policing describes a way of doing police business. It is primarily a practical notion of how better to deliver police work. No explicit philosophy of policing lies behind its development. The aims and functions of policing remain largely tacit and taken for granted. Intelligence-led policing is essentially about doing the practical business of policing more smartly, incorporating modern information technology and modern methods. It is not about taking a critical line on what that business is"
>
> (Tilly 2003, p.32)

In Ratcliffe's words, intelligence-led policing:

> "...is a business model and managerial philosophy where data analysis and crime intelligence are pivotal to an objective, decision-making framework that facilitates crime and problem reduction, disruption and prevention through both strategic management and effective enforcement strategies that target prolific and serious offenders".
>
> (2008, p.6)

The highlights of intelligence-led policing are: one, 'a management philosophy/business model', which aims to 'reduce and prevent crime and disrupt offender activity'; the adoption of 'a top-down management approach', which combines 'crime analysis and criminal intelligence into crime intelligence', or the use of 'crime intelligence to objectively direct police resource decisions'; and a focus on 'enforcement activities on prolific and serious offenders' (Ratcliffe 2008, p.87). In practice, intelligence-led policing is 'crime fighting that is guided by effective intelligence gathering and analysis', with 'the potential to be the most important law enforcement innovation of the twenty-first century' (Bratton and Kelling 2006, in Ratcliffe 2008, p. 213).

The emergence of intelligence-led policing seems inevitable, because 'the realities of the nature of the modern criminal justice system' and 'the world of the criminals themselves', made it imperative for 'the acceptance of a new doctrine of policing' (Flood and Gaspar 2009, p. 47).Ratcliffe calls it the 'complexity in policing and the performance culture'; an 'increasing complexity' in law enforcement that called 'for a better level of organization of knowledge', intertwined with 'a greater managerialism culture' and 'increased bureaucratic load'. It is a 'drive for greater efficiency', on the premise that 'police strategies can be more articulated and justified internally and externally' (2008, p.16-18). The second driver is

the management of risk. As the police increasingly came under pressure and 'more scrutiny than before' (citing Flood 2004), police professional judgment and decisions got 'tempered by risk management', which was now considered 'as one of the most significant changes' in the annals of law enforcement (Ericson and Haggerty 1997, in Ratcliffe 2009, p.1-2). Henceforth, police operations and activities would have 'no place to hide' (2009, p.18). Thirdly, is 'the demand gap'. Citing Flood (2004), Ratcliffe explains that the rise in crime from the 1960's and 1970's, unemployment, relative deprivation, and other 'social forces beyond the control of the police', all had a role to play in this development. He illustrates with England and Wales where police strength increased 'by about 50%' while 'recorded crime increased by 250%'; with 'a similar trend in the US' (2008, p.18-20). The gap in demand for policing services necessitated a new paradigm. Next is the 'limitations of standard model of policing'. Policing in1829 is not the same as today; 'fire brigade' policing is no more relevant today, as the reactive nature of policing could no longer cope effectively (Tilley, in Ratcliffe 2008, p. 20-22). The impact of 'organised and trans-national crime' is another. Local and national policing has always been impinging on each other. Recently, however, the international or transnational nature of crime, and how it could affect both local and national policing, has been highlighted. The 9/11 and 7/7 (July 2005) incidents in the US and UK respectively, have brought the issue home. Ratcliffe calls this, 'the growth of criminal opportunities resulting from globalisation', being the consequence of 'mobility increases for offenders across boundaries [which] heighten anxieties and complexities of policing' (2008, p.22-23). The sixth driver is 'changes in technology'. Policing had

been accustomed to unsophisticated and traditional intelligence systems. There was no way the police could remain unperturbed and indifferent to 'the rapid digitalization of the rest of the world' in the 1980's, so the police needed to have their own 'computerised intelligence databases' (Ratcliffe 2008, p. 23-24). More recently, Ratcliffe has included factors like government inquiries and new legislation (2009, p.1-2). One major pillar of his intelligence outlook is the concept of "the crime funnel"--the volume and magnitude of crime reported. He then concludes, that '[t]he crime funnel paints a fairly bleak picture of the criminal justice system', where less than a hundred out of a thousand cases are successfully detected (Ratcliffe 2008, p. 43-52; 62-63).

The Features and Components of Intelligence-Led Policing

Types and levels of intelligence vary among agencies, because 'roles vary considerably' (Ratcliffe 2008, p. 99). Australia is known for her diversity and differences regarding intelligence (Rogers 2008, p.13, 19). Some authorities mention three types of intelligence, but with different nomenclatures. Evans, for instance, (borrowing from Sternberg's Triarchic Theory), refers to 'analytical' or 'book smart' intelligence-'the ability to problem-solve'; 'creative' or 'imaginative' intelligence- 'the ability to deal with new situations by drawing on existing knowledge [and] going beyond learnt skills'; and 'practical' or 'street smart' intelligence- 'the ability to solve real everyday problems often by applying learnt skills to new or unusual situations'. He concludes that 'success requires a balance' of the three (2009, p.112). Ratcliffe, however, refers to 'tactical intelligence'-in

supporting front-line areas, investigations and other operational areas, which aims at specific enforcement objectives; 'operational intelligence'- in supporting area commanders and regional operational commanders 'in planning crime reduction activity and deploying resources to achieve operational objectives'; and finally, 'strategic intelligence'-providing the insights and understanding, for broad strategies, policies and resources (2004d/ 2008, p. 99). He adds, however, that smaller agencies rate operational as strategic intelligence (2009, p.6).Others, like Quarmby, mention four types: 'basic intelligence' ('what has happened?'), which is 'usually encyclopaedic in nature', providing 'baseline information and intelligence'; 'current intelligence' ('what is happening?'): 'specific assessments related to ...an ongoing operational threat' and for the short term'; 'warning intelligence' ('is a future unfolding?'): providing warning and giving 'rapid alert and some form of policy, intelligence and operational response'; and finally, 'estimative intelligence' ('what could occur?'): providing 'forward looking assessment and predictive judgments' for the future with its analyses and implications (2008, p.166-167).Peterson also mentions four types-'tactical', 'strategic', 'evidential' and 'operational' intelligence (2005, p.3); for Innes and Sheptycki the four are 'community', 'criminal', 'crime' and 'contextual' intelligence (2004, in Harfield and Harfield 2008, p. 57-58). A new type, 'biographical intelligence', is data aimed at 'a wider picture of activities of heads of states and politicians likely to be harmful to the interests of sovereign state', as part of UK's NIM (Smith 2009).

The intelligence cycle or intelligence process 'is a repetitive set of actions' (Ratcliffe 2009, p.6); it is "also part of 'designed for action'" in intelligence (Grieve 2008b, p.29). It is 'a sequence of activities intended to take information found from the status of new material to the point of intelligence', and fed to 'decision-makers in order to define policy or intervention'. It proceeds from 'identified need to informed decision' (Harfield and Harfield 2008, p.63, 65). In talking about the 'intelligence cycle' and 'intelligence process', Ratcliffe also draws attention to 'Gills cybernetic model', 'the SARA model', 'the NIM business model' and his own '3-i model'- 'interpret', 'influence' and 'impact' (2008, p.104-109). He, however, refers to his model as 'a simple description' of 'a much more complex process'; the basic structure of the intelligence cycle (2008, p.10). Grieve mentions five stages of the cycle as collection, evaluation, analysis, dissemination and action (2008b, p.29; also Ratcliffe 2008, p.105-106, 153 and 2009, p.7; Ridley 2008, p.141; Harfield and Harfield 2008, p.64-65). Peterson mentions six steps: planning and direction, collection, processing/collation, analysis, dissemination and re-evaluation (2005, p.6-7). Though Phillips registers seven steps, in the 'Sherman Kent tradition', he notes it as 'a misnomer', a 'paradigm' that is 'out of date', especially 'for dealing with modern day terrorism' (2008, p. 27). The peculiar 'eight rings' of the Canadian intelligence cycle is another (Grieve 2008, p.15). As Ratcliffe observes, none of these models is perfect, and few of them really show 'the importance of key relationships between the analyst, the client and the business' of intelligence (2008, p.114). While acknowledging the need for independence and the crucial value of evaluation and analysis in the transformation of 'raw materials into intelligence', and in defining its

characteristics (Harfield and Harfield 2008, p. 68; also Heldon 2009, p.124,146), the intelligence cycle should not be distracted or affected by misguided research or analysis, an 'inappropriate reporting style, content and format', or 'minimal interest in the published product' and 'poor or completely absent feedback processes' (Nicoll 2009, p.83).

Intelligence sources abound, since practitioners can only be limited by their own imagination and 'certain legal constraints', or 'ethical and legal boundaries' (Harfield and Harfield 2008, p.70; also Ratcliffe 2008, p.134). These sources include covert operations and informants, financial and major crime and other analyses, prison intelligence officers and community intelligence (ACPO 2001). Others include internal and partner agencies, the community and suspects, the wider intelligence community and the criminal use of intelligence (Harfield and Harfield 2008, p.73-87). Intelligence sources also include electronic and physical surveillance (Ratcliffe 2009, p.119), newspapers (including internet sources), and public records (e.g. deeds, property, tax records, etc,).The most neglected, and yet 'the best sources of information gathering', are the frontline officers, as 'the eyes and ears of law enforcement' (Peterson 2005, p. 6,11). However, these frontline officers don't generally realize their potential intelligence contribution, especially with arrests, which can yield a number of dividends, if well managed. The officers should, therefore, be encouraged to seek and collect specific information for specific intelligence plans, to be 'supplemented by spontaneous information collection through the normal course of work'. The way frontline officers interpret or understand intelligence issues is also a crucial success factor in any organisation that claims to be intelligence-led (Harfield and Harfield 2008, p. 71).

For many, the basic elements or components of intelligence are two: the analysts and the managers (Flood and Gaspar 2009, p.60-61; Guidetti 2009, p.234); intelligence managers and strategic intelligence operators (Nicoll 2009, p.70; 1997, p.21); the analysts and the decision-makers (Heldon 2009, p.124, 126; Tusikov and Fahlman 2009, p.148). Even Ratcliffe, despite his extended 'range of potential decision-makers', still maintains two components: the analysts and decision-makers (2008, p. 142-143); or criminal intelligence units and their clients (Hawley 2008, p.211). The work of the analyst is central or is 'the heart of intelligence' (Heldon 2009, 124): he interprets the criminal environment and conveys the product to the decision-maker in a timely and accurate fashion, to maximize effect (Ratcliffe 2009, p.9-10, 11). Sissens isolates four roles for the analyst within the NIM: establishing theory for analysis; evaluating the role of intelligence analysts; determining any difference in theory and reality; and analyzing why there is any disparity between theory and reality (2009, p.121). These analysts include the crime analyst, the crime intelligence analyst, or sometimes the police analyst; and what they do is crime analysis, crime intelligence analysis or criminal intelligence analysis (Ratcliffe 2009, p.9,10; 2008, p.7, 87, 92-93). Although there are two elements, 'two realities', Nicholl believes 'the separation...is no longer so distinct' (2009, p.70).

What is the value and importance of intelligence-led policing? The place of intelligence as 'a highly reusable resource' with 'both utility and relevance for all strata of policing and law enforcement', despite its 'range of complex problems' and 'competing priorities', is crucial (Christopher and Cope 2009, p. 243-245). Intelligence-led policing helps the police in

meeting the ever-increasing demand for services from very limited resources: resources 'that could not exponentially increase in parallel to the demand' (Ericson and Haggerty 1997, in Harfield 2008a, p. 2). Specifically, intelligence is important in decision-making: what to do with all the information and getting 'results in a best estimate of what has happened or will happen'; planning: forming 'an accurate picture of the business' and 'where the threats lie'; strategic targeting: using 'available resources carefully...[for] the best results and the best chances of success'; and for crime prevention: observing indicators and crime trends in order to devise 'preventive measures' against crime and criminals (Peterson 2005, p.4; also Ratcliffe 2008, p.8,14,42-63).

There are as many intelligence products as there are law enforcement agencies, 'multiple variants' and 'a bewildering array of different products or output'; but generally, 'only about three products may be needed' (NCIS 2004, in Evans 2008, p.187). The UK's NIM mentions four--problem profile, subject profile, tactical assessment, and strategic intelligence (Evans p.188-189; Harfield and Harfield 2008 p.103-104). The AFP also has four intelligence products within an 8-Step Intelligence Services Model, which 'allows for both a consistent application of intelligence principles and the flexible delivery of intelligence services', enabling it to act as 'both a service provider and a leader' (Hawley 2008, p.220-222).

Emerging Perspectives on Intelligence-Led Policing

Tamuno (1996, p.vii) observes that insights are based on available evidence, which determines perspectives. Available evidence suggests that policing perspectives are changing. As crime and disorder become more complex, policing needs 'tools' that 'would do justice to that complexity', by 'bringing together a wide range of perspectives' and 'welding them' to 'create a complete picture'. This is termed 'intelligent policing'; 'emphatic and proactive, rather than reactionary' (Juett *et al* 2008, p.161). Although the police are 'operating in an information-rich environment', it is, however, not 'necessarily easier' converting this information into practical 'action'. Inevitably, the result is 'an information-rich but knowledge-poor' policing (Ratcliffe 2008, p. 8). So, the challenge of intelligence-led policing is, 'to raise the discourse above the tactical operational level to consideration of policing in its widest sense' (Harfield 2008a, p. 4). Ratcliffe agrees that intelligence-led policing is not the *mantra* for policing, as it cannot be presented 'as a *fait accompli*' (2008, p.10). Evans also believes that a single model cannot provide 'definitive guidance' (2008, p.191); and there is "no one way of 'doing' intelligence for policing" (Harfield 2008a, p. 3). Consequently, practitioners now propose new lines of thinking, 'a knowledge-based approach', one 'where effectiveness is rated higher than efficiency in order to tackle the challenges of the future' (Kleiven and Harfield 2008c, p.203; also Harfield and Harfield 2008, p. 212). This is because, knowledge has 'conceptual primacy over intelligence', embraces 'community knowledge as well as practitioner, policymaker and expert knowledge', and is 'the context within which judgments about the

proportionality of proposed intelligence-led responses should be considered' (Kleiven and Harfield 2008c, p.197).

This new concept is gaining ascendancy in the UK, within the AFP, the Norwegian Police Service (NPS), and Europol, going 'beyond traditional approaches' and highlighting 'a number of perspectives on knowledge-based policing' (Kleiven and Harfield 2008c, p.195; 2008d, p. 239-240). Knowledge-based policing (KBP) itself is anchored on 'a consilient approach', incorporating 'the disciplines which inform and invigorate intelligent policing' (Harfield et al 2008; Grieve 2008c, p.9). MacVean and Harfield define consilience as 'the imaginative and innovative recourse to, and utilization of, ideas and learning from different disciplines to achieve new insights'. They link its birth to 'contemporaneous epidemiology investigation (Johnson 2006), and philosophical consideration (Whewell 1847)' (2008a, p.93); and the successful partnership between 'a man of God and a man of science', is the classic illustration (Harfield et al 2008).

To Juett *et al*, consilience is 'unity of knowledge', while consilient thinking provides clarity: 'an ability to see patterns and causes and connections across disciplines and knowledge bases', for more effective and efficient policing (2008, p.162). This comes with a caveat, though:

> "Time will tell whether [KBP] is just a new sound-bite or whether it is a concept with substance. It is possible, like intelligence-led policing, that it will come to mean different things to different people. But the fact that various practitioners are talking about knowledge-based policing indicates increasingly widespread recognition that intelligence-led policing as it is currently [understood] and implemented can be enhanced and improved upon".
>
> (Harfield and Harfield 2008, p.10)

Does this have any bearing on the intelligence perspectives of the NPF?

2. Wings to Fly? The intelligence architecture in the Nigeria Police

> "Even though there has been broad endorsement of intelligence-led policing across the world, I sometimes wonder whether some proponents know what they are supporting. A lack of clarity as to definition and conceptual direction can be the downfall of some initiatives, while others can founder due to misunderstandings associated with terminology and tactics.
>
> Ratcliffe (2008)

This chapter is in three sections. The first is a brief discussion on the history of the Nigeria Police Force (NPF) up to the emergence of its intelligence unit. The second examines NPF perspectives on intelligence along the lines of the previous chapter. This appraises the definitions, conceptions and other components of intelligence in the NPF. The third section is a description and in-depth analysis of the intelligence architecture in the NPF: from the local to the divisional, state to zonal and finally, the force headquarters levels. It concludes with a debate on the emerging perspectives. The chapter is not about the history of the NPF, except where it impinges on the narrative. This has been treated by others (Rotimi 2001; Ahire 1993; Tamuno *et al* eds. 1993; Tamuno 1970; Okonkwo 1966).

The NPF: History and genesis of its intelligence

The NPF had its beginnings in the 1861 Consular Guard of Lagos and the merger, later in 1930, of the various colonial forces after the 1914 amalgamation of the country. So, in birth and orientation, the NPF is a colonial establishment (Ahire 1993; Tamuno 1970; Okonkwo 1966). The Native Authority and Regional Police Forces also functioned locally before

they were merged in the 1960's with the NPF. The Nigeria Police is currently organised into six Departments: 'A'-Finance and Administration; 'B'- Operations'; 'C'-Works; 'D'-Investigation and Intelligence; 'E'-Training; and 'F'-Management Services. The NPF is structured along seven hierarchical steps (bottom up): the Village (Police) Post; the Police Station; the Police Division (or Divisional Headquarters); the 36 State Commands and the Federal Capital Territory FCT-Abuja (SHQs); the 12 Zonal Commands; and the Force Headquarters (FHQ), located at the Federal Capital Territory (FCT), Abuja. The NPF reportedly has about 5,000 Village Posts, 5,515 Stations, 1,115 Divisions, 123 Area Commands 37 State Commands, and 12 Zonal Commands under the FHQ; manned by about 320,000 officers and men (Arase 2007, p.43). If the current 'politics of the police' (Reiner 1991) permit, these arrangements could still come under some modifications (Presidential Committees on Police Reform 2006/2008). To many observers, the police in Nigeria before and immediately after independence performed comparatively well (Tamuno 1970; Rotimi 2001; Okonkwo 1966); as represented by Asemota:

> "The Nigeria Police was at its peak in the First Republic (1960-1966). Thereafter, its efficiency began to slide due to its involvement in military politics. The sliding struck the bottom in 1992, when the Inspector-General, a member of the Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC)- the legislative and executive body of Government of Nigeria made public his frustrations".
>
> (In Jemibewon 2001, p.124)

The first intelligence unit of the NPF, the Special Branch (SB), had very humble beginnings. The establishment of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) in the Lagos colony, in 1898, started the intelligence story in the NPF. The department was responsible for 'general investigation and statistics, antiquities and narcotics, [and] detective Training School, among others' (Ekoko *et al* 1994, p.139). It was also charged with 'the maintenance of all criminal records', being 'the central authority for the collection, compilation, classification and recording of all criminal information and for the dissemination of this information when required'. It was divided into four branches: Investigation (D1), Administration (D2), Technical (D3), and Training (D4).The Technical Branch comprised the Records Section, Printing Section, Fingerprint, Disputed Documents, Photographic, Central Arms Registry and Drawing Office. The Records Section was for 'the collection, recording and classification of all information concerning crime and criminals', and maintaining the 'records of persons convicted of any crime within the country' (*The CID Pamphlet No. 1* [n.d.], p.1). The pamphlet states that 'all newspapers and printing presses in Nigeria', together with 'Clubs, unions, societies and religious movements' had their records kept and 'made available to the C.I.D. or Special branch [sic], and it is the duty of the P.P.Os [Provincial Police Officers] to see that Force C.I.D. H.Q. is kept fully informed of the advent of any new union, etc' (p.3). Police in the provinces worked with the central bureau in all these. Also, CID personnel from the headquarters were attached to the Posts and Telecommunications (P and T) and the Customs and Excise Department, for special investigative duties. The head, an Assistant Commissioner of

Police (ACP), ensured, by regular and detailed inspection, that the 'methods of crime prevention and investigation throughout the Force are kept up-to-date and, where necessary, improved' (*CID Pamphlet*, p.1-2). This continued with little or no modification well beyond independence in October 1960.

Before independence, the intelligence unit of the NPF was christened the 'E' Department, but still remained the Special Branch (SB).Its transformation by the British colonial authorities was with the 'primary aim of gathering intelligence on the country's nationalists', whose political agitations and demands openly threatened British interests. Its duties then included 'general surveillance, travel control, alien control, and checking communist influence' (Ekoko *et al* 1994, p.140). The effectiveness and impact of the unit continued well into independence. A retired general has written, that the Special Branch Reports (the intelligence reports) on the events of the first *coup*- of 15 January, 1966- 'had a full list of military officers and civilians earmarked for annihilation and the appointed assassins' (Oluleye 1985, p.29). Okoi-Uyonyo confirms that the SB 'had access to privileged information', and more than once had information on the activities of Murtala Mohammed, a general and later head of state (2005, p. 41-42). It is also on record that the head of the SB 'was more or less seen as the Chief Security Officer of the country, even in the presence of the Inspector–General of Police'; and '[t]he onus to investigate rumours of coups and report to the authorities fell on him' (Okoi-Uyonyo 2005, p.37). During the Civil War (1967-1970), the SB was commended for its efforts in liberated areas of the country, as the police and the army maintained a close surveillance over refugee camps (Membere 1982, p.31-

32). Okiro cites Inyang on the SB working 'closely with the Department of Military Intelligence in the collection and collation of intelligence against subversion, sabotage and espionage', and the 'screening for reabsorption into the Federal Civil Service by the Police' of returnee federal public servants from eastern Nigeria (2009, p. 33; also Jemibewon 2001, p.73).Membere reports, that the SB's 'network of activities spread all over the country provided useful information' on saboteurs of government's war efforts (1982, p.33). For a good part of the war period, Kam Salem House, then the Nigeria Police Force Headquarters (NP FHQ), became the administrative and political headquarters of the country and the IGP, Kam Salem, was a conspicuous member of the government (Omooba 1994, p.13).The SB continued to function until 1976, when the failed coup (and assassination of General Mohammed, then head of state), changed its destiny. The unit failed the country at a time of great need. Oluleye reports, that the SB 'went on holidays' by adopting 'a low profile approach' of operation 'in order to correct Gowon's [government's] flamboyant excesses'. He adds that the three arms of the military intelligence also failed 'regrettably'. For the failure of the SB, the IGP, M D Yusuf, voluntarily resigned his appointment (Oluleye 1985, p.178), though Obasanjo, as new head, rejected it (Okoi-Uyonyo 2005, p.67). That singular act of courage by an IGP, more so in a military era, remains a milestone, a landmark, in the ethics and morality of Nigeria's police leadership till today.

From 1976 onwards, police intelligence never remained the same. Consequent upon this failure, the SB was severed from the police and became the Nigerian Security Organisation (NSO). Thus the NPF 'lost an important' part of its operation (Ekoko *et al* 1994, p.140). The instrument of

this loss, or conversion, was the Nigerian Security Organisation (NSO) Decree 16, March 24, 1976/Decree 17 of 1977. Imobighe and Maduagwu report:

> "The foundation staff were drawn almost entirely from the personnel of the Special Branch. No systematic training programme was immediately evolved to equip them for the additional responsibilities they were assuming. This police heritage was to limit the NSO, especially in the perception of its role, for a very long time".
>
> (1989, p.11)

The birth of the Criminal Intelligence Bureau (CIB) in the NPF could, therefore, be regarded as an accident; a child of circumstances. According to Imobighe and Maduagwu, it was a double loss for Nigeria: no requisite intelligence outfit as replacement in the police, and the new outfit for 'intelligence information', 'national security', and monitoring of aliens (Membere 1982, p. 46), was from the onset handicapped. This handicap significantly reduced the erstwhile laudable performance of the NPF. Coincidentally, the era (close to the 1967-1970 civil war) witnessed an 'increasing crime wave and growing sophistication' of criminals, that set the police authorities thinking for a replacement of the SB, one which would also have a 'nation-wide coverage' (*NPF General Handbook* 1981, p. 43). Meanwhile, the remnant of the SB went into limbo: 'petty and domestic matters of Policemen and activities of Policemen at Stations and Barracks [sic] were made subjects of intelligence reports submitted by Special

Branch Officers' (Smith, in Dawodu 2006, p.52). This wide lacuna in police intelligence led to the emergence of so-called 'suspect squads' and 'surveillance squads' at the grassroots or divisional level. Unfortunately, these units lacked the requisite skills or trained personnel for intelligence gathering. So, when religious riots broke out in Kano, critical information on the strength of the fanatics, their weapons, tactics, the enclave, access and exit routes could not be monitored. This accounted for the reason why the police lost 'at least fourteen...officers' (Ehindero 1998, p.132). By the time the Justice Aniagolu Inquiry submitted its report on the 1980 Maitatsine riots to the government, it was not surprising that:

> "...the intelligence network of the Police Force was weak, probably due to the severance of the Special Branch. That the excision of the Special Branch from the Nigeria Police negated its clout for information acquisition. That this is a costly vacuum created within the operational spectrum of the Force and consequently detrimental to its operational strategies. Had the Force appropriately maintained an outfit to perform the roles of the erstwhile Special Branch, the situation could have been different".
>
> (In Dawodu 2006, p. 53)

The IGP accepted this finding and empanelled a group comprising Donald Ugbaja (DIG) as head, Ahmadu Anivbasa (DCP), and Samuel Olatoye (ACP), to 'study how organized crime is combated in the developed world and obtain relevant records which will be useful in our own circumstances'; 'to study the objectives, role and services to be provided by an intelligence unit'; and 'to propose standard procedures for the collection, storage and

dissemination of intelligence'. After visiting Britain 'extensively' (Dawodu 2006, p. 54), the group's recommendations for the new intelligence unit were accepted, and still remain, its core functions:

> "Collection, collation, assessment and dissemination of Criminal Intelligence affecting the activities of criminals with particular reference to organised crimes;
>
> "To act as a think tank or reservoir for information, identification of criminals, exchange of information, keeping of photographs and records of criminals;
>
> "Development of contacts with undercover operators who will penetrate criminal syndicates;
>
> "Maintain a system of criminal intelligence on travelling professionals or hardened criminals and organised crime syndicates; and
>
> "Assemble, assess and circulate information collected from the systematic assembling of criminal intelligence of special interest to various police formations on a continuing basis"
>
> (Ekoko *et al* 1994, p.141)

The police authorities, from inception, found it necessary to have a training programme for staff of the Bureau with the Nigerian Army School of Intelligence (NASI), Apapa-Lagos, in addition to the unit's regular weekly training programmes. The CIB was under the control of the FHQ, then in Lagos; so, the personnel in State Commands were administratively and operationally responsible to the CP at Headquarters. It must be noted here that this was not the best arrangement, and the practice was discontinued only recently. In 1990, the CIB was split into two-Criminal Intelligence (CI)

and Security Intelligence (SI). Smith (then CP) headed the SI while his former deputy, now promoted CP, Saidu Aliyu, took charge of the CI. The CI was for information on criminals and criminal activities, while the SI unit dealt with information on security of the nation, including sabotage, espionage, subversion, 'undue radicalism', treason and terrorism (Dawodu 2006, p.56). Names have changed but performance still remains the issue. Today, the CIB 'has, wittingly or unwittingly, been converted into an investigative unit at various levels of the Force' and consequently, 'reduced the efficiency and intelligence gathering mechanism of the [NPF]' (Reform Committees 2006/2008, in Chukwuma 2008, p.27, 81).

The NPF: Some perspectives on intelligence

Police institutions generally are closed and conservative (Reiner 1992). The NPF is seen more as 'a law enforcer' than a 'peace maker' (Ehindero 1998, p.130; Alemika 2003, p.19). Ehindero observes:

> "Police as an organisation is traditional and to a large extent conservative. Abandoning old activities are as difficult as taking new ones. It is therefore not surprising that Police management techniques lag behind about a quarter of a century behind management development in the private sector [in Nigeria]. This is because Policing is reluctant to look at management ideas which are not marketed specifically as police management. As a result new concepts come to the Police already reformulated to fit a particular idea of Police needs. Sometimes the new management ideas have been adapted and reformulated so much that modifications effectively nullify the new management ideas"

(1998, p.128-129)

This observation aptly illustrates the NPF's perspectives on intelligence and intelligence-led policing. However, the need for change is not only imperative but inevitable:

> "Because change is the only constant phenomenon in life, the policing of society thus involves a constant reappraisal of the shifting conditions of life and their effects on the peace of mind and security of lives and property of the people. It is a most demanding assignment and the policing authority must interpret those developments correctly and take very decisive actions to maintain the peace and protect life and property".
>
> (1998, p.xii)

The NPF is now trying to move from the traditional model of policing to a new model. This traditional model has to do with 'arrest, search, detention and prosecution of offenders', and is rooted in police statutory duties. This style is now 'inadequate', so 'new preventive concepts' are needed. This new philosophy entails 'modern preventive policing tactics [and strategies which] part ways with the traditional model'; it is the elevation of 'a law enforcer' to 'a problem solver'. And this comes in four stages- identifying the problem; analyzing the problem; responding by setting strategies; and assessing and evaluating it (Ehindero 1998, p.130). The NPF is striving 'to modernize its operations in the 21st century' (Onashile 2007, p.131); and to 'appraise its position' in order to 'prepare for even more challenging

situations in the future' (Ahiede 2007, p. 283). It also wants to improve on its methodologies, described as 'a body of methods applied by the police for the effective discharge of its activities'; or 'a set of procedures and guiding principles that direct the conduct of the police officers in line of duty' (Ogunlowo 2007, 83-84). This search has set the NPF leadership on a journey of ideas and concepts in modern policing, as discussed in the introduction, with community policing (COP) and intelligence-led policing (ILP) as front runners. However, the concern here is intelligence.

The NPF believes intelligence gathering is an essential tool of policing: 'of prime importance for planning and future strategies', as 'incorrect information may lead to incorrect assessment of the crisis and incorrect action by the police' (Ehindero 1998, p.132). Furthermore:

> "Information is the key to all policing...activities. There is need to continuously gather intelligence reports about criminal individuals and associates, receivers... operational hideouts, targets, and mode of operations. Information is vital and investigators must regard everyone they come in contact with as a potential source of information. Information received through this medium is useful in combating crime. Cultivating informers is an essential part of police duty and this is achieved by building relationships as well as developing rapport with members of the public..."
>
> (Ogunlowo 2007, p.85)

Membere states:

> "The objective of crime prevention activities is therefore to employ adequate but deliberately planned actions and measures to counteract both the causes and effects of crime and criminal activities within a community, check and neutralize the desires, the urge, the plot and opportunities to commit crime. In pursuit of these goals the responsibility of Police Officers begins with the search for and the identification of the type and nature of crimes prevalent and being perpetrated within a specified environment and the method of operations of the criminals directly within the area or community under survey".
>
> (1982, p.162)

There is a problem here. The NPF does not have an official definition of intelligence, though the IGP is 'the Chief Crime Officer to Mr. President' and 'he also has to cope with national intelligence gathering' (Atta 1996, p. 31). Nevertheless, the police leadership has been pursuing, erratically and therefore unsuccessfully, the establishment of a National Policy on Criminal Intelligence Sharing among security agencies in Nigeria (Okiro 2008b, p.12). The question is, if the NPF has not succeeded within its ranks, how can it expect to succeed nation-wide? Within the NPF, there is a problem of 'common understanding of criminal intelligence and its usefulness', so establishing intelligence-led policing, "without also having a shared understanding of what 'criminal intelligence' " is (Anyagafu 2010, p.34), is difficult. Occasionally, some officers do take a position. Onovo, for instance, takes intelligence as 'the combination of credible information with quality analysis'; 'information that has been evaluated and from which conclusions have been drawn'; or 'data that can be used proactively for

strategic and tactical purposes' (2004, p.8). Another defines 'intelligence report' to be 'a report on latent or emerging issues that constitute [a] threat which may lead to conflicts'; so 'the aim of intelligence report is to allow appropriate authorities take action to prevent violence or conflict'. On the other hand, 'intelligence-led policing' is 'a proactive policing methodology... characterized by intelligence gathering on criminals to truncate their [criminals'] plans and thereby prevent crime' (Adoda 2008, p. 87). A senior intelligence manager defines intelligence as 'the product resulting from the collection, evaluation, integration and interpretation of all available information which concerns one or more aspects of policing and are immediately or potentially significant for police planning and operations' (Ogwume Dec. 2010). Ehindero is emphatic: it is 'data gathering and intelligence information and statistics to find out the pattern of crime and disorder that may not be immediately obvious' (1998, p.130).Beyond these platitudes, however, the NPF is still searching for its own definition of intelligence and intelligence-led policing. As Dawodu observes, the CIB is 'the only major organ available to the Police to gather intelligence'; it is 'the brain house of the Force', but unfortunately, it 'has since been in slumber' (2006, p.47-48). Onovo's confusion is symbolic: 'which national system of intelligence collection will be best suited for us here in Nigeria?'(2004, p. 9). Police intelligence architecture in Nigeria has therefore become 'an intelligence black hole': 'where all information is swallowed up but from where no light emerges' (Ratcliffe and Sheptycki 2009, p. 249). Unfortunately, this confusion and buck-passing continues:

> "Whatever shortcomings there [are] in the much-maligned policing system could only be traced to other institutional defects beyond the reach of the Police Management Team's strategic initiatives. These could only be addressed by policy measures to shore up the very foundations on which any efficient and effective security system is built".
>
> (Arase and Iwuofor 2007, p. 22)

Moreover, the NPF does not have an official classification of intelligence, as to types and levels. As in other areas of its operation and activities, the organisation has been improvising with received traditions and nomenclatures from outsiders; influences from the Nigerian military and from outside the country, impacting a few lucky officers who have gone on courses within Nigeria and abroad. According to Folawiyo, the NPF employs two basic types: 'operational' and 'strategic' intelligence. Operational intelligence is 'for short term law enforcement purposes', or 'for immediate impact in the arrests' of suspected persons and in carrying out seizures and forfeitures. Operational intelligence 'is useful for street level officers or field officers [frontline officers]'. Strategic intelligence, on the other hand, is 'for long term focus or goals by chiefs [of police] to determine priorities on crimes and criminals based on insights, nature, types, scope and future trends' (2010, p.1-2). He believes that the little impact the NPF has made in intelligence is due to the dedication and professionalism of a handful of officers, and adds that the NPF must seriously brace up to its responsibilities in this area (personal communication, Nov. 2010).

