

LONDON METROPOLITAN UNIVERSITY

Britain, Germany and the European Security and Defence Policy

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Constructivist socialisation at work?

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Abstract

This thesis investigates the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) which has evolved rapidly since its establishment at the Cologne European Council in June 1999. Its development has been driven by the three biggest EU member states – Germany, France and the UK. While this is to some extent not surprising as these three states are also the most militarily powerful ones in Europe, they had for many years opposing views on the creation of a separate European defence initiative. During the 1990s due to a number of reasons German and British policy-makers' views on this topic converged with that of French policy-makers, who had always argued for the establishment of a common European defence policy. The British Prime Minister and the French President were therefore able to launch the European defence project at their historic meeting in Saint Malo. A few months later, Germany presided over the important Cologne European Council.

Following the creation of ESDP, German and British policy-makers went beyond mere support and actively drove it forward. This thesis will explore why they changed their behaviour from opposing a common European defence policy towards pressing ahead with it. It proposes the answer that these policy-makers became socialised in ESDP by the EU. Successful socialisation led to the complete internalisation of ESDP norms and the adoption of the EU's interests and identity by German and British policy-makers. This hypothesis will be tested by applying Jeffrey T. Checkel's constructivist socialisation approach to the case studies of German and British policy-makers, who shaped ESDP from the Saint Malo meeting (3 and 4 December 1998) to the Lisbon European Council summit (18-19 October 2007).

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1. Introduction

In the recent history of the European Union (EU) the creation of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)¹ certainly was one of its most significant events. Not only did it occur in a 'densely institutionalised environment that for decades had been dominated by NATO'², but also for 40 years the EU had been characterised as a civilian power³ being 'long on economic power, [...] short on armed forces [...] [and] a force for the international diffusion of civilian and democratic standards'.⁴ Many politicians, academics and experts had argued that there would be the 'need for the European allies at least to acquire a greater element of self-sufficiency in providing for their defence' if they wished to be influential in international relations again.⁵ And indeed, over the years, there had been some attempts to establish greater EU cooperation on defence, notably the European Defence Community and the Fouchet plan, but they had all failed. Eventually, at their June 1999 Council summit in Cologne, the EU member states reached the agreement that the EU 'must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so'.⁶ Preceding the Cologne meeting, Britain and France, the two biggest military powers in Europe, had met at Saint Malo, where they had laid the political foundation for ESDP.

France had a long standing interest in an independent European defence capacity not least because it recognised the necessity for the EU to take care of its own security if it wanted to

¹ The Treaty of Lisbon renamed the European Security and Defence Policy to Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). For the sake of clarity only one of the two terms will be used throughout this dissertation. As this thesis will concentrate on the time before the Lisbon Treaty, the term 'the European Security and Defence Policy' will be used.

² Berenskoetter, Felix, Bastian Giegerich (2010), 'From NATO to ESDP: A Social Constructivist analysis of German strategic adjustment after the end of the Cold War', *Security Studies*, vol.19, no.3, p.408.

³ It has recently been argued by a number of authors that the term 'normative power' is better-suited to describe the EU. See, for example: Diez, Thomas (2005), 'Constructing the Self and Changing Others: Reconsidering 'Normative Power Europe'', *Millennium*, vol.33, no.3, pp.613-614.

⁴ François Duchêne's definition of a civilian power quoted in Stavridis, Stelios (2001), 'Militarising the EU: the Concept of Civilian Power Europe Revisited', *The International Spectator*, vol.36, no.4, p.44.

⁵ Bull, Hedley (1982), 'Civilian Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol.21, no.2, p.152.

⁶ Cologne European Council (1999), 'Presidency Conclusions', 3-4 June, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/kolnen.htm [01.09.2009].

pursue more autonomous policies.⁷ It was therefore not surprising that France initiated the European defence policy and was later actively involved in ESDP's further development.

The UK, on the other hand, was against any EU attempts to develop autonomous military instruments because of fear that these could threaten NATO and US involvement in Europe. For Britain the EU often seemed at very best a necessary interference. Hugo Young's book *This blessed plot: Britain and Europe from Churchill to Blair* begins with a sentence that aptly describes Britain's attitude towards the EU: 'This is the story of 50 years in which Britain struggled to reconcile the past she could not forget with the future she could not avoid.'⁸ In 1998, then British Prime Minister Tony Blair, however, did not only launch a European defence policy together with his French counterpart, President Jacques Chirac, but ever since then drove it forward. In doing so, he faced fierce domestic opposition by the Conservative Party, eurosceptic media, the public and sometimes even by his own cabinet as well as external opposition by the US government.

Although Germany was not involved in the Saint Malo summit, it became vital for the development of ESDP afterwards. Much to the annoyance of the US, its presidency conclusion on ESDP presented at the Cologne summit went far beyond the wording agreed at the April 1999 NATO summit communiqué. By replacing the phrase 'where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged' with the much less restrictive phrase 'without prejudice to actions by NATO' it assigned only a weak role to NATO.

Following Cologne Germany participated in all major ESDP innovations and even proposed a number of further improvements. Why did Germany that had been deeply integrated into NATO and that had profited enormously from NATO membership⁹ decide to invest in a new

⁷ Posen, Barry (2004), 'ESDP and the structure of world power', *The International Spectator*, vol.39, no.1, p.14.

⁸ Young, Hugo (1999), *This Blessed Plot: Britain and Europe from Churchill to Blair*, Macmillan, Basingstoke, p.1.

⁹ According to Timothy Garton Ash, NATO membership provided for Germany a 'ladder out of the morass'. Garton Ash, Timothy (1993), *In Europe's Name: Germany and the Divided Continent*, Vintage Press, New York.

security institution? German chancellors had resisted attempts by French politicians to set up European defence cooperation outside NATO throughout the Cold War. What did Germany hope to achieve through ESDP that it could not gain through NATO? Moreover, in the light of its history, Germany had always been reluctant to engage in defence and deploy its armed forces. Why did it take the lead in ESDP?

The author will show that there were various pragmatic reasons why the UK and Germany supported the creation of ESDP. In the case of Britain, for example, Blair realised that after the Kosovo disaster the EU member states had to invest more in defence policy. He hoped that ESDP would force the EU member states to improve their capabilities thereby satisfying the US calls for burden-sharing. His active cooperation in the launch of ESDP also allowed Blair to show his pro-Europeanness. For Germany, a normal defence policy was the last step towards becoming a full sovereign state after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Whereas at the beginning of the 1990s Germany did not participate in the Gulf War to the dismay of its allies, by the end of this decade, following the judgement of the German Constitutional Court on out-of-area deployments of the *Bundeswehr*, it militarily contributed to the Kosovo war, whose legal basis was at best unclear. In the 1990s Germany also grew detached from NATO. It was ambiguous regarding NATO's reform agenda, which it saw as a process of nationalisation rather than real reform. Germany therefore concentrated its effort on reforming WEU and later ESDP.¹⁰

But these opportunistic reasons do not explain why Britain and Germany continued to drive ESDP forward, especially since, even according to critical observers, ESDP developed into a competitor of NATO 'challenging NATO's monopoly as the provider of European security'.¹¹ Even the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon and Britain's increasing focus on the transatlantic relationship and the 'war on terror' did not weaken Blair's commitment

¹⁰ Berenskoetter, Felix, Bastian Giegerich (2010), 'From NATO to ESDP: A Social Constructivist analysis of German strategic adjustment after the end of the Cold War', *Security Studies*, vol.19, no.3, p.435.

¹¹ Ibid, p.408.

to ESDP. In 2003, German Federal Chancellor Gerhard Schröder used much of its political capital to push through far-reaching ESDP proposals. In all other policy fields the EU virtually had come to a standstill in 2003 due to the disagreement about Iraq. But ESDP developed further. Blair, Chirac and Schröder were able to find agreements on the ESDP provisions of the draft Constitutional Treaty and on other ESDP proposals.

This thesis will investigate the motivation behind Britain's and Germany's continuous efforts in driving ESDP forward. Its unit of analysis will be individual British and German policy-makers. It will argue that once those British and German policy-makers participated in ESDP their interests and even identities changed. They became socialised. According to Jeffrey T. Checkel, socialisation is defined as a 'process of inducting actors into the norms and rules of a given community'. The outcome of this process is 'compliance based on the internalization of these new norms'.¹² Applied to this thesis, it would mean that British and German policy-makers internalised ESDP norms. But how can one prove that?

The author will employ Checkel's theoretical approach on socialisation developed in his 2007 volume *International Institution and Socialization in Europe*. His approach centres on three socialisation mechanisms – normative persuasion, role playing and strategic calculation - that link institutions and socialisation outcome. Those state how institutions achieve that agents internalise their norms. However, out of these three mechanisms only if normative persuasion is at work socialisation actually occurs because then agents switch from a logic of consequence to one of appropriateness, completely internalise new community norms and adopt the interests and identity of the institution.

Normative persuasion is a social process of communication convincing agents through argument and debate. Institutions are the promoter of socialisation persuading agents to internalise their norms. Although role playing also requires a logic of appropriateness agents internalise norms in a non-reflective manner. They take on certain roles in line with

¹² Checkel, Jeffrey T. (2007), 'International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and Framework', in, Checkel, Jeffrey T. (ed), *International Institutions and Socialization in Europe*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p.6.

the norms of an institution because they appear appropriate in the institution's environment. But they do not adopt the interests and identity of the institution. With strategic calculation there is usually no shift away from a logic of consequence. Agents calculate the consequences of norm compliance instead of internalising them.

Consequently, the aim of this thesis is to examine whether ESDP or rather the EU, as ESDP is part of the EU, indeed succeeded to persuade British and German policy-makers through argument and debate to internalise supranational ESDP norms.

Checkel outlines a number of scope conditions for when it is more likely that one of the three socialisation mechanisms occurs. In addition to establishing whether normative persuasion occurred in the cases of British and German policy-makers this thesis will test the scope conditions in order to identify whether they indeed triggered normative persuasion. If normative persuasion cannot be detected, it will be analysed which of the other two socialisation mechanisms was at work.

Checkel's approach is largely based on constructivism although it includes an element of rationalism as one of the socialisation mechanisms, strategic calculation, is rational choice, which has deep roots in rationalist theories. But Checkel emphasises that rationalist theories are 'ill-equipped to theorise those instances in which basic properties of agents are changing'¹³. Thus, normative persuasion, which holds that the persuadee will change his interests and identities in the process of socialisation, can only be explored from a constructivist perspective.

This thesis will begin with a theoretical chapter, which will compare constructivism to other International Relations and European integration approaches to point out its advantages and show that it is the most suitable approach for the purpose of this thesis. Rationalist International Relations and European integration approaches respectively cannot account for changes in agents' identities and interests resulting from institutional processes. They

¹³ Checkel, Jeffrey T. (2007), 'International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and Framework', in, Checkel, Jeffrey T. (ed), *International Institutions and Socialization in Europe*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p.11.

largely treat identities and interests as exogenous to these processes. While reflective International Relations and European integration approaches theorise the formation of identities and interests they are not interested in explaining specific policy outcomes and providing a social scientific research programme. Both rationalist and reflective theories are therefore unsuited as a theoretical basis for this thesis. Constructivism, on other hand, being in the middle ground between rationalist and reflective theories maintains that identities and interests are constructed by social interaction and depending on the particular constructivist approach aims at producing new knowledge and insights. This thesis will follow the holistic, conventional constructivist approach, which advocates 'methodological conventionalism', i.e. it adopts positivist conventions about sample characteristics and process-tracing case studies and allows science or causal explanations. Holistic means that the domestic and international arenas are two faces of a single social and political order. Therefore both the domestic and the international face need to be examined. Checkel's socialisation approach, however, neglects the domestic arena – a fact he admits. The thesis attempts to at least some extent pay attention to the domestic arena by, for example, considering domestic constraints and freedoms the individual policy-makers encounter.

This is one of only a few alterations done to Checkel's socialisation approach. In all other respects this thesis will follow Checkel's approach as developed in his 2007 volume *International Institution and Socialization*. In chapter three this approach will be extensively explained and analysed. Also, the dissertation's hypothesis 'Following the creation of the European Security and Defence Policy and German and British policy-makers' participation in it, they became socialised by the EU in ESDP, i.e. successful socialisation has resulted in the complete induction of ESDP norms and the adoption of EU's interests and identity in the area of ESDP by German and British policy-makers' will be developed in this chapter. The timeframe, in which the hypothesis will be assessed, will embrace the period from the

Saint Malo meeting (3 and 4 December 1998) to the Lisbon European Council summit (18-19 October 2007) thereby covering numerous important ESDP developments and at least one change in government in the UK and Germany. The methods used to support or falsify the hypothesis will be process-tracing and case study method. Both are well-suited to examine the socialisation mechanisms and scope conditions in action.

Chapter four will explore the development of ESDP during the above chosen period. It will first examine the failed attempts to create an autonomous European defence policy and then establish under which conditions ESDP was set up. Following the birth of ESDP, treaty provisions concerning ESDP, notably provisions of the Constitutional Treaty / Lisbon Treaty, and ESDP instruments, such as rapid reaction force and battlegroups, will be analysed. The last part of this chapter will look at ESDP from a NATO / US perspective. This chapter is a 'reality check' for the two case studies – Britain and Germany - which through the application of Checkel's socialisation approach to speeches, statements and interviews given by British and German policy-makers will analyse whether they were socialised by the EU in the area of ESDP. Chapter four enables the author to assess whether the contents of the speeches, statements and interviews actually correspond to facts.

The case studies will begin with an overview of the UK's and Germany's attitude towards defence in general and European security and defence policy before Saint Malo in particular thereby considering national peculiarities, which will be important for the analyses of the individual policy-makers. The focus of the two studies will be on the heads of government, defence ministers and foreign ministers as those are the policy-makers who primarily shaped the development of ESDP from the Saint Malo meeting to the Lisbon European Council summit. Their speeches, interviews and statements will be scrutinised for relevant ESDP quotes. After the end of each government, those quotes will be examined according to Checkel's socialisation approach in order to establish whether normative persuasion was at work or whether the policy-makers were driven by role playing or strategic calculation. For

the mechanism, which occurred, the appropriate scope conditions will be tested and if necessary will be refined or new conditions will be created. These two case studies with their empirical discussions are crucial to identify the analytical value of Checkel's socialisation approach.

In the conclusion, it will be discussed if and why the hypothesis proves correct or false and whether Checkel's approach indeed enhances our understanding of policy-makers' behaviour within ESDP. The implications for the future of ESDP will also be outlined.

This thesis fills a gap in the few existing theoretical accounts of ESDP, which tend to portray the intergovernmental character of ESDP. Furthermore, those analyses predominantly focus on the case studies of Britain and France. Germany's role has mostly been ignored when examining ESDP. Therefore and to some extent due to the timeframe of the case studies only a few journal articles, research papers, monographs and book chapters exist, which will be consulted for the two case studies chapters. Mostly, however, primary documents will be used for these chapters. In the third chapter, the author will rely heavily on the 2007 volume *International Institution and Socialization in Europe* edited by Checkel, although other articles written by Checkel and other authors, which clarify Checkel's approach, will also be consulted. The author refrains from describing the existing literature on the topic of this thesis in detail and reviewing this literature body in the introduction. The existing literature will become sufficiently clear over the course of the argument. The detailed bibliography at the end of this thesis also provides an overview of the consulted literature.

2. Theories

The study of European integration draws upon a broad range of theories, mostly International Relations¹⁴ theories, each of them viewing European integration from a different theoretical angle. Jill Steans and Lloyd Petticord define theories as

an attempt to explain something – an event or activity. [...] A theory is then a set of ideas, which are coherent, internally consistent and claim to have some purchase on the nature of the world and how it “works”. [...] A theoretical [approach¹⁵] [...] is [...] an attempt to construct a coherent explanation for a certain phenomenon, which in turn rests upon a wider belief system, or upon certain basic assumptions, about the nature of the world.¹⁶

The theoretical background for this chapter lies in the recognition of the fact that the study of European integration has been undergoing substantial changes. Until recently, scholars working on International Relations approaches have had difficulties coming to terms with the phenomena of European integration. Most of the approaches have been too state-centric and unable to capture the complexities of decision-making and change in the EU member states' identities and attitudes. Yet, developments in International Relations, which saw the emergence of a new strand of International Relations approaches, have challenged the formerly dominant approaches. For the first time, the study of the formation of identity and interests has come to the fore. The author has chosen constructivism from this new strand as the theoretical basis for her thesis.

This chapter will compare constructivism to other International Relations and European integration approaches to point out its advantages and show that it is the most suitable approach for this thesis. The author has selected five important International Relations

¹⁴ ,International Relations' written in capital letters means the discipline ,International Relations'.

¹⁵ In their book *International Relations: Perspectives and Themes* Jill Steans and Lloyd Pettiford use the term 'theoretical perspective' instead of 'theoretical approach'. Both terms mean the same. The author has decided to use 'theoretical approach' in her work.

¹⁶ Steans, Jill, Lloyd Pettiford (2001), *International Relations: Perspectives and Themes*, Pearson Education, Harlow, p.7.

approaches, which will be briefly analysed – realism, neo-realism, neo-liberal institutionalism, post-modernism, and critical theory. The European integration approaches have been grouped into three broad phases and within each phase one or more approaches, depending on how many different approaches the phase comprises, will be examined.

It would not be sufficient to compare constructivism only to European integration approaches. Constructivism is important for both disciplines – European integration studies and International Relations. Therefore, its advantages have to be shown vis-à-vis both disciplines. Moreover, most European integration approaches, except comparative and governance approaches, derived from International Relations approaches. Consequently, only a survey of both International Relations and European integration approaches can comprehensively highlight the advantages of constructivism and its appropriateness for this thesis.

2.1 An introduction into theoretical approaches

Pure empirical knowledge is impossible, because knowledge itself is not neutral. Everyone has preconceptions affecting which facts one regards as significant and which not. Facts do not speak for themselves. Any set of facts can yield different interpretations. Consequently, the way reality is perceived is always intimately linked to particular concerns and assumptions. Likewise, theoretical approaches give only a partial view, or representation of the world. Anyone seeking to engage academically with a subject must be conscious of their theoretical predispositions as these determine how one approaches a subject. Donald Puchala compared this to blind men being confronted to describe how an elephant looks

like.¹⁷ The morale of his story is that different starting points, like different theoretical approaches, can lead to different conclusions.

There are three fundamental points on which theoretical approaches differ: object of analysis, purpose, and methodology^{18, 19} The first point deals with the nature of the analysed subject matter. Theoretical approaches focus on different actors or phenomena. According to Kenneth Waltz, 'there are three levels of analysis: 1) the nature of individuals, 2) the nature of states and societies, and 3) the nature of the international system'.²⁰ Depending on which level of analysis is chosen, certain actors or phenomena will be privileged over others. As regards to the second point – the purpose of theoretical approaches – Robert W. Cox has differentiated between two types of theory on the basis of their purpose: problem solving theory and critical theory.²¹ Problem solving theory takes the world as it finds it, with the prevailing social and power relationships and the institutions into which they are organised. It analyses actions taking place in this provided framework.²² Critical theory²³, on the other hand, 'steps outside the confines of the existing set of relationships to identify the origins and developmental potential of these

¹⁷ The blind men need to touch the elephant to discover what the animal looks like. But as they touch different parts of the elephant, they arrive at different conclusions and no man can give an accurate description of the elephant.

Puchala, Donald J. (1972), 'Of blind men, elephants and international integration', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol.10, no.3, p.267.

¹⁸ Methodology means 'theory of methods'.

¹⁹ These differences can also be detected in the analysis of the selected International Relations and European integration approaches in the following two sections.

²⁰ Waltz, Kenneth N. (1959), *Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis*, Columbia University Press, New York.

²¹ Neufeld, Mark (1994), 'Reflexivity and International Relations Theory', in, Sjolander, Claire Turenne, Wayne S. Cox (eds), *Beyond Positivism: Critical Reflections on International Relations*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, London, pp.28-29.

²² Sinclair, Timothy J. (1996), 'Beyond International Relations Theory: Robert W. Cox and Approaches to World Order', in, Cox, Robert W., Timothy J. Sinclair, *Approaches to World Order*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p.6.

²³ Critical theory in this sense refers to all post-positivist approaches. It should not be confused with critical theory of the Frankfurt School. For more information on this form of critical theory see p.13. Smith, Steve (1996), 'Positivism and beyond', in, Smith, Steve, Ken Booth (eds), *International Theory: Positivism and Beyond*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p.25.

phenomena'.²⁴ By identifying the sources of contradiction and conflict in these entities, critical theory evaluates the potential to change different patterns. This is just one scholar's method of distinguishing theoretical approaches on the basis of their purposes. There are obviously a variety of purposes which animate the work of theorists. The third point refers to the differences in methodology²⁵. Every approach relies on its own appropriate methodology. In the 1960s, a great debate between behaviouralism versus traditionalism about methodology took place. Whereas behaviouralists were committed to employ the methods of natural sciences, including the quantification of variables and formal hypotheses building, to explain behaviour, traditionalists emphasised the utility of history, law, philosophy and other classical methods of academic inquiry.

Besides these fundamental points, there are other differences between theoretical approaches. In the late 1980s 'the search for thinking space'²⁶ or what is commonly known as the 'Third Debate'²⁷ challenged the dominance of positivist approaches in International Relations and contributed to the development of new post-positivist theoretical approaches.

Positivism argues that all sciences, both natural and social are unified (so-called naturalism). In order to comprehend the one world we live in one has to use the scientific

²⁴ Sinclair, Timothy J. (1996), 'Beyond International Relations Theory: Robert W. Cox and Approaches to World Order', in, Cox, Robert W., Timothy J. Sinclair (1996), *Approaches to World Order*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p.6.

²⁵ The term methodology may be defined in at least three ways: (1) a body of rules and postulates that are employed by researchers in a discipline of study; (2) a particular procedure or set of procedures; and (3) the analysis of the principles of procedures of inquiry that are followed by researchers in a discipline of study.

²⁶ Foucault, Michel quoted in Smith, Steve (1996), 'Positivism and beyond', in, Smith, Steve, Ken Booth (eds), *International Theory: Positivism and Beyond*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p.12.

²⁷ The major contribution to the 'Third Debate' was Yosef Lapid's metatheoretical elaboration 'The Third Debate: On the Prospects of International Theory in a Post-Positivist Era', where he appeals for a 'rethinking of the ontological, epistemological as well as axiological foundations of scientific endeavours in the field of the social disciplines'.

Lapid, Yosef (1989), 'The Third Debate: On the Prospects of International Theory in a Post-Positivist Era', *International Studies Quarterly*, vol. 33, no. 3, pp.235-254.

method of analysis, which relies on the distinction between facts and values, the belief in the existence of regularities and the need of empirical validation or falsification through observation. This is known as an empiricist epistemology.

It is important that epistemology is conceptually separated from both ontology and methodology.²⁸

[T]o make sense of the world one needs an ontology (a general theoretically charged account of what there is and how it works), a methodology (for revealing and explaining or understanding that picture of the world) and an epistemology (which shows how we can know (or reasonably believe) that the methodology gives us the picture).²⁹

There is a debate about whether ontological questions are prior to epistemological ones because ontology deals with the very nature of 'being'. Ontology reflects the researcher's view about the nature of the world, whereas epistemology reflects the view of what a researcher can know about the world and how one can know it.³⁰ According to Steve Smith, however, ontology and epistemology are 'mutually and inextricably interrelated'. Neither ontology nor epistemology is prior to the other.

Just as epistemology is important in determining what can be accepted ontologically, so ontology affects what we accept epistemologically. In this light, prioritising one or the other, as has been the case in work on the philosophy of knowledge (prioritising epistemology) and in post-modernist work (prioritising ontology), misses the point.³¹

Positivism in International Relations is essentially a methodological commitment, linked to an empiricist epistemology³²: together these result in a very restricted ontology. Positivists

²⁸ Ibid, p.18.

²⁹ Hollis, Martin, Steve Smith (1996), 'A Response: why epistemology matters in international theory', *Review of International Studies*, vol.22, no.1, p.112

³⁰ Marsh, David, Paul Furlong (2002), 'A Skin not a Sweater: Ontology and Epistemology in Political Science', in, Marsh, David, Gerry Stoker (eds), *Theory and Methods in Political Science*, Palgrave, Basingstoke, pp.18-19.

³¹ Smith, Steve (1996), 'Positivism and beyond', in, Smith, Steve, Ken Booth (eds), *International Theory: Positivism and Beyond*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p.18.

³² The simplest form of empiricism is, according to Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, adopting a purely inductive method of observing, noticing a pattern, generalising and eventually testing for new instances.

Hollis, Martin, Steve Smith (1990), *Explaining and Understanding International Relations*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, p.52.

in fact adhere to a foundationalist ontology as for them there is a world which exists independently of our (their) knowledge of it. According to Steve Smith, positivism is therefore

a methodological position, reliant on an empiricist epistemology, which grounds our knowledge of the world in justification by (ultimately brute) experience and thereby licensing methodology and ontology in so far as they are empirically warranted.³³

Adherents of most of the post-positivist approaches are questioning the ontological, epistemological, methodological, as well as normative assumptions held by the positivist theoretical tradition.³⁴ In contrast to positivism, post-positivism believes in 'an intimate connection between social life and cognitive processes'. It employs a methodological framework which allows it to reflect on the origins of social and power relationships constructed by actors.³⁵ According to Yosef Lapid, there are three fundamental ideas around which most post-positivist approaches could rally: the focus on meta-scientific units (paradigmatism), the concern with underlying premises and assumptions (perspectivism) and the move towards methodological pluralism. Paradigmatism relates to the insistence of post-positivism that only 'long-lived, large-scale and multi-tiered constructs', such as paradigms, should qualify as 'basic knowledge producing, knowledge accumulating and knowledge conserving units'.³⁶ Perspectivism contains the relative liberation of theory from

³³ Smith, Steve (1996), 'Positivism and beyond', in, Smith, Steve, Ken Booth (eds), *International Theory: Positivism and Beyond*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p.17.

³⁴ Reus-Smit, Christian (2001), 'Constructivism', in, Burchill, Scott, Richard Devetak, Andrew Linklater (eds), *Theories of International Relations*, Palgrave Publishers, Hampshire, p.209.

Instead of post-positivist approaches, Christian Reus-Smit uses the term 'critical theory', but stresses the fact that he includes all post-positivist theory of the Third Debate and after.

³⁵ Cox, Robert W. (1992), 'Towards a post-hegemonic conceptualization of world order: reflections on the relevancy of Ibn Khaldun', in, Rosenau, James N., Ernst-Otto Czempiel (eds), *Governance without government: order and change in world politics*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p.138.

³⁶ Ibid, p.240.

observation, whereas the third idea refers to the distrust of relying on one method and instead calls for utilising multiple processes to approach knowing.³⁷

Post-positivism is, however, not a unitary philosophical platform. It comprises a 'confusing array of only remotely related philosophical articulations'.³⁸ The various post-positivist approaches also operate within very different epistemological positions. Steve Smith maintains that

although the post-positivist approaches are united in an opposition to traditional international theory, one of them works within the same epistemology as traditional theory^[39], and the others are operating in distinctly different epistemologies to each other.⁴⁰

There are basically five epistemological alternatives: scientific realism, hermeneutics, critical theory (in its Frankfurt school sense), feminist standpoint epistemology, and post-modernist epistemology.⁴¹

2.2 Theoretical Approaches to International Relations

The following section analyses selected International Relations approaches. Realism, its neo-realist variant as well as neo-liberal institutionalism adhere to the ontological, epistemological, methodological and normative assumptions of positivist approaches. Post-modernism and critical theory in contrast operate in the ontological, epistemological, methodological and normative positions of post-positivist approaches.

The outbreak of the Second World War shattered the then dominant idealist world view,

³⁷ Ibid, pp.239-241.

³⁸ Lapid, Yosef (1989), 'The Third Debate: On the Prospects of International Theory in a Post-Positivist Era', *International Studies Quarterly*, vol. 33, no. 3, p.239.

³⁹ Steve Smith relates to historical sociology that according to him seems 'to be largely working within an empiricist epistemology, if not an outright positivism'.

Smith, Steve (1996), 'Positivism and beyond', in, Smith, Steve, Ken Booth (eds), *International Theory: Positivism and Beyond*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p.35.

⁴⁰ Idem.

⁴¹ Smith, Steve (1996), 'Positivism and beyond', in, Smith, Steve, Ken Booth (eds), *International Theory: Positivism and Beyond*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp.36-37.

which sought to reform the international system in such a way as to ensure peace.⁴² As a response to the failure of idealism to explain the events of 1930s - 40s, realism⁴³ emerged.⁴⁴ According to E.H. Carr, one of the founders of realism, it is dangerous to base the study of international politics on an imaginary desire of how we would like the world to be. Instead, the realistic distribution of power in international politics should be emphasised. Hans J. Morgenthau, the other founder of realism, took up Carr's challenge to create a 'science of international politics by applying the positivist methodology of the natural science to the study of international relations'.⁴⁵ He outlined 'six principles of political realism':⁴⁶ First, 'politics [...] is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature'.⁴⁷ Second, interests are defined in terms of power:

The concept of interest defined as power imposes intellectual discipline upon the observer, infuses rational order into the subject matter of politics, and thus makes the theoretical understanding of politics possible.⁴⁸

Third, interests are not fixed but depend upon the political and cultural context within which foreign policy is formulated. What remains stable is the notion of 'interest' which 'is indeed of the essence of politics and is unaffected by the circumstances of time and place'.⁴⁹ Fourth, realism takes the moral significance of political actions into consideration and is well aware of the potential tensions between morality and the demands for a

⁴² Smith, Steve (1987), 'Paradigm Dominance in International Relations: The Development of International Relations as a Social Science', *Millennium*, vol.16, no.2, p.191.

⁴³ Realism does not constitute a single theoretical approach. It should rather be regarded as a 'paradigm', which gives an answer to the following crucial questions in International Relations: 'What are the causes of conflict and war amongst nations, and what are the conditions for cooperation and peace among them?'

Legro, Jeffrey W., Andrew Moravcsik (1999), 'Is Anybody Still a Realist?', *International Security*, vol.24, no.2, p.9.

⁴⁴ The realist critique of the idealism is sometimes referred to as the first great debate in International Relations.

⁴⁵ Morgenthau, Hans J. (1993), *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, McGraw-Hill, New York, p.3.

⁴⁶ Ibid, pp.3-4.

⁴⁷ Ibid, p.4.

⁴⁸ Ibid, p.5.

⁴⁹ Ibid, p.10.

successful policy. Fifth, a 'universally agreed set of moral principles' does not exist.⁵⁰ Sixth, political realism recognises that other 'standards of thought' exist and are relevant but these are nevertheless subordinate to standards of politics.⁵¹ The political sphere is autonomous. To sum up, Morgenthau's theory of international politics analyses international relations in terms of a struggle for power that is rooted in human nature. Since universal moral and ethical principles do not exist, rational statesmen will always pursue a policy that prioritises the accumulation of power to a policy that considers morality as its priority.⁵²

Until the 1970s, realism was considered the most influential theory in International Relations. With the emergence of structuralist and pluralist accounts⁵³, which for the first time stressed the importance of different actors and different issues, realism's influence waned.⁵⁴ Yet, events in the late 1970s and early 1980s, such as the rise of a Second Cold War, led to a return of realism under a new guise – neo-realism.⁵⁵

Kenneth N. Waltz, the founder of neo-realism, criticised Morgenthau for having failed to take 'the fateful step beyond developing concepts to the fashioning of a recognizable theory'.⁵⁶ Theory, according to Waltz, 'isolates one realm from all others in order to deal with it intellectually'.⁵⁷ Although Morgenthau claimed the autonomy of the political sphere,

⁵⁰ Burchill, Scott (2001), 'Realism and Neo-realism', in, Burchill, Scott, Richard Devetak, Andrew Linklater (eds), *Theories of International Relations*, Palgrave Publishers, Hampshire, p.80.

⁵¹ Morgenthau, Hans J. (1993), *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, McGraw-Hill, New York, p.13.

⁵² Burchill, Scott (2001), 'Realism and Neo-realism', in, Burchill, Scott, Richard Devetak, Andrew Linklater (eds), *Theories of International Relations*, Palgrave Publishers, Hampshire, p.80.

⁵³ Of these approaches, the ones that had the most impact were world system theory and the transnationalist approach.

⁵⁴ The 1970s/1980s debate between realism, pluralism and structuralism is called the inter-paradigm debate as all three paradigms adhere to positivist assumptions.

⁵⁵ Smith, Steve (1987), 'Paradigm Dominance in International Relations: The Development of International Relations as a Social Science', *Millennium*, vol.16, no.2, p.196.

⁵⁶ Waltz, Kenneth N. (1995), 'Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory', in, Kegley, Charles W. Jr. (ed), *Controversies in International Relations Theory. Realism and the Neoliberal Challenge*, St. Martin's Press, New York, p.71.

⁵⁷ Idem.

in Waltz's view, he failed to develop this concept and apply it to international politics.⁵⁸ Waltz believed that international politics should be understood as a system⁵⁹ with a precisely defined and separate structure containing the three following important characteristics: the ordering principle of the system, the specification of functions of differentiated units, i.e. states, and the distribution of capabilities across the units.⁶⁰ Whereas in domestic political systems the ordering principle is hierarchic, in international system the ordering principle is anarchic, which implies that '[n]o central agency is available to enforce promises or to provide protection'.⁶¹ In this self-help environment nation states only survive through accumulation of military power. Through the establishment of a central authority, the international system can be transformed from an anarchical system into a hierarchical one.⁶² The second characteristic, the specification of functions of differentiated units, can be neglected since in the international system states are made functionally similar by the constraints of the structure. The anarchical system requires states to pursue security.⁶³ Although states are alike in the tasks they face they differ vastly in their capabilities to perform them. The distribution of capabilities therefore allows distinguishing states from one another. Hence, the decisive factors of the international system are the conception of anarchy as well as the accumulation of capabilities, which will determine the position of a state within the international system. According to the Waltz's theory of international politics, the structure of the international system forces states to act

⁵⁸ Idem.

⁵⁹ For Waltz, the system level is an ontological necessity rather than a conceptual choice. Dunne, Timothy (1995), 'The Social Construction of International Society', *European Journal of International Relations*, vol.1, no.3, p.369.

⁶⁰ Ibid, pp.370-386.

⁶¹ Grieco, Joseph M. (1995), 'Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism', in, Kegley, Charles W. Jr (ed.), *Controversies in International Relations Theory. Realism and the Neoliberal Challenge*, St. Martin's Press, New York, p.165.

⁶² Waltz, Kenneth N. (1986), 'Political Structures', in, Keohane, Robert O. (ed), *Neorealism and its Critics*, Columbia University Press, New York, p.96.

⁶³ Ibid, p.87.

rationality and to adopt a non-cooperative stance as they are focused on the relative increase of capabilities instead of absolute increase to assure their survival.⁶⁴

Neo-liberal institutionalism⁶⁵ is assumed by many scholars to be the main challenger of realist as well as neo-realist thoughts although it has a number of basic assumptions in common with both:

it is crucial to remember that it [neo-liberal institutionalism] borrows as much from realism as from liberalism: it cannot be encapsulated as simply a "liberal" [66] theory opposed at all points to realism. Indeed it is almost as misleading to refer to it as liberal as to give it the tag of neorealism.⁶⁷

Both neo-liberal institutionalism and neo-realism regard the international system as anarchical with states as the key units although neo-liberal institutionalism takes other actors into account as well. They furthermore share the assumption that states are rational egoists which always seek to maximise their interests. Yet, whereas neo-realists argue that states are concerned with relative gains (who will gain more?), neo-liberal institutionalists claim that states are concerned with absolute gains (what will gain me the most?) as they feel secure enough to maximise their own gains regardless of other states.⁶⁸ Given the focus of states on absolute gains, neo-liberal institutionalists maintain that the prospects

⁶⁴ Ibid, p.186.

⁶⁵ Robert O. Keohane's book 'After Hegemony', written in 1984, is considered to be the initiator of the neo-liberal institutionalist school in IR.

⁶⁶ There are a number of different strands of liberalism within International Relations; for example, idealism, transnationalism, liberal peace theory, and neo-liberal institutionalism. Despite their differences, they agree on five main points: 1) rationality is the defining, universal, characteristic of human kind; 2) people rationally pursue their own interests, but there is a potential harmony of interests between people; 3) cooperation is a central feature of all human relations, including international relations; 4) government is necessary, but the centralisation of power is inherently bad; 5) individual liberty is of high political importance.

Steans, Jill, Lloyd Pettiford (2001), *International Relations: Perspectives and Themes*, Pearson Education, Harlow, p.48.

⁶⁷ Keohane, Robert O. (1993), 'Institutional Theory and the Realist Challenge after the Cold War', in, Baldwin, David A. (ed), *Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate*, Columbia University Press, New York, p.272.

⁶⁸ 'Realists argue that the general insecurity of international anarchy leads states to worry not simply about how well they fare themselves (absolute gains) but about how well they fare compared to other states (relative gains).'

Snidal, Duncan (1993), 'Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation', in, Baldwin, David A. (ed), *Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate*, Columbia University Press, New York, p.172.

for institutional cooperation, even in an anarchical world and without the presence of a hegemonic state, are greater than neo-realists who do not believe in international cooperation admit: '[neo-realists] feel that [interstate cooperation] is hard to achieve, difficult to maintain, and dependent on state power.'⁶⁹ For neo-liberal institutionalists, however, the willingness of states to cooperate is significantly influenced by the quality, quantity and distribution of information available in the system. Although states are afraid of being 'cheated' by others and can end up not cooperating, according to neo-liberal institutionalists, conditional cooperation is the best way for states to deal with cheating in an anarchical system.⁷⁰ This type of cooperation can be enforced by international institutions as they can monitor compliance and sanction defectors.

To summarise, neo-realism and neo-liberal institutionalism are no counterparts in their perception of the international system. They are grounded in a common epistemological position, address similar questions and share common assumptions. They therefore represent 'two different versions of the international system rather than two different visions' (neo-neo synthesis).⁷¹

Post-modernism⁷² as well as critical theory (Frankfurt School)⁷³ question the assumptions of positivist theories. They share an alternative view of the international system.

Post-modernism lacks a consistent definition. According to the remarks of François Lyotard, who at least attempted to determine what post-modern means, post-modern is 'incredulity

⁶⁹ Idem.

⁷⁰ See Prisoner's dilemma: The prisoner's dilemma forms a non-zero-sum game in which two players ('prisoners') may each cooperate with or defect from (i.e. betray) the other player. In this game the only concern of each individual player is maximizing his/her own payoff, without any concern for the other player's payoff. Rational choice leads the two players to both play defect even though each player's individual reward would be greater if they both played cooperate.

⁷¹ Smith, Steve (1995), 'The Self-Images of a Discipline: A Genealogy of International Relations Theory', in, Booth, Ken, Steve Smith (eds), *International Relations Theory Today*, Polity Press, Cambridge, p.24.

⁷² Post-modernism is sometimes known as post-structuralism or deconstructivism.

⁷³ The Frankfurt School emerged at the Institute for Social Research (*Institut für Sozialforschung*) of the University of Frankfurt am Main in Germany when Max Horkheimer became the Institute's director in 1930.

towards metanarratives'.⁷⁴ As a consequence of the rejection of metanarratives, post-modernists focus on two aspects in terms of research. First, they study 'the way in which meaning is constructed and manipulated through the use of words and symbols'⁷⁵ and second, they try

to step outside the assumptions of modernism in order to see its violent side, its destruction of nature, its enforcement of uniformity, its suppression of diversity, and its construction of arbitrary constellations of power.⁷⁶

Post-modernists do not aim to provide alternative assumptions. In fact, they regard such a task as impossible. What they want to achieve is to identify the underlying assumptions of the social sciences and undermine their foundations. The methods post-modernists apply are of hermeneutic type, such as genealogy⁷⁷, constituting analyses of the relationship between power and knowledge, deconstruction⁷⁸ and double reading.

⁷⁴ Metanarratives are theories that maintain that they have clear foundations for adopting a foundational epistemology.

⁷⁵ Porter, Tony (1994), 'Postmodern Political Realism and International Relations Theory's Third Debate', in, Sjolander, Claire Turenne, Wayne S. Cox (eds), *Beyond Positivism: Critical Reflections on International Relations*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, London, p.109.

⁷⁶ Ibid, p.112.

⁷⁷ According to Steve Smith, the central message of genealogy is that there is no such thing as truth, only regimes of truth. These reflect the ways in which, through history both power and truth develop together in a mutually sustaining relationship. What this means is that statements about the social world are only 'true' within specific discourses. Accordingly, post-modernism is concerned with how some discourses and therefore some truths dominate others. Here, of course is exactly where power comes in. It is for this reason that post-modernists are opposed to any metanarratives, since they imply that there are conditions for establishing the truth or falsity of knowledge claims that are not the product of any discourse, and thereby not the products of power.

Smith, Steve (1995), 'The Self-Images of a Discipline: A Genealogy of International Relations Theory', in, Booth, Ken, Steve Smith (eds), *International Relations Theory Today*, Polity Press, Cambridge, p.24.

⁷⁸ Deconstruction is 'a technique to analyze texts to discover internal inconsistencies that reveal hidden assumptions [...]. Such hidden assumptions can preclude questioning of the foundations upon which assertions are based. Deconstruction is used to show that all claims are rhetorical and that all foundations of knowledge are arbitrary. A goal is to discover alternative interpretations of texts that recognise a diversity of meanings, and thus subvert the notion that authors can create one legitimate interpretation.'

Porter, Tony (1994), 'Postmodern Political Realism and International Relations Theory's Third Debate', in, Sjolander, Claire Turenne, Wayne S. Cox (eds), *Beyond Positivism: Critical Reflections on International Relations*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, London, pp. 110-111.

Critical theory seeks 'to understand society by taking a position outside of society while at the same time recognising that it is itself the product of society.'⁷⁹ There may be a real world but it is a product of critical thought and reflection. All knowledge is therefore ideological – it reflects values, ideas and interests of particular groups. Hence, international relations are regarded as a struggle between different groups and movements. So, whereas post-modernism denies the idea of truth claims assessed by International Relations theory (anti-foundationalist), critical theory concedes that International Relations theory might reveal truth claims (foundationalist)⁸⁰ as long as the theory adopted is an emancipatory one that guarantees 'freedom from static social conditions and from conditions of distorted communication'.⁸¹ The following quote by Mark Hoffman aptly summarises the objectives of critical theory:

The goal of critical theory becomes the construction of a politics oriented towards the development of a rational consensus between human beings – a return to the classical understanding of politics, to the development of an emancipatory politics in which the individual is subject and not object and in which constraints on human autonomy are removed. The purpose of critical theory is to isolate and critique those rationalisations of society that are advanced as self-evident truths, but which may be ideological mystifications.⁸²

Robert O. Keohane was among the first scholars to take seriously the criticism of the

⁷⁹ Hoffman, Mark (1987), 'Critical Theory and the Inter-Paradigm Debate', *Millennium*, vol.16, no.2, p.233.

⁸⁰ According to Steve Smith, a 'foundationalist position is one that thinks that all truth claims (i.e. about some feature of the world) can be judged true or false', whereas an 'anti-foundationalist thinks that truth claims cannot be so judged since there are never neutral grounds for so doing; instead each theory will define what counts as the facts and so there will be no neutral positions available to determine between rival claims.'

Smith, Steve (2001), 'Reflectivist and Constructivist Approaches to International Theory', in, Baylis, John, Steve Smith (eds), *The Globalization of World Politics*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, p.227.

⁸¹ Hoffman, Mark (1987), 'Critical Theory and the Inter-Paradigm Debate', *Millennium*, vol.16, no.2, p.236.

⁸² Idem.

emerging post-positivist (reflective as he called it)⁸³ approaches. By contrasting rationalist approaches⁸⁴, such as neo-realism and neo-liberal institutionalism, against the reflective ones, Keohane drew the conclusion that rationalist approaches were indeed limited by their inability to take account of human consciousness and changes thereof. On the other hand, reflective approaches largely neglect the essential task of developing a 'clear reflective research programme' as they almost exclusively concentrate on levelling criticism against rationalist approaches.⁸⁵ Rationalists therefore sometimes claim that reflectivists have nothing to say about the 'real world' of international relations. This polarisation between rationalists and reflectivists somewhat changed due to the constructivist turn in International Relations and the establishment of a middle ground on the rationalist/reflectivist axis. The emergence of constructivism has, on the one hand, challenged rationalist approaches; on the other hand, it encouraged reflectivist approaches to move away from metatheoretical⁸⁶ critique to empirical analysis of world politics.

2.3 Theoretical Approaches to European Integration

Before elaborating in greater detail on constructivism, this section will give a short overview of a number of European integration theories, in order to show the strengths of constructivism compared to International Relations as well as European integration approaches.

⁸³ He called post-positivist theoretical approaches 'reflective' as these approaches emphasise the 'importance of human reflection for the nature of institutions and ultimately for the character of world politics'.

McCarthy, Patrick, Aris Alexopoulos (1995), 'Theory Synthesis in IR: Problems and Possibilities', *EUI Working Paper*, vol.14, no.95, p.5, <http://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/1389> [11.09.2007].

⁸⁴ Rationalism refers to those theoretical approaches that apply rational choice and positivist methods, for example neo-realism and neo-liberalism.

⁸⁵ Keohane, Robert O. (1988), 'International Institutions: Two Approaches', *International Studies Quarterly*, vol.32, no.4, p.392.

⁸⁶ Meta-theory explores the underlying assumptions that theories hold and examines their consequences on theorising and empirical research.

According to Antje Wiener and Thomas Diez, the development of European integration approaches can be grouped into three broad phases: explanatory, analytical and constructive phase.⁸⁷ The explanatory phase, which took place from the 1960s onwards, focused on explaining integration. During this phase, the following theoretical approaches emerged: transactionalism, neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism. As the debate between the two latter approaches had the most significant impact on European integration theories, neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism, which is close to International Relations' realism, shall be briefly examined. Neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism privilege different actors in their accounts of European integration. Whereas for intergovernmentalists national governments are the principal agents, which drive or prevent European cooperation, neofunctionalists see national governments as only one actor amongst others.⁸⁸ Moreover, intergovernmentalism, according to Stanley Hoffmann, depicts states as profoundly concerned about sovereignty. States will only agree on cooperation after a careful weighing of long-term costs and benefits. Consequently, for intergovernmentalists European integration is a product of interstate bargaining.⁸⁹ Neofunctionalism⁹⁰, on the other hand, assumes that supranational institutions are established because important political groups see the advantages of joint governance in specific areas. Integration in one area spills over into another when the supranational institutions affect the interests of these groups, which respond by pushing for more integration. Neofunctionalists understand integration as a process with reference to an

⁸⁷ Wiener, Antje, Thomas Diez (eds) (2004), *European Integration Theory*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, p.6.

⁸⁸ Risse-Kappen, Thomas (1996), 'Exploring the Nature of the Beast: International Relations Theory and Comparative Policy Analysis meet the European Union', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol.34, no.1, p.55.

⁸⁹ Pierson, P. Paul (1998), 'Path to European Integration: A Historical-Institutionalist Analysis', in, Sandholtz, Wayne, Alec Stone Sweet, *European Integration and Supranational Governance*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp.32-33.

⁹⁰ Representative of neofunctionalism are, for example, Ernst B. Haas, Leon Lindberg and Philippe C. Schmitter.

endpoint as spill-over of integration continues until the EU becomes a supranational state.⁹¹

Overall, intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism pose two opposed scenarios for the European future: the EU as an intergovernmental organisation versus the EU as a supranational state.

Both intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism were accused of marginalising important aspects of European integration, such as the day-to-day politics within the EU system - 'Euro-polity'.⁹² The second phase therefore brought comparative and institutionalist approaches to the foreground of European integration studies, which concentrated on analysing the political system of the EU and political processes within the EU. According to the comparative – so called governance - approaches, the EU has acquired many qualities normally associated with national political systems.⁹³ For example, the multi-level governance approach claims that the EU has become a polity where authority is dispersed between level of governance and amongst actors.⁹⁴ States are not understood as unitary or sovereign actors anymore. They are melded into multi-level polity by the actions of subnational and supranational actors.⁹⁵ Institutional approaches do not constitute a single research programme. They are usually divided into rational choice, historical and sociological institutionalism. According to Mark Pollack, a representative of rational choice institutionalism, this institutionalism has the virtue of beginning with the intergovernmentalist claim about member states primacy, but then takes into account the way institutions structure individual and collective policy choices. Historical institutionalism

⁹¹ Haas, Ernst B. (2003), 'The Uniting of Europe', in, Nelsen, Brent F., Alexander Stubb, *The European Union. Readings on the Theory and Practice of European Integration*, Palgrave, Hampshire, pp.145-146.

⁹² Rosamond, Ben (2000), *Theories of European Integration*, Macmillan Press, Hampshire, pp.98-105.

⁹³ Hix, Simon (1994), 'The Study of the European Community: The Challenge to Comparative Politics', *West European Politics*, vol.17, no.1, pp.2-21.

⁹⁴ Aalberts, Tanja (2004), 'The Future of Sovereignty in Multilevel Governance Europe – A Constructivist Reading', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol.42, no.1, pp.23-24.

⁹⁵ Kelstrup, Morten, Michael C. Williams (2000), 'Introduction: Integration and the politics of community in the New Europe', in, Kelstrup, Morten, Michael C. Williams (eds), *International Relations Theory and the Politics of European Integration*, Routledge, London, p.9.

interprets the influence of institutions more generously. Member states may not be aware of the full implications of participating in institutions as their 'short-term preoccupations [...] have led them to make decisions that undermine long-term member state control' ('path dependence', 'unintended consequences').⁹⁶ Sociological institutionalism has clear affinities with constructivism. Sociological institutionalists emphasise the highly-interactive and mutually-constitutive character of the relationship between institutions and states. For them, interests and identities of states are socially constructed.⁹⁷

The third phase of European integration theory, which began in the 1990s, has been marked by a return of International Relations theories. This time, though, one could detect a move away from rationalist European integration theories, such as intergovernmentalism, which are mostly concerned with analysing European integration, towards reflective European integration theories, which focus on the impact of European integration on domestic political and social processes of the member states and beyond.⁹⁸ Due to the wider notions of identity, knowledge and politics, these reflective theoretical approaches have opened up new ways of thinking and research in the study of European integration.⁹⁹ Yet, this third phase has also seen attempts from neo-realists and neo-liberals to explain developments in the EU from the perspective of mainstream American cooperation theory. Amongst these approaches, Andrew Moravcsik's liberal intergovernmentalism¹⁰⁰ represents

⁹⁶ Rosamond, Ben (2000), *Theories of European Integration*, Macmillan Press, Hampshire, p.99.

⁹⁷ Hall, Peter A., Rosemary C. R. Taylor (1996), 'Political Science and the three new Institutionalisms', *Political Studies*, vol.44, no.5, pp.946-949.

⁹⁸ Risse, Thomas, Tanja A. Börzel (2000), 'When Europe hits home: Europeanization and Domestic Change', *EUI Working Paper*, vol.4, no.15, p.1, http://www.eui.eu/RSCAS/WP-Texts/00_56.pdf [11.09.2007].

⁹⁹ Smith, Steve (2000), 'International theory and European integration', in, Kelstrup, Morten, Michael C. Williams (eds), *International Relations Theory and the Politics of European Integration*, Routledge, London, p.48.

¹⁰⁰ Liberal intergovernmentalism is based on a former approach, the intergovernmental institutionalism, which rests on three principles: intergovernmentalism, lowest-common-denominator bargaining, and protection of sovereignty.

Moravcsik, Andrew (1991), 'Negotiating the Single European Act: national interests and conventional statecraft in the European Community', *International Organization*, vol.45, no.1, p.25.

the most notable contribution. Liberal intergovernmentalism rests on three essential theoretical elements: the assumption of rational state behaviour, a liberal theory of national preference formation, and an intergovernmentalist analysis of interstate negotiation.¹⁰¹ Moravcsik merges two traditionally separated levels of analysis - the domestic politics level and the system level – as he conceives the politics of international negotiations are happening at both levels.¹⁰² At the domestic level, national preferences¹⁰³ are formed by the continually changing pressure of domestic societal groups. The government, whose remaining in office depends on societal support, aggregates the preferences of the dominant societal groups and bring this set of national interests to international negotiation, the second stage.¹⁰⁴ International agreements can be achieved when the interests of the dominant national groups converge - bargaining space overlap.¹⁰⁵ The outcomes of international negotiations largely depend on the relative bargaining power of states.¹⁰⁶

The greater the potential gains for a government from cooperation as compared to its best alternative policy, the less risk of non-agreement it is willing to assume and, therefore, the weaker its bargaining power over the specific term of agreement.¹⁰⁷

If the efficiency of negotiations is not guaranteed, it can be attained by the help of international institutions. States must give up some parts of their national autonomy in order for organisation to be able to provide assistance to the states. According to

¹⁰¹ Chrysoschoou, Dimitris N., Michael J. Tsinisizelis, Stelios Stavridis, Kostas Ifantis (1999), *Europe in Change. Theory and Reform in the European Union*, Manchester University Press, Manchester, p.46.

¹⁰² McCarthy, Patrick A., Aris Alexopoulos, (1995), 'Theory Synthesis in IR: Problems and Possibilities', *EUI Working Paper*, vol.14, no.95, pp.8-10, <http://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/1389> [11.09.2007].

¹⁰³ 'By preferences, I designate not simply a particular set of policy goals but a set of underlying national objectives independent of any particular international negotiation to expand exports, to enhance security vis-à-vis a particular threat, or to realize some ideational goal.'

Moravcsik, Andrew (1998), *The Choice for Europe. Social Purpose & State Power from Messina to Maastricht*, Routledge, London, p.20.

¹⁰⁴ Moravcsik, Andrew (1993), 'Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol.31, no.4, pp.481-484.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid*, p.483-497.

¹⁰⁶ Moravcsik, Andrew (1998), *The Choice for Europe. Social Purpose & State Power from Messina to Maastricht*, Routledge, London, pp.60-63.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid*, p.499.

Moravcsik, states agree to pool and delegate sovereignty 'as the result of a cost-benefit analysis of the stream of future substantive decisions expected to follow from alternative institutional designs'.¹⁰⁸ Also, by transferring sovereignty to institutions, governments' autonomy vis-à-vis their societal groups is strengthened.¹⁰⁹

2.4 Constructivism

Constructivism is not a substantive theory.¹¹⁰ Most constructivists except Alexander Wendt, who embarked on formulating a comprehensive social theory of International Relations¹¹¹, find the development of a general theory impossible and unnecessary. There is some confusion over what constructivism really is about, especially as constructivism combines a diversity of different approaches. Yet, there are a number of common features of constructivist approaches.

All constructivist approaches aim to explore three core post-postivist ontological propositions about social life and their impact on aspects of world politics.¹¹² First, systems of shared ideas, beliefs and values have structural characteristics. These ideational structures (intersubjective meaning) are just as important as, or even more important than

¹⁰⁸ Moravcsik, Andrew (1993), 'Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol.31, no.4, p.509.

¹⁰⁹ International institutions can strengthen executives over domestic groups by creating domestic informational asymmetries in their favour, providing them with additional sources of ideological legitimation, by recognising only them as legitimate national representatives, etc.

Moravcsik, Andrew (1994), 'Why the European Union Strengthens the State: Domestic Politics and International Cooperation', *Centre for European Studies Working Paper Series*, no.52, pp.8-14, <http://www.ces.fas.harvard.edu/publications/docs/pdfs/Moravcsik52.pdf> [11.09.2007].

¹¹⁰ Ruggie, John G. (1998), 'What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge', *International Organization*, vol.52, no.4, p.879.

¹¹¹ Wendt, Alexander (1999), *Social Theory of International Politics*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

¹¹² Price, Richard, Christian Reus-Smit (1998), 'Dangerous Liaison? Critical International Theory and Constructivism', *European Journal of International Relations*, vol.4, no.3, pp.266-267.

material structures.¹¹³ Second, the ideational structures shape the identities and interests of agents, individuals or states, in a process of mutual constitution. Third, agents and structures are mutually constituted.¹¹⁴ It is through reciprocal interaction that agents create and instantiate ideational structures, which in turn define agents' identities and interests.¹¹⁵ Neither agents nor structures are reduced to the other and made 'ontologically primitive'.¹¹⁶

So, constructivists build on the ontological implications of *Verstehen*.¹¹⁷ All knowledge is continually constituted and reproduced by agents and their interactions. At the same time, knowledge determines what these agents consider to be real or unreal. According to Emanuel Adler, '[i]t follows from the ontological implications of *Verstehen* that intersubjective meanings are not simply the aggregation of the belief of agents who jointly experience and interpret the world'.¹¹⁸ Rather, intersubjective meanings exist as collective knowledge embedded in social routines and practices.¹¹⁹ Intersubjective meanings have thus structural attributes. These intersubjective structures are, however, not impregnable, although they are difficult to challenge.¹²⁰

¹¹³ Constructivists do not dismiss material structures. Yet, for constructivists material structures are given meaning only through the structure of collective knowledge in which they are embedded. Material capabilities as such explain very little. Whether ideational structures are more important or just as important as material ones depend on the various constructivist approaches.

¹¹⁴ Reus-Smit, Christian (2001), 'Constructivism', in, Burchill, Scott, Richard Devetak, Andrew Linklater (eds), *Theories of International Relations*, Palgrave Publishers, Hampshire, pp.215-219.

¹¹⁵ Adler, Emanuel (1997), 'Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics', *European Journal of International Relations*, vol.3, no.3, p.325

¹¹⁶ Jupille, Joseph, James A. Caporaso, Jeffrey T. Checkel (2003), 'Integrating Institutions: Rationalism, Constructivism, and the Study of the European Union', *Comparative Political Studies*, vo.36, no.1/2, p.14.

¹¹⁷ See Habermas, Jürgen Habermas (1992), *Nachmetaphysisches Denken*, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main.

¹¹⁸ Adler, Emanuel (1997), 'Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics', *European Journal of International Relations*, vol.3, no.3, p.327.

¹¹⁹ Ruggie, John G. (1998), 'What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge', *International Organization*, vol.52, no.4, p.869.

¹²⁰ Wendt, Alexander (1995), 'Constructing International Politics', *International Security*, vol.20, no.1, p.80.

In contrast to neo-realists or neo-liberal institutionalists, who define interests and identities as exogenous and given, constructivism argues that it is important to elaborate how agents develop these interests and identities. Identities are necessary in order to ensure a least some minimal level of predictability and order. They perform three necessary functions: they tell you and others who you are and they tell you who others are. Everyone can have multiple identities, for example a state can be sovereign and an imperial power.¹²¹ In telling you who you are, identities imply a particular set of interests, which in turn outline certain forms of action.¹²² 'The crucial observation [...] is that the producer of identity is not in control of what it ultimately means to others, the intersubjective structure is the final arbiter of meaning.'¹²³ This explains Alexander Wendt's often cited comment 'Anarchy is what states make of it'. Anarchic structure explains little by itself. What matters are the identities and interests that agents bring to interactions.¹²⁴

Nearly all constructivists would accept such a description of their enterprise. Beyond that, however, differences emerge. While the majority of constructivists would agree on the post-positivist ontology and the relevance of ontological over epistemological discussions as a logical consequence of the notion of intersubjective meanings, they do not agree on one epistemological position.¹²⁵ Given its epistemological position, the respective constructivist approach is either closer to rationalist approaches or reflective approaches. Thomas Christiansen compares this with a semi-circle over a hypotenuse, which has at one

¹²¹ Wendt, Alexander (1992), 'Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics', *International Organization*, vol.46, no.2, p.398.

¹²² Farrell, Theo (2002), 'Constructivist Security Studies: Portrait of a Research Program', *International Studies Review*, vol.4, no.1, p.50.

¹²³ Hopf, Ted (1998), 'The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory', *International Security*, vol.23, no.1, p.175.

¹²⁴ Wendt, Alexander (1992), 'Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics', *International Organization*, vol.46, no.2, pp.394-395.

¹²⁵ Wiener, Antje (2003), 'Constructivism: The limits of Bridging Gaps', *Journal of International Relations and Development*, vol.6, no.3, pp.256-257.

end a rationalist pole and at the other end a reflective one. The semi-circle emerges as each constructivist position is formed by the distance to each pole on the hypotenuse.¹²⁶

There are a number of other contentious issues among constructivists, such as whether discourse should take precedent over material factors.¹²⁷ According to Scott Burchill, there are three points of disagreement amongst constructivists: the relationship with rationalism, the appropriate methodology, and the contribution of constructivism to critical theory. First, whereas some constructivists believe that constructivism and rationalism could engage in a scholarly division of labour with constructivism focusing on interest formation and rationalism on interest satisfaction, other constructivists do not regard such a division of labour as sensible. Second, constructivism is divided between those, who assume that the study of ideas, norms and other meanings require an 'interpretive methodology', and those, who take the position of 'methodological conventionalism' claiming that their explanations do not depend upon any specialised separate 'interpretive methodology'. Third, there are constructivists, who are aware of the origin of constructivism in critical theory and remain in this tradition. Others have embraced constructivism simply as an explanatory or interpretive tool.¹²⁸

On the basis of these disagreements many authors have attempted to distinguish between the variants of constructivism. The author will follow Jeffrey T. Checkel's division of constructivist approaches¹²⁹ and will first divide constructivism into conventional and critical approaches. Then, conventional constructivism will be further broken down into

¹²⁶ Christiansen, Thomas, Knud Erik Jorgensen, Antje Wiener (1999), 'The Social construction of Europe', *Journal of European Public Policy*, vo.6, no.4, p.536.

¹²⁷ Adler, Emanuel (1997), 'Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics', *European Journal of International Relations*, vol.3, no.3, p.335.

¹²⁸ Reus-Smit, Christian (2001), 'Constructivism', in, Burchill, Scott, Richard Devetak, Andrew Linklater (eds), *Theories of International Relations*, Palgrave Publishers, Hampshire, pp.222-225.

¹²⁹ Checkel, Jeffrey T. (2003), 'Social Constructivism in Global and European Politics (A Review Essay)', *Arena Working Paper Series*, no.15, p.2, http://www.sv.uio.no/arena/english/research/publications/arenapublications/workingpapers/working-papers2003/wp03_15.pdf [11.09.2007].

systemic, unit-level and holistic constructivism. Conventional constructivists are largely positivists in their epistemological orientation and post-positivist in their ontological position. They advocate bridge building between different theoretical approaches, including rationalist approaches.¹³⁰ They do not reject science or causal explanations. As their methodological starting point, they adopt positivist conventions about sample characteristics and process-tracing case study. According to Ted Hopf,

[w]hereas conventional constructivism is aimed at the production of new knowledge and insights based on novel understanding, critical [constructivism] analyses social constraints and cultural understanding from a supreme human interest in enlightenment and emancipation'¹³¹

Indeed, critical constructivists primarily focus on the relationship between power and knowledge. Although conventional constructivists share the idea with critical constructivists that power is being exercised by a dominant actor in every social change, they are not necessarily interested in interrogating those relations. Conventional constructivists are more interested in exploring the role of norms and culture in constructing interests and identities of agents.¹³² Critical constructivists, on the other hand, seek to unmask power relations. In doing so, they are post-positivist in their epistemology.¹³³ Among the methods they use are discourse and textual analysis.

Conventional constructivism has assumed three principal forms: holistic constructivism, unit-level constructivism, and systemic constructivism. Holistic constructivists attempt to bridge the domestic and international realm. For example, Friedrich V. Kratchowil and John G. Ruggie, two of the leading proponents of holistic constructivism, treat the domestic and

¹³⁰ Idem.

¹³¹ Hopf, Ted (1998), 'The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory', *International Security*, vol.23, no.1, p.185.

¹³² Jupille, Joseph, James A. Caporaso, Jeffrey T. Checkel (2003), 'Integrating Institutions: Rationalism, Constructivism, and the Study of the European Union', *Comparative Political Studies*, vol.36, no.1/2, p.15.

¹³³ Farrell, Theo (2002), 'Constructivist Security Studies: Portrait of a Research Program', *International Studies Review*, vol.4, no.1, p.56.

the international as two faces of a single social and political order. They then consider the mutually constitutive relationship between this order and the state.¹³⁴ Unit-level constructivism, in contrast, focuses on the relationship between domestic social and legal norms and the identities and interests of states. Although this form of constructivism does not entirely disregard the role of international norms in conditioning the identities and interests of states, it emphasises the internal, domestic determinants of national policies. Systemic constructivism concentrates solely on interactions between unitary state actors, because notwithstanding the growing importance of non-state actors in world politics, states remain jealous of their sovereignty and so may resist collective identification more than other actors, which pose a harder case for theory.¹³⁵ Alexander Wendt is the principal, and some would even say the only exponent of systemic constructivism.

2.5 Conclusion

This chapter has dealt with a number of different International Relations as well as European integration theories. These theoretical approaches have been examined to show that only constructivism is well suited as the theoretical basis for the analyses of the selected case studies. The European Security and Defence Policy itself has changed since its establishment, and it is reasonable to assume that in the process member states' identities and subsequently their interests and behaviour have equally changed. As it will be shown in the following chapters of this thesis, there is strong evidence that ESDP has had a transformative impact. Participation in ESDP has affected its members in various respects – not only in terms of bargains over set interests, but also in terms of world-views, loyalties,

¹³⁴ Price, Richard, Christian Reus-Smit (1998), 'Dangerous Liaison? Critical International Theory and Constructivism', *European Journal of International Relations*, vol.4, no.3, p.269.

¹³⁵ Wendt, Alexander (1994), 'Collective Identity Formation and the International State', *American Political Science Review*, vol.88, no.2, p.385.

ideas and ideology.¹³⁶ While the aspect of change can be theorised within constructivist perspectives, it remains invisible in rationalist approaches.

Rationalist International Relations approaches, such as realism, neo-realism and neo-liberal institutionalism, as well as rationalist European integration approaches, such as intergovernmentalism and liberal intergovernmentalism, are insufficient and in many cases even misleading when it comes to detecting change.¹³⁷ Rationalist approaches treat identities and interests as exogenous to the process of policy-making. Identities and interests are fixed before the process begins. Hence, these approaches ignore the formation of interests and identities completely, and deduce interests from maxims about human nature (individual seeks power or wealth or both).¹³⁸ Although liberal intergovernmentalism endogenises interests to the extent that they are defined domestically, once this has happened they are fixed.¹³⁹ As a consequence, rationalist approaches are unable to account for changes in identities and interests resulting from institutional processes. Constructivism, on the other hand, maintains that identities and interests are constructed by social interaction. Interests and identities do not exist exogenously to a context of interaction between structures and agents.¹⁴⁰ 'The social construction of identity and interest is a process which takes place simultaneously at both national and European levels without necessarily being mutually supportive.'¹⁴¹

¹³⁶ Matlary, Janne Haaland (1997), 'Epilogue: new Bottles for New Wine', in, Jørgensen, Knud Erik (ed), *Reflective approaches to EU governance*, Macmillan Press, Hampshire, p.212.

