Heritage Land in the United States: Continuity and Conflict

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Abstract

This thesis sets out to explain the establishment and protection of United States federal heritage land, through some 200 years of conflict and change. It uses concepts like preservation, conservation and exploitation. As the US has grown in area and population, pressures on land and natural resources have also intensified, particularly at times of external and internal strife: wars, the Depression, etc. As the exploitative pressures grew, a counterbalancing response arose from the preservationists.

Various federal agencies have a rôle in protecting heritage land, none more so than the National Park Service since its founding in 1916. Its achievements and problems, and its relations with the other agencies, are discussed in some detail.

From one point of view, heritage land is a location for recreation or contemplation. Others regard it as a potential source of exploitable wealth, specially in its timber mineral and water resources. These opposed positions may be understood in terms of a theory that the countervailing forces of land exploitation and land protection were (and are) expressed politically in the conflict and interdependence of heritage land protection.

More recently, environmental problems have arisen at a global level, suggesting that the preservation : exploitation symbiosis is of relevance there as well. It is possible that large, though comparatively local, environmental issues in the United States could be resolved through the interplay of local and global politics.

Preface

'Civilisation is tolerance, detachment and humor, or passion, anger, revenge; culture is the entrance examination, the gas chamber, the doctoral dissertation and the electric chair.'

Edward Abbey (1968) **Desert Solitaire**

In 1984 the author was awarded a Churchill Fellowship to examine the effects of the two Reagan Administrations on recreational use of the US Federal park system. In retrospect this great opportunity, during an eight-week visit, became a combination of fascination and familiarisation: getting to know something of the units within the system, and of the people who ran them - at headquarters and park levels. It was also an opportunity to meet academics, retired key park officials, people in State parks, journalists and so forth. Its avowed purpose was not achieved: the idea was to measure human use of the system and to analyse such aberrations as might surface. In fact none of the required data were available: there were crude statistics on visitor-hours, but virtually nothing on income, age, sex, occupation, distance travelled, mode of transport used, employment status ... of these visitors.

On return from the United States I registered for an MPhil transferable to a PhD at the Polytechnic of North London. My objective was to research decision-making within the US park system, on an hypothesis that it took place bottom-up rather than top-down, in many cases. The study was structured from Washington Headquarters, through their South East Regional Office, to Everglades National Park, which headed an NPS short list of those parks experiencing the most adverse external impacts on its precarious environment. The topic researched was water supply to the park, a crucial issue as it is a **biological** not geological park: its wildlife are what people come to see and the wildlife survive or decline largely in accordance with human interference with hydrological regimes - in other words if there is too much or too little water in the park at specific times of year (the breeding season is crucial) biological life will suffer. This work provided a preliminary understanding of conflict within and outside the park system, and of how it was resolved.

Conceptual Base and Methodology

The PhD has been interdisciplinary, though this thesis may be seen to be concerned mainly with environmental politics in the United States, during the period 1784 to 1990. While this is not a work of history, key time periods have illustrated the progression of heritage land protection and a conceptual approach has been developed, exploring the relation between the economic forces of land (and other resource) exploitation, and the environmental forces of land preservation. The context has been the continually enlarging interest in and concern for environmental quality - initially the province of a few thinkers in the United States and elsewhere, now an issue of world significance.

The thesis attempts to show how the apparently opposed forces have come together to form a symbiotic relationship, an interdependence. While federal government agencies have been set up to accommodate this phenomenon, they experience conflict both within themselves, and with other agencies which have land managing rôles. The protection of federal government heritage land has become a big issue, and is handled mainly - though not exclusively - by the National Park Service. While the states and private sector are also significantly involved in the protection of heritage land, they have had to be excluded from this thesis.

My objectives may therefore be stated. They are to:

* understand the origin, and development, of the concept of heritage land protection (preservational forces) in the United States
* set the above within a political (economic forces) context at specific periods in time, selected because they represented high levels of activity
* examine how the conceptual and the contextual have formed an interdependent relationship, a symbiosis
* explain how this relationship has enabled continuity of heritage land protection over 200 years.

The attempt to meet the objectives has taken place through an examination of the literature, and of people's views, through at least one hundred interviews during five related visits to the United States: these form the backbone of the research. Various agencies' headquarters in Washington were visited as were the National Park Service

regional offices in Atlanta and Denver. The Denver Service Center was visited, as was a Forest Service office in Colorado. There were detailed examinations of policy, procedure and problems in Everglades and Rocky Mountain National Parks; earlier in my research I had discussions in many western national parks, with superintendents and their staff. Outside federal government I talked to Senators, Representatives and their staffs, to two ex-Directors of the National Park Service, and to many in the voluntary sector. In Britain the US Embassy, School of Advanced Legal Studies and London School of Economics libraries have been used; in the United States, the Library of Congress, and the libraries of the Department of the Interior, and of the National Park Service were used.