As neither crime analysis nor intelligence analysis is done yet in the NPF at an organisational (not personal) level, it is the opinion of this writer

that, describing the intelligence cycle or process is a misnomer. However, in the closest description of the cycle, Membere posits:

> "On receipt of any information, it is usually unwise to set out to attack the location or target without checking-out the information. Any information should be checked for confirmation as to its truthfulness or authenticity of the facts. As a start, surveillance should be placed on the target –the building or premises or on the person, covered and shadowed for sufficiently reasonable time, as to where the suspect visits and who are his or her associates etc. This activity would enable the Police to collect sufficient data to rebut or confirm the suspicion and even to pin-point the exact target".
>
> (1982, p. 247)

So, the intelligence process, universally defined or practised, is strange to the NPF. Nevertheless, Folawiyo believes there are a few officers who recognize and operate the intelligence cycle. He constructs a Seven -Step Intelligence Cycle, which he believes some officers have been applying. The first is 'tasking', the 'allocation' of 'what to do', or the recognition of a particular intelligence requirement. 'Assessment': is the 'scrutinising' and 'perusing' of what to do; the 'how' or 'feasibility' of the task. 'Collection' is third stage: actually 'doing' or performing the 'task'. 'Evaluation' is next: where 'you consider the value of information before interpreting the quality of data capture', to 'enhance confidence in the process of analysis'. Evaluation 'must assess sources used'; it must judge or weigh 'the validity of information', and 'assess [the] relationship of source and information' through a 'standardized system' in order to '[gauge] the

outcome'. The fifth step is 'collation': here the 'information is stored by cross-referencing', which could involve the use of 'paper files, card indices, [and] computer record[s]'; and this enhances 'fast/ accurate retrieval'. It also involves planning, or collating will be difficult to do. The storing must be 'in a simple/logical manner', because 'poor collation can affect [the] value of analysis'. Next is analysis, with three levels: integration, interpretation and conclusion or development of a hypothesis. With integration the meaning receives clarity; interpretation applies 'inductive logic to develop inference on [criminal] activities, roles and methods'; and hypothesis becomes 'theory that can focus further data collection', or 'theory...to be confirmed or denied through testing'. This is by asking questions such as 'who', 'what', 'how', 'where', 'when', and 'why'? The seventh or final step, 'dissemination', involves sharing/using the product, or 'getting the product into action otherwise [it is] wasted'. The client asking for the product is known during planning. And dissemination could be made orally or in written form; or, it could be in both forms. But, generally, it is presented in oral form to field officers and in written form to policy makers (Folawiyo 2010, p.2-4; personal communication Nov. 2010). The absence of feedback or review is the major weakness of this construct.

For the NPF, the sources and resources of intelligence are varied but haphazard, unorganized and erratic. These include the occasional professional informants who are paid. Others are criminals who 'give away their colleagues either for money or to seek revenge'; 'casual informants'; 'undercover agents' who "are 'planted' inside the target or as near it as possible"; and 'police discreet investigation' (Membere 1982, p.247). The old-fashioned treatment and attention given to police informants' use has

been clearly brought out in the NPF *Training Manual*, but the actual practice is different today (Detective College 1976, p. 66-67).Worse still, is the fact that 'there [has been] no information fund to ...recruit informants' (Para. 6.0 of Reform Committee Report 2006, in Chukwuma 2008). Anyagafu agrees: '[it] is difficult to say if the Force can boast of informants today except those who are victims of crime' (2010, p.34-35). As 'informants are the lifeblood' of police work (Roger Richardson, in Bright 2003, p. xv), it beats the imagination that the NPF leadership remains non-chalant about it? Membere includes as sources of intelligence, 'crime prevention surveys', 'crime prevention programmes' (p.158-159,162), use of crime statistics 'based on accurate information' (p.164-165), and 'crime maps' (p.168-172). The addition, recently, of more than 52 Closed Circuit Television or Public Space Surveillance (CCTV/PSS) cameras 'for digital security surveillance', which is 'to help the [NPF] monitor, detect and investigate crime with great ease as it's done in developed nations' (**National Compendium Vol. 4 No. 9** Oct. 2006, p.11; **Police News Vol. 1 No. 5** p. 21), is important. Many observers hope the CCTV launch in Lagos and Abuja (2006 and 2010), the commercial and political capitals of Nigeria respectively, would be sustained.

The previous chapter described two basic components of intelligence: the intelligence manager and the analyst. The latter is the specialist. In the NPF today, there is no known analyst in the professional or technical sense. True, a few officers have benefitted from crime and intelligence analysis, or allied courses, but none is known or designated as analyst in the entire organisation. Many within and outside the NPF even doubt if any

analysis is done. In the course of this project, some key officers, senior and long-serving in intelligence, personally felt embarrassed or scandalized, at this and other questions. The issue is, they were/are not aware of analysis in the professional and technical sense of the word. So, the fact remains: 'intelligence analysts are non-existent in the [NPF] today' (Anyagafu 2010, p. 34).

There is also the assumption that the NPF recognizes the value and importance of intelligence and intelligence-led policing, judging from the attention given to it, as described in the introduction. But that assumption is rebuttable. If the taste of the pudding is in the eating, then one cannot agree that the NPF values intelligence-led policing with what is on ground. It appears the various IGPs came with their different agendas for propaganda and political purposes. It could also be argued that the NPF has lost some real value through wasted resources and diverted attention through these publicity stunts.

Perhaps, the most important intelligence product of the NPF is the daily intelligence report or briefing the IGP gives the President without fail, aside his duties as the nation's number one chief security officer (Atta 1996, p.31). This report or brief outlines the internal security situation in the country and advises or suggests what should be done in that regard. It is a most valuable document, and its impact or value reflects on the way the government also perceives the police in Nigeria. There is the general feeling that the value/impact of this document has been going on a downward trend in the last couple of years. Other products include the weekly, monthly and quarterly briefs coming from the lower rungs of the police hierarchy upwards. Some of these products are for local

consumption. The State Intelligence Bureau (SIB) may offer its products to the State Government through the CP. Aside these periodic and formal products, other special products can also crop up, depending on circumstances. For instance in an area where the law appears to be breaking down or any unusual incident is brewing, the authorities may ask for a daily or hourly intelligence report from the command. This comes in when there is need for the authorities to monitor and nip a situation in the bud. Reports on the Abuja bomb blasts in October 2010, for instance, are special intelligence products.

The NPF Intelligence Architecture

This section is a critical examination of the NPF intelligence architecture from the local to the force headquarters level. The NPF has a hierarchy of seven steps: the Village Post, the Police Station, Division, the Area Command, State Command, the Zone and the Force Headquarters. The intelligence infrastructure at the local level, from the Village Post to the Divisional Headquarters, is however not a structured or formalized arrangement; intelligence gathering here is fluid. From the time the Special Branch began to fail, with no proper intelligence outfit at local or national level, and intelligence began to take the backwaters in the NPF, the Stations and Divisions were forced to operate investigation and information- gathering units under various names. They were (are) known as Surveillance Squads, Suspect Squads, Divisional Police Officer's Squads, Special Squads, Anti-Vice Teams, and Stop and Search. Other squads are called Crack, Eagle, Hawk, Monitoring, Anti-Burglary, 'X' Squad, Anti-Corruption, Safety Squads, Special Investigation Panel, and

Political Desk Squads (Osuji *et al* 2008, p.7). These units appear to create more problems than provide solutions. One, what is the basis for all these nomenclatures? Two, how do these outfits define and delineate their duties and operations? Again, would the units pass useful information not related to their schedule, to others for further action? What is their total impact or value compared to their large numbers? Furthermore, all the outfits 'lacked trained personnel in intelligence-gathering' (Ehindero 1998, p.132). The problem, however, is not just lack of skills, but the use to which they were/are put. Most of the units are solely or directly responsible to the officers and commanders that constituted them and they have little bearing on the investigation or information aspect of policing. Because of their informal or pseudo formal nature, their activities and operations are not generally known to the mainstream of policing in their areas of responsibility (AoRs). Sometimes, the police personnel outside these units are afraid or just indifferent in their relations with these organs. So, how could the units possibly or maximally function?

Moreover, because they are a privileged group, the units, invariably, become sometimes silent and sometimes blatant corruption outfits and extortion centres that cannot be challenged. Their activities once got to a head that the IGP called for an investigation. In the report submitted, a section was titled, significantly, 'Unwholesome Duplicity of Investigating [and Intelligence] Teams [sic]' (Osuji *et al* 2008, p.7).Though the report was specifically on the 'South-South Geo-Political Zone of the Country', it speaks volumes on the investigation and intelligence condition of the NPF as a whole. While the intelligence units at these lower levels are fluid, erratic and epileptic, their counterparts at the State Command, the Zonal

Command and the Force Headquarters levels are organized and structured, but very little is systematic, scientific or sophisticated in their organisation and operation. Nevertheless, in the current reform drive, the former State, Zonal and Force CIB's have been re-christened State Intelligence Bureau (SIB), Zonal Intelligence Bureau (ZIB), and Force Intelligence Bureau (FIB), respectively (Ref: SB:3383/FS/ FHQ/ ABJ/Vol. T1/45 of Nov. 26, 2010).

Formerly the Criminal Intelligence Bureau (CIB), the State Intelligence Bureau (SIB--Figure 1) is headed by a Superior Police Officer (SUPOL), from the rank of Assistant Superintendent of Police (ASP), to Chief Superintendent of Police (CSP), depending on the profile and pedigree of the Command. The head of the unit is called Officer-in-Charge (O/C). There is a Second-in-Command (2 i/c), who takes charge in the absence of the O/C. The duties of the O/C include:

"Fulfilling the overall mandate for which the bureau was established;

"Acting as the bridge between the Command/Commissioner and the Assistant-Inspector General of Police (AIG)/Zonal Headquarters on one hand and the Force Headquarters on all Intelligence matters, on the other;

"He 'tasks' the personnel under him as the police authorities direct him or as occasions warrant;

"Supervises the personnel and directs them to fulfill their 'intelligence and information mandate';

"Sees to the smooth running of the whole intelligence unit and ensures there is no hitch or failure in the information/ intelligence channel of the Command;

"He empowers the personnel by way of in-training via lectures and talks, etc, given or organised by him;

"Organises or recommends the personnel for specific training and capacity-building to enhance their skills and performance;

"Also prepares and ensures the intelligence reports are forwarded unfailingly;

"He collates or acts as 'the collating officer', or 'analyst', for the intelligence unit of the Command; and

"Acts as the Liaison Officer (LO) between the police and other security/ intelligence agencies in his state, or AOR."

The bureau has two officers under the deputy. They are the Criminal Intelligence Officer (CIO), and the Intelligence Operations Officer (IOO), who send their respective reports to the O/C through the Administrative Officer (AO). As the name suggests, the AO is the clerical and secretarial coordinator of the unit, who puts reports into shape under the direction of the O/C or 2i/c. The CIO and IOO each has under them the Area Intelligence Officers (AIOs): these are the field officers attached to the Area Intelligence Units (AIUs), based in the Area Commands, who submit their reports to the CIO or the IOO, as the case may be. These reports deal with what they have observed on the streets about 'tasked' issues or emerging issues of criminal, security or national interest. The same applies to the Local Intelligence Officers (LIOs) attached to the Local Intelligence Units at

the Divisions. The reports submitted by both the AIOs and LIOs are then collated and referred to the authorities for necessary action (Longe Nov. 2010; Ogwume Dec. 2010). Occasionally, these intelligence reports hit the mark in the short term; but the long-term perspective (strategy) remains the problem. The LIOs could be regarded as an attempt to bridge the gap in intelligence matters at the divisional level from the Command Intelligence centre (SIB). But this lacuna, to be filled, needs more than a symbolic gesture. After all, the personnel from the State Command and these units come from the same, mostly untrained and unskilled pool. Another major influence on the SIB is the CP of the Command, either for good or bad.

Figure 1


STATE INTELLIGENCE BUREAU (SIB)
Officer – in – Charge (O/C)
Second-in- Command (2 I/C)
Administrative Officer (A/O)
Intelligence Operations Officer (IOO)
Criminal Intelligence Officer (CIO)
Area Intelligence Officer (AIO)
Local Intelligence Unit or Division (LIU/LID)
Local Intelligence Unit or Division (LIU/LID)
Local Intelligence Unit or Division (LIU/LID)
Field Officers

Although the SIBs have a basic and similar structure in the Force, there could be some variation in their field operations. Commands have their operational peculiarities; some concentrate on pipeline vandalization and others on kidnapping, or ritual killings, etc. For instance, the SIB at the Federal Capital Territory (Abuja) has a Station Officer (SO), in addition to the CIO and the IOO. This is due to the Command's work load. Some of the responsibilities of the SO are leading undercover operations, monitoring criminal hideouts, and the night-time industry (Ogwume Dec. 2010). He adds that some SIB's now go beyond their primary area of responsibility (AoR) due to the exigencies of duty. They are now forced to go extra-territorial to build co-operation and enhance performance; because what happens in one area affects the others. That is the case with the Group of Six States (G6): the FCT (Abuja), Nassarawa, Kaduna, Kogi, Niger and Benue. The last five are the adjoining States to the Capital, Abuja, and they were brought together in 2008, to learn from the 'success' of the FCT Command, encouraged by a former minister in the capital city. A Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was prepared and necessary logistics were provided accordingly (Ogwume Dec. 2010).

The Zonal Intelligence Bureau (ZIB--Figure 2)) is structured in a similar way to the SIB, except that it is higher in hierarchy and superior in authority, being the supervisory organ for the State Command and its SIB. The functions of the O/C in the ZIB are the same with those of the O/C SIB; ditto for the 2i/c. Under the 2i/c is the Administrative Officer (AO), who may or may not have an Inspector or Sergeant Administration. The ZIB has an Intelligence Operations Officer (IOO) and a Criminal Intelligence Officer

(CIO). As the Zone supervises a number of State Commands, it has Intelligence Officers (IOs) stationed there, who are the field officers or operatives and they report to the O/C through the administrative channel.

Figure 2



As is the case with the SIB, the operatives of the ZIB go on the streets and file in reports that have implications for crime or may impinge on the security of the state in any way. These operatives may or may not have specific beats or desks which they cover and report on, depending on availability and quality of personnel. For instance, some may cover higher institutions or politics. In the absence of these operatives (whether because of leave, transfer, disciplinary matter, etc), qualified or competent personnel may not be easily available to replace them. As a result, the reports may sometimes have a general, omnibus nature, whose value will be determined at the ZIB Headquarters (Longe Nov. 2010).Occasionally, there have been misjudgments and miscalculations on the part of the higher authority. Sometimes, the SIB may be coerced by the ZIB to maintain a no -complaints façade of normalcy. In some cases also, political, tribal, religious and other considerations are allowed to overshadow policing priorities. In essence, what the ZIB does to the SIB, the FIB does to the ZIB; a form of pecking order. And so, information/intelligence gathering continues with its 'motions without movement' (Chukwuma and Alemika 2008).

The Force Intelligence Bureau (FIB—Figure 3) has some history behind it, as the early part of this chapter has demonstrated. However, it still has a long way to go in the management of police intelligence. The FIB is now headed by an AIG, replacing the CP. This has to do with elevating and promoting intelligence-led policing in the NPF. By making an AIG, superior in rank and authority, the head of the Bureau, the NPF is signaling a step change, a higher ground than before for the unit; attaching a more than passing recognition to the importance of intelligence in the police. The

police authorities believe that, for policing to be done with the 21st century in focus, a paradigm shift must take place in crime prevention and management. They believe the pillar of policing today is intelligence and that the NPF, to succeed, must come along. This arrangement is expected to bring in more changes which are, hopefully, going to impact police intelligence. Incidentally, the pioneer AIG is Ganiyu Dawodu, now a DIG, heading the 'D' Department, the Force Investigation and Intelligence Bureau (FIIB). As he explains, the FIB hopes to make an indelible mark on police intelligence in Nigeria and, more crucially, on the acrimonious inter-agency relations between the NPF and sister agencies. He speaks warmly and passionately on the need and desire of the police authorities to work together with these agencies as the NPF could not go it alone; indeed that Nigeria cannot afford that the agencies continue to bicker and divide (Nov. 2009).

FORCE INTELLIGENCE BUREAU(FIB)



Figure 3

In the current organogram of the FIB, the AIG reports directly to the Inspector-General of Police (IGP/INGENPOL). This was the position in the days of the Special Branch (SB). The belief then was that, because the head of the SB had direct access to the IGP (and sometimes the Head of State), matters needing urgent and close attention were treated expeditiously; explaining the reason the NPF had little problems and great success. This direct access principle is back, with the hope that same speed and efficiency will result. Amadi states that the AIG headship of the bureau is:

> '...to reposition the unit for greater challenges, especially the threat of insurgency and Militancy [sic] from the Niger Delta. The AIG has the responsibility of coordination of all [sic] the activities of [the CIB] throughout the Federation and [to] collate and disseminate timely intelligence to the Inspector-General of Police'
>
> (2008, [n. p.])

On the official relationship between the AIG and the DIG--since the AIG could see the IGP without DIG's authorization or permission--Dawodu says, 'there is no problem and none envisaged'. He explains that the AIG's position 'could be described as semi-autonomous'; that the DIG in charge of FIIB, comprising investigations and intelligence, 'is the administrative as well as operational head of the FIIB and he oversees and directs their affairs'; while 'the AIG is responsible only for the administrative and operational direction/control of the [FIB], and reports directly to the IGP, nothing more nothing less'. Reminded this is only an informal arrangement and that personalities coming after the AIG and DIG could overturn this, as

witnessed several times in the police (most of the Command CPs and their deputies hardly harmonize; ditto at FHQ level where the 'Force Management Team' (FMT) has 'force' but is neither 'managing' nor a 'team'); he still replies 'there would be no problem' (Dawodu Nov. 2009). The former AIG (interviewee) is promoted DIG now with an AIG under him, and events may not be working out as expected. This writer, therefore, suggests the direct access principle be formalized or canonized, if it is to endure. That is, for the FIB to be fully autonomous and truly independent. Whichever way one looks at it, the principle needs to be properly reviewed in a country where pluralism and multiplicity (or multi-culturalism) is being increasingly challenged (Sunday Mirror 31 Jan. 2011, p.49). The AIG and the IGP, working on this principle and coming from the same area or background, may exploit it to the country's/Force's disadvantage. Some attention has been given to the leadership issue because a great impact could be made through it. The authorities should give serious attention to this and similar questions in future. The direct access principle was intended to work some intelligence miracles, but so far, there is no difference; as recent events show. However, it's not all about the AIG.

The AIG has under him in Abuja and Lagos a CP each (see Figure 3). Directly under each CP is the Deputy Commissioner of Police (DCP). The DCP has one Assistant Commissioner of Police (ACP) each for Operations and Administration. They oversee the two sections and report to the CP who himself reports to the AIG. The organogram stretches to include an Administrative Officer (AO), the O/C Technical and the O/C Transport (TPT). The work of the AO remains the same; the O/C TPT has a clear mandate for the vehicles and the movement of personnel; and the

O/C Technical takes care of the equipment, the tools of the trade, and whatever soft or hardware the agency has. He also suggests and advises the authorities on necessary equipment to acquire. At the base of this structure are the teams with their personnel who are the field operatives. The teams are labelled alphabetically (A, B, C, etc) and they monitor and report on politics, conferences and seminars, the trade unions, students groups, banks and financial institutions, chieftaincy/ religious/ boundary matters, embassies and consulates, etc. The teams monitor and report on these matters and pass the reports up, for further action. It is the opinion of many observers within and outside the police that the FIB is working grossly below expectations (**The Punch** Feb.1, 2011, p. 55). The current impasse in police intelligence has contributed to some ugly incidents recently. A major weakness of the department is that most operatives are not sufficiently educated to be there, or even in any modern police; but they are, because their area or zonal personnel quotas, following the federal character principle, must be balanced, unfortunately, at the expense of merit (see Appendix B). Unfortunately, the department, like the NPF, does not provide sufficient or professional levels of intelligence training for its personnel. Furthermore, as the negative national environment (so-called Nigerian Factor) rubs off on many public institutions, the NPF/FIB is not immune. Other problems: lack of equipment and technical aids; lack of understanding of the definition, nature and scope of police intelligence and the question of qualitative and transformational leadership, still remain.

Summary: Emerging perspectives

The analysis above paints a composite picture of police intelligence in Nigeria today. From this, one sees no clarity of purpose; no official position on NPF definitions of intelligence or intelligence-led policing. Also, there is no long-term or strategic planning and neither is any proactive thinking and action-based programme involved in NPF intelligence management. Official thinking on intelligence in the NPF is still at its infancy, if not nil, depending on one's perspectives. Its role, purpose and potential, and the ramifications (the need for involving the community, the role of partners, etc) are yet to be appreciated or appropriated. The real paradigm shift (Harfield and Harfield 2008, p. 20) is still being awaited in Nigerian policing. Consequently, if intelligence 'aims to provide insight or understanding, and make a contribution to broad strategies, policies and resources', to be 'primarily directed to the achievement of long-term organizational objectives' (Ratcliffe 2008, p.6); and if it is 'to describe a problem in all its complexity, explaining the links, the contingencies, the players, the values and the opportunities', so as to provide 'priorities to be established and targets selected', to 'be able to determine the tactics appropriate to the problem to be addressed' (ACPO 2001), then the NPF is not in yet. Furthermore, if talking about intelligence-led policing is where appropriate structure or architecture, characterized by '...handling, controls, authorities, record keeping, co-ordinating, and tasking groups and inter-agency [collaboration]', and where 'informers, analysis, and profiling [are] promoted into mainstream policing', by utilizing 'analytic and reasoning tools to study risk, health, safety and welfare, and human rights' (Grieve 2008, p. x) all

come within the package, the NPF is still a century away, for all practical purposes. The NPF may occasionally talk of 'scientific aids' and 'modern techniques' (Onashile 2007; Ogunshakin 2007), but the organisation, practically, is dwelling in the woods, and still groping in darkness.

So, this time may or may not be the 'early developmental stages' in 'organizational changes and cultural shifts' for the NPF, but Ratcliffe's observation is very true of the organisation:

> "While a number of police departments are experimenting with intelligence-led policing, some claims to be intelligence-led are rather dubious and often just based on the police department making arrests in a case rather than demonstrating any proof that the case was a priority resulting from managerial decisions based on strategic assessment of the criminal environment. Unfortunately, many such approaches tend to stress the intelligence aspect of intelligence-led policing rather than emphasizing policing; in doing so, they relegate the value of crime intelligence to a sideshow rather than as central to organizational goal".
>
> (2008, p. 211, p.10)

The Nigeria Police is in a dilemma: is intelligence-led policing to be or not to be domesticated? It appears the omens are portending a wind of change towards it. However, the structure and superstructure for this change are significantly absent. As Anyagafu observes, intelligence-led policing has 'tremendous benefits' and 'the cost of implementing [it] is

minimal'. He therefore 'strongly' advises 'that the [NPF] should adopt the strategy' (2010, p. 27-28, 37). Despite the odds, the NPF should not be deterred. Flood and Gaspar have observed that even in the UK, NIM is 'an incremental process', where 'mistakes are made and misunderstandings' encountered, but 'it [NIM] was not the conclusion... merely the beginning' (2008, p. 64). Moreover, the New Jersey State Police (NJSP) was 'the first' in the US 'to provide an online guide to intelligence-led policing', but today 'is still engaged in the process of learning and expanding intelligence-led policing within [the] organization' (Fuentes 2008, p.176); and still 'building the plane as we're flying it' (Guidetti 2008, p. 26). Does the NPF have the requisite knowledge and capacity to build and fly its own plane--policing Nigeria by deploying intelligence? The next chapter examines the issues.

3. Knowledge Is Power: Capacity and the intelligence function in the NPF

> "Knowledge is power".
>
> (Sir Francis Bacon, 1561-1626)

> "Without sound administrative and [modern] personnel management techniques no organisation can make any progress in the present day and there will be general chaos [if they attempt it]".

> "The Federal Government is doing all in its power to solve the perennial problems of shortage of manpower, office and residential accommodation and in providing sophisticated equipment without which no Police Force can hope to meet the challenges posed by criminals..."
>
> (*The NPF Handbook of General Information* 1981, p.19, 5)

The chapter is in three sections. The first is an appraisal of the intelligence landscape: a discussion on the Nigeria Police Force's failings and the response of the society to these. The second is a detailed examination and analysis of knowledge and capacity issues as they impact the NPF. There is an implicit suggestion that these deficiencies partly explain NPF's intelligence failings. The final part is a restatement of highlights and conclusion. The chapter, for space, does not explore all the concepts raised; it assumes, *apriori,* that they are understood. It briefly defines, however, the concept of 'knowledge management'.

The NPF: An overview of the intelligence landscape

The last two quotes above were penned three decades ago by officers who experienced a bit of the old, colonial, but comparatively effective and efficient NPF. Since that golden era passed, things have not remained the

same. Fast forward to 2010, Nigeria's 50th independence anniversary. An influential newspaper proprietor has lamented:

> "Let no one deceive himself by continuing to imagine, let alone hope, that we can solve the problem of kidnapping, robberies, and other related crimes without a wholesome overhaul of the police system, especially its cumbersome central structure. A police system that is not based on adequate knowledge of the social dynamics of its operating locale cannot provide the appropriate response to the complexities of present day crimes... We need to inquire, once again, about the capacity and present structure of the nation's policing system to effectively rise to such challenges, especially in the context of crime prevention".
>
> (Ogunsola July 2010)

The skeptic stands pardoned if this evidence is lightly esteemed. What about this:

> "...the Nigerian Society [sic] has undergone fundamental transformation in several respects over nearly half a century of nationhood. Regrettably, the Nigeria Police is an institution that has not kept pace with this rapid transformation. This has obviously resulted in it neither being prepared nor equipped to cope with the challenges of policing a modern, increasingly urban society like ours in today's technology- and knowledge- driven world..."
>
> (President Yar'Adua, in *Police Annual Report* 2008)

He concludes: 'It has become necessary for the Government to reform and reposition our Police...to make it fully functional and able to meet its constitutional mandate and effective maintenance of law and order [sic]". Consequently, the government empanelled another reform committee in 2008. The nation is still waiting for the genuine fruits of both committees' work.

Meanwhile, police leaders themselves have been diagnosing the problems of the organisation. Ehindero, echoing Sir Robert Mark (1977), says the police 'in a critical society' should no longer be 'artisans' but 'articulate professionals', who are 'skilled in management and competent to analyze and perform [their] service/social functions with integrity, humility, commitment, sensitivity and sensibility'. He believes the management techniques of the NPF are about 25 years behind those of the private sector (1998, p.128-129). He adds that for proper law enforcement in Nigeria, 'the human, scientific, technological, organizational, institutional and resource capabilities [sic]', must be involved. He posits this will enhance the NPF ability for evaluation on 'the crucial questions related to policy .choices and modes of implementation'. He believes this will empower the NPF to successfully 'manage change...resolve conflict [and] institutional pluralism'; 'enhance co-ordination'; 'foster communication', and 'ensure...data and information are shared' (Ehindero 2008, p.99). He takes capacity building as 'paying special and maximum attention to both human and material resources' (p.102). Okiro also notes that NPF's journey 'has been a tortuous one from the First Republic [independence] to date', having 'suffered neglect in areas of manpower, equipment and logistics, as well as welfare' (2009, p. 45). This neglect Tamuno refers to as 'the police predicament' (Tamuno 1996). This informed then Police Affairs Minister's comment that the policeman is not the problem, but 'the system that must give the [police officer] the conducive atmosphere, the infrastructural requirement in terms of training and equipment', so that they could give their best (Waziri, in **POLIS Vol. 2 No. 3** 2010). Lame before him had

confessed there was no 'security infrastructure to really work', or to 'ensure efficiency and correct record [keeping]' (in **POLIS**, the Maiden Edition, p. 23). Kayode Are, former Deputy National Security Adviser, observes, that 'the national security infrastructure' in Nigeria (the NPF is a major stakeholder) is not functional or working. He, therefore, calls for massive investments in security infrastructure (**The Guardian** 31 May 2010).

It is pertinent to return to Ogunsola's statement above. The gentleman made the comment during the saga of five kidnapped journalists in mid-2010. The police authorities, typically, resorted to various means (from blackmail to tribal jingoism) to rescue the victims. At a time, the IGP and some aides relocated to the south-east, where the actual incident occurred and where these kidnappings were most endemic. The NPF further deployed an 'additional 10,000 policemen in [the] South-East', to combat the menace (**Nigerian Tribune** 17 June 2010). This mass policing, or policing by large numbers, is now standard pattern for the NPF. Policing issues or problems which simple and affordable technology could handle have become lingering problems and, unfortunately in most cases, are now regarded as part of the menu of policing in Nigeria.

The National Intelligence Model (NIM-UK) recognises four categories of assets: knowledge, system, source and people (Harfield and Harfield 2008, p. xxvii). As the NPF does not have or operate any model yet, one is not sure of NIM's equivalents in the NPF. It is true, however, that intelligence-led policing (ILP) emphasises data and analysis in 'police strategic thinking', different from the 'whack-a-mole policing that arrests offenders with no overarching strategy' (Ratcliffe 2008, p. 6-7). Intelligence-led policing also involves 'having the necessary trained personnel, properly

equipped to *gather* and *analyse* the intelligence that will inform the products', and these 'capacity and capability create outcomes, which is the purpose of effective intelligence' (Harfield and Harfield 2008, p.96;emphasis in original). If it is so, does the NPF have these (capacity and capability) to properly function? Using Kupolati's words, is the NPF 'legally, statutorily and structurally equipped to break the deep-rooted ice of perfidy and deceit that often plague [Nigeria's social, criminal] and political system' (2007, p. 483)? The rest of the chapter deals with some of these capacity and capability issues in the belief that the NPF is neither equipped with, nor does it have the knowledge, to respond to the demands of 21st century policing in general and intelligence-led policing in particular. Does the NPF 'know its business'? (Flood and Gaspar 2009, p. 53)

The NPF: Knowledge and capacity issues and the intelligence function

The first of these critical issues is manpower and personnel. When in the early 1990's Tamuno wrote that 'any dispassionate analysis of the multiple problems of the [NPF] will...reveal that its hardest nuts lie in men than in measures and materials' (1993a, p. xvii), he actually hit the nail on the head. Ebo also agrees there is 'a concern about persistent and acute decline in performance level of police personnel over the years since... 1960' (1993, p.356). The problem has gone progressively worse over the years, no thanks to the flawed, highly politicized and irregular recruitment procedures, and the declining status of the police training institutions turned dumping grounds (Taiwo 2005; Police Academy Memo to PCPR 2006). The evidence of Ehindero is crucial:

> "...the era where neophytes would be assigned to investigate criminal offences is gone... we are not going to put a tailor to goand investigate, we must have the census of all those people with professional knowledge [lawyers, statisticians, accountants, etc]...we will make use of them and nobody will be routinely posted to CID [and CIB] unless he has something to offer".
>
> (In **This Day** 18 Jan. 2005, p. 43)

Ehindero's comments are significant. Part of the problem was/is that people who joined the police as nurses, typists, mechanics, drivers, carpenters and tailors (artisans in general), later surreptitiously converted to general duty (GD) officers. The costs of this in terms of personnel inadequacies, manpower failures and organisational morbidity may never be known. Police in other parts of the world are believed to be 'Jacks of all trades' (Reiner 1992, p. 80-81), due to the multiple tasks they perform and the skills and abilities they demonstrate. The situation is different in Nigeria. One can conveniently say that only a minority among the thousands of NPF personnel have skills and abilities that a modern police organisation actually requires. Also, the way the NPF is structured and managed has continuously ignored 'knowledge, skills and abilities (KSAs) required for effective performance of police work', with only a 'few qualified, well-trained and efficient personnel', which should be 'preferred to a force with many but poorly qualified, ill-trained and inefficient officers' (Ebo 1993, p.359), as a policeman can never perform beyond his 'education, training and intellectual dynamics' (Nwolise 2004, p.84). This manpower and personnel situation has further been complicated by extraneous factors having no bearing on the NPF's professional needs.