¹³⁷ Wind, Marlene (1997), 'Rediscovering Institutions: A Reflectivist Critique of Rational Institutionalism', in, Jørgensen, Knud Erik (ed), *Reflective approaches to EU governance*, Macmillan Press, Hampshire, p.18.

¹³⁸ Wendt, Alexander (1994), 'Collective Identity Formation and the International State', *American Political Science Review*, vol.88, no.2, p.391.

¹³⁹ Diez, Thomas (2001), 'Europe as a Discursive Battleground. Discursive Analysis and European Integration Studies', *Cooperation and Conflict*, vo.36, no.1, p.8.

¹⁴⁰ Rosamond, Ben (2000), *Theories of European Integration*, Macmillan Press, Hampshire, p.122.

¹⁴¹ Jørgensen, Knud Erik (1997), 'PoCo: The Diplomatic Republic of Europe', in, Jørgensen, Knud Erik (ed), *Reflective approaches to EU governance*, Macmillan Press, Hampshire, p.175.

Rationalist approaches also view institutions, including the EU, as external to actors. Institutions only constrain or widen the scope of choices available to states so that they can realise their interests. States, which are the most significant actors for rationalists, are instrumentally rational, enacting given identities and interests and trying to realise their preferences.¹⁴² Constructivism holds against this view that actors including corporate actors such as national governments are deeply embedded in and affected by the institutions in which they act. 'Consequently, the EU as an emerging polity is expected not just to constrain the range of choices available to nation states, but the way in which they define their interests and their identities.'¹⁴³

Rationalist approaches, in particular liberal intergovernmentalism, overemphasise the importance of the major turning points - the big bargains - in the history of European integration, and therefore neglect the dynamics of daily decision-making. Constructivism insists that these turning points cannot be explained without considering the effects of previous decisions on the identities and interests of the member states' governments and societies.

Not only rationalist European integration approaches foreclose any idea of change, but also neofunctionalism¹⁴⁴ and comparative approaches. According to the author, neither rationalist approaches (implicitly assuming there is no fundamental change) nor comparative approaches (implicitly assuming that fundamental change has already occurred) will therefore move the examinations of the case studies forward.

¹⁴² Lewis, Jeffrey (2003), 'Institutional Environments and Everyday EU Decision Making. Rationalist or Constructivist?', *Comparative Political Studies*, vo.36, no.1/2, pp.102-106.

¹⁴³ Wiener, Antje, Thomas Diez (eds) (2004), *European Integration Theory*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, p.164.

¹⁴⁴ Wind, Marlene (1996), 'Europe Towards a Post-Hobbesian Order? A Constructivist Theory of European Integration', *EUI Working Paper*, vol.31, no.96, p.6, <http://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/1446> [11.09.2007].

Although reflective International Relations and European integration approaches, such as post-modernism and critical theory, can detect change, due to other reasons they are unsuited as a theoretical basis for this thesis. For reflectivists, theoretical approaches are primarily a tool designed to free one's imagination from the constraints imposed by historical reality.¹⁴⁵ Reflective approaches are not about explaining specific policy outcomes but about investigating the discourses that enable one to represent international politics in a certain way. Any attempt to integrate reflective approaches into a social scientific research programme would undermine their central aim.¹⁴⁶ Yet, given this notion, the propositions of reflective approaches can neither be verified nor falsified. The empirical value of such approaches is therefore low. As Knud E. Jørgensen remarks 'reflective scholars who wish to conduct theoretically informed, empirical research on European governance cannot allow themselves the luxury of a comfortable postmodernist position'.¹⁴⁷ In contrast, constructivism, in particular conventional constructivism, which combines a post-positivist ontology with an empiricist epistemology and a positivist methodology, attempts to engage in theory testing.¹⁴⁸

In conclusion, the author has shown why this thesis will be based on constructivism. For the analysis of the topic of the thesis, the advantages of constructivism outweigh those of other International Relations and European integration theories. Within constructivist perspectives, the author will focus on the holistic, conventional constructivist approach. The socialisation of national policy-makers in the area of ESDP requires an approach, which bridges the domestic and international realm.

¹⁴⁵ Moravcsik, Andrew (1999), 'The Future of European Integration Studies: Social Science or Social Theory?', *Millennium*, vol.28, no.2, p.389.

¹⁴⁶ Diez, Thomas (1999), 'Riding the AM-track through Europe; or, the Pitfalls of a Rationalist Journey through European Integration', *Millennium*, vol.28, no.2, p.365.

¹⁴⁷ Jørgensen, Knud Erik (1997), 'Introduction: Approaching European Governance', in, Jørgensen, Knud Erik (ed), *Reflective approaches to EU governance*, Macmillan Press, Hampshire, p.7.

¹⁴⁸ Wiener, Antje, Thomas Diez (eds) (2004), *European Integration Theory*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, p.174.

3. Research design

In the last chapter it was concluded that this thesis benefits most if it is grounded on a holistic conventional constructivist approach. This strand of constructivism relies on a post-positivist ontology, positivist epistemology and 'methodological conventionalism'¹⁴⁹. In this chapter, the focus will be on methodology.

Methodology is according to political scientist Emanuel Adler the 'major mission link' in many constructivist studies.¹⁵⁰ As acknowledged in chapter two there are different strands of constructivism. Some variants, in particular those who are close to reflective approaches, are first and foremost engaged in meta-theoretical studies and neglect research methodology and operationalisation as they do not see the development of testable hypotheses as an objective of constructivism.¹⁵¹ As a consequence, several scholars, such as Andrew Moravcsik – the leading proponent of liberal intergovernmentalism – claim that constructivism cannot be tested and has therefore no relevance to reality. Those claims are unfounded. A number of constructivists, like Jeffrey T. Checkel, have moved beyond meta-theoretic discussions towards a more empirically orientated constructivism. His approach on socialisation will be applied here in order to explore whether the EU has been able to socialise national policy-makers in the area of the European Security and Defence Policy.

3.1 Jeffrey T. Checkel's approach on socialisation

Jeffrey T. Checkel offers a problem-driven, constructivist, middle-range approach on socialisation, which theorises the process of social interaction through which socialisation

¹⁴⁹ See chapter two.

¹⁵⁰ Adler, Emanuel (2002), 'Constructivism and International Relations', in, Carlsnaes, Walter, Thomas Risse, Beth A. Simmons (eds), *Handbook of International Relations*, Sage, London, p.109.

¹⁵¹ Tonra, Ben (2003), 'Constructing the CFSP: The Utility of Cognitive Approach', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol.41, no.4, p.738.

occurs. One of the key words here is 'middle-range'. According to Checkel, grand theories are not suited to explain reality. Middle-range theories¹⁵² are constructed through the integration of empirical research with theory from which hypotheses can be derived.¹⁵³ They are driven by mechanisms, which can be defined as 'sets of stable elements that provide a plausible account of how social phenomena are linked to one another'.¹⁵⁴ Mechanisms generally enable more 'fine-grained' explanations.¹⁵⁵ In order to identify when a mechanism occurs, Checkel employs so called scope conditions, which detect certain points for when a mechanism is more likely to come about. Checkel argues that more attention to mechanisms and scope conditions would shift the focus of theoretical approaches from correlational arguments and 'as if' reasoning towards capturing and explaining the world as it really works.¹⁵⁶

Checkel bases his approach on a holistic conventional constructivism. The benefits of this variant of constructivism have already been demonstrated in the last chapter. Given Checkel's attempt to convert constructivist ideas into a problem-driven, empirical and middle-range approach, he however does not define ontology in a strict post-positivist sense but more pragmatically. As he explained, '[o]ur goal is to develop substantive middle-range frameworks,

¹⁵² Middle-range theories developed by sociologist Robert K. Merton are explanations of generic features of specific social phenomena. They are in contrast to empirical generalisation, which stresses on the collection of data without attention to theory, and grand theory, which seeks to construct a theoretical system covering all aspects of social life.

¹⁵³ Checkel, Jeffrey T. (1998), 'The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory', *World Politics*, vol.50, no.2, p.325.

¹⁵⁴ Trondal, Jarle (2001), 'Is there any social constructivist-institutionalist divide? Unpacking social mechanisms affecting representational roles among EU decision-makers', *Journal of European Public Policy*, vol.8, no.1, p.4.

¹⁵⁵ Checkel, Jeffrey T. (2007), 'International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and Framework', in, Checkel, Jeffrey T. (ed), *International Institutions and Socialization in Europe*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p.9.

¹⁵⁶ Checkel, Jeffrey T. (2006), 'Tracing causal mechanisms', *International Studies Review*, vol.8, no.2, p.366.

and not to engage in argument at the level of social theory'.¹⁵⁷ Theoretical bridge building thus becomes possible. To date, there has been a tendency to understand strategic-choice effects and socialisation effects as either/or. Checkel challenges this development. While relying on constructivism he opens his approach to other diverse analytic traditions, including rationalism. One author in Checkel's 2007 volume *International Institution and Socialization in Europe* – the work on which this thesis predominately relies - indeed based the socialisation approach on rationalism. As it will be later shown, one of the three mechanisms, Checkel's approach is centred around, is strategic calculation. This might raise controversy as strategic calculation invokes 'images of self-interest perceived as alien to socialization'.¹⁵⁸ However, Checkel defends the inclusion of strategic calculation by pointing out that what starts as calculated behavioural adaptation could end as sustained compliance resembling preference change.

Checkel's approach does not examine socialisation from a macro-level perspective or exclusively in the framework of persuasion, as constructivists usually tend to do when analysing socialisation,¹⁵⁹ but instead offers a micro-level perspective on socialisation. He specifies three socialisation mechanisms as intervening variables linking institutions (input) and socialisation outcome (output). For each mechanism, Checkel outlines a number of scope conditions, which can be empirically tested. Checkel's approach builds on the work of two

¹⁵⁷ Checkel, Jeffrey T. (2007), 'International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and Framework', in, Checkel, Jeffrey T. (ed), *International Institutions and Socialization in Europe*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p.18.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid, p.6.

¹⁵⁹ Johnston, Alastair Iain (2001), 'Treating International Institutions as Social Environments', *International Studies Quarterly*, vol.45, no.4, p.489.

different theorist groups, which regard institutions¹⁶⁰ either as promoter of socialisation or sites of socialisation. Viewing institutions as socialisation promoter, this IR constructivist group elaborates on the argument of the English school that international society can have socialising effects and attempts to systematically explain how and when these effects occur. The other group – Europeanists¹⁶¹ and IR constructivists – which claims that institutions can be sites of socialisation, analyses how and why in isolated environments, without any social pressure, state elites adopt new roles. Checkel believes that institutions can be both promoters of socialisation using persuasion tactics or ‘carrots and sticks’ in order to socialise agents and sites of socialisation providing a social environment that induces the enactment of certain roles.¹⁶²

Those who become socialised are the agents and those who socialise are the structure /institutions. With its sole focus on the socialising structure and its effects on agents, Checkel’s approach is to some extent one-sided. The fundamental insight of constructivism’s structure-agency debate is that structure and agents are mutually constituted.¹⁶³ A simultaneous study of the mutual constitution of institutions and agents would therefore be necessary. Yet given their positivist epistemological position, conventional constructivist scholars, like Checkel, have to start with something – either with the effect of structure or the effect of agency. It is

¹⁶⁰ According to James March and Johan Olsen, ‘institutions can be viewed as a relatively stable collection of practices and rules defining appropriate behaviour for specific groups of agents in specific situations’.

March, James G., Johan P. Olsen (1998), ‘The institutional dynamics of international political order’, *International Organization*, vol.52, no.4, p.948.

¹⁶¹ See for example: Olsen, Johan P. (2003), ‘The Many Faces of Europeanization’, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol.40, no.5, pp.921-952, or Caporaso, James, Maria Green Cowles, Thomas Risse (eds) (2002), *Transforming Europe: Europeanization and Domestic Change*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca.

¹⁶² Checkel, Jeffrey T. (2007), ‘International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and Framework’, in, Checkel, Jeffrey T. (ed), *International Institutions and Socialization in Europe*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp.8-14.

¹⁶³ Risse, Thomas (2000), ‘Let’s argue: Communicative Action in World Politics’, *International Organization*, vol.54, no.1, pp.6-10.

therefore almost impossible for them to analyse the mutual constitution of structure and agency. Checkel tries to rectify the problem by 'better modelling processes of social interaction'.¹⁶⁴ Also, he is careful not to overemphasise the role of social structures in order to show that socialising impact on agents can vary.¹⁶⁵

This thesis will adopt Checkel's approach on socialisation process and apply it to the thesis' research question: Has the EU been able to socialise national policy-makers in the area of the European Security and Defence Policy? In doing so, the author will predominantly rely on Checkel's approach as described in the 2007 volume *International Institution and Socialization in Europe* edited by Jeffrey T. Checkel, although other articles written by Checkel and other authors, which clarify and/or strengthen Checkel's approach, will also be used for this thesis. Some parts of Checkel's approach have been changed and revised by the author as it has been the author's opinion that the changes and revisions would improve the approach. All alterations will be clearly indicated.

3.2 Socialisation

There are different definitions of socialisation. This thesis will employ a definition of socialisation according to sociologists Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann: Socialisation is 'the comprehensive and consistent induction of an individual into the objective world of a society or a sector of it'.¹⁶⁶ Although this definition is different to the one Checkel has chosen

¹⁶⁴ Checkel, Jeffrey T. (2001), 'Why comply? Social learning and European Identity Change', *International Organization*, vol.55, no.3, p.597.

¹⁶⁵ Checkel, Jeffrey T. (1999), 'Norms, Institutions and National Identity in Contemporary Europe', *International Studies Quarterly*, vol.43, no.1, pp.84-85.

¹⁶⁶ Berger, Peter L., Thomas Luckmann (1967), *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge*, Anchor Books, Garden City, p.150.

for his approach, the meaning is largely the same. In their book *The Social Construction of Reality*, Berger and Luckmann distinguish between primary and secondary socialisation.

Primary socialisation is the first socialisation an individual undergoes in childhood, through which he becomes a member of society. Secondary socialisation is any subsequent process that inducts an already socialised individual into new sectors of the objective world of his society.¹⁶⁷

Consequently, secondary socialisation always has to deal with an already formed self and already internalised world, which has a tendency to persist.

This thesis will focus on secondary socialisation. My unit of analysis will not be the state, but individual national policy-makers. States as unitary actors do not participate in institutions – in this thesis the EU – rather state agents do.¹⁶⁸ In this respect, this thesis will differ from Checkel, whose agents include policy-makers as well as states.

The author will analyse whether institutions – either as promoters or as sites of socialisation – have the ability to socialise agents with the help of norms. A norm can be defined as a ‘standard of appropriate behaviour’.¹⁶⁹ For rationalists, norms serve a regulative function limiting the choices and behaviours of self-interested agents, which operate according to a logic of consequence. For constructivists, the meaning of norms goes beyond this definition. In their view, norms can also constitute agents’ identities and their interests.¹⁷⁰ Applying the constructivist concept of norms to this thesis, the EU has socialised national policy-makers in the area of ESDP if it induced them into the norms of ESDP. The outcome of the socialisation

¹⁶⁷ Ibid, pp.150-151.

¹⁶⁸ Christiansen, Thomas, Gerda Falkner, Knud Erik Jorgensen (2002), ‘Theorizing EU Treaty Reform: Beyond Diplomacy and Bargaining’, *Journal of European Public Policy*, vol.9, no.1, pp.13-14.

¹⁶⁹ Finnemore, Martha, Kathryn Sikkink (1998), ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Change’, *International Organization*, vol.52, no.4, p.891.

¹⁷⁰ Checkel, Jeffrey T. (1997), ‘International Norms and Domestic Politics: Bridging the Rationalist-Constructivist Divide’, *European Journal of International Relations*, vol.3, no.4, p.473.

March, James G., Johan P. Olsen (1999), ‘The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders’, in, Katzenstein, Peter J, Robert O. Keohane, Stephen D. Krasner, *Exploration and Contestation in the Study of World Politics*, MIT Press, Cambridge, p.320.

process is, according to Checkel, 'compliance based on the internalization of these new norms'. The compliance must last and must be achieved without material incentives and/or sanction. Hence, agents must have switched from following a logic of consequence to a logic of appropriateness.¹⁷¹ The degree of internalisation of institution norms may vary.¹⁷² According to Checkel's approach, there are two different internalisation degrees. Agents may behave appropriately by 'acquiring the knowledge [through institution] that enables them to act in accordance with expectations irrespective of whether they like it or agree with it'.¹⁷³ In this case, agents replace rational calculating behaviour with a form of role playing. Checkel calls this type of behaviour Type 1 internalisation/socialisation. Type 2 internalisation/socialisation means that agents comply with institution norms because they believe it is the right thing to do. Both types of internalisation/socialisation represent a shift away from a logic of consequence and both require a logic of appropriateness. However, it is important to distinguish between the two types. Only if Type 2 occurs, norms are completely internalised and agents socialised. They have adopted the interests and the identity of the institution.¹⁷⁴ According to Alastair Johnston there are four dimensions of identity, which can change during socialisation.

identities are composed of four somewhat overlapping components or dimensions: normative or constitutive beliefs and practices, beliefs about the social purposes of the

¹⁷¹ Checkel, Jeffrey T. (2007), 'International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and Framework', in, Checkel, Jeffrey T. (ed), *International Institutions and Socialization in Europe*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p.6.

¹⁷² Johnston, Alastair Iain (2001), 'Treating International Institutions as Social Environments', *International Studies Quarterly*, vol.45, no.4, p.495.

¹⁷³ Checkel, Jeffrey T. (2007), 'International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and Framework', in, Checkel, Jeffrey T. (ed), *International Institutions and Socialization in Europe*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p.6.

¹⁷⁴ Checkel, Jeffrey T. (2007), 'International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and Framework', in, Checkel, Jeffrey T. (ed), *International Institutions and Socialization in Europe*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p.6.

group, beliefs about the group's relationship to other groups and cognitive processes or world views.¹⁷⁵

If the switch from a logic of consequence to one of appropriateness does not occur, there can normally be no socialisation and internalisation. Agents do not internalise institution norms but only adapt their behaviour to these norms provided that they benefit the agents' interests.

However, [...] it is possible that what starts as behavioural adaptation may – because of various cognitive and institutional lock-in effects – later be followed by sustained compliance that is strongly suggestive of internalisation and preference change.¹⁷⁶

3.3 Mechanisms

In order to analyse how norms are transmitted to agents and internalised by them, mechanisms come into play. They explain how institutions achieve that agents internalise their norms.

Checkel deduces the mechanisms from different modes of rationality. He suggests three modes that may 'contribute to socialization outcomes: instrumental, bounded and communicative'.¹⁷⁷ These modes of social action, of course, represent ideal types that do not have to occur in pure form.¹⁷⁸ Notwithstanding, three mechanisms can be derived from these modes of rationality: strategic calculation, role playing and normative persuasion.¹⁷⁹

¹⁷⁵ Johnston, Alastair Iain (2007), 'Conclusion and Extension: Toward Mid-Range Theorizing and Beyond Europe', in, Checkel, Jeffrey T. (ed), *International Institutions and Socialization in Europe*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p.229.

¹⁷⁶ Checkel, Jeffrey T. (2007), 'International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and Framework', in, Checkel, Jeffrey T. (ed), *International Institutions and Socialization in Europe*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p.10.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid, p.6,

¹⁷⁸ Risse, Thomas (2000), 'Let's argue: Communicative Action in World Politics', *International Organization*, vol.54. no.1, p.18.

¹⁷⁹ Checkel, Jeffrey T. (2004), 'Social Mechanisms and the Quality of Cooperation: Are Europe and the EU really all that different?', *Arena Working Paper Series*, no.8, pp.2-3, http://www.arena.uio.no/publications/working-papers2004/papers/04_08.xml [15.08.2009].

3.3.1 Strategic calculation

There is the possibility that agents comply with norms because of strategic calculation. Faced with the proper incentive (tangible (material or political) or intangible (social or symbolic))¹⁸⁰ or the threat of sanction, agents will engage in cost/benefit calculations that lead them to follow institution norms. This mechanism differs from the other two in that agents calculate the consequences of norm compliance rather than reflect on its appropriateness; they engage in bargaining and rhetoric action rather than consensus-oriented arguing; and they adapt their behaviour rather than change their views, interests or identities. Still, according to Frank Schimmelfennig, one of the authors who published an article in Checkel's volume, there are two possibilities how the switch from a logic of consequences to a logic of appropriateness may still happen despite strategic calculation: 'routinization and rationalization'.

In the first case, the socializees come to follow the community norms and rules habitually, without being persuaded and changing their desires; in the second, they adapt their desires to the reinforced behavior in order to reduce cognitive dissonance. In both cases, specific awards and punishments are not necessary anymore to elicit norm-conforming behavior, although a stable "shadow of reinforcement" probably helps to sustain the belief that nothing is to be gained by reverting to a calculation of the costs and benefits of compliance.¹⁸¹

It would take a long time until such a switch to a logic of appropriateness would happen.

Some scholars suggest that there is another socialisation mechanism: social influence.

According to them, social influence implies that agents are induced to act according to norms through the distribution of social rewards/incentives and punishments/threats. The most important process of social influence is the desire to maximise status, honour, prestige and the

¹⁸⁰ The use of incentives to alter agents' behaviour is called conditionality.

Checkel, Jeffrey T. (2000), 'Compliance and Conditionality', *Arena Working Paper Series*, no.18, pp.1-2, http://www.arena.uio.no/publications/working-papers2000/papers/wp00_18.htm [15.08.2009].

¹⁸¹ Schimmelfennig, Frank (2007), 'Strategic Calculation and International Socialization: Membership Incentives, Party Constellations, and Sustained Compliance in Central and Eastern Europe', in, Checkel, Jeffrey T. (ed), *International Institutions and Socialisation in Europe*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p.34.

desire to avoid loss of status, shaming or humiliation and other social sanctions.¹⁸² The author, however, agrees with Checkel that social influence is part of the strategic calculation mechanism.

3.3.2 Role playing

Agents are 'boundedly rational'. According to Checkel, they can neither

attend to everything simultaneously [nor] [...] calculate carefully the costs and benefits of alternative courses of action; attention is a scarce resource. Organizational or group environments provide simplifying shortcuts, cues and buffers that can lead to the enactment of particular role conceptions – role playing - among [...] [agents].¹⁸³

Roles include expectations about what constitutes appropriate behaviour given the agents' position.¹⁸⁴ Thus, agents take on certain roles in line with the norms of an institution because they appear appropriate in the institution's environment. Also, the expectations of other agents matter.¹⁸⁵ There is the possibility that different organisational settings can induce agents to adopt diverging roles which can lead to tension between these role.¹⁸⁶

Agents comply with norms in a non-reflective manner. As 'non-calculative behavioural adaptation' is involved, the shift from a logic of consequences towards a logic of

¹⁸² Johnston, Alastair Iain (2001), 'Treating International Institutions as Social Environments', *International Studies Quarterly*, vol.45, no.4, pp.499-500.

¹⁸³ Checkel, Jeffrey T. (2007), 'International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and Framework', in, Checkel, Jeffrey T. (ed), *International Institutions and Socialization in Europe*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p.11.

¹⁸⁴ Beyers, Jan (2007), 'Multiple Embeddedness and Socialization in Europe: The Case of Council Officials', in, Checkel, Jeffrey T. (ed), *International Institutions and Socialization in Europe*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp.101-102.

¹⁸⁵ Christiansen, Thomas, Gerda Falkner, Knud Erik Jorgensen (2002), 'Theorizing EU Treaty Reform: Beyond Diplomacy and Bargaining', *Journal of European Public Policy*, vol.9, no.1, pp.18-19.

¹⁸⁶ Lewis, Jeffrey (2003), 'Institutional Environments and Everyday EU Decision-Making. Rationalist or Constructivist?', *Comparative Political Studies*, vol.36, no.1-2, p.109.

appropriateness has begun, but agents do not have reflectively and completely internalised norms. The socialisation outcome is therefore Type I internalisation.¹⁸⁷

3.3.3 Normative persuasion

Normative persuasion is a social process of communication, which alters 'the most basic properties of agents' without any sign of coercion.¹⁸⁸ It entails convincing someone through argument and debate.¹⁸⁹ When normative persuasion takes place, agents actively and reflectively internalise new norms. This also implies that they adopt the interests and the identity of the persuader. The switch from a logic of consequence to one of appropriateness is complete and the result is Type II internalisation.

Normative persuasion draws from German philosopher Jürgen Habermas' theory of communication action. Proponents of Habermas' theory argue that norms are internalised following a process of deliberation in which different viewpoints are communicated and scrutinised.¹⁹⁰ Participants who enter such a process are open to being persuaded by the better argument.¹⁹¹ However, in this respect normative persuasion differs from Habermas' communication theory. Normative persuasion does not believe in the force of the better argument. Furthermore, it is unclear as to what constitutes a convincing argument.¹⁹²

¹⁸⁷ Checkel, Jeffrey T. (2007), 'International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and Framework', in, Checkel, Jeffrey T. (ed), *International Institutions and Socialization in Europe*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p.11.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid, p.13.

¹⁸⁹ Checkel, Jeffrey T. (2003), "'Going native" in Europe? Theorizing Social Interaction European Institutions', *Comparative Political Studies*, vol.36, no.1/2, p.212.

¹⁹⁰ Sijssen, Helene (2003), 'Understanding the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Analytical Building Blocks', in, Knodt, Michèle, Sebastiaan Princen (eds.), *Understanding the European Union's External Relations*, Routledge, New York, p.41.

¹⁹¹ Deitelhoff, Nicole, Harald Müller (2005), 'Theoretical paradise – empirically lost? Arguing with Habermas', *Review of International Studies*, vol.31, no.1, p.168.

¹⁹² Johnston, Alastair Iain (2001), 'Treating International Institutions as Social Environments', *International Studies Quarterly*, vol.45, no.4, pp.493-494.

Therefore, normative persuasion places the emphasis on persuasion and not on the better argument.¹⁹³

3.4 Scope conditions

For each of the three mechanisms Jeffrey T. Checkel outlines a number of scope conditions for when it is more likely that the particular mechanism occurs that can lead to Type 1 or Type 2 internalisation/socialisation or to no internalisation/socialisation at all. Although scope conditions are central to mechanisms and middle-range theories, only a few scholars have so far attempted to develop them.¹⁹⁴ In his approach, Checkel identifies the conditions through an interplay between deduction and induction.¹⁹⁵

3.4.1 Strategic calculation

According to Checkel and Frank Schimmelpfennig, behavioural adaptation – and perhaps eventually internalisation - in line with community norms is more likely to occur when the following conditions arise:

[1]) [...] [Agents] expect the promised rewards to be greater than the costs of compliance.¹⁹⁶

[2]) [...] [Agents expect] the costs of external punishment to be higher [...] than the

¹⁹³ Checkel, Jeffrey T. (2001), 'Taking Deliberation Seriously', *Arena Working Paper Series*, no.14, pp.5-6, http://www.arena.uio.no/publications/working-papers2001/papers/wp01_14.htm [15.08.2009].

¹⁹⁴ Trondal, Jarle (2001), 'Is there any social constructivist-institutionalist divide? Unpacking social mechanisms affecting representational roles among EU decision-makers', *Journal of European Public Policy*, vol.8, no.1, p.9.

¹⁹⁵ Jupille, Joseph, James Caporaso, Jeffrey T. Checkel T. (2003), 'Integrating Institutions: Rationalism, Constructivism, and the Study of the European Union', *Comparative Political Studies*, vol.36, no.1-2, pp.16-17.

¹⁹⁶ Checkel, Jeffrey T. (2007), 'International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and Framework', in, Checkel, Jeffrey T. (ed), *International Institutions and Socialization in Europe*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p.10.

costs of adaptation.¹⁹⁷

To 1) The importance of political conditionality is emphasised in this condition. 'Defined as the use of incentives to bring about a desired change in the behaviour of a targeted agent, conditionality is the quintessential incentives-based policy.'¹⁹⁸ Incentives induce agents to support institution norms through utility maximisation. Utility maximisation prevails when norms are perceived to have material or social consequences that are large enough to matter. To 2) The threat of punishment will lead to agents' pro-norm behaviour if the costs of punishment are higher for the agents than the costs of compliance.

Frank Schimmelfennig distinguishes these two conditions along another dimension: institutions, here the EU, can make their promise of rewards or threat of punishments directly to the state ('intergovernmental reinforcement') or to societal and corporate groups, which then would pressure their government to change policy in line with the institutions' norms ('transnational reinforcement'). However, as this thesis focuses on governmental policy-makers, which fall into the category of intergovernmental reinforcement, this distinction is not relevant here.¹⁹⁹

¹⁹⁷ Schimmelfennig, Frank (2007), 'Strategic Calculation and International Socialization: Membership Incentives, Party Constellations, and Sustained Compliance in Central and Eastern Europe', in, Checkel, Jeffrey T. (ed), *International Institutions and Socialisation in Europe*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p.35.

¹⁹⁸ Checkel, Jeffrey T. (2007), 'International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and Framework', in, Checkel, Jeffrey T. (ed), *International Institutions and Socialization in Europe*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p.10.

¹⁹⁹ Schimmelfennig, Frank (2007), 'Strategic Calculation and International Socialization: Membership Incentives, Party Constellations, and Sustained Compliance in Central and Eastern Europe', in, Checkel, Jeffrey T. (ed), *International Institutions and Socialisation in Europe*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp.34-35.

3.4.2 Role playing

Role playing is more likely to happen under the following conditions:

- [1]) Agents are in settings, where contact is long and sustained and it has some significant duration.
- [2]) Agents are in settings where the contact is intense.
- [3]) Those agents with extensive previous professional experiences in regional or international policy-making settings are more likely to internalize supranational role conceptions.
- [4]) [...] Agents with extensive domestic policy networks who are briefly “parachuted” into regional/international settings will be less likely to internalize new role conceptions.²⁰⁰

To 1 and 2) Organisational settings do not induce agents to adopt new roles the first time they interact in these settings. Some experiences and time are usually needed before new roles are activated. The internalisation of new roles consistent with institution norms is generally more likely when agents meet regularly in the environment of the institution and devote time and energy to participate.²⁰¹ However, individuals entering such a setting are in no sense ‘free agents’; they are embedded in multiple domestic and international contexts.²⁰² Much depends on the previous affiliation of agents and what happened before agents arrive at the socialisation site. This relates to conditions 3 and 4) Checkel argues that previous professional experiences in regional or international policy-making settings facilitate the adoption of roles

²⁰⁰ Checkel, Jeffrey T. (2007), ‘International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and Framework’, in, Checkel, Jeffrey T. (ed), *International Institutions and Socialization in Europe*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p.12.

²⁰¹ Trondal, Jarle (2001), ‘Is there any social constructivist-institutionalist divide? Unpacking social mechanisms affecting representational roles among EU decision-makers’, *Journal of European Public Policy*, vol.8, no.1, pp.7-10.

²⁰² Checkel, Jeffrey T. (2004), ‘Social Mechanisms and the Quality of Cooperation: Are Europe and the EU really all that different?’, *Arena Working Paper Series*, no.8, pp.5-6, http://www.arena.uio.no/publications/working-papers2004/papers/04_08.xml [15.08.2009].

in line with the norms of an institution.²⁰³ In contrast, if agents have strong domestic ties, it will be less likely that the institution's environment will trigger the enactment of such roles.

3.4.3 Normative persuasion

According to Checkel and other authors in *International Institution and Socialization in Europe*, normative persuasion is more likely to happen when the following conditions hold:

- [1]) The target of socialization is in a novel and uncertain environment and thus cognitively motivated to analyze new information.
- [2]) The target has few prior, ingrained beliefs that are inconsistent with the socializing agency's message.
- [3]) The socializing agency/individual is an authoritative member of the ingroup to which the target belongs or wants to belong.
- [4]) The socializing agency/individual does not lecture or demand but, instead, acts out principles of serious deliberative argument.
- [5]) The agency/target interaction occurs in less politicized and more insulated, in-camera settings.²⁰⁴

To 1) Newcomers are more open to efforts to persuasion than experienced members. While they go through a period of social learning they can be easily persuaded to internalise new norms which could help them to operate in the unfamiliar environment. To 2) If an agent has only a few relevant prior beliefs, according to psychologist research findings, new experiences stick best. However, it is important that these few beliefs do not conflict with the socialising message – the norm. Also, the background and previous thinking of an agent strongly affect his/her openness to persuasion.²⁰⁵ Norms are more persuasive and more likely to be internalised when 'they can be linked to other attitudes and schema in a complex network of

²⁰³ Beyers, Jan (2007), 'Multiple Embeddedness and Socialization in Europe: The Case of Council Officials', in, Checkel, Jeffrey T. (ed), *International Institutions and Socialization in Europe*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p.101.

²⁰⁴ Checkel, Jeffrey T. (2007), 'International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and Framework', in, Checkel, Jeffrey T. (ed), *International Institutions and Socialization in Europe*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp.13-14.

²⁰⁵ Checkel, Jeffrey T. (2004), 'Social Mechanisms and the Quality of Cooperation: Are Europe and the EU really all that different?', *Arena Working Paper Series*, no.8, pp.14-15, http://www.arena.uio.no/publications/working-papers2004/papers/04_08.xml [15.08.2009].

causal connections and cognitive cues'.²⁰⁶ They need to resonate with an agent's (nationally constructed) identities.²⁰⁷ Habermas has called this 'overlapping of lifeworlds'.²⁰⁸ To 3 and 4) An agent can be susceptible to persuasion if he/she wants to belong to the persuader – here the EU. Also, norms from sources that are liked are more convincing than from sources that are disliked. If the persuadee believes the persuader to be knowledgeable about an issue and that his/her intentions are trustworthy, he/she is more open to persuasion.²⁰⁹ To 5) Normative persuasion appears to work best in institutions with exclusive membership, where the emphasis is on small, knowledgeable and private meetings.

3.5 Analytical goal

The analytical goal of this thesis is to analyse the thesis' research question 'Has the EU been able to socialise national policy-makers in the area of the European Security and Defence Policy?' by applying Jeffrey T. Checkel's approach on socialisation to it.

To date, the analysis of ESDP has been dominated by empirical case studies of decision-making, policy-making and regional or issue-based events. Such accounts are only infrequently grounded in theoretical frameworks and even then they are overwhelmingly dominated by rationalist accounts due to the intergovernmental character of ESDP. Traditional rationalist models of ESDP, however, tend to dismiss or at least undervalue both the significance and the

²⁰⁶ Risse, Thomas (2002), 'A European Identity? Europeanization and the Evolution of Nation-State Identities', in, Caporaso, James, Maria Green Cowles, Thomas Risse (eds), *Transforming Europe: Europeanization and Domestic Change*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, p.202.

²⁰⁷ Idem.

²⁰⁸ Deitelhoff, Nicole, Harald Müller (2005), 'Theoretical paradise – empirically lost? Arguing with Habermas', *Review of International Studies*, vol.31, no.1, p.172.

²⁰⁹ Johnston, Alastair Iain (2001), 'Treating International Institutions as Social Environments', *International Studies Quarterly*, vol.45, no.4, pp.496-497.

impact of ESDP.²¹⁰ There have been a number of neofunctionalist analyses of ESDP, but they prove to be unsatisfactory as well as they portray ESDP as the outcome of an inevitable spill-over process driven by supranational actors. Hence by applying Checkel's socialisation approach to policy-makers' behaviour in ESDP, this thesis fills a gap in the few existing theoretical accounts of ESDP.

Although before ESDP there had already been attempts to organise greater EU cooperation on defence, but mainly due to the sensitivity of the issue of European security and defence cooperation, the EU member states had never been able to agree on realising such cooperation. The United Kingdom had been one of the staunchest opponents of a common European security and defence policy. This changed in December 1998 when at a Franco-British summit in Saint Malo, the two countries released a Joint Declaration, in which for the first time it was stressed that the EU must have 'the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces'. Following the establishment of the European Security and Defence Policy, France, the UK and Germany began to drive the process of ESDP. Many major ESDP developments, such as mutual agreement clause and battlegroups, were first proposed by France, Germany and the UK.

The fact that these three countries have mainly influenced the direction of ESDP does, on the one hand, not surprise. They are the three biggest member states as well as the most militarily powerful countries of the Union. On the other hand, the UK being strongly Atlanticist had for decades opposed a European defence cooperation for fear of harming NATO and angering the US. Germany had also not been enthusiastic about establishing a common European defence policy given its reluctance to use forces and deploy troops overseas. In addition, it had been

²¹⁰ Tonra, Ben (2003), 'Constructing the CFSP: The Utility of Cognitive Approach', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol.41, no.4, p.749.

strongly anchored within NATO and during the Cold War had resisted attempts by French politicians to organise European defence cooperation outside NATO.

This thesis argues that Germany and the UK pursued different opportunistic interests when they first started to support the establishment of a European security and defence policy. Britain, for example, hoped that ESDP's creation would lead to a more equal Europe-US burden sharing and therefore would reinforce and perpetuate the Atlantic Alliance. Germany disillusioned with NATO's reform agenda in the 1990s regarded its support for ESDP as the final step towards normalisation of its foreign and defence policy. However, these opportunistic reasons do not account for both countries' behaviour once ESDP was founded. They went beyond mere support and actively drove ESDP forward.

France, in contrast, had stressed for a long time the need for Europe to be able to act autonomously in military operations. Since French President, Charles de Gaulle, took French officers out of NATO commands in 1966, France sought to build a military counterweight to NATO and the US. Realising that it was too weak on its own, it tried to convince its European allies to sign up to a common defence project. Consequently, it can be concluded that France did not change its behaviour to a great extent. Considering Britain and Germany, however, one has to wonder what motivated them to significantly change their behaviour from opposing a common European defence policy towards driving it forward.

The hypothesised answer of the author is socialisation: Following the creation of the European Security and Defence Policy and Germany's and the UK's participation in it, they became socialised in ESDP. Successful socialisation has resulted in the complete induction of ESDP norms and the adoption of EU's interests and identity in the area of ESDP by German and British policy-makers. ESDP norms will be understood abstractly as the preparedness to establish ESDP as a supranational, fully-fledged security and defence organisation.

This thesis will concentrate on policy-makers from Germany and the UK. Policy-makers from the remaining 25 EU member states will not be examined. This is firstly because the thesis' limited space does not allow discussing the socialisation processes of policy-makers from 27 member states. More importantly, however, due to a number of reasons the other EU states were not as involved in the development of ESDP as Germany, Britain and France were. In addition, as highlighted above, even after a brief examination of facts it becomes obvious that German and British policy-makers notably changed their attitude towards a European security and defence policy over the years. Something happened and the author aims to assess whether this was socialisation.

Also, most analyses of ESDP tend to focus on France and the UK. Germany's role is either ignored or 'reduced to a mediator between France and the UK, guided by the primary aim of furthering European integration as such'.²¹¹ However, Britain and Germany constitute two interesting, different case studies. They represent opposite sides in the EU. On the one hand, Germany is arguably the most pro-European country and judging from speeches by its current Chancellor, Angela Merkel, would support the complete supranationalisation of its security and defence policy and the creation of a European army. On the other hand, the UK is a very eurosceptic country and is traditionally reluctant to agree on the supranationalisation of any policy field let alone of a sensitive area, like defence. If policy-makers from so different countries were socialised in the ESDP this would enable the refinement of the scope conditions for normative persuasion and would allow to further developing Checkel's approach.

The timeframe of the case studies on British and German policy-makers will embrace the period from the Saint Malo meeting (3 and 4 December 1998) to the Lisbon European Council

²¹¹ Berenskoetter, Felix, Bastian Giegerich (2010), 'From NATO to ESDP: A Social Constructivist analysis of German strategic adjustment after the end of the Cold War', *Security Studies*, vol.19, no.3, p.412.

summit when an agreement on the Lisbon Treaty was reached (18-19 October 2007). This phase is chosen because it covers the beginning of the ESDP process and the important changes happening in ESDP over the years. The Lisbon Treaty itself contains a number of new instruments for ESDP, such as permanent structured cooperation. Furthermore, at least one change in government occurred in each of the two countries during the chosen timeframe so that the author is able to determine whether the new governments altered their stance on ESDP.

Socialisation of German and British policy-makers in ESDP will be analysed by applying Jeffrey T. Checkel's problem-driven constructivist middle-range socialisation approach. According to Checkel, socialisation in ESDP might either be promoted by the EU using persuasion or rewards and punishment or ESDP itself might provide a social environment that induces role playing socialisation. Consequently, two different notions of triggers of socialisation are identified. One is the notion of ESDP as a social environment, whose mere membership evokes role playing of policy-makers. The other focuses on different activities that are carried out by the EU vis-à-vis policy-makers in ESDP. Relating to this, Checkel provides three socialisation mechanisms – normative persuasion, role playing and strategic calculation – which link the EU/ESDP norms and policy-makers' socialisation/internalisation. Depending on the mechanism at work, socialisation is measured differently. For strategic calculation, the 'socialisation' outcome would be behavioural adaptation with ESDP norms although following strategic calculation there could be the switch from a logic of consequences to a logic of appropriateness and internalisation of ESDP norms could happen. If role playing took place, the dependent variable would be the adoption of new roles consistent with ESDP norms. Role playing would be an indicator of Typ1 internalisation. For normative persuasion, the outcome would be the active and reflective internalisation of ESDP norms accompanied by policy-

makers' adoption of the EU's interests and identity in the area of ESDP. These results would indicate Type II internalisation.²¹²

For the two chosen case studies, this means that only if there is proof of normative persuasion, it can be concluded that German and British policy-makers were socialised by the EU in the area of the European Security and Defence Policy. The EU as socialiser must have convinced German and British policy-makers through argument and debate in a social process of communication and thus must have promoted the complete internalisation of ESDP norms by the policy-makers. This process must have affected the interests and identities of German and British policy-makers.

The change of identity does not necessarily imply that policy-makers identified with the EU/ESDP first and their nation state second. But it could also mean that there was no fundamental conflict between identification with the EU/ESDP and nation state. As the author decided to focus on individual policy-makers, the question is whether the changed identity and the internalisation of ESDP norms by the individual did translate into pro-norm behavioural changes in states.²¹³ The author will attempt in her analyses to show that changes in individual identity preceded later shifts in policy that are consistent with them. As this thesis focuses on the German and British heads of state and government, defence ministers, foreign ministers and occasionally states secretaries – in general the most powerful politicians of a country – it will be easier to show that changes in their identities preceded shifts in policy. However, it is

²¹² Checkel, Jeffrey T. (2007), 'International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and Framework', in, Checkel, Jeffrey T. (ed), *International Institutions and Socialization in Europe*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p.14.

²¹³ Checkel, Jeffrey T., Michael Zürn (2007), 'Getting Socialized to Build Bridges: Constructivism and Rationalism, Europe and the Nation-State', in, Checkel, Jeffrey T. (ed), *International Institutions and Socialization in Europe*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p.250.

not enough to establish a correlation between these two steps. The author will attempt to identify causality.

Indicators for the internalisation of ESDP norms and changed identities would, for example, be if the policy-makers were consistent in their redefinition of identity/interest in accordance with the new ESDP norms and upheld them vis-à-vis different audience and in different circumstances. It is also reasonable to expect that the policy-makers would try to protect and promote ESDP norms they now take for granted by seeking to embed them in institution, legislations and practices.²¹⁴

In addition, as elaborated on before, Checkel proposes a number of scope conditions under which to expect normative persuasion:

- 1)] The target of socialization is in a novel and uncertain environment and thus cognitively motivated to analyze new information.
- [2)] The target has few prior, ingrained beliefs that are inconsistent with the socializing agency's message.
- [3)] The socializing agency/individual is an authoritative member of the ingroup to which the target belongs or wants to belong.
- [4)] The socializing agency/individual does not lecture or demand but, instead, acts out principles of serious deliberative argument.
- [5)] The agency/target interaction occurs in less politicized and more insulated, in-camera settings.²¹⁵

In this thesis, the outlined scope conditions are the independent variables whilst the complete and active adoption of ESDP norms has to be the dependent variable.

The author will first analyse whether normative persuasion is at work. If this is the case she will then test the scope conditions in order to identify whether they (all or only some of them) triggered normative persuasion. If appropriate, the author will also refine the outlined scope

²¹⁴ Gheciu, Alexandra (2007), 'Security Institutions as Agents of Socialization? NATO and the "New Europe"', in, Checkel, Jeffrey T. (ed), *International Institutions and Socialization in Europe*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p.179.

²¹⁵ Checkel, Jeffrey T. (2007), 'International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and Framework', in, Checkel, Jeffrey T. (ed), *International Institutions and Socialization in Europe*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp.13-14.

conditions or add new ones. If normative persuasion has not occurred, the author will establish which of the two other mechanisms is at work. For strategic calculation the dependent variable is behavioural adaptation with ESDP norm whereas for role playing it is the adoption of new roles consistent with ESDP norms. Nevertheless, one has to note that in both cases the hypothesis would have been falsified and German and British policy-makers would not have been socialised by the EU in the area of ESDP.

3.6 Methods

Constructivist studies are compatible with many research methods currently used in social and political science.²¹⁶ Checkel suggests a number of tools and techniques to assess the reliability and strength of his socialisation study. Amongst these tools and techniques, the author has chosen to employ two methods - process-tracing as well as case study method. Both are well-suited to examine the three socialisation mechanisms and scope conditions in action. The author will so be able to verify or falsify her hypothesis.

Process-tracing means to detect the operation of mechanisms, i.e. identifying the links between independent and dependent variables.²¹⁷ In order to use process-tracing, things need to be held constant in a series of 'theoretically predicted intermediate steps'.²¹⁸ Examining the process that led to the outcome helps to narrow the list of potential links. Nevertheless, it may be difficult to eliminate all potential explanations except one.²¹⁹ For mainstream social science

²¹⁶ Pouliot, Vincent (2007), 'Subjectivism: Toward a Constructivist Methodology', *International Studies Quarterly*, vol.51, no.2, pp.359-360.

²¹⁷ Checkel, Jeffrey T. (2006), 'Tracing Causal Mechanisms', *International Studies Review*, vol.8, no.2, p.363.

²¹⁸ Checkel, Jeffrey T. (2005), 'It's the Process Stupid! Process-Tracing in the Study of European and International Politics', *Arena Working Paper Series*, no.26, p.3, http://www.arena.uio.no/publications/working-papers2005/papers/wp05_26.pdf [15.08.2009].

²¹⁹ George, Alexander L., Andrew Bennett (2005), *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Science*, MIT Press, Cambridge, p.207.

process-tracing has led to a revolutionary methodological innovation as it is based on a 'processual (rather than correlational) understanding of causality'.²²⁰

From an epistemological point of view process-tracing is a method solidly anchored in positivism. The philosophical foundations of post-positivist epistemologies, in particular their 'fluidity', are incompatible with process-tracing.²²¹ The only possible exception is scientific realism²²². That being said there are scholars who argue that process-tracing is not only amenable to the interpretive style of reasoning but it would also benefit from turning to post-positivist philosophies.²²³

According to Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, there are four varieties of process tracing:

[1] Detailed narrative

The simplest variety of process-tracing takes the form of a detailed narrative or story presented in the form of a chronicle that purports to throw light on how an event came about.

[2] Use of hypotheses and generalizations

In a more analytical form of process-tracing, at least parts of the narratives are accompanied with explicit causal hypotheses highly specific to the case without, however, [...] attempting to extrapolate the case's explanation into a generalization.

[3] Analytic explanation:

²²⁰ Pouliot, Vincent (2007), 'Subjectivism: Toward a Constructivist Methodology', *International Studies Quarterly*, vol.51, no.2, p.372.

²²¹ Checkel, Jeffrey T. (2005), 'It's the Process Stupid! Process-Tracing in the Study of European and International Politics', *Arena Working Paper Series*, no.26, p.5, http://www.arena.uio.no/publications/working-papers2005/papers/wp05_26.pdf [15.08.2009].

²²² The central claim of scientific realism is that it makes sense to talk of a world outside of experience, that is to say, it is interested in uncovering the structures and things of the world that make science possible and that exist independently of our perception of them. Scientific realists dispute the primacy of epistemology over ontology in rationalism and empiricism, yet sees pragmatism as mistaken in its implication that what is true is only what is 'good in the way of belief'. (Smith, Steve, Ken Booth, Marysia Zalewski (eds) (1996), *International Theory: Positivism and beyond*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp.25-26)

²²³ Pouliot, Vincent (2007), 'Subjectivism: Toward a Constructivist Methodology', *International Studies Quarterly*, vol.51, no.2, p.374. Checkel, Jeffrey T. (2005), 'It's the Process Stupid! Process-Tracing in the Study of European and International Politics', *Arena Working Paper Series*, no.26, p.22, http://www.arena.uio.no/publications/working-papers2005/papers/wp05_26.pdf [15.08.2009]. Jeffrey T. Checkel demands that process-tracers need to think harder about their philosophical bases. In his opinion, process-tracers would benefit from turning to post-positivist philosophies and in particular to scientific realism.

[This] [...] variety of process-tracing converts a historical narrative into an analytical causal explanation couched in explicit theoretical forms.

[4] More general explanation:

In [this] [...] variety of process-tracing the investigator constructs a general explanation rather than a detailed tracing of a causal process.²²⁴

This thesis will employ a mixture of two process-tracing strands - detailed narrative and use of hypothesis. Such a form of process-tracing provides a middle-ground: it is sensitive to the complexities of historical events but at the same time is interested in theorising and explaining events.

The data for process-tracing is mostly qualitative. It usually comprises primary and secondary sources, for example interviews, meeting summaries and policy document, and compares them. Process-tracing requires a significant amount of data, which can take a lot of time. But it is easy to determine when there is enough data.²²⁵ One has to be careful when collecting the data as sources can be biased.

The author will attempt to prevent biased sources by using a strategy of 'empirical triangulation'²²⁶, which suggests to combine different data sources and 'triangulate' between them. For primary sources the author will analyse speeches, interviews and statements given by those national policy-makers who deal with ESDP and if available, minutes of ESDP meetings as well as press releases. She will also conduct in-depth, semi-structured background interviews with German and British government officials and where possible politicians, notably foreign and defence ministers. These interviews with former defence and foreign ministers are crucial to support the author's line of argument as they were present at

²²⁴ George, Alexander L., Andrew Bennett (2005), *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Science*, MIT Press, Cambridge, pp.210-211.

²²⁵ Checkel, Jeffrey T. (2008), 'Process Tracing', in, Klotz, Audie, Deepa Prakash (eds), *Qualitative methods in International Relations: A Pluralist Guide*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, pp.115-116.

²²⁶ Lewis, Jeffrey (2007), 'The Janus Face of Brussels: Socialization and Everyday Decision-Making in the European Union', in, Checkel, Jeffrey T. (ed), *International Institutions and Socialization in Europe*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p.150.

important meetings and prepared ESDP proposals and policies. The author will also consult numerous secondary sources.

Apart from the risk of using biased sources, there are a number of other flaws in the process-tracing method, in particular the fact that one can lose sight of the broader context, its enormous amount of data as well as its epistemological problem. Nevertheless, it is an important method, which enables to connect data with theory. Through its theoretically predicted intermediate steps, it leads researchers to carefully consider the connection (or lack thereof) between theoretically expected patterns and what the data say. Using process-tracing the author will closely examine the socialisation process exploring whether normative persuasion is at work and the prior derived scope conditions can be identified. Process-tracing is therefore well-suited for studying the application of Checkel's socialisation approach.

Case study method, especially in combination with process-tracing, has considerable advantages in studying mechanisms and scope conditions. In their book *Case Studies Theory Development in the Social Sciences* Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett define a case 'as an instance of a class of events'.²²⁷ A case study method is defined by them to include within-case analysis of single cases or comparisons of small number of cases.²²⁸

This thesis will use the case study method of two within-cases employing process-tracing. The study of within-cases will allow a close examination of the operation of mechanisms.²²⁹

All in all, the case study method together with process-tracing offers numerous advantages. Not only does process-tracing generate observations within a case but it also links these observations in particular ways to identify an explanation of the case. Process-tracing can also

²²⁷ George, Alexander L., Andrew Bennett (2005), *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Science*, MIT Press, Cambridge, p.17.

²²⁸ Ibid, p.18.

²²⁹ Ibid, pp.19-20.

uncover links between cases. It offers the possibility of constituting causal paths that lead to similar outcomes in different cases. The objective of this thesis is to analyse whether socialisation occurred in the chosen cases. However, after the analyses of the two within-cases the cases will shortly be compared against each other in order to contrast the processes and impacts of the socialisation mechanisms in each case. For this, process-tracing is also well-suited.

It must be considered whether the two chosen methods need to be supported with a counterfactual analysis: Absent the three mechanisms would the outcomes of two cases have been different? Yet, as this thesis is supported by a strong theory and the causal chain of events is plausible and consistent with the evidence²³⁰, the author has decided against conducting counterfactual cases. Also, it is difficult if not impossible to conduct a plausible useful counterfactual analysis when the explanation for a historical event is very complex.²³¹

3.7 Problems

A number of critics have identified several weaknesses in Checkel's approach on socialisation. For example, Andrew Moravcsik accuses Checkel's approach for its lack of a sufficiently strong and distinct constructivist theory. Also, from Moravcsik's point of view, the scope conditions Checkel hypothesises in his approach are not distinctive to constructivism.²³² Checkel does not agree with the lack of a strong constructivism. He, however, accepts the criticism that to a certain extent his scope conditions overlap with those advanced by rationalists. However, in his opinion this overlap captures the empirical reality that both conventional constructivists

²³⁰ Ibid, pp.230-231.

²³¹ Idem.

²³² Moravcsik, Andrew (2001), 'Bringing Constructivist Integration Theory Out of the Clouds: Has it Landed Yet?', *European Union Politics*, vol.2, no.2, pp.228-231.

and soft rationalists are trying to theorise. The scope conditions therefore benefit from constructivism as well as rationalism.²³³ Checkel's scope conditions are also criticised by other scholars, in particular Jürgen Habermas. He argues the opposite of Checkel that normative persuasion is more likely in front of large public audiences. The presence of a 'third party' provides 'an arbiter for better arguments' and simultaneously threatens sanctions for ruthless bargaining behaviour. Agents become 'rhetorically entrapped' and eventually internalise norms.²³⁴ According to Checkel, this claim is weak empirically as well as theoretically. For example, the mechanism leading rhetorically entrapped actors to internalise new beliefs is not clear.²³⁵ Not only Checkel's identified scope conditions cause criticisms, but also his concept of the socialisation process.

Checkel's approach is focused on how participation in institutions changes identities, interests, normative models, notions of appropriateness and so on, in individuals as national agents. The causal arrow points from socialiser whose properties are temporarily fixed to socialisee. This is, as said before, only one part of the entire institution-agent relationship. In order to better address the mutual constitution of institutions and agents, other scholars, for example Alastair Iain Johnston, have therefore suggested expanding Checkel's approach.

[One should] [...] look at the institutions and its ideology at time *t*; the institution's impact on socializing state-level agents at *t*+1; state-level agent responses at *t*+2, state-level agent interaction within a state's foreign policy process at *t*+3 (agent

²³³ Checkel, Jeffrey T. (2002), 'Constructivism and Integration Theory: Crash Landing or Safe Arrival?', *European Union Politics*, vol.2, no.2, pp.241-242.

²³⁴ Deitelhoff, Nicole, Harald Müller (2005), 'Theoretical paradise – empirically lost? Arguing with Habermas', *Review of International Studies*, vol.31, no.1, pp.173-174.

²³⁵ Checkel, Jeffrey T. (2002), 'Persuasion in International Institutions', *Arena Working Paper Series*, no.14, p.6, http://www.arena.uio.no/publications/working-papers2002/papers/wp02_14.htm [15.08.2009].

principal interaction); interstate interaction at t+4; state-institution interaction at t+5; and changes in institution and ideology at t+6.²³⁶

While Johnston's proposal is important, the positivist epistemological stance of Checkel's approach makes it difficult to capture the mutual constitution between agents and institutions and therefore to pursue Johnston's approach.²³⁷ Besides Checkel's approach is to develop an operationalisable social science theory and not a social theory. It should be seen as 'supplying much needed micro-foundational building blocks for more sweeping – and often heuristic - constructivist arguments about collective identity formation', although of course the emphasis on the micro-level has come at the expense of the macro-level.²³⁸

Johnston's approach points to another important arena, which critics claim is undertheorised by Checkel: the domestic arena. A finding of constructivist socialisation research is that domestic politics can play a key role in any socialisation process and identity change in the EU.²³⁹ Thomas Risse, for example, argues that socialisation into European identity works on the national levels in a process whereby Europeanness or becoming European is gradually being embedded in understandings of national identities.²⁴⁰ Checkel agrees with Risse that more attention needs to be given to domestic arena. At the moment, there is a tendency 'for ad-hocism to prevail, where domestic factors are added, but unguided by some broader and

²³⁶ Johnston, Alastair Iain (2007), 'Conclusion and Extension: Toward Mid-Range Theorizing and Beyond Europe', in, Checkel, Jeffrey T. (ed), *International Institutions and Socialization in Europe*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p.226.

²³⁷ There are only a few viable methodological means of accommodating the variability of agency and structure in empirical analysis. One is the analytical bracketing strategy proposed by Anthony Giddens. Giarbo, Kenneth (2001), 'Reconstructing a Common European Foreign Policy', in, Christiansen, Thomas, Knud Erik Jorgensen, Antje Wiener (eds), *The Social Construction of Europe*, Sage, London, pp.143-144.

²³⁸ Checkel, Jeffrey T. (2001), 'From Meta- to Substantive Theory? Social Constructivism and the Study of Europe', *European Union Politics*, vol.2, no.2, p.226.

²³⁹ Checkel, Jeffrey T. (2006), 'Constructivist Approaches to European Integration', *Arena Working Paper Series*, no.6, p.25, http://www.arena.uio.no/publications/working-papers2006/papers/wp06_06.pdf [15.08.2009].

²⁴⁰ Risse, Thomas (2005), 'Neofunctionalism, European Identity and the Puzzle of European Integration', *Journal of European Public Policy*, vol.12, no.2, p.305.

overarching theoretical argument's'.²⁴¹ In making the connection to the domestic arena, Checkel suggests that EU constructivists should dynamically combine factors across different levels of analysis. Dynamic means that one goes back and forth across levels, stressing the simultaneity of international and domestic developments.²⁴² However, positivist epistemology, which requires that something is held constant, is again at odds with such a dynamic approach. For the time being, therefore, Checkel's approach is not suited for taking into account the domestic arena as well as 'feedback effects' from socialisee to socialiser. But, as said before, Checkel aims to develop an operationaliseable social science theory and not a social theory.

3.8 Conclusion

The criticisms on Jeffrey T. Checkel's socialisation approach are partly justified. However, when judging the approach one should not forget that socialisation research, including Checkel's approach, is at an early stage. Like the early stages of other researches, the goal of Checkel's approach is more or less to show that socialisation happens in institutions.²⁴³ Checkel has also responded to the criticism that constructivist socialisation theories are long on meta-theory but short on testable hypotheses and empirical analyses. His middle-range approach can compete with other conventional integration theories. By adopting a definition of socialisation that allows for both sociological and rationalist accounts of norm adoption, Checkel's approach furthermore acts as a bridge between constructivism and rationalism.

²⁴¹ Checkel, Jeffrey T. (2006), 'Constructivist Approaches to European Integration', *Arena Working Paper Series*, no.6, p.26, http://www.arena.uio.no/publications/working-papers2006/papers/wp06_06.pdf [15.08.2009].

²⁴² *Idem.*

²⁴³ Johnston, Alastair Iain (2007), 'Conclusions and Extensions: Toward Mid-Range Theorizing and Beyond Europe', in, Checkel, Jeffrey T. (ed), *International Institutions and Socialization in Europe*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p.225.

4. The European Security and Defence Policy - History and Challenges

Established at the Cologne European Council in June 1999, the European Security and Defence Policy has, in the 10 years since its inception, given rise to countless debates and discussions. In this chapter the main events and developments of ESDP are summarised. It is divided into four sections.

The first section explores the pre-Saint Malo²⁴⁴ process of a common European security and defence policy. In doing so, particular importance is attached to the post-Cold War era and, especially, to the Maastricht Treaty and Amsterdam Treaty since they referred for the first time to the eventual (Maastricht Treaty) and the progressive (Amsterdam Treaty) framing of a common defence policy. The Saint Malo Declaration as well as the attitudes and behaviours of the three biggest EU member states, the UK, France and Germany, towards a European security and defence policy and how much they contributed to the establishment of ESDP will be examined in the second section. France will be analysed in greater detail here given that the UK and Germany are already the topics of the two case studies. The third section concentrates on the developments of EDSP after the Saint Malo meeting, such as the birth of ESDP at the Cologne European Council summit and the Constitutional and Lisbon Treaties. The final section looks at the US' / NATO's view of ESDP. This outsider's perspective on ESDP is important as the US and NATO were for a long time the guarantor of security in Europe. And it is still debated whether the EU states can assume responsibility for their own security. This chapter, however, does not address the shortcomings of the European Security and Defence Policy. Political, financial and material problems continue to plague ESDP and hinder it from meeting its own ambitions. But it is neither the purpose of this chapter nor of this thesis to identify the ESDP shortcomings.

²⁴⁴ The Franco-British Summit in Saint Malo in December 1998 was a watershed event in the development of a common European security and defence policy.

4.1 European security and defence policy pre-Saint Malo

The first significant European defence treaty after the end of the Second World War was the 1948 Treaty of Brussels between Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, which envisaged a mutual defence pact.²⁴⁵ At the time of the Treaty the Western European countries began to increasingly fear an attack by the Soviet Union. They recognised that the Soviet Union was a much greater threat to their security than the possibility of a resurgent Germany. In order to counter the military power of the Soviet Union, the Western European countries knew they needed to rely on the assistance of the United States. In 1949, they therefore created together with the United States and Canada the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), which constituted a system of collective defence obliging its member states to respond if one of them had been the victim of an armed attack.²⁴⁶

With the outbreak of the Korean war in 1950 and the growing threat of international communism, the United States came to the conclusion that all Western European states including West Germany²⁴⁷ needed to contribute more to their own defences. West Germany's rearmament was, however, anathema, to its neighbours, in particular France. The French Prime Minister René Pleven therefore proposed the plan of a European Defence Community, which envisaged the establishment of a 'pan-European military' divided into national components whereby the German component would be subordinated to the

²⁴⁵ Howorth, Jolyon (2000), 'European integration and defence: the ultimate challenge?', *Chaillot Paper Institute for Security Studies of Western European Studies*, no.43, p.1.

²⁴⁶ Gordon, Philip H. (1996), 'Does the WEU have a Role?', *The Washington Quarterly*, vol.20, no.1, p.125. Article V states that the 'Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that [...] each of them [...] will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.'

The North Atlantic Treaty (1949), Washington D.C., 4 April, http://www.nato.int/nato-welcome/pdf/nato_treaty_en_light.pdf [01.09.2009].

²⁴⁷ West Germany is the common English name for the Federal Republic of Germany, which on 23 May 1949 was established from eleven states formed in the three Allied Zones of occupation held by the United States, the United Kingdom and France (the 'Western Zones').

European Defence Community. Although a treaty was signed by West Germany, France, Italy and the Benelux countries in 1952, the plan was never enacted as it failed to obtain ratification in the French Parliament.²⁴⁸ Following the failure of the European Defence Community, the Treaty of Brussels signatory countries as well as West Germany and Italy agreed in 1954 to create instead a European security and defence organisation, called Western European Union (WEU), on the basis of the Treaty of Brussels.²⁴⁹ The WEU, however, remained weak, lacking forces, capacities and reputation required for a defence institution. Its member states continued to rely on NATO and in particular the United States as the only possible guarantor for their security against the Soviet threat.²⁵⁰

With the end of the Cold War, NATO's original primary function, i.e. defence against the Soviet threat, disappeared. For the US, the collapse of the Soviet Union clearly reduced the centrality of Europe to its security policy. Other theatres outside of Europe, for example the Gulf region, where the first conflict after the demise of the East-West confrontation arose, gained in strategic importance for the United States. As a consequence, calls from Washington became louder for the Europeans to take greater responsibility for their own regional security. The member states of the European Union, for their part, which for a short while had thought that the long-held dream of a Europe at peace had become a reality, received a rude jolt to their complacency when violence erupted in Yugoslavia in the summer 1991.²⁵¹

Against this background, the 12 member states of the European Union signed the Maastricht Treaty in February 1992, which as one of its first objectives declared 'the

²⁴⁸ Keukeleire, Stephan, Jennifer MacNaughtan (2008), *The Foreign Policy of the European Union*, Palgrave Macmillan, Hampshire, p.174.

²⁴⁹ The creation of the WEU was part of the Paris Agreements.

Duke, Simon (1996), 'The Second Death (or the Second Coming?) of the WEU', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol.34, no.2, p.168.

²⁵⁰ Howorth, Jolyon (2007), *Security and Defence Policy in the European Union*, Palgrave Macmillan, Hampshire, p.5.

²⁵¹ Menon, Anand, Anthony Foster, William Wallace (1992), 'A common European defence?', *Survival*, vol.34, no.3, pp.102-106.

implementation of a common foreign and security policy [CFSP] including the eventual framework of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to common defence'. The Treaty further requested the WEU, which was referred to as an 'integral part of the development of the Union', 'to elaborate and implement decisions on actions of the Union which have defence implications'.²⁵² Shortly after signing the Maastricht Treaty, the ten EU-WEU member states (only Denmark and Ireland were not WEU members) held a meeting in the Petersberg Castle (Germany), where they set out on the basis of the Maastricht decisions the guidelines for the organisation's future development. The WEU member states declared their preparedness to make available military units from the whole spectrum of their conventional armed forces for military tasks under the authority of the WEU. These tasks, the so-called Petersberg tasks, consisted of humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, and tasks of combat forces in crisis management including peacemaking.²⁵³ The Maastricht and the Petersberg meetings represented a first, limited step towards the European Union's taking responsibility for its own continent's security. In the years following the Maastricht and Petersberg meetings, the Yugoslavian conflict worsened. First US President Georg H. W. Bush and then his successor Bill Clinton decided not to get involved in the Yugoslavia civil war and let it be known that it was considered a European problem. Indeed, the Foreign Minister of Luxembourg, Jacques Poos, declared:

This is the hour of Europe, not the hour of the Americans. If one problem can be solved by the Europeans, it's the Yugoslav problem. This is a European country and it is not up to the Americans and not up to anybody else.²⁵⁴

²⁵² Treaty on European Union, Maastricht, 7 February 1992, Article B, Title I, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/11992M/htm/11992M.html> [01.09.2009].