Thesis Structure

The first chapter considers the concept of heritage land in the United States, while the second examines the origins of environmental protection, from about 1790 to 1900. Chapters 3-7 look at periods in time of particular relevance to protection of heritage land: the period dominated by Theodore Roosevelt, Wilson and the first world war; Franklin Roosevelt and the Depression years; the 1960s period of extraordinary environmental flowering; and the policy *volte face* from Carter to Reagan. Chapter 8 reviews the threads that run through the entire thesis and looks tentatively toward the future.

Acknowledgements

My first thanks must go to my principal tutor at the Polytechnic of North London, Noel Parry, who developed a penetrating and constructive criticism of great value to this thesis, and devoted much time to it. Other academics have been involved with this thesis from time to time, though have either had too heavy a work load, or have moved to new jobs elsewhere, thus preventing a fuller commitment. I should like to thank, in alphabetical order Fred Coalter (PNL), Professor Tim O'Riordan (University of East Anglia), Tony Veal (University of Technology, Sydney), Dr Judy White (University of Birmingham), and Dr John Whitelegg (University of Lancaster).

My work colleagues have been very tolerant of my frequent unavailability to share the workload with them. In particular, Nicholas James has

helped greatly, not least with the preparation of some of the figures. I typed the thesis myself, so am wholly responsible for errors. It would take several pages to acknowledge all those who have helped with ideas and data, but two exceptionally helpful people should be mentioned: David Browne, recently retired from the National Park Service's International Section, and Destry Jarvis, now Executive Vice President of the Student Conservation Association and, during the data-collection period of this thesis, Vice President of the National Parks & Conservation Association.

Finally, I am indebted to Professor Forbes of the University of California for his reinforcement of a concern I have had for some years - that the terms 'America' and 'American' were wrongly used if one were talking about the US or one of its settler-citizens rather than the entire north, central and south american continent. In fact Amerigo Vespucci first landed in what is now called South America. So, I shall strive not to use noun or adjective. 'US' is useful if one is talking of the country. Talking of a citizen becomes more difficult: Forbes suggested 'Usanian' or 'Usan', but I have not been so courageous. (Forbes, Jack [1987] How Europeans have Stolen America in The Guardian August 24).

Abbreviations and Units of Measurement

BLM	Bureau of Land Management	F&WS	Fish & Wildlife Service
BURec	Bureau of Reclamation	FS	US Forest Service
CoE	US Army Corps of Engineers	NP	National Park
DoI	Department of the Interior	NPS	National Park Service

The National Park Service abbreviates its units, other than National Parks, as follows (the N means National):

NB	Battlefield	NMP	Military Park
NHP	Historic Park	NPres	Preserve
NHS	Historic Site	NRA	Recreation Area
NL	Lakeshore	NS	Seashore
NM	Monument	NSR	Scenic River
NMem	Memorial		

Measurement units are as found in quoted documents. This means they

are normally in the Imperial rather than the Metric system. Finally, each chapter has its own references, and tables and figures are numbered within the same number set, prefixed T or F in the listing below.

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1 Heritage Land of the United States

Chapter Summary

This chapter provides a context for the main thesis topic: the interdependence or complementarity of opposites, in particular the poles of preservation and exploitation of the heritage land.

The fragmentation of power, and the reconciliation of apparent opposites within the political system of the United States, has enabled heritage land to endure through nearly 120 years since a Congressional Act set aside the first area for protection, and public use, 'in perpetuity' in 1872. The concept of 'heritage land' is then defined and quantified; it is shown where it is and who uses it.

On one rather generous definition there are 708 million acres of federal recreation lands; all state and local government recreation land combined is a mere tenth of this area. Thus, while the acreage of federal lands largely dominates the heritage scene, it is notable that the states' holdings had 150% more visitors than the National Park Service, on 80% of its land area, in the mid-1980s. Small urban parks were even more intensively used. It may therefore be inferred that a substantial proportion of the federal lands has a different purpose, of which the search for wilderness, of seemingly limitless space, is of consequence. Since inception of the concept, heritage visitation has been exponential, but the growth rate is now slowing. Population growth in the US is about 40% every 25 years. But the supply of land (by acquisition) has not increased to anything like the same extent, so population density has increased from 26 persons per square mile in 1900 to 70 per square mile in 1989 - the more significant when it is recalled that Alaska and Hawaii became states in that period.

Federal heritage land is biased toward the west and Alaska. Yet demand is predominantly in the east. This is particularly so with forests, a type of heritage land of which there is less federally-owned than there is within the states and private ownership. But there is more forest in the east than in the west; three-quarters of the eastern forests are in state and private ownership.

Much of heritage land is poorly protected and maintained, and there has always been a shortage of Treasury money for these needs. On the other hand, entrepreneurs would say it was overprotected, and they should have access to it for commercial development. Is heritage land under threat? It is argued that it is, clear evidence having been collected in the Park Service's **State of the Parks** in 1980, and from my own discussions with many Service officials, Congressmen and those in the voluntary sector, in Washington, two Regional Offices, and many units of the National Park System.