In the UK, Harfield and Harfield observe that intelligence units are "sometimes seen as a convenient place in which temporarily to situate staff confirmed to 'light duties'". The situation is different in Nigeria: intelligence units, especially at force level, are staffed with personnel who are well connected, good at sycophancy, or who represent a state or regional quota, which must be balanced in a lopsided federal structure (institution) premised, by and large, on a culture of mediocrity and inanity. Postings to intelligence units are also regarded and treated as juicy and lucrative, even though the operatives concerned may not have prepared or submitted reports or dossiers of any security, criminological, or intelligence value! Many are also happy working in *mufti* or civil dress so they can hide their identities, have time to do their own thing and pride themselves as big men and women in policing. Many of these operatives are also struggling with literacy, not to say numeracy. In any case, for both the UK and Nigeria, the 'two forms of immediate opportunity cost' manifest: one is 'reduced capacity and capability in the processing of information into intelligence', or 'reduced output for both proactive and reactive investigators for whom the intelligence department is a source of both information and intelligence'. Second, is the effect on the staff and morale, which comes as 'a longer-term opportunity cost' for those who will not be able to 'respond well to such circumstances', and which engenders 'a further drain on [staff] motivation and productivity' (Harfield and Harfield 2008, p. 7). This does not rule out the possibility of individual officers excelling in this environment. Individuals can still excel, but, as Higgins notes, 'individual knowledge is not always reflected in corporate understanding', since it 'only goes so far' and 'the challenge rests on cultural organisational change' (2009, p. 106).

The crucial importance of manpower and personnel in policing and intelligence management is clearly illustrated by Grieve:

> "At present in the UK over 130,000 officers are touching all levels of the communities they police, gathering information. They all work with people, creating a million personal contacts a year in London. The potential numbers of intelligence submissions and their contributions to risk and community impact assessment, is staggering; with the latest generation of intelligence tools we now have some of the best processes and technology in the world to collate this information".
>
> (2008d, p.38)

For the NPF, therefore, a new approach to police manpower and personnel management is not only urgent but imperative. To witness a transformation in this area, the NPF would need to go beyond personnel administration to human resources management. This approach not only 'takes cognizance of the existence of the traditional requirements for managing personnel', but also 'adopts a systems approach which recognizes the dynamic interaction of personnel functions with each other and with the objectives of the organization', as a whole (Ebo 1993, p. 356, citing Sharman and Chruder 1984). When the MI5 is undertaking 'an unprecedented round of redundancies for older staff', in order to 'hire new intelligence officers with better command of information technology and more up-to-date skills', (**The Telegraph** 29 March 2010), the NPF has a lesson to learn.

The corollary to the challenge of personnel and manpower is the challenge of officer training. The two are intertwined. The training of the personnel makes or mars them. The NPF

> "...has always placed great premium on thorough training because it realises that the effectiveness of Police services to the community is a direct reflection of the performance of the individual member of the Force. Unless the average policeman has been prepared for his duties by adequate training, he cannot be expected to perform well".
>
> (*The NPF Handbook* 1981, p. 23)

Almost every level of police authority and leadership has emphasized training (Lame, in **POLICE** the Maiden Edition 2009, p. 21; Ehindero 2007, p. xxiv; the Presidential Committees on Police Reform 2006/ 2008). As the 2006 Reform Committee has observed, training is 'one of the very important processes of organisational development which must be taken seriously if the organisation is to achieve its goal'. The committee also notes: 'training has fallen below expected standard', mainly 'due to general deterioration in the [NPF] and the dearth of facilities in the training institutions' (in Chukwuma and Alemika 2008; also Taiwo 2005). All this should be juxtaposed with Tamuno's long-standing evidence, that even the British colonial government 'showed much interest in improving the content of instruction given to the police so as to meet Nigeria's needs adequately' (1970, p.181). Gross deficiencies and inadequacies in police training and manpower development have been highlighted in the past (**Police Academy Memo** to 2006 Reform Committee; Taiwo 2004/2005; Onashile 2004). The subsisting training programmes for the two cadet courses were crafted in the 1980's, but hardly anything in it bears resemblance to policing in the 21st century; or intelligence training for that matter (See Appendix C). Intelligence education and training as a programme of instruction is not officially available in any police training institution in Nigeria today, despite

the reform committees, and posturing of the IGPs for the 'massive training of our operatives in intelligence gathering' (IGP's **Conference Paper** of 11 Aug. 2009).

Occasionally, when specialized training is given to officers, the authorities may find some irrelevant use for such trained personnel. For instance, some 'capacity building/training programmes' were arranged to 'improve professionalism, civility and dependability of officers ...for the challenges in the 21st century'. Between 3,000 and 8,000 officers were to be trained nationwide. Other training programmes included internal security, mentoring and evaluation, curriculum development and design, basic intelligence analysis and criminal intelligence, database management, and counter-terrorism and rapid response (**The Dawn** 27 Sep. 3 Oct. 2010, p.1; **The Dawn** 8-14 Nov. 2010, p.5)). Unfortunately, these specially trained officers were not allowed to put this to use:

> "One then wonders if officers who received training in specialized areas are never found in those areas, but the institution takes them away and before you know it they become rusty with such training and ideas. The traditional institution of the present police structure would not allow any new ideas to flourish".
>
> (**The Dawn** 16-22 Aug. 2010, p.18)

And this corroborates de Rover's observation that most police 'education and training are dictated by traditional views on law enforcement, with the stress on law, order, authority and enforcement tactics'. He then offers the solution organisations like the NPF would do well to adopt:

> "Knowing that human capital is the prime driving force behind quality performance in law enforcement, it becomes self-evident

> that levels of recruitment and selection as well as the quality of education and training are of critical importance. Basic qualifications of law enforcement personnel can be influenced both by raising entry level requirements in the recruitment and selection phase and by modifying basic and advanced education and training. The selection of future law enforcement officials is (or should be) based on testing a candidate's profile and qualifications against the profile and qualifications of the law enforcement official sought. The latter profile is a mixture of personal qualities deemed necessary to meet the essential job requirements".
>
> (1998, p.368)

The result:

> "...It is obvious that in situations where standards are low or virtually non-existent, the average qualifications of law enforcement officials will be low. If the existing levels of education and training are also poor, then the quality of law enforcement performance is likely to fall short of expectations".
>
> (de Rover 1998, p.367-368)

De Rover must have had Nigeria in mind when he penned these words, because he is right on target! Today, training in the NPF at the three points of entry (Police Recruit, Cadet Inspector and Cadet ASP) remains a palpable failure! Much more fundamental, however, is the total lack of deliberate, systematic and organisation-wide intelligence training in the NPF. Intelligence staff must be trained, to reduce risk in policing, and to put intelligence practitioners, who 'do not always enjoy the same professional perception that other police specialists acquire', on same or near same pedestal. This training should entail 'systems technology' and enable personnel to be capable of 'free thinking' (Harfield and Harfield 2008, p.154). As Sir David notes, 'untrained' intelligence personnel are often

'seduced by actionable information of passing significance'; so there must be adequate investments in 'good people' and 'skilled professionals' (2009, p. 29), imbued with a 'healthy skepticism', 'an open mind' and 'an investigative approach' (Lord Laming and Fox 2003, in Grieve 2008b, p. 22).

Despite the propaganda, few believe current police training enhances their intelligence function (see Table 3). It makes sense, therefore, for 119 (86.95 per cent) out of 133 respondents, to agree to a comprehensive review of NPF training programmes; while four (2.9 per cent) say, no need, and ten are not sure.

Table 3 shows the response on whether or not police training enhances NPF intelligence function.

Response	No of Respondents	Percentage of Respondents
Yes	34	25
No	75	55
Sometimes	17	12.4
Don't Know	9	6.6
Other	2	1.5
Total	**137**	**100**

There is a connection between the NPF, the money trap and the intelligence function. There is little argument that finance can empower or cripple policing. The UK's MI5 at a time claimed 'lack of resources' and 'poverty over 7/7 failure' (**The First Post** Feb.15, 2007). Atta complained: 'Admittedly, funds are scarce in Nigeria now' (1997, p. 98). Then again:

"The [NPF] can be likened to 'a child that refused to die'. The NPF, 'despite being starved of funds...belittled, attacked, choked, laughed at, dismembered and being taken advantage of [has] refused to die" (Atta 1996, p.192). Okiro, (**Farewell Address 2009**, p.3), while celebrating a meagre topping-up of police officers salary structure (the Consolidated Police Salary Structure (CONPOSS)) forgot to mention the several millions in personnel allowances that remain unpaid, and the irreparable damage to officers' morale. Former Minister Waziri is more forthright:"...Yes, [the police] have been neglected over time, they have been under-funded, under-trained, under-accommodated and even 'under-promoted'". He then declared that 'we need probably a sustained promotion exercise over the next 18 months to be able to give [police personnel their] due" (**POLIS Vol. 2 No. 3** 2010, p. 46). The training programmes mentioned above were all foreign sponsored. There are complaints in other areas on police funding. A Community Policing Co-ordinator/Trainer lamented: 'So far [in 2007] the [Community Policing] project has not received any substantial support in terms of funding and other forms of support from the government of the day'. He continued: 'if the donor agencies cease to support the project what will be its fate?' (Dickson 2007, p.195-196). Incidentally, praise for the government and this lamentation are in the same text (see Ehindero 2007, p. xxvi-xxviii, in Arase and Iwuofor 2007 eds.).

It is crucial for the NPF to realise that public or government resources cannot continue to meet ever-increasing policing needs at a time of ever-increasing demand for policing services. This development, therefore, calls for 'intelligent policing', or 'the imperative of intelligence working' (Ericson and Haggerty 1997, in Harfield 2008, p.2). When the NPF

asked the government for N2.7 trillion 'for effective policing', it received only N202 billion, responding that this 'will merely keep the police going and not guarantee effective policing' (**This Day** 1 Sep. 2009). The police also reported the need to 'raise N420 billion yearly for infrastructure', according to the Chairman of the Police Service Commission (PSC). The report concluded that 'since 1981, only two per cent of the nation's budget is allocated for training and retraining of officers', with the result that personnel have not been receiving adequate and 'proper training' (**The Guardian** 31 Oct. 2009, p.6).The desperate financial position of the NPF could be better appreciated when one recalls the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) incurred a bill of £2.5m (over N500 million at a conservative rate) on the search for the nine year-old Shannon Mathews (**BBC News** 9 June 2008). Recently, also, the Nigerian Air Force (NAF) spent 12 million dollars to train only eleven officers; so, the NAF is now 'domesticating [the] training' of their personnel (**Leadership** 4 May 2010). In concluding this funding/finance issue, a few questions are pertinent, in view of NPF's move towards intelligence-led policing: a) what method(s) have the police and policing authorities been using to prepare, calculate and measure police financial and operational requirements?; b) is/are this/these the best method(s); and c) if not, do they intend to change? Are the experts now in charge of these projections and calculations; or are they still the same artisans or old hands? Old methods cannot work in the face of daunting new problems and realities.

Another capacity issue is leadership, now aptly referred to as 'the leadership conundrum' (Grieve **Policing Leadership Lecture** Aug. 2009), because of its impact on modern policing. Machiavelli once said: 'The first

method of estimating the intelligence of a leader is to look at the men and women around him'. This is one sure way of assessing NPF leadership, and here, they are found wanting. The 21st century for the policing profession is a challenging one. The omens are there for all to see. Police leadership today has a lot to account for: 'leadership requirements are changing to cope with new missions and issues' and in this arena 'new knowledge and better practices are required':

> "The moment is clearly at hand for leading police executives and practitioners to capture and define the state of policing today and set a course for the foreseeable future –to take control of a changing environment, exercise vision and follow with action. Inaction constitutes a disservice to the police profession and the community it serves".
>
> (IACP 2005, p.5)

The NPF leadership does not appreciate this. The Force is still suffering from professional lethargy, as it still places into delicate positions, officers who are intellectually inadequate, hardly literate, and who 'definitely' lack the 'analytical mind' to deal or relate with, process or initiate ideas and meaningful policies. Consequently, many become 'very myopic, bugged down to routine activities only to occasionally give fire-brigade reactions to vital issues' (Oseni 1993, p.13). Moreover, the NPF is 'about the only institution in Nigeria where illiteracy thrives', and 'no particular recognition... accorded the very few educated officers and men above the teaming illiterates and half-baked [police staff]'; with the result that all are 'lumped together for the same treatment more often than not with the [educated] elites worst off [sic]' (Oseni 1993, p.4). An IGP once complained about CPs

who 'do not have [an] abundance of academic [and] professional knowledge and [who lack] current affairs in their arsenals [sic]'; 'poor crisis managers' bugged with many 'inadequacies'. He then warned, vainly though, that there was 'no room for mediocre or half-baked Police Officers' (Atta1996, p.117-118). All this at a time Reiner was praising the Chief Constables' rising social, intellectual and professional profiles (1992)!

In view of the gross leadership deficiencies in the NPF, an arrow-head is lacking that should understand the holistic picture of criminality and the criminal environment. This is because, without an understanding of "this taxonomy" the NPF cannot properly identify the features and patterns that "in turn enable the identification of enforcement principles", or "the application, through well-informed decision-making fora, of a 'tactical menu' to deliver against the priorities" (Flood and Gaspar 2009, p. 57). It is this leadership that leads what is called 'a learning organization', where 'leaders are designers, stewards and teachers', who build 'organizations where people continually expand their capabilities to understand complexity, clarify vision, and improve shared mental models'. These are leaders who 'literally breathe life into' their organisations (Bowers 2008, p. 284, citing Senge 1990). Like police leadership elsewhere (Ratcliffe 2008, p. 230), NPF leadership is failing. Furthermore, for most NPF leaders, to 'understand the subtleties of what works and what does not, is akin to teaching them mathematics and subjecting them to a geography test'. These leaders are not prepared for their role and, therefore, rarely capable of crime prevention (Ratcliffe 2008, p.174; also p.145). Also, many of the current and future police leaders grew from the investigative branch, which thrives on 'a tactical frame of mind', and it may take a while for this

'incentive structure of policing' to change, in order to encourage officers in crime and intelligence analysis. So, for intelligence-led policing to be successfully implemented in the NPF, there is need for 'a strong, educated executive and management cadre that values strategic approaches over the more audience-pleasing count of arrests and prosecutions' (Ratcliffe 2008, p. 234,152).

However, this leadership is not available yet, as the tables below show. So, the NPF needs life to be breathed into its policing and intelligence management. That explains why 131 of 136 respondents (95 percent) want NPF leadership to adopt more modern management techniques in the organisation (Table 4). Also, 60 (47 per cent) of 127 respondents believe the NPF is not adapting the agency well to social change (Table 5).

Table 4. The response on the NPF leadership adopting more modern management techniques.

Response	No of Respondents	Percentage of Respondents
Yes	131	95
No	1	1
Probably	2	2
Others	2	2
Total	**136**	**100**

Table 5. The response on police leadership adapting policing to social change

Response	No of Respondents	Percentage of Respondents
Fairly Well	62	49
Extremely Well	5	4
Usual	33	26
Badly	22	17
Extremely Badly	5	4
Total	**127**	**100**

The explanation for this situation could be seen in the ideological orientation of police leadership in Nigeria, which has very little radical and reformist tendencies(3 per cent), 53 per cent of 'modernizers' and 38 per cent of 'political partisans', among others (see Table 6).

Table 6. The perceived ideological categories of NPF leadership

Ideological persuasion	No of Respondents	Percentage of Respondents
Radical and Reformist	3	2
Progressive and Modernising	53	40
Conservative	24	18
Dictatorial and Repressive	4	3
Politically Aligned	38	29
Neutral And Passive	6	5
Others	4	3
Total	**132**	**100**

The challenge of education and training for NPF leadership in the 21st century is also a divisive issue, as 54 (39 per cent) and 48 (35 per cent) of 131 respondents agree/disagree, respectively, on the sufficiency of this.

Table7. The response on whether current police leadership education/training is sufficient for the 21st century.

Response	No of Respondents	Percentage of Respondents
Agree	54	39
No	48	35
Probably	23	16.8
Don't Know	9	2
Total	**131**	**92.9**

However, adding those who answer 'no' and 'probably' (71 respondents or over 51per cent), indicates some dissatisfaction and so, the education/training of current police leadership should be looked into. If the arrow-head of an organisation is crippled or bankrupt intellectually and professionally (not to say ethically and morally), as it is with the NPF, then very little should be expected, in terms of new thinking, innovation and re-orientation. It is significant that 68 (about 50 per cent) of 134 respondents want a change in police leadership (see Table 8 below).

Table 8. The response on the need for change in police leadership

Response	No of Respondents	Percentage of Response
Yes	68	49.6
No	35	25.5
Sometimes	19	13.5
Don't know	4	2.9
Others	8	5
Total	**134**	**96.5**

Can capacity and intelligence be discussed without a mention of information and knowledge management? It has been observed that: 'Law enforcement now operates within an information age that is making new demands of and is generating new expectations among the public and public servants alike' (Kleiven and Harfield 2009c, p. 203). The value of information in the work of the police has been severally acknowledged (Higgins 2008; Phillips 2008; Stanko 2008; Ratcliffe 2008; Harfield and

Harfield 2008). For the NPF, the importance of information in the 'delicate nature of police work' (Ojomo and Alemika 1993, p.609) has been highlighted:

> "Policing in Nigeria requires a reliable information system that is properly managed. Many of the problems associated with poor police functional performance are due to... poor information. Policing in Nigeria is largely based on guesswork and rule of thumb developed in the course of ...experience. This cannot lead to satisfactory performance in an era of explosion in public expectation in policing and social services delivery from the police".
>
> (1993, p.626)

What is knowledge management? As a 'pragmatic definition', it is simply 'the explicit and systematic management of vital knowledge and its associated processes of creating, gathering, organising, diffusion, use and exploitation, in pursuit of organizational objectives' (Skyrme 2007, in Kelly 2009, p. 257). As a 'generic' one, it is 'the process of creating, capturing and using knowledge to enhance organizational performance' (Colliers 2006, in Kelly 2008, p. 257); two definitions, but one goal. How has the NPF fared?

In the immediate post-independence era, Tamuno confidently and satisfactorily consulted 'the official records of the NPF between 1930 and 1965'(1970, p.190). Today, scholars, writers and consultants readily complain of difficulties in accessing or receiving information on the police. Chukwuma, while working on 'public safety and security' covering 2003-2008 , reports: 'All we had were police statistics on crime which were not only unreliable...but infrequently published or made available to members

of the public' (2007). Police officers have given (or have been given) different and confusing figures as the total numerical strength of the force (Balogun 2009; Okiro 2009/2008; Hadejia 2008; Adeoye 2007; Ehindero 2007). The *NPF Annual Reports* are not helpful in this regard, too. Recently, a CP complained of 'the problem of record keeping associated with the NPF and the Nigerian society at large', while working on 'recruitment and manpower development in the force' (Bolanta 2007, p.10). In the recent promotion exercises (2010), large numbers of dead, dismissed and retired police officers had their names listed as beneficiaries. It is, therefore, not surprising that the authorities recently confessed that the actual strength of the NPF was bloated and actual police numbers were yet to be determined (**This Day** 18 Dec. 2010). The problem of NPF information and knowledge management with regard to even routine matters of public interest, could be further illustrated by the response of former Force Public Relations Officer (FPRO) to a question on kidnappings. When asked, 'Can you, by way of statistics, give us an insight into the crime wave in the south-east...to see a state by state analysis... and police reaction by way of arrests', he responded:

> "It's available but I don't have it on hand now. There is an office that deals with that and we need to put them on notice to get an update. It's not what I can access on the spot. As we speak now, one kidnap arrest could have been made or one victim rescued. There should be an update on it, and we can release it if we get the request on time"
>
> (In Daily Trust 27June 2010)

A few questions are pertinent here. Would it not have been better to shift the press briefing/question time, till information was ready? Any need to refer to another office, when people know the duties of a PRO? Should a

PRO, on top of their game, not have the facts and figures on their finger-tips before meeting with the press? More crucially, what system of storage and retrieval is the FPRO ('not what I can access on the spot') referring to? In view of the FPRO's buck-passing, highlighting the NPF's lack of co-ordination ('an office deals with that'), it appears the NPF is not working as an organisation, or is one agency with differing philosophies; partly explaining its lack-lustre performance:

> "An organization is a group of people who consciously come together to perform some specific assignments to enable them achieve the purpose for which the organization is set up. Such an organization needs information and data to assist in carrying out operational activities that are needed for the effective performance of their assignments. In other words, an organization cannot survive without records and the information these records contained... Because of the importance of records [and information], it could be affirmed that the efficiency of an organization is to a large extent, measured by the efficiency with which its records are managed".
>
> (Akinade 2006, p. 45-46)

If the NPF is not sure of its staff strength, if it cannot differentiate between dead, dismissed and servicing officers, and if it cannot easily retrieve information on numbers of arrested suspects and rescued victims on a particular or localized crime, how easy or practicable would it be for the Force to process information into intelligence and construct, as it should, a picture of the crime environment for operational and strategic purposes? How could the NPF talk of intelligence-led policing (ILP), strategic intelligence, threat and risk assessments (TRA's), intelligent policing and consilient thinking? There are many consequences of this 'information black hole' (Ratcliffe 2009). The most obvious one is: policies 'on crime and justice reform are often formulated, implemented and trashed without any

rigorous data or whether they [policies] worked or not [sic]'. This anomaly, regrettably, is in 'the national character':

> "...problems peculiar to developing countries, especially Nigeria, with regard to collection of reliable official statistics on practically everything...[and] having to do with national and organizational failures and capacity with respect to information management as tool of planning, decision-making, monitoring and evaluation".
>
> (Chukwuma 2008)

The observation, that 'the current situation [in policing] is probably such that there is a slow, but growing, realization that information and knowledge management are central to effective policing decisions' (Ratcllife 2008a), is still not true of the NPF. If the NPF were to be placed on the scale of Ratcliffe's D.I.K.I. formula: Data, Information, Knowledge and Intelligence (2008, p. 94-99), it would be found grossly wanting. And that is part of the problem: does the NPF have the capacity to receive, store and retrieve information, not to say process it? And so, the issue of information and communication technology (ICT) comes in.

The point must be made: providing the best of ICT facilities does not necessarily resolve knowledge issues, because knowledge is intangible; and some problems 'are often inherently human' (Ratcliffe 2008, p. 96-97). But the corollary must be understood also: "Managing information-flow through the effective use of information technology and through developing good standards of practice around information management processes', Kelly observes, 'are fundamental to effective working, especially in service-based organizations such as the police' (2008, p. 258). Christopher and Cope agree: driving forward intelligence-led policing needs a workforce

with 'a familiarity and expertise in...analytical capability' and with 'adequate mechanisms for effective data management, retrieval and presentation' that enhances police 'ability to effectively structure and optimise the use of raw data' (2008, p. 241, citing Tremblay and Rochon 1991). For the NPF, these ingredients: 'information technology', 'professional doctrine' and data or 'information management processes', are defective and deficient. As Akinade states, every modern organisation must have a Management Information System (MIS), to operate successfully. And this involves 'the application of technology and management techniques to produce, communicate and use information in business and in general', a system which is 'responsive to a variety of informational requirements for... effective management', comprising 'all measurable data pertaining to the organization [and] organized in a manner where it can readily be recorded, stored, processed, retrieved and communicated as required by a variety of users'. So, it should be 'an integrated system of man, machine and procedures' designed for 'collecting and processing data to supply information to aid planning, decision-making and controlling activities in an organization' (2006, p.133-134). The four functions of the MIS are therefore clear: data-processing, decision-making, planning and control (p.136-139). Following his lead (Akinade p.46-47), one can ask: where is the NPF MIS; or how is it operated? More specifically, where are: data on NPF personnel: their total number, categorization, turn-over, salary profiles, and history; data on NPF operations: the mode(s), variation, expansion, and history; and on NPF facilities: installation, expansion, future rate, consumption pattern, cost of installation, frequency of maintenance, frequency of replacement, cost of maintenance, cost of replacement (p.141-142).

Finally, what does NPF's records management, or records creation, records maintenance, or records disposition programme, look like?

These are the inner workings or internal processes of the NPF, wherein it has not succeeded. How can it be expected to perform its intelligence function, one which requires, indeed demands, a more rigorous if not elaborate ICT build-up for 'effective working' (Kerry), and the ICT issue is 'non-negotiable' in intelligence (Christopher and Cope 2009,p.24). As the Patten Report on Northern Ireland emphasizes, 'information technology is fundamental to modern policing'; and the features of a successful ICT programme are access, inter-operability, training for staff, quality and suitability of systems and project management (paras. 11.4-11.10; p.65-67). However, the NPF is stuck. Internally, it does not have a coherent or systematic information sharing formula; and externally, it is cut off from its 'operating locale' (Ogunsola 2010). The NPF cannot boast of any sophisticated MIS. A most appalling situation: Nigeria has one National Criminal Data Base, the Central Criminal Registry (CCR), which is completely manual, 'low in efficiency', with a high incidence of 'errors made by the human worker', and cannot guarantee the necessary security (Asagba 1993, p. 256-257). It is 'outdated', an 'enormity' in managing millions of entries (Ogunsakin 2007, p.100). The NPF appears determined, nonetheless, to acquire modern tracking systems and surveillance equipment, digital telephone and allied technology, database management systems, wrist radios, satellite photographic equipment, CCTV cameras, etc (see Appendix D).Ratcliffe's counsel is still crucial, however: police departments should ensure the basics are right and develop robust

mechanisms for mapping time and place of crime, as these remain two leading parameters providing 'the most reliable indicators of linked cases and problem areas' (2008, p.118).

The issue of knowledge and capacity in the NPF highlights the research and development (R&D) vacuum. The statement, that 'Knowledge is of two kinds', and that '[w]e know a subject ourselves, or we know where we can find information on it (Samuel Johnson, 1709-1784), is unknown to the NPF. The NPF is rather at home with the dictum that 'Law enforcement thinks in silence' (Rider May 2009). The lack of capacity and capability in the NPF and the dire consequences it has produced has been compounded by the fact that the NPF does not 'know its business' (Flood and Gaspar 2009), and has not really bothered to 'find information on it' (Johnson). The 'finding information on it' may be referred to as the research and development part of policing, largely ignored or sidetracked by the NPF. How would the force know what works and what does not, if not by searching, or researching? Occasionally, the NPF refers to this:

> "Modern policing requires constant systemic [sic] research and planning to meet the needs of the ever changing society and to be able to watch the technologically advanced orientation of the crime scene... the Force should be able to carry out systematic study through [its] own research to enable it clarify issues, identify alternatives, obtain relevant facts and evaluate them for development of Force policies".
>
> (Coomasie 1998, p. 28)

The former IGP also suggested that the NPF's Management Services Department (MSD) should 'affiliate with institutions of higher learning to secure attachment programmes' for police personnel with a view to

researching police operations and use of data and statistics on recruitment, crime and police duties. He advocates making this unit 'a good compliment for Police scientific orientation' (Coomasie 1998, p. 29). The Annual Report (2007) also notes that 'crimes and their frequency should be a subject of research to proffer...enduring solutions' (p.1).

As policing is 'constantly evolving', it 'demands continuous improvement and learning' (Evans 2008, p.111). As Ratcliffe notes, 'when all you have is a hammer then every problem looks like a nail' (2009, p.109). To most NPF personnel, including the top echelons, policing is a cut and paste job; it does not require much effort or labour. To them, policing does not require going to school; and there is a silent war between the academic and intellectually minded elements on one hand and the masses holding the traditional view in the service. The peculiar nature of the country's geopolitics has widened the division and distorted whatever professionalism the Force once laid claim to. Many joining the police now see it as an easy road to fame, power and wealth, with little concern for knowledge, principles, and the values and ethics of policing. So, while the police authorities are trumpeting the need for research and other high sounding rhetoric, the situation on ground is radically different. A commentator has rightly observed:

> "Police forces in many developing countries, including Nigeria, neglect collection, analysis and utilization of crime information as essential input to their planning operations and administration. As a result good hands are not often posted to their planning, research and statistics department, which should have been seen as the engine of a police organization. And those posted to [this] department view their posting as punishments and would do anything to be posted out".

(Chukwuma 2008)

The above is not an exaggeration; mainly due to the cliché that police work is photocopy work. With this cliché as philosophy, how can the NPF study or research, to 'understand' its community, 'learn their structures, attitudes, and behaviours', which will 'allow for a closer inspection of their [community's] culture'. If the NPF does not do research, how can it apply the 'model of an ecosystem to communities' in its work, or find it easier 'to interpret causality and its consequential effects on communities' it is policing? This explains why the policeman in Nigeria has failed to be 'a forest worker who can identify plants and trees without interfering with their mode of being', since he does not possess the required 'level of critical reasoning and the willingness to listen' (Bhatti 2008, p.180). Explaining 'context' in police work and the value of community impact assessments (CIA's), a form of reasoning and listening, which is research in practical terms, Bhatti adds:

> "Understanding the scope of the context will provide a greater impetus to get to the heart of the matter. The police are then in a better position to evaluate information and intelligence. Crucially, the police will also have generated a healthier appreciation for the effects of our actions. This in turn identifies a need to continually review the process, method, and style of communication. The police need to constantly review to ensure that they are listening and talking to the most appropriate people; this would enable the police to consider if the style and purpose of engagement is appropriate".
>
> (2008, p.181)

The challenges in modern policing, or the 'explosion of criminality' (Ratcliffe 2008, p.2), has a crucial lesson for the NPF; it is the challenge of research. As Grieve notes for the UK, 'the increasing trajectory of

challenges' to the police at the courts and the formation or coming together of 'a small group of police officers and academics who were dissatisfied with some criminal justice disasters', encouraged considerable proactivity that brought policing a notch higher. This then facilitated an 'understanding [of] the whole range of environmental, social, economic and education factors', but also 'had to build on existing best practices as practised on the streets' (2008b, p.35,citing Gudjosson 2002). The combination of officers and academics is crucial and symbolic. Talking about 'intelligence research', Ratcliffe advocates going beyond literature review, to 'a better term', an emphasis on 'a critical analysis of the existing body of knowledge', which translates to 'good research' (2009, p.109); and which can be accomplished by 'academic researchers working with police...to improve operational responses to crime problems' (Ratcliffe 2008, p. 235; also Birzer 2002; Bradley 2005; Marenin 2003). He adds:

> "One of the significant changes to policing has been an influx of middle management with some degree of tertiary education. From this may flow a greater appreciation of research. This will help enhance the role of the analyst and build the internal capacity for police to evaluate their own strategies and tactics. Without this, the ability to impact on the criminal environment will be hindered, and will end up relying on either external evaluations from other agencies or on the hunches of police commanders unable to articulate whether their tactics work or not. Some evidence of this greater engagement with research can be seen in the increasing interaction between police agencies and the research community".
>
> (Ratcliffe 2008, p. 234-235)

Conclusion

The influx of graduates into the NPF is real; especially from the 1980's (recall that the two PhD candidates among our respondents are police officers). The problem remains, however:

> "Appreciation of knowledge produced by external studies of a broad social scientific nature is hampered by the lack of training within policing with regard to understanding and applying research methodology. Brown (1996) not only mentions an atmosphere of anti-academia within law enforcement, but also raises some serious concerns regarding the ability of internal police research departments to conduct quality research".
>
> (Ratcliffe and Sheptycki 2009, p. 260)

In Rider's words, the NPF is still 'thinking in silence'. Thinking in silence hardly produces results, especially where there is little or no quality manpower, capacity or appropriate methodology to think through. Moreover, intelligence is rational, a rigorous discipline, but the lack of knowledge and capacity in the NPF cripples the intelligence function, which should act 'as criminal research facilities'. This paralyses intelligence from playing its 'role in setting operational strategy and tactics' (Phillips 2008, p. 25-33), as it should, for Nigerian policing. There is at the moment very little hope of the NPF succeeding in its intelligence-led policing project. It is a tall, but not an impossible order; it does not spell doom or the end, if the NPF leadership would amend its ways. Meanwhile, would the NPF co-operate and synergize with sister agencies, to share knowledge, manpower and capacity, and so benefit from partnership working in intelligence? The next chapter examines the NPF: inter-agency collaboration or confrontation?

4. A Net and Its Network, or at Daggers Drawn: NPF intelligence in collaboration or confrontation?

> "Our intelligence gathering capacity is suspect and remains at pre-historic level. The Federal Government must look into this urgently and embark on proper training of our security [personnel] for the great task ahead. The solution would not lie in unnecessary harassment and extortion of innocent citizens by the security agents who we know are neither well trained nor equipped to detect and deter serious threat[s] to our homeland posed by terrorist[s].
>
> (Akeredolu, in **The Nation** 5 Oct. 2010)

A caveat is necessary here. Though the chapter examines primarily the intelligence co-operation between the NPF and sister agencies in the country, it will, nevertheless, discuss potentially relevant partners like the International Police Organisation (INTERPOL). This is the 21st century perspective on policing (partnership working), which the NPF should adopt.