²⁵³ 'Declaration by the Western European Union Council of Ministers (The Petersberg Declaration)', Bonn 1992, in, Hill, Christopher, Karen E. Smith (2000), *European Foreign Policy. Key Documents*, Routledge, London, pp.208-209.

²⁵⁴ Poos, Jacques quoted in White, Brian (2001), *Understanding European Foreign Policy*, Palgrave, London, p.108.

However, European diplomatic efforts to halt the war showed no results and United Nations (UN) personnel were also unable to prevent the massacres of Sarajevo and Srebrenica. Thus, the US eventually agreed to lead NATO air strikes against Yugoslavia in 1995. The conflict brutally showed that the Europeans were still dependent on the US' military assets in order to pacify their continent; and that this dependence was particularly problematic given the US' reluctance to get involved.

As a result of their military dependency on the US, the European NATO members decided to create a European 'pillar of defence' within the framework of NATO, which would, they hoped, strengthen Europe's political cohesion and military capabilities. The European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI), first proposed at the 1994 NATO summit in Brussels and approved at the 1996 NATO ministerial meeting in Berlin, aimed at facilitating European efforts to develop 'separable but not separate' military capabilities under the aegis of the WEU.²⁵⁵ It should provide for circumstances where the European NATO members/WEU wanted to deploy military forces, but the US did not want to get involved. In such cases, through the concept of 'Combined Joint Task Forces', the WEU states could use NATO assets if they so wished.²⁵⁶

Yet, ESDI failed to provide political cohesion and incentives for the European countries to improve their capabilities. The WEU was too weak politically and too ineffective institutionally to carry out this responsibility. Moreover, NATO itself was undergoing a process of re-invention triggered by the end of the Cold War and not all of its members were convinced that NATO would survive this process.

²⁵⁵ Gordon, Philip H. (1997/98), 'Europe's Uncommon Foreign Policy', *International Security*, vol.22, no.3, pp.91-92.

²⁵⁶ Treacher, Adrian (2004), 'From Civilian Power to Military Actor: The EU's Resistible Transformation', *European Foreign Affairs Review*, vol.9, no.1, p.58.

The uncertain development of ESDI coincided with the negotiations of the Amsterdam Treaty (1996-1997)²⁵⁷ and created consensus among the EU member states that further steps towards a common European policy on security and defence matters should be incorporated into the EU framework. The 1997 Amsterdam Treaty therefore provided for the 'progressive' framing of a common defence policy and, even more importantly, introduced the Petersberg tasks into the legal framework of the EU.²⁵⁸ These were both significant steps in the evolution of ESDP, but their impact should not be overstated.²⁵⁹ The WEU was still left floating between and linked to both NATO and EU.²⁶⁰

In the run up to the Amsterdam European Council summit, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxemburg and Spain presented a far-reaching document, which proposed a gradual merger of the EU and WEU.²⁶¹ Yet, this initiative was blocked by the new British Prime Minister Tony Blair together with the non-aligned countries - Finland, Sweden, Austria and Ireland.²⁶² Blair feared a merger of the EU and WEU would discriminate non-EU NATO allies. The member states were thus only able to agree in the Amsterdam Treaty that the EU 'shall foster closer institutional relations with the WEU with a view of the possibility of the integration of the WEU into the Union'.²⁶³

²⁵⁷ The Amsterdam Treaty was adopted by the EU member states at their Amsterdam European Council summit held on 16 and 17 June 1997.

²⁵⁸ Sijursen, Helen (1998), 'Missed opportunity or eternal fantasy? The idea of a European Security and defence policy', in, Peterson, John, Helene Sijursen, *A Common Foreign Policy for Europe? Competing Visions of the CFSP*, Routledge, London, pp.99-100.

²⁵⁹ Manners, Ian (2002), 'Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol.40, no.2, p.237.

²⁶⁰ Hoffmann, Stanley (2000), 'Towards a Common European Foreign and Security Policy', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol.38, no.2, p.193.

²⁶¹ Treacher, Adrian (2001), 'Europe as a Power Multiplier for French Security Policy: Strategic Consistency, Tactical Adaptation', *European Security*, vol.10, no.1, p.36.

²⁶² Howorth, Jolyon (2000), 'Britain, NATO and CESDP: Fixed Strategy, Changing Tactics', *European Foreign Affairs Review*, vol.5, no.3, p.393.

²⁶³ Treaty of Amsterdam (1997), Amsterdam, 2 October, Art.I.7 para2, <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/topics/treaty/pdf/amst-en.pdf> [01.09.2009].

Both the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties only provided the framework for an emerging European security and defence policy. The Europeans' dismal performance in the Kosovo conflict stressed the need to add substance to the framework.²⁶⁴

4.2 The Saint Malo Declaration

For years the different attitudes of Britain, France and Germany towards a serious European defence and security cooperation acted as a substantial barrier to its development. While France was convinced that the creation of a European defence project 'with teeth' would lead to a more balanced and therefore stronger US-Europe relationship, Britain was only prepared to work together with its European allies on security and defence within NATO and in the framework of the WEU and only insofar as it would prove Europe's willingness to take on more responsibility for its own security to the US (see chapter six). Germany was traditionally reluctant to engage in any defence policy (see chapter five).

Following the war in Yugoslavia between 1991 and 1995 and in view of the limits to Europe's military capabilities, which were clearly demonstrated during the war, France's attitude towards NATO and the US' involvement in Europe changed. It became more eager to keep the US militarily engaged in Europe. In 1995, France even considered fully returning to the non-integrated military bodies of NATO.²⁶⁵ Nevertheless, despite this more positive view of NATO, France remained convinced that Europe needed military means to act independently of NATO and the US.²⁶⁶

²⁶⁴ Cameron, Fraser (2002), 'The European Union's Growing International Role: Closing the Capability-Expectation Gap?', *National Europe Centre Paper*, no.15, p.17, <https://digitalcollections.anu.edu.au/handle/1885/41659> [01.09.2009].

²⁶⁵ Treacher, Adrian (2001), 'Europe as a Power Multiplier for French Security Policy: Strategic Consistency, Tactical Adaptation', *European Security*, vol.10, no.1, pp.32-35.

²⁶⁶ Rynning, Sten (2003), 'Why not NATO? Military Planning in the European Union', *Journal of Strategic Studies*, vo.26, no.1, p.62.

Throughout 1998 and 1999, the Balkans, this time Kosovo, became once again an arena for armed conflict. When Britain held the EU presidency in the first half of 1998, Prime Minister Tony Blair struggled to formulate a policy on Kosovo on behalf of the EU. The Americans, for their part, showed no sign of engaging in Kosovo at first. When the conflict escalated and the Europeans lacked the military capabilities, in particular high-technology capabilities, to contain the conflict, the US finally agreed in March 1999 to take the lead in fighting Serbia. Yet, they decided on an air-only approach, again emphasising the limits to their engagement in 'small' wars on the European continent.²⁶⁷

Europe's military impotence and dependence on the US in this matter caused increasing frustrations among the European states, and served as a catalyst for bringing Britain, France and Germany together.²⁶⁸ At the height of the Kosovo crisis, Blair met with his counterpart French President Jacques Chirac in Saint Malo on 3 and 4 December 1998. They signed a Letter of Intent (LoI) on defence co-operation and a joint declaration on European defence. The LoI aimed at making it easier to undertake joint military operations by improving links between operational headquarters, cooperating in logistics, intelligence and civil/military affairs and exchanging information. In a joint declaration, both states stressed that the Union must have 'the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crisis', so that the EU could 'take decisions and approve military action where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged'.²⁶⁹ The inclusion of the word 'autonomous' in this declaration, was highly significant since it had not been used before in such a context.

²⁶⁷ Mayer, Sebastian (2003), 'Die Erklärung von Saint Malo und die Europäische Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik: Bedingungsfaktoren des britischen Strategiewandels 1998', *Journal of European Integration History*, vol.9, no.1, pp.138-140.

²⁶⁸ Biscop, Sven (2002), 'In Search of a Strategic Concept for the ESDP', *European Foreign Affairs Review*, vol.7, no.4, pp.476-477.

²⁶⁹ 'Franco-British Declaration on European Defence', Saint Malo 1998, in, Hill, Christopher, Karen E. Smith (2000), *European Foreign Policy. Key Documents*, Routledge, London, p.243.

France understood 'autonomous' in the sense that the European defence initiative should be independent of NATO.²⁷⁰ European security and defence policy should be first and foremost a European project, which when necessary, would make use of NATO assets.²⁷¹ However, in order to accommodate Britain, France agreed to include a commitment to NATO in the declaration: 'the strengthening of European defence would contribute to the vitality of a modernised Atlantic Alliance, which is the foundation of the collective defence of its members'.²⁷² The future of the WEU - another controversial issue between the two states – was left unanswered in the declaration. The declaration only stated that the EU would take account of the 'existing assets of the WEU and the evolution of its relations with the EU'.²⁷³

The Saint Malo declaration was adopted without consultation with the other EU member states. But only a few months after the Saint Malo declaration, at the June 1999 Cologne European Council meeting, the EU member states built on the declaration's philosophy to reach an unprecedented level of agreement on the establishment of a European security and defence policy.²⁷⁴ Germany, who held the EU presidency in the first half of 1999, considerably contributed to this success. During the 1990s Germany had undergone significant changes in its attitude towards contributing to military operations (see chapter five).

²⁷⁰ Rummel, Reinhardt (2002), 'From Weakness to Power with the ESDP?', *European Foreign Affairs Review*, vol.7, no.4, p.460.

²⁷¹ Howorth, Jolyon (2000), 'Britain, France and the European Defence Initiative', *Survival*, vol.42, no.2, p.45.

²⁷² 'Franco-British Declaration on European Defence', Saint Malo 1998, in, Hill, Christopher, Karen E. Smith (2000), *European Foreign Policy. Key Documents*, Routledge, London, p.243.

²⁷³ Idem.

²⁷⁴ Shepherd, Alistair J.K. (2003), 'The European Union's Security and Defence Policy: A Policy without Substance?', *European Security*, vol.12, no.1, p.42.

4.3 The European Security and Defence Policy after Saint Malo

The Presidency Conclusions adopted at the Cologne European Council summit reiterated the Saint Malo declaration and noted that the EU

must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO.²⁷⁵

The member states also agreed at the Cologne summit to absorb the WEU, albeit without its collective defence commitment, by the end of 2000. The exclusion of the WEU's defence guarantee came after strong protests from the EU's non-aligned countries - Finland, Sweden, Austria and Ireland – and Britain, which feared to undermine NATO and its Article V.²⁷⁶

The Helsinki European Council meeting, which followed a few months later in December 1999, reinforced the institutional basis of ESDP. It was decided to create three interim committees. These committees should provide, together with the High Representative for CFSP established by the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty, the necessary infrastructure for the European Security and Defence Policy. At ambassador level, the Political Committee responsible for the CFSP was to become the Political and Security Committee (PSC) with competence in all aspects of the EU's foreign, security and defence policies. A Military Committee (EUMC), made up of the military representatives of the national chiefs of defence, would provide advice to the PSC and direction to the European Union Military Staff (EUMS). The EUMS would carry out early warning, situation assessment and strategic planning for the Petersberg tasks.²⁷⁷ In addition, it was decided that the General Affairs and

²⁷⁵ Cologne European Council (1999), 'Presidency Conclusions', 3-4 June, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/kolnen.htm [01.09.2009].

²⁷⁶ Howorth, Jolyon (2000), 'Britain, France and the European Defence Initiative', *Survival*, vol.42, no.2, p.44.

²⁷⁷ Shepherd, Alistair J.K. (2003), 'The European Union's Security and Defence Policy: A Policy without Substance?', *European Security*, vol.12, no.1, p.42.

External Relations Council²⁷⁸ would meet regularly and, as appropriate, include defence ministers.

Prior to the Helsinki European Council summit, French President Jacques Chirac and British Prime Minister Tony Blair held a meeting, where they urged the EU to strive for the capacity to deploy rapidly combat forces which could be militarily self-sufficient up to corps level. This Anglo-French recommendation was accepted by the member states at the Helsinki Council. It was agreed to launch the Helsinki Headline Goal, calling for the creation of a functioning Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) of up to 60,000 troops with naval and air support by 2003. The Rapid Reaction Force should be deployable at full strength within 60 days of a deployment decision and be sustainable in the field for at least one year. It should be able to act upon the full range of the Petersberg tasks.²⁷⁹

The decisions the member states had taken in Cologne and Helsinki were brought into the EU's legal framework at the December 2000 European Council in Nice.²⁸⁰ Significantly, the Nice Treaty did not contain references to WEU. The institutions that were previously part of the WEU, namely the Satellite Centre in Torrejon (Spain) and the Institute of Security Studies, were transferred to the EU by the Nice Treaty. The WEU nevertheless continued to exist as its collective defence commitment was not included within the remit of the EU.²⁸¹

²⁷⁸ The General Affairs and External Relations Council was a configuration of the Council of the European Union and brought together the Foreign Ministers of the Member States. The Treaty of Lisbon split up this council in two separate councils – the General Affairs Council and the Foreign Affairs Council.

²⁷⁹ Riggio, Daniel (2003), 'EU-NATO Cooperation and Complementarity between the Rapid Reaction Forces', *The International Spectator*, vol.38, no.3, pp.50-51.

²⁸⁰ Crowe, Brian (2003), 'A Common European foreign policy after Iraq?', *International Affairs*, vol.79, no.3, p.534

²⁸¹ Duke, Simon (2001), 'CESDP: Nice's Overtrumped Success?', *European Foreign Affairs Review*, vo.6, no.2, p.164.

4.3.1 The European Constitutional Treaty

In December 2001, the EU member states met in Laeken to establish the Convention on the Future of Europe, whose aim was to draft a Constitutional Treaty. During the Convention (2002-2003), a number of frictions arose among the member states. Firstly, after the attack on the World Trade Center on 11 September 2001 some member states, most importantly Britain, shifted their focus to the global war on terror.²⁸² Although the other member states were also concerned about terrorism, at the same time they were worried about the implications of the new US doctrine of pre-emption²⁸³.

Secondly, the Central and Eastern European states, who were due to join the EU in 2004 and were thus allowed to participate in the Convention, saw the US and NATO as essential for ensuring security in their region. For them, ESDP was at best a kind of luxury and at worse a threat to the Atlantic link. During the Convention, these states were therefore wary of any ESDP progress.

Thirdly, the US decision to invade Iraq divided the EU, with Germany and France opposing the war and Britain, Spain, Italy and the acceding Central and Eastern European states supporting the US.

Fourthly, in April 2003, at the height of the Iraq war, France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg held a controversial defence summit in Tervuren/Belgium, where they agreed on ambitious proposals for procedural and institutional reform of ESDP. The centrepiece of the summit was the proposal to create a European Security and Defence Union including an

²⁸² Richards, Steve (2001), 'Let's not kid ourselves: Britain is not part of the United States', *The Independent*, 23 September, p.24.

²⁸³ In 2002, the US published a new National Security Strategy, which highlighted four points: pre-emption, military primacy, new multilateralism, and the spread of democracy. This Security Strategy and its Doctrine of Pre-emption provided a political basis for the US to intervene unilaterally around the world based on perceptions of terrorist threats and the existence of weapons of mass destruction.

EU operational planning unit to be located at Tervuren and a commitment for mutual help and assistance.²⁸⁴ The meeting provoked resistance among the other EU member states.²⁸⁵

Despite these tensions, the Convention members were able to agree on several important modifications of ESDP, which were included in the draft Constitutional Treaty presented at the June 2003 Thessaloniki European Council summit. These provisions were permanent structured cooperation, the mutual assistance clause, European Defence Agency, the solidarity clause, the expansion of the Petersberg tasks, and the delegation of a task within the Union framework (e.g. an EU mission based upon an unanimous decision) to a group of member states.

Both permanent structured cooperation and the mutual assistance clause derived from a Franco-German proposal for the ESDP submitted to the Convention in November 2002.²⁸⁶

France and Germany suggested the possibility for those member states which meet certain military capability criteria and wish to enter into more binding commitments, to establish 'structured cooperation'. Their proposal also introduced 'closer cooperation on mutual defence'. A member state participating in such cooperation, which is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, should inform the other participating member states of the situation and request assistance from them.

For a number of members of the Convention, notably from Britain and the non-aligned countries, the insertion of the two Franco-German initiatives into the draft Constitutional Treaty was highly contentious. Britain was concerned that under a regime of structured cooperation decisions on European military missions could be taken by a minority. The

²⁸⁴ Diedrichs, Udo, Mathias Jopp (2003), 'Flexible Modes of Governance: Making CFSP and ESDP Work', *The International Spectator*, vol.38, no.3, pp.21-22.

For more information on the Tervuren summit please see chapter 5.

²⁸⁵ Langellier, Jean-Pierre (2003), 'Tony Blair s'oppose à Jacques Chirac et dénonce les dangers d'un monde multipolaire', *Le Monde*, 30 April.

²⁸⁶ De Villepin, Dominique, Joschka Fischer (2002), 'Joint Franco-German proposals for the European Convention in the field of European security and defence policy', CONV 422/02, Brussels, 22 November, <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/02/cv00/cv00422.en02.pdf> [01.09.2009].

inclusion of a mutual defence cooperation was seen by Britain as a duplication of NATO structure. For the non-aligned countries, binding security guarantees between the member states of the Union was the line they were not willing to cross. Yet despite the strong opposition by Britain and the non-aligned countries, both proposals made their way into the draft Constitutional Treaty.

Following the presentation of the draft Constitutional Treaty, the Intergovernmental Conference²⁸⁷ began in October 2003, which in lengthy negotiations discussed and changed parts of the draft. A breakthrough on the mutual defence clause and structured cooperation was achieved in the week leading up to the meeting of EU foreign ministers in Naples in November 2003, when Germany, France and the UK met for a trilateral talk.²⁸⁸

The three states were able to agree on new drafts for structured cooperation and the mutual defence clause. Any reference to mutual defence disappeared. It was now called the mutual assistance clause. An assertion that NATO would remain the foundation of collective defence for member states was inserted. In addition, the requirement to give aid and assistance to a member state under attack was qualified with the wording that member states should have 'an obligation of aid and assistance'. The new draft of structured cooperation (now named 'permanent structured co-operation') also accommodated a number of Britain's concerns. The British government secured assurances that a group participating in permanent structured cooperation could not launch a mission on behalf of the EU without the unanimous agreement of the Council. Britain furthermore succeeded that the requirement for participants to have to fulfil 'higher military capability

²⁸⁷ The term 'Intergovernmental Conferences' is used to describe negotiations between the EU member states' governments with a view to amending the EU Treaties. The Conferences are convened, at the initiative of a member state or the European Commission, by the Council of Ministers acting by a simple majority (after consulting the European Parliament and, if appropriate, the Commission).

²⁸⁸ Zecchini, Laurent (2003), 'Paris, Londres et Berlin scellent leur rapprochement sur la défense', *Le Monde*, 13 December.

For the German-Franco-British meeting in Berlin, which preceded the Naples meeting, please see chapter five.

criteria' was removed from the permanent structured cooperation concept. In return for these assurances, Britain agreed to decision-making under permanent structured cooperation taking place through qualified majority voting.

Most of the other member states welcomed the agreement. The non-aligned countries remained the only member states continuing to oppose the mutual assistance clause. In order to resolve this impasse, the member states agreed to insert a passage from the Maastricht Treaty into the Constitutional Treaty: 'This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain member states.'²⁸⁹ As a result, Sweden, Finland, Ireland and Austria as well as the 2004 acceding non-aligned countries, Malta and Cyprus, accepted the mutual assistance clause and both this initiative and permanent structured cooperation could be included in the final text of the Constitutional Treaty. Following the failure to agree on the Constitutional Treaty at the European Council in December 2003,²⁹⁰ the member states eventually agreed on the Treaty in June 2004 and officially signed it in October 2004 in Rome.

The draft Constitutional Treaty referred to the creation of a European defence agency. The Thessaloniki European Council, however, decided not to wait until the Constitutional Treaty is adopted but to task

the appropriate bodies of the Council to undertake the necessary actions towards creating in the course of 2004 an intergovernmental agency in the field of defence capabilities development, research, acquisition and armaments.²⁹¹

The European Defence Agency was officially established in July 2004. The mission of the Agency is to support the Council and the member states in their efforts to improve the EU's defence capabilities required to give substance to the ESDP.

²⁸⁹ Treaty on European Union, Maastricht, 7 February 1992, Art.I.4 para4, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/11992M/htm/11992M.html> [01.09.2009].

²⁹⁰ The EU member states failed to agree on the Constitutional Treaty due to a controversy on the Council voting system.

²⁹¹ Thessaloniki European Council (2003), 'Presidency Conclusion', 19 – 20 June, p.20, http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/76279.pdf [01.09.2009].

The solidarity clause, which should ensure mutual assurance to help countries deal with a terrorist attack, a natural or man-made disaster, came also into force earlier as a reaction to the March 2004 terrorist attack in Madrid. At the European Council summit on 25 March 2004 the EU Heads of State and Government declared that they would 'act jointly against terrorist acts in the spirit of the solidarity clause'²⁹² contained in the draft Constitutional Treaty. In contrast to the mutual assistance clause, the solidarity clause does not apply to an attack by another state.

The Constitutional Treaty envisaged the expansion of the Petersberg tasks adding to them joint disarmament operations, military advice and assistance tasks, post-conflict stabilisation and conflict prevention. The Constitution also stated that all these tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism.

With respect to the possibility of entrusting 'a group of member states' with a certain operational task, the Constitutional Treaty mainly certified what was already happening in EU-led international crisis management missions, namely that participation was limited to a number of interested member states acting with the consensus and in the name of all.

4.3.2 The Lisbon Treaty

After the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty by France and the Netherlands²⁹³, a number of member states swiftly declared the Constitutional Treaty dead. Later, during the so-called 'period of reflection'²⁹⁴, they argued for a simple amending treaty as opposed to the retention of the Constitutional Treaty desired by other member states, notably Germany.

²⁹² Council of the European Union (2004), 'Declaration on Combating Terrorism', 25 – 26 March, p.18, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/DECL-25.3.pdf> [01.09.2009].

²⁹³ The French voters rejected the Constitutional Treaty in a referendum on 29 May 2005; the Dutch voters said 'no' to the treaty on 1 June 2005.

²⁹⁴ As a result of the lost referendums in France and the Netherlands, the EU member states called in June 2005 for a 'period of reflection' in order to reconnect the citizens with the European project and to decide the fate of the Constitutional Treaty.

Germany, however, changed its position at the beginning of its EU presidency in January 2007 and signalled its willingness to revert to the traditional method of an amending treaty instead of a constitution. After careful consultations with other EU member states about their expectations and reservations concerning the future of the Constitutional Treaty the German EU presidency eventually paved the way for treaty reform at the European Council summit in June 2007. The member states agreed on a mandate for an intergovernmental conference, which should draft a new treaty based on the Constitutional Treaty, albeit removing most of its constitutional terminology and amending the existing EU treaties instead of replacing them. The new treaty, officially called Treaty of Lisbon, was adopted at the European Council meeting in October 2007 in Lisbon. In December 2007 it was signed by the member states' Heads of State and Government. After two referendums in Ireland – the first one was rejected - the Lisbon Treaty came into force in 2010.

The Constitutional Treaty's ESDP provisions were saved in the Lisbon Treaty. At Britain's insistence, a 'Declaration concerning the common foreign and security policy', which should emphasise the intergovernmental nature of ESDP, was attached to the Lisbon Treaty.²⁹⁵ Yet as declarations are not legally binding, this declaration has only symbolic value.

4.3.3 The European Security Strategy and the Headline Goal 2010

The Constitutional Treaty / Lisbon Treaty as well as the preceding EU treaties deal with ESDP institutions and capabilities. The damaging internal divide within the EU over the Iraq war, however, showed that a strategy on the EU's general approach to security was needed. Such a strategy would provide a reference framework for policy-making and would thus render unilateral action more difficult. Therefore, in May 2003, shortly after the height of the Iraq crisis, the EU foreign ministers tasked High Representative for CFSP, Javier

²⁹⁵ Lisbon Treaty (2008), 'Declaration concerning the common foreign and security policy', Lisbon, 9 May, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/JOHtml.do?uri=OJ:C:2007:306:SOM:EN:HTML> [01.09.2009].

Solana, with producing a European strategic document, which should promote a common understanding within the EU regarding security risks the EU is facing and provide the means to confront these challenges.²⁹⁶ The Security Strategy should also mend fences both inside the EU and across the Atlantic. A first version of the Strategy was presented by Solana to the Thessaloniki European Council, which 'took note' of it and asked Solana to submit the final text to the Brussels European Council in December 2003.²⁹⁷ The document was adopted by the European Council under the title 'A secure Europe in a better world'. Since then, it has become the closest thing to a European foreign and security policy 'doctrine' the EU has.

On the basis of the Security Strategy and given the outstanding capability shortfalls against the Helsinki Headline Goals²⁹⁸, the member states proposed in the 2003 ESDP Presidency Report to 'set new goals for the further development of European capabilities for crisis management with a horizon of 2010'.²⁹⁹ At the European Council summit in June 2004, the EU member states agreed to adopt the new Headline Goal 2010, which should focus on the qualitative aspects of capability development, in particular interoperability, deployability and sustainability. Also, the Headline Goal 2010 should envisage further development of the EU's capacity for rapid decision-making in the planning and deployment of forces. 'The ambition of the EU under the Headline Goal is to be able to take the decision to launch an operation within 5 days of the approval of the Crisis Management Concept by the

²⁹⁶ Castle, Stephen (2003), 'EU seeks multilateral strategy to combat global terror threat', *The Independent*, 20 June.

²⁹⁷ Thessaloniki European Council (2003), 'Presidency Conclusion', 19 – 20 June, p.20, http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/76279.pdf [01.09.2009].

²⁹⁸ Although the EU defence ministers declared in May 2003 in line with the Helsinki Headline Goal plan that the EU now had initial operational capability across the full range of Petersberg tasks, they acknowledged that the capabilities were still limited and constrained, particularly in the key areas of rapid deployment, sustainability and concurrent operations. Critics pointed out that that most of the armed forces allocated to the EU could only be deployed to observer and peacekeeping missions of low intensity, with specialised combat troops being in noticeably short supply.

²⁹⁹ Council of the European Union (2003), 'ESDP Presidency Report', 9 December, p.12, <http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/03/st15/st15814.en03.pdf> [01.09.2009].

Council'.³⁰⁰ The relevant forces should be able to start implementing their mission on the ground no later than 10 days after the EU decision to launch the operation.

Central to this rapid response element of the 2010 Headline Goal is the Battlegroup concept, a British-Franco-German proposal. The concept was first mentioned in November 2003 at a British-Franco summit in London as a result of the successful first EU-only mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo.³⁰¹ Three months after the British-Franco summit, on 10 February 2004, the two countries submitted together with Germany a 'Food for Thought Paper'³⁰², which suggested producing a 'catalogue of high utility force packages that can be tailored rapidly to specific missions'.³⁰³ These 'packages' came to be known as 'battlegroups' and the concept was officially launched at the November 2004 Capability Commitment Conference. Each Battlegroup is based on a combined arms, battalion size force (1500 troops) reinforced with combat support and combat service support. Since the battlegroups are sustainable in the field for 30 days, by adequate supply, extendable to even 120 days, they are capable of stand-alone operations or for the initial phase of large operations. Battlegroups are employable across the full range of both the Petersberg tasks and those identified in the European Security Strategy. They can be either national or multinational, composed of troops from one or more member states. In any case, interoperability and military effectiveness have to be key criteria. From January 2007, the EU has had the full operational capability to undertake two battlegroups-size rapid response operations, including the ability to launch both operations almost simultaneously.

³⁰⁰ Headline Goal 2010, p.2,

<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/2010%20Headline%20Goal.pdf> [01.09.2009].

³⁰¹ McSmith, Andy (2003), 'Chirac and Blair aim for new entente', *The Independent*, 23 November.

³⁰² The battlegroup concept, 10 February 2005,

<http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/Battlegroups.pdf> [01.09.2009].

³⁰³ 'The Battlegroups Concept – UK/France/Germany Food for Thought Paper', in, Gnesotto, Nicole et al. (2005), *EU Security and Defence – Core Documents 2004*, EU Institute for Security Studies, Chaillot Paper, p.11.

4.3.4 Civilian crisis management

The EU is able to draw on a mixture of instruments ranging from civilian and military crisis management to economic, political and institution building in a flexible joined-up way. The combination of the use of military and civilian instruments in crisis management constitutes the strength of the EU.

In parallel to military capabilities, the member states have therefore developed civilian capabilities. At the Feira European Council summit in June 2000, the EU member states listed four priority areas in which the EU should acquire civilian capabilities: police, the rule of law, civil administration and civil protection. The Council's goal was that by 2003 a police force of up to 5,000 personnel contributing to international missions across the range of conflict prevention and crisis management operations should be set up.³⁰⁴ Rapid progress towards this goal was made after the Feira summit and in consequence the EU was able to undertake the Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina. At the European Council summit in December 2004, the Civilian Headline Goal 2008 was endorsed by the EU member states.³⁰⁵ This Headline Goal envisaged the deployment of civilian ESDP capabilities within 30 days of the decision to launch a mission. Building on the successful results of the Headline Goal 2008 and on the growing body of ESDP crisis management experience, the ministerial Civilian Capabilities Improvement Conference adopted the Civilian Headline Goal 2010 on 19 November 2007.³⁰⁶ It should ensure that the EU could conduct crisis management in line with the European Security Strategy and deploy civilian crisis management capabilities in a short time-span and in sufficient quantity.

³⁰⁴ Santa Maria da Feira European Council (2000), 'Presidency Conclusions', 19-20 June, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/fei1_en.htm [01.09.2009].

³⁰⁵ Council of the European Union (2004), 'ESDP Presidency Report', 17 December, p.5, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/ESDP%20Presidency%20Report%2017.12.04.pdf> [01.09.2009].

³⁰⁶ Civilian Capabilities Improvement Conference (2007), 'Ministerial Declaration', Brussels, 19 November, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/esdp/97166.pdf [01.09.2009].

In June 2007, the EU Council of Ministers established the new post of a Civilian Operations Commander within the Council Secretariat supported by a team called Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability. They are responsible for the effective planning and conduct of civilian ESDP missions, as well as the proper implementation of all mission-related tasks.³⁰⁷

In 2008, the EU launched its biggest ever civilian mission under ESDP: EULEX Kosovo, which should support the Kosovo authorities in their efforts to build a sustainable and functional rule of law system.

4.3.5 EU operations

On 1 January 2003 the EU embarked on its first operation - the EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina. As of October 2011, the EU has launched 24 military as well as civilian crisis management operations, such as police, border control, rule-of-law training and peace-monitoring missions. The bulk of the operations have been in Europe, particularly in the Western Balkans. The missions the EU has carried out outside Europe, especially in the Middle East, have mostly been of minor importance. Although overall most of the missions have been a success, some missions experienced problems at their launch and/or later on the ground. The member states that were capable of leading missions were not always willing to do so. For example, it took many months to get the EUFOR RD Congo mission off the ground because Germany – at the time the only member state capable to act as the lead nation³⁰⁸ - was reluctant to lead the military operation from its headquarters in Potsdam. A number of ESDP missions, for example the EU Police Mission in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (Operation Proxima) experienced fierce battles over

³⁰⁷ The Civilian Planning Conduct Capability, http://consilium.europa.eu/media/1222515/110412%20factsheet%20-%20cpcc%20-%20version%204_en.pdf [01.09.2009].

³⁰⁸ France and the UK were unable to mount an international deployment because of their respective involvement in Iraq and the Ivory Coast.

competence between the head of the relevant mission, the special representative and the European Commission delegation because of lack of effective co-ordination and division of labour between existing European development efforts and ESDP activities. Another problem was the missing co-ordination between ESDP military and civilian crisis management operations. In Bosnia, for example, military operation Althea clashed in many areas with the work of the police mission. Since then, however, the EU has worked hard to improve the coherence of its civilian and military instruments. The military EUFOR RD Congo mission and the civilian EUPOL Kinshasa mission, for example, worked effectively together to prevent an escalation during Congo's general elections process.

For military missions, the EU has three possibilities of operation headquarters, which are responsible for planning and commanding of missions. One option is to make use of the national operation headquarters available in France, Germany, UK, Italy and Greece (so called 'framework nation concept'). A second option is to draw on NATO structures under the 'Berlin-Plus' arrangement. This arrangement covers three main elements: EU access to NATO planning, NATO European command options and use of NATO assets and capabilities. Under 'Berlin Plus', the EU is allowed to make use of NATO's Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) or the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR).

The third option the EU has is the Operations Centre within the EU Military Staff. Contrary to the name, the Operations Centre is not a standing headquarter but a permanently available capacity, which can be rapidly activated to plan and run minor - preferably civil-military - autonomous operations. The Operation Centre will achieve initial operation capacity, that is the ability to plan, within five days at the latest, and it will reach full operation capacity, that is the ability to run the operation, within twenty days.³⁰⁹

³⁰⁹ EU Council Secretariat (2007), 'The EU Operations Centre', http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/070228-EU_OpsCentre.pdf [01.09.2009].

The idea of an autonomous EU military headquarters surfaced for the first time at the controversial 2003 Tervuren meeting held by France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg. Their proposal was rejected by most of the other EU states, notably Britain. Yet after close consultation, the UK, Germany and France were able to present a paper at the EU foreign minister meeting in Naples in November 2003, which recommended no autonomous standing operational capability but the creation of a small strategic planning cell with an operational dimension based at the EU Military Staff as well as the installation of a small permanent EU cell within NATO Headquarters SHAPE. The British-German-Franco deal was endorsed by the December 2003 European Council.³¹⁰ In December 2004, the European Council agreed on the implementation of the document titled 'European Defence: NATO/EU consultation, planning and operations', which tasked the civil-military cell within the EU Military Staff to set up an Operations Centre. Since 1 January 2007, the EU Operation Centre has been ready for activation. The 'NATO/EU consultation' document also served as the basis for the agreement with NATO on the establishment of the small EU cell at SHAPE.

4.4 NATO's and the US' reaction to ESDP

After the Saint Malo declaration, Washington reacted cautiously. Although the US officially welcomed the EU's shift towards greater self-reliance, it remained fearful of potential EU challenges to NATO's and the US' leadership. In an article for the Financial Times US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright enunciated what became later known as the 'three-Ds': Europe should avoid 'decoupling (of NATO from the EU), duplication (of military/defence efforts) and discrimination (against non-EU members of NATO)' when

³¹⁰ *The Independent* (2003), 'Agenda: this week's big issues', 23 November.

developing a European security and defence policy.³¹¹ US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott aptly described America's position in a talk at the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London in 1999,

[The US] would not want to see an ESD[P] that comes into being first within NATO, but then grows out of NATO and finally grows away from NATO, since that would lead to an ESD[P] that initially duplicates but that could eventually compete with NATO.³¹²

In a communiqué adopted at NATO's 50th anniversary summit in Washington in April 1999, the member states endorsed the Saint Malo declaration and agreed that building on the 1996 Berlin decisions the Alliance would adopt the necessary arrangements for making the collective assets and capabilities of the Alliance available 'for use in EU-led operations' ('Berlin Plus' arrangement). This emphasis on EU operations, rather than those of the WEU, was new and significant. Although it was not explicitly stated, the end of the WEU seemed to be anticipated. At the same time, however, it was included in the communiqué that the new European project should develop in close cooperation with NATO. The EU should only envisage autonomous action 'where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged'.³¹³ The wording of the Cologne Presidency Conclusions, however, went considerably beyond the wording of NATO communiqué by replacing the phrase 'where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged' with the much less restrictive phrase 'without prejudice to actions by NATO'.³¹⁴ This did not correspond to the American view that NATO should always have the right of first refusal in a crisis. Thus, the Clinton administration was alarmed. Strobe Talbott commented on the Cologne summit:

³¹¹ Albright, Madeleine (1998), 'The Right Balance Will Secure NATO's Future', *Financial Times*, 7 December.

³¹² Talbott, Strobe quoted in Howorth, Jolyon (2003), 'Saint Malo plus five. An interim assessment of ESDP', *Notre Europe Policy Paper*, no.7, http://www.notreeurope.eu/uploads/tx_publication/Polycypaper7.pdf [01.09.2009].

³¹³ NATO (1999), 'Washington Summit Communiqué. An Alliance for the 21st Century', 24 April, <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-064e.htm> [01.09.2009].

³¹⁴ Cologne European Council (1999), 'Presidency Conclusions', 3-4 June, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/kolnen.htm [01.09.2009].

The EU's leaders' declaration at Cologne in June, [...] could be read to imply that Europe's default position would be to act outside the Alliance whenever possible, rather than through the Alliance.³¹⁵

The US started a sustained diplomatic effort to pressure the EU member states to change the wording of the Cologne Presidency Conclusions. The effort was successful in terms of the language emerging at the December 1999 European Council summit in Helsinki. The Helsinki Presidency Conclusions attempted to remove any ambiguity by stating that the EU 'does not imply the creation of a European army' and 'will avoid unnecessary duplication'.³¹⁶

The Helsinki Presidency Conclusions also included the commitment to develop modalities for the 'necessary dialogue, consultation and cooperation with NATO and its non-EU members'.³¹⁷ The non-EU NATO members could participate in EU operations if they so wished. The absolute right of operational participation by non-EU NATO members, however, should only be applied to operations requiring recourse to NATO assets and capabilities. In operations where the EU would not use NATO assets, these countries would need an invitation from the European Council to participate. The Nice Presidency Conclusions repeated and reinforced this principle making it entirely clear that non-EU NATO members would not always have full access to ESDP operations. This arguably 'discriminatory' approach particularly angered Turkey.

The 'Berlin Plus' arrangement had been agreed at the 1999 Washington NATO summit to provide the basis for NATO-EU cooperation by allowing the EU access to NATO's assets and

³¹⁵ Speech by US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott on 'America's Stake in a Strong Europe', in, Rutten, Maartje (2001), 'From St Malo to Nice - European defence: core documents', *Chaillot Paper Institute for Security Studies of Western European Studies*, no.47, p.54-59, <http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/cp047e.pdf> [01.09.2009].

³¹⁶ Helsinki European Council (1999), 'Presidency Conclusions', 10-11 December, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/hel1_en.htm [01.09.2009].

³¹⁷ Helsinki European Council (1999), 'Presidency Conclusions', 10-11 December, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/hel1_en.htm [01.09.2009].

capabilities for ESDP operations. Following the Nice summit, Turkey feared that the EU could conduct operations in a contiguous region to its own borders – the area of the Aegean sea - affecting Turkish interests but without Turkey's active participation in all phases. It therefore blocked the adoption of the 'Berlin Plus' arrangement. After a series of discussions, US and Turkish diplomats proposed a solution in 2001 comprising a reinforcement of consultation between the EU and NATO and a confirmation that ESDP, irrespective of the type of crisis, would not be directed against an ally. Greece, however, did not agree with this compromise as in its view it contained too many concessions to Turkey. It was not until December 2002 that a solution was finally negotiated. Turkey agreed to the formula whereby Cyprus, on the somewhat technical grounds that it belonged neither to NATO nor the Partnership for Peace (PfP), could not be covered by the 'Berlin Plus' arrangement. Turkey was furthermore given a formal guarantee that ESDP missions would not be deployed in the Aegean. The resolution of the 'Berlin Plus' dispute allowed the EU and NATO to make a historic declaration on ESDP on 16 December 2002 providing a formal basis for cooperation between the two organisations.

4.5 Conclusion

Although the European Security and Defence Policy still retains its distinctive decision-making system, where unanimity is the norm and the roles of the Commission, European Court of Justice and European Parliament are heavily restricted, it has undoubtedly progressed over the past ten years. As the former French Defence Minister Michèle Alliot-Marie said, 'ESDP is on the move. Security and Defence could be Europe's great rallying point'.³¹⁸

³¹⁸ Alliot-Marie, Michèle (2005), 'Security could be Europe's Great Rallying Point', *Financial Times*, 5 December.

So far, the development of ESDP has been to some extent related to external events.³¹⁹ It was the bipolarity of the Cold War, which prevented a common (west) European security and defence policy. After the end of the Cold War, the Kosovo conflict served as a wake-up call for the EU member states to further develop the cautious beginning of the European security and defence policy provided in the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaty. The drafting of the European Security Strategy and the adoption of the Headline Goal 2010 were triggered by 9/11 and the Iraq crisis. Yet, notwithstanding those external events it has always needed member states to propose new initiatives and drive the development of ESDP. Usually, these member states have been France, Britain and Germany. The rapprochement of France and Britain in the field of European security and defence cooperation led to the declaration of Saint Malo. Permanent structured cooperation and the mutual assistance clause were only inserted in the Constitutional Treaty because Britain, France and Germany achieved a compromise on these two proposals. The Battlegroup concept and the Operations Centre derived from Franco-German-British proposals. Britain, France and Germany are not only the most militarily powerful countries of the Union, but they also represent different political camps on the question of ESDP. The question is why Britain that had always opposed an EU defence policy and Germany that traditionally had been wary to use military force, put so much effort into developing ESDP in comparison to other EU policy fields. As explained in the last chapter, the answer to this question this thesis proposes is socialisation: the EU has been able to socialise Germany and the UK in the European Security and Defence Policy. Successful socialisation has resulted in the induction of German and British policy-makers into ESDP community norms. In the next chapters, this hypothesis will be tested.

³¹⁹ Treacher, Adrian (2004), 'From Civilian Power to Military Actor: The EU's Resistable Transformation', *European Foreign Affairs Review*, vol.9, no.1, p.50.

5. Germany

As explained in the methodology chapter, the unit of analysis in this thesis will be individual policy-makers. The case study will therefore concentrate on German policy-makers, who shaped the European Security and Defence Policy from the Saint Malo meeting (3 and 4 December 1998) to the Lisbon European Council summit (18-19 October 2007). The focus will be on chancellors, defence ministers and foreign ministers as these are the policy-makers who mostly deal with ESDP. However, parliamentary state secretaries as well as state secretaries of the Federal Ministry of Defence, the Federal Foreign Office and the Chancellery³²⁰ will be examined too when they help illustrate whether the defence minister, the foreign minister or the chancellor completely internalised ESDP norms. Speeches, interviews and statements given by the policy-makers over the eight years will be reviewed in order to identify their attitude towards ESDP.

During the eight years, there were three federal elections, which led twice to a SPD-Green Party government³²¹ (1998-2002 and 2002-2005) and in 2005 to a so called Grand Coalition - a SPD-CDU/CSU government. Relevant quotes from the policy-makers' speeches, interviews and statements will be grouped along those three elections. After the end of each government, the quotes will be analysed according to Jeffrey T. Checkel's problem-driven constructivist middle-range socialisation approach. It will be examined whether normative persuasion was at work and whether the German policy-makers actively and reflectively internalised ESDP norms. If this is the case, the scope conditions will be tested with the help of process-tracing. Occasionally in the analysis sections, background interviews conducted with the German Defence Minister Peter Struck and a government official will be quoted in order to support or disprove certain arguments. If normative

³²⁰ The Foreign Office and the Chancellery are using a slightly different title, and are calling their

³²¹ Germany's Green Party - the Alliance '90/ The Greens – was founded on 13th January 1980. Until then, there had been only three parties – SPD, CDU/CSU and FDP – dominating Germany's political spectrum.

persuasion cannot be identified, the thesis will attempt to establish whether German policy-makers were driven by role playing or strategic calculation. However, if either role playing or strategic calculation was at work, the German policy-makers would not be socialised and the hypothesis would be disproved.

This chapter will begin with a section on Germany's history as it shaped Germany's distinctive culture, which affected the policy-makers and played a role in their socialisation process.

5.1 Germany's defence policy after 1945

After World War II West Germany's approach to the use of military force was a manifestation of its identity as a civilian power: in other words a state committed to multilateralism and tight constraints on the use of force with an emphasis on resolving disputes first and foremost in a peaceful manner. This led to a strategic culture characterised by the strong aversion to military power projection for national purposes and the belief that the only purpose of the *Bundeswehr* was to deter war.³²² Moreover, given Germany's semi-sovereign status any military action by Germany would have required NATO and therefore, ultimately American consent. Since unification and the regaining of its full sovereignty, there has been a re-evaluation of the role of the *Bundeswehr* towards a gradual 'normalisation' of German security and defence policy.³²³ According to some commentators, this process led Germany to abandon its civilian power tradition. Whether this is true or not, is not subject of this dissertation. In any case, German attitudes towards the use of military force remain deeply affected by its history and the legacy of World War II.

³²² Hyde-Price, Adrian (2004), 'European Security, Strategic Culture and the Use of Force', *European Security*, vol.13, no.4, p.325.

³²³ Hyde-Price, Adrian, Charlie Jeffrey (2001), 'Germany in the European Union: Constructing Normality', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol.39, no.4, p.703-707.

5.1.1 Towards a Normalisation of German Security and Defence Policy

The deepest break in Germany's history was 8 May 1945 - the date when the World War II allies formally accepted the unconditional surrender of the armed forces of Nazi Germany and the end of Adolf Hitler's Third Reich. There are no simple answers to the questions why a racist dictatorship emerged in Germany whilst other European countries such as France and Britain retained democracy and the rule of law. One part of the explanation is that although after World War I German elites did attempt a new beginning with the Weimar constitution of 1919, the authoritarian state still lived on in the heads of the German public.³²⁴ The problem was that after 1918 Germany did not experience the kind of profound political, social and moral rupture it did after 1945.

8 May 1945 did not only change Germany's political fate but also the mentality and values of the German population. In particular the role of the military, which had had an excessive influence over economic, social, political and cultural values first in the state of Prussia and later in the German empire and the Nazi regime, was scaled down to an absolute minimum.³²⁵ After 1945 most Germans believed that the most important lesson Germany should draw from the two world wars was: 'No more German soldiers and no more war from German soil.'³²⁶ In November 1949 the newly elected West German government solemnly declared in the Petersberg Agreement³²⁷ that West Germany would be demilitarised.

³²⁴ Winkler, Heinrich August (2000), *Germany: The Long Road West Volume 2: 1933-1990*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, p.575.

³²⁵ This predominance of the military is called militarism: The belief or desire of a government or people that a country should maintain a strong military capability and be prepared to use it aggressively to defend or promote national interests.

³²⁶ Von Bredow, Wilfried (2000), *Demokratie und Streitkräfte: Militär, Staat und Gesellschaft in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, Westdeutscher Verlag, Wiesbaden, p.13.

³²⁷ The Petersberg Agreement is an international treaty that extended the rights of the Federal Government of Germany vis-à-vis the occupying forces of Britain, France, and the United States, and is viewed as the first major step of Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) towards sovereignty.

Yet with the beginning of the Korean war in June 1950 the European situation became increasingly tense. Communist success led to an almost hysterical fear of communist aggression in Europe.³²⁸ The NATO states except France became more and more convinced that West Germany sharing borders with communist states should be rearmed. In order for France to prevent the re-armament of Germany, Frenchmen Rene Pleven proposed as a compromise the 'European defence community' in October 1950. In the spring of 1952, the *Bundestag*, despite protests by the Social Democratic Party (SPD), the then opposition party, and the public, agreed to re-armament within the framework of the European defence community. In August 1954, however, the French National Assembly voted against the European defence community (see chapter four).³²⁹ For German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, who had strongly identified himself with this project, this was a serious setback. As a consequence of the defeat of the supranational European defence community, the US and Great Britain proposed a national alternative, that is, direct West German membership in NATO. The integration of West Germany in the Atlantic Alliance seemed to be inevitable. Even France could no longer avoid the logic of its own decision and had to agree to the so called Paris Agreements. In addition to West Germany's membership in NATO, the Brussels Pact of 1948 should be expanded to include West Germany and Italy and should be re-named West European Union (see chapter four).³³⁰

West Germany should become an equal member of NATO and WEU subject to one restriction: It promised to forgo the manufacture of atomic, biological, and chemical weapons (so-called ABC weapons) on its own soil, as well as a number of other heavy weapons like guided missiles, warships beyond a particular size, and strategic bombers. Also, the size of the new army would be restricted to 500,000 men.

³²⁸ Kitchen, Martin (1976), *A Military History of Germany: From the Eighteenth Century to the Present Day*, Lyle Stuart, Secaucus, pp.333-334.

³²⁹ Ibid, pp.333-337.

³³⁰ Winkler, Heinrich August (2000), *Germany: The Long Road West Volume 2: 1933-1990*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp.150-151.

In February 1955, the *Bundestag* ratified the Paris Agreements, which, amongst other things, terminated the allied occupation and admitted West Germany into NATO and the Western European Union. The *Bundeswehr* was officially established on 12 November 1955. Ten years after the war West Germany was once more armed.

Strong opposition to re-armament by a large section of West German society and fears among the Western allies of a resurgence of German militarism, made it essential to democratise the structure of the new West German army.³³¹ It should be prevented that the *Bundeswehr* would become a 'state within a state' like the *Reichswehr* in Weimar.³³² Therefore, the *Bundestag* in March 1956 decided that the defence minister would have the supreme command in peacetime; if the country were attacked, command would be transferred to the chancellor. Parliamentary control of the military and the primacy of politics would so be preserved at all times.³³³ Emphasis was furthermore placed on the strictly defensive character of West Germany's army of 'citizens in uniform'.³³⁴

West Germany's foreign and security policy during the Cold War was largely shaped by the legacy of the two world wars and German militarism. A strong antimilitary sentiment, multilateralism (never again going alone) and European integration (with an emphasis on regaining recognition, trust and economic wealth) were its defining concepts.³³⁵ As the scope of UN peace-keeping operations was still limited and out-of-area operations were rarely discussed in NATO³³⁶, West Germany's restraint to use its armed forces and deploy

³³¹ Kitchen, Martin (1976), *A Military History of Germany: From the Eighteenth Century to the Present Day*, Lyle Stuart, Secaucus, p.339.

³³² Winkler, Heinrich August (2000), *Germany: The Long Road West Volume 2: 1933-1990*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, p.165.

³³³ Müller, Klaus-Jürgen (1995), *The Military in Politics and Society in France and Germany in the 20th Century*, Berg, Oxford, p.2.

³³⁴ Hyde-Price, Adrian, Charlie Jeffrey (2001), 'Germany in the European Union: Constructing Normality', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol.39, no.4, p.704.

³³⁵ Buras, Piotr, Kerry Longhurst (2004), 'The Berlin Republic, Iraq and the Use of Force', *European Security*, vol.13, no.3, p.216.

³³⁶ After the end of the Cold War, NATO approved a new doctrine of 'out-of-area' operations. This enabled NATO to conduct operations, not in the NATO 'area' (defined by the territory of its members). An example for a NATO 'out-of-area' operation is the ISAF mission in Afghanistan.

them abroad was seldom perceived as a problem. Yet, following the end of the Cold War and the rise of UN and NATO peace-keeping operations, Germany - newly unified and fully sovereign again - had to adjust its international role to meet a new context and a changed set of expectations.

The first test for Germany's new role came with the Gulf war of 1990/91. Iraq's invasion in Kuwait occurred at a time when Germany was still preoccupied with wrapping up the 'Two-plus-Four' negotiations leading to German unification. Not least because the 'Two-plus-Four' treaty required Soviet approval, the German government decided it would be unwise now to make a departure from its foreign policy practice and turned down a request from the US to send German troops to the Gulf. Instead, it agreed to contribute 18 billion Deutschmark to cover the costs of the war. The German government defended their decision by citing the 1982 controversial statement of its Security Council, which had stated that the Basic Law³³⁷ prohibits any deployments of *Bundeswehr* troops outside of NATO territory.³³⁸ Germany's refusal to send troops drew a lot of criticism from the US, Britain and Israel. It became obvious that Germany's allies were not satisfied anymore with Germany's Cold War 'chequebook diplomacy' but expected Germany to take over more responsibility and contribute to international military operations.³³⁹

Although a majority of the German public as well as the political elite still supported the view that only political means were justified to resolve international conflicts, the government formed by the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU) and the Free Democratic Party (FDP) were anxious to respond to the increasing pressure from Germany's allies and shoulder more responsibility. As Karl Lamers, foreign policy spokesman of the CDU/CSU group in the *Bundestag*, put it, 'without forgetting its history,

³³⁷ The Basic Law is the constitution of Germany.

³³⁸ Webber, Douglas (2001), *New Europe, New Germany, Old Foreign Policy?*, Frank Cass & Co, London, p.68-69.

³³⁹ Winkler, Heinrich August (2000), *Germany: The Long Road West Volume 2: 1933-1990*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp.558-560.

Germany must become as normal as possible'.³⁴⁰ Both CDU/CSU and FDP, however, disagreed whether the Basic Law already legitimised Germany's participation in multilateral out-of-area operations or needed to be amended. Whereas representatives of the CDU/CSU asserted that an amendment of the Basic Law was not necessary, the Free Democrats were convinced that an amendment would clarify the issue. Given these differing views, a decision on the issue was deferred. Nevertheless, over the next years the government was still able to agree on the contribution of German troops to a number of low-scale missions. For example, medical troops were sent to the UN peace-keeping operation in Cambodia in 1991/92. These contributions, albeit low-scale, gradually accustomed the German public to out-of-area deployments of the *Bundeswehr*.³⁴¹ Also, due to the violent conflict in former Yugoslavia public opinion became more sympathetic towards German participation in military operations.³⁴²

In 1993 the German government with the votes of the CDU/CSU ministers approved the participation of German soldiers in a mission of NATO surveillance aircrafts securing the non-fly zone the UN had declared over Bosnia-Herzegovina. This decision led to a heated debate within the government (CDU/CSU on the one side and FDP on the other) and between the government and opposition parties. Eventually, the FDP together with the opposition parties filed suit against this decision in the Federal Constitutional Court, which should rule on whether out-of-area deployments of the *Bundeswehr* were in accordance with the Basic Law.³⁴³ On 12 August 1994 the Court delivered its judgement: There was no need to change the Basic Law. The *Bundeswehr* could undertake humanitarian and/or

³⁴⁰ Lamers, Karl quoted in Anderson, Jeffrey J., John B. Goodman (1993), 'Mars or Minerva? A united Germany in a post-Cold War Europe', in, Keohane, Robert, Joseph S. Nye, Stanley Hoffmann, *International Institutions and State Strategies in Europe, 1989-1991*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, p.48.

³⁴¹ Webber, Douglas (2001), *New Europe, New Germany, Old Foreign Policy?*, Frank Cass & Co, London, pp.70-71.

³⁴² Smith, Michael E. (2000), 'Conforming to Europe: the domestic impact of EU foreign policy cooperation', *Journal of European Public Policy*, vol.7, no.4, p.624.

³⁴³ Von Bredow, Wilfried (2000), *Demokratie und Streitkräfte: Militär, Staat und Gesellschaft in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, Westdeutscher Verlag, Wiesbaden, p.103.

military missions outside of NATO territory if the *Bundestag* gave its authorisation (with a simple majority) and if this operation was conducted within the framework of a system of collective security.³⁴⁴ This judgement stopped the debate, which had accompanied each contribution of the *Bundeswehr* to international missions over the last three years. Germany could continue its tentative steps onto the world stage. Indeed, not long afterwards, the events in Bosnia and Herzegovina, notably the Srebrenica Massacre³⁴⁵, forced the *Bundestag* to approve the support of the US-led NATO air campaign with German non-combat forces. Yet the way the campaign was conducted by the US and the lack of consultation with its allies, including Germany, caused frustration in the government.

Already in the 1994 White Paper on the security of the Federal Republic of Germany and the situation and future of the *Bundeswehr*, it was stated that the conditions to secure peace and stability in Europe had fundamentally changed.

The danger of large-scale aggression threatening our existence has been banished. [...]The risk of a major war in Europe has been replaced by a multitude of risk factors of different nature with widely varying regional manifestations. Therefore, the focus has to shift to new challenges and risks which originate outside NATO's defence parameters.³⁴⁶

The White Paper tied Germany's security to the process of European integration. This shift of attention away from NATO towards the EU intensified following the NATO air campaign against Bosnia and Herzegovina.

At the end of 1998, having just elected for the first time a SPD-Green Party government, Germany faced another foreign policy catastrophe – Kosovo – which threatened to tear

³⁴⁴ Winkler, Heinrich August (2000), *Germany: The Long Road West Volume 2: 1933-1990*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, p.562.

³⁴⁵ The Srebrenica Massacre refers to the July 1995 killing of more than 8,000 Bosniak, as well as the ethnic cleansing of 25,000-30,000 refugees in the area of Srebrenica in Bosnia and Herzegovina, by units of the Army of Republika Srpska (VRS) under the command of General Ratko Mladić during the Bosnian war.

³⁴⁶ White Paper on the security of the Federal Republic of Germany and the situation and future of the *Bundeswehr*, 5 April 1994, <http://www.resdal.org.ar/Archivo/d0000066.htm> [01.09.2010].

apart the new government. Serbia had entered the largely ethnic-Albanian province and was pursuing a campaign of ethnic cleansing. NATO was eager to prevent another 'Srebrenica' and was prepared to use force against Serbia if necessary. Srebrenica had also had a major impact on the German political elite and public. It was now widely accepted that the legacy of Germany's history should not be to call for 'no more wars' but for 'no more Auschwitz'. When all diplomatic measures failed in March 1999 and NATO agreed on military intervention against Serbia, the government under Federal Chancellor Gerhard Schröder came under pressure to contribute to the NATO mission. However not only were the air strikes against Serbia not authorised by a UN Resolution³⁴⁷, but this would also have been the first time that Germany took part in an offensive combat mission. Schröder and his Foreign Minister, Green Party head Joschka Fischer, were both at pains to convince their parties - both strongly devoted to pacifism and peace – about the importance of sending German troops to Kosovo. In the end, the *Bundestag* narrowly approved Germany's participation in the mission.³⁴⁸ For the first time in the post-world wars history of the Federal Republic German soldiers were deployed to use force in a military operation with a questionable legal basis.

Germany's participation in NATO's Kosovo war was the culmination of its realignment. In nine years, between 1990 - 1999, the German policy concerning out-of-area operations shifted from abstention in the Gulf war, to a limited engagement in international missions and to an engagement in NATO's war against Serbia to stop the ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, whose legal basis was unclear. Whereas during the Gulf war Germany had showed utmost reluctance to commit military force and tens of thousands of Germans had demonstrated against the allied intervention, there were almost no demonstrations against the Kosovo war but rather public support for sending the *Bundeswehr* to participate in a combat

³⁴⁷ Russia and China were unwilling to contemplate the use of force against Serbia.

³⁴⁸ Buras, Piotr, Kerry Longhurst (2004), 'The Berlin Republic, Iraq and the Use of Force', *European Security*, vol.13, no.3, p.227.

operation. The expectations of its allies and the aspiration to be a reliable partner both in NATO and later ESDP played an important role in this process.³⁴⁹

5.1.2 Attitude towards a developing European security and defence policy pre-Saint Malo

During the 1990s Germany became more and more disillusioned with NATO. NATO missions completely depended on the US, which was, however, increasingly reluctant to engage in small wars in Europe. Also, the way the US led NATO missions, particularly the often lacking consultation with its allies, caused anger among the European members. The status of NATO's reform process, which had become necessary after the end of the Cold War, raised further disagreement. From German policy-makers' point of view, this was actually a process of nationalisation rather than real reform.

At the same time, the tragic events on the Balkan during the 1990s and Europe's impotence to deal with these showed German policy-makers that the European states had to improve their security and defence policies and cooperate to a greater extent. Therefore, Germany along with France proposed to develop a foreign and security component within the EU. Their proposals shaped the Maastricht and later the Amsterdam Treaty provisions for the creation of CFSP including the eventual/progressive framing of a common defence policy. Both countries also attempted to revive the WEU. In the joint letter of 16 October 1991 to the Dutch EU presidency Germany and France made concrete suggestions for strengthening the operational role of the WEU. These included the establishment of a WEU planning and coordination staff, regular meetings of the military chiefs of staff, and the creation of military units that would be assigned to the WEU. In their letter, the German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and his French counterpart President François Mitterrand also proposed to make the WEU the defence component of the EU and establish a European Corps based on

³⁴⁹ Webber, Douglas (2001), *New Europe, New Germany, Old Foreign Policy?*, Frank Cass & Co, London, p.41.

the Franco-German brigade. At the Franco-German summit in La Rochelle on 21–22 May 1992, Kohl and Mitterrand announced that alongside France and Germany the Eurocorps would comprise Belgium, Spain and Luxembourg and would serve two major functions: the defence of the territory of NATO and WEU allies and to carry out the Petersberg tasks³⁵⁰.

Even though Bonn and Paris broadly agreed on the outlines of a European security and defence policy, they differed on how far it should develop vis-à-vis NATO. Despite the disillusionment with NATO, for the German government, NATO and its integrated military command structure remained an indispensable element of security and stability in Europe. The European defence pillar should be strengthened in order to achieve a more co-equal transatlantic partnership. In no way, however, it should be designed to challenge the US' presence in Europe. Yet, the vehement US opposition to the emerging European security and defence policy confronted Germany with a situation it had successfully avoided for more than four decades: being squeezed between its commitment to the US and NATO as well as a strengthened European Community. It became obvious that Germany's traditional *sowohl als auch* policy, which required Germany to make no decision in favour of either Washington or Paris, would be difficult to sustain.³⁵¹

In two senses, 1995-96 was a critical juncture for the German government. First, in December 1995 French President Jacques Chirac accepted that a European security and defence policy needed to be built from either within NATO or in close cooperation with NATO. Second, at the July 1996 NATO Council in Berlin the US agreed that the WEU could be asked to carry out a military role in purely European conflicts. Following those two important events, at the Franco-German Nuremberg summit in December 1996 the two states adopted a 'common strategic concept', in which both states committed themselves to creating a European defence identity and a balanced European engagement with the

³⁵⁰ See chapter four.

³⁵¹ Meiers, Franz-Josef (2002), 'A Change of Course? German Foreign and Security Policy after Unification', *German Politics*, vol.11, no.3, pp.201-204.

US/NATO. For the first time, they jointly defined the objectives of a common European defence policy.³⁵²

Both the SPD and the Green Party had a more powerful tradition of pacifism than the CDU/CSU and the FDP. However, events in Bosnia – especially the Srebrenica massacre – provided a window of opportunity for SPD and Green advocates of a more active German policy in developing a European security and defence policy. Whereas within the SPD future chancellor Gerhard Schröder and future defence minister Rudolf Scharping acted as policy entrepreneurs on a European security and defence policy, within the Green Party it was future foreign minister Joschka Fischer. In June 1995 in a *Bundestag* debate on Bosnia, Fischer spelt out the limitations of a pacifist policy, referring to Germany's responsibility to confront ethnic cleansing. At the beginning of 1997 the SPD's federal executive established the *Zukunftskommission* (Commission on the future) under Scharping, whose aim it was, inter alia, to create a consensus in the SPD on European security. The Commission's report was adopted at the SPD conference in November 1997. It recommended that the WEU should be built up as the European pillar of NATO, allowing a greater role for Europe if the US lost the will to intervene in European crises.³⁵³

5.2 ESDP and Germany's first Red-Green Coalition (27 September 1998 – 22 September 2002)

One key aspect of the first SPD-Green Party government was its readiness to punch at its true weight on the world stage and to fight for Germany's interests.³⁵⁴ Chancellor Helmut Kohl had never gone so far as to openly strive for a more prominent role for Germany in

³⁵² Dyson, Tom (2002), 'Civilian Power and 'History-Making' Decisions: German Agenda-Setting on Europe', *European Security*, vol. 11, no.1, p.41.

³⁵³ Hyde-Price, Adrian, Charlie Jeffrey (2001), 'Germany in the European Union: construction normality', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol.39, no.4, pp.704-705.

³⁵⁴ Mestres, Laia (2002), 'The Franco-German motor before the Eastern enlargement: the cause of its decline', *Observatori de Política Exterior Europea Working Paper*, no.33, p.10.
<http://www.iuee.eu/pdf-publicacio/34/YvmgtVMGTq0anUuoR8a4.PDF> [25.04.2010].

world politics or to stress German national interests as a category for defining German foreign and security policy goals. These ideas were repeatedly raised by Chancellor Gerhard Schröder.³⁵⁵ The fact that Schröder was the first chancellor whose life was not dominated by World War II as he was only born in 1944 is often cited as an explanation for his positive attitude towards conducting a more self-confident foreign and security policy.

The Kosovo war, which was the first major political challenge the new government had to face, meant for Schröder and Fischer a break with the tradition of military reticence and therefore a real turning point in German foreign and security policy. The Kosovo war also showed Schröder and his government that Europe needed a credible foreign and security policy including military means, in order not to rely solely on the US, which was increasingly reluctant to intervene in small wars in Europe. Therefore, exploiting its double presidency in the EU and WEU Germany became the main driving force behind the establishment of the ideas in the Saint Malo Declaration on the European stage.

5.2.1 Germany's presidency of the EU Council and the Helsinki European Council summit (1999)

In his first government policy statement Schröder declared that the main goal of Germany's EU presidency would be to develop a European security and defence policy so that Europe would finally be able to act on the world stage.³⁵⁶ At the 35th Munich Security Conference, Schröder even went beyond the objective of establishing a European security and defence policy. He demanded that Europe needed a common European security and defence identity:

³⁵⁵ Buras, Piotr, Kerry Longhurst (2004), 'The Berlin Republic, Iraq and the Use of Force', *European Security*, vol.13, no.3, pp.226-227.

³⁵⁶ Regierungserklärung von Bundeskanzler Gerhard Schröder vor dem Deutschen Bundestag, 10 November 1998, <http://archiv.bundesregierung.de/index.jsp?&dokumentart=rede&sV=modified&sD=d> [01.09.2010].