The chapter is in three parts, with a conclusion. The first describes NPF's attempts at defining sister (security and intelligence) agencies and appraises its concept of, and the need for, collaboration and inter-service co-operation. The second examines the nature and scope of relations between the NPF and other agencies. The NPF-State Security Services (SSS) angle is evaluated at length, in view of their strategic relationship; followed by other agencies and the International Police Organisation (INTERPOL). The third and final part explores the barriers to, and proffers suggestions, for collaboration.

The NPF's Need for Collaboration: The dilemma and delusion of definitions

The bombings that took place in the capital city (Abuja) on 1 October 2010 remain a shock to date; and the security/intelligence community in Nigeria is not yet to recover. Highly respected professionals not known for controversial statements could not refrain themselves this time. Such is Senior Advocate of Nigeria (SAN--equivalent of the Queen's Counsel) and former President of the Nigerian Bar Association (NBA), Oluwarotimi Akeredolu, as quoted above. Another lawyer and commentator, Bamidele Aturu, also spoke:

> "...Be that as it may, again we have another evidence of gross incompetence, nay imbecility, on the part of our security agencies. Their comprehensive incompetence is not only embarrassing but a national disaster. May be, we should be thinking seriously of employing vigilante [local neighbourhood watch] groups to secure the country".
>
> (In **The Nation**, 5 Oct. 2010)

Perhaps, the most damning comment came from one who has been in some liaison with the security and intelligence community. Dr. Paul Obianoso, a 'criminologist, lawyer and anti-terrorism expert', on the same Abuja incident, said:

> "The State Security Service (SSS) tried their best but as they admitted, their best was not good enough. However, they deserve some credit for doing the much they did under short notice. They

> need to go back to the drawing board. The Police on their part are hopelessly confused to rise up to the occasion. Onovo [then IG] would still be IG today if he had implemented my proposal on counter-terrorism measures nationwide. Abia State [endemic with kidnappings] would not have gotten out of hand and these bombers
>
> would not have entered Abuja. Instead, he chose to compromise our national security by claiming he was bringing in Israeli experts..."
>
> (In **Daily Sun** 1 Nov. 2010)

Obianoso would not stop his assessment of the incident and its impact on the present or the past, but would probe into the future:

> "I am going to guarantee you that in the next 10 years, if the system we are running is allowed [to continue], you will be hearing of armed robbery in Aso Rock [Presidential Villa]. It can happen. Oh yes there have been burglaries in government houses in many states [of the Federation]".

The implication: 'Very soon, if the national security/intelligence apparatus continues in the present mode, armed robbers and other felons will be entering the Presidential Villa in Abuja, to commit all sorts of atrocities and there is little anybody can do'. This risk assessment is not in any way exaggerated. As Obianoso rightly mentions, ugly incidents on a lower scale have been happening across the states of the Federation, including those within Government Houses, which are hardly reported. The unresolved case of the assassination of former Minister for Justice and Attorney-General of the Federation (AGF), Bola Ige, in December 2001, among several others, (Sani 2007), remains an indelible stain on the entire national security/intelligence apparatus.

Meanwhile, in managing the public relations of the bomb incident and reporting progress on investigations made, not by the NPF as the country expected, but by the SSS, an agency official came up with a statement akin

to a double-edged sword. Inflating the fears and anxieties of Nigerians and indeed, friends and well wishers, though unwittingly emphasizing the importance of co-operation at both local and international levels, she said:

> "...the international terrorist group Al-Qaeda may have a hand in the bombings....Of course, we know that the recent incursion into some North African countries have all pointed to Al-Qaeda. So, when our international [partner] agencies assessed the situation in North Africa and the sectarian crises we have had in some parts of Nigeria, of course, it was apparent that Al-Qaeda might want to make an attempt at Nigeria [sic]. You don't leave anything to chance. At the time of the event the only obvious information was the one pointing to Al-Qaeda".
>
> (In **The Nation** 5 Oct. 2010)

Have there been genuine and sincere efforts at collaboration between the NPF and others, or has it all been a cloak and dagger affair? Has the intelligence community in Nigeria been dynamic, united and co-operative?

The NPF has a somewhat diffuse (if not confused) definition of security and intelligence agencies, who are supposed to be collaborating with her. This is not surprising, as it has not yet clarified her definition(s) of intelligence and co-operating partners; with attendant implications (see chapter two). So, at various times, NPF authorities have juggled their definitions of intelligence and security/ intelligence agencies as occasions demanded; or depending on who was speaking. Onovo, then DIG in charge of the Federal Investigations and Intelligence Bureau (FIIB), once referred to some in the plethora of Nigeria's security agencies as 'security' but not 'necessarily intelligence' agencies. He was not categorical in demarcating the security from intelligence agencies though; thereby causing more confusion. These security and intelligence agencies are:

a) The Nigerian Security Council (NSC);
b) The Nigeria Police Force (NPF);
c) The Armed Forces;
d) National Intelligence Agency (NIA);
e) Department of State Services ,or State Security Services (DSS/SSS);
f) Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA);
g) Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI);
h) The Security and Criminal Intelligence Bureaux of the NPF (S/CIB);
i) The Nigerian Immigration Service (NIS);
j) The Nigerian Prison Service (NPS);
k) National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA);
l) The National Economic Intelligence Agency (NEIA);
m) The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC); and
n) The Federal, State and Local Government Security Committees (2004, p. 11).

It is surprising that this long list conveniently ignores agencies like the Nigerian Customs Service (NCS), the Federal Road Safety Corps (FRSC), the National Agency for Food and Drugs Administration (NAFDAC) and the Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC). It is similar to Okiro's, which includes the Customs Service (2007). Dawodu makes a similar assertion that all these bodies 'are not strictly intelligence agencies but get involved in intelligence gathering along the line...of duties [sic]', referring especially to the NDLEA and the NCS (2006, p. 27). He, however, clarifies the position of the National Security Adviser (NSA), as the co-ordinator of the intelligence activities for all the nation's security agencies and the chairman of the Joint Intelligence Board (JIB) and the Intelligence Community Meeting (ICM). The JIB comprises all the security and law enforcement agencies, as well as 'core ministries' like Foreign Affairs,

Internal Affairs and Finance. But the ICM has 'purely intelligence bodies such as the NSA, the NIA, the SSS, the DIA and the Special Services Office' (Dawodu 2006, p. 28).The demarcation or separation of security and intelligence (agencies), for practical policing and intelligence purposes, is both unnecessary and unhelpful. It is an illusion for the NPF, distracting for policing, and the reason for professional delusion. The NPF cannot afford this.

The dilemma or delusion facing the NPF is not peculiar to it. Other security/intelligence agencies in Nigeria share in this. An official publication of the SSS also demarcates (but does not define) the two groups. The first are intelligence bodies like the SSS, the NIA and the DIA, which deal with the nation's internal and external security management and intelligence operations, respectively. The second are the security and law enforcement bodies--where the NPF, NPS, NCS, NIS, etc, supposedly belong (**Outlet** No. 6 2007, p.11). In the SSS practice, so much of this delusion has been in operation. Strangely, another national agency, the Nigerian Postal and Telegraphic Service (NIPOST), in what it calls 'battling crimes [and] terrorism', gave kudos to collaborating agencies, which include the SSS, NDLEA, EFCC, NCS, Nigerian Civil Aviation Authority (NCAA), the National Financial Intelligence Unit (NFIU) and the UK's Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) (**The Tribune** 4 April 2010)! Nigeria's primary crime-fighting agency, the NPF, was not mentioned, but effectively sidetracked. One can see that these agencies, wittingly or unwittingly, create a dichotomy, which makes it practically difficult to work together. The situation, once dubbed 'friendly fire', but now fashionably termed 'Blue on Blue', is here graphically portrayed:

> "Ideally, the activities and operations of these intelligence/ security agencies are supposed to be complementary and targeted towards the achievement of overall National Security [sic]. However, frequent conflicts/clashes and mutual suspicion between sister agencies have continued to impact negatively on the performances of the agencies. Cumulatively, the nation is worse off it, as threats that would ordinarily be nipped in the bud are left to escalate either as a result of overlap of functions or clash of interests. This becomes even more worrisome as the nation's nascent democracy enters its critical stage".
>
> (**OUTLET** 6 May 2006, p.12)

The magazine concludes that this has now acquired 'an endemic nature' and should, therefore, 'be tackled head-on', especially because of its 'implications' for 'the corporate existence of Nigeria' (p.11-12). The situation seems irredeemable and hopeless, yet there is a growing need for collaboration.

The policing scene today is driven, inevitably, by what is called multi-agency or partnership working, having clear implications for the new demands on police intelligence, even though this 'leads to a more complex and inflexible decision-making environment' (Evans 2008b, p. 198). Accordingly, law enforcement needs to 'operate sensitively' by building relationships with other bodies and partners that may include non-governmental organisations (NGOs), while duly recognizing their (NGO's) 'responsibility... to client confidentiality' (Higgins 2009, p.105). As the demands for policing services increase, it is likely the work load of intelligence agencies would also be 'increasing with no respite in sight' (Ratcliffe 2009, p.vi). The importance of solid partnerships in the intelligence business is very clear. However, it is the spectre of 'failures

(sometimes fatal in their consequences) that bring the issue into sharp focus' (Harfield and Harfield 2008, p.159). One antidote or solution is for the partnership to depend on stable relationships and 'sound, mutual understanding' that helps in 'reducing the risks inherent in partnership'. However, there is no one quick fix for this (Harfield and Harfield 2008, p.154).

In the NPF worldview, collaboration or inter-service co-operation means 'the sharing of law enforcement expertise', 'technology and resources'; it includes 'joint actions, efforts, [and] co-operation between services to foster good service delivery' (Ringim 2007, p.2, p.8). This definition also encompasses the 'exchange of cultural information and philosophy' and, strangely, the enjoyment of "'off-duty' social and recreational activities"; which 'offer potential benefits, far beyond facilitating law enforcement's capacity to control crime' (Ringim 2007, p. 2). One wonders what 'potential benefits' these activities could provide to agencies that could go 'far beyond' the 'capacity of law enforcement to control crime'! What is the primary responsibility of law enforcement: social engagement and entertainment or criminal justice? This, unfortunately, is not isolated evidence. Writing on Balogun's era, Arase and Iwuofor point out the need for inter-service co-operation because of 'the huge manpower and logistic needs of the [NPF]' and the fact that 'internal security is a combination of the roles played by the police and other security agencies'. This need made Balogun, the duo add, to encourage the exchange of top-hierarchy visits, more social interactions at officer levels in the officers' messes, and participation in sporting and religious activities, among others. They conclude: 'The exchange of information and intelligence on security risks

coupled with joint analysis of internal security initiatives, monitoring and analysis by the agencies was seen as potentially beneficial for the improved performance of the police'. This, allegedly, led to a 'marked improvement in the provision of police assistance to sister agencies on request' and 'a dramatic reduction...in incidence of violent clashes between the junior ranks of the police and other security services' (Arase and Iwuofor 2007, p. 20). These benefits should be appreciated, if true, and the provision of modern social facilities for personnel is most welcome. However, the waste of time, energy and scarce resources on socialising with other services and ancillary engagements, masquerading as inter-service co-operation, should be gauged and put in proper perspective. The NPF needs to get its focus right, and wake up to its responsibilities as a serious law enforcement agency of the 21st century, and for 'the great task ahead' (Akeredolu, in **The Nation** 5 Oct. 2010).

Intelligence since after 9/11 has become everybody's business. The culture of intelligence and collaboration is now accepted; 'based on all source-information gathering and analysis'. This is the basis for the 'fusion centers' in the US, so designed for 'multiagency policing needs' and to 'provide information to patrol officers' (Peterson 2005, p.1, 9). This new culture allows some European law enforcement agencies to see the benefits of well co-ordinated criminal intelligence activities and operations as one at 'the heart of combating serious and organised crime' (Block 2008, p.183). Inter-agency partnership or co-operation, for some, has long been a popular 'approach to community safety and policing' (Lewis 2008, p.157). From the preceding paragraphs, one notes 'there is not much to write home about the level of inter-agency intelligence sharing' in Nigeria,

compared with 'other developed countries' (Okiro 2007). In other places, co-operation is a 'necessity', even though the 'law enforcement agencies ...differ widely in how they identify threats and risks posed by various crimes and criminal groups' (Tusikov and Fahlman 2009, p.147). Now, more than ever, national security issues are fast becoming domestic issues, as incidents like 9/11 took 'the future role of the police in the 21st century' beyond 'the academic and esoteric' and made it 'public, wide-ranging and imbued [it] with a sense of urgency' (Ratcliffe 2008, p. 227).

Dega agrees: for Nigeria, internal security, policing and intelligence are now connected in 'a nexus', which 'reinforce' one another (2004, p.17). An illustration of this kind of incident becoming part of 'domestic priorities' and 'a nexus' that 'reinforces', are the Abuja bombings of October 2010. So, it behoves the NPF to work with other agencies and partners; and they may 'even join other networks or groups involved in governance' since 'the security field has grown beyond traditional police agencies to include customs and border control, immigration authorities, defence agencies and organizations with national responsibilities' (Ratcliffe 2008, p. 149-150, citing Bigo 2000). Moreover, unlike in the early days of Nigeria's independence, when Tamuno wrote: 'As the eyes and ears of the government, the police [can] carry out this important duty [internal security and crime control] with or without the help of separate intelligence agencies' (1970, p. 281). These days, 'the Police surely cannot do it alone' and therefore they 'will require the co-operation of other agencies' (Waziri, in **POLIS Vol. 2 No. 3** 2010). Coomasie made the point clearly: Nigeria's vast and porous borders lend greater weight to the need for co-operation between the NPF and others, especially the NCS and the NIS, because

'policing of aliens and economic activities are largely supervised by the customs and immigration services', while 'the violence and other crimes on footpaths and illegal routes' will interest the police (1997, p. 54-55).

Another issue highlighting the need for collaboration in Nigeria relates to capacity. As former Minister for Police Affairs, Waziri, has noted, (and the last chapter has shown), there is a great lack in the capacity of the NPF and other agencies; so, co-operating would be better for all! He has observed that inter-agency co-operation within the context of Nigeria is lower, compared with some other countries. (**POLIS Vol. 2 No. 3**, p.48). This should encourage the agencies, as Tusikhov and Fahlman suggest, to engage in inter-service co-operation, in order to establish 'a common framework for threat and risk assessments [TRAs]', as veritable means of ensuring analyses are 'compared between different agencies' (2008, p.147). Guidetti captures this clearly:

> "Interpreting the range of threats facing society often requires capabilities beyond those demonstrated by any single law enforcement organization. A more holistic view of the criminal environment requires an integration and application of analytical capabilities best represented by an inter-agency collaborative intelligence effort ... [and results in] a more inclusive and complete intelligence product".
>
> (2008a, p. 222)

This co-operation further offers 'increased opportunities for knowledge exchange and growth because of their [individual agencies'] ability to draw on others' experience and expertise' and for 'a lasting synergistic effect on enhancing analytical support' (Guidetti 2008a, p. 223-224). This support allows additional 'collaborators', 'ideas' and 'inspiration' for 'forming hypotheses, seeking out material, drawing conclusions and suggesting

recommendations to decision-makers'. These partnerships or networks may further comprise 'thinkers in the private sector, prosecutorial services, crime prevention, academia, and the military', who can bring different perspectives and help 'think in new ways' which are in many cases outside the traditions of their individual agencies. In other words:

> "Every policing organization has a number of agency-specific accepted wisdoms; some are justified while others are vague, poorly defined, and rooted more in tradition than evidence. The thread that joins them all is usually an absence of superlative evidence combined with a reticence to these conventional wisdoms. Breaking away from the myths of an agency requires creative thinking and a willingness to challenge convention".

(Ratcliffe 2009, p.115)

The agencies in Nigeria should see this as an added reason to co-operate in order to shore up their capacity and capabilities; and together impress it on the government to consider national security as utmost priority, over and above the usually divisive, politically motivated and departmentally focused perspectives they are accustomed to!

The NPF, Sister Agencies and Intelligence Sharing

The NPF and the SSS have been so close and yet far apart. As Gregory notes, there are 'two linked approaches to understanding the relationship between the police and the intelligence services'- the 'historical' and 'legal-institutional' (2008, p.47). Unlike their UK counterparts, the relationship between these two bodies 'in terms of intelligence gathering and the use of intelligence in relation to possible criminal activities...is [not] dynamic in character' (Gregory 2008, p.58-59). From the 'historical' point, the SSS

(equivalent of the MI5) should, perhaps, be the closest and best ally of the NPF when it comes to internal security matters. By virtue of its birth in 1976 with the conversion of the NPF's Special Branch (SB) to the National Security Organisation (NSO), its metamorphosis into the State Security Services (1986) (see chapter two), and its statutory and constitutional responsibilities, this agency and the NPF should be regarded as professional twins. Perhaps, they are; some twins will rather live as sworn enemies than as friends. From 1976 to 1986, the NSO was solely responsible for intelligence on domestic and internal security. But its general performance has been abysmal--including in human rights (Takaya ed. 1993).

From the 'legal-institutional' point, Kupolati's brilliant analysis will suffice. After pin-pointing the famous section 4 of the Police Act, Cap. 19, as basis for NPF legality, he elaborates on section 2(3) National Security Agencies Act, Cap. N74, which provides:

"(3) The State Security Services shall be charged with responsibility for:

a) *Prevention and detection within Nigeria of any crime* against internal security of Nigeria;

b) The protection and preservation of all non-military classified matters concerning the internal security of Nigeria; and

c) Such other responsibilities affecting internal security within Nigeria as the National Assembly or the President, as the case may be, may deem necessary" (2007, p.446).

He submits:

> "The import of the statutory powers, functions and responsibilities of the SSS and the police very much intertwine and are inexorably connected on matters of crime detection and prevention. The Nigeria Police though established by a distinct statute, in every definitional sense, is a national security agency. Many decisions of the court have held that the police are an agency of the federal government. The responsibility of the [SSS] to prevent and detect crime within Nigeria against internal security grandly overlaps with the Police's functions under section 4 of the Police Act. The [DIA], [NIA], [and the SSS] though created by a single statute...are practically bound to open up operational network that the police can freely access on matters of prevention and detection of crime".
>
> (p. 448)

Conclusively:

> "By virtue of section 10 (1), Interpretation Act Cap. 123, where an enactment confers a power or imposes a duty, the power may be exercised and the duty shall be performed from time to time as occasion requires. Subsection 2 provides that an enactment which confers power to do any act shall be construed as also conferring all such powers as are reasonably necessary to enable that act to be done or are incidental to the doing of it. These provisions compel the SSS to perform its duty from time to time as occasion requires".
>
> (p. 449)

What Kupolati adorns in beautiful legal robe, Dega conveys in layman's language:

> "Although the [NPF] has its intelligence gathering mechanism, intelligence they obtain from the SSS serves an added advantage for the enhancement of their operational capabilities. Thus, the SSS and the NPF have complimentary roles to play in maintaining internal security. The NPF will succeed more in their operations if the co-operation and collaboration with the SSS is enhanced. The emphasis is in the area of information exchange including the existing inter-dependence between the two in their roles as security agencies".
>
> (2004, p.18)

What is the relationship like between the two? From the time of its birth in 1976 to date, there appears to be more instances of dissension than cases of co-operation and collaboration between the two. From the Maitatsine religious riots in the north, to the political riots and arson in the west (1980's), to the tribal/ communal clashes of the Aguileris/ Umuleris in the south east and the Tivi/Jukun clashes (1990's), the evidence of co-operation between the two is scanty. Recent developments speak more clearly of 'the wide chasm' between the two (Kupolati). Mention should also be made of the political assassinations rocking the country in the last decade, when it appeared nobody was safe. Seemingly disturbed by these killings, the Senate invited then IGP, Ehindero, who stated, for the umpteenth time, the need for the SSS to share information, but which they refused to do. Then Director of the SSS, Kayode Are, had declared to the Upper House, that 'it was not the business of his agency to track down persons behind political killings in the country' (**The Punch**, in Kupolati 2007, p. 445-446). On one hand, one might ask the NPF: what are all your intelligence units doing? On the other, one would be shocked to hear the head of MI5 saying this to the Metropolitan Police in the House of Lords; and still retain his job! Does this SSS action/ inaction stand to reason?

> "It is grossly violating of the provisions of section 2(3) (a) of the National Security Agencies Act for the [SSS] to withhold information or refuse to share information on the existence of killer squads in Nigeria with the [IGP]. The failure or refusal to release information on the existence of such criminal bodies like killing squads is capable of frustrating the [NPF] and crippling the policing system in Nigeria. The withholding of information on criminal acts is apt in prompting echoes of cover up".
>
> (Kupolati 2007, p. 448)

The bomb blasts incident, October 2010, is another illustration. It may suffice to refer to the statements of Akeredolu, Aturu and Obianoso at the beginning of this chapter; especially that of the criminologist, on the NPF and the SSS. If the services have been working as one family (one intelligence community), there shouldn't have been any basis for comparison and adulation/condemnation. But this has its value: it shows a divided house. Newspaper headlines (like 'SSS/NPF rivalry over Abuja bombings probe', 'SSS/NPF to conduct separate investigations', etc) routinely portrayed division, dissension and disarray (**The Punch** 17 Oct. 2010). After the blame-game and buck-passing, the SSS took over the investigation of the bomb blasts, instead of the NPF. However, the issue of dissension in Nigeria's intelligence community is not confined to the NPF/SSS. Concerning the Christmas (2009) attempted bombing in the US, the SSS alleged the National Intelligence Agency (NIA) had received reliable intelligence on Abdulmutallab, but did not pass it to them (**BBC News** 31 Dec. 2009), a claim waiting to be denied. Nevertheless, the NPF and the SSS (and the abetting federal government) must urgently heed Kupolati's warning, which appears to be manifesting:

> "In all civilized democracies and popular governments the world over, security organizations not only work hand in hand but perform in a clear professional sense...the potent roles for which they are established...The type of chasm that divides the police and the SSS which prevents working relationship between them is a severe plague capable of opening up the channels of violence. This is because duties are bound to fail. Responsibilities are bound to be shattered. Roles are bound to be abandoned. The people would therefore stand on the precipice of danger of violence [sic] and peril of death. It would seem that our security agencies are caught up in

> the labyrinthine of politics and politicking [sic]. Such experience obviously diminishes the space for safety and security of the citizens".
>
> (2007, p. 449-450)

Although there are many agencies involved in the nation's security and intelligence business, as the early part of the chapter shows, for space and pragmatism, only sister agencies with open and overt modes of operation like the Customs, the Prisons, Immigration, the NDLEA and the Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC), will receive attention here. It must be pointed out, however, that practically the same pattern of relationship which exists between the SSS and the NPF, subsists with all these agencies. It is a woeful, confused and chaotic national security and intelligence mosaic!

The Nigeria Police Force Order No. 338 states:

> "The Police will not hesitate to come to the assistance of the Customs at any time they are called upon to do so. If, during the course of Police investigation into a case it is suspected that an offence against the Customs and Excise Act has been committed, the Police Officer concerned should inform the nearest customs Officer forthwith and be prepared to hand the case over, if required to do so; he should, however, continue with his investigation, until the Customs have given a decision on their interest in the matter. Where investigation has disclosed an offence under the Customs and Excise act and another Act, say, the Criminal Code, e.g. illegal exportation and unlawful possession of cannabis sativa [sic], particulars of the Customs offence will be furnished to the Customs Department with all dispatch".

The co-operation of strategic public or government agencies is often taken for granted in many societies. And that was the pattern handed over to the country at independence. The directive for Police/Custom co-operation was assumed. This co-operation naturally flowed among the agencies. This

delicate inter-service collaboration was well maintained. Even in the **Supplement to Force Order** No. 404 (**Force Directive C.I.D.** No. 55), special attention was 'drawn to the legislation governing the release of arrested persons on Police bail and in particular it directs special emphasis on the care to be exercised in the acceptance of sureties and the establishment of bona fides'. This circular concludes authoritatively:

> "Co-operation between the Police and Customs is to be maintained at the highest possible level, and the possibility of the loss of revenue through the lack of proper care in cases involving Police bail where any action by the Customs Authorities is contemplated, should not be allowed to arise by any neglect on the part of the Police".

These Standing Orders speak at length of Police/Customs co-operation, including in intelligence sharing: 'Police will not hesitate to come to the assistance of the Customs at any time they are called upon to do so'. Today, this has been more in the breach. Both parties are to blame. Hear Okiro: 'the Criminal Justice System [sic] in Nigeria is not working as a system' (2007b, p. 16). He adds, that there is 'poor inter-agency co-operation' between the NPF and other services. This is why the NPF can only maintain 'the joint [vehicular] patrol with the Immigration and Customs Services to secure the Nation's borders from abuse by smugglers and illegal aliens [sic]'; occasionally 'collaborates' with the Prison Service 'in the escort of accused and convicted persons to/from trial Courts and prison custody'; assists 'the NDLEA in fighting illegal use of drugs' and 'partners with the FRSC in traffic control as well as providing assistance for accident victims' (Okiro 2008a, p. 21). However, these are not enough. In explaining these deficiencies, Ige and Dabiri suggest these agencies, especially the Customs, do not understand their importance and strategic placement in

'the country's economic security' and 'the security of the country's economy', which 'has both domestic and international connotation' (1993, p.87). Okiro's NPF may boast of co-operating with NDLEA, but evidence from other sources suggests 'there is no significant co-operation between the Police and NDLEA', especially 'in the area of investigations [and intelligence] against suspected substance [drug] abusers' and their allies (Maisaka 2008, p. 49). For the courts, the prison and police, agencies that should be the closest allies, Alemika and Best believe very little has been achieved in inter-service co-operation. They, therefore, suggest these agencies pay 'attention to the implication of the police law enforcement practices and the courts' performance for the functioning, management and performance of the nation's Prisons Service'. Nevertheless, the duo acknowledge that 'the police encounter great difficulties in collecting evidence and procuring witnesses' in their work (1993, p.143, 153).

In an appraisal of the need for police and immigration partnership, which is not the case so far, Osieke, Igweika and Adetula advocate an examination of 'the legal regime of aliens in Nigeria', which will 'focus on ...their interaction within the country [as it affects] national security' (1993, p. 29). This is with a view to monitoring '[aliens'] movements... residence and their establishment [sic]' (p. 57). Again, they acknowledge the problem:

> "...both the Immigration and Police authorities must be issued with adequate tools and equipment particularly computers for their operations. The Immigration authorities will be enabled to take and store all the information and particulars required by the Regulation at the entry points. The Police will keep and store the information regarding the movements, residence, establishment and departures once the alien has entered the country. These computers must have facilities not only for storage but for easy inter-agency retrievance [sic]. It is needless to mention that adequate personnel

must be trained for proper operation and maintenance of these facilities".

(p.58)

The situation is yet to be remedied! Their warnings, almost twenty years ago, 'that some of the religious disturbances of the past were masterminded or at least influenced by religious groups across our borders' (p.57), are still not heeded by the authorities. Consequent upon this lack of focus and attention, potential intelligence has been lost in times past, with fatal consequences. With a well-structured, cultivated and co-ordinated intelligence unit or liaison with these agencies, the NPF should function more properly. The Federal Road Safety Commission (FRSC), for instance, recently 'intercepted 1, 500 bags of diverted fertilizer' along Ogbomosho-Ilorin road (**Daily Sun** 10 Aug. 2010), one of the two roads connecting the south to the north of Nigeria. For decades, this has been the pattern: tonnes of government-subsidized fertilizer meant for mostly poor farmers in the rural areas are diverted by powerful politicians and top civil servants for private purposes; and the security/intelligence agencies have not been able to stop this menace. Had there been solid co-operation and proper liaison between these agencies, this could have led to reliable intelligence and successful investigation of the perennial failure of the country's hugely expensive (costing billions of naira annually) but moribund agricultural sector. While the NPF does not have the foresight or resources for this liaison, their men were sufficiently available to 'brutalise...no fewer than ten officers and men of the [NSCDC]' at their Kwara State Command Headquarters (**National Compendium Vol. 4 No. 9** Oct. 2006, p.13). Is the NSCDC itself innocent? The NSCDC's official publication recently reported: 'The Corps Intelligence Directorate at the initial stage was good in witch

hunting one another [sic] but as at today, the story has changed as personnel... [are now] submitting report[s] that are relevant to the government' (**The Defender Vol. 2**, p. 34). Sounds familiar to the post-1976 NPF Special Branch (see chapter two)! In this kind of organisational culture, what form of inter-service co-operation can this agency give or receive: is a dog safe when the hyena bites her own? Recall also that the IGP has shot at the NSCDC by calling for its scrapping, or merging with the NPF (see Introduction); which has dramatically increased the friction and acrimony between the two agencies. Okiro, as IGP, graphically portrays the woeful inter-agency relationship in Nigeria, revealing 'glaring threats to our security' and the precipice on which Nigeria is tottering:

> "It is my observation that this situation can be largely attributed to the loose co-operation among relevant agents of state, especially in the area of intelligence sharing. As a matter of fact, the combined efforts of Military Intelligence, the Criminal/State Intelligence Bureau of the Police, the State Security Service [sic] and the intelligence units of other agencies, obviously have not been able to penetrate deep enough to avert some of the major security incidents that we've experienced so far. Regrettably too, there is little evidence to show that we have enough intelligence to avert or contain any future calamity".
>
> (2008a, p.22)

The NPF and Intelligence Sharing at International Level

The links between the NPF and the Interpol still continue, naturally, despite its many hiccups. These links started in 1960 and became official and better consolidated in 1962 with the establishment of the National Central Bureau (NCB) in Lagos (Tamuno 1970, p. 279). Nigeria was admitted into full membership in 1961, at the 30th Annual General Assembly in

Copenhagen, Denmark, in 1961 (Nwolise 2004, p.94-95). The NCB has the following roles, among others:

a) "Ensure and promote the widest possible mutual co-operation between all police authorities, within the limits of the laws existing in the different countries and in the spirit of the universal declaration of Human Rights

b) "Collection of documents and Criminal Intelligence which have a direct bearing on International Police Co-operation sources in their own countries, and pass this material on to the other NCB, and General Secretariat [sic];

c) "Ensuring that Police enquiries and operations requested by another country's NCB are carried out in their own countries; and

d) "Receiving and responding to requests for information, checks, etc, from other NCBs and reply to such requests [sic]" (Ekoko *et al* 1993, p. 525-526; see also *Police Handbook,* 1981, p. 43).

The level of co-operation between the NPF and Interpol was comparatively high then. The NCB made a total of 'ninety enquiries for Interpol and foreign forces' in 1962 alone. In addition:

> "Nigeria gained much from participation in Interpol, but it also helped such countries as the United Kingdom which needed its co-operation in checking narcotics crimes in which Nigerian immigrants became increasingly involved during the early 1960's. Such co-operation was particularly required to deal with the traffic in Indian hemp, much of which was smuggled out of Nigeria. For its suppression the NPF Anti-Narcotics Squad worked closely with others in Nigeria's National Central Bureau of Interpol. The members of the ...Squad aimed at suppressing not only the cultivation and circulation of hemp at home but also its export".

(Tamuno 1970, p. 279)

Interpol also helped greatly in dealing with many cases of 'obtaining under false pretences', also known as '419', a crime category in which Nigerians had become masters in the international arena (Glenny 2008). Former IGP Atta believes that Interpol 'did help a great deal' on these cases as they 'were so many and varied that several books could be written about them' (1997, p. 37). Atta then wished 'that the Nigeria Police shall be in a position to reciprocate this commendable gesture in future' (p. 57). Coomasie confirms that the NPF 'enjoyed the co-operation of sister organisations in the West African sub region and beyond, through the [Interpol]' (2005, p. x); and Nwolise notes the NPF's 'co-operation with international police (INTERPOL) over crime control' (2004, p. 95).

It has not all been a rosy affair, however. Interpol had its many ups and downs, especially during the military era, when Nigeria was a pariah state (up till1999). It was an era the political authorities and the security/intelligence establishment would like to forget. The NPF, especially, became adept at equivocation. Atta, then IGP, told visiting Interpol Secretary-General in 1990, that 'complaints from member nations of [Nigeria's] inability to respond promptly to... correspondences or enquiries' were unfounded; that the NPF 'found information on these enquiries sometime inadequate or fictitious' [sic]; and that member-nations should 'take cognisance of the complex problems of the geographical set up of [Nigeria] and its size' (1998, p. 27). He continued, by saying that foreign detectives/operatives and 'our West African neighbours' partnering with Nigeria 'can attest to [Nigeria's] commitments and co-operation', as the

NPF was 'never known to double-cross or hide vital facts or clues' (1998, p.60). He concluded, erroneously, that 'considerable improvement' had been made 'in recent times' (1998, p. 28). Several member-nations, including those in the West African sub-region Atta mentioned, had many complaints and disagreements with Nigeria (Atta1998, p. 36, 63-64, 94-95). Atta then ended with the usual vow that Nigeria would 'contribute [its quota] to the global effort', as 'it affects the African Region', by upholding Nigeria's vision to 'deepen involvement and greater participation of the region in the pursuit of the day to day concerns of the Interpol' (p.58).This pledge is yet to be meaningfully and substantially followed through; the reason for S. I. Ringim's observation that:

> "[The] relationship between Interpol Nigeria and other nations Interpol [sic] has not been adequately harnessed to meet the challenges of crime prevention. There is, therefore, the need to improve the relationship between them through close co-operation, collaboration and mutuality...there is the need for Interpol Nigeria and other Interpol member-nations to enter into a networking relationship so that advance intelligence obtained by member nations on intentions and activities of subversive elements, saboteurs, insurgents and other criminals can easily be available to NPF and other relevant security agencies without delay...[and] areas of friction between Interpol Nigeria and other Interpol member nations such as co-operation and sharing of intelligence should be smoothened to avoid rancour and acrimony".
>
> (2007, p.42-43)

The NPF and Sister Agencies: Barriers to, and suggestions for, collaboration

These agencies have shown little or no collaboration in their operations. Some barriers are involved in this. The **OUTLET** mentions:

a) Defective recruitment policies;
b) Hegemonic attitude and idiosyncratic disposition/orientation of personnel, particularly junior ones;
c) Ego and supremacy problem; and
d) Non-adherence to, and overlap of, responsibilities among agencies (p. 11).

Tamuno refers to rivalries which 'government policies, programmes and their reviews... have failed to provide wholesome solutions to' (1993, p. xviii). These rivalries are now like 'a pecking order', having the army over police, the police over customs, and the customs over immigration, which is injurious to 'the common good' (Ahmed 2007, p. 201). Dega adds 'inefficient record keeping' and 'limited access to vital information', which is 'particularly difficult in the case of the SSS whose operations are basically under-cover and clandestine' (2004, p.19). Onovo speaks of the laws, rules, regulations, orders and directives, which are designed 'to ensure the security of...intelligence information' [sic]; absent national intelligence model; hierarchies in information sharing; inadequacies in criminal/intelligence analysis; and lack or shortage of appropriate technologies (2004, p.12-13). Ige and Dabiri suggest the absence of nationalism and patriotism, or the 'lack of knowledge by security agencies of the dynamics of the Nigerian economy' and 'the security dimensions of their responsibilities', making them behave like 'independent islands of power', leading to struggles 'for importance and prominence' among themselves (1993, p. 137). This 'unnecessary competition' and 'unhealthy but unspoken rivalry' has existed for so long (Daura [n. d.], p. 22). One may note here, however, that Sheptycki's 'organisational pathologies' (2004) do

not necessarily affect Nigeria's security and intelligence agencies as their intelligence system is not sophisticated or advanced enough to be so affected.

The most crucial of these barriers, it appears, is the absence of a coherent national policy on criminal intelligence gathering and sharing (Okiro 2008a; Onovo 2004; Adeyemi 1993; Asagba 1993). There is no value, then, in the assumption of the National Defence Policy paper that:

> "The NCS, NIS, NPS and FFS, as well as the NDLEA, NSCDC and FRSC shall together with the conventional police, constitute the nation's third tier of defence. This requires strengthening the intelligence gathering capabilities through the establishment of a credible and effective intelligence network. These services shall be appropriately equipped with communication surveillance and transport equipment, to meet the challenges of the prevailing threat situation"
>
> (2006? p. 37).

Perhaps, another barrier is that the concept of 'partnerships and networks' is a new one that more advanced societies are still learning and grappling with, much less new comers (Wood and Shearing 2007, in Ratcliffe 2009, p.114). In addition to this, is 'the corporate culture of... secrecy' (Ratcliffe and Sheptycki 2009, p. 257), as most 'government organizations naturally continue to reward information hoarding over information sharing' (Guidetti 2008, p.226), especially in Nigeria's current socio-cultural milieu. Moreover:

> "...security demands are more acute and maintaining the unity of purpose of agencies with different cultures, internal pressures and ambitions can be very difficult, but is vital. The point is that without intelligence the required case for co-operation cannot be adequately made in the first place, the priorities cannot be identified, the threats cannot be tackled, the most impactive opportunities cannot be seized, the authorities of agencies cannot

> be coordinated to the best effect and, above all, we cannot know how we are doing".
>
> (Flood and Gaspar 2008, p. 56)

So, whether between the police and sister agencies or the Interpol, the above is true: 'agencies cannot be coordinated' or be made to co-operate, so 'we cannot [or do not] know how we are doing'. Just as the NPF could not properly manage or relate with sister agencies, there is very little positive contact or sharing it can do with the general public. Could there be remedies for this?

The Federal Government, still grappling with its own multifaceted problems, and with a limited, jaundiced and grossly distorted perspective on intelligence and national security, has been holding 'presidential retreats' with the agencies to offset the dwindling inter-service co-operation (**Police News May Vol. 1 No. 4**, 2006, p. 54). These are round-table meetings and conferences between political/ministerial authorities and agency leaders, and not training or capacity-building programmes. These are, essentially, social jamborees and political loyalty clubs, with little or no benefits for the intelligence community. Consequently, others have suggested 'functional/vibrant' security liaison offices or units, where the agencies are 'parts...of the organic whole' with 'the simultaneous working of all [parts]' (**OUTLET** May 2007 No. 6, p. 53-54; also Okiro 2009, p. 292). Ratcliffe puts this succinctly:

> "Liaison officers perform important information functions that are both technical and cultural. They stand at the interface of distinct organisations and provide the host agency with access to technical databases that are normally unavailable. Of possibly greater importance, liaison officers bring understanding of the processes, doctrine and organizational culture of the remote agency they represent....It is possible that, more than integrated databases and data-mining techniques, liaison officers with their understanding of

> the information culture of their respective organizations represent the future of collaborative and co-operative policing".
>
> (2008, p.133)

Ige and Dabiri believe a top management level determination by these agencies to harmonise roles and 'forge [a] co-operative culture' could help (1989, p.137). Okiro wants this co-operative culture to 'integrate' the 'community organisations, non-governmental organisations, the business sector and private citizens', with built-in 'sustainability and accountability' (2008a, p.11-12). Perhaps, this might be formalised by Guidetti's Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), now a tool 'for organisations to communicate and recognize collaborative partnerships'(2008a, p. 225).The importance of training, especially for low-level capacity agencies as these, is also crucial, 'for boosting and sustaining a culture of collaboration' and 'a great force multiplier' (Guidetti 2008a, p. 228). The NPF and sister agencies also need to deliberately forge and promote partnership with the private sector which usually controls a large chunk *(85 percent in the US, for instance) of the country's infrastructure, while local law enforcement agencies often possess threat information on infrastructure (Morabito and Greenberg 2005, p. vii). Finally, these agencies need to engage in more strategic thinking at every level of their operations (Higgins 2009, p.102), by clarifying their mission, establishing a governance process, and producing evaluations or assessments that recognize jointness (Guidetti 2008a, p. 225-233). All this should necessarily be in a coherent National Criminal Intelligence Gathering/Sharing Policy, or a National Crime Control Master Plan, which incorporates all the essentials of criminal intelligence management (Okiro 2008a; Ezekwezili 2006; Onovo 2004; Adeyemi 1993;

Asagba 1993). With this in place, one hopes the intelligence community in Nigeria and the criminal intelligence portfolio of the NPF in particular will regain its sanity and, eventually, its pride of place.

This area of the survey appears to be fairly intricate, and one where respondents struggled with the most.

Table 9. The response on inter-service intelligence co-operation.

Response	No. of Respondents	Percentage of Respondents
Highly Successful	9	8
Fairly Successful	43	31
Averagely Successful	30	26.7
Ineffective	23	22
Extremely Ineffective	5	5
Total	**110**	**92**

Significantly, 27 (about 20 per cent) of 137 respondents abstained, raising doubts as to the actual rate of success of inter-agency collaboration in Nigeria. Furthermore, from a total of 137, only 87 (about 64 per cent) responded to (and about 36 per cent abstained from) the question on the availability/sufficiency of frameworks and instruments for inter-service collaboration; an indication that many within and outside the agencies still don't understand this need.

Table10. The response on the availability/sufficiency of instruments and frameworks for inter-service collaboration (only 78 responded).

Response	No. of Respondents	Percentage of Respondents
Agree	19	24.4
Disagree	27	34.6
Sometimes	15	19.2
Don't know	17	21.8
TOTAL	**78**	**100**

So, there is an urgent need for instituting these frameworks. In addition, 82 of 109 respondents (about 75 per cent) agree that the intelligence agencies should collaborate with other public and private entities. Only 13 (about 12 per cent) say no; eleven (about 10 per cent) say sometimes and three (about 3 per cent) don't know. With 28 abstentions (about 20 per cent) out of 137, one believes the issue should be seen as crucial and urgent.

Table11. The response on whether there is crisis in the Nigerian intelligence community.

Response	No. of Respondents	Percentage of Respondents
Yes	64	47
No	15	10

Sometimes	24	18
Don't know	6	4
Abstentions	28	20
TOTAL	**137**	**99**

Table12. The response on the effectiveness of the nation's security and intelligence agencies.

Response	No. of Respondents	Percentage of Respondents
Highly Effective	10	9
Fairly Effective	57	52
Average	28	26
Ineffective	11	10
Extremely ineffective	3	3
Abstentions	27	20
TOTAL	**137**	**100**

With a fifth of the 137 respondents abstaining, there is an indication of ignorance on the part of agency staff and the general public and there is need, therefore, for more education and training for the former and enlightenment for the latter. This is necessary because, once the frameworks and instruments of operation and collaboration are created and fine-tuned, the public may be left in a slippery landscape where the

surveillance society becomes the norm, with attendant consequences (Wood 2006 ed.). The NPF (like other services) is already struggling with many unresolved problems; issues which have resulted from the burden of its history, and are now due for examination.

5. The Burden of History: Issues and problems in embedding Intelligence-Led Policing (ILP) in the NPF

> "Nothing is as dangerous as an army in the midst of an unwarlike nation; excessive love of the whole community for quiet continually puts the constitution at the mercy of the soldiery".
>
> Alexis de Tocqueville (1805-1859)

> " [A] student of the political institutions of any country desirous of understanding the 'ethos' of any country's government can hardly do better than make a close study of its police system, which will provide him with a measuring rod of the actual extent to which its government is free or authoritarian".
>
> J. Coatman (1959)

This chapter argues from the premise that the Nigeria Police Force (NPF) has been operating under seemingly inevitable circumstances. The impact of this heritage is regarded as the burden of its history. With this kind of heritage, the NPF's course could not have been significantly different; nor could the NPF have done better. These problems affect Nigerian policing, but much more the intelligence component. Finally, this chapter should be seen as reinforcing and complimentary to chapter three (Knowledge is Power); the two appear as two sides of the same coin.

These NPF problems are multi-dimensional and multi-faceted. Some are historical and structural, while others are political, essentially human

factors and barriers that are 'foundational' to the force's *modus operandi*', creating many 'management crises' which have displaced 'the spirit of responsibility' in the service, and bleached away 'the legendary commitment and confidence' of Nigerian police personnel (Kupolati 2007,p. xiii). The overall consequence is manifest in 'organizational ineffectiveness', a result of the average officer's impotence and ineptitude as they have little or no professional authority to fight the battle of crime successfully (Kupolati 2007, p. viii). The problems are also evident in the serious concerns shown by the public, governments, police authorities and officials, and through the mass media and human rights organisations in the country (Alemika and Chukwuma 2006, p.16). The police authorities appear worried (and confused) (*Annual Report* 2008, p.13-14). The strike action of early 2002, the first in NPF's history, which took place because the personnel believe that 'successive governments have been paying lip-service to improving their working conditions', to borrow Ugbaja's words (1993, p. 498-499), is both significant and symbolic.

The NPF and the Bogey of Colonial or Imperial Policing

The first problem for the NPF is living with the circumstances of its birth. The police in Nigeria, as in other colonized countries of the world, were seen as instruments of the colonial government. They were perceived as agents of oppression and control. Tamuno explains that this situation was aggravated by the nature of the police in Nigeria, with 'a distinct semi-military character', which the colonialists needed because of the people's 'opposition to British jurisdiction and rule' (1970, p. 38-40). He suggests

that it would have been unwise for the British to engage soldiers directly, as this would have exposed the British colonialists early enough (1970, p. 283). As Coatman (1959, in Alemika and Chukwuma 2006, p. 8) observes, the police reflect the government. The people saw the police as agents of government and a tool of oppression and they became alienated from the police. With the nature of policing, especially pertaining to sourcing information and intelligence-gathering, where success depends on police-public co-operation, police failure in the face of public hostility or isolation, was inevitable. The situation still persists; despite the campaigns for reforms and police-public co-operation. The major reason: the ruling elite/political class in Nigeria has continued to perpetuate the 'inherited hegemonic policing policy' of the past (Onyeozili 2005, p. 39). As Adisa argues:

> "Many people thought that from being the enemies of the people the police would become friends of the people as well as custodians of law and order in society. Regrettably, this has not turned out to be so. Almost [five] decades after independence, the police are yet to change [their] orientation to a people-oriented force".
>
> (In Chukwuma 2005)

So, the NPF is not totally separated from 'its colonial usages' (Coomasie 1994, p.19). There is, therefore, an urgent need for the NPF to shed its 'neo-colonial apron that has stymied progress', and to 'embrace innovative approaches geared towards combating the obstacles in the way of a detached professionalized police' (Onyeozili 2005, p.32). The issue, however, should be seen in proper perspective. Colonialism had a great

impact (both negative and positive) in many areas of national life (including policing), but it cannot, and should not, be held accountable, especially after half a century of self-government, for the woeful and shameful policing of today. To do so now is mischievous, 'makes little or no sense' (Nwolise 2004, p. 83) and amounts to 'blind resentment', clothed in 'the fervour of theoretical [political] nationalism'. The fact is, to suit their primordial and predatory tendencies, Nigerian rulers have deliberately created the 'shattered law and order regime' in the country (Kupolati 2007, p.185) and also consciously sustain it. As the former UN chief, Kofi Annan cautioned, colonialism should no longer be Africa's scape-goat (**New York Times** 17 April, 1998).

The Politicization of the NPF and Nigerian Policing

The next problem affecting Nigerian policing and the intelligence function is its unwholesome politicization. As Marenin has consistently and convincingly shown, the 'frequently intermittent control the ruling class exercises over the state, the state over its agencies, and agencies over their personnel' (1982, p.379), illustrates Nigeria's experience. Reiner also observes 'the [police's] invidious role of being "piggy in the middle"' (1992, p.185). As Lustgarten argues, 'policing is inescapably political' (1986, p.111); so 'issues about policing in Nigeria cannot be discussed in isolation from the socio-political history of Nigeria' (Nwankwo and Udeh 2006, p.106). In Kupolati's words, the NPF has been walking 'on the cryptic political plain', and 'policing which is affected by the political pendulum...is not ripe for global challenges' (2007, p.483). The birth of this political beast

could be traced to the 1959 Christmas Message of the Prime Minister, directly to the Police:

> "This is the last year we are celebrating Christmas as a dependent territory. The New Year will usher in an independent Nigeria and my thoughts are naturally concentrated at this time on those checks and balances as manifested in our various institutions and organisations, particularly the Nigeria Police, without which democracy cannot work. If you discharge your multi-farious duties [sic] with a sense of self-detachment, honesty and an incorruptible manner, though you will be faced with an ever-increasing burden, you will no doubt derive satisfaction that Nigeria will come to look on you as a friend and guide in her hour of need, and you will be accorded a place of honour in the history of this great country".
>
> (In Tamuno 1970, p.260)

One may ask, where was the Inspector-General; and couldn't he have performed this duty? It is ironic that the number one partisan or political figure in pre-independent (and later independent) Nigeria also doubled as the unofficial mentor and motivator of the police. Nevertheless, the exact opposite of the prophecy was what happened. Eventually, the NPF became part of the government, from where it began sliding into professional opprobrium; it is yet to recover.

The NPF has continued to operate without self-detachment, honesty of purpose and an incorruptible manner. It has slipped 'from its days of innocence'; 'its early dreams' of professionalism and commitment have been shattered by 'its entanglement with the complexities of the Nigerian state', brought so low to an 'almost total severance... [from] decency and sobriety' (Izeani 1999, p.39). The NPF is, in Chinese writer Fu's words, 'a bird in the cage' (1997), controlled and manipulated by 'powerful and wealthy individuals' (Alemika and Best 1993, p.153; also Oseni 1993, p. 53-

55). Ironically, 'the best' in Nigerian policing 'techniques and operational methods, even policing concepts, are [now] drawn from the political environment', one which condescendingly 'views policing and the police force with [a] distinct functional purpose, very much apart from [its] pure statutory objectives' (Kupolati 2007, p.387). This 'undue political influence' has become a hindrance to effective policing in investigation, intelligence and prosecution (Okiro 2007, p.18). The Force now openly represents 'a department of the executive', more often 'a tool of oppression and suppression of political opponents' (Kupolati 2007, p. 53; p. 378-379, 450), and working for the 'narrow political interests and immediate needs for regime protection rather than a [holistic] approach to security' (Williams 2006, p.129).Tamuno calls this, 'policing with politics', or 'the familiar principle of He-who-pays-the Piper-dictating-the-Tune'; as the police are now seen 'as buttresses of Governments-in-place' (in Rotimi, 2001, p.vi-vii). Similarly, Jemibewon wonders if the NPF could 'have done much better than it did within the convoluted and acrimonious atmosphere it found itself' (2001, p.91). Asemota aptly observes:

> "The effect of the involvement of the Police in the Legislative, Executive and Judicial Functions of government, reduced its policing efficiency. The end result was, rather than provide adequate manpower and all necessary equipment to enhance police efficiency, 'short cut' methods were employed, standard lowered and convictions were gained with little or no [effort] ... The unedifying and unfortunate result was that the Police closed down its dog section, neglected its fingerprint, handwriting and other scientific departments and ignored training abroad, recruited no new experts or scientists and lost grip of its traditional function of crime prevention and apprehension of offenders".
>
> (1993, p.397-398)

To worsen matters, the NPF, like other politicized forces in the West African sub-region, received 'limited political support' for its activities; the 'control of reform processes' came from outside it; and there was 'limited [professional] knowledge by many [police] practitioners', made worse by an unwholesome 'exclusion of civil society' in policing (CLEEN and APCOF 2006). Some commentators also allege there is a 'political-criminal nexus in Nigeria' (Ebbi 1997), manifesting as 'a profoundly corrupt relationship between the local tycoons and party leaders' (Glenny 2008, p. 362), which corrupts and distorts Nigerian policing, holding it captive.

A word on the politics or events of the1990's, the June 12 Episode, now regarded as 'a major political crisis, which shook the nation to its foundations' (Okiro 2009, p.145), is pertinent. The elections of 1993, reputed to be the freest and fairest in Nigeria up to that time, were cancelled by the military government, who had their own hidden agenda. Most Nigerians did not accept this, as the election results came as a rare opportunity for the country to be truly united, so they demonstrated and protested both within and outside Nigeria, against the cancellation. The consequence was a prolonged and costly economic dislocation and socio-political instability. It got so bad the government and some security/intelligence agencies became persecutors, instead of protectors, of the citizens. Unfortunately, a significant segment of the NPF intelligence became an active and useful appendage to this evil agenda. On this tragic part of NPF history, Dawodu's delicate and subtle words only give a hint:

> "Unfortunately, the Force has come to face certain issues which are seemingly detrimental to the overall development of the Force [sic]. Despite its commitment to the cause of social rebirth through security and intelligence control, there has not been any such

'perfect' achievement of the Force, owing perhaps to the presence of unforeseen circumstances".

(2006, p. 50)

Membere's words, in another context, are more revealing: the NPF 'actually served the angels and...demons during this era in the history of law enforcement in Nigeria' (1982, p.30). Many police officers from the south, especially the south-western part, serving or retired, still have bitter memories. One retired Assistant-Inspector General (AIG) came out recently, to say he 'nearly quit' the NPF (in **The Westerner Vol. 1 No. 21**, Aug. 2009, p.10-15). Another intelligence chief, now an *Oba* (King) in the south-west, was almost ignominiously swept away from service. Other officers were transferred without cogent professional or ethical reasons. The examples abound. The effects are still raging, as some educated and experienced hands have been forced to quit intelligence, and sometimes the service. Regrettably, a vital arm of the police in the process of being restored was tragically returned to limbo. It is yet to recover! This control or influence still subsists in subtle forms, as some of the survey results illustrate.

From a total of 137 respondents, only 20 (about 15 per cent) agree that the federal government influences the police through promotions. With two abstentions (1.5 per cent), the remaining 115 (about 75 per cent) disagree.

Table13. Response on manifestations of government's influence over police, through...

Govt. influence	Agree	Disagree	Abstention	Percent-age of Agreement	Percentage of Disagreement	Percentage of Abstention
Promotions	20	115	2	15	83	1.5
Appointments	33	102	2	24	75	1.5
Influence Peddling	42	92	2	42	92	2
General influence	80	55	2	58	40	1.5

Though an undemocratic IGP during his unusually long tenure (Sep.1993-May 1999), Coomasie's point that the NPF 'should be independent' of government and 'be answerable to the public first', with the 'authority to check [the] excesses of the high and the lowly', and equipped 'with enhanced capability...to prevent and detect crime' (1998, p. 27), is appropriate. Former Met Commissioner, Sir Paul Stephenson, has counselled: 'there must be appropriate space between policing and politics' (**Metro** 16 Sep. 2009, p. 4). Lustgarten offers:

> "...And there remains a large unanswered question: what happens when the police get from the political authorities messages they do not want to hear? This raises the fundamental constitutional question, of designing institutions of governance for law enforcement and order maintenance appropriate to the philosophy and practice of a liberal democracy".
>
> (1985, p. 111-112)

The Militarization of the NPF and Policing Principles

This issue is related to the last. It is the demon of militarization. The military or semi-military character of the NPF has already been acknowledged. However, with the coming of independence (1960), the civil war (1967-1970) and the forceful taking over of government by the military from the civilians, which they controlled up to 1999 (except briefly from 1979-1983), the NPF went through a period of not only neglect and lack, but a bastardization of its principles, practices and procedures. Instead of continuing on the path of a progressive acquisition of professional knowledge, technical competence and a scientific basis for policing, premised on a solid compliance to the rule of law and protection of human rights, the NPF began, or was forced to begin, adopting short cut methods. Some have tried to rationalize this military-police marriage, which they regard as 'the most logical given the circumstances', on the basis that the police had 15,000 to the armed forces combined total of 11,000 personnel; and the fact that 'only the communications system of the police covered the entire country at the time' (CLEEN and NHRC 1999, p.18).Malherbe also shares this sentiment, illustrating the human rights perspectives and democratic credentials of many police leaders in Nigeria:

> "The [NPF] has no choice as to whether to relate more with the judiciary, legislative or the executive [military] arms. All functionaries of the Force are employed by the establishment and, as such, they owe allegiance to the [military] state. It is not in doubt that a majority of the public has misconstrued this relationship. That could have been the basis for their attitudes and suspicion against the police establishment. But one wonders whether it will be justified to reason that way in modern times".

He continues:

> "[I]t has been stated that the [NPF] is an agency of the government. It is the case that the law and Government of the day dictate the objective of the Force....the force has continued to play the role of a government agency in internal security matters. Succeeding [IGP's] have always been in command of the Force until recently when the general Babaginda administration transferred that function to the President-in-Council of the Armed Forces [sic]; thereby leaving the IG with delegated authority and responsibilities. Like the British overlords, the Executive arm of the Government has always controlled the police system".
>
> (1994, p.50)

It is on record, that the NPF 'was at its peak' by the mid-sixties, but '[t]hereafter its efficiency began to slide due to its involvement in military politics' (Asemota 1993, p. 414). Many, like Nwabueze, have reported the legendary damage done to the police by the military (in Jemibewon 2001, p.125). Jemibewon blames the military for 'manipulating' the police to erode 'the standards of policing' (2001, p.80). The police were also made redundant by the military rulers as, without weapons and equipment, it became difficult, and sometimes impossible, for them to operate. Then, it was possible for an army major to have three or four official vehicles serving his office, while a state command of the police could not boast of six vehicles in good condition (Adeniyi 1980, p.6). In short, successive military regimes deliberately upset 'the apple-cart to the detriment of the Nigeria Police' (Omooba 1994, p.11). Not only did the NPF lose 'prestige, power, and status', the demon of militarization turned the police from being 'loyal to the flag, the law and the nation' (Unamka 1994, p. 66, 68), to an apologist and executioner of the military government's undemocratic principles and propensities. As Malherbe observes:

> "[I]t is worthwhile evaluating the overall influences that have become apparent from our [Police] interaction with the armed forces. Has it helped to restore the distinct identity that had been accomplished during the pre-independence era or has it acted as a catalyst in disintegrating the police identity while the armed forces have maintained their own peculiar form? The latter appears more plausible".
>
> (1994, p. 49)

So, the military advent in Nigerian politics and government was a disaster for the NPF. It would have come as a rude shock if Malherbe thought otherwise, considering 'the multi-faceted nature of the impact of military rule in Nigeria' (Yusuf, in Adewumi 2003, p.vii; also Oloyede 2004). How did this demon of militarization destroy Nigerian policing?

The phenomenon, termed 'the military psyche' or 'the military mind' (Odu 1997, p.44-48), is a one way machine. Whereas policing engages and partners with others, the military world sees others as obstacles. The military man 'sees every situation as a conflict situation', and so is 'trained to combat it' and 'not...to discuss it', or 'to dialogue over it'. This 'conflict psyche...damages national psyche', and 'creativity and productivity [are] hurt by the subjugation' of the people and national institutions (Odu 1997, p.45-46). Moreover, the military's 'sense of insecurity' in a political setting makes them see 'any source of threat' as one to be 'always suppressed'. To them, the NPF was a rival institution; the reason they ensured it 'suffered in silence'; 'was deliberately starved of funds', and its professionalism truncated (Nwolize 2004, p.111-112). Democratic policing in Nigeria is really a new terminology, as true democratic principles and nuances have since been misunderstood, misapplied and overthrown by those responsible for governance, who ensured that 'the value and

importance of professionalized policing [were] discounted [sic]' (Kupolati 2007, p.376). *Jones *et al* explain:

> "The reasoning behind [democratic policing] is that the military's mission is so different from that of the police that each contaminates the other. Democratic policing is undermined by military involvement because soldiers take orders from above rather than responding to the appeals of individual citizens; their use of force is much less restrained and secrecy is a more ingrained mindset. Conversely, military officers in developed democracies recognized long ago that policing duties were antithetical to their war-fighting mission. Policing requires mediation skills, the exercise of discretion in the use of authority and a facilitative style of supervision".
>
> (1994, p. 39)

Strangely, for Malherbe, it is okay for law enforcement and government to 'dictate the objective of the Force'. The rule of law is not enough, so the military's omniscience must help; all this in the context of policing priorities being 'dictated' by a military government that has suspended the already fragile or fledgling national constitution. Having first suspended the constitution, the military enacted many obnoxious laws and decrees 'which to a large extent detracted from the responsibilities of the police' (Membere 1982, p. 34) and crippled its efficiency. Crucially also, the military took over 'the command of the force', while 'leaving the IG with [only] delegated authority and responsibilities', which was '[another] distasteful arrangement' to subjugate the police (Oseni 1993, p.60-61). This was akin to taking the controls from the aeroplane pilot while expecting him to ensure a safe landing at an unknown destination. Why should Malherbe quarrel with Nigerians 'for their attitudes and suspicions against the police establishment'; why quarrel with them for not co-operating with the police?

Who would want to co-operate or partner with *this* police? Would that not amount to dining with the devil?

However, militarization did more! After the civil war, the demobilization of many soldiers was initiated through 'massive programmes' of training and re-training, which were 'hurriedly improvised', and 'a far cry from the regular [NPF] training...in all respects'. As Suleiman reports, '[n]o professional subterfuge was enlisted to create the impression of maintaining hitherto established recruitment and training standards'. The NPF, which was a '15,000 strong fully integrated national institution', meant for law enforcement, began, from 1968, to receive close to a 'staggering figure of 80,000 ill-trained, ill-motivated and ill-equipped men [ex-soldiers] by 1979'. It was regarded as an 'emergency period [that] begot its emergency policemen', personnel 'who had hardly any inkling of the best traditions of the NPF' (Suleiman 1993, p.343), compounding and worsening the problems of funding, infrastructure and logistics. The aftermath:

> "Rather than self-confidence they [these 'soldier-policemen'] were overbearing, rather than possessing social maturity they were intrusionists, and rather than acceptance of legitimate authority they were confrontational [sic]. [They] were crisis-ridden soldier-policemen who did not fit into the police services comfortably".
>
> (Oseni 1993, p.112)

Furthermore, their conversion as policemen catalyzed the conversion of 'the ports authority security guards' and 'the once supernumerary (Spy) policemen', to 'regular policemen with no adequate training' (Oseni 1993, p.112). This development now fostered and consolidated an era of 'half-

baked and semi-disciplined policemen' (Ekoko *et al*, 1994, p.130-131), which was a total departure from the past.

On whether the military era had an impact on the police culture and organisation, an outstanding 113 (about 83 per cent) say yes and only 8 (about 5.8 per cent) say no; 2 (1.5 per cent) don't know, while 1 (less than1per cent) and 2 (1.5 per cent) are the other and missing categories respectively. This is also captured in the survey, as 113 (83 per cent) of 126 respondents agree the military era impacted Nigerian policing.

Table14. Response on the perceived impact of the military era on police culture.

Response	No of Respondents	Percentage of Respondents
Yes	113	83
No	8	5.8
Don't know	2	1.5
Missing	2	1.5
Other	1	Less than 1
Total	**126**	**91.8**

Another crucial but negative development related to militarization is that the new internal security/intelligence outfit, the National Security Organisation (the NSO/1976, formerly Special Branch) from now on, was to be headed exclusively by career military officers (see Oluleye 1985, p. x, 88, 194-195). Unfortunately, these men had purely political motives and the survival of the various military regimes as their primary agenda. The

national interests, including giving assistance/co-operation to the NPF in its activities, particularly its intelligence function, became unabashedly subjugated and displaced. The military heads of this agency certainly felt no obligation or need to co-operate on intelligence matters with the police, since they regarded themselves as the political masters, coupled with their mentality of professional superiority to the police. The security/intelligence network (as per co-operation between the NPF and the NSO/SSS) is yet to recover from limbo since that era. Other effects of this polarization include the distortion of well-established practices; the professional standards the Force had always been known for, now being 'hamstrung by lack of documentation', a compulsion to adopt undemocratic procedures, thereby cutting the establishment (NPF) from 'her revered standards' and generally leaving it 'groping' in the dark, becoming an institution with a broken identity (Adoda 2008 'Preface'). The NPF and its intelligence, under the military, became a distasteful copycat. Malherbe's words are apt:

> "The organizational development of the Force has always been the odd victim [in a military era].For while the [NPF] needed to cultivate and consolidate its own distinctive traditions, they started to adopt many ways peculiar to the armed forces. The Police Mobile Force dressed in ways that exemplified military influences. Even the regular police personnel followed [suit]. The general dispositions of...policemen began to assume military postures [procedures and practices]".
>
> (1994, p.49)

Furthermore:

> "Not only did the Force [lose] its well-trained manpower, it also lost in equipment and material resources to newly established federal agencies. And while they were excised it became obvious that the Force still needed nearly all the sections. A case in point is the

> intelligence gathering section for which the criminal and security intelligence has just been resuscitated. It needs to be emphasised that there is inherently nothing wrong with Government policies and decisions [sic]. Their effects are however apparent on the growth and development of a virile police force. While other competing sectors of the economy were attracting well-qualified prospects, the implementation of the manpower policies forced our hands [the NPF] to make do with lower qualified prospects. In addition, the training standard was also not the best in terms of instructional facilities. It was also difficult to change the orientation of a soldier-turned policeman in only three calendar months".
>
> (1994, p. 46-47)

It is disheartening that police intelligence that performed so creditably in the pre- and early independence period could deteriorate soon after. This should not be a surprise, however! With the benefit of historical hindsight, one observes the military regimes that held sway in the land would not have permitted, or felt comfortable with, an impressive or high-flying police intelligence outfit outside their control and beyond their manipulation. The SB had already demonstrated (chapter two) that a virile police intelligence unit would be the undoing of the military and its bands of ill-informed adventurers in Nigerian government and politics. So, it had to go!

The Bastardization of NPF's Organisational Structure and Culture

Faced with chronic forms of neglect, the result for the NPF was 'a corresponding and gradual marginalisation' of its departments (Ekoko *et al* 1994, p. 130-131). A very crucial but delicate psychological connection is involved here:

> "Problems facing the armed forces, the police, and the intelligence agencies are tightly interconnected. A weak or ineffective police will put pressure on officials to use the military in policing roles for which it is ill-prepared, or to militarize the police. The existence of

> several poorly controlled intelligence agencies may harm the professionalism of military and police, and so on. Problems in this sector are in turn embedded in the larger context of developmental challenges and institutional features of societies and politics".
>
> (Aguero 2001, p. 3)

Consequently, the military engineered a number of unnecessary and wasteful re-arrangements of the police structure (see Arase and Iwuofor 2007), in a bid to have a unitary or military style command, in order to control and manipulate the police. And they succeeded tremendously. The Nigeria Police is still heavily yoked and, contrary to all expectations, 'a turn-around from the dispiriting experience the police had under military rule', is still a pipe dream (Okiro 2009, p. 45).