Für das Haus Europas ist eine gemeinsame Sicherheits- und Verteidigungsidentität ein unverzichtbarer Baustein. [...] Diesen Prozess werden wir im Rahmen der deutschen EU-Ratspraesidentschaft vorantreiben - einer der wesentlichen Punkte, die auf der Agenda unserer Praesidentschaft stehen. [...] Wir wollen ein neues Europa für eine neue NATO, und wir wollen die neue NATO für das neue Europa.³⁵⁷

Although Schröder assured that the EU would not duplicate already existing NATO structures when creating its common security and defence policy, new instruments were needed in his view in order for the EU to assume greater military responsibility. One important structural change Schröder proposed in his speech was to appoint the EU's High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy as Secretary General of the WEU since this would send a clear signal that eventually the WEU would be integrated into the EU.³⁵⁸

Schröder's cabinet colleagues, notably Defence Minister Rudolf Scharping and Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer, shared his view point on the importance of a European security and defence policy. In January, Scharping gave a speech at the Federal College for Security Studies, in which he argued for a better balanced partnership between the US and the EU and an effective EU security policy:

Wir wollen eine neue [...] Arbeitsteilung zwischen den Vereinigten Staaten und Europa. Europa muß [...] in der Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik handlungsfähig werden. [...] Auf dem Weg dorthin haben wir noch viele Hürden zu überwinden. Entscheidend wird natürlich sein, ob wir auch den politischen Willen aufbringen, einig und entschlossen zu handeln, wenn das nächste Mal europäische

³⁵⁷ Rede von Bundeskanzler Gerhard Schröder, auf der 35. Münchener Sicherheitskonferenz, 6 February 1999, <http://www.securityconference.de/Activities.192.0.html?&L=1> [01.09.2010].

Own translation:

For the European building a common security and defence identity is an indispensable brick. We will use our EU presidency to develop such an identity – one of the main goals of our presidency. We want a new Europe for a new NATO, and we want a new NATO for a new Europe.

³⁵⁸ Idem.

Handlungsfähigkeit gefragt ist.³⁵⁹

In a speech to the European Parliament in January, Foreign Minister Fischer highlighted the positive impact of a European security and defence identity on European integration. In his view it would counter the growing trends of nationalisation in Europe.³⁶⁰

In May, a meeting of WEU foreign and defence ministers took place in Bremen as Germany also held the presidency of the WEU Council. It was the first time that the sequence of presidencies of the EU and WEU Councils was harmonised.³⁶¹ Both Scharping and Fischer delivered groundbreaking speeches at the Bremen WEU meeting. Scharping proposed the controversial idea of integrating the WEU into the EU:

gegenwärtig [müssen wir] Beratungen, Planungen und Entscheidungen in [...] drei Organisationen, nämlich Europäischen Union, Westeuropäische Union und NATO, zusammenführen. Ich persönlich sehe eine Lösung für dieses Problem in der Integration der WEU in die EU.³⁶²

Scharping also addressed the importance of European armament cooperation. According to him, more collaboration in armaments and R&T would improve Europe's defence

³⁵⁹ Rede des Bundesministers der Verteidigung, Rudolf Scharping, beim 'Forum der Chefredakteure zur Sicherheitspolitik' der Bundesakademie für Sicherheitspolitik, Bad Neuenahr, 26 January 1999, http://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/kcxml/04_Sj9SPykssy0xPLMnMz0vM0Y_QjzKLd4k3cQsESUGY5vqRMLGglFR9b31fj_zcVPOA_YLciHJHROVFAFBC9EYI/delta/base64xml/L3dJdyEvd0ZNQUFzQUMvNEIVRS82XORfNEdD [01.09.2010].

Own translation:

We want a new division of international responsibility between the US and Europe. Europe needs to be able to act together in foreign and security policies. In order to achieve that, we will have to overcome many obstacles. The litmus test will be whether in the face of the next crisis the EU will be willing to act jointly and decisively.'

³⁶⁰ Rede des Bundesministers des Auswärtigen, Joschka Fischer, vor dem Europäischen Parlament in Straßburg, 12 January 1999, <http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/de/Infoservice/Presse/Web-Archiv.html> [01.09.2010].

³⁶¹ This harmonisation was agreed on at the 1997 Amsterdam European Council summit and annexed to the EU Treaty by the Treaty of Amsterdam.

³⁶² Einführungsstatement vom Bundesminister der Verteidigung, Rudolf Scharping, anlässlich der gemeinsamen Sitzung der Außen- und Verteidigungsminister der WEU, Bremen, 10 May 1999, http://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/kcxml/04_Sj9SPykssy0xPLMnMz0vM0Y_QjzKLd4k3cQsESUGY5vqRMLGglFR9b31fj_zcVPOA_YLciHJHROVFAFBC9EYI/delta/base64xml/L3dJdyEvd0ZNQUFzQUMvNEIVRS82XORfNEdD [01.09.2010].

Own translation:

performance especially in light of the limited size of Europe's defence budgets.³⁶³ Fischer referred to the inability of the European states to contain the Kosovo conflict calling it a wake-up call for Europe to act more unitedly in foreign, security and defence policy.

Der Konflikt im Kosovo führt uns in diesen Tagen dramatisch vor Augen, [...] [dass] [w]ir Europäer [...] in der Lage sein [müssen], Krisen, die uns unmittelbar betreffen, auch dann gemeinsam zu bewältigen, wenn unsere transatlantischen Partner sich nicht daran beteiligen. [...] [V]on der Entwicklung des Kosovo-Konflikts wird - bei aller Tragik der Geschehnisse - ein Impuls in Richtung eines stärkeren Zusammengehens der Europäer in der Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik [...] Aus diesen Gründen meine ich, daß jetzt die Zeit reif [...], um zu substantiellen, weiterführenden Ergebnissen zu gelangen. Dies ist unser Ziel für den Europäischen Rat in Köln. Die [...] Europäischen Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik erfolgt nicht in Konkurrenz, sondern [...] zur Stärkung der NATO. Die kollektive Verteidigung wird weiterhin Aufgabe der NATO bleiben.³⁶⁴

The Presidency Conclusions of Germany's EU presidency, which was adopted at the Cologne European Council, noted that thanks to Germany's EU presidency the European security and defence policy had developed successfully over the last six months.

We intend to give the European Union the necessary means and capabilities to assume its responsibilities regarding a common European policy on security and defence. The work undertaken on the initiative of the German presidency [...] permit[s] us to take a decisive step forward.³⁶⁵

In his government statement, Schröder reported that following up on his proposal the Cologne European Council had agreed that the High Representative for CFSP would also

Currently decision-making, planning and organisation are taking place in three separate organisations: EU, WEU and NATO. In my opinion the integration of the WEU into the EU would solve this problem.

³⁶³ Idem.

³⁶⁴ Einführungsstatement vom Bundesminister des Auswärtigen, Joschka Fischer, anlässlich der gemeinsamen Sitzung der Außen- und Verteidigungsminister der WEU, Bremen, 10 May 1999, <http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/de/Infoservice/Presse/Web-Archiv.html> [01.09.2010]. Own translation:

At the moment the Kosovo conflict shows us dramatically how important it is for us Europeans to be able to respond to crises forcefully, which directly affects us and in which our transatlantic partners do not want to become involved. Therefore, despite all the tragedy of the Kosovo conflict it will give momentum to a European foreign and security policy. Given those reasons I believe the time is ripe to achieve substantial, advanced results. This will be our aim for the upcoming Cologne European Council summit. Such a common security and defence policy should not rival but strengthen NATO. Collective defence will remain NATO's responsibility.

³⁶⁵ Cologne European Council (1999), 'Presidency Conclusions', 3-4 June, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/kolnen.htm [01.09.2010].

become the Secretary General of the WEU. Javier Solana was appointed as the first High Representative in Cologne. Another important decision of the European Council, according to Schröder, was the transfer of the WEU's capabilities and functions to the EU albeit without its defence commitment. The transfer should be finalised by the end of 2000.³⁶⁶

In a speech to the European Parliament at the end of Germany's EU presidency, Fischer reviewed the presidency highlighting the establishment of the European Security and Defence Policy by the Cologne summit as significant for the future development of the EU:

[ESDP] wird [...] das nächste große Integrationsprojekt der EU sein. Es geht dabei [...] nicht um eine "Militarisierung" der EU, sondern darum, sie zu einer wirksamen und handlungsfähigen Friedensmacht fortzuentwickeln, die dazu in der Lage ist, wie im Kosovo den Krieg [...] endgültig der Vergangenheit angehören zu lassen.³⁶⁷

Speaking at the German Council on Foreign Policy in September, Schröder described the appointment of Javier Solana and the conclusions taken at the Cologne summit as important steps, which showed the EU's readiness to assume more responsibility. Yet, these steps were not enough. In his view, political and military decision-making structures and instruments for crisis management needed to be established in the EU and the WEU needed to be completely absorbed by the EU, that is, including its defence commitment. In response to the often uttered criticism that Germany under Schröder appeared too forcefully in its foreign and security policy, Schröder stated:

Außenpolitik ist Interessenpolitik. Wie alle unsere Nachbarn, haben auch die Deutschen nationale Interessen. Der entscheidende Punkt ist nur der, wie man

³⁶⁶ Regierungserklärung von Bundeskanzler Gerhard Schröder zu den Ergebnissen des Europäischen Rates am 3./4. Juni 1999 in Köln vor dem Deutschen Bundestag, 6 June 1999, <http://archiv.bundesregierung.de/index.jsp?&dokumentart=rede&sV=modified&sD=d> [01.09.2010].

³⁶⁷ Rede des Bundesministers des Auswärtigen, Joschka Fischer, zum Ende der deutschen Ratspräsidentschaft in der Europäischen Union vor dem Europäischen Parlament, Strasbourg, 21 July 1999, <http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/de/Infoservice/Presse/Web-Archiv.html> [01.09.2010]. Own translation:

ESDP will become the next big integration project for the EU. This, however, will not lead to a militarisation of the EU but will contribute to the EU becoming a credible and capable power for peace, which will achieve that war, as in Kosovo, will finally be a thing of the past.

diese Interessen definiert, und wie man sie verfolgt. Ich verstehe deutsche Außenpolitik [...] als eine Politik in und mit Europa.³⁶⁸

Only a few days later in a speech at the *Führungsakademie der Bundeswehr* in Hamburg Scharping explained Germany's motivation behind its support of the development of ESDP: 'Wir haben in der NATO nicht zuviel Amerika, sondern zuwenig Europa. In der Europäischen Union haben wir zuviel Agrar- und zuwenig Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik.'³⁶⁹

At the end of 1999 Schröder gave a speech at a commander's meeting of the *Bundeswehr* in Hamburg, in which he pointed out that Germany had undergone a major change and as Kosovo showed was ready now to meet its responsibilities in Europe and the world. This, however, would not mean a change in the direction of German politics. German politics would remain driven by Europe and for Europe. With regards to the EU security and defence policy, the Amsterdam Treaty and the decisions of the Cologne European Council were proof that the EU was serious to develop ESDP and speak with one voice in the future, although, Schröder admitted, more needed to be done, like the establishment of political and military decision-making structures as well as instruments for crisis prevention and management. In this respect, Schröder applauded the British suggestion to create a European rapid reaction force and proposed that Eurocorps formed the core of the reaction

³⁶⁸ Rede von Bundeskanzler Gerhard Schröder zur offiziellen Eröffnung des Sitzes der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, 'Außenpolitische Verantwortung Deutschlands in der Welt', Berlin, 2 September 1999, <http://archiv.bundesregierung.de/index.jsp?&dokumentart=rede&sV=modified&sD=d> [01.09.2010]. Own translation:

Foreign policy is driven by interest politics. Like all our neighbours, we have national interests. It is crucial, however, how one defines and pursues these interests. I understand German foreign policy as politics in Europe and together with Europe.

³⁶⁹ Rede des Bundesministers der Verteidigung, Rudolf Scharping, an der Führungsakademie der Bundeswehr, Hamburg, 8 September 1999, http://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/kcxm/04_Sj9SPykssy0xPLMnMz0vMOY_QjzKLd4k3cQsESUGY5vqRMLGglFR9b31fj_zcVPOA_YLciHJHROVFAFBC9EYI/delta/base64xml/L3dJdyEvd0ZNQUFzQUMvNEIVRS82XORfNEdD [01.09.2010].

Own translation:

In NATO we don't have too much America but too little Europe. In the EU we have too much agricultural policy but too little foreign and security policy.

force. Considering these developments at EU level and the new security challenges, the role of the *Bundeswehr* should be redefined:

Deutschland muß [...] über Streitkräfte verfügen, die [...] zusammen mit unseren Verbündeten auch zu Einsätzen im Rahmen der Krisenbewältigung fähig sein müssen [...] und - im Rahmen der Entwicklung europäischer Kapazitäten - "europafähige" Streitkräfte. Hierzu wird die Kommission "Zukunft der Bundeswehr" im nächsten Jahr ihre Vorschläge [...] vorlegen. Die Entwicklung der Europäischen Sicherheitspolitik fordert uns [...] heraus, über die nationalen Grenzen hinweg zu prüfen, ob und wie wir Aufgaben und Kosten mit unseren Verbündeten teilen können.³⁷⁰

In the run-up to the Helsinki European Council summit, Schröder once again urged his EU colleagues to agree on both the creation of decision-making mechanisms, including a political and security committee and a military committee, and the improvement of the EU's military capabilities by fully integrating the WEU into the EU.³⁷¹ Indeed, Schröder was able to report in his government statement on the outcome of the Helsinki summit, that the member states decided to create three interim committees - the Political and Security Committee, the Military Committee, and the Military Staff.³⁷² There was, however, no agreement on the transfer of the WEU's defence commitment to the EU, as Schröder had to concede. Yet, in order to improve the EU's military capabilities, the member states adopted the Helsinki Headline Goal, which envisaged the creation of a Rapid Reaction Force by 2003. Although Schröder agreed that the Rapid Reaction Force and the three

³⁷⁰ Rede von Bundeskanzler Gerhard Schröder bei der 37. Kommandeurtagung der Bundeswehr, Hamburg, 29 November 1999, <http://archiv.bundesregierung.de/index.jsp?&dokumentart=rede&sV=modified&sD=d> [01.09.2010].

Own translation:

Germany needs armed forces, which will be able to conduct crisis management missions together with our allies and - given the development of European military capacity – which will be 'Europe-capable'. Therefore, the commission 'future of the *Bundeswehr*' will present its proposals on these issues in the next year. The development of a European security policy challenges us to consider beyond borders if and how we can share tasks and costs with our allies.

³⁷¹ Regierungserklärung von Bundeskanzler Gerhard Schröder zum bevorstehenden Europäischen Rat in Helsinki am 10./11. vor dem Deutschen Bundestag, 3 December 1999,

<http://archiv.bundesregierung.de/index.jsp?&dokumentart=rede&sV=modified&sD=d> [01.09.2010].

³⁷² Regierungserklärung von Bundeskanzler Gerhard Schröder zu den Ergebnissen des Europäischen Rates in Helsinki vom 10./11. Dezember 1999 vor dem Deutschen Bundestag, 16 December 1999, <http://archiv.bundesregierung.de/index.jsp?&dokumentart=rede&sV=modified&sD=d> [01.09.2010].

committees should be created without 'unnecessary duplication of NATO structures'³⁷³, he insisted that these new structures were important for ESDP. Otherwise Europe would never become a co-equal partner of the US and co-determine the global order in the 21st century. Without taking over military responsibility from the US, the EU, however, would not be able to keep the US interested in Europe. 'Ein starkes Europa, das bereit ist, auch [...] militärische Verantwortung zu übernehmen, ist die beste Garantie für eine fortdauernde Präsenz der Vereinigten Staaten in Europa'³⁷⁴

5.2.2 Reform of the *Bundeswehr* and Nice European Council summit (2000)

While Schröder attempted on the European stage to push forward with the European Security and Defence Policy, Scharping had to struggle to reform the *Bundeswehr*, which in his view, when he became Defence Minister, was neither ready for NATO's out-of-area operations nor good enough to play a part in the new European defence policy. Constrained by a tight defence budget, Scharping instigated a reform plan, which included most of the proposals made by the Weizsäcker Commission in May 2000. The German cabinet approved this plan in June. Against the backdrop of international commitments both within the EU and NATO the plan envisaged a cut in the force strength from 338,000 troops to 280,000 troops. Out of these 280,000, 200,000 should be professional soldiers or short service volunteers, whereas the remaining 80,000 should be conscripts. The standing forces should be structured to provide NATO and the EU with forces capable of sustaining a major operation for up to a year or two medium-sized operations troops each for several

³⁷³ Helsinki European Council (1999), 'Presidency Conclusions', 10-11 December, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/hel1_en.htm [01.09.2010].

³⁷⁴ Regierungserklärung von Bundeskanzler Gerhard Schröder zu den Ergebnissen des Europäischen Rates in Helsinki vom 10./11. Dezember 1999 vor dem Deutschen Bundestag, 16 December 1999, <http://archiv.bundesregierung.de/index.jsp?&dokumentart=rede&sV=modified&sD=d> [01.09.2010]. Own translation:

A strong Europe, which is prepared to assume military responsibility, is the best guarantee for a continuing presence of the US in Europe.

years. A new Joint Operations Command (*Einsatzführungskommando*) would be set up at Potsdam-Geltow which would give the *Bundeswehr* for the first time in its history the capability of planning, preparing and conducting land, naval or air operations on its own. The command could also provide an operational headquarters to the EU for Petersberg tasks. The reform also included a modernisation of equipment. In this regard, strategic mobility and deployability were top priorities. To better achieve air and sea transport capacities, the German government started an initiative with France for a European Air Transport Command. Furthermore, together with other European governments Germany decided to jointly develop and procure a Future Transport Aircraft (A-400M).³⁷⁵

Another indicator of Germany's seriousness in contributing to ESDP was its commitment of 13,500 ground troops to the first EU Capabilities Commitment Conference in November, which requested member states to earmark units for a force catalogue providing the capabilities required for the Helsinki Headline Goal. This was the largest commitment any member state had made. For Schröder the conference was an incredible success, which sent a strong signal that the EU was ready and determined to assume responsibility in security and defence policy. The upcoming European Council summit in Nice would represent, according to Schröder, another major milestone for ESDP: 'Die Europäer werden bei der Krisenprävention und bei der Krisenbewältigung ein starker Akteur sein.'³⁷⁶ Schröder also referred to the importance of civilian crisis prevention, which at the insistence of Germany was high on the EU's agenda. 'Ich halte es für einen Vorzug, dass

³⁷⁵ American Institute for Contemporary German Studies Study Group (2001), 'Redefining German Security: Prospects for *Bundeswehr* Reform', *German Issues*, no.25, pp.31-38.

³⁷⁶ Regierungserklärung von Bundeskanzler Gerhard Schröder zum Europäischen Rat in Nizza vor dem Deutschen Bundestag, 28 November 2000, <http://archiv.bundesregierung.de/index.jsp?&dokumentart=rede&sV=modified&sD=d> [01.09.2010].

Own translation:

The EU will become a strong actor in military as well as civilian crisis prevention and management.

Europa nicht in erster Linie in militärischen Kategorien denkt. Für uns kann der Einsatz militärischer Mittel - das unterstreiche ich - immer nur Ultima Ratio sein.³⁷⁷

In his government statement on the outcome of the Nice summit, Schröder welcomed the fact that the three interim committees had received formal status and the decision to transfer WEU institutions, such as the Satellite Centre and the Institute of Security Studies, to the EU. In this view this was an important step to eventually fully include the WEU into the EU.³⁷⁸

5.2.3 The events of 9/11 and Laeken European Council summit (2001)

Schröder used the 37th Munich Security Conference to calm US concerns over ESDP and assure the new US administration under George W. Bush that ESDP would not replace or rival NATO. In his view ESDP would actually benefit the transatlantic cooperation.

For a Europe that is capable of acting on security policy issues will, by strengthening the European pillar of the Alliance, strengthen the Alliance as a whole. This is true for the simple reason that most of the members of the European Union are also members of NATO [...]. We therefore need the greatest possible degree of transparency, and close and early coordination between the European Union and NATO.³⁷⁹

At the same time, however, Schröder insisted on redefining the transatlantic relationship taking into account a more powerful and self-confident Europe:

[T]he transatlantic relationship of 2001 is no longer the transatlantic relationship of 1949. The European side is no longer composed of individual states, but has become a Union that is growing ever closer. Our cooperation must adapt to this new circumstances.³⁸⁰

³⁷⁷ Idem.

Own translation:

I think it is actually an advantage that the EU does not primarily focus on military power. For us – and I emphasise this – the deployment of military forces can only be used as last resort.

³⁷⁸ Regierungserklärung von Bundeskanzler Gerhard Schröder vor dem Deutschen Bundestag zu den Ergebnissen des Europäischen Rates in Nizza, 19 January 2001,

<http://archiv.bundesregierung.de/index.jsp?dokumentart=rede&sV=modified&sD=d> [01.09.2010].

³⁷⁹ Speech by Gerhard Schröder, Federal Chancellor, 37th Munich Security Conference, 3 February 2001, <http://www.securityconference.de/Activities.192.0.html?&L=1> [01.09.2010].

³⁸⁰ Idem.

Fischer took the same line in his speech at the Munich Security Conference: 'The transatlantic relationship is changing, and change it must if it is to maintain its vitality.'³⁸¹ Fischer showed a high level of self-confidence. He asserted that the US and NATO would profit from a strong ESDP and suggested the idea of a 'Berlin Plus reversed': 'the new capabilities, which a credible ESDP requires, will also be available to NATO.'³⁸² On the contentious issue of the engagement of non-EU European NATO members, such as Iceland, Norway and Turkey, in ESDP he pointed out that those countries had already more consultation and co-decision rights than any non-members had ever been offered by another international organisation. Fischer even went so far as to belittle NATO's efforts in integrating Central and Eastern European states:

Let us not forget that EU eastward enlargement is an investment in a long-term preventive security and peace policy, which will have a greater and more lasting influence on the internal stability of these states and societies than the opening up of NATO. [...] Europeans [also don't need to] be ashamed of either their civilian or military commitment in the Balkans.³⁸³

Fischer had already expressed most prominently in his famous Humboldt University speech of 12 May 2000 that he wanted the EU to become a federal state in every sense, including defence policy.³⁸⁴ Yet, it was new that he took such a firm stand against the US. To some extent, he softened his arguments in a *Bundestag* debate on the transatlantic relationship in March:

Ich teile nicht die Ängste in Washington, die Ängste der Vereinigten Staaten, obwohl ich sie verstehe. Die Europäische Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik richtet sich nicht gegen die NATO. Natürlich bleibt die NATO für die strategische Sicherheit und für die Verteidigungsfähigkeit unseres Kontinents und damit unseres Landes von zentraler, überragender Bedeutung. Die Europäische Sicherheits- und

³⁸¹ Speech by Joschka Fischer, Federal Foreign Minister, 37th Munich Security Conference, 3 February 2001, <http://www.securityconference.de/Activities.192.0.html?&L=1> [01.09.2010].

³⁸² Idem.

³⁸³ Idem.

³⁸⁴ Speech by Joschka Fischer, Federal Foreign Minister, 'From Confederacy to Federation: Thoughts on the Finality of European Integration', Humboldt University Berlin, 12 May 2000, http://www.ena.lu/speech_joschka_fischer_ultimate_objective_european_integration_berlin_12_2000-020005639.html [01.09.2010].

Verteidigungspolitik ist auf die Petersberger Aufgaben, auf Krisenmanagement und Konfliktbewältigung fokussiert und eben nicht auf die strategische Verteidigung.³⁸⁵

In an interview with the newspaper *Le Monde* Schröder signalled that Germany was prepared to support very close integration of ESDP although he stopped short of endorsing a European army. His response to the question whether he believed in the possibility of a European army was very diplomatic: 'Was Sie hier vorschlagen, ist eine große Vision. Und man hat mir oft vorgeworfen, dass ich keine großen Visionen habe.'³⁸⁶ However, in his opinion a European defence identity was certainly developing.

The attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon had a strong impact on the German government. A month after the events of 9/11 Schröder gave a speech to the *Bundestag*, in which he emphasised that Germany needed to accept greater responsibility given its fully regained sovereignty after the end of the Cold War. For Schröder, that included participation in military operations to defend freedom and human rights and to create stability and security.³⁸⁷

When questioned in an interview with the German newspaper *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, why the US had not asked the EU and its ESDP for support of the US operation in

³⁸⁵ Rede des Bundesministers des Auswärtigen, Joschka Fischer, im Deutschen Bundestag, 'Die transatlantischen Beziehungen', 15 March 2001, <http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/de/Infoservice/Presse/Web-Archiv.html> [01.09.2010].

Own translation:

I don't share Washington's fear of ESDP but I can understand it. The European Security and Defence Policy is not directed against NATO. NATO will remain central to our strategic security and the defence of our continent. ESDP, on the other hand, will focus on the Petersberg tasks, crisis management and conflict resolution and not on strategic defence.

³⁸⁶ Interview der französischen Tageszeitung *Le Monde* mit Bundeskanzler Gerhard Schröder, 30 October 2001, <http://archiv.bundesregierung.de/index.jsp?&dokumentart=rede&sV=modified&sD=d> [01.09.2010]. Own translation:

What you propose here is a great vision. And I have been often accused of not having great visions.

³⁸⁷ Regierungserklärung von Bundeskanzler Gerhard Schröder vor dem Deutschen Bundestag, 11 October 2001, <http://archiv.bundesregierung.de/index.jsp?&dokumentart=rede&sV=modified&sD=d> [01.09.2010].

Afghanistan, Schröder defended this decision by arguing that the European Security and Defence Policy was not ready yet for such a huge operation.³⁸⁸

In a speech to the French Assemblée Nationale, Fischer acknowledged the fact that the EU and ESDP were ignored by the US but claimed that this should not be perceived as a setback. After all NATO was ignored too. For Fischer the events of 9/11 actually showed again that the European nations, even the bigger ones, were too small to deal with the new security challenges on their own.

Wir beobachten im Zuge der Koalition gegen den Terror eine große Achsenverschiebung der internationalen Politik. [Als Resultat] werden die Europäer, selbst die größten europäischen Nationen zu klein sein, um ihre Interessen [...] allein wahren zu können. Diese große Achsenverschiebung bietet Chancen für eine aktive [...] der gemeinsamen Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik.³⁸⁹

According to Fischer, a further step towards greater integration could, for example, be to merge the jobs of the High Representative and the Commissioner for External Relations into one post. This would help the EU to speak with one voice on foreign affairs.³⁹⁰ In a speech to the *Bundestag* in December Fischer stressed that the EU did respond effectively to the events of 9/11 but its foreign, security and defence policies were only at their beginning and needed to develop further. He mentioned three crucial reasons forcing Europe to integrate these policies further:

Erstens: Wenn Europa nicht zusammenfindet, dann wird Europa [...] in der Welt des 21. Jahrhunderts in erheblichem Maße Einfluss verlieren. Zweitens: Die Erweiterung wird einen gewaltigen Druck in Richtung institutionelle Veränderungen [...] und damit in Richtung mehr Integration ausüben. Der dritte [und wichtigste] Punkt betrifft die veränderte weltpolitische Situation. Denn Europa [...] wächst aufgrund

³⁸⁸ Interview der Tageszeitung *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* mit Bundeskanzler Gerhard Schröder, 10 November 2001,

<http://archiv.bundesregierung.de/index.jsp?&dokumentart=rede&sV=modified&sD=d> [01.09.2010].

³⁸⁹ Rede des Bundesministers des Auswärtigen, Joschka Fischer, vor der *Assemblée nationale*, Paris, 30 October 2001, <http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/de/Infoservice/Presse/Web-Archiv.html> [01.09.2010].

Own translation:

In the light of the coalition against terrorism we can observe a huge change in power of international politics. [As a result] Europeans, even the bigger European nations, will be too small to act alone to maintain their interests on the world stage. This huge change in power therefore offers a chance to pushing ahead with the common foreign and security policy.

³⁹⁰ Idem.

gemeinsamer Interessen bzw. aufgrund der [...] Erkenntnis dass die Alternativen zu einem gemeinsamen Europa für die Mitgliedstaaten schlicht und einfach schlechter sind.³⁹¹

Therefore, according to Fischer, the upcoming Laeken European Council summit had to send a strong signal to press ahead with integration.

Less than a month before the EU summit in Laeken a Franco-German summit took place in Nantes. In a Declaration by the Franco-German Defence and Security Council³⁹² it was suggested that ESDP should not solely focus on the Petersberg tasks.³⁹³ Instead, it should also contribute to preventing and tackling terrorist threats thereby protecting the public.³⁹⁴

After the Laeken European Council summit Schröder praised the establishment of the Convention on the Future of Europe in his government statement. In his view it proved that the 'concerns' of some commentators and journalists about a re-nationalisation of the member states' foreign policies after 9/11 were not true; neither was it true that there was a confrontation between bigger and smaller member states about the future development of the common security and defence policy fuelled by a number of exclusive meetings between the bigger member states. Although, as Schröder admitted, the common foreign, security and defence policies still had major shortfalls, the solution would be more Europe not less Europe. In this regard, Schröder strongly supported that less than three years after it had been proposed, the EU declared its Rapid Reaction Force operational notwithstanding the remaining shortcomings. This meant, he explained, that the EU could

³⁹¹ Rede des Bundesministers des Auswärtigen, Joschka Fischer, vor dem Deutschen Bundestag im Rahmen der europapolitischen Debatte, 12 December 2001, <http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/de/Infoservice/Presse/Web-Archiv.html> [01.09.2010]. Own translation.

First, if Europe does not come together Europe will to a great extent lose influence in the world of the 21st century. Second, the enlargement of the EU will exert pressure to renew the EU's institutions and therefore will lead to greater integration. The third [and most important] reason refers to the changed 'world political situation'. Europe is driven by common interests and the realisation that for the member states the alternatives to a united Europe are quite simply worse.

³⁹² This council was founded in 1988 as an integral part of the Elysée Treaty and since then the members of the Council have met once in a year.

³⁹³ *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (2001), 'Terrorbekämpfung als Aufgabe der EU?', 14 December.

³⁹⁴ Franco-German Defence and Security Council (2001), 'Declaration', Nantes, 23 November, <http://www.ambafrance-uk.org/Seventy-eighth-Franco-German.html> [01.09.2010].

now conduct some crisis management operations and gradually could take on even more demanding operations. Schröder finished his statement by emphasising again the impact the events of 9/11 had on Germany and Europe in general:

Seit der Zeitenwende von 1989, deutlich spürbar seit unserem Engagement im Kosovo-Konflikt und wirklich mit Händen zu greifen seit dem 11. September, werden uns Deutschen die veränderten Bedingungen in der Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik und auch unsere gewachsene internationale Verantwortung zunehmend bewusst. Diese gewachsene internationale Verantwortung können und wollen wir nicht aus dem europäischen Kontext herauslösen.³⁹⁵

5.2.3 The looming Iraq war and the German federal election (2002)

Although 2002 was all about the federal election and Schröder's government concentrated mainly on domestic policies, there were a number of important events and speeches concerning ESDP in 2002.

In April at the 39th commander's meeting, Schröder highlighted Germany's pro-common European security and defence policy attitude by maintaining that in comparison to other member states, there were no reservations about ESDP in Germany. The government and the public not only agreed on its importance but also argued for its further development. Schröder also demanded the swift implementation of the EU-NATO 'Berlin Plus' agreement³⁹⁶ so that the EU would be able to take over the NATO 'Amber Fox' mission in Macedonia³⁹⁷ and therewith conduct its first crisis management mission.³⁹⁸

³⁹⁵ Regierungserklärung von Bundeskanzler Gerhard Schröder zum Europäischen Rat in Laeken am 14./15. Dezember 2001, 17 December 2001, <http://archiv.bundesregierung.de/index.jsp?&dokumentart=rede&sV=modified&sD=d> [01.09.2010].

Own translation:

After the watershed events of 1989, albeit more noticeable after our contribution to NATO's Kosovo operation and absolutely palpable now after the 9/11 attack, Germany had become aware of the changed circumstances to which foreign and security policy needed to adapt and of its growing international duty. This increased international duty we only can and want to from a European perspective.

³⁹⁶ See chapter four.

³⁹⁷ *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (2002), 'Präzedenzfall Mazedonien', 28 March.

³⁹⁸ Rede von Bundeskanzler Gerhard Schröder auf der 39. Kommandeur-Tagung der Bundeswehr, Hanover, 8 April 2002, <http://archiv.bundesregierung.de/index.jsp?&dokumentart=rede&sV=modified&sD=d> [01.09.2010].

At the same commander's meeting, Scharping addressed the infamous 'capability-expectation gap' of European armed forces. In his opinion, the military weakness of Europe was caused by a lack of political determination of European leaders to better harmonise their armed forces, better organise their military cooperation, better standardise armament and to make more efficient and economic use of their defence investment. However, Scharping asserted that

Wir Europäer sollten aber generell nicht die Diskussion über eine angemessene Lastenteilung in der Friedenssicherung auf die reinen Verteidigungsausgaben verengen. Die [...] Mitglied[er] der Europäischen Union [...] stellen 6 % der Weltbevölkerung [...] Die Europäer stellen knapp 20 % aller VN-Truppen, -Polizeikräfte und -Beobachter im Einsatz, ihr Anteil am regulären VN-Budget beträgt 40 %, am VN-Budget für Peacekeeping-Operationen [...] Diese Leistungen tragen genauso zur Stärkung von Stabilität und Sicherheit bei wie die Verfügbarkeit militärischer Fähigkeiten.³⁹⁹

In any case, only a comprehensive approach on security, which also included preventive measure, could tackle today's complex security problems. According to the speech Scharping made at the International Workshop on 'Global Security and the War on Terrorism', the EU was well suited to carry out this approach given that it had at its disposal a unique mix of civil and military capabilities.⁴⁰⁰ The growing capacity of the EU to take on civil and military crisis management mission would relieve NATO of some of its burden.

³⁹⁹ Rede des Bundesministers der Verteidigung, Rudolf Scharping, anlässlich der 39.

Kommandeurtagung der Bundeswehr, Hanover, 8 April 2002,

http://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/kcxml/04_Sj9SPykssy0xPLMnMz0vM0Y_QjzKLd4k3cQsESUGYSvqRMLGgIFR9b31fj_zcVPOA_YLciHJHROVFAFBC9EY!/delta/base64xml/L3dJdyEvd0ZNQUFzQUMvNEIVRS82XORfNEdD [01.09.2010].

Own translation:

We Europeans should not solely focus on defence expenditure when discussing adequate burden-sharing in peace keeping operations. The EU member states make up 6% of the world's population. But almost 20% of all UN troops, police forces and observers originate from the EU and the EU countries fund nearly 40% of the UN's budget and peacekeeping costs. Those activities contribute to improving stability and security as much as the existence of military capabilities do.

⁴⁰⁰ Address by Rudolf Scharping, Federal Defence Minister, 19th International Workshop on 'Global Security and the War on Terrorism', 4 May 2002,

http://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/kcxml/04_Sj9SPykssy0xPLMnMz0vM0Y_QjzKLd4k3cQsESUGYSvqRMLGgIFR9b31fj_zcVPOA_YLciHJHROVFAFBC9EY!/delta/base64xml/L3dJdyEvd0ZNQUFzQUMvNEIVRS82XORfNEdD [01.09.2010].

Nevertheless, despite ESDP's progress, the EU member states still did not spend enough on R&D. In order to enhance investments in this area, Scharping proposed the following:

I think it would be best if the Europeans agreed on corridors for their investments. They should increase their investments within agreed margins. It requires the Europeans to spend their investment funds more wisely and on a more cooperative basis.⁴⁰¹

On 18 July, Schröder announced the dismissal of Scharping following allegations that he improperly received money from a public relations firm. Scharping was succeeded by Peter Struck, former leader of the SPD's parliamentary group in the *Bundestag*,

On 25 July in his first government statement Struck welcomed the 2000 reforms on the *Bundeswehr* acknowledging that they gradually bore fruit. Only because of this progress, Struck stated, Germany was able to assume the responsibilities stemming from the EU, NATO and UN memberships.⁴⁰² The decision of the Seville European Council to undertake the first crisis management operation by replacing the UN police mission in Bosnia with the EU Police Mission (EUPM) was described as a very encouraging sign by Struck.⁴⁰³ Another milestone agreed at this summit was the declaration requesting ESDP to contribute in combating terrorism – something that had already been proposed by Schröder and Chirac at their meeting in Nantes in November 2001.

At the end of July, a Franco-German summit took place in Schwerin, which inter alia discussed defence. Ahead of the meeting, the Belgian Prime Minister, Guy Verhofstadt, had proposed the establishment of a European military headquarters and a mutual solidarity clause in a letter to Schröder and Chirac. Both leaders confirmed at the press conference

⁴⁰¹ Idem.

⁴⁰² Regierungserklärung des Verteidigungsministers, Peter Struck, zur Lage der Bundeswehr und ihrer Aufgaben im Rahmen der Sicherheitspolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 25 July 2002, http://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/kcxm/04_Sj9SPykssyOxPLMnMz0vM0Y_QjzKLd4k3cQsESUGY5vqRMLGgIFR9b31fj_zcVPOA_YLciHJHROVFABFC9EYI/delta/base64xml/L3dJdyEvd0ZNQUFzQUMvNEIVRS82XORfNEdD [01.09.2010].

⁴⁰³ Idem.

after their summit that Verhofstadt's proposals 'went in the right direction'.⁴⁰⁴ They were also asked about a possible US military attack against Iraq. Although Schröder answered cautiously that any attack would have to be justified by a decision of the UN Security Council, in the final weeks of his election campaign, he became more and more outspoken in his opposition against military intervention in Iraq.⁴⁰⁵ Schröder called Bush's policy on Iraq an 'adventure' and spoke of a 'German way' in dealing with this crisis.⁴⁰⁶ Schröder's opposing attitude towards a possible war against Iraq was fully supported by the German public. Not least because of this Schröder narrowly won a second term in office together with the Green Party in September.

5.3 Analysis No.1

Although German policy-makers did not participate in the Saint Malo meeting, they became the driving force behind the establishment of ESDP on the European stage. Given that Germany held the EU presidency in the first half of 1999, its government was responsible for organising the crucial Cologne European Council. The Cologne Presidency Conclusions drafted by German policy-makers caused uproar. In comparison to the 1999 NATO summit communiqué, which had endorsed the Saint Malo Declaration, it did not give NATO the right of first refusal and overall assigned a weak role to NATO. If one considers only the Cologne document, German policy-makers' behaviour may be deemed surprising as Germany had been deeply integrated into NATO and had profited enormously from NATO membership. But the Cologne Conclusions must be seen in context. As explained above, during the 1990s, Germany became more and more disillusioned with NATO and as a result

⁴⁰⁴ *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (2002), 'Deutschland und Frankreich wollen die EU militärisch stärken', 31 July.

⁴⁰⁵ *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (2002), 'Schröder keine Beteiligung an Krieg gegen den Irak', 5 August.

⁴⁰⁶ Interview der Tageszeitung *Tagesspiegel* mit Bundeskanzler Gerhard Schröder, 15 August 2002, <http://archiv.bundesregierung.de/index.jsp?&dokumentart=rede&sV=modified&sD=d> [01.09.2010].

shifted its efforts to the WEU and the EU. In addition, following reunification Germany adjusted its foreign and defence policy to reflect its new status in the international system. To some extent, those trends intensified when Schröder's government came into power. By introducing the concept of national interest into German foreign and security policy debate, Schröder presented a hitherto unknown, self-confident foreign and security policy. Fischer was more cautious and warned against uttering German national interests too vocally. His vision somewhat ironically - most observers had expected the Greens to pursue a more transformationist approach – demonstrated a remarkable continuity with that of Kohl and other politicians of the 'Bonn Republic', namely, that Germany had to remain embedded in the foreign and security consensus of the European states.⁴⁰⁷ Notwithstanding this difference, for both as well as for the other members of the government the tragic events in Kosovo were a watershed and convinced them that the EU needed military crisis management for humanitarian purposes.

Beyond these initial reasons for the development of ESDP, Chancellor Gerhard Schröder and Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer became noticeably attached to ESDP during their first term in office. They considered ESDP the EU's next big integration project. Schröder made a number of important ESDP proposals, such as the establishment of Eurocorps as the core of the European reaction force, the complete integration of the WEU, including the WEU's collective defence commitment, into the EU and the appointment of the EU's High Representative for CFSP as the Secretary General of the WEU.⁴⁰⁸ The inclusion of the WEU's defence guarantee in the EU, for which Schröder explicitly argued on many different

⁴⁰⁷ Hyde-Price, Adrian, Charlie Jeffrey (2001), 'Germany in the European Union: construction normality', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol.39, no.4, p.698.

⁴⁰⁸ See, for example, Rede von Bundeskanzler Gerhard Schröder bei der 37. Kommandeurtagung der Bundeswehr, Hamburg, 29 November 1999 (footnote 370).

occasions⁴⁰⁹, was however controversial among most EU member states and even within his own government. Fischer did not support this proposal.⁴¹⁰ He emphasised that collective defence should remain NATO's responsibility. ESDP should instead focus on the Petersberg tasks, crisis management and conflict resolution. Fischer's attitude can be partly explained by his intention for Germany to follow the foreign and security consensus of the European states. Also, he genuinely believed that due to its range of civilian capabilities and some military ones ESDP was already better prepared to tackle today's complex security crises than many other organisations. Mere military means were not sufficient anymore.

Fischer and Schröder demanded a more balanced transatlantic relationship, which acknowledged the remarkable development of ESDP.⁴¹¹ Fischer was convinced that NATO and the US would actually profit from a strong ESDP, for example, by establishing a 'Berlin Plus reversed'.⁴¹²

Defence Minister Rudolf Scharping proposed to improve the European Security and Defence Policy through various projects, such as better collaboration in armaments and R&T beyond already existing programmes like OCCAR⁴¹³. At the national level Scharping pushed forward with far-reaching reforms of the *Bundeswehr* to make it a capable and credible force, which could contribute to NATO and ESDP operations. At the 2000 EU

⁴⁰⁹ See, for example, Rede von Bundeskanzler Gerhard Schröder zur offiziellen Eröffnung des Sitzes der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, 'Außenpolitische Verantwortung Deutschlands in der Welt', Berlin, 2 September 1999 (footnote 368).

⁴¹⁰ See Einführungsstatement vom Bundesminister des Auswärtigen, Joschka Fischer, anlässlich der gemeinsamen Sitzung der Außen- und Verteidigungsminister der WEU, Bremen, 10 May 1999 (footnote 364).

⁴¹¹ See speech by Joschka Fischer, Federal Foreign Minister, 37th Munich Security Conference, 3 February 2001 (footnote 381) and speech by Gerhard Schröder, Federal Chancellor, 37th Munich Security Conference, 3 February 2001 (footnote 379).

⁴¹² See speech by Joschka Fischer, Federal Foreign Minister, 37th Munich Security Conference, 3 February 2001 (footnote 381)

⁴¹³ The Organisation for Joint Armament Cooperation (OCCAR) established in 1996 is a European intergovernmental organisation which facilitates and manages collaborative armament programmes between the nations of Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, the United Kingdom and non-EU member Turkey.

Capabilities Commitment Conference, he made sure that Germany was able to offer the largest commitment of 13,500 ground troops.

The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon as well as the subsequent 'coalition of the willing' against Afghanistan led by the US strengthened the government's belief that only through greater cooperation the European states would be able to influence world politics.⁴¹⁴ As a consequence, the member states should assign more power to the EU in general and to CFSP/ESDP in particular. ESDP, for example, should gain the ability to prevent and overcome terrorist threats. Schröder also indirectly accepted Verhofstadt's far-reaching ESDP proposals of a EU military headquarters and mutual assistance clause at the Franc-German Schwerin summit⁴¹⁵ although he knew those proposals would anger and concern the US due to their consequences for NATO. To a certain extent, in 2002, German policy-makers' support for the further development of ESDP became influenced by their tensions with the US government over a possible war against Iraq.

Overall, during their first term in office, the three policy-makers engaged extensively with ESDP and drove it forward with numerous proposals. At times Scharping appeared less enthusiastic than Schröder and Fischer. It is very likely, however, that this was because of pressure of the Federal Ministry of Defence - traditionally the least Europeanised of the German ministries⁴¹⁶ - and not because he was anti-ESDP. Before Scharping became Defence Minister he, as chairman of the SPD's *Zukunftskommission*, had convinced his party to support the development of a European security and defence policy.

⁴¹⁴ See, for example, Rede des Bundesministers des Auswärtigen, Joschka Fischer, vor dem Deutschen Bundestag im Rahmen der europapolitischen Debatte, 12 December 2001 (footnote 391).

⁴¹⁵ See *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (2002), 'Deutschland und Frankreich wollen die EU militärisch stärken', 31 July (footnote 404).

⁴¹⁶ Defence Ministry officials perceived NATO as less threatening to conscription, which according to them as well as most German policy-makers was a cornerstone of Germany's political culture and should not be abolished.

Dyson, Tom (2005), 'German Military Reform 1998-2004: Leadership and the Triumph of Domestic Constraint over International Opportunity', *European Security*, vol. 14, no.3, p.373.

There is clearly evidence that the policy-makers internalised ESDP norms and did not comply with them because of strategic calculation. There was neither prospect of reward nor threat of punishment, which led the policy-makers to push forward with ESDP. On the contrary, it could cause serious consequences to the relationship with the US, which at least at the beginning worried the German government.

On the other hand, there is no proof of active and reflective internalisation of ESDP norms. Often, the policy-makers spoke cautiously about ESDP and stressed that ESDP was still at its beginning. For example, Scharping made clear in a speech at the Federal College for Security Studies that ESDP still had to show that it was willing to act in the face of a crisis.⁴¹⁷ Furthermore, at the beginning of ESDP, the policy-makers attempted to calm US concerns over ESDP. At the 2001 Munich Security Conference, Schröder assured the US administration that ESDP would not replace or rival NATO.⁴¹⁸ Consequently, for the three policy-makers of the first Red-Green government, it can be concluded that Type II internalisation did not happen. Instead, the policy-makers acted boundedly rational. Thus, they adopted certain roles in line with ESDP norms because they were appropriate, socially accepted standards of behaviour, which enabled them to prioritise and respond to particular policy problems and interests. Therefore, the mechanism 'role playing' took place. ESDP as a site had a socialising impact on the policy-makers.

Having identified the socialisation mechanism, it will be tested whether any of the four proposed scope conditions actually triggered role playing:

- {1}) Agents are in settings, where contact is long and sustained and it has some significant duration.
- {2}) Agents are in settings where the contact is intense.

⁴¹⁷ See Rede des Bundesministers der Verteidigung, Rudolf Scharping, beim 'Forum der Chefredakteure zur Sicherheitspolitik' der Bundesakademie für Sicherheitspolitik, Bad Neuenahr, 26 January 1999 (footnote 359).

⁴¹⁸ See speech by Gerhard Schröder, Federal Chancellor, 37th Munich Security Conference, 3 February 2001 (footnote 379).

[3]) Those agents with extensive previous professional experiences in regional or international policy-making settings are more likely to internalize supranational role conceptions.

[4]) [...] Agents with extensive domestic policy networks who are briefly “parachuted” into regional/international settings will be less likely to internalize new role conceptions.⁴¹⁹

Between 1999 and 2002 the three German policy-makers regularly met with their counterparts on the European stage to discuss security and defence matters. Following a German proposal, which suggested the need for meetings of the EU foreign ministers’ General Affairs Council⁴²⁰ together with defence ministers,⁴²¹ EU defence ministers met for the first time with foreign ministers on 15 November 1999. At the Helsinki council it was then officially agreed that defence ministers should participate in the General Affairs Council when it discussed matters related to ESDP. In addition, it was decided that from 2000 EU defence ministers should meet informally twice a year. The Heads of State and Government held official European Council meetings four times a year although when the situation required, the presidency convened a special meeting of the European Council. However, none of these special summits were on ESDP and not all of the official meetings discussed ESDP. Each EU presidency published a report on ESDP, which was presented to the European Council and approved by the other the Heads of State and Government. Given that security and defence policy is a highly sensitive area for every member state, most of these ESDP meetings were intense and could last until late at night.

Yet, despite these frequent meetings on ESDP, some of them were only established at the end of 1999/beginning of 2000 and more importantly these meetings have to be seen in the light of other summits Schröder, Fischer and Scharping had to attend. As a German civil

⁴¹⁹ Checkel, Jeffrey T. (2007), ‘International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and Framework’, in, Checkel, Jeffrey T. (ed), *International Institutions and Socialization in Europe*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p.12.

⁴²⁰ Since June 2002, it has been renamed to the General Affairs and External Relations Council holding separate meetings on general affairs and external relations.

⁴²¹ ‘German Presidency paper – 24 February 1999’, in, Rutten, Maartje (2001), *From St Malo to Nice - European defence: core documents*, EU Institute for Security Studies, Chaillot Paper, No.47, p.14. <http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/cp047e.pdf> [01.09.2010].

servant pointed out, considering the numerous meetings on various issues they took part in every day, it is difficult to believe that the duration and intensity of the meetings on ESDP had an impact on them.⁴²²

According to this civil servant, the establishment of relationships outside these meetings were more important.⁴²³ After initial tensions the relationship between Schröder and Chirac grew to such an extent that together, they frequently proposed new developments for ESDP as, for example, at their Nantes meeting in November 2001 and Schwerin meeting in July 2002.

Consequently, it is difficult to find a systematic relationship between the first two scope conditions and the dependent variable.

According to the third and fourth scope conditions, the likelihood of role playing is conditioned by previous experiences of policy-makers and how they are tied to their domestic environments. Policy-makers that are less tied by their national government and/or have international experiences develop supranational roles more easily. None of the three policy-makers had international experiences when they joined the government. The third scope condition is therefore not supported by evidence. The policy-makers were tied to the domestic level in the sense that they had to justify any ESDP development to the German public. In the 2002 Eurobarometer 79% of respondents in Germany approved of a common security and defence policy.⁴²⁴ But in the 2000 Eurobarometer only 38% of respondents in Germany were of the opinion that decisions concerning European defence policy should be taken by the EU although the EU was still placed first before the national government and NATO. Also, among the six founding member states it was only in Germany that the approval rate (70%) for the establishment of the Rapid Reaction Force

⁴²² Interview with a German civil servant, Berlin, 5 November 2011.

⁴²³ Idem.

⁴²⁴ Oppermann, Kai, Alexander Höse (2007), 'Public Opinion and the Development of the European Security and Defence Policy', *European Foreign Affairs Review*, vol.12, no.2, p.165.

was below the European average (73%).⁴²⁵ Although public opinion in Germany was on these issues less favourable than compared with the other founding member countries this can be explained by the public's continuing scepticism of defence policy, especially interventionist forces, such as the Rapid Reaction Force. Moreover, the approval rate for ESDP was with 79% still very high and the respondents placed the EU before national government and NATO when asked who should take decisions on European defence policy. This support of ESDP by the German public gave Schröder, Scharping and Fischer leeway to push forward with ESDP and in this sense they were not tied to the domestic environment. Nevertheless, they were only briefly 'parachuted' into the EU setting for each meeting. Therefore, according to the second part of the scope condition they were supposed to be less likely to internalise new role conceptions. Yet, as they adopted certain roles in line with ESDP norms the fourth scope condition proves incorrect as well.

On the basis of the research conducted for this thesis, a far more probable scope condition for the role playing mechanism Schröder, Scharping and Fischer subscribed to is the fact that they were novices in the EU as well as at the domestic level. Newcomers are likely to be disoriented and eager to conform. Therefore, Schröder, Scharping and Fischer could have adopted cognitive templates in line with ESDP norms in order to operate in the unfamiliar environment. This scope condition is, however, difficult to prove. First, such a procedure usually happens subconsciously without agents realising what they are doing. Second, even if they had knowledge about this, none of the three policy-makers were willing to be interviewed.

According to Liesbet Hooghe, policy-makers from a federal country are more favourably disposed to supranationalism and multilevel governance as federalism already divides

⁴²⁵ Manigar, Philippe (2001), 'Public Opinion and European Defense', Royal Military Academy, Belgium, pp.11-15, http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_146_en.pdf [01.09.2010].

sovereignty and this notion underpins multilevel governance.⁴²⁶ Although German politicians had always been very pro-European and prepared to transfer sovereignty to the EU, due to its history an aversion to military power had existed among the public and elites and German politicians had been reluctant to establish a defence component within the EU. As already shown, due to a number of reasons this had changed during the 1990s. The Schröder government, whose members for the first time were born at the end or after World War II, were not only willing to engage in European defence policy but also to develop ESDP to a supranational institution. The fact that the three policy-makers were already familiar with multilevel governance – Schröder and Scharping had been prime ministers of German states – surely influenced their behaviour. Hence, there is evidence that to some extent the scope condition ‘federalism’ triggered the role playing of Schröder, Fischer and Scharping.

This scope condition can also be seen as part of a broader conceptualised condition, i.e. domestic socialisation: A national policy-maker always comes with distinctive cultural baggage to the international scene. The domestic socialisation of Schröder, Fischer and Scharping was clearly different to the one former Chancellor Kohl had experienced. The new generation of German politicians saw the necessity for developing ESDP and readjusting German defence and security policy to a changing international security environment. Hence, it is likely that their domestic socialisation induced their role playing at the ESDP level.

Consequently, during their first term in office the three policy-makers took on roles in line with ESDP norms because they appeared appropriate in the EU environment. This mechanism *inter alia* occurred because the policy-makers were from a federal country and were therefore already inclined to supranationalism. Moreover, their domestic socialisation

⁴²⁶ Hooghe, Liesbet (2007), ‘Several Roads Lead to International Norms, but Few Via International Socialization: A Case Study of the European Commission’, in, Checkel, Jeffrey T. (ed), *International Institutions and Socialization in Europe*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p.80.

may have benefited the adoption of role playing. Also, the fact that they were newcomers might have brought about the mechanism. In Schröder's case, the expectations of Chirac with whom he developed a close relationship contributed to Schröder's role playing as well. Since the policy-makers were not socialised by the EU in the area of ESDP but only complied with ESDP norms in a non-reflective manner, for the first Schröder government the hypothesis is disproved.

As Struck only came into office in July 2002 there is not enough information to assess his behaviour and attitude towards ESDP.

5.4 ESDP and Germany's second Red-Green Coalition (22 September 2002 – 18 September 2005)

5.4.1 The work in the Convention (2002)

At the Schwerin meeting, Fischer and the French Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin had announced that they intended to become members of the European Convention. On 21 November soon after they had joined the Convention, Fischer and de Villepin submitted joint proposals on the European Security and Defence Policy to the Convention. In accordance with the Schwerin Summit declaration, they proposed to introduce a passage on 'solidarity and common security' in the new treaty and to annex a political declaration with the same title to the treaty. This mutual assistance declaration should identify common security risks, including terrorism, and the means to confront them. It should also provide for transforming ESDP into a European Security and Defence Union.⁴²⁷ In order to render decision-making in ESDP more efficient, Fischer and de Villepin recommended the establishment of 'enhanced cooperation' in the EU's security and defence policy. By using enhanced cooperation the member states should furthermore be allowed to transfer their

⁴²⁷ In order to calm concerns about such a union, it was stated in the proposals that such a union would strengthen NATO's European pillar.

obligations under the WEU to the EU if they wanted to.⁴²⁸ In order to give the EU the requisite capabilities, they proposed to create a European armaments agency.⁴²⁹ At the press conference on the presentation of the ESDP proposals Fischer argued for unanimous decision-making in specifying the agency's statute. The German government, in particular the Ministry of Defence, was afraid that qualified majority voting could lead to further pressure on conscription. As this should be avoided at any cost, the government aimed at securing a narrow mandate for the agency.⁴³⁰

At the NATO summit in Prague and at the Copenhagen European Council summit, the relationship between NATO and ESDP were put at the centre. Fischer confirmed in his speech at the NATO meeting that Germany supported the American proposal of a NATO Response Force but only under the condition that it would not rival the EU's Rapid Reaction Force. Fischer emphasised that both forces needed to complement each other.⁴³¹ On 16 December shortly before the Copenhagen European Council summit the 'Berlin Plus' agreement was finalised to the satisfaction of both Turkey and Greece. Following this agreement, the Copenhagen European Council announced 'the Union's readiness to take over NATO's military mission in Macedonia as soon as possible in consultation with NATO'.⁴³² In his government statement on the outcome of the Copenhagen summit,

⁴²⁸ De Villepin, Dominique, Joschka Fischer (2002), 'Joint Franco-German proposals for the European Convention in the field of European security and defence policy', CONV 422/02, Brussels, 22 November, <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/02/cv00/cv00422.en02.pdf> [01.09.2010].

⁴²⁹ *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (2002), 'Berlin und Paris für Sicherheits- und Verteidigungsunion', 26 November.

⁴³⁰ Wagner, Wolfgang (2005), 'From Vanguard to Laggard: Germany in European Security and Defence Policy', *German Politics*, vol.14, no.4, p.465.

⁴³¹ Regierungserklärung von Bundesaußenminister Joschka Fischer zum NATO-Gipfel am 21. und 22. November in Prag vor dem Deutschen Bundestag, 14 November 2011, <http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/de/Infoservice/Presse/Web-Archiv.html> [01.09.2010].

⁴³² Copenhagen European Council (2002), 'Presidency Conclusions', 12-13 December, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/73842.pdf [01.09.2010].

Schröder welcomed this announcement and the finalisation of the 'Berlin Plus' agreement.⁴³³

5.4.2 European Security Strategy and the Constitutional Treaty (2003)

At the beginning of 2003 Fischer and de Villepin submitted a proposal on the institutional architecture of the EU to the Convention, which represented a well elaborated compromise between Germany's integrationist proposal of strengthening the Commission and France's intergovernmental plan for reinforcing the Council.⁴³⁴ Instead of the rotating EU presidency a permanent president should be elected for two and a half or for five years. In return, France accepted the German idea of the election of the president of the Commission by the European Parliament so that he/she would be accountable to the European Council as well as the European Parliament. They also proposed merging the post of the High Representative and the Commissioner for External Relations into the post of a European foreign minister. The foreign minister would wear a 'double hat' meaning that he/she would not only be a member of the Commission but also an agent of the Council of Ministers.⁴³⁵

On 22 January Germany and France celebrated the 40th anniversary of the Elysee Treaty. In a joint declaration, Schröder and Chirac referred to Fischer's and de Villepin's ESDP proposals and stated that a European Security and Defence Union would 'give concrete shape and efficacy to its members' solidarity and common security'. They went on,

we are determined to make the European Security and Defence Policy enter a new stage so that the Union can take on its full role in the international arena. To signal our determination to pursue such a development of the European Security and

⁴³³ Regierungserklärung von Bundeskanzler Gerhard Schröder zu den Ergebnissen des Europäischen Rates in Kopenhagen vor dem Deutschen Bundestag, 19 December 2002, www.bundesregierung.de/Reden-Interviews/Regierungserklärungen [01.09.2010].

⁴³⁴ *Le Monde* (2003), 'Mille-feuille franco-allemand', 23 January.

⁴³⁵ De Villepin, Dominique, Joschka Fischer (2003), 'Contribution franco-allemande à la Convention européenne sur l'architecture institutionnelle de l'Union', CONV 489/03, Brussels, 16 January, <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/03/cv00/cv00489.en03.pdf> [01.09.2010].

Defence Policy, we shall embark on the requisite efforts to improve military capabilities.⁴³⁶

In a speech to members of the German and French parliaments Schröder assured critics that the close Franco-German cooperation on ESDP was not directed at anyone: 'We do not want to dominate the other EU member states.'⁴³⁷

The 22 January also marked the fifteenth anniversary of the Franco-German Security and Defence Council, which stressed Germany's and France's commitment to EU missions on the ground in its declaration. The two countries supplied the largest contingents to the EU first ever mission, the Police Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which had started on 1 January.⁴³⁸ On the occasion of this anniversary Struck and the French Defence Minister Michèle Alliot-Marie published an article in the German newspaper *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, in which they described the development of ESDP as currently the most important project for Germany, France and the EU:

Die Erfahrungen der vergangenen und aktuellen Krisen haben gezeigt, daß Europa in der Lage sein muß, seine Verantwortung im Bereich der Sicherheit wahrzunehmen. Sie muß dazu führen, daß wir die nationalen Streitkräfte- und Ausrüstungsplanungen verstärkt harmonisieren [...] Langfristig wollen wir europäisch integrierte, mit der NATO interoperable Streitkräfte aufbauen.⁴³⁹

⁴³⁶ Chirac, Jacques, Gerhard Schröder (2003), 'Joint declaration on the 40th anniversary of the Elysée Treaty', Paris, 22 January, <http://www.ambafrance-uk.org/40th-anniversary-of-the-Elysee,4066.html> [01.09.2010].

⁴³⁷ Rede von Bundeskanzler Gerhard Schröder zum 40. Jahrestag der Unterzeichnung des Elysee-Vertrags, Paris, 22 January 2003, <http://www.ambafrance-uk.org/40th-anniversary-of-the-Elysee,4066.html> [01.09.2010].

⁴³⁸ Franco-German Defence and Security Council (2003), 'Declaration', Paris, 22 January, <http://www.ambafrance-uk.org/Fortieth-anniversary-of-the-Elysee.html> [01.09.2010].

⁴³⁹ Alliot-Marie, Michèle, Peter Struck (2003), 'Gemeinsame Visionen, Verpflichtungen und Interessen', *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 24 January.

Own translation:

The experiences of previous and current crises have shown that Europe must be prepared to assume responsibility for ensuring security in the world. Therefore we must better harmonise our national forces and equipment procurements. In the long term we want to achieve that our armed forces are integrated in the EU and interoperable with NATO.

In his speech at the 39th Munich Security Conference Struck announced that he had commissioned the drafting of new defence policy guidelines⁴⁴⁰, which should define the role of the *Bundeswehr* in crisis management operations as well as frame Germany's international responsibilities in a post-9/11 world.⁴⁴¹ The defence policy guidelines were made public in May embodying the core findings of the Weizsäcker Commission: Germany faced little threat from its neighbours. Instead, it had to develop its crisis management capabilities.⁴⁴² The guidelines also outlined that Germany had to concentrate on the threat of terrorism. As a consequence, the defence of Germany could no longer be geographically limited. The crisis intervention role of the *Bundeswehr* should, according to the guidelines, be balanced between ESDP and NATO.⁴⁴³ As Struck said in a speech at the conference held in August under the auspices of Impulse 21 – The Berlin Forum on Security Policy,

there are three implications for the structure of the *Bundeswehr* drawn from the guidelines: First, the military core competency must be improved. Second, traditional territorial defence does not determine structure and capabilities of the *Bundeswehr* anymore. Instead, mission, tasks and capabilities of the *Bundeswehr* should be oriented to the more probable types of operations; namely, conflict prevention and crisis management, including the fight against international terrorism. Third, contributions to rapid reaction forces require troops that can be deployed quickly. In short, the *Bundeswehr* must be fully transformed into an expeditionary army.⁴⁴⁴

⁴⁴⁰ The last defence policy guidelines were compiled in 1992.

⁴⁴¹ Speech by Peter Struck, Federal Defence Minister, 39th Munich Security Conference, 8 February 2003,
http://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/kcxml/04_Sj9SPykssy0xPLMnMz0vM0Y_QjzKLd4k3cQsESUGYSvqRMLGgIFR9b31fj_zcVP0A_YLciHJHROVFAFBC9EYI/delta/base64xml/L3dJdyEvd0ZNQUFzQUMvNEIVRS82XORfNEdD [01.09.2010].

⁴⁴² Rede des Bundesministers der Verteidigung, Peter Struck, an der Führungsakademie der Bundeswehr, Hamburg, 27 May 2003,
http://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/kcxml/04_Sj9SPykssy0xPLMnMz0vM0Y_QjzKLd4k3cQsESUGYSvqRMLGgIFR9b31fj_zcVP0A_YLciHJHROVFAFBC9EYI/delta/base64xml/L3dJdyEvd0ZNQUFzQUMvNEIVRS82XORfNEdD [01.09.2010].

⁴⁴³ Defence policy guidelines, 21 May 2003,
http://www.bmvg.de/fileserving/PortalFiles/C1256EF40036B05B/N264XJ5C768MMISDE/VPR_BROSCHUERE.PDF [01.09.2010].

⁴⁴⁴ Speech by Peter Struck, Federal Defence Minister, Impulse 21 – The Berlin Forum on Security Policy, 24 June 2003,
http://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/kcxml/04_Sj9SPykssy0xPLMnMz0vM0Y_QjzKLd4k3cQsESUGYSvqRMLGgIFR9b31fj_zcVP0A_YLciHJHROVFAFBC9EYI/delta/base64xml/L3dJdyEvd0ZNQUFzQUMvNEIVRS82XORfNEdD [01.09.2010].

The first half of 2003 was dominated by the US invasion of Iraq and the serious disagreement among the EU member states on Iraq. Whereas Germany and France continued to strongly oppose an Iraq invasion, a number of European countries, notably Eastern and Central European countries, expressed indirect support for an invasion in an open letter to the British newspaper *The Times*. When the US alongside the UK and other countries indeed invaded Iraq on 20 March Schröder condemned this in an address to the *Bundestag*: 'Wir haben versucht, den Krieg zu verhindern. Ich bin sicher: Es hätte einen anderen Weg zur Entwaffnung des Diktators gegeben.'⁴⁴⁵

Shortly after the beginning of the invasion, a European Council summit in Brussels took place. In his statement on the conclusions of this summit Schröder admitted that the EU member states had not acted as jointly as one had wished for. But despite the divisions on Iraq, the EU was able to deploy its first military ESDP crisis management operation on 31 March 2003 when it took over NATO's Operation in Macedonia. Although the mission was of minor importance and had a tight mandate, it nevertheless showed, according to Schröder, that the EU could assume responsibility. Schröder accepted that there was still a lot of work to do on ESDP so that in future disagreements, like the one over Iraq, could be prevented. But he stressed: 'Das ändert aber nichts daran, dass es zu dieser gemeinsamen Politik keine wirklich vernünftige Alternative gibt.'⁴⁴⁶

In his statement on the conclusions of the European Council summit Schröder also announced that the Belgian Prime Minister had invited him to a meeting on ESDP. In his

⁴⁴⁵ Regierungserklärung von Bundeskanzler Gerhard Schröder nach Beginn des Krieges gegen den Irak vor dem Deutschen Bundestag, 20 March 2003, <http://archiv.bundesregierung.de/index.jsp?&dokumentart=rede&sV=modified&sD=d> [01.09.2010].

Own translation:

We tried to prevent this war. I am certain that there would have been another way to disarm the dictator.

⁴⁴⁶ Regierungserklärung von Bundeskanzler Gerhard Schröder zur internationalen Lage und den Ergebnissen des Europäischen Rates in Brüssel vor dem Deutschen Bundestag, 3 April 2003, www.bundesregierung.de/Reden-Interviews/Regierungserklärungen [01.09.2010].