A major consequence of these twin demons of politicization and militarization, particularly the latter, on Nigerian policing, is the gross distortion of not only the principles and standards, but also the organisational structure and operational modus of the NPF. Though it happened as part of the historical process, the traditions, procedures and practices of the NPF, which were based on a collegiate pattern of leadership (with the IGP as head, with the same pattern through the lower structures), gave way to the military's unitary style, which did not condone an alternative view or outlook, but handed down orders to be obeyed, willy-nilly. In this way, the effective decision-making structures of policing collapsed on a large scale, especially in areas like investigation and intelligence, where the military (and later on, their civilian counterparts), as political masters, had vested interests. This partly explains why the performance of the NPF has been so woeful and shameful, especially in

intelligence. As Sir David notes, organisational culture is very important 'both in terms of local knowledge and tactical skills', because it helps 'practitioners to be constantly learning' and 'reviewing', affording 'a golden opportunity to refine tactical thinking and enhance intelligence holding' (2009a, p. 34). However, with orders handed down, and policing priorities determined by military fiat, there were no opportunities to make mistakes and, therefore, no basis for learning. Since there were no lessons learned, Nigerian policing could not grow or mature, neither could the police acquire knowledge and expertise. What happened in the larger society repeated itself in the police: 'structural and policy interruptions in police administration and management' (Waziri, in **POLIS Vol. 2 No. 3** 2010, p.42) led to chronic dysfunction in Nigerian policing. The NPF, with its intelligence, is still in a coma:

> "Notwithstanding the value of this single system [unitary style or 'unity-in-diversity'], it must be acknowledged that democratising such a large police service presents significant challenges to the NPF Management Team, which is charged with reforming and repositioning the NPF to ensure uniformity in the delivery of quality policing services".
>
> (*Police Annual Report* 2008, p. 11)

A closely related problem is the unnecessary and burdensome entanglement of the NPF with Nigeria's cumbersome bureaucracy. The NPF remains under the yoke of the Ministry of Police Affairs (it has been tossed a number of times between this and Internal Affairs), which barely understands its remit or mandate, and lacks the requisite personnel for modern police management. It is also a far cry from the prestige and supervisory authority of the Home Office (UK), lacking the investigatory

machinery of Her Majesty's Inspector of Constabulary (HMIC), and the professional expertise and support of the Association of Chiefs of Police (ACPO). Suffice to say, it is an albatross; more of a burden than a blessing. Williams' perspective is pertinent:

> "The mistake is that we have accepted...the Law Enforcement Agencies are like any public sector parastatal with supervising Ministries as Defence, Internal Affairs and Police Affairs. A system that has not improved the efficiency and effectiveness of Law Enforcement Agencies [sic]. Many of these Ministries are manned by Civil Servants without any specialized knowledge of security management, [or] technology and strategic operations. In the last three decades, public sector management is increasingly adopting Private Sector Management [sic] techniques and methods blindly without the necessary infrastructure, in-depth study or expertise and resources for self-adaptation rather than dependency and adoption".
>
> (2006, p.128-129)

Police bureaucracy on its own, as in the US, could be 'the biggest obstacle in opposition to community and problem-oriented policing' (Greene 2000, p. 300; also Gargan 2007). For the NPF to be yoked under Nigeria's bureaucracy, a bureaucracy with similar negative experiences (Olaopa 2009) is double jeopardy for the NPF and its intelligence function.

The NPF, Intelligence and the Problem of Language and Communication

The centrality of communication and information to policing needs no repeating here. There cannot be information without communication. And language is very crucial in this regard, especially in a country like Nigeria, with an abysmally low level of literacy. Perhaps, the reason countries and

police services (the UK and the Metropolitan Police Service, for instance), even with high levels of literacy, but with many languages and people groups, officially operate interpretation and language facilities. For Nigeria, reputed to have over 200 languages and people groups, this remains a major problem for policing. Moreover, the different parts of the country have not only varying degrees of topography but also of socio-economic development, which is reflected in the quality of police personnel. Consequently, members of the force, especially the majority at the lower ranks, when posted outside their local areas, find policing and communication difficult, because:

> "...language differences constitute another barrier to effective policing in Nigeria. In a plural and semi-illiterate [sic] society, people take recourse to their 'mother-tongue' in their day-to-day socialisation. In such a society it is difficult for a 'foreigner' or an 'outsider' (non-native speaker of the given language) to effectively communicate with the indigenes. This situation is true in Nigeria where as an example, a Hausa speaking police officer in the multi-linguistic Nigeria Police finds it difficult to perform his duty of preventing disorder in non-Hausa speaking Yorubaland or Igboland [sic]. In recognizing this problem the colonial police belatedly tried to rectify their error when it emphasised essential, practical but not academic knowledge of a language to enhance the functions of the police officer in the civil society. The problem of (mis)communication [still] persists".
>
> (Onyeozili 2005, p. 43)

Oseni posits:

> "I often wonder aloud why we cannot adopt a particular language of the nation [sic] as the...lingua franca...It is deceitful believing English Language is our lingua franca when in actual fact you need to be a complete part of a particular language of the nation before you can conveniently break into where things are happening".

(1993, p.13)

The government and the NPF do not see this as a problem yet, much less think of a solution; it is assumed policing is taking place.

The Patten Report, incidentally, has an insight into the NPF dilemma: 'The present structure of the [NPF] is the product of decades of security policing'; it is a force saddled with 'a complicated and multi-layered command structure', whose development has much to do with 'the response to security threats than to the demands of community policing and management efficiency'. The solution, therefore, is an appropriate structure to 'reflect the role' the NPF is to perform (paras.12.1-12.3; p. 69). Meanwhile, are there any pearls in Nigerian policing; has intelligence impacted the Nigerian policing landscape?

6. Pearls before Swine? The impact of the intelligence function on Nigerian Policing

> "It is well known that cops do not think statistically but through anecdotes".
>
> -Marenin (2004)
>
> "Moreover, existing intelligence routines are entrenched in a law enforcement apparatus that can be both inefficient and ineffective, even while it is capable of providing statistics that attest to a modicum of efficiency and effectiveness".
>
> -Ratcliffe and Sheptycki (2009)

This chapter examines the impact of the intelligence function on Nigerian policing. It is in five parts. The first is a brief critique of intelligence

performance in Nigerian policing. The second assesses the impact of intelligence on Nigerian policing from before independence up to the 1970's. The third part is a thematic evaluation of intelligence performance from the late1970's, while the fourth is a contemporaneous assessment of the NPF through its own records. The last part is an appraisal of the questionnaire related to this subject. This multi-layered way of looking at the impact of intelligence on Nigerian policing intends to show whether or not, the NPF has been casting its 'pearls before swine'-- reducing crime and impacting the society positively without proper appreciation or due recognition.

A critique of Nigerian policing reveals the Nigeria Police as an organisation operating in an intelligence vacuum. Policing generally operates in a dilemma; and one area of dilemma is proving its worth or value to the society. Many questions arise here. Is policing contributing to the safety and peace of mind of citizens and the community? How is performance to be assessed or measured? Who should do the measuring? For a country like Nigeria, yet to join the 'measurement revolution in development and governance' (Ignatief 2005, in Chukwuma 2008, p.vi), where the police are facing many problems of 'recording [and measuring] crime', and alternative 'unofficial methods of crime measurement', like the self-report and victim studies, are still relatively absent_(Chukwuma 2008, p. vi), the problems of performance management multiply. Furthermore, the NPF itself does not yet have standard or key performance indicators (KPI's) by which it could be judged, or the impact of its activities measured. This remains one among many issues of concern to stakeholders on policing reforms in Nigeria (Chukwuma 2008, p.vi). However, for Scott-Lee

et al (2008), three indicators, or 'key strands of the strategic vision' of policing are: (a) protecting 'the public from death and serious physical/ psychological harm'; (b) 'promoting community stability and trust and confidence'; and (c) 'reducing victimization' (p. 298-299). Others include (a) reducing crime b) investigating crime; (c) promoting safety; (d) providing assistance; (e) citizen-focus; (f) resource use; and (g) doing local policing (Home Office, in Ratcliffe 2008, p. 208). However, these performance indicators overlap, as other personnel are engaged in the monitoring of police performance internally (Ratcliffe 2008, p. 208). It is this growing complexity of policing and the performance indicators that has given rise to the delineation between 'low level', or 'soft policing' and 'hard policing'; or the 'low-hanging fruit' and the 'more complex and persistent issues', which often require more rigorous 'analysis and understanding', or intelligence

(Scott-Lee *et al* 2008, p. 293). At any rate, how has intelligence been performing?

Policing is believed to throw up more failures than successes (Grieve 2008a, p. x; Phillips 2008, p.90). It is, therefore, an irony that police intelligence can be both inefficient and ineffective, while producing statistics which demonstrates efficiency and effectiveness (Ratcliffe 2008, p. 265). So, if alleged intelligence failures appear more common than successes, or their effects are more commonly felt, the intelligence professional should expect criticisms from the public, while police authorities must be ready and willing to defend when necessary. At this point, the police would need to be 'lawfully audacious' (Grieve 2008b, p.16). In the circumstances of the NPF, however, there is no justifiable ground for them to be 'lawfully audacious'.

The reason is the total absence of NPF's own standard performance indicators. In any case, an assessment of the impact of NPF's intelligence will be based on a blend of the Home Office and Scott-Lee et al's indicators as stated above.

The intelligence function in the NPF in the pre-independence era to the 1970's, like other areas of Nigerian policing, had some vitality and vigour. The work has already hinted at the comparative success of the NPF before and immediately after independence (chapter two). Many commentators agree on this. Okonkwo (1966), for instance, believes the NPF was a force Nigerians should be proud of; that the NPF detected major crimes admirably; were doing their best to 'preserve a tradition of service to the public in matters however trivial'; and had 'set up special offices' on public complaints against police officers (1966). Tamuno reports,

that the NPF succeeded to a large extent in responding to crime and criminality; that intelligence was put to good use during the Great Depression (1930's) on criminal gang activities; and that the negative impact of the Second World War on the Nigerian society was well-managed. He observes that the Force saw the value of air transport in its work and accordingly incorporated it, albeit on a low scale (1970, p.190-192). He adds that 'the NPF prepared itself in several ways for tackling the various problems connected with crime control', with the CID and intelligence section leading all these (1970, p.193). From the late1930's, it became compulsory for every detective to attend the Police (Detective) Training School, Enugu, before joining the CID (p.194). Moreover, from the 1950's, there was increased 'specialist training' for detectives in crime

control, with 'particular attention [given] to the medico-legal aspects' of policing, through 'the study of forensic science and related modern detective techniques' (p. 95). Other progressive developments took place at the time, all geared to making the NPF a more efficient and effective force, one which understood the dynamics of social change and creatively applied itself to it (p.196-198). Tamuno adds:

> "The increasing problems of law enforcement and crime control from the1930's compelled important reforms in the machinery and techniques of the NPF. Consequently, the NPF expanded the range of its specialized activities and improved its efficiency through training and the development of various branches, detachments and squads".
>
> (1970, p. 283)

He then concludes:

> "It is conceivable that other cases where the police did not show valour, though many, were not reported. But on balance, the reported cases, before and after 1930, showed the resourceful-ness and courage of some policemen who earned for them-selves appropriate and well-deserved medals of gallantry".
>
> (1970, 200-201)

The cumulative effect is that the NPF intelligence outfit before and after independence, was a shining example of what an intelligence unit should be, albeit with room for improvement. As chapter two has shown, the Special Branch (SB) had a fairly good grasp of its duties and did it diligently and brilliantly. Other commentators also acknowledge the importance of the NPF and the SB on Nigerian policing and national

security during this era (Okoi-Uyonyo 2005; Asemota 1993; Oluleye 1985; Membere 1982). However, as an imperative for their political survival, the military regimes saw to the demise of the SB in particular and police intelligence in general.

This section examines the intelligence function from some aspects, or themes, of Nigerian policing from the 1970's. In nearly all cases, the NPF performance at this period cannot compare with that of the preceding era. The first aspect is national politics. Despite the politics desks of the police intelligence units at local or national levels, this is one area the NPF has failed woefully. A fundamental error here is that the NPF forgot that 'all the political parties' in Nigeria were like the Central Intelligence Agency (the CIA), very 'adept at intelligence gathering' (Oluleye 1985, p. 201). As a result of this organisational ignorance or oversight, the ones who should police others now became the policed. The politicians practically overwhelmed the police. As Tamuno observes:

> "Irresponsible politicians made the police attempts at preserving public safety and order more difficult. Masquerading as law-makers they blatantly employed law-breakers as their agents in the bitter struggles for power. The common people whose lives and property were endengered looked on aghast powerless even at election time to set things right. Indeed, the political party rallies and election periods provided favourable opportunities for the fire-eaters to organise a reign of terror with the powerful protection of high-ranking politicians. The police who were required to maintain law and order and preserve public safety at a time when politics ran riot found themselves in the unenviable position of stone-rolling Sisyphus".
>
> (1970, p. 287)

This development manifested from the First Republic (which led to the country's civil war (1967-1970), through to the Second Republic (1979-1983), and, unfortunately, continues till today. With glaring and worrisome police intelligence failures, what followed were, among many problems, political assassinations and murders which have almost become the nation's trademark. Many of these assassinations and murders shook the nation to the foundations. In particular was the murder of the Attorney-General of the Federation (AGF), Bola Ige, in December 2001, which significantly impacted police image. Ige, aside his eminent status as AGF, was a highly charismatic and celebrated political leader from the south-western part of the country, who was not in the ruling party, but was co-opted as AGF, to give some respectability to the new government; after decades of military interregnum, that ended in May 1999. His own side of the political divide did not particularly agree with his joining the government, so his murder was interpreted in ways that the federal government and the police would never be able to exonerate themselves. So, with other developments in the national political firmament, the death of the AGF came as a total shock to the country. The effect of this on police image, crime and community safety was that, if the AGF could be killed, in his own home and guarded by policemen, who was safe, and what is the relevance of the police? Interestingly, till date, despite the court cases, nobody has been brought to justice. This episode further pushed the debate on the police and crime right on top of national discourse (Arase and Iwuofor 2007, p. 9). The situation has not changed significantly. The highly influential *Emir* of Kano, in the north, escaped assassination twice, in 2007 and 2010 (**Newswatch** 18 July 2010). About 73 assassinations between

1986 and 2003 still remain unsolved (Igbinovia 2003, p. 267-269); and Sani was disturbed enough to write a book on 'political assassinations in Nigeria', because of 'much outcry and disquiet over the apparent helplessness of [the NPF] and national security apparatus (2007, p.144). Igbafe and Offiong echo this failure when they write of 'the incapability' and 'ineffectiveness of the ...national security outfit' to end these problems (2007). Related to political assassinations are kidnappings, where 76 foreigners and 56 Nigerians were victims in 2006 alone. For this, Nigeria is now sixth among ten 'worst countries in the world' known for kidnapping (Castle Rock Global Corporation 2008, in **Newswatch** 18 July 2010). The case of the four kidnapped journalists and their driver in mid-2010 has already been mentioned (chapters three and four). As if the NPF accepts this perennial intelligence failure as normal, IGP Okiro demonstrates the helpless position of the NPF by pleading for 'maturity, tolerance and sportsmanship among the political class', so that 'political assassinations [and kidnappings] would not arise' again (2009, p.108).

The impact of intelligence on corruption, whether within the police or the nation as a whole, is also nil. One of the reasons for creating the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) in 2002 was the scandalous failure of the NPF not only in the country but even within the organisation, with regard to corruption. For a long time, the 'X' Squad, a CID unit formed in 1963, had 'a unique role', specifically dealing 'with cases of police and public corruption' (Tamuno 1970, p. 198). Today, the 'X' Squad, recently re-introduced, exists only in name. Ironically, the NPF now tops the list of 'the leading bribe takers' in Nigeria (**Newswatch** 1 July

2010). When Collin Powell, retired US general, labelled Nigerians as 'scammers', many Nigerians felt bad and unjustifiably attacked him (**The Guardian** 9 Oct. 1995). It is now on record that Nigerian rulers have stolen close to US$ 380bn since independence (**BBC** Report 20 Oct. 2006); while governors and their local government surrogates loot over US$10bn monthly (Ribadu, in **Nigerian Tribune** 21 July 2010). Smith (2008) in reference to corruption in Nigeria is only illustrative. A Minister of Police Affairs admits:

> "There is corruption in Nigeria and the [NPF] is part of Nigeria. The first thing is let us not play the ostrich. Let us admit that one of the problems and challenges in Nigeria, a challenge to its existence, is corruption. A challenge means you have something you must overcome. There is corruption in the Nigeria Police; that is not saying every policeman is corrupt. That there is corruption in Nigeria is not saying everybody is corrupt...So we have the
>
> challenge...to support the creation of a better Nigerian polity and a better and less corrupt police force".
>
> (Waziri, in **POLIS Vol. 2 No. 3** 2010, p. 44/46)

The impact of the intelligence function in the NPF could also be assessed through its monitoring of religion. There are grave threats to Nigeria from the religious firmament. More worrisome are speculations of Al-Qaeda's presence in the country (**The Nation** 3 Aug. 2010). However, this did not just start (see Atta1997, p.53-60; Okiro 2009, p.135-137). The threat of prolonged religious based conflicts had been a constant one (Ahiede 2007, p. 279). Several warnings to the government and security agencies that there were outside influences on Nigeria's religious crises have been

largely ignored. Some Islamic groups in Nigeria are also believed to be connected to religious groups in Algeria, Libya, Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan; groups that are not in the best terms with their home governments (Kafur 2008, p.2). It is not surprising that religious upheavals have grown worse in the country (Ahiede 2007, p. 279-280). Onovo reports on the religious riots which occurred in some northern states of the country, from 25 July 2009, a day after becoming the IGP:

> "About 28 [police] officers died; about 50 [police] family members also died and some [police] family members are still missing.... I also learnt that [the Federal Road Safety Commission] lost some people. We are now talking about innocent civilians who were murdered. About 13 churches were burnt, eight pastors were killed and many people were killed in the churches. INEC [The Independent National Electoral Commission] officers were burnt; prisons in Maiduguri were burnt also. We have the detailed reports. It was complete mayhem".
>
> (In **POLIS Vol. 1 No. 2,** p. 34)

Some have alluded to the failure of the security agencies and the NPF, on the 2009 Boko Haram riot in Maiduguri, accusing the security forces of not acting on intelligence received; others believe the security agencies prevented what would have been greater violence and damage (Reuters, in **The Dawn** 21-27 Sep. 2009). Reuters reports that about 800 people were killed. These disturbances are still on-going, without the NPF or the national security apparatus, being able to have a handle on them. The NPF's intelligence failure in the area of religion is legendary, considering the long-standing warning of an observer:

> "The future portends a trend towards a shift from ...mild forms of terrorism to the more fatalistic catastrophic type of terrorism and terrorist activities. Already, evidence of resurgent 'explicit violence'

> by individuals or groups of individuals operating under the sponsorship of corporate and non-corporate bodies in Nigeria is simmering".
>
> (James 1993, p.603)

The Nigerian university students remain an enigma to the NPF. Police-students relations in Nigeria have not been traditionally cordial or smooth (Ehindero 1986, p. 135).The issue of cultism has worsened the situation (Okiro 2009, p.156-160). Even though police-students relations date back to pre-independence days, the quality of police intelligence on students' affairs has remained palpably low-rate. The Ife Students Riot Tribunal appears to be the only inquiry, among many, that scored the NPF positively: 'The Tribunal finds the Police action on that day reasonable, given the circumstances that the students embarked on an illegal procession' (*Main Report* 1981, Para. 3.38/p.45). On the Nigerian students, Alli and Gabriel observe:

> "Students power in Nigeria has never been placed in its proper perspective...It appears that ever since the early 1970's, the thinking in security circles in this country has been to regard students as a negative force in nation-building. This has created suspicion, confrontation and total lack of co-operation".
>
> (1989 p. 282)

However, on this score, the security services, the NPF in particular, have not been responsible and responsive. Generally, NPF personnel, in relation to students, feel inferior or like second class citizens, finding it difficult to understand students and respond appropriately to them. Even the top hierarchy of the force has been displaying a considerable degree of ineptitude and incompetence in responding to and coping with students'

affairs, especially on the streets. Udeka reports on the Force's management of students' riots:

> "...From the way the NPF dabbled into the crisis, they had no information of the build-up of the students [sic]. There was no planning on the way and manner to contain the students. It was only when the rioting students had surged into Lagos [from the hinterland] in large numbers and held the city to ransom that the NPF rushed an unprepared and ill-equipped anti-riot unit to stop them...In any case, it is obvious that the NPF went into the 1978 students' crisis without adequate intelligence".
>
> (2007, p. 29-30)

He captures the sequel, three decades after, on a sad note:

> "There was no difference in the police action between 1978, 1986 and 2006 students' crises in Nigerian universities. The NPF was still caught unprepared by the students. The usual claim of shortage of tear-gas, smoke and manpower made it impossible
>
> again for the NPF to make any meaningful impact on the quelling of the students' crisis. This means that since after [the] 1978 students' crisis the police high command had not stocked enough of these equipment. Also since in 2006, the NPF still repeated the same mistakes made during the management of the 1978 and 1986 students' crises, it is the researcher's view that the NPF has no way of reviewing its past operations with a view [to] improving areas of weakness".
>
> (2007, p. 39)

This is the same rigid posture, which the NPF shockingly stuck to, applying the old strategies of 1971 in dealing with the students' crisis of 1978 (Ekoko *et al* 1993, p.110). Sadly, Akhimien's warning to police authorities and decision-makers in higher institutions not to neglect intelligence (2008, p. 98), has consistently been ignored.

In addition, the failure of police intelligence is glaring in robbery cases. Ehindero once lamented the death of many police officers through attacks by robbers (1998, p.115-116). This trend has worsened over the years. The robbers seem to have some intelligence on police activities and operations, which the police lack on them. Some sources indicate that, between June 1992 and June 2002, there were at least sixty bank robberies in Nigeria; with cash running into millions of naira (Okezie 2002, p. 218-220). Between 1985 and 2006, the average number of vehicles stolen or robbed annually was over a thousand in the country (Okezie 2002, p. 212). Deaths from robbery or assassination are sometimes difficult to label: cases mostly lead to nowhere and often remain 'under investigation'. It is interesting to note, however, that robbery gangs were professional enough to rely 'on an intelligence network' in all their operations (Okezie 2002, p.165). The failure of NPF intelligence on the robbery kingpin, 'Anini the Law', and his gang, in the late1980's became a scandal, and an embarrassment, for the then Federal Military Government (FMG), painting Nigeria as a failing state:

> "...Before this directive [to arrest Anini], the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) had announced three days before, that two of the nineteen states of the Federation had been taken over by armed robbers, and that the then Head of State, General Ibrahim Babangida, a dictator, was in charge of seventeen states while a notorious armed robber and his gang were in charge of two states. They gave the names of the states as Lagos and Bendel".
>
> (Osayande, in Okezie 2002, p.193-194)

A newspaper editorial of that era pin-pointed intelligence failure: 'Armed robbers are on the loose due to the failure of the police [and] the

collapse of the intelligence network'; the result 'is the reign of terror', but the solution is for the police 'to step up their intelligence gathering techniques' (**The Guardian** 7 Sep. 1999). This is as true today as it was over a decade ago.

There is a crucial need to consider the importance of local knowledge and community intelligence in the current dispensation. In the early days, local knowledge, known now as community intelligence, was a priority for the NPF during and after training (*NPF Training Manual* 1976, p.16-18). This is no longer the case! The cost of this neglect to NPF's capability today is enormous. Communal clashes that have occurred in Nigeria number over 200 (from May 1999 to December 2008). This trend shows 'a steady rise' in violent conflicts and confrontations among ethnic groups in Nigeria since the return to democracy (Elaigwu, in Zenchi 2008, p. 49-52). These conflicts, great threats to national security (Okiro 2009, p.135), occur because the police have been failing in their intelligence function. The NPF is still organisationally ignorant, having abandoned or forgotten the importance of community intelligence, not only within the country, but more significantly, across the borders. One can confidently report, for instance, that what happens in the Middle East could affect or impact the behaviour of certain parts of northern Nigeria, thereby affecting the policing of the country. As Klevein and Harfield rightly observe:

> "Even community policing, in some countries, is assuming a transnational element with immigrant countries in Britain or expatriate communities abroad retaining close communication and regularly travelling between their adopted homeland and their countries of origin. Events overseas or regular visits with extended families and kin groups that reside in different national jurisdictions

> can influence community interaction and activity so that neighbourhood policing teams may well need to be fully conversant with relevant issues overseas in order to understand properly the community issues they are dealing with daily here".
>
> (2009c, p. 244)

This section assesses the impact of intelligence on the Nigerian crime scene; an attempt to see, even if darkly, through NPF's own records. However, the limitations of official crime statistics are well-known; they now represent a 'descriptive medium' in crime debates (Maguire 1997, in Tombs 2000, p. 64). Ratcliffe and Sheptycki observe, that an ineffective and inefficient intelligence apparatus may yield statistics indicating its effectiveness and efficiency (2009; also Ratcliffe 2008, p. 265). So, despite glaring intelligence failings and general lack-lustre performance, the NPF has been boosting its image through statistics. For instance, the NPF claims there was a dramatic fall of about 46 per cent in 2007, compared with the offences for 2006, as illustrated below. This would, obviously, be difficult for the public to agree with.

Table 15. The comparison of offences (2006 and 2007) at Force or national level.

Offences	**2006**	**2007**	**Remark**
Offences against Persons	74,585	34,738	Decrease
Offences against Property	87,454	49,415	Decrease
Offences against Lawful Authority	7,677	7,314	Decrease

Offences against Local Act	2,610	2,350	Decrease
Total	**172,326**	**93,817**	**Decrease**

Source: *Police Annual Report* 2007, p.158-159.

Again, the totals at Force level for 'local' offences in 2007 were 93,817 and 90,156 for 2008, falling just a little over 1per cent. The wide disparity in these two figures, or rate of success, is suggestive or significant.

Table 16. The comparison of offences (2007 and 2008) at Force or national level.

Offences	**2007**	**2008**	**Remark**
Offences against Persons	34,738	35,109	Increase
Offences against Property	49,415	47,626	Decrease
Offences against Lawful Authority	7,314	5,938	Decrease
Offences against Local Act	2,350	1,483	Decrease
Total	**93,817**	**90,156**	**Decrease**

Source: *Police Annual Report* 2008, p.145.

Table 17 shows comparison of offences (2008 and 2009) at Force level.

Offences	**2008**	**2009**	**Remark**
Offences against Persons	35,109	38,955	Increase

Offences against Property	47,626	64,286	Increase
Offences against Lawful Authority	5,938	7,878	Increase
Offences against Local Act	90,156	1,387	Decrease

Source: *Police Annual Report* 2009, p.136.

Another very useful and practical way of looking at these figures is to employ Ratcliffe's 'crime funnel' analysis: volume of crimes committed, reported and dealt with (2008). For instance, the FCT/Abuja Command, in 2007, had 645 reported cases and 231were prosecuted. Of these, 79 were acquittals and 152 were convictions. The total number of arrested persons was 662, and 341 were prosecuted--with 123 acquitted and 218 convicted persons. The total national value of property lost/stolen was N13, 365,000 and total value of property recovered was N7, 603,000, representing over 50 per cent (in *Police Annual Report* 2007, p.17). Overall, however, as Ratcliffe observes, the efforts of the police yield little, 'as the crime funnel paints a fairly bleak picture' and only a number of cases are usually 'successfully detected', so the need for intelligence-led policing is imperative (2008, p. 43-52, 62-63; also 2009).

Table18. Crime Statistics for year 2007 at Force or national level.

SUMMARY OF CRIME ADMINISTRATION 2007

State	No. Of Cases Reported	No Of Cases Prosecuted	No. Of Cases Abandoned	No. Of Cases Convicted	No. Of Cases Awaiting Trial	No. Of Cases Cleared	No. Of Cases Under Trial	No. Of persons Arrested	No. Of Persons Prosecuted	No. Of Persons Acquitted	No. Of Persons Convicted	No. Of Persons Awaiting Trial	No. Of Persons Under Arrest	Value Of Property Lost/Stolen =N=	Value of Property Recovered =N=
Abuja	645	231	79	152	-	-	414	662	341	123	218	-	321	13,365,000	7,605,000
Abia	1,342	977	31	104	762	10	355	2,423	1,646	71	380	1,395	577	18,070,707	10,124,618
Adamawa	4573	4057	341	1749	1976	63	453	5159	4305	406	1823	1976	964	22,976,661	12,868,882
Akwa Ibom	2,957	1,520	218	856	446	221	1,116	3,618	1,920	414	946	560	1,698	26,857,413	8,064,110
Anambra	1,571	932	65	158	789	-	639	3,049	1,372	97	237	1,038	2,477	28,136,749	658,747
Bayelsa	1,162	315	6	6	303	1	846	1,906	417	6	6	405	1,489	127,758,610	9,530,196
Bauchi	2,210	1,490	21	415	994	27	753	3,350	2,651	21	571	2,059	769	59,136,838	38,967,350
Benue	1,513	1,436	248	442	746	17	60	4,316	3,832	603	1,203	2,076	434	99,913,705	14,411,875
Borno	2,435	1,911	29	889	995	33	489	3,368	2,376	39	965	1,372	992	71,879,774	49,931,253
C/River	2,283	923	95	242	586	135	1,275	2,394	1,238	124	734	730	1,156	193,299,762	14,603,672
Delta	4,230	1,904	411	430	1,013	546	1,790	6,110	2,203	489	646	1,068	3,507	64,046,786	17,117,512
Ebonyi	1,611	503	45	66	472	317	741	3,354	957	70	98	789	2,397	67,877,482	6,904,353
Edo	3,615	1392	276	548	2638	-	221	4,985	3566	322	654	2990	319	124,175,474	56,127,179
Ekiti	414	200	30	70	100	-	214	612	244	35	87	122	368	60,600,000	5,000,000
Enugu	1,159	934	152	268	509	79	146	1,931	1,931	347	443	1,141	-	48,890,907	27,173,572
Gombe	1,950	725	-	290	435	-	325	1,194	984	-	455	529	210	41,016,950	4,492,795
Imo	3,482	606	-	108	498	14	2,862	5,692	1,126	-	193	933	4,766	10,664,326	1,860,830
Jigawa	1,680	1,454	61	558	835	-	226	2,402	2,073	64	710	1,299	419	11,165,495	2,506,485
Kaduna	863	716	-	236	480	59	88	1,515	1,245	-	384	861	270	274,237,000	256,728,147
Kano	6,510	5,701	212	2,782	2,707	352	457	10,024	7,900	263	3,837	3,800	2,124	1,171,604,514	722,791,168

In 2008, the FCT Command had 649 reported cases and 420 were prosecuted. Of these, 32 cases were acquitted and 216 were convicted. While 722 persons were arrested, 584 were prosecuted, with only 42 acquitted and 320 convicted. The number awaiting trial was 218, with138 persons under investigation. However, out of a total N218, 722,000 in value of property lost/stolen, only N11, 812,350 were recovered; less than 10 per cent (*Police Annual Report* 2008, p.136). The police are failing, even at the Force/national level (see Tables 18, 19 and 20)!

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Table 19. Crime Statistics for 2008 at Force or national level.