Own translation:

However, it does not change the fact that there is not really a sensible alternative to a joint policy.

opinion, he said, the meeting should be open to everyone, in particular the UK. Yet, besides Schröder only the French, Belgian and Luxembourgish leaders attended the summit on EU defence in Tervuren, which took place on 29 April. The other EU states strongly criticised this mini-summit because of its exclusivity and its contents.⁴⁴⁷ In a joint statement the four Heads of State and Government proposed

the creation of a nucleus capability for planning and conducting strategic-level operations. This strategic headquarters, or to be more precise, nucleus, could be used when the European Union decides [...] not to use NATO's assets and capabilities. The definition of a European Security and Defence Union (ESDU) should be accepted by the Convention and inserted in the Constitutional Treaty. It should include a commitment for mutual help and assistance, [...], the development of military capabilities and an increase in the share of spending on investment in equipment. We shall also be proposing the creation of a European Agency for developing and acquiring military capabilities, a measure obviously also designed to achieve greater economies of scale and thus an overall strengthening of our common defence effort.⁴⁴⁸

At the press conference on the meeting Schröder responded to criticism on the summit's proposals by claiming that these would strengthen NATO and that at the moment there was not enough Europe in NATO.⁴⁴⁹ Struck also defended the meeting in an interview with the German newspaper *Der Tagesspiegel*:

Dieses Treffen soll ja nicht bedeuten, dass wir [...] einen eigenen Sonderzug fahren wollen. Ziel ist, als Konsequenz aus den Erfahrungen die gemeinsame europäische Sicherheitspolitik schneller fortzuentwickeln. [...] Richtig ist, dass der Irak-Krieg und die Uneinigkeit Europas den Gedanken an eine eigene europäische Armee gefördert haben. Das ist auch der Hintergrund für den Vorstoß des Kanzlers. Aber man muss

⁴⁴⁷ Diedrichs, Udo, Mathias Jopp (2003), 'Flexible Modes of Governance: Making CFSP and ESDP Work', *The International Spectator*, vol.38, no.3, pp.21-22.

⁴⁴⁸ Statement by Jacques Chirac, President of the French Republic, Gerhard Schröder, Federal Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, Jean-Claude Juncker, Prime Minister of Luxembourg, and Guy Verhofstadt, Prime Minister of Belgium, Tervuren, 29 April 2003, <http://www.ambafrance-uk.org/Statements-made-by-M-Chirac-during,4859.html> [01.09.2010].

⁴⁴⁹ Pressekonferenz mit Bundeskanzler Gerhard Schröder, Tervuren, 29 April 2003, <http://archiv.bundesregierung.de/index.jsp?&dokumentart=rede&sV=modified&sD=d> [01.09.2010].

Schritt für Schritt gehen.⁴⁵⁰

In early May 2003 at an informal EU foreign ministers' meeting Solana was tasked to draft a European Security Strategy.⁴⁵¹ In an interview with the academic journal *Internationale Politik*, Schröder welcomed the Security Strategy as a sign that after the disagreement over Iraq the member states decided to look ahead again:

Wir teilen uneingeschränkt die Grundaussagen des Solana-Papiers: Ausgehend von einem umfassenden Sicherheitsbegriff muss sich die EU so zentralen Herausforderungen wie internationaler Terrorismus und Weiterverbreitung von Massenvernichtungswaffen stellen; militärische Mittel sind unerlässlich, müssen aber eingebettet sein in eine umfassende Strategie der Konfliktprävention und des internationalen Krisenmanagements. Eine solche Strategie muss die besondere Stärke der Europäischen Union nutzen, die über ein breites Spektrum von politischen, wirtschaftlichen und diplomatischen Instrumenten verfügt.⁴⁵²

The Security Strategy and the draft Constitutional Treaty were presented at the Thessaloniki summit. As the draft Treaty included most of Fischer's and de Villepin's ESDP proposals as well as the proposals of the Tervuren summit, it was not surprising that at a press conference on the conclusions of the Thessaloniki summit Schröder expressed his satisfaction with the Treaty's provisions on ESDP. He approvingly mentioned the new

⁴⁵⁰ Interview des Bundesministers der Verteidigung, Peter Struck, in der Zeitung *Der Tagesspiegel*, 30 April 2003, http://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/kcxm/04_Sj9SPykssy0xPLMnMz0vM0Y_QjzKLd4k3cQsESUGYSvqRMLGglFR9b31fj_zcVPOA_YLciHJHROVFAFBC9EYI/delta/base64xml/L3dldyEvd0ZNQUFzQUMvNEIVRS82XORfNEdD [01.09.2010].

Own translation:

This meeting does not mean that we want to follow an 'exclusive, special path'. As a consequence of the previous experiences the aim should be to faster develop the common European security policy. [...] It is correct that the Iraq war and Europe's disagreements gave a boost to the idea of a European army. That is also the reason for the Federal Chancellor's initiative. But this will be a step-by-step process.

⁴⁵¹ Lohse, Eckart (2003), 'Wieder Anschluss an Amerika finden', *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 21 June, p.3.

See chapter 4.

⁴⁵² Interview des Bundeskanzlers Gerhard Schröder in der Zeitschrift *Internationale Politik*, 12 September 2003, www.bundesregierung.de/Reden-Interviews/Interviews [01.09.2010].

Own translation:

We unreservedly agree with Solana's proposal of a European Security Strategy: The EU must deal with core challenges, such as international terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, based on a comprehensive security concept: Military means cannot be ruled out but must be embedded within a strategy of conflict prevention and international crisis management. Such a strategy must use the EU's particular advantage as it already has a broad range of political, economic and diplomatic instrument at its disposal.

cooperation procedure of 'structured cooperation', which would open up the possibility for member states with higher military capabilities to enter into more binding commitments with a view to more demanding tasks. Schröder also welcomed the provision on 'closer cooperation on mutual defence', the solidarity clause in the event of a terrorist attack or a natural or man-made disaster and enhanced cooperation, which would relate to ESDP without any restrictions.⁴⁵³

Subsequently to the Thessaloniki summit, Schröder, Chirac and the British Prime Minister Tony Blair met in Berlin in order to find common ground over the Constitutional Treaty, which was due to be discussed at the Intergovernmental Conference, and to solve the outstanding issues on the European Security and Defence Policy, notably structured cooperation, the mutual assistance clause and the 'Tervuren proposal' of a strategic European headquarters.⁴⁵⁴ Within the German government there was disagreement on whether Germany should make concessions to the UK in order to get the UK's approval of the controversial ESDP innovations. Whilst Fischer and Struck stressed the importance of the UK for building an effective European defence policy, Schröder was less prepared to accommodate Blair not least because of the UK's behaviour during the Iraq crisis.⁴⁵⁵ No breakthrough on the issues under discussion could be found at the Berlin summit although Blair for the first time agreed that the EU should have a common capability for planning. At the press conference Schröder announced that

we need, and [...] we are agreed on this, a common capability for planning and it would be a very good thing indeed, and certainly the best thing, to have this adopted among the 25 then members of the European Union, but we have developed this instrument of a structured cooperation, so if we are not able to do

⁴⁵³ Idem.

⁴⁵⁴ *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (2003), 'Tervuren' ist kein Reizwort mehr', 24 September.

⁴⁵⁵ *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (2003), 'Fischer und Struck können den Kanzler nicht bremsen', 31 August.

this among 25 we would also then have to use this option.⁴⁵⁶

This statement constituted an unconcealed threat. Schröder repeated his position at a NATO summit in Brussels, which was especially convened because the US increasingly felt threatened by Germany's and France's insistence on a European nucleus capability for planning and conducting strategic-level operations without recourse to NATO assets.⁴⁵⁷

The breakthrough was achieved during the preceding weeks of the Naples EU foreign minister meeting in November 2003 so that a Franco-German-British paper could be presented at the summit. The paper proposed a new draft for an operational planning headquarters⁴⁵⁸ as well as provided compromises on 'structured cooperation' and the mutual assistance clause.⁴⁵⁹ Struck welcomed the Franco-German-British paper when he spoke at the second Congress on European Defence in Berlin.

Ich bin froh, dass wir auf der Basis eines deutsch-französisch-britischen Vorschlags auch bei der Initiative zur Verbesserung der Fähigkeit der EU zur Planung und Führung von autonomen Einsätzen weiter vorangekommen sind und hoffen, dass diese Überlegungen bald von allen Seiten akzeptiert werden [...] Mit dieser Lösung können wir die Voraussetzungen dafür schaffen, dass die Europäer militärisch handlungsfähig sind - auch wenn sie nicht auf NATO-Mittel und -Fähigkeiten zurückgreifen wollen oder können. Es geht hier nicht um unnötige Konkurrenz zur NATO [...] Deutschland hat in den vergangenen Jahren bei der Entwicklung einer eigenständigen Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik der EU eine Vorreiterrolle

⁴⁵⁶ Joint press conference by the Rt Hon Tony Blair, Prime Minister, Jacques Chirac, President of the French Republic, and Gerhard Schröder, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, Berlin, 20 September 2003,

<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20070701080624/http://www.pm.gov.uk/output/Page4508.asp> [01.09.2010].

⁴⁵⁷ *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (2003), 'Washington besorgt ueber EU-Verteidigung', 21 October.

⁴⁵⁸ Bacia, Horst (2003), 'Von Tervuren spricht niemand mehr', *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 4 December.

⁴⁵⁹ Bacia, Horst (2003), 'Keim eines Hauptquartiers', *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 1 December. See chapter 4 for more details on the British-German-French compromises on structured cooperation and the mutual assistance clause.

gespielt. Dieser Prozess liegt in unserem sicherheitspolitischen Interesse.⁴⁶⁰

The Franco-German-British compromises were indeed accepted by the other member states and included in the final text of the Constitutional Treaty, which was due to be adopted at the Brussels European Council summit on 12 and 13 December. In the run-up to this summit, Fischer gave a statement in which he urged the Heads of State and Government to adopt the Constitutional Treaty:

so schafft der vorliegende Entwurf doch die notwendigen Institutionen und Verfahren, mit denen Europa künftige Krisen geschlossen besser bewältigen kann. [...] Europa [bekommt] in der operativen Außenpolitik ein Gesicht, nämlich durch einen **europäischen Außenminister**. [...] Gleichzeitig muss die Europäische Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik jedoch weiterentwickelt werden. Hierzu würden die jetzt vorliegenden Verfassungsbestimmungen entscheidend beitragen.⁴⁶¹

Fischer also underlined the importance of the Franco-German-British compromises by stating that the proposals agreed at the Naples meeting accommodated the concerns of the non-aligned countries as well as the Atlanticists. For him, both the Constitutional Treaty and the Security Strategy would in fact strengthen NATO's European pillar. A weak Europe, on the other hand, would lead to the erosion of NATO.⁴⁶²

⁴⁶⁰ Rede des Bundesministers der Verteidigung, Peter Struck, auf dem 2. Europäischen Verteidigungskongress, Berlin, 9 December 2003, http://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/kcxm1/04_Sj9SPykssy0xPLMnMz0vM0Y_QjzKLd4k3cQsESUGYSvqRMLGgIFR9b31fj_zcVP0A_YLciHJHROVFABFC9EYI/delta/base64xml/L3dJdyEvd0ZNQUFzQUMvNEIVRS82XORfNEdD [01.09.2010].

Own translation:

I am glad that on the basis of the German-Franco-British proposal we also made progress on the initiative for the improvement of the EU's capability for planning and conducting autonomous military operations and hope that these thoughts will be accepted by everyone soon [...] With this solution we can set the conditions for Europe to be military capable even if it can't or won't make use of NATO assets and capabilities. This will not lead to unnecessary competition with NATO. In the last couple of years Germany has led the way in the development of an autonomous EU security and development policy. This process is in our security interests.

⁴⁶¹ Regierungserklärung von Bundesaußenminister Joschka Fischer zum Europäischen Rat in Brüssel, 11 December 2003, <http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/de/Infoservice/Presse/Web-Archiv.html> [01.09.2010].

Own translation:

'the Treaty provides for necessary institutions and processes, which will help Europe to resolve future crises better together. Europe's foreign policy gets a face, namely by establishing the post of a **European foreign minister**. [...] At the same time the European Security and Defence Policy has to be developed further. For this we need the ESDP innovations envisaged in the Treaty.'

⁴⁶² Idem.

Due to problems unrelated to ESDP the member states were not able to settle on the final text of Constitutional Treaty at the Brussels summit. The incoming Irish presidency of the EU was therefore tasked to hold consultations with member states on how to break the deadlock over the provisions of the Constitutional Treaty. The Security Strategy however was adopted by the European Council.⁴⁶³

5.4.3 Headline Goal 2010 and battlegroups (2004)

After the transatlantic dispute in 2003, Fischer and Struck undertook efforts to restore NATO's role as a consultation body across the Atlantic. On the occasion of the 40th Security Conference in Munich in February 2004, Foreign Minister Fischer suggested a 'new transatlantic initiative' on the Middle East, with NATO playing a central role.⁴⁶⁴ With a similar motive and at the same conference, Defence Minister Struck presented his idea of a modern-day Harmel report⁴⁶⁵, i.e. a new conceptual document as a foundation for the future of NATO compiled by European and American experts.⁴⁶⁶

Besides these attempts to improve the relationship with the US and extend the role of NATO, the German government also continued driving ESDP forward. On 10 February, Germany, France and the UK jointly proposed to establish 'battlegroups'.⁴⁶⁷

⁴⁶³ Lohse, Eckart (2003), 'Wer ist schuld?', *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 14 December.

⁴⁶⁴ Speech by Joschka Fischer, Federal Foreign Minister, 40th Munich Security Conference, 7 February 2004, <http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/de/Infoservice/Presse/Web-Archiv.html> [01.09.2010].

⁴⁶⁵ In 1966, on the initiative of Pierre Harmel, the Foreign Minister of Belgium, the NATO member states resolved to study the future tasks, which could face the Alliance. The so called Harmel report, which was approved by the NATO council in 1967, advocated a strong defence but also good diplomatic relations with the countries of the Warsaw Pact.

⁴⁶⁶ Speech by Peter Struck, Federal Defence Minister, 40th Munich Security Conference, 7 February 2004, http://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/kcxm/04_Sj9SPykssyOxPLMnMz0vM0Y_QjzKLd4k3cQsESUGY5vqRMLGgIFR9b31fj_zcVP0A_YLciHJHROVFAFBC9EYI/delta/base64xml/L3dJdyEvd0ZNQUFzQUMvNEIVRS82XORfNEdD [01.09.2010].

⁴⁶⁷ Knowles, Vanda, Silke Thomson-Pottebohm (2004), 'The UK, Germany and ESDP: Developments at the Convention and the IGC', *German Politics*, vol.13, no.4, p.599. See chapter four.

Although it was again after an exclusive Franco-British-German meeting that an important ESDP proposal was presented, in an interview Fischer dismissed the idea of a French-German-British 'directoire' that ran ESDP policies. He also spoke out against the creation of a 'core Europe', which would move ahead with quicker integration than the rest of Europe, therewith revising the position he had taken in his famous Humboldt speech.⁴⁶⁸ Schröder, on the other hand, indicated in a speech at the opening of the Federal Academy for Security Policy in Berlin that a definitive failure to agree on the Constitutional Treaty could lead to a 'two-speed Europe'.⁴⁶⁹ According to him, an area, where a 'two-speed Europe' could be feasible and in the case of the failure to adopt the Constitutional Treaty important, was the European Security and Defence Policy since the ESDP provisions envisaged in the Constitutional Treaty were essential for strengthening the EU's ability to act.⁴⁷⁰

On 13 May, at a joint Franco-German cabinet meeting, the Franco-German Defence and Security Council published a declaration, in which it proposed to make the Franco-German brigade the nucleus of one of the battlegroups.⁴⁷¹ It also welcomed the idea to introduce a new capabilities headline goal.⁴⁷²

In June, the Intergovernmental Conference reached an agreement on the Constitutional Treaty. In a government statement, Schröder hailed the Treaty as a milestone in the EU's

⁴⁶⁸ Interview des Bundesministers des Auswärtigen, Joschka Fischer, in der *Berliner Zeitung*, 28 February 2004, <http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/de/Infoservice/Presse/Web-Archiv.html> [01.09.2010].

⁴⁶⁹ *Agence France Press* (2004), 'Fischer: Kein Dissens mit dem Kanzler in Europapolitik', 18 April. 'Two-speed Europe' is a different term for 'core Europe'.

⁴⁷⁰ Rede von Bundeskanzler Gerhard Schröder zur Eröffnung der Bundesakademie für Sicherheitspolitik, 19 March 2004, www.bundesregierung.de/Reden-Interviews/Regierungserklärungen [01.09.2010].

⁴⁷¹ *Stuttgarter Zeitung* (2004), 'Berlin und Paris üben den Gleichschritt; Chirac und Schröder betonen Einigkeit – gemeinsame Linie in Irak und Nahostpolitik', 14 May.

⁴⁷² Franco-German Defence and Security Council (2004), 'Declaration', Paris, 13 May, http://www.elysee.fr/elysee/elysee.fr/anglais_archives/speeches_and_documents/2004/declaration_by_the_franco-german_defence_and_security_council.1096.html [01.09.2010].

integration process albeit admitting that he would have liked to include more far reaching provisions in the Treaty.⁴⁷³

At the June European council summit, the EU member states agreed to adopt the Headline Goal 2010, which should focus on interoperability, deployability and sustainability.⁴⁷⁴ At the session of the WEU Parliamentary Assembly, Struck emphasised that with the Headline Goal 2010 and the European Defence Agency, which was due to be established in July 2004, the EU's role as a security-political actor would be strengthened and the EU would eventually become a 'real' strategic partner of the US.

Bei all dem geht es ausdrücklich nicht um die Ausbildung eines "Gegengewichts" zu den USA. Es geht vielmehr um die Teilung von Lasten und Verantwortung unter Partnern mit gleichen Grundwerten und Grundinteressen. [...] Die Europäische Sicherheitsstrategie [...] bildet eine exzellente Grundlage für diesen notwendigen strategischen Dialog mit den USA.⁴⁷⁵

The Parliamentary State Secretary in the Defence Ministry, Walter Kolbow, elaborated on Struck's vision of the new relationship between Europe and the US in a speech at the second conference of Impulse 21 – The Berlin Forum on Security Policy:

In einer Krise können sie den politisch wie militärisch besten Weg für den Einsatz ihrer Streitkräfte unter NATO- oder EU-Führung wählen. [...] Den Luxus, angesichts komplexer gewordener sicherheitspolitischer Aufgaben nur auf eine Organisation

⁴⁷³ Regierungserklärung von Bundeskanzler Gerhard Schröder zur Einigung der Staats- und Regierungschefs der Europäischen Union auf eine Europäische Verfassung vor dem Deutschen Bundestag, 2 July 2004, www.bundesregierung.de/Reden-Interviews/Regierungserklärungen [01.09.2010].

⁴⁷⁴ Brussels European Council (2004), 'Presidency Conclusions', 17-18 June, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/81035.pdf [01.09.2010].

⁴⁷⁵ Rede des Bundesministers der Verteidigung, Peter Struck, vor der Parlamentarischen Versammlung der WEU, Paris, 3 June 2004, http://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/kcxml/04_Sj9SPykssy0xPLMnMz0vM0Y_QjzKLd4k3cQsESUGY5vqRMLGglFR9b31fj_zcVPOA_YLciHJHROVFAFBC9EYI/delta/base64xml/L3dJdyEvd0ZNQUFzQUMvNEIVRS82XORfNEdD [01.09.2010].

Own translation:

zu setzen, kann sich heute auf alle Fälle niemand mehr leisten.⁴⁷⁶

In August, the German Ministry of Defence published a new conceptual document *Konzeption der Bundeswehr* based on the Defence Policy Guidelines. It introduced a new, three-layered force structure⁴⁷⁷ with the aim of building a mission-oriented force that would cover the whole spectrum of operations from low-intensity conflict to high-intensity war fighting. This new structure should be implemented by 2010.⁴⁷⁸

At their September meeting in Noordwijk, the EU defence ministers decided to take up the Franco-German-British proposal on the creation of battlegroups.⁴⁷⁹ Struck presented the outcome of the meeting in his speech to the *Bundestag*:

Die schnelle Eingreiftruppe wird kleiner - in der Zusammensetzung verschiedener [...] Staaten. [...] Das ist also die Konzeption: wo man, wenn in Europa irgend etwas los oder auch darüber hinaus, dann schnell eine solche Battlegroup einsetzt. Deutschland wird dazu seinen Beitrag leisten und wir können auch den Beitrag dazu

This explicitly does not mean that the EU would become a 'counterweight' to the US but rather burden and responsibilities should be shared between partners with the same basic values and interests. The European Security Strategy establishes an excellent basis for the necessary, strategic dialogue with the US.

⁴⁷⁶ Abschließende Stellungnahme des Parlamentarischen Staatssekretärs beim Bundesminister der Verteidigung, Walter Kolbow, auf der Konferenz IMPULSE 21 Berliner Forum Sicherheitspolitik, Berlin, 21 June 2004, http://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/kcxm/04_Sj9SPykssy0xPLMnMz0vMOY_QjzKLd4k3cQsESUGY5vqRMLGglFR9b31fj_zcVPOA_YLciHJHROVFAFBC9EY!/delta/base64xml/L3dJdyEvd0ZNQUFzQUMvNEIVRS82XORfNEdD [01.09.2010].

Own translation:

In a crisis, they [the European countries] can decide whether it makes more sense militarily and politically to deploy their forces under the auspices of NATO or the EU. Nobody can afford anymore the luxury to back only one organisation.

⁴⁷⁷ The force structure should consist of the following elements: First, 35,000 troops for combat operations; second, 70,000 troops for stability and reconstruction operations; and third, 147,500 troops to provide joint logistics for operations abroad and the *Bundeswehr* at home.

⁴⁷⁸ Conceptual document on the *Bundeswehr*, 10 August 2004, http://www.bundeswehr.de/fileserving/PortalFiles/C1256EF40036B05B/W2652FFY414INFODE/broschuere_kdb.pdf [01.09.2010].

⁴⁷⁹ *The Associated Press* (2004), 'Militärische Fähigkeiten und Mission in Bosnien Thema – Fünfer Initiative für Gendamerie Truppe', 18 September.

leisten.⁴⁸⁰

Germany, according to Struck, would form a Battlegroup with the Netherlands and another one with France – the Franco-German brigade.

Klaus Scharioth, State Secretary of the German Foreign Office, pointed out in a speech he gave to the pilot course of the European Security and Defence College⁴⁸¹ that the battlegroups and the NATO Response Force would be mutually reinforcing: 'The strategic partnership between the EU and NATO is and remains an indispensable precondition for tackling the new challenges.'⁴⁸² However, according to Scharioth, the EU should also develop its civilian capabilities:

From the very beginning of ESDP, Germany has stressed that civilian and military means must be developed on an equal basis. It is this approach that is one of the chief characteristics of ESDP and which renders it distinct from other concepts.⁴⁸³

At the December European Council summit, Schröder welcomed the decision to further evolve the EU's civilian capabilities by launching the Civilian Headline Goal 2008.⁴⁸⁴

⁴⁸⁰ Rede des Bundesministers der Verteidigung, Peter Struck, anlässlich der Debatte im Deutschen Bundestag über die Bundeswehr, 23 September 2004, http://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/kcxml/04_Sj9SPykssy0xPLMnMz0vM0Y_QjzKLd4k3cQsESUGY5vqRMLGglFR9b31fj_zcVP0A_YLciHJHROVFAB9C9EYI/delta/base64xml/L3dJdyEvd0ZNQUFzQUMvNElVRS82X0RfNEdD [01.09.2010].

Own translation:

The battlegroups will be smaller – composed by different [...] states. The concept behind is that if in Europe or beyond Europe something happens they can be deployed rapidly. Germany will contribute to the battlegroups and we are able to do our part.

⁴⁸¹ The European Security and Defence College is a network of educational establishments, which provide training to civilian and military personnel in the field of the European Security and Defence Policy. The development of a coordinated EU training policy regarding ESDP was endorsed by the 2003 Thessaloniki European Council summit.

⁴⁸² Address by Klaus Scharioth, State Secretary of the Federal Foreign Office, to the ESDC Pilot Course, Federal Foreign Office, 24 September 2004, <http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/en/Infoservice/Presse/Reden/Archiv/2004/040924-EUAsGlobalPeaceForce.html> [01.09.2010].

⁴⁸³ Idem.

⁴⁸⁴ Pressekonferenz mit Bundeskanzler Gerhard Schröder, Brussels, 17 December 2004, <http://archiv.bundesregierung.de/index.jsp?&dokumentart=rede&sV=modified&sD=d> [01.09.2010]. For more information on the Civilian Headline Goal see chapter 4.

5.4.4 Failed referenda and the German federal election (2005)

At the 41st Security Conference in Munich in February, Schröder's speech provoked considerable opposition. Schröder openly criticised the US for not sufficiently taking into account German and European interests.

The maxim continues to apply: close transatlantic ties are in the interests of Germany, Europe and America. However, we cannot look to the past when it comes to translating this maxim into practical policies, as is so often the case when transatlantic loyalty is professed. Rather, we must adapt to the new circumstances. [...] [However] this process of adjustment to a changed reality has still not been completed.⁴⁸⁵

Schröder went on,

[NATO] is no longer the primary venue where transatlantic partners discuss and coordinate strategies. The same applies to the dialogue between the European Union and the United States which in its current form does justice neither to the Union's growing importance nor to the new demands on transatlantic cooperation.⁴⁸⁶

Therefore, Schröder called for the establishment of an independent commission, which should make suggestions for a fundamental reform of the transatlantic ties. Regarding the relationship between the US and Germany, Schröder pointed out that Germany adapted its understanding of its international role to the new circumstances:

As part of the European Union, Germany today feels that it shares responsibility for international stability and order. And our active commitment in numerous crisis regions around the world demonstrates that we Germans are living up to this responsibility. However, this responsibility also brings with it a right to be involved in decision-making.⁴⁸⁷

The German government tried to dampen the controversy caused by Schröder's speech.

Fischer said in his speech at the Security Conference that Schröder's remarks did not mean

⁴⁸⁵ Speech by Gerhard Schröder, Federal Chancellor, 41st Munich Security Conference, 11 February 2005, http://www.securityconference.de/archive/konferenzen/2005/index.php?menu_2005=&menu_konferenzen=&sprache=en& [01.09.2010].

⁴⁸⁶ Idem.

⁴⁸⁷ Idem.

to suggest a break with NATO. They were, rather, a critical description of the current conditions, which needed to be changed.⁴⁸⁸

Struck, however, repeated Schröder's assessment of NATO at a *Handelsblatt* conference on 'Security Policy and the Defence Industry' in Berlin:

Dabei bleibt die NATO [...] für uns Europäer [...] in vielerlei Hinsicht für die europäische Sicherheit unersetzlich. Aber die EU entwickelt sich perspektivisch mehr und mehr zu einem ernst zu nehmenden sicherheitspolitischen Akteur und Partner von USA und NATO. Dies muss sich in einem erneuerten transatlantischen Verhältnis niederschlagen.⁴⁸⁹

Struck also mentioned the Civil-Military Cell and the battlegroups, which in his view were important instruments providing ESDP with flexibility and better capabilities.

In April, at the joint Franco-German cabinet meeting, Schröder stressed the importance of ratifying the Constitutional Treaty as this would be an important milestone in the effort to assert Europe's influence on the international stage and increase its ability to promote world peace and security. Schröder also declared that for him this matter was not solely one of reason anymore but a matter of heart.⁴⁹⁰ The statement by the Franco-German Defence and Security Council took the same line:

Adopting the proposals, which our countries had presented jointly in the Convention on the Future of Europe, [...] the Constitutional Treaty will be the

⁴⁸⁸ Speech by Joschka Fischer, Federal Foreign Minister, 41st Munich Security Conference, 11 February 2005, http://www.securityconference.de/archive/konferenzen/2005/index.php?menu_2005=&menu_konferenzen=&sprache=en& [01.09.2010].

⁴⁸⁹ Rede des Bundesministers der Verteidigung, Peter Struck, anlässlich der 2. Handelsblatt Konferenz Sicherheitspolitik und Verteidigungsindustrie, Berlin, 12 April 2005, http://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/kcxml/04_Sj9SPykssy0xPLMnMz0vM0Y_QjzKLd4k3cQsESUGYSvqRMLGglFR9b31fj_zcVP0A_YLciHJHR0VFAFBC9EYI/delta/base64xml/L3dJdyEvd0ZNQUFzQUMvNEIVRS82XORfNEdD [01.09.2010].

Own translation:

In many respects, NATO remains an irreplaceable guarantor of security for the European countries. But the EU has gradually developed into a serious security actor and partner for the US and NATO. The transatlantic partnership must be renewed in order to reflect this.

⁴⁹⁰ Pressekonferenz mit Bundeskanzler Gerhard Schröder und französischem Staatspräsident Jacques Chirac, Paris, 26 April 2005, <http://archiv.bundesregierung.de/index.jsp?&dokumentart=rede&sV=modified&sD=d> [01.09.2010].

instrument for increasing the effectiveness of European action on the international stage.⁴⁹¹

Yet despite the campaign efforts, the Constitutional Treaty was rejected by France and the Netherlands at the end of May/beginning of June. In his government statement on the conclusions of the June European Council, Schröder expressed his disappointment over the failed referenda in France and the Netherlands but also emphasised that despite the current deadlock Germany was still committed to the Constitutional Treaty.⁴⁹²

2005 also marked the 50th anniversary of the *Bundeswehr*. At its ceremony Schröder analysed the process of the *Bundeswehr*, Germany's contribution to the euro-transatlantic security and the importance of ESDP for Germany:

Mit der Wiedererlangung unserer vollen nationalen Souveränität hat sich die Rolle Deutschlands in der Welt geändert. Wir sind Partner mit gleichen Rechten, aber eben auch mit gleichen Pflichten. Daneben wird zunehmend die europäische Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik zu einem zweiten Standbein deutscher Aussen- und Sicherheitspolitik. Sie kann und soll NATO nicht ersetzen. Sie kann und muss sie aber sinnvoll ergänzen. Die Reform der Streitkräfte ist [...] die notwendige Antwort auf die völlig veränderte sicherheitspolitische Lage.⁴⁹³

On 18 September an early federal election took place in Germany. It had to be called after a motion of confidence in Chancellor Schröder had failed in July.⁴⁹⁴ The election results showed no clear win for an SPD/Green or CDU/CSU/FDP coalition. After long negotiations,

⁴⁹¹ Franco-German Defence and Security Council (2005), 'Declaration', Paris, 26 April, <http://www.ambafrance-uk.org/Fifth-Franco-German-Council-of-5918.html> [01.09.2010].

⁴⁹² Regierungserklärung von Bundeskanzler Gerhard Schröder zum Europäischen Rat vor dem Deutschen Bundestag, 16 June 2005, <http://archiv.bundesregierung.de/index.jsp?&dokumentart=rede&sV=modified&sD=d> [01.09.2010].

⁴⁹³ Rede von Bundeskanzler Gerhard Schröder beim Festakt zum 50. Jahrestag der Gründung der Bundeswehr, Berlin, 7 June 2005, http://www.bundesregierung.de/nn_1514/Content/DE/Bulletin/2001__2005/2005/06/2005-06-07-rede-von-bundeskanzler-gerhard-schroeder-beim-festakt-zum-50-jahrestag-der-gruendung-der-bu.html [01.09.2010].

Own translation:

After having regained our full national sovereignty German's role in the world had changed. We became a partner with the same rights but also the same duties. At the same time, the European Security and Defence Policy gradually became the second pillar of Germany's foreign and security policy. ESDP can't and shouldn't replace NATO. But it can and must complement NATO. The reform of our armed forces is the necessary response to the completely changed security situation.

⁴⁹⁴ Following the defeat of the SPD in an important state election, Schröder asked SPD and Green members of the *Bundestag* to abstain in the motion of confidence so that it would fail and trigger an early federal election.

the SPD and the CDU/CSU indicated that they would form a coalition with Angela Merkel as Chancellor. On 22 November CDU/CSU and SPD *Bundestag* members voted for Merkel as their new Chancellor.

5.5 Analysis No.2

During the second Schröder government the three policy-makers' positions on ESDP gradually diverged. Whereas Fischer and Struck were willing to seek compromises on the controversial ESDP provisions and rebuild the relationships with the countries supporting the Iraq war, Schröder, in particular after the Iraq war⁴⁹⁵, adopted a rather uncompromising stance. His display of self-confidence in opposing the Iraq war and questioning the value of the transatlantic relationship, including NATO, at the 41st Security Conference in Munich⁴⁹⁶ show that in many respects he regarded ESDP as a better-suited alternative for embedding the Berlin Republic. He therefore intended to develop ESDP so that it could fulfil this role. Although Fischer and his French counterpart Dominique de Villepin first made the controversial ESDP proposals of permanent structured cooperation and the mutual assistance clause in their contribution to the European Convention, the idea of an EU operational planning unit suggested by Schröder and the French, Belgian and Luxembourgish Heads of State and Government at their infamous Tervuren summit was no less far-reaching and contentious. The Tervuren summit marked another clear sign that despite its implications Schröder did not mind to duplicate NATO structures in order to develop ESDP.

In the email interview with Struck, he conceded that he had advised Schröder not to go ahead with the meeting because he had feared that the meeting at the height of the Iraq

⁴⁹⁵ At the celebration of the 40th anniversary of the Elysee Treaty Schröder had still assured critics that the close Franco-German cooperation on ESDP was not directed at anyone (see footnote 437).

⁴⁹⁶ See speech by Gerhard Schröder, Federal Chancellor, 41st Munich Security Conference, 11 February 2005 (footnote 486).

war would send wrong signals to the US and the other EU member states, notably the UK. But at the same time Struck asserted that the main aim of the meeting was to endow ESDP with necessary new instruments. In this sense, it was a successful meeting.⁴⁹⁷

According to an article in the German journal *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* Fischer regarded the timing of the Tervuren summit as unwise as well.⁴⁹⁸ Furthermore, both Struck and Fischer were convinced that the UK needed to be involved in building an effective ESDP. They were therefore prepared to mitigate the most controversial aspects of the ESDP proposals in order to obtain the British Prime Minister Tony Blair's approval.⁴⁹⁹ Schröder, however, was very reluctant to accommodate Blair. Not only were there still tensions between them resulting from the Iraq war, but more importantly, in Schröder's view the proposals were indispensable for the development of ESDP. At the British-Franco-German Berlin meeting in September 2003 Schröder therefore insisted that if the common capability for planning could not be implemented by the 25 member states – i.e. the UK refused to accept them - a 'core Europe' would use the instrument of structured cooperation to adopt it. Schröder did not change his hard-line position when he was put under pressure from the US at a NATO summit in Brussels. Eventually, Schröder's uncompromising stance paid off when the UK accepted the ESDP provisions. Although Schröder could not enforce his idea of a fully-fledged military headquarters the fact that the UK agreed on the creation of a small strategic planning cell with an operational dimension as well as on the establishment of permanent structured cooperation and the mutual assistance clause can be declared a great success for Schröder.

⁴⁹⁷ Email interview with Peter Struck, Federal Defence Minister, 2 December 2011.

⁴⁹⁸ Schöllgen, Gregor (2004), 'Die Zukunft der deutschen Außenpolitik liegt in Europa', *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, B.11, p.9.

⁴⁹⁹ See *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (2003), 'Fischer und Struck können den Kanzler nicht bremsen', 31 August (footnote 455).

Despite the improved relationship with Britain in 2004 and the Franco-German-British cooperation on the Battlegroup concept Schröder did not regard Britain as a close and essential partner for the progress of ESDP. He merely acknowledged that with Britain it was easier to convince the other member states, in particular the Central and Eastern European states, about the importance of ESDP. But if the EU Heads of State and Government could not agree on essential issues like the Constitutional Treaty Schröder still believed a 'core Europe' would be the way forward instead of watering down the Constitutional Treaty's provisions. Ironically, it was then Schröder's great ally – France – whose public rejected the Constitutional Treaty in the referendum.

Following the fallout over the Iraq war, Schröder's relationship with the Bush government did not significantly improve. In the discussion of the European Security Strategy Schröder insisted on erasing any reference to pre-emptive action and watering down the notion of preventive action to distinguish the EU Strategy from the 2002 US National Security Strategy. At the beginning of 2005 Schröder caused an even greater controversy when at the Security Conference in Munich he claimed that NATO was no longer the primary venue for the transatlantic dialogue and called for a commission to review the transatlantic partnership.⁵⁰⁰

It can therefore be concluded that through a social process of communication Schröder was socialised by the EU in the area of ESDP. He actively and reflectively internalised ESDP norms, as he aimed at establishing ESDP as a supranational, fully-fledged security and defence organisation. There was no reward or threat of sanction that could have led Schröder to behave the way he did. His insistence on pushing forward with far-reaching ESDP proposals if necessary in a smaller framework than the EU-25 left him isolated within the EU and worsened his already shaky relationship with the Bush administration. The fact

⁵⁰⁰ See speech by Gerhard Schröder, Federal Chancellor, 41st Munich Security Conference, 11 February 2005 (footnote 486).

that Schröder emphasised in speeches and interviews that he was proud of ESDP, which due to its comprehensive security concept could deal more effectively with the challenges of the 21st century than NATO, is further evidence for his socialisation. Moreover, Schröder upheld the ESDP norms vis-à-vis different audiences and in different circumstances. He also tried to convince his ministers, notably Fischer and Struck, to adopt his stance on ESDP as the civil servant confirmed in the interview.⁵⁰¹

What had started as role playing in accordance with ESDP norms, led to the socialisation of Schröder in the area of ESDP and to changes in his interests and identity consistent with ESDP norms. Thus, in Schröder's case Liesbet Hooghe was correct in suggesting that after a while the views of former newcomers in an organisation could 'crystallise', that is, their views could become more consistent and stable.⁵⁰² Schröder underwent a period of social learning during which he adopted new cognitive templates, which helped him operating in the area of ESDP. Schröder's identity change comprised changes in both his constitutive norms and his cognitive worldviews.

Checkel suggests the following five conditions for when normative persuasion is more likely occur:

- [1]) The target of socialization is in a novel and uncertain environment and thus cognitively motivated to analyze new information.
- [2]) The target has few prior, ingrained beliefs that are inconsistent with the socializing agency's message.
- [3]) The socializing agency/individual is an authoritative member of the ingroup to which the target belongs or wants to belong.
- [4]) The socializing agency/individual does not lecture or demand but, instead, acts out principles of serious deliberative argument.
- [5]) The agency/target interaction occurs in less politicized and more insulated, in-camera settings.⁵⁰³

⁵⁰¹ Interview with a German civil servant, Berlin, 5 November 2011.

⁵⁰² Hooghe, Liesbet (2007), 'Several Roads Lead to International Norms, but Few Via International Socialization: A Case Study of the European Commission', in, Checkel, Jeffrey T. (ed), *International Institutions and Socialization in Europe*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p.67.

⁵⁰³ Checkel, Jeffrey T. (2007), 'International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and Framework', in, Checkel, Jeffrey T. (ed), *International Institutions and Socialization in Europe*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp.13-14.

The first and third conditions can be falsified here. Schröder had been German Chancellor since 1998. He knew the EU very well. Likewise, Germany was already a member of ESDP and the EU. It was not an in-group Schröder wanted to join.

With regard to the second scope condition, Schröder did not only have a more relaxed attitude towards military policy and Germany's participations in military missions than previous chancellors⁵⁰⁴, but he also presented a new, more self-confident tone of German foreign and security policy. Moreover, in his second term in office, it became obvious that in many respects he regarded ESDP as a better-suited alternative than the transatlantic relationship and NATO. To some extent, this attitude was induced by the discord on the Iraq war. However, Schröder was also convinced that due to its soft power and the unique mix of civil and military capabilities ESDP was better prepared to tackle the challenges of the 21st century than NATO, which in its current form, was a mere extension of the US anyway. He believed that the sole focus on military power pursued by the US was not sufficient anymore in today's world and was one of the reasons why the US had not been able yet to pacify Iraq. Schröder was anxious to highlight the difference between the US and EU approach by, for example, ensuring that the EU Security Strategy did not refer to pre-emptive action. Furthermore, as the Iraq war had shown the US did not want to rely on international institutions and alliances anymore but on coalitions of the willing.⁵⁰⁵ This meant, in Schröder's view, a further loss of power for NATO and should convince the EU member states how important it was to concentrate on ESDP instead. Considering the US' increasing hegemonic behaviour Schröder demanded that the EU should more forcefully

⁵⁰⁴ For example, in 2001, in order to silence the opposition against the largest ever military intervention by the *Bundeswehr* in his own party as well as in the Green Party, Schröder linked the decision on Germany's participation in the Afghanistan war with a vote of confidence in his government.

⁵⁰⁵ Stewart, Patrick (2010), 'The Mission Determines the Coalition': The United States and Multilateral Cooperation after 9/11', in, Jones, Bruce D., Shepard Forman (ed), *Cooperating for Peace and Security: Evolving Institutions and Arrangements in a Context of Changing U.S. Security Policy*, Cambridge University Press, New York, p.20.

pursue its own interests too. But Schröder also recognised that the military and civil powers of ESDP still had to be improved before it could become a fully-fledged security and defence union. He therefore suggested new instruments for ESDP, such as a strategic headquarters for planning and conducting operations.

These views Schröder held were consistent with ESDP norms and hence he had no or only a few ingrained cognitive priors that were inconsistent with the socialising message. As a result, the second condition proves to be correct.

There is also evidence that supports the fourth scope condition. On the basis of the analysed speeches, interviews and statements it can be established that Schröder was neither lectured nor forced but persuaded through arguments and debates in social interactions that ESDP should become a supranational, fully-fledged security and defence organisation. It can be observed how over the years, since he had assumed office, Schröder was convinced in social interactions with the EU and fellow politicians, especially Chirac, to internalise ESDP norms.

Most ESDP summits and talks attended by Schröder were held in insulated in-camera settings given that security and defence policy is a hugely sensitive area for every member state. Thus, there is evidence that in institutions with exclusive membership, where the emphasis is on small and private meetings normative persuasion is more likely to occur.

In addition to these scope conditions, Jan Beyers' proposes in his contribution to Checkel's 2007 volume that 'the longer one's involvement in an organisation the more one's belief can be expected to approximate that organisation's norms'.⁵⁰⁶ This proves to be correct in Schröder's case.

As for Struck and Fischer, it can be concluded that the mechanism 'role playing' still applies. There is no evidence that they were socialised in the area of ESDP. Although some of the

⁵⁰⁶ Beyers, Jan (2007), 'Multiple Embeddedness and Socialization in Europe: The Case of Council Officials', in, Checkel, Jeffrey T. (ed), *International Institutions and Socialization in Europe*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p.110.

controversial ESDP proposals were first suggested by Fischer, he and Struck were willing to adapt these to obtain approval from the other member states, notably the UK. They considered Britain's participation in the development of ESDP as essential because of its military power as well as its influence on the Central and Eastern European states. Furthermore, in contrast to Schröder, Fischer and Struck stressed the continuing importance of NATO and therefore demanded that when enhancing ESDP complementarity to NATO should be maintained and existing NATO structure should not be duplicated.⁵⁰⁷ At the 2004 Munich Security Conference they also suggested different initiatives for NATO's role in the future.⁵⁰⁸ Yet, despite the diverging positions on ESDP, Fischer and Struck continued to defend Schröder's uncompromising and often non-diplomatic behaviour in interviews and speeches.⁵⁰⁹ But, as hinted by the civil servant in the interview, this was to obey the government policy guidelines set by the chancellor.⁵¹⁰

To a certain extent Fischer seems to have revised the ideas he had proposed in his Humboldt speech since in a 2004 interview he argued against the creation of a 'core Europe' as solution for stalled integration projects.⁵¹¹ However, in many respects, Fischer was concerned to mitigate Schröder's behaviour and therefore could have said this in order not to further infuriate the smaller EU member states, which were traditionally sceptical of a 'two-speed Europe'. Fischer also attempted to reconcile the US-German relationship following the Iraq war and Schröder's increasing anti-American sentiment.⁵¹² Nonetheless, Fischer still continued to internalise ESDP norms albeit non-actively and non-reflectively.

⁵⁰⁷ See, for example, Rede des Bundesministers der Verteidigung, Peter Struck, auf dem 2. Europäischen Verteidigungskongress, Berlin, 9 December 2003 (footnote 460).

⁵⁰⁸ See speech by Joschka Fischer, Federal Foreign Minister, 40th Munich Security Conference, 7 February 2004 (footnote 464) and speech by Peter Struck, Federal Defence Minister, 40th Munich Security Conference, 7 February 2004 (footnote 466).

⁵⁰⁹ See, for example, speech by Joschka Fischer, Federal Foreign Minister, 41st Munich Security Conference, 11 February 2005 (footnote 468).

⁵¹⁰ Interview with a German civil servant, Berlin, 5 November 2011.

⁵¹¹ Interview des Bundesministers des Auswärtigen, Joschka Fischer, in der *Berliner Zeitung*, 28 February 2004 (footnote 468).

⁵¹² Fischer, Joschka (2007), *Die rot-grünen Jahre. Deutsche Außenpolitik - vom Kosovo bis zum 11. September: Deutsche Außenpolitik - vom Kosovo bis zum Irak*, Kiepenheuer&Witsch, Köln, p.30.

When the NATO Response Force was created at the 2002 Prague NATO summit he, for example, set the condition that this force should not rival the EU's Rapid Reaction Force.

Struck, like Scharping, was under pressure from the defence ministry, which was concerned that the new ESDP proposals would put military conscription⁵¹³ under increasing strain. Although Struck was the first German policy-maker who mentioned a European army as a distant possibility⁵¹⁴, he and his Parliamentary State Secretary Walter Kolbow preferred a balanced approach to ESDP and NATO.⁵¹⁵ In their view, it would be foolish for Germany to rely on only one organisation. The defence policy guidelines commissioned by Struck referred to ESDP as a necessary supplement to NATO that would strengthen the Alliance rather than as a substitute for NATO.⁵¹⁶ Nevertheless, in the email interview he confirmed that ESDP's range of civil and military capabilities gave the EU an important advantage over other defence organisations.⁵¹⁷

In conclusion, Fischer and Struck did not actively and reflectively internalise ESDP norms. Instead, they subscribed to socially accepted standards of behaviour (role playing) in the area of ESDP. Regarding the four scope conditions, which according to Checkel could trigger role playing, the first two conditions can be falsified: There is no support of the scope conditions 'duration and intensity of ESDP meetings' in the light of the numerous meetings on other issues Fischer and Struck attended. The third condition however is correct since both politicians had experiences in international policy-making settings due to their first term as foreign and defence ministers. As they were only briefly 'parachuted' into

⁵¹³ Until recently, no government had dared to abandon conscription and the concept of 'citizens in uniform'.

⁵¹⁴ See Interview des Bundesministers der Verteidigung, Peter Struck, in der Zeitung *Der Tagesspiegel*, 30 April 2003 (footnote 450) as well as email interview with Peter Struck, 2 December 2011.

⁵¹⁵ See Abschließende Stellungnahme des Parlamentarischen Staatssekretärs beim Bundesminister der Verteidigung, Walter Kolbow, auf der Konferenz IMPULSE 21 Berliner Forum Sicherheitspolitik, Berlin, 21 June 2004 (footnote 477).

⁵¹⁶ Meiers, Franz-Josef (2005), 'Germany's Defence Choices', *Survival*, vol.47, no.1, pp.153-154.

⁵¹⁷ Email interview with Peter Struck, Federal Defence Minister, 2 December 2011.

international settings for ESDP meetings but nevertheless adopted roles in line with ESDP norms, the fourth condition is false. Similar to the first analysis, the mechanism could be triggered by their domestic socialisation and the fact that they were from a federal country and were therefore inclined to supranationalism.

Consequently, whereas Schröder was socialised by the EU in the area of ESDP and for three of the five scope conditions evidence was found that they could have indeed brought about normative socialisation, Fischer and Struck adopted certain roles in line with ESDP norms and only one of the four scope conditions proposed by Checkel proved to be correct. Hence, only in Schröder's case the hypothesis 'Following the creation of the European Security and Defence Policy, German policy-makers became socialised in ESDP. Successful socialisation has resulted in the complete induction of ESDP norms and the adoption of EU's interests and identity in the area of ESDP by German policy-makers.' is verified.

5.6 ESDP and Germany's Grand Coalition (22 November 2005-2007)

5.6.1 EUFOR RD Congo mission and Germany's White Paper (2006)

When Merkel assumed office she vowed to rebuild the relationship with the US. In her first government policy statement, with a view to the transatlantic partnership Merkel expressed her desire 'für ein enges, ehrliches, offenes und vertrauensvolles Verhältnis in der transatlantischen Partnerschaft'.⁵¹⁸ In her opinion European integration and transatlantic partnership were not at odds. Rather, they were the most important pillars of

⁵¹⁸ Regierungserklärung von Bundeskanzlerin Angela Merkel vor dem Deutschen Bundestag, 30 November 2005, http://www.bundesregierung.de/nn_774/Content/DE/Archiv16/Artikel/2005/11/2005-11-30-lasst-uns-mehr-freiheit-wagen-.html [01.09.2010].

Own translation:

for a close, honest, open, and confidence-based relationship.

Germany's foreign policy. A powerful and self-confident Europe would harm neither NATO nor the transatlantic partnership.⁵¹⁹ The new coalition agreement therefore called for

die Fähigkeiten und Handlungsoptionen der EU zu verbessern. Um ihrer internationalen Verantwortung gerecht zu werden und ihre Interessen vertreten zu können, benötigt die EU [...] zivile und militärische Mittel zur Konfliktbeilegung und Konfliktverhütung. Wir wollen die Europäische Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik zu einer Sicherheits- und Verteidigungsunion fortentwickeln.⁵²⁰

On the occasion of the 42nd Munich Security Conference, which was held under the slogan of 'Restoring the Transatlantic Partnership', Merkel underlined NATO's central role in Germany's security policy. For her, the Alliance was still the place for political consultations on new conflicts arising around the world. Merkel was even prepared to give NATO the right of first refusal – something the US had demanded since the creation of ESDP but the Schröder government had always refused to allow.

Do we want to give NATO a kind of primacy in transatlantic cooperation, meaning an attempt first being made by NATO to carry out the necessary political consultations and decide on the required measures – [...]? [...] In my view we should decide that NATO has that primacy, and that other courses should not be explored until the Alliance fails to arrive at an agreement.⁵²¹

On the other hand, she also praised the development of ESDP:

if we look back to the early 1990s and see where we are today [...] then Europe and the EU have grown into a role in which we are truly prepared to assume independent political responsibility, including the military security aspect. I think we Europeans can be justly proud of finally being able to help maintain peace and security on our own continent.⁵²²

Thus, in Merkel's view both NATO and the EU were very successful security alliances.

Together, she stated, they could become an anchor of stability in the world.

⁵¹⁹ Idem.

⁵²⁰ Koalitionsvertrag von CDU, CSU und SPD, 'Gemeinsam für Deutschland. Mit Mut und Menschlichkeit', 11 November 2005, <http://www.cducsu.de/upload/koavertrag0509.pdf> [01.09.2010].

Own translation:

an improvement of the EU's capabilities and options for action. In order to fulfil its international responsibility and be able to represent its interests, the EU needs to acquire civil and military means for conflict settlement and prevention. We intend to develop ESDP to a security and defence union.

⁵²¹ Speech by Angela Merkel, Federal Chancellor, 42nd Munich Security Conference, 4 February 2006, http://www.securityconference.de/archive/konferenzen/rede.php?menu_2006=&menu_2005=&menu_konferenzen=&sprache=en&id=170& [01.09.2010].

⁵²² Idem.

However, as Franz-Josef Jung, the new German Defence Minister, noted in his speech at the Munich Security conference, there were still considerable lack of cooperation and coordination between the EU and NATO:

NATO and the EU must better coordinate the development of their capabilities, and we must adopt a jointly harmonized crisis management [...] we must achieve a higher efficiency of the common bodies of the two organizations. It is vital to explore all options for cooperation and to do more than merely exchange information. Possible areas of cooperation range from intelligence sharing to coordinated force planning to joint training of the NATO Response Force and the EU Battlegroups.⁵²³

At the end of 2005, the UN had asked the EU to provide a rapid reaction capability ahead of the April 2006 presidential elections in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Although France was keen to initiate such a mission, given its other major involvements it did not have the capabilities to act as the lead nation. So, France tried to pressure Germany into leading the mission. Yet, the German government was very reluctant.⁵²⁴ At the EU defence ministers' meeting in Innsbruck in March 2006, Jung insisted that the Congo was an overall responsibility for Europe and that therefore there had to be a fair distribution of duties among the member states.⁵²⁵ Jung set four conditions, which in his opinion would need to be met in order for the EU to deploy a mission to the Congo: clear goals set by the EU, a UN mandate, limited deployment to Kinshasa and the mission would need to be restricted to four months.⁵²⁶ In May, the German government eventually agreed on becoming the lead nation of the mission after it had been accepted that the mission's mandate would comply with the four conditions, in particular with the timeframe and the restrictions on

⁵²³ Speech by Franz-Josef Jung, Federal Defence Minister, 42nd Munich Security Conference, 4 February 2006, http://www.securityconference.de/archive/konferenzen/rede.php?menu_2006=&menu_2005=&menu_konferenzen=&sprache=en&id=168& [01.09.2010].

⁵²⁴ *Der Spiegel* (2006), 'Fallschirmjaeger nach Kinshasa?', 30 January.

⁵²⁵ Interview des Bundesministers der Verteidigung, Franz-Josef Jung, mit dem Radiosender *Deutschlandradio* anlässlich einer Tagung der EU-Verteidigungsminister, Innsbruck, 7 March 2006, http://www.bundesregierung.de/nn_1514/Content/DE/Bulletin/2006/10/107-1-bmvg-bt.html [01.09.2010].

⁵²⁶ *Idem*.

deployment.⁵²⁷ It was also decided that no Battlegroup unit would be deployed.⁵²⁸ Instead, according to Jung, Germany and France would supply two-thirds of the troops needed.⁵²⁹ In October, the German government published a defence and security policy review. The White Paper – the first strategic document since 1994 – underlined the ambition to readjust German defence and security policy to a changing international security environment.⁵³⁰

[T]he radical changes in the security environment have created new risks and threats [...] International terrorism represents a fundamental challenge and threat to freedom and security [...] the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and of the means of their delivery has become a potential threat. In addition, Germany has been confronted with the aftermath of intrastate and regional conflicts, the destabilisation, and the internal disintegration of states as well as its frequent by-product – the privatisation of force.⁵³¹

Therefore, to tackle these new risks and threats, a comprehensive concept of security, which combined a wide range of military and non-military tools and approaches and was embedded in a multilateral framework, was needed. The use of force should only be one among a range of government instruments available to restore order in fragile territories, such as Kosovo, or to reconstruct war-torn societies, such as Afghanistan. This concept, which the White Paper aptly called 'networked security', also emphasised networks between agencies and nations as well as the need for more technology-based capabilities and jointness in operations. The White Paper furthermore affirmed that NATO would continue to be the 'cornerstone of Germany's future security and defence policy'. The EU was described as a 'recognised actor in international crisis management with an increasing

⁵²⁷ The operation was supposed to last 5 months. The troops should be pulled out as soon as the result of the election is announced. Only 800 troops should be based in Congo whilst a reserve force of 1,200 troops should stay in Gabon.

⁵²⁸ *Berliner Zeitung* (2006), 'Trotz allem – ein Ja zum Kongo-Einsatz', 18 May.

⁵²⁹ Rede des Bundesministers der Verteidigung, Franz-Josef Jung, anlässlich der Debatte im Deutschen Bundestag über die deutsche Beteiligung an der EU-geführten Operation EUFOR RD CONGO in der Demokratischen Republik Kongo, 19 May 2006, <http://www.deutsche-aussenpolitik.de/daparchive/anzeige.php?zaehler=7359> [01.09.2010].

⁵³⁰ Noetzel, Timo, Benjamin Schreer (2008), 'All the way? The evolution of German military power', *International Affairs*, vol.84, no.2, p.214.

⁵³¹ White Paper on German security policy and the future of the *Bundeswehr* – Summary, 25 October 2006, http://merlin.ndu.edu/whitepapers/Germany_White_Paper_2006summary.pdf [01.09.2010].

capacity for taking action on foreign and security policy matters'.⁵³² Germany's new sense of self-confidence became also apparent as the White Paper stated that '[t]he united Germany has an important part in shaping the future of Europe and beyond'.⁵³³ When Jung presented the White Paper to the *Bundestag*, he proudly pointed out the rapid evolution of German defence policy and practice over the twelve years since the last White Paper. During this period, according to Jung, 200,000 German military personnel served on various international missions, in particular in the Congo, Afghanistan, Lebanon, and the Balkans. In order to enable the *Bundeswehr* to cope with these new types of missions and threats, Jung promised that he would press ahead with the reform of the *Bundeswehr* from large, heavy and armoured-dominant forces to smaller, more mobile crisis intervention forces.⁵³⁴

At a press conference on the presentation of the White Paper, Jung was asked whether the statement that NATO would remain the cornerstone of Germany's security and defence policy could be understood as a confirmation of the prioritisation of NATO over other defence organisations, notably ESDP. Jung denied this and assured that Germany was committed to NATO as well as ESDP.⁵³⁵

At the fourth conference of Impulse 21 – The Berlin Forum on Security Policy, Merkel also confirmed that the White Paper did not prioritise NATO over ESDP. On the contrary, Merkel said,

Wir Europäer können in die euro-atlantische Sicherheitspartnerschaft viel Wertvolles einbringen: Nämlich die Kombination aufeinander abgestimmter ziviler

⁵³² Idem.

⁵³³ Idem.

⁵³⁴ Rede des Bundesministers der Verteidigung, Franz-Josef Jung, anlässlich der Bundestagsdebatte zum Weißbuch 2006, 26 October 2006, http://www.bundesregierung.de/nn_1514/Content/DE/Bulletin/2006/10/107-1-bmvg-bt.html [01.09.2010].

⁵³⁵ Pressekonferenz mit dem Bundesminister der Verteidigung, Franz-Josef Jung, Berlin, 25 October 2006, http://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/kcxml/04_Sj9SPykssy0xPLMnMz0vM0Y_QjzKLd4k3NjGwBMmB2CZu5vqRcMGgIFR9X4_83FT9gODUnNTkkoDE9FR9b_2C3IhyR0dFRQCjdFodelta/base64xml/L2dJQSEvUUt3QS80SVVFLzZfRF8zRjdF?yw_contentURL=%2FC1256F1200608B1B%2FW26UXBA4951INFODE%2Fcontent.jsp [01.09.2010].

und militärischer Fähigkeiten. Wir Europäer lassen uns von einem umfassenden Sicherheitsbegriff leiten: Außenpolitik, Entwicklungspolitik und Verteidigungspolitik, zivile und militärische Möglichkeiten – sie gemeinsam bilden eine Einheit.⁵³⁶

At the end of 2006 the German government began preparing for its EU presidency in the first half of 2007. The expectations for its presidency were very high. The other member states hoped that Germany would manage to overcome the constitutional and EU reform deadlock. In June, the European Council therefore tasked the upcoming German presidency to

present a report to the European Council next year [...] This report should contain an assessment of the state of discussion with regard to the Constitutional Treaty and explore possible future developments.⁵³⁷

In a cabinet statement in November the German government promised that it would work hard to ensure that this task would be achieved and the constitutional process would be concluded successfully.⁵³⁸

In a speech at the German Council on Foreign Policy in November, Merkel stressed how important the ratification of the European Constitutional Treaty was for the further development of the European Security and Defence Policy:

Mit einer Stimme zu sprechen, macht Europa stark; zerstritten zu sein, bewirkt das Gegenteil. [...] regionale Konflikte, instabile Staaten [...] haben im Zusammenhang mit [...] asymmetrischen Bedrohungen kaum abwägbare Folgen. Solchen Bedrohungen kann kein Staat allein Herr werden. Deshalb ist es so notwendig, dass die Europäische Union als Gemeinschaft Antworten auf diese Fragestellung findet. Die Europäische Union hat im Europäischen Verfassungsvertrag und in der

⁵³⁶ Rede von Bundeskanzlerin Angela Merkel auf der Konferenz IMPULSE 21 Berliner Forum Sicherheitspolitik, 10 November 2006, http://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/EN/Artikel/2006/11/2006-11-10-sicherheitspolitik-in-der-diskussion_en.html [01.09.2010].

Own translation:

We Europeans can contribute many valuable means to the euro-Atlantic security partnership; namely the combination of coordinated civil and military capabilities. We Europeans follow a comprehensive security approach: foreign, development and defence policy, civil and military opportunities form a unit.

⁵³⁷ Brussels European Council (2006), 'Presidency Conclusions', 15-16 June, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/90111.pdf [01.09.2010].

⁵³⁸ Regierungserklärung von Bundeskanzlerin Angela Merkel vor dem Deutschen Bundestag, 26 November 2006, http://www.bundesregierung.de/Webs/Breg/DE/Mediathek/Start/Functions/FilterFormular_templateId=processForm.html__nnn=true [01.09.2010].

Europäischen Sicherheitsstrategie entsprechende Antworten gegeben.⁵³⁹

The official German presidency programme was presented by Merkel in her government statement on 14 December. Merkel declared that the primary objective of the German government was to achieve an agreement on a road map for the re-launch of the Constitutional Treaty's ratification or modification by the end of its presidency.⁵⁴⁰

5.6.2 Reform Treaty (2007)

On 29-30 January, the German presidency and the EU Institute for Security Studies organised a conference entitled 'ESDP: from Cologne to Berlin and beyond. Operations-Institutions-Capabilities' in Berlin. In his speech at the conference, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, the German Foreign Minister, took stock of the achievements ESDP had accomplished since its launch and also analysed its challenges and priorities for the coming years:

Looking back just seven years – but already 16 ESDP missions later –, we can appreciate how much this relatively new area of EU policy has developed in such a short time. [...] I can still remember the scepticism which accompanied the advent of ESDP [...]. But it seems to me that even the sceptics of the time today view the European Security and Defence Policy much more positively. The EU has developed into a recognized player in international crisis management.⁵⁴¹

However, at the same time Steinmeier admitted that the journey had not always been easy and disagreements among member states as well as within member states had often

⁵³⁹ Rede von Bundeskanzlerin Angela Merkel im Rahmen einer Vortragsveranstaltung der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, Berlin, 8 November 2006, http://www.cap-lmu.de/lit/eintrag.php?we_objectID=1248 [01.09.2010].

Own translation:

To speak with one voice makes Europe strong; discord, however, leads to the opposite. Regional conflicts, unstable states [...] linked to asymmetrical threats can cause almost incalculable consequences. No state on its own can deal with such threats. It is therefore important that the EU as a community finds answers to those problems. The EU delivered relevant answers in the Constitutional Treaty and the Security Strategy.

⁵⁴⁰ Regierungserklärung von Bundeskanzlerin Angela Merkel zur Doppelpräsidentschaft vor dem Deutschen Bundestag, 14 December 2006, <http://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/Archiv16/Regierungserklaerung/2006/12/2006-12-14-regierungserklaerung-bkin-doppelpraesidentschaft,layoutVariant=Druckansicht.html> [01.09.2010].

⁵⁴¹ Speech by Frank-Walter Steinmeier, Federal Foreign Minister, Conference 'ESDP: From Cologne to Berlin and Beyond. Operations, Institutions, Capabilities', Berlin, 29 January 2007, http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/ESDP-from_Cologne_to_Berlin-STEINMEIER.rtf [01.09.2010].

occurred. Referring to the discussions about whether or not Germany should lead the Congo mission, he stressed that in end Germany had agreed to lead the mission. Most of the disagreements on ESDP had ended so positively. Steinmeier furthermore pointed out that given today's constantly changing security situation the EU had to ensure that its range of instruments, capacities and concepts kept pace with the new challenges. The German EU presidency, according to Steinmeier, would therefore attempt to make ESDP more effective. As the Constitutional Treaty contained important provisions for ESDP, this was another reason why the member states urgently needed to find a solution to the current stalemate. The most interesting statement in Steinmeier's speech was his suggestion that a 'common European defence force' would counter the crisis in the EU.

And we may well think about long-term projects: the step-by-step adoption of a common defence policy right up to the possibility of a common European defence force. There remains much talk today of crisis in the EU. And of a lack of vision. Common European defence – would that not be a good counter-example?⁵⁴²

On the occasion of the 43rd Munich Security Conference, Steinmeier delivered a speech, in which sounding similar to this former boss Gerhard Schröder⁵⁴³ he called for reform of the transatlantic relationship. In his view 'it still needs considerable renewal for the age of globalization'. Yet, in contrast to Schröder, he confirmed that 'NATO naturally remains our partnership's definitive security organization' although he doubted whether 'all questions regarding the future of security in the broadest sense need to be placed within the NATO framework'.⁵⁴⁴

Merkel emphasised in her speech that

⁵⁴² Idem.

⁵⁴³ Frank-Walter Steinmeier served as Chief of Staff in the German Chancellery from 1999 to 2005.

⁵⁴⁴ Speech by Frank-Walter Steinmeier, Federal Foreign Minister, 43rd Munich Security Conference, 11 February 2007, [http://www.securityconference.de/archive/konferenzen/rede.php?menu_2007=&menu_2006=&menu_2005=&menu_konferenzen=&sprache=en&id=193&\[01.09.2010\]](http://www.securityconference.de/archive/konferenzen/rede.php?menu_2007=&menu_2006=&menu_2005=&menu_konferenzen=&sprache=en&id=193&[01.09.2010]).

[...] Atlantic partnership and European integration remain the pillars of Germany's security policy for me. Strengthening Europe's security identity, separate from the Atlantic security partnership, is not a route I want to take.⁵⁴⁵

But she also asserted that the German EU presidency aimed to further develop ESDP since 'it has become second nature to us in spite of its relative youth'.