CRIME STATISTICS SPREAD SHEETS

SUMMARY OF CRIME ADMINISTRATION

State	No. Of Cases Reported	No Of Cases Prosecuted	No. Of Cases Acquitted	No. Of Cases Convicted	No. Of Cases Awaiting Trial	No. Of Cases Closed	No. Of Cases Under Invest.	No. Of persons Arrested	No. Of Persons Prosecuted	No. Of Persons Acquitted	No. Of Persons Convicted	No. Of Persons Awaiting Trial	No. Of Persons Under	Value Of Property Lost/Stolen =N=	Value of Property Recovered =N=
Abuja	649	420	32	216	172	42	187	722	584	46	320	218	138	218,772,000	11,812,350
Abia	940	754	-	174	580	3	183	1,275	1,015	-	315	700	260	49,948,830	15,255,030
Adamawa	3,844	3,380	134	1,555	1,691	44	420	4,477	3,604	152	1,661	1,791	873	108,354,922	31,642,794
A/ Ibom	2,693	1,333	105	1,037	191	190	1,170	6,585	2,088	160	1,668	260	4,497	26,857,413	8,464,110
Anambra	598	402	20	50	332	-	196	1,373	613	39	100	332	474	3,307430	1,720,000
Bayelsa	1,362	880	40	298	542	126	356	2,820	1,088	53	350	685	1,732	4,719,422	1,997,366
Bauchi	2,515	1,711	11	501	1,199	26	778	4,177	3,074	15	719	2,340	1,103	80,565,179	4,826,792
Benue	1,403	1,346	219	412	715	-	57	3,823	3,700	625	1,133	1,942	123	45,898,049	33,047,104
Borno	2,718	1,913	25	962	926	45	760	3,786	2,443	30	1,080	1,333	1,343	230,569,706	81,045,705
C/River	1,977	533	25	62	446	72	1372	2,012	714	36	145	533	1,298	163,946,581	29,789,465
Delta	8,924	3,200	520	1,159	1,521	1,452	4,272	7,324	3,534	668	1,246	1,620	3,790	116,345,000	93,785,320
Ebonyi	1,716	443	41	38	364	219	1,054	3,003	754	109	55	590	2,749	137,945,438	1,754,458
Edo	2,019	1,681	61	196	1,424	-	338	3,566	1,820	82	216	1,522	1,746	122,368,447	98,33,677
Ekiti	415	188	20	75	93	93	134	710	267	45	102	120	443	6,318,920	1,256,000
Enugu	1,211	921	158	259	504	97	193	1,845	1,718	353	411	954	127	80,646,767	24,918,931
Gombe	1,573	1,192	2	828	362	12	369	2,230	1,855	4	1,303	548	375	1,131,447,543	9,345,330
Imo	3,309	2,230	130	1,304	796	296	783	5,068	3,460	260	1,888	1,312	1,608	112,378,900	66,522,000
Jigawa	1,319	1,262	121	535	606	12	45	2,054	1,778	135	790	853	276	19,560,344	896,095
Kaduna	1,447	1189	-	466	783	-	258	2,117	1,897	-	633	1,264	220	375,262,663	221,620,732
Kano	6,553	2,929	35	2,519	61	314	3310	11,049	4,020	52	2,816	1,152	7,029	146,898,166	44,680,000
Katsina	594	577	-	528	49	-	17	862	855	-	777	78	7	6,734,495	2,226,120
Kebbi	1,202	1,011	5	696	310	-	191	1,492	1,362	11	880	471	130	7,892,887	2,274,530
Kwara	2,713	2,228	120	1,302	806	209	276	4,247	2,677	218	1,485	974	1,570	52,100,000	42,600,000
Kogi	37	275	31	40	204	36	60	668	502	36	56	410	166	37,607,000	15,500,000

Lagos	12,837	3,371	393	949	2,029	293	9,173	14,996	5,620	520	1,260	3,840	9,376	544,502,759	488,897,765
Nassarawa	1,308	1,130	-	502	628	-	178	1,611	1,413	-	693	720	198	37,780,161	3,320,011
Niger	2,484	1,697	4	576	1,117	49	738	3,297	2,294	6	712	1,576	1,003	8,721,505	2,227,166
Ogun	1,538	878	38	293	547	122	538	2,012	1,104	66	420	618	908	127,936,448	68,396,588
Ondo	1,864	268	25	24	219	131	1,465	1,518	725	25	26	674	793	10,557,168	482,144
Osun	2,650	1,427	145	392	890	154	1,069	2,243	1,859	159	552	1,148	384	30,630,586	5,106,900
Oyo	6,700	5,299	789	2,558	1,961	-	1,401	7,308	5,688	1,132	2,580	1,976	1,620	50,689,242	38,781,821
Plateau	2,221	1,567	189	737	641	153	501	5,601	2,139	224	983	932	3,462	400,555,110	18,349,050
Rivers	5,287	2,112	150	1,572	390	-	3,175	7,226	1,342	182	1,620	460	5,884	340,624,030	60,128,000
Sokoto	1,413	1,113	27	436	650	22	278	2,543	1,585	37	567	981	958	167,125,900	95,959,184
Taraba	1,345	878	35	296	547	124	343	2,811	1,085	43	325	717	1,726	41,605,139	5,886,170
Yobe	1,173	720	18	227	475	3	450	1,494	935	265	256	654	559	38,093,685	7,586,698
Zamfara	592	543	22	105	416	2	47	926	842	24	187	631	84	74,391,200	18,445,000
Airport	193	150	19	102	29	-	43	266	200	28	128	44	66	3,260,110	2,000,000
Railway	240	85	-	36	49	12	143	303	95	-	39	56	208	2,101,000	190,000
P.A.P	246	80	5	32	43	-	166	462	180	58	96	26	280	132,690,000	68,346,000
TOTAL	**90,156**	**51,816**	**3,705**	**23,589**	**24,522**	**3,083**	**35,257**	**131,902**	**72,528**	**5,898**	**30,593**	**36,037**	**59,086**	**5,297,710,145**	**2,014,425,676**

From the analysis above, the NPF's bag of achievements appears a mixed one. On one hand, there is improvement through falling figures in some crime categories; nevertheless, there are increases in other categories, and consequently, failures in reduction of criminal impact. For instance, in the area of lost/stolen and recovered items/property, a potentially major indicator in the Nigerian crime management context, the FCT, like other Commands, has been failing. Moreover, some irregularities are observed in their data. For instance, the Command gave similar figures for both 2008 and 2009, and the Headquarters did not notice, or just passed it. Secondly, Lagos Command, for 2009, reported close to N27million as total value of property lost/stolen, while total value of property recovered was over N48million. What could explain these discrepancies? The total for the various sub-headings (in the Summary of Crime Administration at Force level) was also not calculated or mentioned in 2009; while the entries for value of property lost/ stolen and value of property recovered in the 2009 report are difficult to decode. The report must have been prepared in a hurry, and not properly vetted, which questions its validity (see Table 20).

CRIME STATISTICS SPREAD SHEETS

SUMMARY OF CRIME ADMINISTRATION

State	No of Cases Reported	No of Cases Prosecuted	No of Cases Acquitted	No of Cases Convicted	No of Cases Awaiting	No of Cases Closed	No of Cases Under	No of Persons Arrested	No of Person	No of Persons	No of Persons Convicted	No of Persons Awaiting Trial	No of Persons Under Investigation	Value of Property Lost/ Stolen	Value of Property Recovered
Abuja	649	420	32	216	172	42	187	722	584	46	320	218	138	218772000	11812350
Afibom	2990	698	187	472	213	193	639	3945	1769	414	868	487	672	#27,747,750.00	#12 ,645,400.00
Anambra	3,461	1,027	8	44	983		2,350	6,778	2,483	18	121	2,362		16,460,448	9,500,250
Abia	967	137		137	191	80	66	661	170		129	187		#160.87M	#160.87M
Adamawa	143	84		15	69	4	55	235	198	15	35	148	37		
Bauchi	1888	378		501	929		551	2,216	2004		412	1649			N 7,043,050.00.
Benue	1,315	1,252	296	339	617		63	3,353	3,238	500	1038	1,700	115	N33,268,957.00	N 22,238,984.00
Borno	2,718	1,913	25	962	926	45	760	3,786	2,443	30	1,060	1,333		N 238,569,706	N 81,045,705.
Bayelsa	1369	362	3	11	362	24	930	2090	586	3	16	547	1524	N4, 719,422	N 1,997,366.
C/River	1,765	614	27	52	614	18	1026							N 4, 736, 270.00	N 327, 447.00
Delta	10087	663	520	759	1022	1143	4979	8430	790	1090	1346				
Edo	2019	1681	61	196	1424	338	338	3566	1820	82	216	1522	1746	122368447	98333677
Enugu	1224	843	69	296	478	87	120	1928	1753	316	507	972	175		
Ebonyi	1504	61	34	27	346	221	822	3026	1009	54	31	924	822	170210268.11	4434105.00
Ekiti	332	190	50	80	60		102							26007500	10020500
Gombe	1573	1192	2	828	362	12	29	2230	1855	4	1303	548	375	1131447543	9345030
Imo	3309	2230	130	1304	796	296	783	5062	3460	250	1888	1312	1608	72447952	48060750
Jigawa	284	248		179	09	12	14							12586622	419540.00
Kaduna	1180	166		118	811		249	1629	166		118	1264		323224332	176933115
Kano	6553	2929	35	2519	51		314	11049	4020	52	2816	1152	7029	146898166	44680000
Katsina	575	477		541	64		34	795	66		795	105	26	5364280	677000
Kebbi	1202	1011	5	696	310		191	1465	1362	11	738	647	130	20309710	5908275
Kogi	371	275	31	40	204	367	60	668	502	36	56	410	166	37607000	15509000
Kwara	2976	2450	2450	1308	626		84	3571	3142	516	1965	661	429	281950	1 Billion
Lagos	12492	3148	2192	3148	8099	3508	1052	19540	3148	1510	2169	5089	1052	26753881	48445934

Table 20. Crime Statistics for 2009 at Force or national level.

Niger	2150	1463	19	390	885	89	687									88205027	28177465
Nasarawa	1210	1896		1896	757		127	2355	681		629	1065				39004801	19414550.00
Ogun	1538	878	38	283	947	122	538	2012	1104	66	420	618	908			127939448	60396568
Ondo	1621	268	25			268	1456	131	18	8	9	95				120422.90	72915.92.00
Oyo	9404	5139	652		1961		1401	7308	5698	113	2580	1976	1620			50089242	38781821
Osun	3630	1162	318	438	724	210	778	3217	1517	391	467	842				43589552.00	17245351.00
Plateau	1940	702	29	224	459	14	1143	2376	933	33	287	613				26317.9834.00	38780935.00
River	5289							8119	4154	367	1624	2162					42225.000.00
Sokoto	1413	1110	15	422	673			2070								167449370	95959184
Taraba	1607	1136	14	409	713	167	414	2097	1483	16	434	1033	614			7875261	39709513.00
Yobe	1106	622	11	290	342	10	453	1151	820	15	367	453	453			53260613	4240633
Zamfara	879	310	71	95	114		136	967	844	26	187	629	123			28829049	8780750

The survey results also illustrate the level of impact of intelligence on Nigerian policing, when compared with other aspects of Nigerian policing. Though most respondents (81 per cent) agree there is a nexus between police investigation and intelligence (Table 21), there is also the impression that the NPF engages more in law and order maintenance than in crime prevention, which should be the priority, if intelligence is working (Tables 22 and 23). Furthermore, 108 respondents (80 per cent) of 134 agree investigation is doing successfully (Table 24); while 98 (72 per cent) of 111 respondents believe operation and patrols are effective (Table 25). Compared or juxtaposed with 32 respondents (24 per cent) of 137, who score the intelligence function 46 per cent and over, the failure of the latter becomes more glaring, pathetic and disappointing (Table 26). This is not surprising; the NPF operates a habitually reactive style of policing, which gives 'more attention to the detection of crime' (Tamuno 1970, p.193), than to scientific policing and crime prevention (Okiro 2001, p.vii).

Table 21. The response on connection between investigation and police intelligence.

Response	No of Respondents	Percentage of Respondents
Agree	81	59
Disagree	23	17
Sometimes	25	18
Don't know	6	4
Total	**135**	**98**

Table 22. The response on NPF's maintenance of law and order over crime prevention.

Response	No of Respondents	Percentage of Respondents
Yes	56	41
No	54	40
Sometimes	18	13
Don't know	2	2
Others	4	3
Total	**134**	**99**

Table 23. The response on NPF's maintenance on law and order.

Response	No of Respondents	Percentage of Respondents
Highly Successful	18	13
Fairly successful	49	36
Averagely successful	52	38
Woeful failure	10	7
Highly woeful	7	5
Other	1	Less 1
Total	**137**	**100**

Table 24. The response on NPF's performance in investigation.

Response	No of Respondents	Percentage of Respondents
Highly Successful	7	5
Fairly successful	45	33
Averagely successful	56	42
Woeful failure	24	18
Highly woeful	2	2
Total	**134**	**100**

Table 25. The response on NPF's performance in operations and patrols.

Response	No of Respondents	Percentage of Respondents
Highly Successful	11	8
Fairly successful	50	37
Averagely successful	37	27
Ineffective	9	7
Extremely Ineffective	4	3
Total	**111**	**82**

Table 26. The response on NPF's performance in intelligence.

Response	No of Respondents	Percentage of Respondents
Under 30 per cent	46	34
31-45 per cent	32	22
46-55 per cent	21	15
56-69 per cent	9	7
70 per cent above	2	2
Abstentions	27	20
Total	**137**	**100**

The analysis above demonstrates that the two eras of Nigerian policing--from before independence to the late 1970's and from that era till now--

represent two different or distinct phases of policing history. The first can be categorized as one where policing and intelligence had a fairly successful outing, while the second represents a record of disappointment and disillusionment. So, Dawodu's statement, that there is no 'perfect' achievement for the NPF in intelligence (2006, p.50, 38) is an understatement. It is a serial record of disappointing failures. Clearly, Nigerian policing lacks the necessary lustre and vitality, because police intelligence remains in a coma. Another critical issue in Nigerian policing and intelligence is the law and human rights, which the next chapter examines.

7. What Have Rights Got To Do With Policing? The law, human rights and the intelligence function

> "Law enforcement can no more be an absolute than the environment remains pure in an industrial economy".
>
> -Lustgarten (1986)

> "With pressures from the despotic rulers to curb and crush opposition and control rising crimes coupled with institutional neglect (suffered by the police), which is manifested in lack of resources, embargo on recruitment and promotion for several years, victimization and nepotism, the [NPF] embraced a culture of impunity".
>
> Alemika and Chukwuma (2006)

This chapter examines the position of the Nigeria Police Force (NPF) in relation to law, human rights and the intelligence function. It is divided into five parts. The first is a brief discussion on the legality of the NPF's

existence, that is, its constitutional legitimacy. The second describes the elements of a human rights-compliant policing or democratic policing. The third debates whether or not the NPF is human rights-compliant. The next part demonstrates the absence of, and argues the need for, a legal framework, for embedding intelligence in Nigerian policing. The fifth analyzes the questionnaire results in the area of human rights.

The NPF and Constitutional Legitimacy for Nigerian Policing

Notwithstanding the creation of the NPF as a colonial appendage, the political authorities through the years have ensured the organ is

appropriately legitimized through the law and constitution. The major instruments for this are the Police Act (1964; see also chapter 359 of *The Laws of the Federal Republic of Nigeria*) and *The Nigerian Constitution* (1999). Section 214 of the Constitution states:

> "(1) There shall be a Police Force for Nigeria which shall be known as the Nigeria Police Force, and subject to the provisions of this section no other police force shall be established for the Federation or any part thereof".

It adds:

> "(2) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution
>
> (a) The [NPF] shall be organised and administered in accordance with such provisions as may be prescribed by an Act of the National Assembly;
>
> (b) The members of the [NPF] shall have such powers and duties as may be conferred upon them by law; [and]

> (c)The National Assembly may make provisions for branches of the [NPF] forming part of the armed forces of the Federation or for the protection of harbours, waterways, railways and airfields".

The duties of the NPF are in section 4 of the Police Act:

> "The police shall be employed for the prevention and detection of crime, the apprehension of offenders, the preservation of law and order, the protection of life and property and the due enforcement of all laws and regulations with which they are directly charged, and shall perform such other military duties within or without Nigeria as may be required by them by, or under the authority of, this or any other act".

These two instruments clearly vest the NPF with the powers to perform its duties. At least, the constitutional element of police legitimacy is ensured, if not policing with the citizens' consent.

What Is Human Rights-Compliant Policing, or Democratic Policing?

Human rights have replaced capitalism and socialism as the 'big idea' in the new millennium, despite their 'complex origin and a controversial past and present' (Neyroud and Beckley 2001, p. 54-55). Human rights can be defined as 'a cluster of ethical liberties, claims, powers and immunities that together constitute a system of ethical autonomy possessed by an individual as a human being vis a vis the state' (Wellman, in Neyroud and Beckley 2001, p. 58). Policing systems, however, are political, 'profoundly influenced by the constitutional order [or disorder] in which they are situated' (Walker 2000, p.3). Jones *et al* affirm:

> "Police are perhaps the most visible face of government, one that most people recognise and encounter with frequency. They also have special and awesome powers, as they are authorized to use force in their dealings with the public. Policing is primarily shaped by two public expectations. First, the police are called on to deal with crime and disorder, preventing them when possible, and to bring to account those who disobey the law. Secondly, the public expects their police to be impartial, producing justice through the fair, effective, and restrained use of their authority. The standards by which the public judges police success in meeting these expectations have become more exacting and challenging, and
>
> police agencies today must find ways to respond in an effective, affordable, and legitimate way".
>
> (1994, p.1)

The crux of the matter:

> "When [the police] use that authority to serve the interests of government, they belie the democratic promise of government for the people. The most dramatic contribution police can make to democracy is to become responsive to the needs of individual citizens. This is what the various emergency telephone systems, such as 911, have acquired in the developed democracies".
>
> (1994, p.13)

It is for the police and government to ensure the interests and welfare of the citizens are protected and promoted; to do otherwise would cripple 'the democratic promise of government for the people'. So, violations of human rights should be taken seriously. The onus, therefore, is on law

enforcement, 'as a visible component of State practice', to play 'a crucial role in promoting and protecting rights', and avoid being 'potential violators of individual rights and freedoms' (de Rover 1998, p. 381). This ensures there is 'a clear sense of the boundaries of the policing idea' (Walker 2000, p. 262).

Human rights-compliant policing or democratic policing is synonymous with ethical policing, with human rights as focus (Neyroud and Beckley 2001, p.4). Specifically, a human rights-compliant policing or democratic policing entails (a) giving special consideration to the interests and needs of citizens and private groups; (b) an accountability to the law, not the government; (c) policing to protect human rights; and (d) policing with transparency in all matters (Jones *et al* 1994, p.13-15). This model of policing is characterized, essentially, by 'police fairness' (p. 252-290), a 'legitimacy [built on] the consent of the Public' (p. 291-326).

The NPF and the Human Rights-Compliant Policing Debate

In view of the description of human rights-compliant policing or democratic policing as seen above, can the NPF be classified as a human rights-compliant organisation? There is not much evidence in earlier works on the NPF to encourage a clear position on this. Okonkwo (1966) and Tamuno (1970) did not pay particular attention to this concept, which has only recently gained attention (Neyroud and Beckley 2001; Rover 1998). So, a fair assessment may not be possible in this regard for the first era of Nigerian policing (from pre-independence to the 1970's). There were, however, a few cases of human rights abuses:

"The case of Rex V. George Dianyi (1933) was a clear case of police brutality. Constable Dianyi had instruction to investigate a murder case at Umu Aware...On reaching there, he rounded up five suspects and applied the techniques of the third degree in his attempt to obtain a confession. For this purpose he bent back their fingers and tied them tightly to the wrist with a string. The suspects remained in that position for several nights. In the process four of them lost the use of their fingers and hands ..."

(Tamuno 1970 p.188)

Nevertheless, there is a- general sense of nostalgia expressed by these authorities for this era. It was considered that, despite being a colonial period, the era witnessed more responsible and responsive policing than the second era (from the 1970's till date). The situation is somewhat different today. The NPF and its managers strive at every public opportunity to present an agency that respects human rights and practises democratic policing, while simultaneously confessing the negative human rights posture of their agency. Okiro refers to NPF's 'ruthlessness and despotism' (2009, p.15); Ehindero calls police, 'a tool of oppression' (1998, p. xi). Outsiders talk of 'killers in uniform', 'a brutal occupation force in enemy territory' (Odunfa in **Sunday Tribune** 12 July 1992); clothed in 'military toga' (Beke 2001, p.13), with its 'autocratic military behaviour' and habitual 'incivility and brutality' (Amadi 2000, p.54/83); a Force still averse to protecting the interests and serving the needs of the poor (Alemika and Chukwuma 2003/2004). Its own have accused it of acquiescing to and participating 'in the violation of the constitution', and for being 'as culpable [as the military] for the descent' into dictatorship and national chaos (Arase

and Iwuofor 2007, p. 4). It would, therefore, be difficult for any self-respecting commentator to label as democratic, a police department that unabashedly applies teargas on grieving and defenceless Nigerian mothers, for peacefully protesting the premature deaths of 50 secondary school students in a plane tragedy (**Al-Jazeera** Report 16 Dec. 2005); which routinely involves in extra-judicial killings (Access to Justice Report 2005; also **The London Guardian** 4 March 2010), like the killing of the harmless Apo Six Traders, deliberately stigmatized by police as robbers, on 8 June 2005 (CLEEN 2006); and also engages in other 'horrendous human rights abuses', to borrow from Jones *et al* (1994, p. 35). Even the late military dictator, known with few scruples, a pariah, Sani Abacha, regarded the NPF as 'one of the nation's most troubled public agencies' (**Daily Champion** 9 April 1994). Okiro concedes:

> "Our operational attitudes and sensitivity to the public have been dictated by factors beyond professional ethics and principles. At different times, we have employed diverse methods to confront varying degrees of challenges to internal security, with consequential impacts on the NPF as well as the general public".
>
> (In *Annual Report* 2009, p. 1)

The NPF today faces the challenge of balancing its primary role of law enforcement with the protection of human rights in a nascent democracy, one 'struggling to achieve stability' (Ayuba and Ajewole 2007, p.148-149). Its failings and shortcomings, however, should not be excused. Like Malherbe (chapter five), Ayuba and Ajewole believe 'the police must give unflinching loyalty and support to the government of the day', justifying this on the basis that 'both the government and the people show little

respect for the rights of citizens' anyway (2007, p.146). Similarly, Akano offers:

> "The Police Force in Nigeria has not been able to create the image that it respects, promotes and protects the fundamental human rights of the citizens. Yet, its daily activities of law enforcement and order maintenance contribute to citizens' enjoyment of their rights...This is not to argue that the [NPF] has fared badly...In fact, they have tried to observe the rule of law and protect human rights, even under difficult political, economic and social conditions".
>
> 1993 p. 444

It should be emphasized that human rights are existential and fundamental issues, and go beyond just 'creating the image'. Akano adds:

> "Police officers subject to arbitrary decisions, [and the] violations of their [human] rights may not be able to protect the rights of others or abide by the rule of law in dealing with citizens... [since it is expected that]...he who must sew dresses for another must himself have dresses [to wear]".
>
> (p. 448, 451)

So, 'the police performance ledger' (Orewa 1997, p.107) in human rights has more of deficits than credits. Contrary to Ayuba and Ajewole's claims, the NPF is not yet 'a new force', neither is it 'dedicated to the service and protection of the people...with pride, dignity and consummate professionalism'; and there is, yet, no 'new dawn... in the history of policing in Nigeria' (2007, p.162). This explains the strident calls for 'a people's

police', transformed as an 'efficient, effective and humane' agency, and 'well-disposed to [respect] human rights' (Coomasie 1998a, p. v).

Towards A Legal Framework for the Intelligence Function in the NPF

Historically, there has been a 'problematic dilemma' in balancing the need for the human rights of citizens and intelligence work (Odekunle 1993, p. vii). Peterson reports the first intelligence units in the US did not respect civil liberties and human rights. That many 'ran afoul of good practices' and that 'some agencies shut down their intelligence functions', through court orders or political pressure (2005, p. 6).In Nigeria, the police had 'served variously as spies, controllers of rally or party meeting permits, *agents provocateurs,* terrorists and active party members'. The pawns in the hands of government benefitted tremendously, while those who refused were punished (Rotimi 2001, p.130). As Imobighe and Maduagwu observe, security and intelligence agencies tend to toe the line of repression and equate security interest with that of 'governmental power', to witch-hunt 'radicals' and 'critics', in order to ensure 'strict political conformity' (1993, p.17, 22). This corroborates Seleti's view that the use of violence usually becomes 'part of the repertoire of police strategies to obtain authority, to control suspects, and to obtain information' (in Marks 2000). Here lies the problem.

Intelligence work is not necessarily in conflict with basic human rights (Imobighe and Maduagwu 1993, p. 22), as long as it is carried out 'in an open manner' (Peterson 2005, p. 20). Since the intelligence environment is delicate and uncertain, 'the process of governance and its

attendant systems must be articulated', in order for police intelligence to avoid being hostage to political pressures (MacVean 2008, p.72), as it happened for decades in Nigeria. Porter submits:

> "But intelligence brings with it special challenges. While the police analytical function may be an effective tool for protecting the public from serious crime, information-gathering activities associated with intelligence-led policing may also infringe on the privacy and civil liberties of individuals. This type of information gathering requires the police to use more intrusive procedures, such as informants, undercover operations, electronic surveillance and sophisticated intelligence analysis. Such intrusive procedures pose threats to civil liberties, privacy, and other rights".
>
> (In Ratcliffe 2008, p. 223)

For the 'threats' (Porter 2008) to be reined in, there must be appropriate protocols of governance, which ensure systems of police intelligence are adequately articulated (MacVean 2008). Crucially, the NPF does not have such processes or protocols, which define_or regulate_its intelligence or information gathering. The UK, like other advanced countries, has the National Intelligence Model (NIM) and the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA 2000, with recent calls for its review), but Nigerian authorities have been unresponsive and lackadaisical to calls for NPF intelligence protocols_in particular and a national intelligence framework in general. An institution that openly boasts of its constitutional legitimacy should not continue to trample on the people's human rights. As Wong says of China, 'govern police by law' (2004, p. 90-106); the law must

govern policing and police intelligence in Nigeria. However, as Akinade rightly observes:

> "It is, in strict law, inaccurate to speak of [NPF] 'powers' of surveillance and information gathering [or intelligence]. These activities are, in general, not carried out under any direct statutory or common law authority. They are, in effect, based on the common law principle that whatever is not expressly forbidden by law is permissible. Such activities are not forbidden because they do not, in general, infringe interests of the citizens, which are recognized by the common law".
>
> (2007, p. 194)

The resort to, or subterfuge in, the general provisions of common law does not justifiably or adequately cater to police intelligence activities and operations in Nigeria, no matter the arguments. Despite the arguments of Adeyemi and Adeyemi on the law, information gathering and police intelligence, they agree, nonetheless, that the NPF's approach in this context is *ad hoc*, based_on 'the philosophy of use and discard' ((2009, p.10-15; see full text in Appendix E). It goes without saying, therefore, that the traditional and current approach to information gathering and management in the NPF is not only short-term, but ill-conceived, haphazard, irregular, unorganized and unsystematic. One wonders how this arrangement could be regarded as intelligence-led policing, which by nature is systematic, long-term and strategic.

The need for a legal framework in police intelligence in Nigeria is both imperative and urgent. When the writer drew the attention of the Head of the Force Legal Department, Bala Hassan, to this gap, he promised to

work/raise a memo on it (Dec. 2010). The laws which address intelligence management come in two forms. The first concerns mechanisms and methods for acquiring intelligence, while the other spells out both the powers and responsibilities of the authorities relating to data held. Looming over these is 'the presiding obligation' of human rights (Harfield and Harfield 2008, p.118). The earlier this is achieved the better for the NPF. The organisation has paid dearly for this over the years, in the form of expensive civil litigations and -financial penalties against the agency and individual officers (estimated to be running into millions of naira: Hassan Dec. 2010; Ogon Nov. 2010). Other effects of absence of a legal framework for police intelligence are reduced effectiveness and efficiency, loss of public confidence and harm to individuals, the organisation or third parties, sometimes involving 'the most extreme consequence' of death, especially of informants (Harfield and Harfield 2008, p.153-154).

Significantly, 77 (about 56 per cent) of 134 respondents believe NPF personnel have an understanding of human rights; 26 (about 20 per cent) say they don't; while 24 (about 18 per cent) say probably (see below).

Table 27. The response on the NPF personnel having understanding of human rights.

Response	No of respondents	Percentage of Respondents
Yes	77	56
No	26	20
Probably	24	18

Only 54 respondents (about 39 per cent) agree the NPF is their friend; 40 (about 29 per cent) disagree; the same for those who say the police are friends sometimes. These figures are not very encouraging though: adding the 'no' and 'sometimes' groups indicates that close to 60 per cent of the respondents are not enthused with police-public relations in Nigeria, as the table below shows.

Table 28. The response on NPF as a friend of Nigerians.

Response	No. of Respondents	Percentage of Respondents
Agree	54	39
Disagree	40	29
Sometimes	40	29

It is also significant that 47 per cent and 30 per cent of respondents are negative and ambivalent, respectively, about democratic policing in Nigeria, as the table below shows.

Table 29. The response on the balance between human rights and policing.

Response	No. of Respondents	Percentage of Respondents
No	64	47
Sometimes	41	30
Yes	26	19
Total	**131**	**96**

Table 30. Response on whether independent Nigeria has ever enjoyed democratic policing.

Response	No. of Respondents	Percentage of Respondents
Extremely Well	6	4
Fairly well	39	29
Moderately well	55	40
Badly	28	20
Extremely badly	7	5
Other	1	1
Total	**136**	**99**

It is disturbing that the relationship between the police and the public in Nigeria is still far from cordial, after half a century of independence. This 50 year old country has an urgent need for improving its democratic policing credentials! Establishing these credentials and embedding intelligence in the NPF, as part of the way forward for Nigerian policing, is examined in the concluding chapter.

Conclusion: Making it work

> "Until we can decide what we want the [NPF] to be responsible for, and what we can realistically expect it to succeed in doing, any attempt to reform its structure is wasted effort. Form should follow structure".
>
> -Lord Dear (2007)

> "With the pace of change in society, [police] organisations must reflect on their past, actively learn from the present and seek to influence the future".
>
> -Neyroud and Beckley (2001)

The popularity of intelligence-led policing (ILP) as an innovative, practical and useful model of policing is universally acknowledged, though some of its concepts and processes are still evolving. The evidence in this study, however, suggests that the Nigeria Police identifies with intelligence-led policing more as rhetoric than as a practical model; and for the political and propaganda value it has for its leaders. Moreover, the study demonstrates that the Nigeria Police, like other government/public agencies in Nigeria, is organisationally ignorant and confused, although there are a few pockets of brilliance, finesse and professionalism among its core personnel.

The introduction examined 'the police predicament' (Tamuno 1996) in Nigeria and the responses of the Inspectors-General of Police (IGPs). Apparently, all the IGPs responded in an *ad hoc*, rather than a systematic, fashion to the drivers of change. Instead of a pre-determined, consistent

and organisation-wide programme of action, each IGP came and went with his agenda. Ironically, all of them spoke of intelligence-led policing, with little understanding of its implications on police practice, and very little on policing outcomes. Moreover, from the analysis of historical and theoretical foundations of intelligence and intelligence-led policing in chapter one, the deficiencies in the understanding of intelligence on the part of NPF leadership becomes more glaring. More importantly, as chapter two argued, the intelligence architecture of the NPF reveals a three-tier (State, Zone and Force) structure, which lacks sophistication in concept and dynamism in practice. In this structure, the essential or core elements of intelligence-led policing--crime analysis, crime intelligence analysis and criminal intelligence analysis (Ratcliffe 2009a, p. 9-10; 2008, p. 7, 70, 87, 92-93)--are crucially absent. Chapter three, knowledge is power, also demonstrated the lack of capacity (knowledge, skills and abilities (KSA's)) in the force; partially explaining the reason for its many operational inadequacies and intelligence failings. Surprisingly, as discussed in chapter four, instead of co-operating and collaborating with sister agencies in intelligence sharing, to enhance capacity and operational efficiency, the NPF works at cross-purposes with them. This makes the burden of history (chapter five), the problems and difficulties the NPF is ensconced in, more unbearable. The result, as chapter six graphically illustrated, there is little impact from intelligence on Nigerian policing; and there is no 'perfect' achievement (Dawodu 2006, p. 56) the NPF can boast of, for most of Nigeria's post-independence history. As things stand today--the level and pattern of crime, with the general insecurity--it is not surprising some observers classify Nigeria a failed state. Above all, as described in chapter

seven, the NPF still carries the stigma or albatross of being violators of the people's human rights; a fact its leaders openly admit.

Two fundamental issues still distort Nigerian policing, and they also impact negatively on the development of its intelligence function. The first is the monster of politics, the unnecessary and unwholesome interference by governments in police activities and operations, which came a little after independence, grew worse under the military and continues today with their civilian counterparts. So, Nigerian policing must be weaned and depoliticized. It must be defined by a clear and unambiguous philosophy, which regards policing as a profession, tenable only on the basis of the active will and general consent of the people, and places their needs, interests and welfare far above the whims and caprices of partisan political authorities. This also implies that Nigerian policing must establish itself solidly on human rights and democratic principles. This sentiment is captured by the NPF in a rare moment, highlighting the first leg, or step, in 'the ultimate goal' of police reforms in Nigeria:

> "... [T]o transform a colonial [and political] policing system to a democratic structure where the police work primarily [in the] public interest and not the interest of the ruling party or any influential group...The role of the Police in an emerging democracy will therefore be that of upholding a democratic system based on the observance of human rights, facilitating access to justice [for] all without discrimination, and work[ing] in conformity with the principle of Rule of Law based on the norms of accountability, transparency, equality and community participation. Any reform agenda should therefore protect the police from external undue interventions and give operational autonomy to the personnel while ensuring

> meaningful and strong oversight, accountability, and transparency with its directives and strategic goals".
>
> (*Annual Report* 2009, p. 4-5)

The second issue is related: the total absence of an ideological or philosophical mooring for the NPF, or the lack of a vision and mission for the whole gamut of Nigerian policing. It goes beyond spelling out the duties and powers of the NPF. It is the very heart of policing, coming as a total and holistic conception of the police practice, which masterfully blends form and structure. As Lord Dear rightly observes for the UK:

> "Until we can decide what we want the police to be responsible for, and what we can realistically expect it to succeed in doing, any attempt to reform its structure is wasted effort. Form should follow structure".
>
> (House of Lords *Hansard* 7 June 2007)

Embedded in these two fundamentals are other subsidiary issues. In other words, it is after these two fundamentals are established that other matters in Nigerian policing could have their place. What could be the resolution of this double burden, this twin dilemma, of Nigerian policing? The first crucial step is that the colonially oriented and outdated Police Act (1964; actually enacted by the British in 1943) must be scrapped or radically amended for a new, authentic *Nigerian Police Act*. It is only after this that the NPF could hope, or endeavour, to embed democratic as well as intelligence-led policing.