We have learned, partly from difficult experience, that where Europe fails to speak with one voice and is divided, we have little or no influence; in other words we cannot even defend our European interests.⁵⁴⁶

In March, Berlin held an official ceremony to mark the 50th anniversary of the Treaties of Rome. The so called 'Berlin Declaration' was signed by Merkel on behalf of the EU presidency, José Manuel Barroso on behalf of the European Commission, and Hans-Gert Pöttering on behalf of the European Parliament. 'Europe – succeeding together' was the message of the anniversary and the tenor of the Berlin Declaration. In the run-up to the Berlin ceremony Merkel gave an interview to Germany's tabloid newspaper *Bild*, in which she looked ahead to the next 50 years of the EU. According to Merkel, one of the key goals for the EU in the next 50 years was the build-up of a European army: 'In der EU selbst müssen wir einer gemeinsamen europäischen Armee näher kommen.'⁵⁴⁷

Although Merkel added that she did not want to steer Europe towards a federal superstate, it was nonetheless a significant statement especially because Merkel was still negotiating the reviving of the Constitutional Treaty with the other member states and wanted to use 'Europe's 50th birthday' to give momentum to the negotiations.⁵⁴⁸

⁵⁴⁵ Speech by Angela Merkel, Federal Chancellor, 43rd Munich Security Conference, 10 February 2007, http://www.securityconference.de/archive/konferenzen/rede.php?menu_2007=&menu_2006=&menu_2005=&menu_konferenzen=&sprache=en&id=178& [01.09.2010].

⁵⁴⁶ Idem.

⁵⁴⁷ Interview der Bundeskanzlerin Angela Merkel mit der Zeitung *Bild*, 23 March 2007, http://www.eu2007.de/de/News/Speeches_Interviews/March/0323BKBild.html [01.09.2010].

Own translation:

In the EU, we have to come closer to creating a common European army.

⁵⁴⁸ *Frankfurter Rundschau* (2007), 'Europa im Tarnanzug: Für eine gemeinsame Armee der EU spricht einiges, als Integrationsmotor eignet sie sich aber nicht', 31 March.

In a speech to the Representation of the State of Hessen to the EU, Jung seized Merkel's suggestion and also called for a European army:

Bundeskanzlerin Merkel hat sich vor wenigen Wochen vernehmbar dafür [europäischen Armee] ausgesprochen. Die Europäische Armee liegt für mich in der Logik der Erfolgsgeschichte des Erfolgsprojektes der Europäischen Integration. Denn zu einer gemeinsamen Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik gehört selbstverständlich auch eine gemeinsame Verteidigungspolitik. Wenn Europa in der Zukunft die ihm gemäße Rolle auf der Weltbühne spielen will, dann müssen wir weiter in Richtung "Europäische Armee" vorankommen. Das Zusammenlegen von Fähigkeiten ist gut, reicht aber nicht aus.⁵⁴⁹

Jung however admitted that a common European defence would be a long-term project and for the time being the EU member states needed to concentrate on projects, which would drive forward Europe's capabilities. Thus, the German presidency, for example, would strive to create the necessary preconditions for autonomous air and naval forces to supplement the battlegroups.⁵⁵⁰

In May at a press conference on the EU's External Relations Council meeting, Jung reported that a 'Rapid Response Air Initiative' and a 'Maritime Rapid Response Concept' were set up, whose results would be published by mid-2007.⁵⁵¹

On the occasion of the 3rd Joint Parliamentary Meeting on the Future of Europe, Steinmeier also spoke about a European army: 'Und wenn nach – langfristigen – Visionen gefragt wird für das Europa der Zukunft: eine gemeinsame europäische Verteidigung ist für

⁵⁴⁹ Rede des Bundesministers der Verteidigung, Franz-Josef Jung, bei der Hessischen Landesvertretung, Brussels, 10 April 2007, http://www.bundesregierung.de/nn_23778/Content/DE/PeriodischerBericht/StichworteSicherheitspolitik/2007/06/2007-06-04-sipo-maerz-april-2007.html [01.09.2010].

Own translation:

A couple of weeks ago Federal Chancellor Merkel had explicitly argued for [a European army]. In my view a European army is a logical step considering the successful history of the successful European integration project. A common foreign and security policy naturally needs a common defence policy. If Europe wants to play an appropriate role on the world stage in the future, we need to move ahead with creating a European army. The pooling of capabilities is good but it is not enough.

⁵⁵⁰ Idem.

⁵⁵¹ Pressekonferenz mit dem Bundesminister der Verteidigung, Franz-Josef Jung, Brussels, 15 May 2007, http://www.eu2007.de/de/News/Press_Releases/May/0515AARAA.html [01.09.2010].

mich ein guter Kandidat.⁵⁵² Referring to the upcoming European Council summit, which should decide about the fate of the Constitutional Treaty, Steinmeier emphasised that the questions the Constitutional Treaty had sought to answer in 2003 were no less urgent today. The EU still needed a new foundation in order to perform its tasks more effectively. Therefore, he asserted, the German government in its role as holder of the EU presidency would work hard to ensure that the upcoming summit was a success.⁵⁵³

Indeed, the European Council summit was a success as it paved the way for a treaty reform in the EU. The compromise of a 'Reform Treaty' reached at the European Council provided for amendments to the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC). In a speech to the European Parliament at the end of Germany's presidency, Merkel hailed the outcome of the European Council as a great success for Europe:

The agreement reached in Brussels enables us to retain the substance of the Constitutional Treaty. With the Reform Treaty we are taking account of citizens' fears of an alleged "European superstate", of surrendering too much of the nation states' identities. I do not share this fear, but I had to respect it.⁵⁵⁴

Merkel went on,

the Reform Treaty brings with it progress in policy-making, for instance as regards the EU's external action. Every day there is a greater need for a coherent foreign policy, every day a greater need to "speak with one voice" in a Europe which wants to assert its interests in the world. The Reform Treaty is necessary so that Europe can hold its course. The European Council hopes that the Intergovernmental Conference can be convened before the end of July.⁵⁵⁵

⁵⁵² Rede des Bundesministers des Auswärtigen, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, anlässlich des 3. Gemeinsamen Parlamentariertreffens zur Zukunft Europas, Brussels, 12 June 2007, <http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/en/Infoservice/Presse/Reden/2007/070612-ZukunftEuropa-BxIs.html> [01.09.2010].

Own translation:

And if you ask me about long-term visions for the Europe of the future, I would say that a common European defence policy would be a good candidate.

⁵⁵³ Idem.

⁵⁵⁴ Speech by Angela Merkel, Federal Chancellor, 'Outcomes of the German EU presidency', European Parliament, 27 June 2007, http://www.eu2007.de/de/News/Speeches_Interviews/Juni/06288KinEP.html [01.09.2010].

⁵⁵⁵ Idem.

Merkel concluded her speech and by extension Germany's EU presidency with the wish that the agreement on the Reform Treaty would lead to a prosperous future for the EU. Germany – beyond its presidency - would remain fully committed to the further integration of the EU.⁵⁵⁶

5.7 Analysis No.3

When the Grand Coalition under the leadership of Conservative Chancellor Angela Merkel came into power, most commentators expected an improvement in the US-German relationship and a commitment to NATO again. The CDU/CSU traditionally had a US-friendly attitude.⁵⁵⁷ During the process of unification, Conservative Chancellor Helmut Kohl fought hard for a united Germany to remain in NATO instead of becoming neutral. Angela Merkel who grew up in the former German Democratic Republic (GDR) felt profound gratitude towards the US for supporting German unification. During the Iraq war, she accused Schröder of anti-Americanism and came out in favour of the invasion of Iraq.

Indeed, when Angela Merkel entered office, she called for a revitalisation of the transatlantic relation.⁵⁵⁸ Also, unlike Schröder, she described NATO as still the place for political consultations on new conflicts and even more importantly, she was willing to provide NATO with the long-sought right of first refusal. In her speech at the 2006 Munich Security Conference she declared that in her view NATO should have primacy in transatlantic cooperation. Only if NATO failed to arrive at an agreement, other courses, i.e. ESDP, should be explored.⁵⁵⁹ This was a striking difference to Schröder who in his second term as chancellor had refused to give NATO any major role let alone primacy over ESDP.

⁵⁵⁶ Idem.

⁵⁵⁷ The first post-World War II leader of the CDU, Konrad Adenauer, was a firm ally of the US.

⁵⁵⁸ Regierungserklärung von Bundeskanzlerin Angela Merkel vor dem Deutschen Bundestag, 30 November 2005 (footnote 518).

⁵⁵⁹ See speech by Angela Merkel, Federal Chancellor, 42nd Munich Security Conference, 4 February 2006 (footnote 521).

However, not only Merkel seems to have shifted Germany's allegiance back to NATO, but also her Defence Minister and CDU colleague Franz-Josef Jung presented a strong commitment to NATO with the publication of the 2006 White Paper on Germany's security policy and the future of the *Bundeswehr*. The White Paper lauded NATO as the 'cornerstone of German security and defence policy', which prompted some commentators to speculate whether this would mean a prioritisation of NATO over ESDP. Jung however denied this.⁵⁶⁰ And indeed, like the European Security Strategy, the White Paper highlighted a comprehensive concept of security, which combined military and civil tools, as the overall approach for tackling today's security challenges. According to Merkel, ESDP provided this unique combination of civil and military capabilities and was therefore able to contribute a different set of instruments to the Euro-Atlantic partnership.⁵⁶¹ Although as Jung stated at the 2006 Munich Security Conference the relationship between NATO and the EU/ESDP still needed cultivating through consultation and coordinated action.⁵⁶²

The behaviour of Jung in the run up to the EU Mission in Congo did not show great commitment to ESDP. Only reluctantly and after long discussions he agreed that Germany would become the lead nation of the mission. Hence, it appears that in the first year of the Grand Coalition, Merkel and Defence Minister Jung shifted their attention away from the further development of ESDP. However, despite this shift there are also signs that the emancipation from the US and NATO Schröder had pursued was to some extent adopted by Merkel's government as well. Similar to Schröder, Merkel stressed that Washington should regularly consult with its partners and undertake all future operations within the NATO framework. Also, Europe needed to be considered as an equal partner in every aspect,

⁵⁶⁰ See Pressekonferenz mit dem Bundesminister der Verteidigung, Franz-Josef Jung, Berlin, 25 October 2006 (footnote 535).

⁵⁶¹ See Rede von Bundeskanzlerin Angela Merkel auf der Konferenz IMPULSE 21 Berliner Forum Sicherheitspolitik, 10 November 2006 (footnote 536).

⁵⁶² See speech by Franz-Josef Jung, Federal Defence Minister, 42nd Munich Security Conference, 4 February 2006 (footnote 523).

including defence, by the US since its ESDP had made incredible progress over the last seven years and it had shown that it could take over responsibility.⁵⁶³

During Germany's EU presidency in 2007, this emancipation tendency strengthened and ESDP became a focal point of interest for the German government. At the beginning of the presidency in January 2007, Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier declared ESDP a success and suggested the creation of a common European defence force as the new long-term project of the EU. In his view, this would provide the EU with a vision, which could help tackling the current crisis over the Constitutional Treaty in the EU.⁵⁶⁴ Of course, Steinmeier, who had served as chief of staff for Schröder, represented the strand of government more comfortable with emancipation and had a more positive position on ESDP from the beginning of the Grand Coalition. Yet, in contrast to Schröder, for him NATO remained Germany's definitive security organisation as he emphasised at the 2007 Munich Security Conference.⁵⁶⁵

At the same conference Merkel assured the US that Germany would never develop ESDP separately from NATO. But she also emphasised the importance of further developing ESDP reminding the European states of the consequences of not speaking with one voice.⁵⁶⁶ Merkel even agreed with Steinmeier on the necessity of a European army.⁵⁶⁷ Interestingly, Merkel brought up the idea of a European army, while she was still negotiating the future of the Constitutional Treaty. Jung seized Steinmeier's and Merkel's suggestion of a

⁵⁶³ See speech by Angela Merkel, Federal Chancellor, 42nd Munich Security Conference, 4 February 2006 (footnote 521).

⁵⁶⁴ See speech by Frank-Walter Steinmeier, Federal Foreign Minister, Conference 'ESDP: From Cologne to Berlin and Beyond. Operations, Institutions, Capabilities', Berlin, 29 January 2007 (footnote 541).

⁵⁶⁵ See speech by Frank-Walter Steinmeier, Federal Foreign Minister, 43rd Munich Security Conference, 11 February 2007, (footnote 544).

⁵⁶⁶ See speech by Angela Merkel, Federal Chancellor, 43rd Munich Security Conference, 10 February 2007 (footnote 545).

⁵⁶⁷ See Interview der Bundeskanzlerin Angela Merkel mit der Zeitung *Bild*, 23 March 2007 (footnote 547).

European army and argued that a common European defence force would be needed if the EU wanted to influence world politics.⁵⁶⁸

With their open commitment to a European army, these three policy-makers went further than Schröder and his government although undoubtedly Schröder's government had laid the foundation for this discussion and Struck had mentioned the idea of a European army as a possibility in the distant future. Therefore, the Grand Coalition did not bring about a fundamental transformation of Germany's foreign and security policy. Instead, in many respects it continued past politics.⁵⁶⁹

Although there was at times disagreement among the three policy-makers about whether to press for a more equal partnership between ESDP and NATO and relating to this between the EU and the US, it can nevertheless be concluded that all three policy-makers behaved boundedly. They did not arrive at cost-benefit solutions or decisions. None of them was rewarded by or threatened into committing to a European army. Indeed, it was very risky for Merkel proposing a European army amid negotiations on the Constitutional Treaty. Eurosceptic countries like Britain or Poland could have questioned whether Merkel was an honest broker or whether in fact she had a hidden agenda. On the other hand, Merkel, Jung and Steinmeier were not persuaded to actively and reflectively internalise ESDP norms thereby changing their interests and identities. In the first year of the Grand Coalition, Merkel and Jung behaved cautiously towards ESDP. They did not push its development and only after enormous pressure agreed on leading the Congo Mission.⁵⁷⁰ Although Steinmeier was committed to ESDP from the beginning, he still regarded NATO as

⁵⁶⁸ See Rede des Bundesministers der Verteidigung, Franz-Josef Jung, bei der Hessischen Landesvertretung, Brussels, 10 April 2007 (footnote 549).

⁵⁶⁹ Meiers, Franz-Josef (2007), 'The German Predicament: The Red Lines of the Security and Defence Policy of the Berlin Republic', *International Politics*, vol.44, no.55, p.637.

⁵⁷⁰ See Interview des Bundesministers der Verteidigung, Franz-Josef Jung, mit dem Radiosender *Deutschlandradio* anlässlich einer Tagung der EU-Verteidigungsminister, Innsbruck, 7 March 2006 (footnote 525).

the definitive security organisation, which shows that he also did not actively and reflectively internalise ESDP norms. The policy-makers adopted new cognitive templates in line with ESDP norms in order to operate in the unfamiliar environment. All three policy-makers realised that in order to achieve their preferred ESDP outcomes, they had to subscribe to socially accepted standards of behaviour.

When testing the first two scope conditions for role playing – duration and intensity of contact – the same conclusion as before has to be drawn: Both conditions are false. Although the policy-makers attended numerous meetings, which dealt with ESDP, these only constituted a fraction of the overall meetings they had to take part in. There is no evidence, which supports the conditions that long, sustained and intense contact would lead to the adoption of role playing by the policy-makers.

None of the policy-makers had previous professional experiences in international policy-making. Jung had been a member of the Hesse government before he became defence minister whereas Merkel had been leader of the CDU and chairwoman of the CDU-CSU parliamentary coalition. Steinmeier as Schröder's chief of staff had mainly dealt with domestic politics. Hence, the third scope condition that previous experiences in international policy-making would trigger the internalisation of supranational role conception is not correct.

There is also no evidence supporting the fourth scope condition, which suggests that policy-makers with extensive domestic policy networks who do not engage on a full-time basis with the supranational institution would be less likely to internalise new roles in line with the norms of the institution. Although Merkel, Steinmeier and Jung were only from time to time 'parachuted' into the ESDP setting in order to attend meetings, i.e. they were no full-timers, they still developed socially appropriate roles consistent with ESDP norms.

Examining the research conducted for this thesis, the effect of novelty, federalism and the domestic socialisation of the three policy-makers appear to be far more probable scope

conditions for the non-reflective internalisation of ESDP norms by the policy-makers. According to the first scope condition - effect of novelty – the role playing in line with ESDP norms acted as cognitive markers for the three newcomers to adapt to the accepted standards in ESDP meetings. This condition casts a different light on the behaviour of Merkel and Jung towards ESDP and the US/NATO at the beginning of the Grand Coalition. It suggests that not only because of their pro-US attitude they attempted to rebuild the relationship with the US and NATO but also because the EU overall had embarked on a conciliatory approach towards the US. Also in 2006, ESDP was not high on the EU agenda. The EU was in a deep crisis due to the failed referenda in France and the Netherlands and attention was focused on reviving the Constitutional Treaty or at least saving the most important provisions in a new intergovernmental treaty. As at the beginning of 2007 a solution to the stalemate over the future of the Constitutional Treaty gradually emerged the EU could once again concentrate on other projects, like ESDP. According to the scope condition, this led German policy-makers to become more pro-ESDP in 2007. Hence, as newcomers German policy-makers adopted cognitive templates in line with ESDP norms in order to operate in the unfamiliar environment. As shown above, there is evidence that supports this scope condition. But as stated in the first analysis, it is difficult to prove 'effect of novelty' conclusively.

In the light of Germany's history, its policy-makers had traditionally been pro-European but wary of defence and military policy. This tendency however changed with the new generation of politicians. The domestic socialisation of Merkel, Steinmeier and Jung probably induced their role playing at the ESDP level. The scope conditions of domestic socialisation and federalism therefore appear to be correct.

With regard to all three policy-makers, the hypothesis is disproved since none of them was socialised by the EU in the area of ESDP. They merely adopted roles in line with ESDP norms and internalised these norms in a non-reflective manner. There was no evidence for

Checkel's scope conditions but for the condition domestic socialisation and probably 'effect of novelty'.

5.8 Conclusion

In this chapter, Jeffrey T. Checkel's problem-driven constructivist middle-range socialisation approach was applied to German policy-makers in order to analyse whether they were socialised by the EU in the area of the European Security and Defence Policy. As elaborated on in chapter three, only if there is evidence that the EU convinced German policy-makers in a social process of communication to actively and reflectively internalise ESDP norms, it can be concluded that socialisation happened. The focus was on specific policy-makers, namely chancellors, defence ministers and foreign ministers, as they are usually the ones in charge of EU policy in general and European defence policy in particular. Two speeches by Walter Kolbow, the parliamentary state secretary in the Defence Ministry, and Klaus Scharioth, the state secretary of the Foreign Office, were also analysed as they gave indications of the mood in these ministries as well as of the ministers' attitudes towards ESDP. Other speeches, interviews and statements by parliamentary state secretaries as well as state secretaries of the Defence Ministry, the Foreign Office and the Chancellery were not relevant for this thesis. The timeframe of this case study embraced the period from the Saint Malo meeting (3 and 4 December 1998) to the Lisbon European Council summit (18-19 October 2007). During that time, two SPD-Green coalitions as well as a Grand Coalition ran Germany.

Following the application of Checkel's socialisation approach to this case study, a number of conclusions can be drawn:

Most German policy-makers were not persuaded to internalise ESDP norms but adopted roles in line with ESDP norms. Through these roles they acquired knowledge that enabled them to operate in the ESDP environment and to act in accordance with expectations.

Although this meant a shift away from a logic of consequence to a logic of appropriateness, as they only complied with ESDP norms in a non-reflective manner they were not socialised by the EU in the area of the European Security and Defence Policy. Only in Schröder's second term in office, normative persuasion could be detected and it could be established that Schröder was persuaded by the EU to actively and reflectively internalise ESDP norms and during this process adopted the interests and the identity of the persuader. Hence, he was socialised in ESDP. His identity change comprised changes in his constitutive norms and in his cognitive worldviews.

When Schröder came into power he continued the traditional *sowohl als auch* policy of the previous chancellors supporting NATO as well as developing ESDP although already at the beginning of his chancellorship he arguably put more effort into driving ESDP forward. Towards the end of his first term in office / beginning of the second, Schröder had moved away from the *sowohl als auch* policy and had shaped a new form of European and transatlantic policy. Whereas his transatlantic / NATO policy became characterised by indifference and following the Iraq crisis by opposition and the demand of a new transatlantic relationship, he pushed forward with far-reaching ESDP proposals and insisted on their implementation if necessary in a smaller framework than the EU-25.⁵⁷¹ Hence what started as role playing developed into persuasion after his re-election. As Hooghe put it, Schröder's views 'crystallised', that is, they became consistent and stable.⁵⁷²

The change in Schröder's identity led to shifts in Germany's security and defence policy that were consistent with Schröder's new identity. For example, the participation in the Tervuren summit clearly was a new path for Germany's security and defence policy although Struck denied this in an interview with the German newspaper *Der Tagesspiegel*.

⁵⁷¹ Risse, Thomas (2004), 'Kontinuität durch Wandel: Eine 'neue' deutsche Außenpolitik?', *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, B.11, p.26.

⁵⁷² Hooghe, Liesbet (2007), 'Several Roads Lead to International Norms, but Few Via International Socialization: A Case Study of the European Commission', in, Checkel, Jeffrey T. (ed), *International Institutions and Socialization in Europe*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p.67.

As head of the government, Schröder was able to implement these policy changes without facing notable opposition. Hence, causality between Schröder's identity change and the shifts in Germany's security and defence policy can be established.

According to this research, three out of the five suggested scope conditions for normative persuasion seem to have triggered the persuasion of Schröder: the target has few prior, ingrained beliefs that are inconsistent with the socialising agency's message; the socialising agency does not lecture or demand but instead acts out principles of serious deliberative argument; and the agency/ target interaction occurs in less politicised and more insulated in-camera settings. In addition, the scope condition proposed by Beyer 'the longer one's involvement in an organisation the more one's belief can be expected to approximate that organisation's norms'⁵⁷³ - albeit not specific to normative persuasion – also proves to be correct in Schröder's case.

Apart from previous experiences in international policy-making Checkel's scope conditions for role playing did not stand the test of reality. Instead according to this research, three other scope conditions may have triggered the role playing of the German policy-makers. First, there is evidence that due to the fact that in the first SPD-Green coalition and the Grand Coalition the policy-makers were newcomers they adopted cognitive templates in line with ESDP norms in order to operate in the unfamiliar environment and to adapt their behaviour to the accepted standards. This scope condition is, however, difficult to prove conclusively. It therefore cannot be determined for sure that it triggered the role playing of the policy-makers in the first SPD-Green coalition and the Grand Coalition.

The second and third scope conditions, which according to this research probably induced role playing, is the domestic socialisation of policy-makers, including their experience in a

⁵⁷³ Beyers, Jan (2007), 'Multiple Embeddedness and Socialization in Europe: The Case of Council Officials', in, Checkel, Jeffrey T. (ed), *International Institutions and Socialization in Europe*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p.110.

federal political system.⁵⁷⁴ Hooghe however argues that the domestic level cannot only enable international socialisation but can also restrict it. Unlike international organisations, national institutions take full advantage of primary socialisation. European children grow up in national contexts. As socialisation within a state happens prior to international socialisation it usually trumps the latter. It is therefore difficult for an international organisation to substantially shift the views of mature policy-makers. Yet, as Alastair Johnston correctly shows national socialisation does not necessarily need to undermine the internalisation of pro-European norms. Pro-European norms

may be inculcated at the national or subnational level through the internalization of pro-European ideologies or the development of a concept of identity that can incorporate both national and international allegiance.⁵⁷⁵

Furthermore, as stated in chapter two, people as well as states can have multiple identities, for example a state can be sovereign and an imperial power.

German politicians had traditionally been very pro-European. At the same time, due to Germany's history, there had been a strong tendency of pacifism among the politicians. Under Chancellor Kohl, Germany's military policy mainly consisted of 'chequebook diplomacy'. But the attitudes of German politicians had changed in the 1990s. The post-war generation saw the necessity for developing ESDP and readjusting German defence and security policy to a changing international security environment. Consequently no discrepancy between the national socialisation of the German policy-makers and the socialising message of the EU can be identified. On the contrary, as shown above, there is evidence that the domestic socialisation favoured the policy-makers' role playing in line with ESDP norms.

⁵⁷⁴ Hooghe, Liesbet (2007), 'Several Roads Lead to International Norms, but Few Via International Socialization: A Case Study of the European Commission', in, Checkel, Jeffrey T. (ed), *International Institutions and Socialization in Europe*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p.80.

⁵⁷⁵ Johnston, Alastair Iain (2007), 'Conclusion and Extension: Toward Mid-Range Theorizing and Beyond Europe', in, Checkel, Jeffrey T. (ed), *International Institutions and Socialization in Europe*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p.212.

Another condition, which could illustrate why Schröder was socialised but none of the ministers, could be the policy-maker's autonomy. In Germany the chancellor is able to act fairly autonomously at the EU level. Ministers, on the other hand, are to some degree dependent on their chancellor as he/she de facto appoints and dismisses ministers⁵⁷⁶ and sets the government policy guidelines. That could make it more difficult to socialise ministers. In addition, some of the German ministries, particularly the Defence Ministry, have a history of being rather Eurosceptic in contrast to the EU-friendly Ministries such as the Chancellery. In the interview with the civil servant he confirmed that Rudolf Scharping, the previous defence minister, felt under pressure by the Defence Ministry to behave cautiously regarding ESDP.⁵⁷⁷ There is however no evidence that proves this condition.

There are a number of other scope conditions for normative persuasion and role playing, which were proposed by contributors to Checkel's volume *International Institution and Sozialisation in Europe*. However, they clearly did not trigger the German policy-makers' normative persuasion or role playing. For example, Liesbet Hooghe suggests that norms that concern diffuse values are more likely to be actively and reflectively socialised.⁵⁷⁸ Although the chosen ESDP norms contains diffuse values, namely the preparedness to establish ESDP as a supranational, fully fledged security and defence organisation, only one policy-maker completely internalised the norms. Hooghe also claims that the extent to which exposure leads to socialisation depends on the boundedness of the organisation. An organisation is bounded to the extent that it controls its members. Socialisation flourishes in homogenous, bounded environments; it is suppressed when an organisation is fragmented and vulnerable to external influences. However, although the EU is not a bounded

⁵⁷⁶ Officially the federal president appoints and dismisses ministers upon the proposal of the chancellor.

⁵⁷⁷ Interview with a German civil servant, Berlin, 5 November 2011.

⁵⁷⁸ Hooghe, Liesbet (2007), 'Several Roads Lead to International Norms, but Few Via International Socialization: A Case Study of the European Commission', in, Checkel, Jeffrey T. (ed), *International Institutions and Socialization in Europe*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p.71.

organisation, but coexists with national institutions it nevertheless socialised Schröder in the area of the European Security and Defence Policy.⁵⁷⁹

Overall, it can be concluded that with a few exceptions the scope conditions for normative persuasion and role playing outlined by Checkel and the other authors were not appropriate for this case study. Moreover, except for Schröder's second time in office, the hypothesis is wrong. Yet before conclusions about the validity of the hypothesis and the scope conditions as well as the state of the socialisation approach can be drawn the approach must be applied to the British policy-makers in order to examine the suitability of the hypothesis, conditions and approach in this case study.

⁵⁷⁹ Ibid, p.87.

6. The UK

In this chapter Jeffrey T. Checkel's approach on socialisation will be applied to British policy-makers who were involved in the European Security and Defence Policy during the period from the informal European summit in Pörschach (24-25 October 1998) to Tony Blair's resignation as prime minister (27 June 2007). This period comprising three Labour governments led by Tony Blair is marginally different to the original chosen timeframe in chapter three. The Pörschach summit marks the beginning of the British government's changed attitude towards a European security and defence policy. It is therefore important to begin the analysis with this meeting. The analysis will end shortly before the original timeframe because it is impossible to assess the new government under Gordon Brown on the basis of speeches and interviews given over only three months.

The focus of this chapter will be on prime ministers, defence secretaries and foreign secretaries and whether they became socialised by the EU in the area of ESDP. For each government, excerpts from relevant speeches, interviews and statements given by those policy-makers will be quoted and examined by applying Checkel's socialisation approach. The aim of this chapter is to ascertain if normative persuasion took place and the policy-makers actively and reflectively internalised ESDP norms, which would then prove that the hypothesis is true. In addition, Checkel's suggested scope conditions for when a mechanism is more likely to occur will be tested too in order to assess their empirical relevance.

A number of speeches and interviews by ministers for Europe and other ministers of state will also be quoted if they help to better identify the mood of the government in general and of prime ministers, defence and foreign secretaries in particular. Background interviews were conducted with the former Minister for Europe, Denis MacShane, as well as with a civil servant. If appropriate, the author will refer to these interviews.

This chapter will begin with a historical overview of Britain's defence policy after World War II followed by a brief summary of Britain's attitude towards a European security and defence policy until the Pörschach summit in order to illustrate the culture in which the policy-makers grew up and which contributed to their domestic socialisation.

6.1 Britain's defence policy after 1945

Since the end of the 19th century Britain's military had increasingly struggled to meet its world-wide interests and commitments. At the start of World War II, Britain possessed no more than half-equipped, half-trained expeditionary forces and barely adequate naval and air defence forces. Despite its enormous contributions to the fighting against Nazi Germany Britain was therefore heavily dependent on its allies, notably on the US' assistance under the Lend-Lease programme^{580 581}.

After World War II Britain was anxious to draw the right conclusions from the past. Never again should Britain be vulnerable to other powers. It had to be better militarily prepared and thus decided to continue its massive wartime defence spending.⁵⁸² There was also consensus among the British elite that Britain's status as a world power should be maintained at any cost.⁵⁸³ However, Britain's economy was in a weak state as a consequence of World War II. Only thanks

⁵⁸⁰ Under this programme the US provided war material to the UK, the Soviet Union, France and other allies between 1941 and 1945.

⁵⁸¹ Bartlett, Christopher John (1971), *The long retreat: a short history of British defence policy, 1945-70*, Macmillan, pp.2-7.

⁵⁸² Bartlett, Christopher John (1977), 'Military instrument in British foreign policy', in, Baylis, John (ed), *British defence policy in a changing world*, Croom Helm, London, p.30.

⁵⁸³ Bogdanor, Vernon (2005), 'Footfalls echoing in the memory. Britain and Europe: the historical perspective', *International Affairs*, vol.81, no.4, p.691.

to further loans provided by the US Britain could keep up the pretence of being a world power and continue spending enormous amounts on defence.⁵⁸⁴

The independence of the former British colonies India, Pakistan, Burma and Ceylon and more importantly the 1947 economic crisis⁵⁸⁵ encouraged a review of Britain's defence spending. The 1948 'Three Pillars Strategy' announced that the number of service personnel on all overseas posts and the strength of the army would be reduced in order to cut defence spending.⁵⁸⁶ But the darkening prospects in the colonies Egypt, Malaya and Kenya reversed any plans for defence cuts.

Despite the increasing fear of an attack by the Soviet Union and the US' reluctance to guarantee the security of Western Europe, the Strategy avoided a formal commitment of troops to the defence of Europe and instead offered only air power supported by the Royal Navy to counter the Soviet Union.⁵⁸⁷ Against this backdrop, negotiations on the formation of the Brussels Treaty took place. Although some members of the British government were against Britain's participation, the Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin insisted on the importance of this Treaty and Britain's involvement in it as it showed the US that Western Europe had something to offer. Indeed, a year later the US agreed to create NATO.⁵⁸⁸

The first atomic test undertaken by the Soviet Union and the outbreak of the Korean war in 1950 convinced the Western states to strengthen their conventional forces in Europe. This meant for Britain a departure from its sole contribution of air and naval power. As a

⁵⁸⁴ Baylis, John (1977), 'The Anglo-American relationship in defence', in, Baylis, John (ed), *British defence policy in a changing world*, Croom Helm, London, pp.68-69.

⁵⁸⁵ The crisis was triggered by the fact that sterling was made freely convertible in accordance with the original terms of the American loan.

⁵⁸⁶ Bartlett, Christopher John (1971), *The long retreat: a short history of British defence policy, 1945-70*, Macmillan Press, London, pp.12-23.

⁵⁸⁷ Dorman, Andrew (2001), 'Crises and reviews in British defence policy', in, Croft, Stuart, Andrew Dorman, Wyn Rees, Matthew Uttley, *Britain and Defence, 1945-2000*, Longman, Harlow, p.10.

⁵⁸⁸ Rees, Wyn (2001), 'Britain's contribution to global order', in, Croft, Stuart, Andrew Dorman, Wyn Rees, Matthew Uttley, *Britain and Defence, 1945-2000*, Longman, Harlow, p.34.

consequence, Prime Minister Clement Attlee announced a doubling of military procurement spending at considerable political and economic cost.⁵⁸⁹ Beyond its national efforts, Britain favoured German rearmament and supported the idea of a European Defence Community (EDC) although it was not prepared to become a member of EDC. Following the rejection of EDC by the French Assembly, Britain was afraid that any signs of fractures among the Western European states could lead to a loss of interest in Western Europe by the US. Therefore, the British government convened a conference in London, which prepared the Paris Agreements (see chapters four and five).⁵⁹⁰ Furthermore, at this conference Britain gave a number of guarantees to reassure France. Those included that Britain would not withdraw its forces from mainland Europe against the wishes of the majority of the WEU members unless those forces put an unbearably heavy strain on Britain's finances.⁵⁹¹

The general election of 1951 brought the Conservative Party⁵⁹² back to power. In the light of the severe state of the economy, Prime Minister Winston Churchill stated that the rearmament plans of the preceding government were beyond Britain's economic capacity and announced cuts in defence spending.⁵⁹³ Anthony Eden who succeeded Churchill as Prime Minister in 1955 commissioned a defence policy review which led to the decision that over the next two and a half years service personnel would fall from 800,000 to 700,000 and the call-up of men for National Service would be temporarily slowed down.⁵⁹⁴

⁵⁸⁹ Chalmers, Malcolm (2008), 'A Force for Influence: making British defence effective', *RUSI Journal*, vol.153, no.6, p.26.

⁵⁹⁰ Kunz, Josef L. (1955), 'The London and Paris Agreements on West Germany', *The American Journal of International Law*, no.49, p.275.

⁵⁹¹ Bartlett, Christopher John (1971), *The long retreat: a short history of British defence policy, 1945-70*, Macmillan Press, London, p.94.

⁵⁹² The Conservative Party is colloquially referred to as the Tory Party or Tories.

⁵⁹³ Bartlett, Christopher John (1971), *The long retreat: a short history of British defence policy, 1945-70*, Macmillan Press, London, pp.56-80.

⁵⁹⁴ *Ibid*, pp.105-108.

A slight consolation for Britain was that the situation in Malaya and Kenya improved by the mid-1950s and that it could withdraw its troops from Korea in 1953. But in Egypt the situation remained tense. After the overthrow of Egypt's monarchy and the establishment of the Republic of Egypt in 1952, the new Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser demanded from Britain to immediately withdraw its troops from the Suez Canal. Mainly because a refusal would have severely harmed Anglo-Arab relations, the British government gave in and withdrew its troops from Suez. In 1956 in retaliation for the refusal of the US and Britain to help pay for the Aswan High Dam project, Nasser announced the nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company. Convinced that a nationalised Suez Canal would injure British economic and military interests as well as its standing in the region and still haunted by Prime Minister Chamberlain's appeasement policy of the 1930s Britain concluded a secret pact with France and Israel to regain control over the Suez Canal.⁵⁹⁵ As planned, Israel's invasion of the Sinai was used by Britain and France as an excuse for their intervention. Eden did not expect the US to oppose the military operation. The US, however, was dealing with the near-simultaneous Hungarian revolution and decided it could not criticise Soviet suppression of the Hungarian revolt and avoid opposing aggression by Britain, France and Israel. Besides the political opposition Britain also faced economic problems. After a sharp fall of its gold and dollar reserves Britain turned to the IMF for emergency loans, which under pressure from the US refused the loans. In light of the financial and political pressure, Britain was forced to accept a ceasefire.⁵⁹⁶

Apart from the political and psychological impact of the Suez crisis on Britain, the invasion had also revealed Britain's military weaknesses. The new Prime Minister Harold Macmillan

⁵⁹⁵ Bartlett, Christopher John (1971), *The long retreat: a short history of British defence policy, 1945-70*, Macmillan Press, London, pp 84 -120.

⁵⁹⁶ Dorman, Andrew (2001), 'Crises and reviews in British defence policy', in, Croft, Stuart, Andrew Dorman, Wyn Rees, Matthew Uttley, *Britain and Defence, 1945-2000*, Longman, Harlow, p.12.

therefore asked the Defence Secretary Duncan Sandys to undertake yet another review of defence policy. The 1957 Defence White Paper - at the time regarded as revolutionary - emphasised the importance of Britain's nuclear forces⁵⁹⁷ and claimed that because of its credible deterrent, Britain could drastically reduce its conventional forces.⁵⁹⁸

However, Britain's nuclear strike force needed to be replaced as they were not able anymore to penetrate Soviet airspace. Instead of continuing with the Blue Streak missile project, Macmillan decided to abandon an independent British nuclear deterrent and buy the American Skybolt system in order to reduce the burden on Britain's scarce scientific and engineering facilities. When in 1963 the American government cancelled Skybolt on grounds of cost-effectiveness and as a replacement proposed a multilateral nuclear force armed with the new developed US Polaris missiles in which the European states should participate and which should be controlled by NATO, the British government felt humiliated. It did not want to share its deterrent with the other European states. At an emergency meeting between Britain and the US in Nassau, Macmillan secured the agreement that the US would supply Britain with Polaris missiles, launch tubes, and the fire control system, whereas Britain would make the warheads and submarines. Britain would be able to keep its deterrent. The agreement was heavily criticised in Britain as a costly pretence.⁵⁹⁹ It also undoubtedly contributed to the French President's veto of Britain's application to join the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1963.

At the beginning of the 1960s British forces were stretched to the utmost and defence costs caused concern again. The Labour government elected in 1964 amid a deepening economic

⁵⁹⁷ The British government decided to develop an atomic bomb in 1947.

⁵⁹⁸ Dorman, Andrew (2001), 'Crises and reviews in British defence policy', in, Croft, Stuart, Andrew Dorman, Wyn Rees, Matthew Uttley, *Britain and Defence, 1945-2000*, Longman, Harlow, p.12.

⁵⁹⁹ Bartlett, Christopher John (1971), *The long retreat: a short history of British defence policy, 1945-70*, Macmillan Press, London, pp.152-179.

crisis had to quickly reduce defence costs. But despite the defence cuts the government required the services to continue to fulfil the same roles, although realistically only a sharp increase in defence spending would have enabled the services to meet its obligations.⁶⁰⁰ Initially, the Labour government was not prepared to recognise this fact. The pretence of Britain being a world power had to be preserved at any cost. According to Prime Minister Harold Wilson Britain had 'always been a world power' and 'should not be corralled in Europe'.⁶⁰¹ However, in 1967 the economic crisis intensified. In order to cut foreign currency expenditure the government had to drastically reduce either the stationing of air and land forces in Germany or its forces deployed 'East of Suez'.⁶⁰² Enthusiasm for the Commonwealth had been waning among the British political elite for some time. Most British politicians recognised that Britain was not able anymore to exert much influence in the world. Europe therefore became the obvious partner for Britain. Also since in 1967 the British government was in the midst of the second application to join the EEC, any withdrawal of troops from Germany would have prevented its chances of succeeding with its application.⁶⁰³ Given those factors, it was no surprise when in July 1967 Wilson announced in the Supplementary Statement on Defence Policy that half of the forces deployed in Singapore and Malaya would be withdrawn by 1970-1. Yet, even those cuts proved to be insufficient. Following the devaluation of Sterling in November 1967, the government had to concede that all units would

⁶⁰⁰ Dorman, Andrew (2001), 'Crises and reviews in British defence policy', in, Croft, Stuart, Andrew Dorman, Wyn Rees, Matthew Uttley, *Britain and Defence, 1945-2000*, Longman, Harlow, pp.15-16.

⁶⁰¹ Wilson, Harold quoted in Bartlett, Christopher John (1971), *The long retreat: a short history of British defence policy, 1945-70*, Macmillan Press, London, p.197.

⁶⁰² The phrase 'East of Suez' is used to refer to imperial interests beyond Europe (sometimes including, sometimes excluding the Middle East).

⁶⁰³ French President Charles de Gaulle nevertheless vetoed Britain's application for a second time. Only in 1973 Britain became a member of the EEC.

need to be withdrawn from 'East of Suez' by the end of 1971.⁶⁰⁴ British forces would only remain in Hong Kong and the posts of Gan and Masirah would be retained.⁶⁰⁵ After the election of 1970, the Conservative government led by Edward Heath slowed down the withdrawal of forces but they did not reverse the decision. The defence review in 1975 marked the final end of Britain's world role by deciding to withdraw most of the residual forces deployed beyond Europe, notably those from the Five Power Agreement⁶⁰⁶ and the Baghdad Pact. In future, Britain would solely concentrate on NATO and its nuclear deterrent.⁶⁰⁷

Despite those enormous cuts the new Defence Secretary John Nott inherited a precarious financial situation in 1981. There was a defence overspending of £200 million from the previous financial year. Nott established that savings could only be made in the continental or maritime commitments to NATO. Home defence and the nuclear deterrent were deemed to be taboo while little remained outside Europe to cut. Indeed, Britain was so entirely focused on Europe and the Cold War stalemate that the Argentine invasion and occupation of the Falkland Islands and South Georgia came as a complete surprise.⁶⁰⁸ The downgrading of Britain's out-of-area operations had encouraged Argentina that its invasion would not be challenged.⁶⁰⁹ Britain,

⁶⁰⁴ Dorman, Andrew (2001), 'Crises and reviews in British defence policy', in, Croft, Stuart, Andrew Dorman, Wyn Rees, Matthew Uttley, *Britain and Defence, 1945-2000*, Longman, Harlow, pp.16-17.

⁶⁰⁵ Bartlett, Christopher John (1971), *The long retreat: a short history of British defence policy, 1945-70*, Macmillan Press, London, p.224.

⁶⁰⁶ This was a consultative pact on the coordination of external defence signed by Singapore, Malaysia, Australia, New Zealand, and Britain, creating the joint ANZUK force.

⁶⁰⁷ Dorman, Andrew (2001), 'Crises and reviews in British defence policy', in, Croft, Stuart, Andrew Dorman, Wyn Rees, Matthew Uttley, *Britain and Defence, 1945-2000*, Longman, Harlow, pp.17-18.

⁶⁰⁸ Blair, Tony (2007), 'Defence Perspectives: defending the United Kingdom and its interests', *RUSI Journal*, vol.152, no.1, p.11.

⁶⁰⁹ Chalmers, Malcolm (2008), 'A Force for Influence: making British defence effective', *RUSI Journal*, vol.153, no.6, p.20.

however, launched military action against Argentina and retook the islands. The Falklands war helped restore Britain's confidence.⁶¹⁰

After 45 years of providing resources to protect Europe against the Soviet threat – Britain's foremost preoccupation in the post-1945 period - the end of the Cold War left Britain's security and defence policy in a strategic vacuum. Furthermore, in the light of the advent of a peaceful era the Ministry of Defence came under increasing pressure from the Treasury to save costs. Thus, following the defence review 'Options for Change', the Defence Secretary Tom King announced that Britain's commitments to NATO as well as its armed forces would be reduced.⁶¹¹ As a consequence the size of the British forces fell by almost a third from 1990 to 1997.⁶¹² However, given that any hope of a peaceful era turned out to be wrong and British forces had to fight in the Gulf war, the Bosnian war, etc., British forces were found to be 'overstretched' when the Labour Party returned to power in 1997. Partly because of this overstretch and partly because it aimed to establish clearer strategic guidelines for the next decade the Labour government published the so called Strategic Defence Review (SDR). The new Prime Minister Tony Blair intended to link defence and foreign policy and asked both the Defence Secretary and the Foreign Secretary to undertake the review.⁶¹³ SDR emphasised the importance of Britain playing an active role on the international stage and being a 'force for good in the world'. In order to fulfil its international responsibilities, the review called for the development of expeditionary armed forces that were deployable, agile and adaptable.

⁶¹⁰ Rees, Wyn (2001), 'Britain's contribution to global order', in, Croft, Stuart, Andrew Dorman, Wyn Rees, Matthew Uttley, *Britain and Defence, 1945-2000*, Longman, Harlow, pp.41.

⁶¹¹ Chalmers, Malcolm (2008), 'A Force for Influence: making British defence effective', *RUSI Journal*, vol.153, no.6, p.21.

⁶¹² Chalmers, Malcolm (2008), 'A Force for Influence: making British defence effective', *RUSI Journal*, vol.153, no.6, p.21.

⁶¹³ Cornish, Paul, Andre Dorman (2009), Blair's Wars and Brown's Budgets: from Strategic Defence Review to Strategic Decay in less than a decade', *International Affairs*, vol.85, no.2, pp.252-253.

Moreover, the review stressed the 'vital role' of the EU's foreign and security policy and demanded that Britain should become a leading member of the EU.⁶¹⁴

At the end of the Second World War Britain had still been a triumphant world power. Nowadays, it can no longer claim to be a world power but it is a middle-ranking European power. However, some of Britain's political elite have still not accepted the reality and continue to believe that Britain should have a voice in major international issues and military forces capable of global interventions.⁶¹⁵ As former Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd stated 'it remains Britain's objective to be able to punch above its weight in international affairs'.⁶¹⁶ The situation today with overstretched armed forces and escalating defence costs due to Britain's overseas responsibilities, notably in Afghanistan, resembles in many respects the 1950s and 1960s as successive British governments determined to preserve the country's great power status were unwilling to reduce Britain's commitments to match the declining military resources available.

6.1.2 Attitude towards a developing European security and defence policy pre-Pörschach

British politicians had always had the tendency to distance themselves from the European continent. Europe was the 'other' across the Channel.⁶¹⁷ The British approach to the EU and its preceding organisations could be best described as one of association not of full-scale

⁶¹⁴ Heisbourg, Francois (2000), 'European defence: making it work', *Chaillot Paper Institute for Security Studies of Western European Studies*, no.42, p.5.

⁶¹⁵ Rees, Wyn (2001), 'Britain's contribution to global order', in, Croft, Stuart, Andrew Dorman, Wyn Rees, Matthew Uttley, *Britain and Defence, 1945-2000*, Longman, Harlow, p.29- 44.

⁶¹⁶ Hurd, Douglas quoted in Rees, Wyn (2001), 'Britain's contribution to global order', in, Croft, Stuart, Andrew Dorman, Wyn Rees, Matthew Uttley, *Britain and Defence, 1945-2000*, Longman, Harlow, p.44.

⁶¹⁷ Daddow, Oliver (2007), 'Playing games with history: Tony Blair's European policy in the press', *The British Journal of Politics & International Relations*, vol.9, no.4, p.594.

commitment.⁶¹⁸ Some observers argue that Britain's awkward attitude was the result of Britain joining the EEC when it had already developed most of its foundations leaving Britain with limited input.⁶¹⁹

In terms of security and defence policy, Britain regarded the relationship with the US and NATO as its highest priorities not least because both were vital in sustaining Britain's international position. British politicians therefore tended to be wary of continental initiatives on creating an independent European security and defence policy, which could be interpreted as competing with NATO and excluding the US.

Given Britain's close relationship with the US and its geographic closeness to continental Europe, British policy-makers often attempted to moderate between Europe and the US. When successive British governments recognised the US' dissatisfaction with Europe's military weakness it tried to push its European partners to improve its defence capabilities and work together on security issues. For example, it took the lead in concluding the Brussels Treaty and later establishing the WEU. In 1987 the British government participated in the reactivation of the WEU.⁶²⁰ As after the end of the Cold War the US appeared reluctant to continue its involvement in European security, the British government led by the Conservative Party proposed to allow the WEU to utilise NATO assets for operations where the US did not want to become involved.⁶²¹ This proposal ensured that the suggested European Security and Defence Identity (see chapter four) would develop within and not separate from NATO, which was

⁶¹⁸ Rees, Wyn (2001), 'Preserving the security of Europe', in, Croft, Stuart, Andrew Dorman, Wyn Rees, Matthew Uttley, *Britain and Defence, 1945-2000*, Longman, Harlow, p.49.

⁶¹⁹ Dryburgh, Lynne (2010), 'Blair's First Government (1997-2001) and European Security and Defence Policy: seismic shift or adaptation?', *The British Journal of Politics & International Relations*, vol.12, no.2, p.259.

⁶²⁰ Rees, Wyn (2001), 'Preserving the security of Europe', in, Croft, Stuart, Andrew Dorman, Wyn Rees, Matthew Uttley, *Britain and Defence, 1945-2000*, Longman, Harlow, p.49-56.

⁶²¹ Dryburgh, Lynne (2010), 'Blair's First Government (1997-2001) and European Security and Defence Policy: seismic shift or adaptation?', *The British Journal of Politics & International Relations*, vol.12, no.2, p.268.

essential for Britain.⁶²² However, beyond ESDI, the Conservative government accepted after long negotiations with its EU partners that 'the implementation of a common foreign and security policy including the eventual framework of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to common defence' was declared to be one of the EU's objectives in the Maastricht Treaty. Although it insisted that this phrase did not mean a common defence separate from NATO, the Labour government later accused the Conservative Party of hypocrisy over their opposition to ESDP.⁶²³

When the Labour Party won the general election in 1997 Prime Minister Tony Blair aimed at improving Britain's relationship with the EU. In his speech at the 1997 Labour Party conference he argued that Britain should fulfil its historic legacy 'to lead in Europe again'.⁶²⁴ In 1998 following a review of Britain's approach to the EU the 'step change' programme was launched, which highlighted the need of regularly engaging with ministers, members of parliament (MPs) and civil servants from other EU countries and pursuing a positive negotiating position on European issues.

However, in respect of a European security and defence policy the Labour government initially favoured a similar approach as the Conservatives: it emphasised that NATO was the primary organisation for European defence and merely intended to improve the link between the WEU and NATO.⁶²⁵ But America's obvious unwillingness to continue playing Europe's 'chief

⁶²² Rees, Wyn (2001), 'Preserving the security of Europe', in, Croft, Stuart, Andrew Dorman, Wyn Rees, Matthew Uttley, *Britain and Defence, 1945-2000*, Longman, Harlow, p.61.

⁶²³ Howorth, Jolyon (2000), 'Britain, NATO and CESDP: fixed strategy, changing tactics', *European Foreign Affairs Review*, vol.5, no.3, p.380.

⁶²⁴ Speech by the Rt Hon Tony Blair, Prime Minister, to the Labour Party Conference, Brighton, 30 September 1997, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/3697434.stm [19.08.2011].

⁶²⁵ Dryburgh, Lynne (2010), 'Blair's First Government (1997-2001) and European Security and Defence Policy: seismic shift or adaptation?', *The British Journal of Politics & International Relations*, vol.12, no.2, p.261-264.

peacemaker'⁶²⁶ and especially its initial refusal to intervene in the Kosovo crisis convinced the government of the necessity to develop a European Security and Defence Policy. Moreover, given Britain's military clout security and defence policy offered Britain the chance to take the lead in addition to demonstrating its pro-European credentials.⁶²⁷

6.2 ESDP and Tony Blair's first term as Prime Minister (2 May 1997 – 7 June 2001)

After 18 years of Conservative governments the Labour Party under its leader Tony Blair won a landslide victory in the 1997 election. Given the weak and divided Conservative Party and Labour's extensive majority in the House of Commons Blair was able to implement far-reaching policy changes.⁶²⁸

6.2.1 Pörtschach Informal EU summit and Saint Malo summit (1998)

At the press conference following the informal EU summit in Pörtschach in October Blair surprised his audience by stating that Britain would support a stronger European cooperation in foreign and security policy:

in respect of common foreign and security policy, there was a strong willingness, which the UK obviously shares, for Europe [...] to play a better, more unified part in foreign and security policy decisions.⁶²⁹

At the North Atlantic Assembly summit in Edinburgh in November Blair even suggested that Europe should go beyond the Berlin arrangements adopted by NATO in 1996 and develop a

⁶²⁶ Biscop, Sven (2002), 'In Search of a Strategic Concept for the ESDP', *European Foreign Affairs Review*, vol.7, no.4, p.475.

⁶²⁷ Dover, Robert (2005), 'The Prime Minister and the Core Executive: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Reading of UK Defence Policy Formulation 1997–2000', *The British Journal of Politics & International Relations*, vol.7, no.4, p.512-515.

⁶²⁸ Ibid, p.517.

⁶²⁹ Press conference by the Rt Hon Tony Blair, Prime Minister, Informal European summit Pörtschach, 24-25 October 1998, <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20070701080624/http://www.pm.gov.uk/output/Page7.asp> [19.08.2011].

genuine operational capability in order to be able to act alone in those circumstances where the US would not want to participate. He also appeared to depart from the preceding government's as well as Labour's hostility to the idea of merging the WEU and EU.⁶³⁰ 'We also need to check the institutions are right. To decide how the EU, WEU and NATO can best mesh together. We have no preconceptions.'⁶³¹ As one of the reasons for Britain's changed attitude towards a European security and defence policy Blair cited Europe's hesitant and disunited performance in Kosovo.⁶³² In a House of Commons' debate Foreign Secretary Robin Cook revealed that Britain had not only agreed on a stronger European security policy in Pörschach but also had led the debate 'on how we can improve European capacity for effective and timely decisions on security'.⁶³³ Later in the same debate Defence Secretary George Robertson was more careful with his choice of words. He attempted to 'sell' Blair's initiative as a 'call for fresh thinking' rather than a 'major revision of Britain's defence policy'.⁶³⁴ Moreover he reminded the Conservative MPs that the foundation for this development had been laid by their government in the Maastricht treaty. Robertson also stressed that there was no intention to create a European army and that a European security and defence policy 'must not undermine

⁶³⁰ The Conservative government had always argued that the absorption of the WEU into the EU would only occur 'over our dead bodies'. When Labour came into power, it seemed to follow this position. Foreign Secretary Robin Cook promised shortly after the election that they would keep the EU and WEU 'quite distinct and separate organisation'. (quoted in Dryburgh, Lynne (2010), 'Blair's First Government (1997–2001) and European Security and Defence Policy: seismic shift or adaptation?', *The British Journal of Politics & International Relations*, vol.12, no.2, p.265).

⁶³¹ Speech by the Rt Hon Tony Blair, Prime Minister, to the North Atlantic Assembly, Edinburgh, 13 November 1998, <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20070701080624/http://www.pm.gov.uk/output/Page7.asp> [19.08.2011].

⁶³² *Idem.*

⁶³³ Debate on Foreign Affairs and Defence, House of Commons, vol.321, col.439, 27 November 1998, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199899/cmhansrd/vo981127/debtext/81127-01.htm#81127-01_head2 [19.08.2011].

⁶³⁴ Debate on Foreign Affairs and Defence, House of Commons, vol.321, col.510, 27 November 1998, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199899/cmhansrd/vo981127/debtext/81127-01.htm#81127-01_head2 [19.08.2011].

NATO or attempt to duplicate it'.⁶³⁵

At the press conference following the December Saint Malo summit Blair outlined the reasons for this meeting:

when I began this debate at Pörschach in, as it were, opening up the British position, I recognised immediately that it would be extremely important for Britain and France to engage closely with each other upon it. [...] I think it is vital for Europe to have a stronger and more coherent force and voice in international affairs. As we point out, this is fully in conformity with our existing alliances, in particular the Atlantic Alliance and NATO.⁶³⁶

Nevertheless the inclusion of the word 'autonomous' in the Saint Malo declaration raised fears that the relationship with NATO could be threatened by this European defence policy. Blair, however, assured British MPs that the development of European defence would not undermine NATO but strengthen it.⁶³⁷ In an article Cook pointed out that Europe needed to develop a military capacity but that it would 'stay in NATO'.⁶³⁸ Following this, Robertson was questioned by a Conservative MP in a House of Commons' debate how an EU capacity for the use of military forces could possibly be both autonomous and within NATO. He responded:

If it uses the European security and defence identity component – the forces that are designed to be in place for use by Europe and can be triggered through the EU via the WEU. We are talking about the same thing. We are not in any way undermining NATO – indeed, we are strengthening it.⁶³⁹

⁶³⁵ Idem.

⁶³⁶ Joint press conference by the Rt Hon Tony Blair, Prime Minister, and Jacques Chirac, President of the French Republic, Saint Malo, 4 December 1998, <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20070701080624/http://www.pm.gov.uk/output/Page7.asp> [19.08.2011].

⁶³⁷ Speech by the Rt Hon Tony Blair, Prime Minister, on foreign affairs, 15 December 1998, <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20070701080624/http://www.pm.gov.uk/output/Page1168.asp> [19.08.2011].

⁶³⁸ Cook, Robin quoted in Oakes, Mark (2000), 'European Defence: from Pörschach to Helsinki', *House of Commons Research Paper*, House of Commons Library.

⁶³⁹ Debate on European Defence Review, House of Commons, vol.322, col.10, 7 December 1998, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199899/cmhansrd/vo981207/debtext/81207-02.htm#81207-02_spm3 [19.08.2011].

6.3.2 Selling the ESDP project and Cologne / Helsinki European Councils (1999)

After the Saint Malo initiative had provoked opposition in Britain and to some extent in the US the Labour government spent the first half of 1999 to better explain the reasons for the development of a European defence policy and its advantages. Blair described his motivation in a speech at the NATO 50th anniversary conference:

We Europeans should not expect the United States to have to play a part in every disorder in our own back yard. The European Union should be able to take on some security tasks on our own and we will do better through a common European effort than we can by individual countries acting on their own [...] To retain US engagement in Europe it is important that Europe does more for itself.⁶⁴⁰

Furthermore, according to Blair, by being part of Europe's defence policy Britain was able to ensure that EU defence would develop complementary to NATO.⁶⁴¹ And Washington valued Britain even more if it could influence thinking on the European continent.⁶⁴²

For Europe Minister Joyce Quin the reason for the Saint Malo summit was:

Europe moves into the 21st century as one of the major powers in the world [...] And for the EU to take its proper place in the world, we need to have the capability to back up that voice, where necessary, with the credible threat of military force.⁶⁴³

But, as she said in a speech in The Hague, Europe's 'collective foreign policy voice can

⁶⁴⁰ Speech by the Rt Hon Tony Blair, Prime Minister, 'NATO, Europe, and Our Future Security', NATO 50th Anniversary Conference, The Royal United Services Institute, London, 8 March 1999, <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20070701080624/http://www.pm.gov.uk/output/Page1286.asp> [19.08.2011].

⁶⁴¹ Speech by the Rt Hon Tony Blair, Prime Minister, 'Britain in Europe', 14 October 1999, <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20070701080624/http://www.pm.gov.uk/output/Page1461.asp> [19.08.2011].

⁶⁴² Debate on Foreign Affairs and Defence, House of Commons, vol.339, col.362, 22 November 1999, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199900/cmhansrd/vo991122/debtext/91122-11.htm#91122-11_head2 [19.08.2011].

⁶⁴³ Speech by the Rt Hon Joyce Quin, Minister for Europe, 'The future of Europe', Franco-British Colloque, Paris, 14 January 1999, <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/19990125095252/http://www.fco.gov.uk/news/speechtext.asp?1913> [19.08.2011].

sometimes be little more than a whisper. The crisis in Kosovo has shown this.⁶⁴⁴

The impact the Kosovo crisis had on the Labour government, notably Blair, became apparent in a speech Blair held in Chicago in April. He argued that foreign policy should predominantly be guided by moral motivations in order to prevent atrocities as those happened in Kosovo. Britain should contribute to make Europe strong and influential and ensure that it used its full potential to be a global power for good.⁶⁴⁵ As Blair stated in his speech on the occasion of the award of the Charlemagne prize, '[f]or Europe, the central challenge is no longer simply securing peace inside the European Union [...] [but] the challenge posed by the outside world.'⁶⁴⁶ Europe's defence capability was nowhere near sufficient to tackle this new challenge.

If Europe is to have a key defence role, it needs modern forces, strategic lift and the necessary equipment to conduct a campaign. We do need to see how we can cooperate better, complement each other's capability, have the full range of defence option open to us.⁶⁴⁷

At the NATO 50th anniversary conference Robertson expressed rather pragmatically compared with Blair, 'our ultimate aim [...] is not so much a European Security and Defence Identity but [...] a European Defence Capability.'⁶⁴⁸ Robertson came up with tangible suggestions on how the EU member states could strengthen Europe's security and defence policy. For example, he proposed information sharing of Europe's existing multinational forces, assessment of defence

⁶⁴⁴ Speech by the Rt Hon Joyce Quinn, Minister for Europe, at the Clingendael Institute, The Hague, 11 May 1999, <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/19991023032653/http://www.fco.gov.uk/news/speech.asp?30> [19.08.2011].

⁶⁴⁵ Speech by the Rt Hon Tony Blair, Prime Minister, 'Doctrine of the International Community', Economic Club, Chicago, 24 April 1999, <http://keeptonyblairforpm.wordpress.com/blair-speech-transcripts-from-1997-2007/> [19.08.2011].

⁶⁴⁶ Speech by the Rt Hon Tony Blair, Prime Minister, 'New Challenge for Europe', Aachen, 13 May 1999, <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/19991103012534/http://www.fco.gov.uk/news/speechtext.asp?2417> [19.08.2011].

⁶⁴⁷ Idem.

⁶⁴⁸ Speech by the Rt Hon George Robertson, Secretary of State for Defence, 'The NATO Alliance and military capabilities for European Security', The Royal United Services Institute, London, 10 March 1999, <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20001201201900/http://www.mod.uk/index.php3?page=43&nid=2466&view=463&cat=33#news2466> [19.08.2011].

budgets to spend smartly and consolidation and rationalisation of Europe's defence industry. He attached particular importance to the development of structures and capacities, which would ensure that the EU could take more rapid and coherent decisions. Robertson insisted that this would not mean a duplication of NATO structures. The EU would only develop capabilities needed for crisis management and humanitarian operations. Therefore, he welcomed the proposal to build on the Berlin agreement and allow the EU access to NATO assets and capabilities for EU-led operations when NATO would not be engaged.⁶⁴⁹

When at NATO's 50th anniversary summit in Washington in April its members were indeed committed to expand the Berlin agreement and endorsed the Saint Malo initiative, the Labour government celebrated the summit as great victory. Blair told MPs in a House of Commons' debate

[t]he warm support at Washington from the United States for our initiative shows that we have been successful in designing proposals that will not decouple Europe from NATO, will not duplicate the functions of NATO and will not discriminate against members of NATO who are not members of the European Union.⁶⁵⁰

In the run-up to the Cologne European Council Cook stated that after the successful NATO summit Britain would concentrate on the Cologne summit to make sure that the EU member states would agree on the necessary reforms to provide the EU with both the capability to take decisions on security and defence policy and the military capacity to carry out those decisions. For the Conservative Party, the outcome of the Cologne summit was unacceptable. They especially condemned the absorption of certain WEU functions into the EU. In a House of Commons' debate, Shadow Foreign Secretary Michael Howard asked Blair to explain why he agreed on something, which he had effectively vetoed two years earlier at the Amsterdam

⁶⁴⁹ Idem.

⁶⁵⁰ Debate on the European Union, House of Commons, vol.332, col.183, 25 May 1999, <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199899/cmhansrd/vo990525/debtext/90525-11.htm> [19.08.2011].

European Council on the grounds that it would weaken the UK's commitment to NATO. Blair defended himself by claiming that there was a difference between the two: the proposal presented at the Amsterdam summit would have clashed with NATO. The measure adopted by the Cologne European Council, on the other hand, did not compromise the WEU's defence guarantee and was therefore consistent with NATO membership.⁶⁵¹

Blair's argument was to some extent destroyed by former Italian Prime Minister Romano Prodi who described the Cologne summit as the first step towards a European army. Despite assurances from the government that there was no prospect of a single army, Conservative MPs quoted Prodi extensively in the weeks after Cologne and the British media took up the story as well.⁶⁵²

In the second half of 1999 the UK held meetings with Italy and France respectively which aimed at further developing European defence policy. The establishment of European defence capability criteria – an idea that emerged from the Anglo-Italian meeting – would, as Robertson pointed out, lead to improvements in capability.⁶⁵³ Likewise, the Franco-British proposal for a European rapid reaction corps would be a crucial step for European defence capability. In order to reassure the US, Blair emphasised at the press conference following the Franco-British meeting:

This is not about creating some single European army under a single command, it is not an attempt in any shape or form to supplant or compete with NATO. It is about

⁶⁵¹ Debate on the Cologne European Council summit, House of Commons, vol.332, col.468, 8 June 1999, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199899/cmhansrd/vo990608/debtext/90608-07.htm#90608-07_spmi0 [19.08.2011].

⁶⁵² 'BBC News, 'Should there be a European army?', 20 May 1999.

⁶⁵³ Speech by the Rt Hon George Robertson, Secretary of State for Defence, 'Europe: the way forward', The New Statesman Conference, 8 September 1999, <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20001201201900/http://www.mod.uk/index.php3?page=43&nid=2466&view=534&cat=33#news2466> [19.08.2011].

strengthening Europe's military effectiveness and capabilities.⁶⁵⁴

Ahead of the Helsinki European Council Cook announced that besides the Franco-British proposal for a rapid reaction force the British government had identified two further priorities which should be addressed by the member states: the development of more coherent capacity for crisis management and better 'transmission' between the EU and NATO.⁶⁵⁵

On returning from Helsinki, the Prime Minister described its outcome on defence as 'truly historic decisions for the European Union'.⁶⁵⁶ The new Defence Secretary Geoffrey Hoon called on Britain to be proud as it had dominated the negotiations on the Headline Goal which would require the member states to deploy a 60,000 strong rapid reaction force by 2003. However, in order to rebut arguments that the rapid reaction force would eventually lead to a European army Hoon also drew attention to the specific undertaking 'not to create a European army' in the Helsinki conclusion. Furthermore, according to Hoon, the Headline Goal would not establish a standing rapid reaction force.⁶⁵⁷ Regarding the creation of three new politico-military bodies, he contradicted claims that these were unnecessary, bureaucratic EU institutions.

⁶⁵⁴ Joint press conference by the Rt Hon Tony Blair, Prime Minister, Jacques Chirac, President of the French Republic, and Lionel Jospin, Prime Minister of the French Republic, London, 25 November 1999, <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20070701080624/http://www.pm.gov.uk/output/Page8.asp> [19.08.2011].

⁶⁵⁵ Debate on the European Union, House of Commons, vol.340, col.322, 1 December 1999, <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199900/cmhansrd/vo991201/debtext/91201-09.htm> [19.08.2011].

⁶⁵⁶ Debate on the Helsinki European Council, vol.341, col.22, 13 December 1999, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199900/cmhansrd/vo991213/debtext/91213-05.htm#91213-05_head0 [19.08.2011].

⁶⁵⁷ Debate on European Defence Initiative, House of Commons, vol.341, col.4, 13 December 1999, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199900/cmhansrd/vo991213/debtext/91213-01.htm#91213-01_sbhd1 [19.08.2011].