Historically, the NPF's capacity and willingness to change and reform is dubious (**BBC** Report 30 July 2009; **CLEEN** 2008; Hills 2008; Kupolati 2007). This is because the NPF lacks a 'reform dynamic', which 'is better understood as a classic dialectic', as it engages more in 'a serial accession of movements' (Hills 2008); or more in 'motions without movements' (**CLEEN** 2008).

Embedding intelligence-led policing in Nigeria, however, demands a true paradigm shift, 'a step change' (Grieve 208b, p. 20); a higher level of re-orientation and re-alignment of strategy. To start with, the NPF has to urgently reform or restructure the whole gamut of its intelligence architecture which, at the moment, lacks requisite sophistication and co-ordination and, therefore, the leverage, clout and dynamism of a 21st century crime-fighting machine. This should go beyond changing nomenclatures and titles. The first requirement here is a change in the mental attitudes of the police personnel. The police should abandon their ingrained inferiority complex, anti-intellectual psychology of leadership and management by intimidation. Instead, the NPF should cultivate, especially in intelligence, 'a disposition to think critically' (McDowell 2009, p.15-19). This is important:

> "In order for an institution to change, all affected personnel, from the lowest to the highest, must first recognize that change is needed and is advantageous--both corporately and personally."
>
> (McDowell 2009, p. 74)

In more practical terms, there must be a common, organisation-wide definition of intelligence, an appropriate language and doctrine, standard

approaches to staff training and development, and best practices in NPF intelligence. The NPF must see intelligence as legitimate and crucial to policing. So far, the NPF leadership has employed intelligence as a political and propaganda tool, but it needs to get more serious with using it to prevent crime, allocate resources, plan for the future and guide executive decision-making. Furthermore, the NPF should adapt its organisational culture to accommodate today's realities. The intelligence operatives should be empowered with necessary gadgets, equipment, and logistics to work with. The command and control, or regimented, policing should give way to a system or model of processing and managing information/intelligence (a structured management information system to be in place), in a sound and secure environment, rooted in 'a professional approach to risk management', and yet limits harm (Grieve 2008b, p. 20; 2008a, p. xi; 2008, p. 8).

Moreover, intelligence-led policing should be introduced to all levels of the NPF for their support, and its value as a 'primarily preventive' tool of policing must be an organisation-wide agreement (Flood and Gaspar 2009, p.63); as was done with local knowledge decades ago. This could be done by introducing intelligence studies as a distinct and compulsory course in the training schools and colleges. It should also be mandatory for intelligence operatives to be trained and perhaps certificated, before their posting to intelligence units. The days of misplaced/misapplied federal character and lopsided quotas (where barely literate operatives serve in intelligence units) without consideration for merit, skills, knowledge and professionalism, should be over. Intelligence must penetrate every nook and cranny of Nigeria. Moreover, police intelligence must originate and

proceed on the basis of law; it must be for legitimate purposes, necessary and proportionate. This raises the need for a legal framework, as the common statutes are grossly inadequate and not meant for intelligence management. This would spell out guidelines on conduct, procedures and other protocols for its operatives. Frontline or field officers, aside intelligence operatives, should be made aware of their position and value in the gathering of information to feed intelligence.

The leaders, managers and executives in intelligence must themselves be sufficiently educated and trained, to understand its techniques and processes, in order to guide operatives; and to successfully direct intelligence projects. The place and role of the intelligence analyst in the NPF is a desirable and urgent imperative. The NPF intelligence infrastructure is crawling on its belly, despite its legendary antecedents in colonial and early independence days, because of this fundamental vacuum. The analyst must be provided for: to make the links obvious, explain the process or market the intelligence product, take the lead in research or make it the focus, refine data sources, monitor the NPF's knowledge bank, engage in performance measurement and manage the hostile lateral and vertical relationships within NPF intelligence (McDowell 2009, p. 254-255).

The point must be reiterated: NPF intelligence in the professional sense is at a very rudimentary stage; it cannot even be regarded as 'insufficiently sophisticated' (MacVean 2008a, p. 72). In view of this, the starting point for the intelligence function could be the recently introduced Nigeria Police Integrated Intelligence Strategy (NPIIS), through the

Community Policing Programme of the UK's Department for International Development (DfID) (*Handbook on Community Policing* 2007). This could be enlarged to go beyond community policing, as intelligence actually transcends parochial models of policing.

Inevitably, the NPF must acknowledge the existence of, and benefits of collaborating with, other security and intelligence agencies, realizing that no agency, even with the best resources, can go it alone. Meanwhile, it is desirable for the NPF to leverage its position and restore its professional integrity, with a view to ensuring its intelligence products are eagerly demanded and voraciously consumed (Harfield and Harfield 2008, p. 9; Ratcliffe 2008, p. 235-236; Peterson 2005, p.15-22). This would make other agencies desire its partnership, which would be knowledge-based and progressively sustained. The barriers and hindrances to collaboration must be reduced, if not removed. So, there is need for a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). On top of this is the need for a national crime prevention and/or intelligence sharing strategy, which will both empower and compel the security and intelligence agencies, probably with other public and private entities, to collaborate in the national interest. Perhaps, a strategy along the line of South Africa's (Shaw 1996), or the UK's National Intelligence Model (NIM), if it would not be too convoluted or expensive (Harfield and Harfield 2008); or a blend of the two, would do. This crucial organ can be called the National Strategic Intelligence Sharing System (NSISS), with a National Strategic Intelligence Management Centre (NSIMC), as a framework for sharing and intelligence practice, respectively.

However, the importance of the international community to Nigerian policing, police personnel training and development, and their tremendous financial and technical assistance, even in intelligence, is on record (Lewis 2002; Atta 1996/1997).This assistance is expected to increase, with current realities:

> "Nigeria linguistically has characteristics that make it a potential theater for terrorist activities. Porous borders, weak law enforcement, a large parallel economy, pervasive official corruption, and an enormous Muslim population, all suggest that terrorist networks all seek a foothold in Nigeria for logistics, finance, and possibly actions against foreign interests. This is a serious policing and intelligence challenge, but it does not necessarily mean that Nigeria is (or will soon become) a major platform for terrorist operations".
>
> (Lewis 2002, p. 9)

British intelligence expert, Justin Crump, has, however, demonstrated that terrorist groups are growing in numbers with their 'fundamentalist global vision', with 'a similar situation emerging in places like Nigeria' (**Security Oracle** 29 March 2010), making international assistance and technical support more crucial.

Nevertheless, the future of the Nigeria Police (Igbinovia 2000) and its intelligence function depends on the organisation's determination to fully embrace 'the scientific age', possible through 'research and the development of a more ambitious, intellectual, and open-minded cadre of senior police executives', who will lead 'intense efforts to change the policies and practices' of Nigerian policing (Jones *et al* 1994, p.19).The

partnership would engage researchers and scholars, both within and outside Nigeria, to open up this conservative institution to crucial and vital research linkages. Research concerns would include: why is the NPF still hanging on to an old (20th century) training curriculum, or spending so much time on drill instructions; why is the leadership still tied to the political authorities/why won't the authorities let go of the NPF; why is intelligence failing, or not connected to other aspects of Nigerian policing; and why is intelligence not taught in police schools and colleges? Research would also examine the reasons and proffer solutions to public apathy towards the NPF; produce key performance indicators (KPI's) for the organisation; study and recommend appropriate strategies for capacity building; produce accountability and governance mechanisms; and design and review programmes for building and empowering police leadership. Other issues to examine are the habitual preference of police leadership for military style management, or management by intimidation, the constant disunity in, and perennial failure, of the Police Management Team (PMT) and the age-long low morale of police personnel in Nigeria.

The Nigeria Police would be the better for this partnership and, before long, would turn out to be a body of well informed, articulate and focused 21st century practitioners the citizens can depend on. Within this NPF, a developed and advanced criminal intelligence role would be essential.

APPENDIX A

Self-Completion Questionnaire

The Nigeria Police Force (NPF): A Research Questionnaire

Terms and conditions for participating in this exercise are:

(a) Participation as a respondent is voluntary;

(b) The confidentiality of information and identity of respondent is guaranteed both during and after the research;

(c) There are no incentives or inducements offered for participation; and

(d) The researcher undertakes to share the results of the project with interested respondents who ask, in writing, and subject to college rules and professional advice.

INSTRUCTION: PLEASE TICK OR WRITE OUT YOUR ANSWERS AS THE CASE MAY BE. THANK YOU.

A. PERSONAL INFORMATION

1. What is your highest educational qualification?

(a). School Cert./'O' L ☐ (b). 'A' L /ND ☐ (c).HND/BA/BSc ☐ (d). Master's ☐
(e). PhD/PD ☐

2. Please, provide details of any other professional or vocational training and qualifications

.....

3. What is your current job?

.....

4. How many years have you been in your current job?.....

B. NIGERIAN POLICING TODAY

5. What do you understand by the term 'democratic policing'?.....
.....

6. Do you think independent Nigeria has ever enjoyed 'democratic policing'?.....

a. Yes ☐ b. No ☐ c. Sometimes ☐ d. Don't know ☐ e.Other

please,provide details.....

7. What are your opinions/views on the size and structure of the NPF?

.....

8. In what areas do you think government is a problem to the police ?

a. Appointments ☐ b. Promotions ☐ c. Interference ☐ d. Influence-peddling ☐
e.Other-please, provide details .....

9. How do you see police administrations during military eras?

a. Radical and reformist ☐ b. Progressive and modernising ☐ c. Conservative ☐ and static ☐ d. Dictatorial and repressive ☐ e. Politically aligned ☐ f. Ideologically neutral and passive ☐ g .Other- please, provide details.....

10. How do you see police administrations during democratic dispensations?

a. Radical and reformist ☐ b. Progressive and modernising ☐

c. Conservative and static ☐. Dictatorial and repressive ☐Politically

aligned ☐ f. Ideologically neutral and passive ☐g. Other- please, provide details .....

11. Do you think military administrations in Nigeria have in any way affected police culture and organisation?

a. Yes ☐ b. No ☐ c. Probably ☐ d. Don't know ☐ e. Other- please, provide details.....

12. Please, provide reason(s) for your answer above.....

13. What type of government do you think would be best suited to 'democratic policing'?

a. Military dictatorship ☐ b. Benevolent dictatorship ☐ c. One-party democracy ☐ ☐ d. Multi-party democracy. ☐ e. Other-please provide details.....

14. Do you agree with the idea of 'state police' in Nigeria?

a. Yes ☐ b. No☐ c. Probably ☐ d. Don't know☐ e. Other- please, provide details.....

15. Do you agree with the idea of 'state police' in, say...?

a. 1-5 yrs. ☐ b. 6-10 yrs. ☐ C. 11-15yrs. ☐d. 16-20 yrs. ☐e. 21+yrs ☐

f. Other-please, specify.....

16. Do you agree with the view that there is crisis in Nigerian policing?

a. Yes ☐ b. No ☐ c. Probably ☐ d. Don't know ☐

e. Other-please provide details .....

C. THE POLICE, THE PUBLIC AND HUMAN RIGHTS

17. Do you personally think the police force is 'your friend'?

a. Yes ☐ b. No☐ c. Sometimes ☐ d. Don't know ☐ e. Other-please, provide details .....

18. Please, suggest how the police force can truly become 'a friend'.....

19. Do you think the police in Nigeria have any understanding of human rights?

a. Yes ☐ b. No ☐ c. Probably ☐ d. I don't know ☐ e. Other- please, provide details .....

20. To what extent do you think policing and human rights in Nigeria have been balanced?

a. Extremely well ☐ b. Fairly well ☐ c. Moderately ☐ d. Badly ☐

e. Extremely badly ☐ f. Other- please, provide details.....

21. What are your suggestions for improving on the human rights practices of the Nigeria Police? .....

D. POLICE LEADERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT

22. How do you see the present police leadership?

a. Radical and reformist ☐ b. Progressive and modernising ☐

c. Conservative and static ☐ d. Dictatorial and repressive ☐ e. Politically aligned ☐
f. Ideologically neutral and passive ☐ g.Other-please, provide details

.....

23. Do you think the education and training of the police leadership is appropriate for 21st century policing? a. Yes ☐ b. No ☐ c. Probably ☐ d. Don't know ☐ e. Other- please, provide details.....

24. Do you agree with the suggestion that the NPF should adopt more modern management techniques?

a. Yes ☐ b. No ☐ C. Probably ☐ d. Don't know ☐ e. Other-please, provide details .....

25. How in your opinion have police leadership responded to social change in their policing of Nigeria?

a. Extremely well ☐ b. Fairly well ☐ c. As Usual ☐ d. Badly ☐
Extremely badly ☐ f. Other-please, provide details .....

26. Would you agree to a change in police leadership?

a. Yes ☐ b. No ☐ c. Probably ☐ d. Don't know ☐ e. Other-please, provide details.....

27. What are the changes you would like to see in the present police leadership?.....

E. POLICE TRAINING, RESEARCH AND CAPACITY BUILDING

28. Do you see current police training and capacity building as adequate for the 21st century?

a. Yes ☐ b. No ☐ c. Probably ☐ d. Don't know ☐ e. Other- please, provide details.....

29. Do you see current police training as enhancing their intelligence function?

a. Yes ☐ b. No ☐ c. Probably ☐ d. Don't know ☐ e. Other- please, provide details .....

30. How might the Research and Management Services Department (MSD) of the NPF help in revitalising the intelligence function?
.....

31. Do you agree to a comprehensive review of police training programmes?

a. Yes ☐ b. No ☐ c. Probably ☐ d. Don't know ☐ e. Other -please, provide details.....

F. POLICE INTELLIGENCE AND INVESTIGATION ACTIVITIES

32. How do you assess the performance of police in their investigation activities?

a. Highly successful ☐ b. Fairly successful ☐ c. Average ☐ d.Woeful ☐
e. Highly woeful ☐ f. Other-please, provide details.....

33. Do you see any connection between police investigation and intelligence?

a. Yes ☐ b. No☐ c. Probably ☐ d. Don't know☐ e. Other-please, provide details.....

34. Please, suggest ways by which there could be a better connection between police intelligence and investigation?.....

G. LAW AND ORDER MAINTENANCE

35. How do you assess the performance of the police in maintaining law and order?

a. Highly effective ☐ b. Fairly effective ☐ c. Average ☐ d. Ineffective ☐
e.Highly ineffective ☐ f. Other-please, provide details .....

36. Do you see any connection between police intelligence and law and order?

a. Yes ☐ b. No ☐ c. Probably ☐ d. Don't know ☐ e. Other-please, provide details.....

37. Do you agree with the view that the Nigeria Police appear more concerned with law and order maintenance than with crime prevention?

a. Yes ☐ b. No ☐ c. Probably ☐ d. Don't know ☐ e. Other-please, provide details .....

H. THE INTELLIGENCE FUNCTION AND POLICING.

38. In what areas of policing do you think intelligence has been very effective?.....

39. In what areas of policing do you think intelligence has been very ineffective?
.....

40. What do you consider to be the problems of the police in intelligence gathering?.....

41. What are your suggestions to reduce or remove these problems?
.....

42. Do you think there is crisis in police intelligence?

a. Yes ☐ b. No ☐ c. Probably ☐ d. Don't know ☐ e. Other-please, provide details.....

43. How would you score the police in the performance of their intelligence function?

a. Under 30% ☐ b.31-45% ☐ c. 46-55% ☐ d.56-69% ☐

e. 70+% ☐

44. Do you agree to having trained civilian criminal /intelligence analysts working in police intelligence units?

a. Yes ☐ b. No ☐ c. Probably ☐ d. Don't know ☐ e. Other- please, provide details.....

45. What specific or general laws and statutes do you know relating to the police intelligence function in Nigeria? .....

46. Do you think these laws and statutes adequately provide for this function?

a. Yes ☐ b. No ☐ c. Probably ☐ d. Don't know ☐ e. Other- please, provide details.....

47. What kind of laws would you suggest for a comprehensive coverage of the police intelligence function in Nigeria? .....

48. Would you agree to a suggestion that the international community / development partners be invited to do 'an overhaul' of police intelligence?

a. Yes ☐ b. No ☐ c. Probably ☐ d. Don't know ☐ e. Other- please, provide details.....

I. INTELLIGENCE AND CRIME PREVENTION

49. How do you assess the effectiveness of police crime prevention measures?

a. Highly effective ☐ b. Fairly effective ☐ c. Average ☐ d. Ineffective ☐ e. Extremely Ineffective ☐. Other- please, provide details.....

.....

50. In what <u>new</u> ways do you think police intelligence can respond to the crime/security challenges in the country?

.....

J. POLICE OPERATIONS, PATROL DUTIES AND INTELLIGENCE

51. How effective do you think police operations and patrols are?

a. Highly effective ☐ b. Fairly effective ☐ c. Average ☐ d. Ineffective ☐ e. Highly ineffective ☐ g. Other-please, provide details.....

52. In what ways do you think police operations/ patrols and intelligence can work together?.....

K. INTELLIGENCE BETWEEN POLICE AND SISTER AGENCIES

53. How do you assess the effectiveness of the nation's security and intelligence agencies?

a. Highly effective ☐ b. Fairly effective ☐ Average ☐ Ineffective ☐

e. Highly ineffective ☐ f. Other-please, provide details.....

54. How do you assess co-operation between the police and sister security agencies in intelligence?

a. Highly effective ☐ b. Fairly effective ☐ c. Average ☐ d. Ineffective ☐ e. Highly ineffective ☐

55. In what ways do you think police and sister agencies can improve intelligence co-operation?

.....

56. What are the institutional or legal frameworks for this kind of co-operation between the agencies?

.....

57. Do you think these frameworks and instruments are sufficient in light of recent developments?

a. Yes ☐ b. No ☐ c. Probably ☐ d. Don't know ☐

e. Other- please ,provide details.....

58. What do you think the roles of the various levels of government should be in the national intelligence business?

.....

59. Do you think the security agencies should enlist the co-operation of other public/private entities in their intelligence function?

a. Yes ☐ b. No ☐ c. Probably ☐ d. Don't know ☐

e. Other-please, provide details.....

60. Do you agree there is crisis in the Nigerian intelligence community?

a. Yes ☐ b. No ☐ c. Probably ☐ d. Don't know ☐

e. Other-please, provide details.....

APPENDIX B

FIB's Nominal Roll Showing Educational Qualifications

SPO'S NOMINAL ROLL ABUJA

S/NO	AP/F/NO	RANK	N A M E	STATE OF ORIGIN	L.G.A	DATE OF BIRTH	DATE ENL.	DATE L. PROM.	DATE T. TO COM.	FROM WHERE	DATE DUE FOR RETIRE	EDU QUA.	DUTY POST
1.		AIG										BSC(HONS)	AIG INT.
2.		Ag/ACP										BA	DCP. INT
3.		ACP										BA	AC ADMIN
4.		Ag/CSP										WAEC /TC.II	AC INT
5.		SP										GCE	TEAM LEADER
6.		"										BA	TEAM LEADER
7.		"										OND	TEAM LEADER
8.		"										GCE	TEAM LEADER
9.		"										ADPA	F/MISSION
11.		"										B.TECH	TEAM LEADER
12.		"										LL.B & L	A/O
13.		ASP										GCE	OPT
14.		"										GCE	O/C TECH.
15.		"										"	F/M
16.		"										GCE	OPT.
17.		"										"	SEC.AIG
18.		"										"	F/M
19.		"										OND	NASS
20.		"										HND	OPT
21.		"										GRD 2	INEC
22.		"										GCE	OPT
23.		"										DIP	"
24.		"										"	"
25.		"										GCE	VILLA
26.		ASP.										GCE	OPT
27.		"										PRI.7	FRSC

NOMINAL ROLL INSPECTORS

S/NO	AP/F/NO	RANK	N A M E	STATE OF ORIGIN	L.G.A	DATE OF BIRTH	DATE ENL.	DATE L. PROM.	DATE T. TO COM.	FROM WHERE	DATE DUE FOR RETIRE	EDU. QUA.	DUTY PO
1.		INSP										BSC	JABI PAI
2.		"										GCE	POLICI AFFAIR
3.		"										OND	OPT
4.		"										DIP	"
5.		"										PR.7	OPT
6.		"										GCE	JABI PAI
7.		"										GRD.2	NASS
8.		"										WASC	AMOURI
9.		"										WASC	AGOF
10.		"										GCE	OPT.
11.		"										WAEC	OPT
12.		"										"	VIP ORDE
13.		"										PR.7	OPT
14		"										GCE	OPT
15.		"										GCE	OPT
16.		"										DIP.	OPT
17.		"										DIP	OPT
18.		"										DIP	OPT
19.		"										ND	OPT
20.		"										DIP	F/MISSI
21.		"										Bsc.POL SCE	VIP ORI
22.		"										WAEC	OPT
23.		"										GCE	OPT

NOMINAL ROLL SERGEANT

NO	AP/F/NO	RANK	N A M E	STATE OF ORIGIN	L.G.A	DATE OF BIRTH	DATE ENL.	DATE L. PROM.	DATE T. TO COM.	FROM WHERE	DATE DUE FOR RETIRE	EDU. QUA.	DUTY POST
.		SGT.										"	NASS
"		"										GRD.2	NASS
.		"										ND	OPT
.		"										GCE	JABI PARK
.		"										"	NASS
.		"										GR II	OFFICE
.		"										GCE	OPT.
.		"										SSCE	OPT.
.		"										GCE	FRSC
.		"										OND	INEC
L.		"										"	ISREALI EMB.
.		"										GCE	OPT
.		"										"	NASS
.		"										B.SC	OPT
.		"										B.S	IGP DESK
.		"										GCE	OPT
.		"										BRA	VIP ORD
.		"										SSCE	AIG ORDER
.		"										DIP	OPT
.		"										GRP.2	NASS
.		"										WASC	OFFICE
.		"										"	INEC
.		"										"	AIG OFFICE
.		"										WASC	IGP DESK
.		"										WASC	OFFICE
.		"										SSCE	IGP DESK
.		"										ND	OFFICE
.		"										GCE	OPT
.		"										OND	FED-SEC
.		"										BCC	OPT
.		SGT.										ND	OPT.
.		"										ND	OPT
.		"										SSCE	OFFICE
.		"										GCE	"
.		"										GCE	NAPTIP
.		"										"	FCDA
.		"										OND	OPT
.		"										OND	OPT
.		"										BSC	OPT
.		"										OND	USA EMB

NOMINAL ROLL CORPORALS

IO	AP/F/NO	RANK	N A M E	STATE OF ORIGIN	L.G.A	DATE OF BIRTH	DATE ENL.	DATE L. PROM.	DATE T. TO COM.	FROM WHERE	DATE DUE FOR RETIRE	EDU. QUA.	DUTY POST
		CPL.										NCE	"
		"										DIP	NNPC
		"										ND	ADMIN
		"										SSCE	NAPTIP
		"										GCE	OPT
		"										DIP	USA EMB.
		"										SSCE	OPT
		"										GCE	AIG ORD.
		"										"	IGP DESK
		"										SSCE	ADMIN
		"										SSCE	ADMIN
		"										DIP	OPT
		"										NCE	OPT
		"										SSCE	ADMIN

NOMIMAL ROLL CONSTABLES

S/NO	F/NO	RANK	N A M E	STATE OF ORIGIN	L.G.A	DATE OF BIRTH	DATE ENL.	DATE L. PROM.	DATE T. TO COM.	FROM WHERE	DATE DUE FOR RETIRE	EDU. QUA.	DUTY POST
1.		PC.										WAEC	JABI PARK
2.		"										SSCE	DC.ORDERLY
3.		"										SSCE	OPT
4.		"										NCE	OPT
5.		"										BED	OPT
6.		"										SSCE	COM. OPERATOR
7.		"										OND	COM. OPR
8.		"										SSCE	DC. ORD.

SPECIALIST NOMINAL ROLL

S/NO	AP/F/NO	RANK	N A M E	STATE OF ORIGIN	L.G.A	DATE OF BIRTH	DATE ENL.	DATE L. FROM.	DATE T. TO CON.	FROM WHERE	DATE DUE FOR RETIRE	EDU. QUA.	DUTY POST
1.		DSP										PR.7	C/C TPT
2.		"										PR.7	DRIVER
3.		INSP										SSCE	DRIVER
4.		SGT										NCC	AIG DRIVER
5.		CPL.										GRD.2	TECH
6.		"										GCE	DRIVER
7.		PC.										SSCE	DRIVER
8.		"										"	DRIVER
9.		"										SSCE	DRIVER
10.		"										"	"
11.		"										"	"
12.		"										SSCE	DC. DRIVER
13.		"										WAEC	"
14.		"										NECO	"
15.		"										"	"

CADET ASSISTANT SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE (ASP) TRAINING

This is a course for those recruited into the officer cadre of the Force. These are fresh graduates with University degress and are expected, after training, to occupy the middle level cadre of the Force.

Like the Cadet Inspectors, the training of this category of fresh intakes is conducted at the Police Academy in Kano and it lasts for eighteen (18) months. The syllabus for their training is similar to the Cadet Inspectors Syllabus but designed to incorporate more of management lectures in view of their expected responsibilities after training. It also includes Citizenship and Leadership Training to sharpen their leadership responsibilities. Endurance and anti-riot skills are impacted at the Police Mobile Training School in Gwoza.

S/NO	INSTITUTION	TYPE OF COURSE	COURSE CONTENTS	ENTRY QUALIFICATION	DURATION	SCHEDULE
3.	Police Academy Kano	Cadet Assistant Superintendent of Police (C/ASP) Training	• Police Duties • Laws • Management • First Aid • Foot/Arms Drill • Musketry/Range Practice • Baton and Rifle Exercises (BARE) • Languages (English & French) • Liberal Studies • Public Relations • Statistics • Citizenship & Leadership • Self Defence	University Graduates or equivalent.	18 months	**February 2008** **To** **August 2009**

CADET INSPECTOR TRAINING

This programme is designed to produce a cadre of Police personnel that act as a bridge between the Rank and File and the officers cadre of the Force. Candidates for this programme are recruited from Senior Secondary School Certificate holders but should possess at least five credits including English Language and Mathematics. However, candidates with higher or additional qualification are at advantage.

The training of this category of recruits is conducted at the Police Academy in Kano and it lasts for eighteen (18) months. The syllabus for their training has been recently revised and enhanced to incorporates interesting, purposeful and educational topics that are aimed at turning out Inspectors that can withstand the current socio-political situation of the nation. During the training, they are exposed to citizenship and leadership Training to sharpen their leadership responsibilities while endurance and anti-riot skills are impacted at the Police Mobile Training School in Gwoza.

S/NO	INSTITUTION	TYPE OF COURSE	COURSE CONTENTS	ENTRY QUALIFICATION	DURATION	SCHEDULE
2.	Police Academy Kano	Cadet Inspectors Training	• Police Duties • Laws • Management • First Aid • Foot/Arms Drill • Musketry/Range Practice • Baton and Rifle Exercises (BARE) • Languages (English & French) • Liberal Studies • Public Relations • Statistics • Citizenship & Leadership • Self Defence • Community Policing	Secondary School Certificate with Credit in five subjects including English Language and Mathematics	18 months	**February 2008** **To** **August 2009**

APPENDIX D

FIB's Equipment and Gadgets (Procured and Yet to be Procured)

ITEMS	QTY
Walkthrough Metal Detector	4
Supervision Digital Night Vision Hand Held Device	5
Differential RF Detector	5
Counter Surveillance Equipment	4
Listening Devices	20
True Day/Night 550/600TVL Speed Dome CCTV Camera with 36x200m	15
Micro GSM Listening Device GSM 400U	5
2. ITEMS Professional Stethoscope Listening Through wall with Digital recorder	8
Canon Sight Camera and Accessories	10
Canon Flash 900	6
Tap any phone Listen to both sides of the Conversation of each other	10
Scanner 10k Letter Bomb Detector	2
968Hrs Tim Lar DVR Recorder system	16
Body worn Transmitter/Recorder/Receiver	3

3. ITEMS	
CCTV Monitor Flat Screen 21"	20
Handbag Recorder Men Video with DVR 800Hrs Recording system	10
Handbag Recorder Women Video 800Hrs Recording system with DVR	10
4. ITEMS	
Long Range Crowed Monitoring Surveillance Vehicle Toyota Sienna	1
Super Broom Non-Linear Junction Detector Bug Devices	9
5. ITEMS	
Professional Stethoscope Listening Through the Wall with Digital Recorder	20
Call Interceptor Device	10
Digital Security Pearl Video Recorder, DPRS 8Hrs with HP Laptop	10
UHF Transmitter Mic and DVR With Laptop	10
6. ITEMS	
VIP Assassination Jammer	2
Sophisticated Money and Document Carrier with shocking capability	5
Covert simple Identity card	5
Hidden camera with Body worn, Transmitter and Receiver	2
Bug Detector Device	3
GSM Bugging Device	2

CCTV Camera/Monitor and DVR	1
7 ITEMS	
ILAD Intelligence Assistance Device	100
ICPL Intelligence Cell PHONE Location	6

APPENDIX E

Adeyemi and Adeyemi on the information debate (2009, p. 11)

"...From what has been said thus far, there is no doubt that the activities of the Police in Nigeria [are] based on some system of information at all levels of its command structure. Comments and observations point to the conclusion that the existing approach to information management is not systematic. Current approach to the collection and use of information in the police is ad hoc. It is determined largely by what can be aptly described as the philosophy of use and discard. Thus, the challenge which the police faces in the area of information generation, management and use is that of developing and sustaining the capacity to identify, collect, collate and store data and information, which is of relevance to police work, for analysis, retrieval and use, as and when the need arises". [Despite the equivocation, it is clear the duo agree to a lack of capacity in the NPF information/intelligence management, by talking of 'the challenge' in 'developing and sustaining capacity'. In the traditional fashion, they want to make a point without their offending the sensibilities of the political authorities and the official task masters; they don't want to rock the boat, as they say].

Postscript

Responding in 2010 to the failure of the security/intelligence services during the independence anniversary bombings in Abuja, Dr. Paul Obianoso warned of the impending security impasse the country would likely experience in the next ten years (when he expects robberies and other forms of violent crimes to be taking place in the Presidential Villa in Abuja), he must have sounded to some as an alarmist (see chapter two). This warning itself came on the heels of Kupolati's on the dangers of the 'wide chasm' between the NPF and SSS (2007, p. 449-450). Recent events in Nigeria confirm we don't need to wait for ten years. Nigeria has already begun to witness its own 'Armageddon'.

The bomb blasts that devastated the parking lot of the Police Force Headquarters, popularly known as Louis Edet House, on 16 June 2011, is now regarded as Nigeria's first suicide bombing in history. The bomber/driver, in his car, successfully followed the IGP's convoy into the premises, until the senior traffic warden diverted him to the park. It was in the process of searching him and the car the bomb went off. At the end of it all, at least two persons (driver-bomber and warden) died and 73 cars were destroyed. Usman Alzawahiri, the Boko Haram spokesperson (arrested later in November 2011) took responsibility on behalf of his sect. The level of fear generated by this sect has led to a partial imposition of curfew in the capital city, for the first time in its history, too. The fear also led to a modest independence anniversary in 2011. It would be fair to say the sect has been able to scare both the political authorities and security/intelligence agencies, with the current spate of bombings across the country. The last

point to note in this saga is that the IGP went to Maiduguri, Borno State (heartland of the sect), to boast that 'the days of Boko Haram were over', only for him to escape death in his own den by the whiskers, within hours.

Perhaps, a most unfortunate development is the bomb attack on the UN headquarters building in Abuja. This also came through a suicide car bomber, who drove through the recently upgraded security barriers, on 26 August 2011. Information had already been received that UN personnel and property were becoming easy or 'soft' targets for terrorists in Nigeria, and they had responded accordingly. The suicide bomber was not deterred. In all, at least eighteen people were killed and several others seriously injured, that some had to be flown outside Nigeria for treatment. The attack was against UN's main building in Nigeria, where 400 employees and a total of 26 humanitarian and development agencies are based. Earlier in the month, America's General Carter Ham reported that many sources had confirmed the links between Boko Haram and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (North Africa) and the al-Shabab movement in Somalia, according to BBC's African analyst, Martin Plaut. Nigeria's Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Viola Onwuliri, had responded that, 'This is not an attack on Nigeria, but on the global community'. Truly so; but would the Nigerian government 'go global' in reforming, refining and updating all that pertains to her security and intelligence management, in view of the coming apocalypse?

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