[T]hese three bodies, and their permanent successors, will allow the Union to act as an intelligent customer – able to ask the right questions to the providers of military resources and to understand the answers.⁶⁵⁸

6.2.3 Eurosceptic press and Nice European Council (2000)

In a speech to the House of Commons Hoon outlined the improvement of the capability of Britain's forces. But since operations would usually be conducted by coalition forces, Britain's partners would also need to rebuild and restructure their forces. Thus, the Helsinki Headline Goal, which required the modernisation of Europe's armed forces, was very important. So far, Europe's problem had not so much been the quantity of its defence spending but its quality. 'Whilst European spending is two-thirds that of the US we do not get two-thirds of the capability of the United States in return.'⁶⁵⁹

Although the US had expressed support for the Helsinki outcome, some US politicians were still sceptical of ESDP. Therefore, Britain's new Europe Minister Keith Vaz travelled to the US. He explained that ESDP was established as a response to two needs:

the need [...] for the Europeans within NATO to take up a greater share of the burden of their own security. And the need for the EU to carry its weight as a stronger and more capable partner of the US in the international arena. NATO will retain its role in collective defence.⁶⁶⁰

According to Vaz, it was very important for Britain to continue its pro-European engagement.

The idea prevalent during Churchill's era that Britain could play a strong role in world

⁶⁵⁸ Speech by the Rt Hon Geoffrey Hoon, Secretary of State for Defence, Centre for European Reform, London, 2 May 2000, <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20010201062700/http://www.mod.uk/index.php3?page=43&nid=2466&view=613&cat=33#news2466> [19.08.2011].

⁶⁵⁹ Debate on the Defence White Paper, House of Commons, vol.344, col.1403, 22 Feb 2000, <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199900/cmhansrd/vo000222/debtext/00222-14.htm> [19.08.2011].

⁶⁶⁰ Speech by the Rt Hon Keith Vaz, Minister for Europe, 'The EU – US relationship – what's in it for America?', European Institute, Washington DC, 28 Feb 2000, <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20000815055408/http://www.fco.gov.uk/news/speechtext.asp?3355> [19.08.2011].

affairs independent of Europe is now a fallacy [...] [T]he best way to protect our national interests lies in positive engagement in Europe.⁶⁶¹

Blair expressed the same opinion in a speech entitled 'Committed to Europe, reforming Europe'. 'Britain's hesitation over Europe was one of the country's greatest miscalculations [...] Britain's destiny in the new millennium is to be a leading partner in Europe.'⁶⁶² Although, he said, the British were generally too pragmatic to believe in visions, his vision for ESDP was that Europe would take on more responsibility to be a beacon for democracy as well as an international force for stability and for promoting European interests and values.

In the aftermath of the June Feira European Council, Blair reported to the House of Commons that despite the ongoing dispute over the 'Berlin Plus' arrangement he was confident that it would be resolved soon and that an agreement on cooperation and full transparency between European and NATO would be concluded too.⁶⁶³

In a speech in London, Hoon explained that the reason why the European defence policy had made such good progress was because thanks to Britain it focused on important things like capabilities. And due to the Helsinki Headline Goal the EU member states were on the right track to improve their military capabilities.⁶⁶⁴ After the EU Capability Commitment Conference, at which the EU states set out their contributions towards the achievement of the Headline

⁶⁶¹ Speech by the Rt Hon Keith Vaz, Minister for Europe, 'Britain's role in Europe', Cambridge, 10 March 2000, <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20000815055408/http://www.fco.gov.uk/news/speechtext.asp?3402> [19.08.2011].

⁶⁶² Speech by the Rt Hon Tony Blair, Prime Minister, 'Committed to Europe, reforming Europe', Ghent, 23 February 2000, <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20000815055408/http://www.fco.gov.uk/news/speechtext.asp?3336> [19.08.2011].

⁶⁶³ Debate on the European Council, House of Commons, vol.352, col.340, 21 June 2000, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199900/cmhansrd/vo000621/debtext/00621-04.htm#00621-04_spm0 [19.08.2011].

⁶⁶⁴ Speech by the Rt Hon Geoffrey Hoon, Secretary of State for Defence, Centre for European Reform, London, 2 May 2000, <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20010201062700/http://www.mod.uk/index.php3?page=43&nid=2466&view=613&cat=33#news2466> [19.08.2011].

Goal,⁶⁶⁵ Hoon announced that the fruits of European defence efforts could already be seen since for the first time in years figures indicated a rise in defence spending in real terms in 11 European states for 2001.⁶⁶⁶

British newspapers picked on Britain's contribution to the Headline Goal and published articles with headlines, such as 'EU're in the army now'⁶⁶⁷. At a press conference in Moscow Blair condemned the media coverage as 'fundamentally dishonest' distortions of Britain's military commitment to the EU's rapid reaction force.⁶⁶⁸ In his speech at the Lord Mayor's Banquet he argued that Europe could be a superpower but never a superstate and that European defence policy proceeded 'absolutely consistently with NATO'.⁶⁶⁹

Hoon also tried to counter the argument that the rapid reaction force would become 'some form of European Mini-NATO'.⁶⁷⁰ In his view, just because Europe would become stronger, it would not aim 'to go alone'.⁶⁷¹ Still, Hoon refused to accept a formal right of first refusal for NATO – something the US and Britain's Conservative Party had demanded.

I do not [...] accept that a formal right of first refusal would be appropriate, because of the way in which a crisis can develop [...] absolute consistency between the planning processes of both NATO and the EU, an absence of duplication between the two, and

⁶⁶⁵ The UK contributed 12,000 strong land component, 18 warships and 72 combat aircrafts.

⁶⁶⁶ Debate on European Defence Cooperation, vol.357, col.313, 22 November 2000, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199900/cmhansrd/vo001122/debtext/01122-04.htm#01122-04_spmi0

⁶⁶⁷ Taylor, Richie (2000), 'EU're in the army now', *The Sun*, 21 November.

⁶⁶⁸ Joint press conference by the Rt Hon Tony Blair, Prime Minister, and Vladimir Putin, President of Russia, Moscow, 22 November 2000, <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20070701080624/http://www.pm.gov.uk/output/Page9.asp> [19.08.2011].

⁶⁶⁹ Speech by the Rt Hon Tony Blair, Prime Minister, 'Britain's choice: engagement, not isolation', Lord Mayor's Banquet, Mansion House, London, 13 November 2000, <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20001206004700/http://www.fco.gov.uk/news/speech.asp> [19.08.2011].

⁶⁷⁰ Speech by the Rt Hon Geoffrey Hoon, Secretary of State for Defence, 'Making Europe defence stronger', Institute for Public Policy Research, London, 14 November 2000, <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20010201062700/http://www.mod.uk/index.php3?page=43&nid=2466&view=801&cat=33#news2466> [19.08.2011].

⁶⁷¹ Idem.

real consistency in the international community's response [...] precisely what the Government are seeking to achieve' would be more appropriate.⁶⁷²

When Blair arrived at the Nice European Council, he was confronted with a statement by French President Chirac, who had announced that the rapid reaction force should be independent from NATO and that he would intend to include such a statement in the Nice Treaty.⁶⁷³ Furthermore, Chirac had demanded that the new procedure of 'enhanced cooperation', which would allow a minimum of 8 countries to cooperate closer on certain areas, should be extended to defence and security. Cook responded that Britain was

rather surprised by the bid to bring defence into the scope of enhanced cooperation. We strongly believe the best way forward is to the task of making a reality of the project in hand, not settling out on a totally different path.⁶⁷⁴

Blair however succeeded that defence was excluded from enhanced cooperation and that the final treaty text did not include the statement that the rapid reaction force was independent from NATO. He also achieved that the treaty contained assurances, including that it would be up to each member state's sovereign national decision whether to deploy national assets to EU-led operation and that EU-led missions would be limited to peacekeeping, humanitarian and crisis management tasks and would only operate when NATO chose not to be engaged.⁶⁷⁵

⁶⁷² Debate on Defence and the Armed Forces, House of Commons, vol.355, col.733, 1 November 2000, <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199900/cmhansrd/vo001101/debtext/01101-10.htm> [19.08.2011].

⁶⁷³ Black, Ian (2000), 'Nice summit: Chirac gives way in row with Blair on NATO', *The Guardian*, 9 December.

⁶⁷⁴ Castle, Stephen (2000), 'France angers Britain over EU defence force', *The Independent*, 5 December.

⁶⁷⁵ Debate on Nice European Council, House of Commons, vol.359, col.349-350, 11 December 2000, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200001/cmhansrd/vo001211/debtext/01211-06.htm#01211-06_spm2 [19.08.2011].

6.2.4. A new US administration (2001)

With a new government in the US, which suggesting from a speech the US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld gave in Munich⁶⁷⁶ seemed to be even more sceptical of European defence than its predecessor, the British government had once again to address concerns about the purpose of the ESDP. At the same conference in Munich, Hoon illustrated key ESDP features:

first the European Union's focus is on delivering better military capability; second, the European Union is not trying to compete with NATO's role in preserving European security; third, European defence arrangements will not divert resources from NATO or duplicate its arrangements; fourth, the European Union project is open and inclusive and fifth, it is an intergovernmental project.⁶⁷⁷

In a House of Commons' debate, Hoon distinguished between the different kind of operations NATO and the EU would undertake. Whereas NATO would conduct major operations, the EU would engage in peacekeeping Petersberg tasks.⁶⁷⁸

Cook was convinced that the new US administration would approve of the European defence policy since it attempted to meet the US' concerns about the need for burden sharing in NATO.⁶⁷⁹ Blair highlighted in his speech to the Canadian Parliament: 'there will be no separate EU military planning structures [...] it applies only where NATO has chosen not to act collectively.'⁶⁸⁰

⁶⁷⁶ Speech by Donald Rumsfeld, US Defense Secretary, 'ESDP runs the risk of injecting an instability into an enormously important alliance', 37th Munich Security Conference, 3 February 2001, <http://www.securityconference.de/Activities.192.0.html?&L=1> [19.08.2011].

⁶⁷⁷ Speech by the Rt Hon Geoffrey Hoon, Secretary of State for Defence, 37th Munich Security Conference, 3 February 2001, <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20011127003706/http://www.mod.uk/index.php3?page=43&nid=2466&view=896&cat=33#news2466> [19.08.2011].

⁶⁷⁸ Debate on Joint Military Capability, House of Commons, vol.365, col.4, 19 March 2001, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200001/cmhansrd/vo010319/debtext/10319-01.htm#10319-01_spm1 [19.08.2011].

⁶⁷⁹ Kettle, Martin (2001), 'Cook dodges defence issue on the visit to US', *The Guardian*, 7 February.

⁶⁸⁰ Speech by the Rt Hon Tony Blair, Prime Minister, to the Canadian Parliament, 23 February 2001, <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20070701080624/http://www.pm.gov.uk/output/Page1582.asp> [19.08.2011].

6.3 Analysis No.1

Since Neil Kinnock's and John Smith's leadership, the Labour Party had developed a pro-EU attitude and campaigned for bringing Britain closer to the EU again. Nevertheless, before Blair became Prime Minister, he had not been an outspoken pro-European compared to, for example, Peter Mandelson. His rather neutral attitude towards the EU was also displayed in his choice of George Robertson who was not a renowned Europhile as Defence Secretary over pro-European candidates.⁶⁸¹

Although Blair's attitude shifted and he became the most pro-European prime minister since Edward Heath, the reasons why the British government initiated the European defence project at the Pörschach meeting and the Saint Malo summit were rather opportunistic. Defence was a policy area in which British politicians could show their pro-Europeanness after it became apparent that Britain would not join the euro soon. Moreover, besides France, the UK was the most militarily powerful country in Europe and therefore would obviously play a leading role in the development of ESDP. The other important motivation for the European defence initiative was the Kosovo crisis. The conflict in Kosovo started to slide into war at the beginning of 1998 when Britain held the EU presidency. The Labour government realised how weak the European states were without the US. In addition, the US' hesitation and its increasing demands for burden-sharing convinced the government that the US could not always be expected 'to bail Europe out in its own backyard'.⁶⁸² Therefore, with the European defence initiative, the Labour government aimed at giving the EU the capacity, which would allow it to fulfil its role as a

⁶⁸¹ Smith, Julie (2005), 'A missed opportunity? New Labour's European Policy 1997 – 2005', *International Affairs*, vol. 81, no. 4, pp. 706.

⁶⁸² Wintour, Patrick (1999), 'After the Balkans war: stronger Britain emerged as the guns fall silent', *The Observer*, 13 June.

global power⁶⁸³ and would strengthen the Atlantic Alliance.⁶⁸⁴ Hence, contrary to previous changes in the UK's defence policy, which mostly had had their origins in the governments' intention to reduce defence budgets, the European defence initiative was to a great extent driven by the desire to maintain NATO, dispel American concerns about burden-sharing and demonstrate the government's pro-EU attitude. Following the Amsterdam European Council, where Blair had fought hard to avoid the merger of the WEU and EU, Blair recognised the need to work with other member states to succeed in the EU. He saw France, which had always argued for a European defence policy and in the last years had drawn closer to NATO (see chapter four), as a natural partner for his defence initiative.

The shift in Britain's approach on European defence led to the successful Cologne and Helsinki European Council summits.⁶⁸⁵ Britain was instrumental in the outcomes of both Councils. It proposed the Headline Goal, including the rapid reaction force, to enhance the build up of capabilities. This focus on capabilities was in line with Britain's pragmatic thinking away from institution building towards the development of hard power although the creation of the three institutions at Helsinki was a UK proposal.⁶⁸⁶ As Hoon said at the Centre for European Reform conference those bodies were necessary for the development of ESDP.⁶⁸⁷

Despite the initial pragmatic reasons for the creation of ESDP, Blair became attached to ESDP and took the leading role in driving ESDP forward. Hence, did Blair actively and reflectively internalise ESDP norms? As proof that Blair was persuaded to change his interests and

⁶⁸³ See speech by the Rt Hon Joyce Quinn, Minister for Europe, 'The future of Europe', Franco-British Colloque, Paris, 14 January 1999 (footnote 643).

⁶⁸⁴ Howarth, Jolyon (2000), 'Britain, NATO and CESDP: fixed strategy, changing tactics', *European Foreign Affairs Review*, vol.5, no.3 pp.384-385.

⁶⁸⁵ Ibid, p.383.

⁶⁸⁶ Miskimmon, Alister (2004), 'Continuity in the face of upheaval – British strategic culture and the impact of the Blair government', *European Security*, vol.13, no.3, pp.287-289.

⁶⁸⁷ See Speech by the Rt Hon Geoffrey Hoon, Secretary of State for Defence, Centre for European Reform, London, 2 May 2000 (footnote 664).

identities through arguments and debate one could cite his change in attitude towards the WEU-EU merger. Blair agreed at Cologne that the WEU would be absorbed into the EU by the end of 2000 but without the WEU's collective defence commitment. At the Amsterdam summit, the proposal which was debated stipulated a gradual integration of the WEU into the EU. The last phase of the integration process would comprise the transfer of all WEU competences to the EU, including the incorporation of the assistance guarantee laid down in Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty.⁶⁸⁸ Therefore, there was, as Blair stated, a difference between the two proposals.⁶⁸⁹ With the agreement at the Cologne summit, Blair maintained his view that NATO should remain solely responsible for collective defence. Consequently, there was no change in his interests and identities but he merely adopted a role in line with ESDP norms. ESDP triggered a role of appropriate, socially accepted standard of behaviour. By agreeing on the absorption of WEU functions into the EU at the Cologne summit Blair acted according to the role.

But not only then role playing was at work. In his first term as Prime Minister Blair consistently adopted certain roles in line with ESDP norms. There is no evidence that he merely complied with ESDP norms because of strategic calculation. By paying so much attention to the development of ESDP Blair voluntarily took a political risk for which there was no real prospect of reward. On the other hand, he clearly did not actively and reflectively internalise ESDP norms. He appeared afraid of antagonising Britain's Eurosceptic media and therefore rarely spoke about ESDP in Britain. When Blair mentioned ESDP he highlighted that the objective of its establishment was to strengthen the Atlantic Alliance and that its remit would not go

⁶⁸⁸ Howorth, Jolyon (2000), 'Britain, NATO and CESDP: Fixed Strategy, Changing Tactics', *European Foreign Affairs Review*, vol.5, no.3, p.393.

⁶⁸⁹ See debate on the Cologne European Council summit, House of Commons, vol.332, col.468, 8 June 1999 (footnote 651).

beyond Petersberg tasks missions.⁶⁹⁰ At the insistence of Blair, the Helsinki Council conclusions contained the assurances that the rapid reaction force would not become a European army and that the normal planning procedures for ESDP would be NATO. Also, at the Nice European Council Blair achieved that the final treaty text stated that only member states could decide on their participations in EU operations. In reaction to German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer's vision of a federalist Europe, Blair emphasised at the Lord Mayor's Banquet that he would not pursue a federalist agenda for the EU in general and ESDP in particular. In his view, Europe should become a superpower but not a superstate.

Considering this behaviour, it can be concluded that Blair was not socialised by the EU in the area of the European Security and Defence Policy. Instead, he behaved appropriately by 'learning a role [and] acquiring the knowledge that [enabled him] to act in accordance with expectations'.⁶⁹¹

According to Checkel, role playing is more likely to occur under the following conditions:

- [1]) Agents are in settings, where contact is long and sustained and it has some significant duration.
- [2]) Agents are in settings where the contact is intense.
- [3]) Those agents with extensive previous professional experiences in regional or international policy-making settings are more likely to internalize supranational role conceptions.
- [4]) [...] Agents with extensive domestic policy networks who are briefly "parachuted" into regional/international settings will be less likely to internalize new role conceptions.⁶⁹²

Discussions on ESDP – either at official European Council summits or at informal European or bilateral/trilateral meetings – tended to be long and intense and within the three years, Blair

⁶⁹⁰ Miskimmon, Alister (2004), 'Continuity in the face of upheaval - British strategic culture and the impact of the Blair government', *European Security*, vol.13, no.3, p.290.

⁶⁹¹ Checkel, Jeffrey T. (2007), 'International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and Framework', in, Checkel, Jeffrey T. (ed), *International Institutions and Socialization in Europe*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p.6.

⁶⁹² *Ibid*, p.12.

participated in many of those meetings. However, as established in the first analysis of chapter five, those meetings have to be seen in the light of the numerous other meetings Blair attended. It can therefore not be assumed that the ESDP meetings influenced Blair's role playing.

Blair did not have any international experiences when he became Prime Minister. Indeed, at his first summit in Amsterdam it was obvious that he did not know how to act in such an environment. However, he quickly learned and succeeded in turning around Britain's reputation in Europe. By 1999 Blair was seen as a constructive European.⁶⁹³ Hence, despite his lack of international experiences and his extensive domestic network, which as Prime Minister he clearly had to have, Blair acquired the knowledge, which allowed him to behave appropriately. Consequently, none of the scope conditions did arise here.

Robertson was not a 'convinced European' when he became Defence Secretary. During his time in office he appeared reserved towards ESDP. For example, he denied that Saint Malo was a major revision of British defence policy. He also constantly emphasised that Britain's aim was not to develop a European security and defence identity but Europe's capability, which would strengthen NATO. Hence, in Robertson's view ESDP was solely a means to encourage the EU member states to improve their capabilities. Therefore, in this respect, ESDP benefited Robertson's interests. That is why he complied with ESDP norms. He merely calculated the benefits of ESDP and adapted his behaviour to ESDP norms. There is no evidence that he reflected on the appropriateness of ESDP norms or even became socialised. Consequently, the mechanism 'strategic calculation' can be identified here.

⁶⁹³ Smith, Julie (2005), 'A missed opportunity? New Labour's European Policy 1997 – 2005', *International Affairs*, vol. 81, no. 4, p. 713.

Strategic calculation can also be detected when analysing Cook's behaviour. For him the aim of ESDP was the development of European capabilities in order to prevent another Kosovo crisis.⁶⁹⁴ He was against any attempt to develop ESDP beyond this aim. For example, Cook rejected French President Jacques Chirac's plan to extend enhanced cooperation to security and defence policy. Cook was convinced that following the Strategic Defence Review Britain with its restructured forces and military tradition was in an excellent position to encourage its European partners to build up of their forces. He also recognised that Britain's influence in ESDP would increase its weight in Washington. Accordingly, for Cook ESDP's advantages clearly outweighed its disadvantages. Considering Cook's behaviour, one can conclude that he merely adapted his behaviour in line with ESDP norms instead of internalising the norms.

Checkel outlines a number of scope conditions for when it is more likely that strategic calculation occurs:

- [1]) [...] [Agents] expect the promised rewards to be greater than the costs of compliance.
- [2]) [...] [Agents expect] the costs of external punishment to be higher [...] than the costs of adaptation.⁶⁹⁵

For Robertson as well as for Cook the first scope condition is correct. The improvement of Europe's capabilities was vital for them, as this would also strengthen NATO. In their view, ESDP was the best means to facilitate the build-up of capabilities and the material consequence of ESDP norms outweighed any disadvantages. They therefore adapted their behaviour to ESDP norms. There is no evidence for the second scope condition.

Geoffrey Hoon who succeeded Robertson as Defence Secretary was a former MEP and

⁶⁹⁴ Wintour, Patrick (1999), 'Army chiefs call for EU backbone', *The Observer*, 25 July.

⁶⁹⁵ Checkel, Jeffrey T. (2007), 'International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and Framework', in, Checkel, Jeffrey T. (ed), *International Institutions and Socialization in Europe*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p.10.

therefore familiar with the EU.⁶⁹⁶ However, considering the speeches, statements, interviews, etc. he gave during Labour's first government, one can conclude that he was not socialised by the EU in the area of ESDP. As he said in a speech at the Munich Security Conference the sole purpose of ESDP was to force the European states to improve their capabilities and modernise their armed forces. ESDP would not compete with NATO nor divert resources from NATO. Moreover, it would stay an intergovernmental project.⁶⁹⁷ These statements clearly show that Hoon did not reflectively internalise ESDP norms. But Hoon also did not just adapt his behaviour to ESDP norms. If Hoon had merely followed strategic calculation he would have complied with demands from the US and the Conservative opposition to allow NATO the right of first refusal. This would not have limited ESDP's main benefit, i.e. to force European states to enhance their capabilities. By arguing against giving NATO this right, Hoon acted appropriately in the environment of ESDP. ESDP induced him to take on certain roles in line with ESDP norms. With regard to Checkel's suggested scope condition for role playing, one can draw the same conclusions as before. The first two conditions are not correct. Hoon attended many other meetings besides ESDP summits. So, it cannot be assumed that the duration and intensity of the meetings on ESDP had an impact on him. Likewise, Hoon had an extensive domestic policy network and was only 'parachuted' into international meetings from time to time. Nevertheless, he internalised new roles in line with ESDP norms. Therefore, the fourth scope condition is also false. The third condition, however, is correct. Hoon had extensive experiences in international policy-making due to his time as MEP. So he was more prone to internalise supranational role conceptions.

⁶⁹⁶ Smith, Julie (2005), 'A missed opportunity? New Labour's European Policy 1997 – 2005', *International Affairs*, vol. 81, no. 4, pp. 706-707.

⁶⁹⁷ See speech by the Rt Hon Geoffrey Hoon, Secretary of State for Defence, 37th Munich Security Conference, 3 February 2001 (footnote 677).

Considering that during Labour's first term in government none of the examined policy-makers were socialised by the EU in the area of ESDP the hypothesis proves false.

6.4 ESDP and Tony Blair's second term as Prime Minister (7 June 2001 – 5 May 2005)

The Labour party won another landslide victory in the 2001 general election only suffering a net loss of 6 seats. The Conservative Party had failed to improve their negative public image.

6.4.1 The September 11 attacks (2001)

The attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon had a profound impact on the British government, notably Blair. Every European state was shocked after the attacks and wholeheartedly declared their support and solidarity for the US. But Blair went beyond that. In his statement condemning the events of 9/11 he struck a messianic tone:

We all agreed that this attack is an attack not only on America but on the world, which demands our complete and united [...] determination to bring those responsible to justice and our support for the American people at this time of trial.⁶⁹⁸

We have 'to take the action necessary against the evil of mass terrorism'.⁶⁹⁹ In a speech, aptly titled 'Out of the shadow of this evil should emerge lasting good', he described the attack as a turning point in history, where the 'civilised states' had to 'confront the dangers of the future

⁶⁹⁸ Statement by the Rt Hon Tony Blair, Prime Minister, on September 11 attacks, House of Commons, 12 September 2001, <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20070701080624/http://www.pm.gov.uk/output/Page1597.asp> [19.08.2011].

⁶⁹⁹ Joint press conference by the Rt Hon Tony Blair, Prime Minister, and Gerhard Schröder, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, London, 20 September 2001, <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20070701080624/http://www.pm.gov.uk/output/Page1601.asp> [19.08.2011].

and assess the choices facing humankind'.⁷⁰⁰ Also, Blair's support for the US appeared to be increasingly 'slavish' stressing that Britain 'will stay with you [the US] to the last'.⁷⁰¹

In the light of 9/11 and the war in Afghanistan Blair remained convinced that the development of a meaningful European security and defence policy was right. However, he argued in a speech at the party conference of the SPD that ESDP should only act if the US decided not to be involved thereby giving the US a de facto right of first refusal.⁷⁰² In the same speech he admitted that the creation of a political dimension of the EU would be difficult for Britain. But nevertheless, he promised in a speech to the European Research Institute, his government would support the establishment of a Convention on the Future of Europe at the upcoming Laeken European Council.⁷⁰³ The Convention would not herald the start for supranational integration in every policy area, according to Britain's new Europe Minister, Peter Hain. Europe's foreign and defence policy, for example, would remain intergovernmental. 'We are not in the business of writing the obituary of the nation state.'⁷⁰⁴ Moreover, in Hain's view, a single European foreign and defence policy as advocated by some member states would limit

⁷⁰⁰ Speech by the Rt Hon Tony Blair, Prime Minister, 'Out of the shadow of this evil should emerge lasting good', The Labour Party Conference, 2 October 2001, <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20070701080624/http://www.pm.gov.uk/output/Page10.asp> [19.08.2011].

⁷⁰¹ Idem.

⁷⁰² Speech by the Rt Hon Tony Blair, Prime Minister, 'Consolidating the European Union', SPD Congress, Nuremberg, 20 November 2001, <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20020124183003/http://www.fco.gov.uk/news/speechtext.asp?5581> [19.08.2011].

⁷⁰³ Speech by the Rt Hon Tony Blair, Prime Minister, 'Britain's role in Europe', European Research Institute, Birmingham, 23 November 2001, <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20070701080624/http://www.pm.gov.uk/output/Page1673.asp> [19.08.2011].

⁷⁰⁴ Speech by the Rt Hon Peter Hain, Minister for Europe, 'A new Europe', Franco-British Council Seminar, London, 31 October 2001, <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20011217183104/http://www.fco.gov.uk/news/speechtext.asp?5494> [19.08.2011].

the effectiveness of Europe's response to that of the lowest common denominator.⁷⁰⁵ Hain also spoke out against extending the remit of ESDP missions to include combating terrorism as some EU member states had proposed.

The EU is already playing its part in this under its third pillar activities. The main task for ESDP in the light of this is to concentrate on being able to react quickly and effectively together to crises as they emerge.⁷⁰⁶

ESDP should foremost concentrate on the more pressing issue of meeting the Helsinki Headline Goal. Although at the upcoming Laeken summit the EU member states would declare the rapid reaction force operational for limited use, in order to become fully operational, shortfalls, such as interoperability and readiness level, still had to be filled. Hain also confirmed that NATO would remain the cornerstone of Europe's territorial defence and security, whereas ESDP's role would be to carry out Petersberg tasks, especially civilian missions, and supplement NATO crisis management.⁷⁰⁷

The new Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw, admitted that one of the consequences of 9/11 was that Europe vanished from the headlines and front pages in Britain, although, he argued, the need for the EU and ESDP was more acute than ever. With regard to the remit of ESDP missions, he agreed with his colleague Peter Hain that 'military operations against terrorists are not among the intended tasks for ESDP. Nor for that matter is territorial defence.'⁷⁰⁸

⁷⁰⁵ Debate on European Affairs, House of Commons, vol.376, col.389, 5 December 2001, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200102/cmhansrd/vo011205/debtext/11205-19.htm#11205-19_spmi0 [19.08.2011].

⁷⁰⁶ Speech by the Rt Hon Peter Hain, Minister for Europe, 'The case for a European Security and Defence Policy', The Royal United Services Institute, London, 28 November 2001, <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20020124183003/http://www.fco.gov.uk/news/speechtext.asp?5612> [19.08.2011].

⁷⁰⁷ Idem.

⁷⁰⁸ Speech by the Rt Hon Jack Straw, Secretary of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs, 'Europe after 11 September', The Royal United Services Institute, London, 11 December 2001, <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20020124183003/http://www.fco.gov.uk/news/speechtext.asp?5670> [19.08.2011].

6.4.2 The European Convention and preparation for the Iraq war (2002)

In a speech on Europe Hain reiterated his view that a supranationalised European foreign and security policy would not work. A successful foreign and security policy

requires speed [...] credibility [...] commitment [...] [y]ou wouldn't get that if some member states had been outvoted. [...] When a corrupt President falls or a war starts, we can't sit around waiting for a Commission proposal in 12 different languages [...]⁷⁰⁹

When Hoon was asked about the progress of ESDP in achieving the Helsinki Headline Goal after the announcement of the Laeken European Council that ESDP now had initial operational capability across the full range of Petersberg tasks he responded that only a few targets for improving military capabilities had not been met yet. Still, he thought that ESDP would not be ready yet to take over the NATO mission in Macedonia. In an advice by the Ministry of Defence given to the Prime Minister it was therefore stated that 'an EU-led operation in Macedonia would not be "premature" but simply wrong'.⁷¹⁰ Despite this advice, Blair defended the conclusion of the Barcelona European Council to just postpone the decision on the ESDP take-over of NATO's Macedonia mission until the end of 2002 in the hope that by then the 'Berlin plus' arrangement would be in place. This was, according to Blair, the key requirement: 'in respect of any European role on defence, it has been made clear that it [...] must be consistent with the Berlin plus arrangement for NATO.'⁷¹¹

In contrast, as Straw announced in a speech on EU-US relations, ESDP's civilian capabilities had progressed so far that it would be able to take on the international police mission in Bosnia

⁷⁰⁹ Speech by the Rt Hon Peter Hain, Minister for Europe, 'The European Union: what's the score', Europe 21, London, 22 January 2002, <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20020124183003/http://www.fco.gov.uk/news/speechtext.asp?5807> [19.08.2011].

⁷¹⁰ Debate on European Defence Cooperation, House of Commons, vol.382, col.10, 18 March 2002, www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200102/cmhansrd/vo020318/debtext/20318-03.htm#20318-03_spm1 [19.08.2011].

⁷¹¹ Debate on European Council (Barcelona), House of Commons, vol.382, col.25, 18 March 2002, <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200102/cmhansrd/vo020318/debtext/20318-07.htm> [19.08.2011].

from January 2003. In Straw's view, this concentration on civilian missions showed again that ESDP was not NATO's replacement. He was convinced that 'the different assets and perspectives which Europe and America bring to the world's problems [were] a source of strength'.⁷¹² Blair agreed with this de facto division of labour between ESDP and the US/NATO in a House of Commons' debate following the Seville European Council as he promised that the remit of ESDP missions would stay restricted.⁷¹³

NATO, which had always been high on the agenda for British politicians, became even more important for Britain following the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. This increased importance was recognised by Hoon in a speech on the occasion of the one-year anniversary of 11 September:

At the forefront of our collective response has been NATO, the embodiment of the transatlantic Alliance. It is [...] absolutely the cornerstone of our collective defence policy. Those who suggest that the Alliance is somehow irrelevant are very wide of the mark indeed. NATO is successfully transforming itself to meet the new threats of a changing world.⁷¹⁴

ESDP, on the other hand, was only mentioned briefly by Hoon in the context of the Headline Goal. The recent publication of a New Chapter to the 1998 Strategic Defence Review was, according to Hoon, a response to the events of 11 September. It highlighted the need for new equipment and capabilities in order to ensure that British armed forces were ready to face the

⁷¹² Speech by the Rt Hon Jack Straw, Secretary of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs, 'EU-US relations: the myths and the reality', Brookings Institute, Washington DC, 8 May 2002, <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20020725225202/http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=10070293> [19.08.2011].

⁷¹³ Debate on European Council (Seville), vol.387, col.615, 24 June 2002, <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200102/cmhansrd/vo020624/debtext/20624-07.htm> [19.08.2011].

⁷¹⁴ Speech by the Rt Hon Geoffrey Hoon, Secretary of State for Defence, 'One year on – a UK perspective', University of Louisville, 9 September 2002, Louisville, http://web.archive.org/web/20030119230235/http://news.mod.uk/news/press/news_press_notice.asp?newsItem_id=1982 [19.08.2011].

challenges of the 'new world'. Furthermore for the first time in 20 years the Ministry of Defence's budget would be increased by £3.5 billion by 2005/6.⁷¹⁵

Meanwhile, in the European Convention Baroness Scotland, one of Britain's representatives on the Convention, fought for keeping ESDP's intergovernmental structure: 'the intergovernmental ESDP we are currently building is the best, indeed the only, way forward'.⁷¹⁶

Besides NATO and ESDP, Straw as well as his cabinet colleagues regarded EU enlargement as an important instrument to strengthen European security in the twenty first century. 'EU expansion should [...] allow us to tackle more effectively security problems of more immediate concern to our citizens, such as cross-border crime.'⁷¹⁷

In a speech at the Chicago's Council for Foreign Relations in July, Straw seized on the idea of 'work-sharing' between NATO and ESDP and called the achievements of Europe's civilian power impressive. However, the reason why ESDP was established in 1998 was to reduce the gap between Europe's and the US' military contributions to NATO. Europe had to bring more and better military capabilities to NATO. According to Straw, ESDP had not fulfilled this role yet. Although Britain's and France's spending had risen last year, other European countries still

⁷¹⁵ Speech by the Rt Hon Geoffrey Hoon, Secretary of State for Defence, 'The New Chapter: a blueprint for reform', The Royal United Services Institute, London, 30 July 2002, http://web.archive.org/web/20030327183009/http://news.mod.uk/news/press/news_press_notice.asp?newsItem_id=1886 [19.08.2011].

⁷¹⁶ Speech by the Rt Hon Baroness Scotland of Asthal, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 'EU defence policy', European Parliament, Brussels, 12 July 2002, <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20020725225202/http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?packageName=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1007029391647&a=KArticle&aid=1031760341315> [19.08.2011].

⁷¹⁷ Speech by the Rt Hon Jack Straw, Secretary of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs, 'Collective security in an enlarged Europe', Budapest, 9 July 2002, <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20020725225202/http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?packageName=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1007029391647&a=KArticle&aid=1026232805596> [19.08.2011].

did not spend enough.⁷¹⁸ Hoon agreed with Straw about the purpose of ESDP in a speech at London's Foreign Policy Centre:

ESDP will give us the ability to [...] [improve] Europe's military capabilities so that EU nations can make a better, and more coherent, contribution to NATO operation and in cooperation with NATO, [...] [give] the EU the ability [...] to undertake operations to meet the Petersberg tasks.⁷¹⁹

In his statement to the House of Commons' debate on NATO's Prague summit Blair conceded that European member states needed to do more to improve their military capabilities but that due to the Headline Goal Europe they were on the right track. Blair also stated that he was reasonably optimistic that the 'Berlin plus' arrangement would be implemented by the end of 2002. This would mean that ESDP would be able to take on the mission in Macedonia at the beginning of 2003. '[T]he Americans', Blair said, 'have made it clear that they prefer it to be led from Europe'.⁷²⁰ Blair pointed out that if the Conservatives could decide, Britain would be the only country not playing its part in the mission.⁷²¹

In the second half of 2002 the British government frequently spoke of the danger emanating from Iraq and tried to rally support for the implementation of stricter measures against Saddam Hussein. Its European partners, however, reacted cautiously as Hoon was forced to

⁷¹⁸ Speech by the Rt Hon Jack Straw, Secretary of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs, 'The UK and the United States: a partnership for stability and prosperity', Council for Foreign Relations, Chicago, 15 October 2002, <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20020725225202/http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1007029391647&a=KArticle&aid=1034348486928> [19.08.2011].

⁷¹⁹ Speech by the Rt Hon Geoffrey Hoon, Secretary of State for Defence, 'Intervening in the new security environment', Foreign Policy Centre, London, 12 November 2002, http://web.archive.org/web/20030328033104/http://news.mod.uk/news/press/news_press_notice.asp?newsItem_id=2143 [19.08.2011].

⁷²⁰ Debate on NATO summit, House of Commons, vol.395, col.38, 25 November 2002, <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200203/cmhansrd/vo021125/debtext/21125-10.htm> [19.08.2011].

⁷²¹ Idem.

admit in a House of Commons' debate.⁷²² In a speech entitled 'A clear course for Europe' Blair appealed to its European partners not to continue with their hesitant stance. 'We need to be clear about where we stand. [T]he orientation of Europe toward the United States is absolutely at the core of whether Europe can become effective in foreign and security policy.'⁷²³ Blair furthermore revealed that he knew that some European colleagues thought that he was unnecessary difficult over European defence and its relations with NATO. But in his view ESDP would never fulfil its potential unless it was complementary to NATO. Likewise Britain would never agree to the communitarisation of defence and foreign policy.

Foreign policy can only be built by gathering a consensus among the member states who possess the resources necessary to conduct it - the diplomatic skills, the bulk of aid budgets, and of course the armed forces.⁷²⁴

Nevertheless, according to Blair, Britain was 'ambitious for European defence'.⁷²⁵ It would support tangible measures, including a European defence capability development agency, responsible to and run by the member states, as well as further steps towards a more open defence procurement.

In an interview on the European Council summit in Copenhagen in December Blair welcomed that the differences between Turkey in Greece, which had delayed the implementation of the 'Berlin plus' arrangement, were resolved. 'As a result of that we can now have the European Defence up and running, able to conduct operations in circumstances where NATO does not

⁷²² Debate on Defence in the World, House of Commons, vol.390, col.496, 17 October 2002, <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200102/cmhansrd/vo021017/debtext/21017-15.htm> [19.08.2011].

⁷²³ Speech by the Rt Hon Tony Blair, Prime Minister, 'A clear course for Europe', Cardiff, 28 November 2002, <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20070701080624/http://www.pm.gov.uk/output/Page1739.asp> [19.08.2011].

⁷²⁴ Idem.

⁷²⁵ Idem.

want to be engaged.⁷²⁶ 'The EU stands ready to take over the military operation in Macedonia in consultation with NATO and to lead a military operation in Bosnia following SFOR.'⁷²⁷

6.4.3 Iraq war and the Constitutional Treaty (2003)

Foreign Office Minister, Mike O'Brien, set out the three British objectives for ESDP in a speech entitled 'European Defence and the NATO/EU relationship':

to strengthen the European contribution to NATO [...], to set a target for European nations to make their military forces more rapidly deployable, effective and sustainable- this will also be highly relevant to the modernisation of NATO's force structures [...] [and] to enable the European Union to play its full role on the international stage, recognising its uniquely wide range of external policy tools, from political dialogue, trade and aid to JHA co-operation and now civilian and military crisis management operations.⁷²⁸

In order to meet these objectives the EU member states would have to move ESDP from the institutional to the operational phase and enhance the development of military and civilian capabilities especially as it seemed likely that the EU would not meet the qualitative element of the Helsinki Headline Goal by 2003. Furthermore, according to O'Brien, the UK would lobby for a better coordination between the EU's capability development process and NATO's capabilities commitment agreed at the Prague summit.⁷²⁹

⁷²⁶ Doorstep interview of the Rt Hon Tony Blair, Prime Minister, on EU Council meeting, Copenhagen, 13 December 2002, <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20070701080624/http://www.pm.gov.uk/output/Page1740.asp> [19.08.2011].

⁷²⁷ Statement by the Rt Hon Tony Blair, Prime Minister, on European Council meeting in Copenhagen, House of Commons, 16 December 2002, <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20070701080624/http://www.pm.gov.uk/output/Page1742.asp> [19.08.2011].

⁷²⁸ Speech by the Rt Hon Mike O'Brien, Minister for the Middle East, 'European defence and the NATO/EU relationship', City Forum Seminar on the Future of NATO, London, 24 January 2003, <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20030908175554/http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1007029391647&a=KArticle&aid=1042719637094> [19.08.2011].

⁷²⁹ Idem.

In the light of the growing differences on Iraq, Europe's relationship to NATO and more importantly to the US figured prominently in speeches by senior Labour politicians at the beginning of 2003. The Minister of State for Trade, Baroness Symons, called on Britain's European partners not to see the US as a rival but as a partner. The UK should help improve the relationship between the US and continental Europe. As the closest ally of the US, the UK 'has a unique position in Europe'.⁷³⁰ In Blair's view, Britain should first be the closest ally of the US and then be at the centre of Europe.⁷³¹ At a press conference with Portuguese Prime Minister José Barroso, Blair warned that '[d]ividing Europe from America, an alliance that has served us well for over half a century [...] would be a very, very dangerous thing to do.'⁷³²

Only eight days after Blair had signed a letter with a number of European countries expressing indirect support for an invasion of Iraq and thereby distancing themselves from France and Germany, Blair met Chirac for their annual summit in Le Touquet. Despite their differences 'on certain issues', as Blair aptly put it, they were able to agree on several improvements in the area of European defence:

First, there is the actual launching of operations for European defence in Macedonia [...]. Secondly, there was a very important and formal commitment by both countries to put the assets of each of our country at each other's disposal in the fight against terrorism [...]. Thirdly, there was the development of a comprehensive approach to defence capability with the establishment of a new agency in order to make sure that

⁷³⁰ Speech by the Rt Hon Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean, Minister of State for the Middle East and International Security, 'Topical aspects of the US/EU relationship', American-European Community Association, London, 15 January 2003, <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20030908175554/http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1007029391647&a=KArticle&aid=1042719489129> [19.08.2011].

⁷³¹ Speech by the Rt Hon Tony Blair, Prime Minister, 'Britain's place in the world', Foreign Office conference, London, 7 January 2003, <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20070701080624/http://www.pm.gov.uk/output/Page1765.asp> [19.08.2011].

⁷³² Joint press conference by the Rt Hon Tony Blair, Prime Minister, and José Barroso, Prime Minister of Portugal, London, 11 March 2003, <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20070701080624/http://www.pm.gov.uk/output/Page3248.asp> [19.08.2011].

we are matching the aspiration [...] with capability and efficient procurement. Fourth, there was the concept of the rapid reaction capability and making sure that we have the ability to act quickly and deploy quickly in circumstances where we need to.⁷³³

They, however, remained at odds over Iraq.⁷³⁴ Blair insisted that Iraq had to be disarmed. If it did not do this voluntarily, military force would have to be deployed.⁷³⁵ On 20 March Blair announced in his address to the nation that military action against Iraq had begun and British forces were taking part in it.⁷³⁶ The day after the beginning of the Iraq war Blair attended the European Council in Brussels and stated that despite the tensions over Iraq it was a harmonious meeting and he was still enthusiastic about British participation in the EU. He would also continue to argue for a closer intergovernmental European foreign and defence policy.⁷³⁷ In a House of Commons' debate following the European Council Blair was questioned about a proposal discussed in the Convention, which allegedly aimed at imposing a single foreign and security policy on all member states. Blair responded that Britain would never accept the inclusion of such a provision in the draft Constitutional Treaty.⁷³⁸ Hain admitted that the British government was not happy with some of the proposed common foreign and

⁷³³ Joint press conference by the Rt Hon Tony Blair, Prime Minister, and Jacques Chirac, President of the French Republic, Le Touquet, 5 February 2003, <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20070701080624/http://www.pm.gov.uk/output/Page1769.asp> [19.08.2011].

⁷³⁴ Lichfield, John (2003), 'Leaders agree on everything (except for the troublesome key issues)', *The Independent*, 5 February.

⁷³⁵ Joint press conference by the Rt Hon Tony Blair, Prime Minister, and George W. Bush Jr., President of the United States, Washington DC, 31 January 2003, <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20070701080624/http://www.pm.gov.uk/output/Page1767.asp> [19.08.2011].

⁷³⁶ Address by the Rt Hon Tony Blair, Prime Minister, to the nation, 20 March 2003, <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20070701080624/http://www.pm.gov.uk/output/Page3327.asp> [19.08.2011].

⁷³⁷ Press conference by the Rt Hon Tony Blair, Prime Minister, European Council summit, Brussels, 21 March 2003, <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20070701080624/http://www.pm.gov.uk/output/Page3329.asp> [19.08.2011].

⁷³⁸ Debate on Iraq and the European Council, House of Commons, vol.402, col.34, 24 March 2003, <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200203/cmhansrd/vo030324/debtext/30324-09.htm> [19.08.2011].

security policy provisions discussed in the Convention. Although Britain was in favour of strengthening Europe's foreign and security policy it would not accept any shift from its intergovernmental nature.⁷³⁹ Therefore, Britain insisted that the new post of a European foreign minister would not be subject to the normal rules for the commissioners but would have to be chosen by the Council and responsible to it.⁷⁴⁰

The new Europe Minister Denis MacShane agreed with his Labour colleagues that Britain wanted more common foreign policy but not a single foreign policy. In his opinion, Britain, France and Germany had special responsibility to enhance Europe's foreign and security policy. 'In tomorrow's Europe [...] [they] must work together to create a new alliance for permanent reform and constant renewal.'⁷⁴¹ In reality, however, there was not much cooperation between the three states. When France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg held a summit on Europe defence in April the British government reacted angry: 'the recent Tervuren summit was neither timely nor appropriate.'⁷⁴² Britain was concerned about the summit's proposals, especially the idea of a European nucleus capability for planning and conducting strategic-level operations, and irritated that it was left out of an initiative in an area, where it regarded itself

⁷³⁹ Debate on the Convention on the Future of Europe, vol.401, col.309WH, 20 March 2003, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200203/cmhansrd/vo030320/halltext/30320h01.htm#30320h01_spmi0 [19.08.2011].

⁷⁴⁰ Speech by the Rt Hon Jack Straw, Secretary of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs, 'Europe in the world', Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, 19 May 2003, <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20030908175554/http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1007029391647&a=KArticle&aid=1052839631711> [19.08.2011].

⁷⁴¹ Speech by the Rt Hon Denis MacShane, Minister for Europe, 'Britain and Germany working together in Europe', Berlin, 15 May 2003, <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20030908175554/http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1007029391647&a=KArticle&aid=1052839488171> [19.08.2011].

⁷⁴² Debate on European Reaction Force, House of Commons, vol.405, col.10, 12 May 2003, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200203/cmhansrd/vo030512/debtext/30512-02.htm#30512-02_sbhd1 [19.08.2011].

indispensable. As MacShane put it: 'The idea of a European defence based on Belgium and without the United Kingdom— I wonder if that's particularly serious.'⁷⁴³

In a speech to the Brussels' Centre for European Policy Studies Straw demanded that instead of discussing over-ambitious proposals that would duplicate NATO and threaten Europe's partnership with the US the focus of the Convention should be on practical improvements of ESDP. For example, Britain supported the idea of an agency for capability development and acquisition and the proposal of a mutual solidarity commitment among EU members in the face of terrorist threats.⁷⁴⁴

According to Hain, mutual defence cooperation, which was inserted in the draft Constitutional Treaty at the insistence of France and Germany, would be a duplication of NATO and Britain would not support this.⁷⁴⁵ In the light of this and other controversial provisions, Straw called the draft, which would ceremonially be handed over to the member states at the Thessaloniki European Council, only a good starting point for lengthy negotiations in the Intergovernmental Conference.⁷⁴⁶ He welcomed that the IGC would be given a broad mandate allowing a re-examination of all articles in the draft. The UK would seek alterations of provisions relating to the European Foreign Minister as well as European defence policy.

Straw also announced that at the Thessaloniki meeting High Representative Javier Solana would present a 'European Security Strategy' 'covering WMD, international crime and

⁷⁴³ Doyle, Leonard (2003), 'French call for military cooperation divides EU', *The Independent*, 28 April.

⁷⁴⁴ Speech by the Rt Hon Jack Straw, Secretary of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs, 'Europe in the world', Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, 19 May 2003, <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20030908175554/http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1007029391647&a=KArticle&aid=1052839631711> [19.08.2011].

⁷⁴⁵ Watson, Rory (2003), 'Britain opposes EU defence plan that harms NATO', *The Times*, 17 March.

⁷⁴⁶ Speech by the Rt Hon Jack Straw, Secretary of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs, 'A blueprint for the new Europe', Seminar on the Convention on the Future for Europe, London, 7 June 2003, <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20030908175554/http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1007029391647&a=KArticle&aid=1055784241918> [19.08.2011].

instability on the EU's border' and providing the basis for a 'policy toolbox'.⁷⁴⁷ At the press conference following the European Council Blair praised the European Security Strategy and stated that it was 'in line with British thinking'.⁷⁴⁸ With regard to the draft Constitutional Treaty, Blair welcomed that it confirmed that 'issues to do with [...] defence policy [...] will remain the prerogative of our national government and parliament'.⁷⁴⁹

Before the IGC began, Straw unveiled a White Paper entitled 'A new Constitutional Treaty for the European Union', in which the government set out in more detail their approach to the negotiations. In the succeeding House of Commons' debate, Conservative MPs accused the government of lying about maintaining the member states' sole authority in foreign and security policy. As proof they cited an article of the draft Constitutional Treaty, which called on member states to actively and unreservedly support the EU's common foreign and security policy. However, the government pointed out that this phrase had already been included in the Maastricht Treaty, which had been signed by the Conservatives.⁷⁵⁰

Besides the controversial ESDP provisions in the draft Constitutional Treaty, Britain also rejected the Tervuren proposal of an autonomous EU military headquarters. When Blair met his German and French counterparts in Berlin in September to discuss a solution to this stalemate, although no breakthrough was announced, Blair moved closer to Germany's and

⁷⁴⁷ Debate on European Affairs, House of Commons, vol.407, col.401, 18 June 2003, <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200203/cmhansrd/vo030618/debtext/30618-16.htm> [19.08.2011].

⁷⁴⁸ Doorstep interview of the Rt Hon Tony Blair, Prime Minister, on EU Council meeting, Thessaloniki, 20 June 2003, <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20070701080624/http://www.pm.gov.uk/output/Page3988.asp> [19.08.2011].

⁷⁴⁹ Debate on European Council, House of Commons, vol.407, col.707, 23 June 2003, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200203/cmhansrd/vo030623/debtext/30623-05.htm#30623-05_spm2 [19.08.2011].

⁷⁵⁰ Debate on EU-IGC, House of Commons, vol.410, col.176, 9 September 2003, <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200203/cmhansrd/vo030909/debtext/30909-07.htm> [19.08.2011].

France' position. For the first time, Blair agreed that the EU should have a joint capacity to plan and conduct operations without recourse to NATO resources and capabilities.⁷⁵¹ However, he remained opposed to the plan to set up an autonomous EU military headquarters. Instead, in a Foot for Thought paper it was suggested to establish an EU military planning cell in NATO's military headquarters.⁷⁵² At the Berlin meeting, Blair also abandoned his opposition to structured cooperation.⁷⁵³

In a House of Commons' debate on the October European Council in Brussels Straw confirmed that Britain upheld its opposition to mutual defence cooperation ('it is unacceptable to us, for the EU [...] to aspire to provide a [...] defence commitment') and an autonomous EU military headquarters ('there is no case for having operational planning and the running of operations [...] in an EU headquarters separate either from [...] SHAPE or from national headquarters').⁷⁵⁴ A separate EU headquarters would undermine NATO and would be a waste of money because autonomous EU operations would rarely happen. In Straw's view, there was a hierarchy in military planning: 'NATO first, then the Berlin-plus arrangements and thirdly, wholly autonomous operation.'⁷⁵⁵ In case of autonomous ESDP operations, the EU should use national headquarters as it did in the operation Artemis launched in June 2003. Although Hoon agreed

⁷⁵¹ Joint press conference by the Rt Hon Tony Blair, Prime Minister, Jacques Chirac, President of the French Republic, and Gerhard Schröder, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, Berlin, 20 September 2003, <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20070701080624/http://www.pm.gov.uk/output/Page4508.asp> [19.08.2011].

⁷⁵² Bennett, Rosemary (2003), 'Blair sabotages French plan for EU army', *The Times*, 25 August.

⁷⁵³ Black, Ian (2003), 'UK backs down in European defence', *The Guardian*, 23 September.

⁷⁵⁴ Debate on European Council, House of Commons, vol.411, col.383, 20 October 2003, <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200203/cmhansrd/vo031020/debtext/31020-07.htm> [19.08.2011].

⁷⁵⁵ *Idem*.

with Straw on the existence of an informal hierarchy in military planning, he denied that this would mean that NATO would have the right of first refusal.⁷⁵⁶

According to Hoon, instead of dreaming about an operational and planning headquarters the EU should better concentrate on improving its ability to identify regions which give rise to concern as well as enhancing coordination with civilian components. This would really improve its strategic planning capacity.⁷⁵⁷

In November, Blair met Chirac for a mini-summit in London, where they proposed the creation of EU battlegroups. However, they still could not agree on solutions to mutual defence cooperation and a standing EU headquarters.⁷⁵⁸ The breakthrough on these issues came in a Franco-British-German meeting ahead of the EU foreign ministers summit in Naples. Following the renaming of mutual defence cooperation as mutual assistance clause and the watering down of some of the more controversial aspects, Britain eventually accepted its insertion in the final Constitutional Treaty text.⁷⁵⁹ With regard to the compromise on the EU's planning and operational capacity Straw insisted that the small strategic planning cell, which would be based at the EU Military Staff and could carry out some operational planning, would just have 'skeleton staff and be used only if no other headquarters were available'.⁷⁶⁰ Blair called this

⁷⁵⁶ Debate on Defence Policy, House of Commons vol.412, col.46, 27 October 2003, <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200203/cmhansrd/vo031027/debtext/31027-13.htm> [19.08.2011].

⁷⁵⁷ Speech by the Rt Hon Geoffrey Hoon, Secretary of State for Defence, Atlantic Treaty Association 49th General Assembly, London, 5 November 2003, http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20040202024338/http://news.mod.uk/news/press/news_speech.asp?newsItem_id=2856 [19.08.2011].

⁷⁵⁸ Joint press conference by the Rt Hon Tony Blair, Prime Minister, and Jacques Chirac, President of the French Republic, London, 24 November 2003, <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20070701080624/http://www.pm.gov.uk/output/Page4884.asp> [19.08.2011].

⁷⁵⁹ Black, Ian, Michael White (2003), 'Blair accepts European defence deal', *The Guardian*, 29 November.

⁷⁶⁰ Debate on International Affairs, House of Commons, vol.415, col.277, 27 November 2003, <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200304/cmhansrd/vo031127/debtext/31127-27.htm> [19.08.2011].

compromise 'an arrangement [...] good for NATO and good for European defence'.⁷⁶¹ Straw emphasised that the protocol attached to the structured cooperation provision, which was tabled by Britain, France and Germany, would ensure that it was 'handled inclusively within the EU, not exclusively'.⁷⁶²

Following the failure of the European Council to agree on the Constitutional Treaty, Blair said that he was optimistic that an agreement would be reached in the coming months. He furthermore highlighted that the proposals put forward by the UK, France and Germany on the future of European defence were welcomed by the other member states.⁷⁶³

6.4.4 Improvement of the relationships with France and Germany (2004)

On the occasion of the 100 year celebration of the entente cordiale Straw pointed out that Britain's and France's different approaches to Europe emerged from the different experiences of World War II.

Britain's memories are of lonely and dogged resistance of 1940, and of the support of the Empire and of the United States in winning the final victory. [...] Our experience [...] convinced us deeply that keeping the strongest possible relationship between Europe and the US was the cornerstone of our security and prosperity.⁷⁶⁴

Britain still regarded both its relationship with the US and its EU membership as central. Without those two alliances, according to the Foreign Office's assessment in its strategy paper

⁷⁶¹ Castle, Stephan (2003), 'US retreat allows EU to clinch deal on defence force', *The Independent*, 12 December.

⁷⁶² Debate on European Affairs, House of Commons, vol.415, col.1111, 10 December 2003, <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200304/cmhansrd/vo031210/debtext/31210-16.htm> [19.08.2011].

⁷⁶³ Debate on European Council, House of Commons, vol.415, col.1320, 15 December 2003, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200304/cmhansrd/vo031215/debtext/31215-05.htm#31215-05_spm4 [19.08.2011].

⁷⁶⁴ Speech by the Rt Hon Jack Straw, Secretary of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs, 'Franco-British relations 100 years after the entente cordiale', Paris, 12 January 2004, <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20050103193245/http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1007029391647&a=KArticle&aid=1073498523999> [19.08.2011].

'A new strategy for a new era', Britain could not face today's challenges.⁷⁶⁵ In his speech at the Munich Security Conference Hoon criticised that Europe sometimes did not appreciate enough America's huge investment in the security of the European continent. In his view it was irresponsible that last year some European states

went out of their way to push a European Union dimension as a counterweight to the defence relationship with the United States. The dangerous consequence of [those] policies [...] is that it can feed misunderstanding and encourage Isolationist tendencies on both sides of the Atlantic.⁷⁶⁶

However, Hoon stressed, there were also a number of positive ESDP developments. He highlighted the Franco-British proposal of establishing battlegroup size force packages in response to crises identified by the UN. 'This will be an important initiative that enhances the real usability of European forces in a fashion complementary to NATO's efforts.'⁷⁶⁷ Hoon also announced that a successor to the Helsinki Headline Goal with emphasis on interoperability, deployability and sustainability was under discussion. The UK would of course make sure, Hoon promised, that both initiatives would strengthen NATO rather than duplicate or even undermine NATO.⁷⁶⁸

At a Franco-British-German meeting Blair, Chirac and Schröder discussed the battlegroup concept and afterwards released a 'Food for Thought Paper' for the other EU member states to

⁷⁶⁵ Speech by the Rt Hon Jack Straw, Secretary of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs, 'A new era for foreign policy', Chatham House, London, 12 February 2004, <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20050103193245/http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1007029391647&a=KArticle&aid=1076522455141> [19.08.2011].

⁷⁶⁶ Speech by the Rt Hon Geoffrey Hoon, Secretary of State for Defence, 'Transatlantic relations', 40th Munich Security Conference, 7 February 2004, http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20040202024338/http://news.mod.uk/news/press/news_speech.asp?newsItem_id=2801 [19.08.2011].

⁷⁶⁷ Debate on European Defence Capability, House of Commons, vol.418, col.607, 1 March 2004, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200304/cmhansrd/vo040301/debtext/40301-04.htm#40301-04_spm1 [19.08.2011].

⁷⁶⁸ Debate on Defence Policy, House of Commons, vol.419, col.1087, 25 March 2004, <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200304/cmhansrd/vo040325/debtext/40325-14.htm> [19.08.2011].

comment on. When Blair was asked about the growing fear of the other member states that Britain, France and Germany attempted to dominate the EU, he responded that

if these countries, which comprise almost half the population in Europe but actually over half the wealth of Europe that is generated by Europe [...] can come to a clear agreement [...] that is a good thing for Europe, and there shouldn't be any [...] sensitivity about this or any sense of exclusivity.⁷⁶⁹

In the aftermath of the Madrid train bombings Blair attended the European Council. He welcomed the decision that the solidarity clause would take effect immediately in spite of the non-implementation of the Constitutional Treaty. He assured that this did not mean that the member states lost faith that they would ever agree on the Constitutional Treaty. On the contrary, Blair remained convinced that negotiations would be finalised soon.⁷⁷⁰ In a statement on the Constitutional Treaty, Blair vowed that the intergovernmental character of certain policy areas, including foreign policy and defence, would not be up for debate. Blair acknowledged that so far the government had not succeeded in explaining the benefits of the Constitutional Treaty to the British public. Even worse, numerous myths about the Treaty, such as that in future Britain could not fight a war without permission from Brussels, were allowed to flourish. Blair announced that he therefore changed his opinion and would hold a referendum on the Constitutional Treaty.⁷⁷¹ Ahead of the June European Council, which was supposed to settle the dispute on the Constitutional Treaty, Straw launched the campaign for a

⁷⁶⁹ Joint press conference by the Rt Hon Tony Blair, Prime Minister, Jacques Chirac, President of the French Republic, and Gerhard Schröder, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, Berlin, 18 February 2004, <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20070701080624/http://www.pm.gov.uk/output/Page5380.asp> [19.08.2011].

⁷⁷⁰ Doorstep interview of the Rt Hon Tony Blair, Prime Minister, on EU Council meeting, Brussels, 26 March 2004, <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20070701080624/http://www.pm.gov.uk/output/Page5567.asp> [19.08.2011].

⁷⁷¹ Debate on the Europe, House of Commons, vol.420, col.157, 20 April 2004, <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200304/cmhansrd/vo040420/debtext/40420-06.htm> [19.08.2011].

'yes vote' in the referendum. He spelt out the Constitutional Treaty's importance for Britain and claimed that it 'encapsulates Britain's vision of an effective, reforming Europe', which was not a superstate but a group of nations.⁷⁷² When the member states indeed agreed on the Constitutional Treaty at the European Council, Blair said in his statement afterwards that Britain was able to obtain a number of significant assurances, which were included in the Treaty. Moreover, foreign policy and defence would still be subject to unanimous decision-making. Blair also welcomed the creation of new posts, such as the president of the European Council and EU foreign minister, although he admitted that he did not like the title 'EU foreign minister'. Likewise, he criticised the term 'Constitutional Treaty' for carrying the wrong connotation. Nevertheless, Blair insisted that the ratification of the Treaty was in the interest of Britain and everyone who campaigned for a no vote would not only say no to the Constitutional Treaty but also no to Britain's future in the EU thereby putting Britain's prosperity and security in jeopardy.⁷⁷³ Straw presented a White Paper on the final text of Constitutional Treaty to the House of Commons, which set out its main elements and highlighted the achievements of the government's negotiations. For example, the White Paper stated that the government succeeded in keeping ESDP flexible, inclusive and complementary to NATO.⁷⁷⁴

At the June European Council summit, there was also agreement to establish the European defence agency immediately instead of waiting for the ratification of the Constitutional

⁷⁷² Debate on European Affairs, House of Commons, vol.422, col.793, 16 June 2004, <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200304/cmhansrd/vo040616/debtext/40616-08.htm> [19.08.2011].

⁷⁷³ Debate on the European Council, House of Commons, vol.422, col.1079-1081, 21 June 2004, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200304/cmhansrd/vo040621/debtext/40621-06.htm#40621-06_spm1 [19.08.2011].

⁷⁷⁴ Debate on the European Constitution, House of Commons, vol.424, col.855, 9 September 2004, <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200304/cmhansrd/vo040909/debtext/40909-12.htm> [19.08.2011].

Treaty.⁷⁷⁵ According to Straw, this agency would help the EU member states increase their military capabilities and enhance their capacity for crisis management. In the light of the security challenges outside Europe's borders Europe would have to cooperate on soft as well as hard security issues.

Together, the EU accounts for a quarter of world GDP, a third of world trade, 50% of the UN budget and 55% of global development aid, giving us far greater clout in the world, when we agree to act together, than any of us would have alone.⁷⁷⁶

However, Britain had to maintain its strong relationship with the US as well. In Blair's view 'both partnerships are vital to British national interests and it will remain the policy, of this government at least, to nurture both'.⁷⁷⁷

Therefore, following the NATO meeting in Istanbul in June, where it was decided that the EU would take over the NATO mission in Bosnia, Blair emphasised once again that 'NATO remains the cornerstone of our security but as I think we are proving in Bosnia there can be a role for European defence'.⁷⁷⁸ Hoon added that he believed that the Bosnia mission would prove that

⁷⁷⁵ Debate on the European Security and Defence, House of Commons, vol.422, col.1063, 21 June 2004, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200304/cmhansrd/vo040621/debtext/40621-02.htm#40621-02_spmi0 [19.08.2011].

⁷⁷⁶ Speech by the Rt Hon Jack Straw, Secretary of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs, 'What is changing in the new European Union?', Conference of Ambassadors to Czech Republic, Prague, 31 August 2004, <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20050404183215/http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1007029391647&a=KArticle&aid=1093349755827> [19.08.2011].

⁷⁷⁷ Debate on EU Summit, House of Commons vol.426, col.584, 8 November 2004, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200304/cmhansrd/vo041108/debtext/41108-11.htm#41108-11_spmi7 [19.08.2011].

⁷⁷⁸ Debate on NATO / special EU Council, House of Commons, vol.423, col.290, 30 June 2004, <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200304/cmhansrd/vo040630/debtext/40630-06.htm> [19.08.2011].

the capability of the EU's defence and security policy complemented rather than competed with NATO.⁷⁷⁹

6.4.5 Campaign for a yes vote in the referendum on the Constitutional Treaty (2005)

At the beginning of 2005 the campaign for a yes vote in the referendum was in full swing. In a speech in London in January McShane outlined how Britain had shaped the EU in the last couple of years, and that therefore the EU in general and the Constitutional Treaty in particular were in the interest of Britain. In the area of defence

[w]e have worked tirelessly, and again successfully, for [...] the beginnings of an EU military capacity which dovetails with NATO. Today, the EU runs the peace-keeping mission in Bosnia and European troops and EU missions create space in the region for some normal politics to emerge.⁷⁸⁰

According to McShane, one of the priorities of the UK's upcoming EU presidency would be the continuing development of ESDP. He stressed that after the EU's preoccupation with the Constitutional Treaty the EU had to concentrate again on issues closer to the people, such as security.⁷⁸¹ Blair agreed with MacShane and advocated in his statement on the spring European

⁷⁷⁹ Debate on Defence, House of Common, vol.425, col.1055, 21 October 2004, <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200304/cmhansrd/vo041021/debtext/41021-16.htm> [19.08.2011].

⁷⁸⁰ Speech by the Rt Hon Denis MacShane, Minister for Europe, 'The challenge of Europe in UK politics', Chatham House, London, 19 January 2005, <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20050404183215/http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1007029391647&a=KArticle&aid=1106073512906> [19.08.2011].

⁷⁸¹ Speech by the Rt Hon Denis MacShane, Minister for Europe, 'Why the Constitutional Treat is good for the EU and for the UK', Central European University, Budapest, 2 March 2005, <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20050404183215/http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1007029391647&a=KArticle&aid=1109170186712> [19.08.2011].

Council that the EU had to shift its focus back to day-to-day politics. He promised that the British EU presidency would attempt to do this.⁷⁸²

6.5 Analysis No.2

In the second term of Blair's government the 'war on terror' and the Iraq war became the dominant issues and threw doubt on the government's European credentials. Blair demonstrated like so many British politicians before him that the relationship with the US was paramount for Britain. Initially, this did not affect the Labour government's relationship with Europe as the European states firmly supported the Afghanistan war as reaction to the attacks of 11 September. However, with the increasing likelihood of an invasion of Iraq divisions between the European states emerged.⁷⁸³

As a consequence of the UK's focus on the 'war on terror' and its shift towards the US, the Labour government became more reactive in European affairs. Instead of launching new initiatives, as it had done in the first term, it dealt with matters, such as the Convention, when they arose. At the Convention's working group on defence, British representatives were at best indifferent and at worst hostile towards most of the ESDP proposals. Britain's hostility was in particular aimed at the concept of structured cooperation, since it feared that under a regime of structured cooperation decisions on European military missions could be taken by a minority. British members of the Convention also argued against the insertion of a mutual defence clause into the Constitutional Treaty. Yet, Britain did not succeed in preventing the inclusion of these two proposals in the draft Constitutional Treaty.

⁷⁸² Debate on the European Council, vol.432, col.1013-1014, 24 March 2005, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200405/cmhansrd/vo050324/debtext/50324-09.htm#50324-09_spmi0 [19.08.2011].

⁷⁸³ Smith, Julie (2005), 'A missed opportunity? New Labour's European Policy 1997 – 2005', *International Affairs*, vol. 81, no. 4, pp. 703-714.

In the first half of 2003 Britain's strained relationship with Germany and France led to the infamous defence summit Germany and France held without the UK. Although the Labour government had diverted its attention away from the development of ESDP and was occupied with Iraq and the 'war on terror', it reacted angrily to the summit. In the carefully crafted realm of diplomatic language Hoon's comment on the meeting can be regarded as unusually explicit.⁷⁸⁴ Britain's harsh response was partly the result of the summit's proposals and the UK's non-invitation to the meeting (see comment by Denis MacShane⁷⁸⁵).

In the second half of 2003 Britain's relationship with France and Germany gradually improved. Britain became engaged in the Intergovernmental Conference and through cooperation with France and Germany achieved compromises on structured cooperation, mutual defence agreement and an autonomous EU military headquarters. However, the British government had to make a number of humiliating concessions. In October 2003 Straw had still promised his fellow MPs that Britain would not accept an EU defence commitment.⁷⁸⁶ But only a month later at the meeting with France and Germany Britain agreed on the mutual defence clause. The only concessions France and Germany had to make were that it was now called mutual assistance and an assertion that NATO would remain the foundation of collective defence for member states was added. Likewise despite fierce opposition the Labour government had to accept the creation of a small strategic planning cell with an operational dimension based at the EU Military Staff. Straw attempted to justify the reversal of Britain's position by highlighting that the cell would only have skeleton staff and be used if no other headquarters were

⁷⁸⁴ See Debate on European Reaction Force, House of Commons, vol.405, col.10, 12 May 2003 (footnote 742).

⁷⁸⁵ See Doyle, Leonard (2003), 'French call for military cooperation divides EU', *The Independent*, 28 April (footnote 743)

⁷⁸⁶ See debate on European Council, House of Commons, vo.411, col.383, 20 October 2003 (footnote 754).

available.⁷⁸⁷ However, if one considers that a few weeks before Straw had insisted that there would be 'no case for having operational planning and the running of operations in an EU headquarters separate from SHAPE or from national headquarters', it clearly was a U-turn.⁷⁸⁸

The Franco-German-British compromise also caused tension with the US. Consequently, while it is often claimed by observers that the final version of the Constitutional Treaty was a victory for the UK⁷⁸⁹, this is certainly not true for the Treaty's ESDP provisions.

In 2003 and 2004 Britain held a number of trilateral meetings with France and Germany in order to further develop ESDP. Those meetings upset the other EU member states, especially Italy and Spain, which were Britain's allies in Iraq. Blair denied that the three countries intended to dominate the EU. On the contrary, he insisted that their cooperation was a 'good thing' for every European state.⁷⁹⁰

At first glance it may seem that Blair's attitude towards ESDP had changed profoundly since his first term as Prime Minister. In his second term his focus was predominantly on the US and the 'war on terror'. On rare occasions he mentioned ESDP. Blair had had a good relationship with US President Bill Clinton not least because Clinton's government had acted as a role model for New Labour. But after the attacks of 11 September his relationship with the US and its President George W. Bush became increasingly close to the point that some observers described Blair's behaviour as 'slavish'. The more Blair engaged with the US the more he appeared to lose interest in Europe. He even admitted in a speech he gave in January 2003 in

⁷⁸⁷ See debate on International Affairs, House of Common, vol.415, col.227, 27 November 2003 (footnote 760),

⁷⁸⁸ See debate on European Council, House of Commons, vo.411, col.383, 20 October 2003 (footnote 754).

⁷⁸⁹ See, for example, Smith, Julie (2005), 'A missed opportunity? New Labour's European Policy 1997 – 2005', *International Affairs*, vol. 81, no. 4, pp. 703-714.

⁷⁹⁰ See joint press conference by the Rt Hon Tony Blair, Prime Minister, Jacques Chirac, President of the French Republic, and Gerhard Schröder, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, Berlin, 18 February 2004 (footnote 188)

London that he regarded the US as Britain's first and foremost ally and its relationship with Europe as second most important.⁷⁹¹

But Blair did not entirely abandon Europe and ESDP.⁷⁹² As he declared in a speech in November 2002, he was still ambitious for European defence.⁷⁹³ Indeed, together with his European counterparts he initiated major ESDP improvements, such as battlegroups. Moreover, against Hoon's advice Blair agreed at the Barcelona European Council to leave open the possibility of ESDP's take-over of NATO's Macedonia mission thereby expressing his faith that ESDP would be ready to lead a mission once the 'Berlin Plus' arrangement was in place.⁷⁹⁴ Blair also welcomed the European Security Strategy, which was drafted by his former foreign policy adviser Robert Cooper.

Therefore, one can conclude that Blair did not just calculate the costs and benefits of complying with ESDP norms. If he merely had engaged in strategic calculation, he would not have agreed and defended the Barcelona European Council's decision. Likewise, he would not have agreed on the compromises on structured cooperation, mutual defence agreement and an autonomous EU military headquarters. Consequently, Blair did not switch back from a logic of appropriateness to one of consequence. However, he also did not go beyond role playing to actively and reflectively internalise ESDP norms. Blair constantly stressed that Britain would never agree on the supranationalisation of European defence. Although he knew that some member states believed that he was unnecessarily difficult over European defence and its

⁷⁹¹ See speech by the Rt Hon Tony Blair, Prime Minister, 'Britain's place in the world', Foreign Office conference, London, 7 January 2003 (footnote 731)

⁷⁹² According to Denis MacShane, despite the disagreements among the EU member states in 2003, Blair wanted to push forward with ESDP. See personal interview with Denis MacShane, British Minister for Europe, 2 February 2012.

⁷⁹³ See speech by the Rt Hon Tony Blair, Prime Minister, 'A clear course for Europe', Cardiff, 28 November 2002 (footnote 723).

⁷⁹⁴ See Debate on European Council (Barcelona), House of Commons, vol.382, col.25, 18 March 2002 (footnote 711).

relation with NATO, he insisted that ESDP had to be complementary to NATO. Blair also admitted that he did not like the ambitious sounding titles 'Constitutional Treaty' and 'European foreign minister'. While he eventually promised to hold a referendum on the Constitutional Treaty, it was not because he intended to explain the benefits of the EU to the British public but rather to keep the issue off the agenda of the 2004 European parliamentary election and 2005 general election.

Hence, Blair continued 'role playing'. He behaved appropriately in ESDP through certain roles in line with ESDP norms, which enabled him to acquire the knowledge to act in accordance with expectation – irrespective of whether he liked the roles. He only complied with ESDP norms in a non-reflective manner and was therefore not socialised by the EU in the area of ESDP.

With regard to the scope conditions, under which role playing is more likely to occur, the first two conditions are false. It is very unlikely that the duration and intensity of the meetings on ESDP influenced Blair. As he internalised roles in line with ESDP norms although he had an extensive domestic policy network and was only 'parachuted' into international meetings from time to time, the fourth scope condition can also be falsified. The third condition, however, is correct since due to his first term as Prime Minister Blair indeed had experiences in international policy-making.

In his second term as Defence Secretary, Hoon grew closer to his American counterpart to the detriment of his relationships with the European defence ministers. Nevertheless, he continued to regard ESDP as beneficial for Britain as it called on the EU member states to enhance their capabilities thereby improving their contributions to NATO.⁷⁹⁵ He therefore also welcomed the battlegroup proposal with its intended enhancement of the usability of

⁷⁹⁵ See speech by the Rt Hon Geoffrey Hoon, Secretary of State for Defence, 'Intervening in the new security environment', Foreign Policy Centre, London, 12 November 2002 (footnote 719).

European forces. But in Hoon's view ESDP was still in its early stages and he did not have confidence in its strengths. He explicitly warned Blair that ESDP would not be ready to take on the NATO mission in Macedonia. Although Hoon approved of ESDP's take-over of NATO's Bosnia mission, it was only a police mission and according to Hoon, served the purpose to prove that ESDP with its focus on civilian capabilities complemented rather than competed with NATO.

For Hoon, NATO gained importance following the attacks of 11 September. It had successfully transformed to meet today's challenges. Therefore, everyone who suggested that Europe's relationship with NATO and the US had become irrelevant was clearly mistaken. NATO remained the cornerstone of Europe's collective defence. Hoon sharply condemned the Tervuren summit as he feared that meetings like this would fuel isolationist tendencies in the US.⁷⁹⁶ He also criticised the lack of recognition of the US' investment in Europe's security by some European states.

Hoon continued the transformation process of the armed forces, which had been started by Robertson with the 1998 Strategic Defence Review. As a response to the 9/11 attacks he published a New Chapter of the Strategic Defence Review aimed at ensuring that British armed forces would be able to face today's challenges and could be better used for NATO operations. Moreover, Hoon announced an increase in Britain's defence budget and pointed out that under Labour the defence budget had had the longest period of sustained growth since the 1980s.⁷⁹⁷

⁷⁹⁶ See debate on European Reaction Force, House of Commons, vol.405, col.10, 12 May 2003 (footnote 742).

⁷⁹⁷ Cornish, Paul, Andre Dorman (2009), Blair's Wars and Brown's Budgets: from Strategic Defence Review to Strategic Decay in less than a decade', *International Affairs*, vol.85, no.2, p.260.

Considering Hoon's behaviour, one can conclude that he acted according to certain roles consistent with ESDP norms. He was clearly not socialised by ESDP. His focus on NATO and the US and his rejection of proposals, which intended to separate ESDP from NATO, prove that he did not completely internalise ESDP norms. However, his behaviour went beyond mere strategic calculation. He, for example, still did not grant NATO the right of first refusal.⁷⁹⁸ Consequently, Hoon continued to play roles in line with ESDP norms because they appeared appropriate in the institution's environment. Apart from the third condition, the suggested scope conditions for role playing are false due to the same empirical evidence as given in the first analysis. In the light of Hoon's experiences in international policy-making as an MEP and Defence Secretary, the third scope condition is correct.

The new Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw, was not known for his European credentials nor did he have any substantial European experiences when he assumed office. The events of 9/11 had a significant impact on him. But besides his unconditional support for the US' reaction to the attacks and his belief that Britain needed to stand by the US,⁷⁹⁹ Straw also argued that following 9/11 the need for the EU and ESDP in particular was more acute than ever. The EU gave Britain far greater clout than it would have alone.⁸⁰⁰ Straw was, however, against the Tervuren proposals and he insisted that the remit of ESDP should be restricted. It should not include military operation against terrorists.⁸⁰¹ Straw supported a division of labour between ESDP and NATO. In his view, ESDP should foremost concentrate on civilian capabilities and civilian missions. Also, Straw maintained that there should be a hierarchy in military planning

⁷⁹⁸ See debate on Defence Policy, House of Commons, vol.412, col.46, 27 October 2003 (footnote 756).

⁷⁹⁹ Naples, Sophie (2003), 'EU military force won't harm NATO, says Straw', *The Observer*, 30 November.

⁸⁰⁰ See speech by the Rt Hon Jack Straw, Secretary of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs, 'What is changing in the new European Union?', Conference of Ambassadors to Czech Republic, Prague, 31 August 2004 (footnote 776).

⁸⁰¹ See speech by the Rt Hon Jack Straw, Secretary of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs, 'Europe after 11 September', The Royal United Services Institute, London, 11 December 2001 (footnote 708).

with NATO in first place, 'Berlin-plus' arrangements in second and in third autonomous ESDP operations.⁸⁰² Moreover, ESDP should only launch a mission if NATO and 'Berlin-plus' were not possible. It is not clear whether this means that Straw agreed with the Conservative Party and the US that NATO should be given the right of first refusal.

Straw explained Britain's sceptical attitude towards the EU with its World War II experience. Memories of lonely resistance and of support from the US led to the belief that as a foundation for its security Britain needed a strong relationship with the US.⁸⁰³

Reflecting on Straw's behaviour towards ESDP, one can state that he was clearly not socialised by the EU in the area of ESDP. He did not internalise ESDP norms nor adopt the EU's interests and identity. Straw did not engage in consensus-oriented arguing when there was the disagreement about a European headquarters, structured cooperation and mutual agreement clause. Instead, he kept a hard-line position until the last minute. Consequently, he only complied with ESDP norms because of strategic calculation. Faced with the incentives that the European states had more clout when working together as well as the importance of Europe's civilian capabilities for worldwide operations, he saw the necessity to adapt his behaviour to ESDP norms. There is no evidence that routinisation or rationalisation occurred. Therefore, Straw did not switch from following a logic of consequent to a logic of appropriateness.

With regard to the two proposed scope conditions for when strategic calculation is more likely to arise the first one - the expected reward is greater than the costs of compliance - is correct here. The rewards of more clout and renowned civilian capabilities were greater than the cost of complying with ESDP norms.

⁸⁰² See debate on European Council, House of Commons, vol.411, col.383, 20 October 2003 (footnote 754).

⁸⁰³ See speech by the Rt Hon Jack Straw, Secretary of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs, 'Franco-British relations 100 years after the entente cordiale', Paris, 12 January 2004 (footnote 764).

Overall, since the three policy-makers were not socialised by the EU in the area of ESDP, the hypothesis is disproved for the period of Labour's second government.

6.6 ESDP and Tony Blair's third term as Prime Minister (5 May 2005 – 27 June 2007)

Despite widespread opposition of the British public to the Iraq war and the steep decline of Blair's popularity the Labour Party under Blair succeeded in winning its third consecutive victory in the general election of 2005 although with a reduced majority. The Conservative Party claimed that their increased number of seats showed disenchantment with the Labour government and its policies.

6.6.1 Britain's EU presidency (2005)

From the point of view of the British government, the British public showed at the recent election

their endorsement for parties who favour a strong engagement with Europe, including Europe's foreign and security policy; and their rejection of those who want to take us out of the European Union.⁸⁰⁴

Therefore, the new Europe Minister Douglas Alexander insisted, Britain would continue to maintain its pro-European and pro-common foreign, security and defence policy attitudes.

Ahead of the French and Dutch referendums on the Constitutional Treaty Alexander appealed again to the voters:

we need to ensure that the EU is equipped to continue to deliver security [...] to its citizens, and to meet the challenges of a globalising world. That is what the new constitutional treaty sets out to do.⁸⁰⁵

⁸⁰⁴ Speech by the Rt Hon Douglas Alexander, Minister for Europe, Douglas Alexander, House of Commons, 18 May 2005, <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20050720202931/http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1007029391647&a=KArticle&aid=1115139751545> [19.08.2011].

After the French voters had rejected the Constitutional Treaty in their referendum, Blair called for a time for reflection but he refused to rule out that the British public might still vote on the Treaty. The upcoming European Council should decide on the further course of action.⁸⁰⁶ Straw agreed with Blair in a House of Commons' debate: 'it is not for the UK alone to decide the future of the Treaty'.⁸⁰⁷ However, he notified the House that the government decided for the time being not to proceed with the second reading of the bill, which provided for the UK's ratification of the Treaty by referendum.

Following a disastrous European Council meeting, where the member states could not agree on how to proceed after the failed referenda in France and the Netherlands and also were unable to reach agreement on the EU's financial perspective, an angry Blair demanded that the ratifications of the Treaty should not be carried on.⁸⁰⁸ Instead, the EU should seize this 'opportunity' and fundamentally reform its policies to reconnect with people in Europe. He continued,

I passionately believe both in the European Union, in Britain's place in Europe and Britain's place at the centre of Europe. But we have today a situation [...] where people in Europe are not satisfied with the direction of Europe.⁸⁰⁹

⁸⁰⁵ Debate on the European Union, House of Commons, vol.434, col.844, 25 May 2005, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmhansrd/vo050525/debtext/50525-42.htm#50525-42_spmi0 [19.08.2011].

⁸⁰⁶ Interview of the Rt Hon Tony Blair, Prime Minister, on the EU Constitution, 1 June 2005, <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20070701080624/http://www.pm.gov.uk/output/Page6825.asp> [19.08.2011].

⁸⁰⁷ Debate on the EU Constitutional Treaty, House of Commons, vol.434, col.991, 6 June 2005, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmhansrd/vo050606/debtext/50606-05.htm#50606-05_spmi2 [19.08.2011].

⁸⁰⁸ Debate on the European Council, House of Commons, vol.435, col.523, 20 June 2005, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmhansrd/vo050620/debtext/50620-06.htm#50620-06_spmi1 [19.08.2011].

⁸⁰⁹ Press conference by the Rt Hon Tony Blair, Prime Minister, EU summit, Brussels, 18 June 2005, <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20070701080624/http://www.pm.gov.uk/output/Page7686.asp> [19.08.2011].

In his speech to the European Parliament, which marked the beginning of Britain's EU presidency, Blair proposed a different policy agenda for Europe in order to tackle the current crisis. Part of this agenda should be to implement practical measures to enhance European defence capability, be prepared to take on more missions of peacekeeping and peace enforcement and develop the capability to be able to intervene quickly and effectively in support of conflict resolution. According to Blair, the numbers of European armies and their expenditure did not correspond with the strategic needs of today.⁸¹⁰

At a press conference on the EU presidency Blair announced that in the coming six months Britain would 'try and get the right capabilities in Europe to take European defence forward'.⁸¹¹ The new Defence Secretary John Reid also confirmed that the build-up of European military capabilities would continue irrespective of the future of the Constitutional Treaty.⁸¹² Straw outlined the EU achievements in security and defence in his speech to the European Parliament. The EU's missions in Bosnia, Macedonia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo as well as the training of Iraqi police and judiciary proved that ESDP was not just a 'piece of paper' but made a 'real difference to thousands of lives'.⁸¹³ The UK presidency would build on

⁸¹⁰ Speech by the Rt Hon Tony Blair, Prime Minister, to the EU Parliament, Brussels, 23 June 2005, <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20070701080624/http://www.pm.gov.uk/output/Page7714.asp> [19.08.2011].

⁸¹¹ Press conference by the Rt Hon Tony Blair, Prime Minister, and José Barroso, President of the European Commission, London, 1 July 2005, <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20070701080624/http://www.pm.gov.uk/output/Page7782.asp> [19.08.2011].

⁸¹² Debate on EU Military Capability, House of Commons, vol.434, col.990, 6 June 2005, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmhansrd/vo050606/debtext/50606-05.htm#50606-05_spm1 [19.08.2011].

⁸¹³ Speech by the Rt Hon Jack Straw, Secretary of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs, 'Strengthening the EU as a force for good in Africa and the wider world', European Parliament, Strasbourg, 6 July 2005, <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20051226193422/http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1007029391647&a=KArticle&aid=1119517952531%20&year=2005&month=2005-07-01&date=2005-07-06> [19.08.2011].

those accomplishments and further strengthen the EU's influence as a force for good in the world.

On the day of the London bombings Reid attended a House of Commons' debate on defence in the world. In his view

the current strategic environment, the complex nature of the necessary security response [...] to many of the problems that we face nowadays, and the obligation to accompany defence with political initiatives and financial, diplomatic and humanitarian assistance, plays into the character of the European Union.⁸¹⁴

Nevertheless, Reid stated that there were still shortcomings in ESDP's cohesion, activity and capability. In order to ensure cohesion, Britain would argue for an improvement of the interplay of political, diplomatic, financial, humanitarian and military instruments. Given the continuing lack of usable European capabilities, Reid urged member states to put more effort into increasing their flexible, deployable, expeditionary forces. During its presidency Britain would therefore seek to further develop the Battlegroup initiative as well as would work on the finalisation of the requirements catalogue, which would identify the military capabilities and force requirement needed to fulfil the Headline Goal 2010. Furthermore together with the two succeeding EU presidencies Britain set out an approach by which civil-military coordination would be taken forward during their presidencies.⁸¹⁵

Four months into the UK's EU presidency Blair reported back to the European Parliament. Regarding defence, Blair pointed out that at the beginning of ESDP people were very sceptical. But '[t]oday we have nine different European missions round the world, undertaken by

⁸¹⁴ Debate on Defence in the World, House of Commons, vol.436, col.482, 7 July 2005, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmhansrd/vo050707/debtext/50707-16.htm#50707-16_spnew5 [19.08.2011].

⁸¹⁵ Idem.

European forces, and that shows that European defence can indeed work'.⁸¹⁶ He promised that he would continue to drive forward European defence policy. In his statement on the EU's informal meeting at Hampton Court in October, Blair announced that the member states would attempt to improve capabilities by increasing the level of research spending, exploiting opportunities for research collaboration and collaborating on training.⁸¹⁷

Summing up the UK's presidency, Alexander stressed that it was the right decision to concentrate on areas, which matter to the European people, instead of embarking on a further debate about the EU's institutional architecture. Over the course of its presidency Britain had provided tangible evidence of the EU's achievements. For example, there was a rapid increase in ESDP missions in 2005. According to Alexander, 'through our European Security and Defence Policy missions we are making a real difference to people around the world whose lives have been shattered by conflict'.⁸¹⁸

At the final European Council meeting under the UK's EU presidency Straw praised the presidency's achievements in the area of ESDP. The requirements catalogue was finalised, a second battlegroup coordination conference was held, the first year of existence of the

⁸¹⁶ Speech by the Rt Hon Tony Blair, Prime Minister, to the EU Parliament, Strasbourg, 26 October 2005, <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20070701080624/http://www.pm.gov.uk/output/Page8384.asp> [19.08.2011].

⁸¹⁷ Statement by the Rt Hon Tony Blair, Prime Minister, on the Informal European meeting, Hampton Court, 31 October 2005, <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20070701080624/http://www.pm.gov.uk/output/Page8475.asp> [19.08.2011].

⁸¹⁸ Speech by the Rt Hon Douglas Alexander, Minister for Europe, 'Leading the debate in Europe', Conference of Chairman of European Foreign Affairs Committees', London, 31 October 2005, <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20051226193422/http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1007029391647&a=KArticle&aid=1130672779912> [19.08.2011].

European Defence Agency was successfully concluded and most importantly, a number of missions were launched, such as the Aceh Monitoring Mission.⁸¹⁹

6.6.2 Blair's cabinet reshuffle and a decline in interest in ESDP (2006)

The British government published a White Paper entitled 'Prospects for the European Union 2006'. When Alexander presented the Paper to the House of Commons, he once again emphasised the success of the UK's EU presidency. 'We handed over [...] a European Union which is stronger, and more confident in the future, than the one we inherited in July.'⁸²⁰ In a speech at Oxford University, Blair expressed optimism about the EU's future. In his view, British presidency had laid the foundation 'for Europe to re-shape a different vision of its future and for Britain to feel comfortable within it'.⁸²¹ Although Blair accepted that the EU member states would eventually need to return the Constitutional Treaty, he was pleased that the EU had finally let go of its obsession with institutional integrationist vision and had moved towards short-term, practical policies, including the improvement of its defence and foreign policy. As Blair put it, 'Europe has a strong common imperative to make our presence, values and objectives felt. Let us re-invigorate it.'⁸²²

⁸¹⁹ Council of the European Union (2005), 'ESDP Presidency Report', 19 December, <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/05/st15/st15891.en05.pdf> [19.08.2011].

⁸²⁰ Debate on 'Prospects for the EU in 2006', House of Commons, vol.442, col.169, 31 January 2006, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmhansrd/vo060131/debtext/60131-06.htm#60131-06_spm1 [19.08.2011].

⁸²¹ Speech by the Rt Hon Tony Blair, Prime Minister, 'Future of Europe', University of Oxford, 2 February 2006, <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20070701080624/http://www.pm.gov.uk/output/Page9003.asp> [19.08.2011].

⁸²² *Idem.*

In his speech at the Munich Security Conference in April Reid asserted that only the cooperation between Europe and North America could tackle today's challenges and that at the core of this relationship was NATO.⁸²³

Following poor results for the Labour Party in local elections in England, Blair undertook a major reshuffle of his Cabinet. Margaret Beckett became Foreign Secretary replacing Jack Straw. John Reid was succeeded by Desmond Browne as the new Defence Secretary. Geoffrey Hoon became the new Minister for Europe.

At a joint press conference with French President Jacques Chirac in the run-up to the June European Council meeting, Blair reported that they had made progress on the plan to build a Franco-British aircraft carrier. Also, they had analysed in which areas of European defence member states could increase their cooperation.⁸²⁴ In the House of Commons the new Foreign Secretary Beckett set out the agenda for the upcoming European Council. She told MPs that the European Commission would present a paper entitled 'Europe in the World', which examined how to strengthen the EU's external action. Furthermore, she expected an extension of the period of reflection on the Constitutional Treaty.⁸²⁵ When the EU member states indeed agreed to extend the reflection period until mid-2007, it was hailed as right step by Blair.⁸²⁶

⁸²³ Speech by the Rt Hon John Reid, Secretary of State for Defence, 42nd Munich Security Conference, 2 April 2006, <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20060522090829/http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/AboutDefence/People/Speeches/SofS/42ndMunichConferenceOnSecurityPolicy.htm> [19.08.2011].

⁸²⁴ Joint press conference by the Rt Hon Tony Blair, Prime Minister, and Jacques Chirac, President of the French Republic, Paris, 9 June 2006, <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20070701080624/http://www.pm.gov.uk/output/Page9595.asp> [19.08.2011].

⁸²⁵ Debate on European Affairs, House of Commons, vol.447, col.790, 14 June 2006, <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmhansrd/vo060614/debtext/606140006.htm#06061448001065> [19.08.2011].

⁸²⁶ Debate on the European Council, House of Commons, vol.447, col.1067, 19 June 2006, <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmhansrd/vo060619/debtext/606190003.htm#0606198000142> [19.08.2011].

In a speech in Berlin the new Defence Secretary Browne highlighted the importance of member states staying committed to ESDP and contributing to its missions. In this respect, he applauded that Germany had agreed to lead the EU operation in the Congo. In his view 'support for the EU is [not] a defeat for NATO or vice versa'.⁸²⁷ As he aptly put it in his statement on the NATO summit in Riga, there was not a 'zero-sum game between the European Union and NATO'.⁸²⁸ On the contrary, he stressed that there was need for further cooperation between the two organisations.

6.6.3 The Reform Treaty and Blair's resignation as Prime Minister (2007)

In a lecture entitled 'Our nation's future – defence' Blair debated that following the events of 11 September security challenges 'qualitatively' changed but the interplay of hard and soft power was still the right means to tackle them. He described the combination of both powers as one of three defining aspects of Britain's foreign policy since 1997. The other two were its close relationship with the US and Europe as well as the importance of national interests and values as incentives for foreign policy. Hard power, Blair insisted, was often necessary to create space for the application of soft power. Hence, 'the setting aside of "hard" power leads inexorably to the weakening of "soft" power'.⁸²⁹ To some extent Europe had not internalised this lesson yet.

⁸²⁷ Speech by the Rt Hon Desmond Browne, Secretary of State for Defence, Berlin, 20 July 2006, <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20061031160419/http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/AboutDefence/People/Speeches/SofS/StauffenbergSpeechBerlin20July2006.htm> [19.08.2011].

⁸²⁸ Debate on NATO summit, House of Commons, vol.453, col.1243, 30 November 2006, <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmhansrd/cm061130/debtext/61130-0008.htm> [19.08.2011].

⁸²⁹ Speech by the Rt Hon Tony Blair, Prime Minister, 'Our Nation's future – defence', The Royal United Services Institute, HMS Albion Devonport, 12 January 2007, <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20070701080624/http://www.pm.gov.uk/output/Page10735.asp> [19.08.2011].

On the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the Treaty of Rome Europe Minister Hoon declared that in his view the EU worked best when it followed a practical agenda focussing on improving the lives of European citizens and pursued an 'outward approach of proactive engagement with the rest of the world'.⁸³⁰ ESDP was clearly a success story as it allowed the EU 'to play a leading international role in matters that concern us – global security and stability'.⁸³¹ Looking ahead to the next 50 years, Hoon stated that he expected even greater cooperation on policies, such as ESDP, and greater EU engagement with global issues. In his opinion that was the right way forward. 'We run huge risks if we decide to turn inwards, whether towards our continent or our nation'.⁸³²

According to Armed Forces Minister Adam Ingram, one area, where ESDP made a huge difference, was, Bosnia. 'There were those who argued against the EU [mission] – some within NATO [...] - because they believed that the EU could not deliver. The EU did deliver and we are where we are today because of that'.⁸³³ The EU should build on the positive experiences in Bosnia, Browne demanded in a speech entitled 'NATO and ESDP: forging new links'.

The EU has the unique potential to draw together several strands of activity [...]: diplomatic, economic, development, policing and rule of law, and now military. Its potential is enormous but it delivers less than the sum of its parts.⁸³⁴

⁸³⁰ Speech by the Rt Hon Geoffrey Hoon, Minister for Europe, 'Britain and the EU – the case for partnership', Chatham House, London, 22 March 2007, <http://collections.europarchive.org/tna/20080205132101/http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1140686158923&a=KArticle&aid=1174558296383> [19.08.2011].

⁸³¹ Idem.

⁸³² Idem.

⁸³³ Debate on Bosnia and Herzegovina, House of Commons, vol.457, col.1094, 1 March 2007, <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmhansrd/cm070301/debtext/70301-0008.htm#07030143001209> [19.08.2011].

⁸³⁴ Speech by the Rt Hon Desmond Browne, Secretary of State for Defence, 'NATO and ESDP: Forging new links', Security and Defence Agenda Conference, Brussels, 8 June 2007, <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20070705121405/http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/AboutDefence/People/Speeches/SofS/NatoAndEsdpForgingNewLinksSpeech8June2007.htm> [19.08.2011].

According to Browne, the EU needed to improve the interplay of its civil and military tools to deliver a more coherent effect. Most importantly, however, the EU had to build up its capabilities. Most European states still did not spend enough on defence. Moreover, they needed to spend smarter, for example, by specialising on capabilities, which would be needed by NATO and/or ESDP. Also, Browne made a number of suggestions as to how NATO and the EU could work better together: they should share assessments about crises and think together about possible responses; both in theatre and in Brussels they should share relevant information and plans; and they should share common standards and procedures to ensure they are complementary and interoperable on the ground. Browne ended his speech with outlining Britain's pragmatic vision of ESDP: '[w]e [...] want the EU to be able to make its unique contribution, whether alongside NATO or on its own, including with armed forces when NATO is not engaged.'⁸³⁵

As the reflection period was coming to an end and the German EU presidency was to propose how to proceed, Hoon pointed out that despite the uncertainty of the future of the Constitutional Treaty the EU had not come to a standstill in the last two years. On the contrary, much had been delivered, for example, in policy fields like ESDP. With regard to the future of the Constitutional Treaty, Hoon suggested to listen to the opinions of the member states, which had already ratified the Treaty, as well as of those, which were concerned about 'the concept of a *constitutional treaty*'.⁸³⁶ According to him, '[t]he way forward should be a return

⁸³⁵ Idem.

⁸³⁶ Speech by the Rt Hon Geoffrey Hoon, Minister for Europe, Conference 'The Future of Europe: Identity, History, Politics and Culture', Birmingham, 19 April 2007, <http://collections.europarchive.org/tna/20080205132101/http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1140686158923&a=KArticle&aid=1176967939163> [19.08.2011].

to the idea of an *amending treaty*'.⁸³⁷ Ahead of the European Council, which would decide on the future of the Constitutional Treaty, Beckett outlined Britain's position. She confirmed that Blair would lobby for abandoning the Constitutional Treaty and replacing it with a simple amending treaty, which would not require a referendum. She furthermore stressed that such a treaty would have to include Britain's red lines, including unanimous voting in foreign and defence policy.⁸³⁸ In his report on the European Council to the House of Commons, Blair announced that he was successful in the negotiations and that the mandate for the new IGC was to draft an amending treaty on the basis of the Constitutional Treaty. In foreign and defence policy unanimity voting would remain the rule. Furthermore, in order to reinforce the intergovernmental character of foreign and defence policy, a declaration emphasising that the treaty provisions would not affect in any way the foreign and defence policies of the member states would be attached to the new treaty. Blair also told MPs that he succeeded in changing the misleading title of European foreign minister. The position would now be called High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.⁸³⁹

6.7 Analysis No.3

In its third term in government, the Labour Party's attitude towards ESDP can be best summed up as one of disinterest. ESDP was rarely mentioned in speeches and interviews by British Labour politicians. This was partly because Labour had to deal with other more pressing issues, such as the worsening situation in Iraq and the 7 July London bombing. Also, Blair's third term

⁸³⁷ *Idem.*

⁸³⁸ Debate on European affairs, House of Commons, vol.461, col.1383, 20 June 2007, <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmhansrd/cm070620/debtext/70620-0004.htm#07062049000002> [19.08.2011].

⁸³⁹ Debate on European Council, House of Commons, vol.462, col.21-23, 25 June 2007, <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmhansrd/cm070625/debtext/70625-0004.htm> [19.08.2011].

as Prime Minister was marked by internal differences due to the growing frustration in the Brown camp over Blair's reluctance to commit to a resignation date. In the rare cases, where Labour politicians addressed ESDP, it was either to criticise Europe's continuing lack of hard power and of adequate defence spending or to suggest improvements for a better partnership between ESDP and NATO. NATO and the transatlantic relationship continued to be of the highest importance for the Labour government.

After the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty by French and Dutch voters, the British government was one of the first to declare the Constitutional Treaty dead and suspend the referendum on it. For Blair, the failed referenda were a wake-up call that the EU should stop focussing on its institutional structure and reach out to its citizens again. The British government therefore used its EU presidency to pursue measures, which would bring about practical improvements. For example, it further developed the Battlegroup concept and launched a number of missions.

Later, during the so-called 'period of reflection', the British government argued for a simple amending treaty as opposed to the retention of the Constitutional Treaty desired by other member states. Blair also demanded changes to the ESDP provisions of the Constitutional Treaty. At his request the June 2007 European Council decided to rename the position of European foreign minister and attach a declaration to the Reform Treaty to emphasise the intergovernmental character of the European foreign and security policy.

Blair was in a weakened political position in his third term as Prime Minister. The reduction of Labour's majority in the 2005 general election was blamed on Blair and led to some Labour MPs calling for Blair to step down soon. Blair had announced in September 2004 that he would not fight a fourth general election but he had not set a resignation date. Labour's third term in government was therefore overshadowed by constant speculation over this date paired with

increasing anger in the Brown camp. Heavy losses in the local elections in England in May 2006 dealt another blow to Blair, after which he reshuffled his cabinet. However, this did not strengthen his position. On 5 September 2006, a letter signed by 17 Labour MPs called for Blair to resign. As a result, Blair declared at the 2006 Labour Party conference that this would be his last as Labour leader.

Despite his weakened position, Blair continued role playing with regard to ESDP. He adopted certain roles in line with ESDP norms because they were appropriate in the ESDP setting. Although he did not initiate any new ESDP reform in his third term he promised that under Britain's EU presidency European defence would be taken forward.⁸⁴⁰ In the end, they only consolidated existing projects, such as battlegroups, and launched a number of EU civilian missions. Nevertheless, it shows that to some extent Blair was still committed to ESDP beyond mere strategic calculation. He also reminded his counterparts that Europe still lagged behind in defence spending and military strengths but hard as well as soft power were required for a successful foreign and security policy.⁸⁴¹

Blair's attempt to push the EU into a new direction away from its focus on the Constitutional Treaty towards better policy-making for Europe's citizens is also proof that Blair did not pursue cost/benefit calculations on the European stage. In a passionate address to the European Parliament he showed his concern about the future of the EU and urged the member states to help the EU reconnect with their citizens. He declared that he still believed in Europe as a political project and Britain's place at the centre of it.⁸⁴² While some coverage of Blair's 2006

⁸⁴⁰ See press conference by the Rt Hon Tony Blair, Prime Minister, and José Barroso, President of the European Commission, London, 1 July 2005 (footnote 811).

⁸⁴¹ See speech by the Rt Hon Tony Blair, Prime Minister, 'Our Nation's future – defence', The Royal United Services Institute, HMS Albion Devonport, 12 January 2007 (footnote 829).

⁸⁴² See speech by the Rt Hon Tony Blair, Prime Minister, to the EU Parliament, Brussels, 23 June 2005 (footnote 810).

Oxford speech depicted it as marking a conversion to Euroscepticism because of its cautious revisionism about the Constitutional Treaty the speech was rather Blair's ongoing attempt to set out a path for the EU's future.⁸⁴³

In his last term as Prime Minister, Blair still did not internalise ESDP norms completely. He devoted much political capital to ensure that a new treaty would highlight ESDP's intergovernmental character. Moreover, he argued for a simple amending treaty instead of a constitution as this would relieve him from his obligation to hold a referendum and would not carry federal connotation.

As regards the scope conditions Checkel suggests for when it is more likely that role playing occurs there were only a few meetings on ESDP in Blair's second term as Prime Minister. Compared with the numerous meetings on other topics Blair had to attend it is unlikely that the duration and intensity of those ESDP meeting had an impact on Blair. Hence, the first and second scope conditions are incorrect. Given the fact that by then Blair had had substantial experiences in international policy-making the third condition, that agents with extensive previous professional experiences in international policy-making settings are more likely to internalise supranational role conceptions, proves correct here. The fourth condition has to be falsified since despite his extensive domestic policy network and his part-time attendance of international meeting Blair internalised certain roles in line with ESDP norms.

Straw continued to comply with ESDP norms because of strategic calculation. For him – still believing in the importance of New Labour's doctrine of international community - ESDP provided the incentive of enabling its member states to be a force for good in the world. ESDP's missions in Bosnia, Macedonia and the Democratic Republic of Congo made a real

⁸⁴³ See speech by the Rt Hon Tony Blair, Prime Minister, 'Future of Europe', University of Oxford, 2 February 2006 (footnote 821).

difference to thousands of lives and through its contributions to these operations so did Britain.⁸⁴⁴ In the light of this reward, he was prepared to continue to adapt his behaviour to ESDP norms.

The new Defence Secretary John Reid who was known as Blair's Rottweiler also engaged in cost/benefit calculations regarding ESDP norms. He complied with them because he considered the build-up of European military capabilities a high priority and believed ESDP would help the member states achieve this objective. In his view European states were still not spending enough on defence and had yet to transform their militaries into forces that could be deployed quickly. The Headline Goal 2010 and the Battlegroup concept were steps in the right direction and he therefore further pursued them during Britain's EU presidency.⁸⁴⁵ In his opinion, ESDP's predominant focus on civil missions did not rule out that the EU could eventually develop capabilities for heavy combat scenarios.⁸⁴⁶ However it was imperative that such capabilities were complementary to NATO. This again highlighted that Reid did not internalise ESDP norms, i.e. to establish ESDP as a supranational, fully-fledged security and defence organisation, but ESDP was merely a means for him to force the European states to develop their military capabilities.

The new Foreign Secretary Margaret Beckett and Defence Secretary Desmond Browne continued Straw's and Reid's cost/benefit calculation. Both regarded ESDP as a means to help EU states build up their capabilities. In addition, according to Browne, NATO and the EU

⁸⁴⁴ See speech by the Rt Hon Jack Straw, Secretary of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs, 'Strengthening the EU as a force for good in Africa and the wider world', European Parliament, Strasbourg, 6 July 2005 (footnote 813).

⁸⁴⁵ See debate on Defence in the World, House of Commons, vol.436, col.482, 7 July 2005 (footnote 814).

⁸⁴⁶ *Idem*.

needed to work better together and when NATO was not engaged ESDP should be able to make its unique contribution to crises.⁸⁴⁷

In either cases there is no evidence that routinisation or rationalisation occurred and so Straw, Reid, Beckett and Browne did not switch from following a logic of consequences to a logic of appropriateness.

Considering the behaviours of Straw, Reid, Beckett and Browne, the first of the two scope conditions for strategic calculations - the expected reward is greater than the costs of compliance – proves correct. The reward of complying with ESDP norms, i.e. the build up of the member states' capabilities, was greater than its costs.

Following this analysis on Labour's last term in government, the hypothesis again proves false since the examined policy-makers were not socialised by the EU in the area of ESDP.

6.8 Conclusion

In this chapter Jeffrey T. Checkel's approach on socialisation was applied to British prime ministers, foreign secretaries and defence secretaries who engaged with ESDP during the period from the informal European summit in Pörtschach to Tony Blair's resignation as Prime Minister. Reflecting on the speeches, statements and interviews given by these policy-makers it can be concluded that in the nine years in government the Labour Party pursued a Janus-like policy towards ESDP. It was eager to reject the fierce Euroscepticism of the Conservative Party but, according to the interview with the civil servant, it equally took care to present domestically its ESDP policy in measured, pragmatic terms.⁸⁴⁸ Hence, while the Labour government managed – at least at the beginning – to convince its European partners about

⁸⁴⁷ See speech by Rt Hon Desmond Browne, Secretary of State for Defence, 'NATO and ESDP: Forging new links', Security and Defence Agenda Conference, Brussels, 8 June 2007 (footnote 834).

⁸⁴⁸ Personal interview with a British civil servant, London, 30 September 2011.

Labour's commitment to ESDP, it did little to make a positive case for ESDP among the British public.⁸⁴⁹ The fact that Blair and his cabinet colleagues did not uphold ESDP vis-à-vis different audiences and in different circumstances is a strong sign that they were not socialised by the EU in the area of ESDP. And indeed even before the attacks of 11 September, as the application of Checkel's socialisation approach to the interviews, speeches and statements given by Blair, Cook/Straw and Robertson/Hoon in their first term in government showed, these policy-makers did not completely internalise ESDP norms. Role playing and strategic calculation were the apt mechanisms to explain why they internalised or rather complied with ESDP norms. Following 9/11 the British government's enthusiasm for ESDP noticeably cooled down. Other issues like the 'war on terror' became more important. According to the analysis, whereas Straw carried on with a cost/benefit calculation regarding ESDP norms, Blair and Hoon continued their role playing in ESDP. Again none of the three policy-makers were socialised nor did they change their interests and identities. Labour's last term in government was marked by an (almost) complete loss of interests in ESDP. No new ESDP reforms were initiated and Labour politicians only rarely addressed ESDP. The new defence secretaries – Reid and later Browne – and Straw and his successor Beckett complied with ESDP norms because it suited their interests. Blair continued to adopt roles consistent with ESDP norms but still did not reflectively and actively internalise ESDP norms.

Consequently, the thesis' hypothesis that following the creation of the European Security and Defence Policy British policy-makers became socialised in ESDP, is wrong. The EU as socialiser did not convince the British policy-makers in a social process of communication to completely internalise ESDP norms. Their interests and identities were also not affected. Instead,

⁸⁴⁹ Smith, Julie (2005), 'A missed opportunity? New Labour's European Policy 1997 – 2005', *International Affairs*, vol. 81, no. 4, pp. 704.

according to Checkel's approach, role playing and strategic calculation account for the policy-makers' behaviour towards ESDP during their time in government. In the former case, ESDP provided a social environment, whose mere membership evoked the role playing, and in the latter ESDP offered rewards that led to pro-ESDP norms compliance.

Most of Checkel's proposed scope conditions triggering strategic calculation or role playing proved incorrect. Apart from previous experiences in international policy-making, the other three scope conditions for role playing, i.e. duration and intensity of contact and extensive domestic networks with only brief stays on the international stage, did not stand the test of reality. The first scope condition for strategic calculation, which suggests that this mechanism is more likely to occur if the expected reward is greater than the costs of compliance, was supported by evidence in the analyses of the interviews, speeches and statements given by Straw, Reid, Beckett and Browne. The second condition was false.

In chapter five, on the basis of the research, three new scope conditions triggering role playing were suggested. The condition, that newcomers tend to adopt cognitive templates in line with ESDP norms in order to operate in the unfamiliar environment, would only explain Blair' and Hoon's role playing in Labour's first term in government. One can however not conclusively prove this scope conditions since such a procedure usually happens subconsciously and also neither Blair nor Hoon were willing to be interviewed. The second scope condition, which suggests that policy-makers with previous experiences of federal systems are favourably disposed to supranationalism and multilevel governance, could not have induced the British policy-makers' role playing since they did not have any federal experiences. According to the third condition, policy-makers always come with distinctive cultural baggage to the

international scene. They do not approach international policy-making with a 'blank slate'.⁸⁵⁰

The domestic socialisation of policy-makers can either enable or restrict international socialisation depending on whether both socialisations can be reconciled. Hence, policy-makers with a domestic socialisation that is not opposed to the socialising message are more inclined to adopt role playing. Blair often cited his experience as a student in France as the reason for being pro-European. So, this could indicate that his pro-EU domestic socialisation may have induced his role-playing. Likewise, Hoon had been an MEP for ten years. This experience surely affected his domestic socialisation, which may then have benefited the adoption of role playing. Accordingly, the scope condition of primary domestic socialisation could have triggered the role playing of Hoon and Blair.

The next chapter – the conclusion - will attempt to analyse why the hypothesis had to be disproved in the German and the British case studies. The value of Checkel's socialisation approach following its application to the two case studies will also be examined.

⁸⁵⁰ Weldes, Jutta (1996), 'Constructing National Interests', *European Journal of International Relations*, vol.2, no.3, p.280.

7. Conclusion: Jeffrey T. Checkel's socialisation approach evaluated

The application of Jeffrey T. Checkel's socialisation approach to German and British policy-makers, who shaped ESDP from the Saint Malo meeting (3 and 4 December 1998) to the Lisbon European Council summit (18-19 October 2007), has shown that except for former German Federal Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, none of these policy-makers actively and reflectively internalised ESDP norms and became socialised by the EU within ESDP.

Only in Schröder's second term as Chancellor was the mechanism 'normative persuasion' detected, which indicates so called Type 2 internalisation and socialisation. It was established that in a social process of communication Schröder was persuaded by the EU to completely internalise ESDP norms and during this process adopted the interests and the identity of the persuader. According to Alastair Johnston's breakdown of identity into four dimensions⁸⁵¹, Schröder's change in identity included changes in his constitutive norms and in his cognitive worldviews. His new identity also led to shifts in Germany's security and defence policy, which, for example, were expressed in Germany's participation in the infamous Tervuren summit. It is difficult to conclusively determine how permanent these changes in Germany's security and defence policy were. Although with the beginning of the Grand Coalition in November 2005 the government shifted its focus back to NATO and the US, it still spoke out in favour of ambitious security and defence projects, such as a European army, and of an equal partnership between ESDP and NATO. Hence, to some extent the changes in Germany's security and defence policy, which had begun under Schröder, continued under the Grand Coalition. Whether this proves that Germany's nation state identity also became subject to change cannot be conclusively answered. It would

⁸⁵¹ See chapter three.

require more research. However, in general, nation state identity tends to be a relatively stable social construction, which rarely changes.⁸⁵²

The other policy-makers either adopted role playing, i.e. merely took on certain roles in line with ESDP norms because they appeared appropriate in the ESDP's environment suggesting a non-reflective internalisation of ESDP norms, or in the case of a number of British policy-makers complied with ESDP norms because of strategic calculation, which means no internationalisation of ESDP norms at all.

Hence, the fundamental conclusion of this dissertation is clear. The hypothesis that following their participation in ESDP German and British policy-makers would become socialised by the EU and as a result, would completely internalise ESDP norms as well as EU's interests and identities has been disproved with the exception of Schröder's second term as Chancellor.⁸⁵³

This thesis also tested the scope conditions Checkel proposes for when the three mechanisms – normative persuasion, role playing and strategic calculation - are more likely to occur. According to the research, three out of the five suggested scope conditions for normative persuasion seem to have triggered the persuasion of Schröder. These were first, the agent has few prior, ingrained beliefs that are inconsistent with the socialising agency's message; second, the socialising agency does not lecture or demand but acts out principles of serious deliberative argument; and third, the interaction occurs in less politicised and more insulated, in-camera settings. In addition, the scope condition proposed by Jan Beyer, a contributor to Checkel's 2007 volume *International Institution and Socialization in Europe*, namely the longer one's involvement in an organisation the more one's belief can be expected to approximate that organisation's norms, also appears to have brought about Schröder's socialisation.

⁸⁵² Marcussen, Martin, Thomas Risse, Daniela Engelmann-Martin, Hans Joachim Knopf, Klaus Roscher (1999), 'Constructing Europe? The evolution of French, British and German nation state identities', *Journal of European Public Policy*, vol.6, no.4, p.620.

⁸⁵³ See chapter three.

The strategic calculation that British politicians pursued was very likely to be activated by the condition that they expected the promised rewards, i.e. the enhancement of the EU member states' capabilities, to be greater than the costs of compliance with the ESDP norms. However, Checkel's second scope condition for strategic calculation, that is, agents expect the costs of external punishment to be higher than the costs of adaptation, could not be supported by evidence.

In both the German and the British case studies, only the condition, that agents with previous experiences in international policy-making are more likely to adopt role playing, seem to have triggered the role playing of the examined politicians. The other three suggested scope conditions for role playing proved false. Since Checkel's scope conditions insufficiently detected the occurrence of role playing, this thesis suggested three conditions - federalism, newcomer and domestic socialisation - instead, which probably led to the German and the British policy-makers' role playing. These proposed scope conditions are to some extent confirmed by a number of empirical approaches to the EU and ESDP.

For example, in an empirical study of the different political systems of Germany and the UK, Professor Vivien Schmidt convincingly shows that the UK's unitary political system is more difficult to reconcile with the EU's division of governing activity as Germany's federal structure. Therefore it is harder for the UK to adapt to the EU.⁸⁵⁴ This study therefore supports the finding of the thesis that most of the German policy-makers being used to a division of sovereignty internalised ESDP norms – albeit non-reflectively – whereas most of the British policy-makers merely complied with ESDP norms because of strategic calculation.

The suggested scope condition 'domestic socialisation' alludes to the often-mentioned lack of a common strategic culture shared by the EU member states. The term 'strategic culture' was coined in the 1970s by Jack Snyder who described it as 'the body of attitudes and

⁸⁵⁴ Schmidt, Vivien A (2006), 'Adapting to Europe: Is it harder for Britain?', *The British Journal of Politics & International Relations*, vol.8, no.1, pp.19-29.

beliefs that guides and circumscribes thought on strategic questions, influences the way strategic issues are formulated, and sets the vocabulary and perceptual parameters of strategic debate'.⁸⁵⁵ Although there have been disagreements about this definition most scholars accept that strategic culture comprises a 'behavioural factor and a more elusive factor that includes common and stated expressions of ideas, expectations, values and attitudes'.⁸⁵⁶ Without a strategic culture there can be no common understanding about the purpose and utility of force and hence no link between the EU's military capabilities and political objectives.⁸⁵⁷ Related to this, the member states also cannot agree on a long-term vision for ESDP.⁸⁵⁸

The strategic cultures of the EU member states were formed during World War II and the early years of the Cold War.⁸⁵⁹ In contrast to Germany, World War II led Britain to have a positive view of their armed forces and to regard military power as a useful tool. Its strategic culture reflects this experience.⁸⁶⁰ The differences between the strategic cultures of Germany and the UK reverberate in many vital areas of security and defence policy, such as conscription, which unlike the UK successive German governments upheld until recently. Although most scholars agree that strategic cultures tend to be persistent and difficult to change, some find signs of a common strategic culture emerging in ESDP advanced by ESDP's new institutions since the Helsinki summit.⁸⁶¹ They compare ESDP to other EU policy

⁸⁵⁵ Snyder, Jack quoted in Longhurst, Kerry, Marcin Zaborowski (2004), 'The future of European Security', *European Security*, vol.13, no.4, pp.382-383.

⁸⁵⁶ Norheim-Martinsen, Per Martin (2004), 'Forging a Strategic Culture – Putting Policy into the ESDP', *Oxford Journal on Good Governance*, vol.1, no.1, p.63.

⁸⁵⁷ Rynning, Sten (2003), 'The European Union: Towards a Strategic Culture?', *Security Dialogue*, vol.34, no.4, p.479.

⁸⁵⁸ Toje, Asle (2003), 'The first casualty in the war against terror: the fall of NATO and Europe's reluctant coming of age', *European Security*, vol.12, no.2, p.66.

⁸⁵⁹ Hyde-Price, Adrian (2004), 'European Security, Strategic Culture and the Use of Force', *European Security*, vol.13, no.4, pp.325-327.

⁸⁶⁰ *Ibid*, pp.324-325.

⁸⁶¹ Cornish, Paul, Geoffrey Edwards (2001), 'Beyond the EU/NATO dichotomy: the beginnings of a European strategic culture', *International Affairs*, vol.77, no.3, pp.587-588.

fields, which were subject to transforming supranational processes, and argue that this development has been happening in ESDP too.⁸⁶²

A number of scholars, however, point out that except for the 2003 European Security Strategy the EU member states have only insufficiently engaged in discussions on strategy and long-term and short-term objectives of ESDP. Moreover, given ESDP's predominant focus on internal matters like institution building, headline goals, etc. rather than on external defence it is unlikely that a common policy and culture will ever develop.⁸⁶³ As former diplomat Alyson Bailes aptly put it, neither a sense of common fate nor loyalty can emerge in ESDP by sitting on committees.⁸⁶⁴

Notwithstanding the discussion on whether a joint strategic culture is slowly emerging in ESDP, the fact that each member state still has its own distinctive strategic culture contributes to the different domestic socialisation of national policy-makers. Therefore, the lack of a common strategic culture shared by the EU member states touches on the finding of this thesis that domestic socialisation can be a serious and persistent impediment to the socialisation of policy-makers by the EU. On the other hand, if there is no discrepancy between domestic socialisation and the socialising message of the EU, domestic socialisation can actually induce the mechanism 'role playing' as identified in the case study on Germany.

Although many of Checkel's proposed scope conditions were disproved in this thesis, they were only examined in the framework of the two case studies. Their value therefore cannot conclusively be determined. It is possible that when Checkel's approach is applied to a different case study, the scope conditions correctly predict the occurrence of one of the mechanisms. What, however, can be stated about the scope conditions, according to

⁸⁶² Ojanen, Hanna (2006), 'The EU and NATO: Two competing models for a common defence policy', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol.44, no.1, p.64.

⁸⁶³ Lindley-French, Julian (2002), 'In the shade of Locarno? Why European defence is failing', *International Affairs*, vol.78, no.4, p.809.

⁸⁶⁴ Bailes, Alyson J. K. (2003), 'The institutional reform of ESDP and post-Prague NATO', *The International Spectator*, vol.38, no.3, p.38.

academics like Andrew Moravcsik, is their lack of distinctiveness. Moravcsik criticises that they 'are not distinctive to constructivism but can also be derived from rationalist theories'.⁸⁶⁵ While Checkel admits that the conditions to some extent overlap with those suggested by rationalist theories, this is, in his opinion, not a detriment but an advantage. Not only do the scope conditions advocated by soft constructivists as well as soft rationalists capture the empirical reality better than other approaches but they also embody Checkel's aim of bridge building.⁸⁶⁶ Therefore, he has also chosen the mechanism of strategic calculation. Moreover, Checkel emphasises that he does not engage in the IR tradition of competitive theory testing where a theoretical approach is tested against a competing perspective and during this process only one approach 'survives'. This would be contrary to bridge building and also inappropriate given the complexity of the EU, for which Checkel's approach was originally designed.⁸⁶⁷

Moravcsik as well as other non-rationalist theorists, however, assert that the overlap between Checkel's constructivist-based approach and rationalist theories shows that his approach lacks a sufficiently strong constructivist theory as its foundation.⁸⁶⁸ His attempt to bring constructivism from the meta-theoretical sphere to develop it into an empirically orientated, problem-driven approach and his aim to build a bridge to rationalist approaches led him to lose 'part of the constructivist train'.⁸⁶⁹ Reflective theorists in particular criticise Checkel's approach for its positivist epistemology, loosely defined post-positivist ontology,

⁸⁶⁵ Moravcsik, Andrew (2001), 'Bringing Constructivist Integration Theory Out of the Clouds: Has it Landed Yet?', *European Union Politics*, vol.2, no.2, p.228.

⁸⁶⁶ Checkel, Jeffrey T. (2001), 'Constructivism and Integration Theory: Crash Landing or Safe Arrival?', *European Union Politics*, vol.2, no.2, p.241.

⁸⁶⁷ *Ibid*, p.243.

⁸⁶⁸ Moravcsik, Andrew (2001), 'Bringing Constructivist Integration Theory Out of the Clouds: Has it Landed Yet?', *European Union Politics*, vol.2, no.2, p.234.

⁸⁶⁹ Checkel, Jeffrey T. (2001), 'From Meta- to Substantive Theory? Social Constructivism and the Study of Europe', *European Union Politics*, vol.2, no.2, p.225.

and strong focus on agency. Also, he seeks the middle-ground exclusively with rationalist approaches. There is no bridge building to reflective theories.⁸⁷⁰

Checkel's approach examines the socialisation of the agent, the socialisee, whose properties change during this process, by the structure, the socialiser, whose properties are temporarily fixed. It is not examined how in return the agent affects the structure. Hence, Checkel's approach is unable to capture the mutual constitution of structure and agency - one of the fundamental insights of constructivism. This is because of Checkel's positivist epistemological stance, which forces him to start with either structure or agency. As academic Kenneth Glarbo pointed out, the mutual constitutiveness of agency and structure has 'proved to be a severe stumbling block for constructivist empirical analyses'.⁸⁷¹ Checkel tries to make up for the non-mutual constitution of structure and agency in his approach by 'better modelling processes of social interaction'.⁸⁷² Also, he is careful not to overemphasise the role of social structures. Nevertheless, in the further development of the approach it would be important to trace the impact of the changes in the agents' properties back to the EU institutions.

Checkel's emphasis on the micro-level of socialisation clearly benefits the understanding of socialisation processes especially since other constructivist approaches tend to only analyse socialisation from a macro-level perspective or in the framework of persuasion. Neglecting the micro-level these macro-level constructivist approaches overpredict international normative influence and cannot explain why the same systemic norm has a constitutive

⁸⁷⁰ Checkel, Jeffrey T. (2003), 'Social Constructivism in Global and European Politics (A Review Essay)', *Arena Working Paper Series*, no.15, p.15, http://www.sv.uio.no/arena/english/research/publications/arenapublications/workingpapers/working-papers2003/wp03_15.pdf [20.08.2012].

⁸⁷¹ Glarbo, Kenneth (1999), 'Wide-awake diplomacy: reconstructing the common foreign and security policy of the EU', *Journal of European Public Policy*, vol.6, no.4, p.638.

⁸⁷² Checkel, Jeffrey T. (2001), 'Why comply? Social learning and European Identity Change', *International Organization*, vol.55, no.3, p.597.

impact in one state but fails to do so in others.⁸⁷³ With his focus on mechanisms and middle-range scope conditions Checkel intends to 'shrink the black box' around socialisation processes and develop fine-grained' explanations about when and how socialisation occurs.⁸⁷⁴ However, his approach comes at the expense of the macro-level. Checkel acknowledges that particularly 'social and material power in the broader environment' are not sufficiently addressed by his approach and it can therefore not be analysed if 'persuasive outcomes [...] coincide with the interests of materially powerful states in the EU'.⁸⁷⁵ Furthermore, Checkel's approach does not pay attention to whether - and if so how - the newly socialised policy-makers affect the policies of the nation state and even its identity. As it was identified in the analysis of Schröder, there is causality between a policy-maker's changed identity and shifts in the nation state's policies that are consistent with him/her new identity. However, the process of how those shifts occur and the link between the policy-maker's new identity and a possible change in the nation state's identity are not examined by Checkel's approach.

Another weakness of Checkel's approach is the neglect of domestic variables. Checkel adds a few domestic factors, such as the scope condition for role playing that agents with extensive domestic policy networks who are briefly parachuted into international setting are less likely to internalise new role conceptions. However, he does that in an ad-hoc way without making the domestic arena part of his theoretical argument. Yet, one should not underestimate the importance of national context. European signals are likely to be interpreted and modified through domestic traditions, institutions, identities and resources

⁸⁷³ Checkel, Jeffrey T. (1999), 'Norms, Institutions and National Identity in Contemporary Europe', *International Studies Quarterly*, vol.43, no.1, p.85.

⁸⁷⁴ Checkel, Jeffrey T. (2002), 'Persuasion in International Institutions', *Arena Working Paper Series*, no.14, p.10, http://www.sv.uio.no/arena/english/research/publications/arena-publications/workingpapers/working-papers2002/wp02_14.htm [20.08.2012].

⁸⁷⁵ Ibid, pp.12-23.

in ways that can limit their impact.⁸⁷⁶ In her research on the socialisation of European Commission officials, Liesbet Hooghe identified that most of them sustained Commission norms but this was because national experiences motivated them to do so and not because they internalised the norms.⁸⁷⁷ Hence, failing to control for domestic variables may distort the result of an analysis. The importance of domestic variables should not be understood in the narrow sense of rationalist approaches, such as Moravcsik's liberal intergovernmentalism. Checkel stresses that it would be important to dynamically go back and forth across levels and address the simultaneity of international and domestic developments.⁸⁷⁸ However, it is once again difficult to combine positivist epistemology, which requires that something is held constant, with such a dynamic approach.

Checkel's preferred method of process tracing has also been criticised by reflectivists as well as rationalists. Reflective theorists employ an 'interpretive methodology' and do not approve of conventional methods, such as process-tracing. Rationalists, on the other hand, warn that distinguishing behavioural change driven by persuasion and socialisation from agents' tactical and strategic adjustment is a difficult and complex task, which cannot be easily ascertained through interviews.⁸⁷⁹ Checkel agrees that it is difficult to distinguish changes in an agent's interests and identity from strategic adaptation. But in his view rationalists do not understand process-tracing correctly. He supplements interviews with other primary and secondary documents. This use of different, process-oriented data streams allows for a reconstruction of agents' motivation. In addition, by interviewing the

⁸⁷⁶ Olsen, Johan P. (2003), 'The Many Faces of Europeanization', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol.40, no.5, p.936.

⁸⁷⁷ Hooghe, Liesbet (2007), 'Several Roads Lead to International Norms, but Few Via International Socialization: A Case Study of the European Commission', in, Checkel, Jeffrey T. (ed), *International Institutions and Socialization in Europe*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp.63-98.

⁸⁷⁸ Checkel, Jeffrey T. (2006), 'Constructivist Approaches to European Integration', *Arena Working Paper Series*, no.6, p.26, http://www.arena.uio.no/publications/working-papers2006/papers/wp06_06.pdf [20.08.2012].

⁸⁷⁹ Moravcsik, Andrew (2001), 'Bringing Constructivist Integration Theory Out of the Clouds: Has it Landed Yet?', *European Union Politics*, vol.2, no.2, pp.235-238.

same agents a number of times over a certain period of time a certain level of guarantee is given that the interviewees actually meant what they said. Hence, process-tracing is well-suited to uncover behavioural change driven by persuasion and to distinguish that change from role playing and strategic calculation.

This thesis adopted the process-tracing strand of detailed narrative and use of hypothesis. It consisted of an analysis of speeches, statements and interviews given by the policy-makers. In addition, specialist publications, major newspapers, minutes of summits, presidency conclusions, etc. were consulted and interviews with British and German civil servants and British and German policy-makers were conducted although it was not possible to repeat the interviews at a later time given time constraints and the fact that the policy-makers were among the highest ranking politicians in their countries. By combining these different sources, it was possible to detect which of the three mechanisms was at work and to examine the correctness of the scope conditions.

Despite the shortcomings of Checkel's approach, in contrast to reflective and many constructivist approaches, Checkel has at least moved away from the focus on meta-theoretical discussions and attempted to develop an operationalisable social science approach, which can be tested on the reality. Notwithstanding the - to some extent - weak constructivist foundation of Checkel's approach, constructivism is still most suitable for the study of socialisation.⁸⁸⁰ Rationalist approaches are unable to account for changes in identities and interests resulting from socialisation.⁸⁸¹ Furthermore, the effects of norms, which according to constructivist understanding not only constrain the behaviour of actors but also constitute them, i.e. they influence actors' identities and interests, were shown in Schröder's second term as Chancellor.

⁸⁸⁰ Tonra, Ben (2003), 'Constructing the Common Foreign and Security Policy: The Utility of Cognitive Approach', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol.41, no.4, p.739.

⁸⁸¹ Waever, Ole (1995), 'Identity, integration and security: solving the sovereignty puzzle in EU studies', *Journal of International Relations*, vol.48, no.2, p.412.

Consequently, although Checkel's approach has a number of weaknesses and in the framework of this thesis predominantly failed to account for why and when one of the three mechanisms occurred, it nevertheless shed light on the behaviour of German and British policy-makers in ESDP. Following this thesis, one can conclude that except for Schröder the EU was not able to socialise the examined German and British policy-makers. And even in Schröder's case there is the possibility that his socialisation was facilitated by an unaccounted domestic factor or a favourable macro environment.

It is, however, important to note that this thesis' finding does not disprove the proposition most constructivist theories would subscribe to, i.e. institutions can socialise.⁸⁸² This thesis' aim was only to explore with the help of Checkel's socialisation approach whether the EU has been able to socialise national policy-makers in the area of ESDP. Hence, this thesis merely disproves the socialisation ability of the EU in the area of ESDP.

⁸⁸² Checkel, Jeffrey T. (2001), 'From Meta- to Substantive Theory? Social Constructivism and the Study of Europe', *European Union Politics*, vol.2, no.2, pp.224-225.

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