The origin of the public domain is then explored. A table shows, with two exceptions, a fairly consistent one third proportion of all US land has been within the public domain from 1790 to 1985. Custodians of the public domain (insofar as it comes within the purview of this thesis) are then reviewed, from the Public Land Office through to the many conservationist (but only one preservationist) agencies today, in the Departments of Agriculture, Defense, Energy and Interior.

It may be hypothesized that the endurance of the concept of heritage protection results from: the checks and balances of the US political system; the strength of the voluntary sector; increased worldwide environmental awareness, to which the US has made a major contribution; and the relationship between preservation and exploitation of heritage land. The chapter concludes with a brief examination of typical public sector locations of this conflict: intra-agency and inter-agency.

Origins of a Thesis

This thesis is concerned to explain the establishment and continuity of heritage land protection, and of how that was achieved amidst conflict and change. The idea of the thesis originated during a meeting with Dr Machlis at the University of Idaho in 1984, when we were discussing the National Park Service. He believed it was possible to preserve cherished national lands in perpetuity, by setting them aside under legislative protection, though I was unconvinced on two grounds. The first was that the objectives of the 1916 National Park Service Act, which required it both to preserve its lands and open them to public use, were not uncompromisingly protectionist, but included seemingly contradictory ideas. The second was that the intensification of demand for resources was such that at some point the federal government might

withdraw its protection. Thus, preservation and exploitation were apparently opposing forces. From my knowledge of the Park Service I came to believe that, on the contrary, these opposites are frequently both complementary and interdependent: their continuing uneasy coexistence is a question underlying the thesis. In examining the Park Service's mission in its organic act in some detail, I shall use this at relevant points to view the operation of other agencies, and thus to suggest how heritage land became secure amidst conflict and change.

The United States

The United States presents unique opportunities for research into its institutions. While not particularly young as a Nation, it is a comparatively youthful anthropological grouping of peoples, an integrative process not yet fully completed. Initially, it had two enormous advantages. First, there appeared to be virtually unlimited land available, inhabited by a seemingly savage native population who could be cleared out of the way without undue difficulty. With the land came abundant wildlife, minerals, natural resources of all kinds. Second, its emergent population could recoil from the political systems it had left behind and forge a new society, properly constituted in law, which it was hoped would protect its inhabitants, their possessions, and large areas of common land. This hope has, to a large extent, been fulfilled.

A major characteristic of the political system has been pointed out by Griffith (1983,2):

> 'The separate election of the President and Congress has scattered power, but seems on the surface to have institutionalized a permanent conflict between these two great branches. In fact, each must justify its actions to the other.'

The constitutional separation of powers is still a matter of major debate in the US, with historians asking 'did the founding fathers get it right?' Griffith (p5) points out that while there are spheres of action permitted only to the federal government, and some permitted only to the states, there are others which are shared by both. He also refers to the 'unwritten constitution' which additionally has provided

for sharing of powers or mutual responsibility in which 'one branch must justify its affirmative exercise of power in the eyes of its constitutional equal.' All of these separate and corporate exercises of power have led to both a 'government by consensus' and, because any changes in public policy require the support of substantial elements of both the geographic and economic sectors of the nation, a quality of conservatism in the nation, and greater freedom to experiment in the states. Such conflicts between apparently polarised interests, the compromises that follow, and their effect of creating continuity in the preservation of high quality amenity land, lie at the core of this thesis.

One other element of continuity should be mentioned: the US constitutional principle of hierarchy of law. Quite unlike Britain, where a new law can and often does transcend similar law previously on the statute book, the US has different types of law, some of which can easily be changed, and others which are very difficult to change. Indeed, the law is of great importance to environmentalists who frequently challenge decisions which displease them, or ask for interpretation of particular laws, or their constitutionality, through the Courts.

Contemplating the Environment

Environmentalism, the title of O'Riordan's (1981) book, is explained by him (p ix) as being 'as much a state of being as a mode of conduct or a set of policies. Certainly it can no longer be identified simply with the desire to protect ecosystems or conserve resources - these are merely superficial manifestations of much more deeply-rooted values.' Nevertheless, it is essentially a protective, if theoretically complex, concept. Interestingly, O'Riordan has several references to 'conservation' in his index, but none to 'preservation'. Some adherents of environmentalism - the preservationists - would like to leave things as they are, not always appreciating they are 'as they are' because of conscious or unconscious human interference. Consciously these lands have been deforested or afforested, their waters have been dammed and diverted, they have given up minerals and have produced crops. Unconsciously they have been subjected to humanity's pollutants. There are no 'natural' landscapes left, in this definition, and preservation is only conceived because people dislike change: it is irrelevant to them

that 'naturally' such landscapes would look quite different.

The conservationists are more pragmatic. They understand that other humans, and other biological species, have created what is viewed by them as a landscape to be changed as little as possible: if it has to be changed, then it should be possible to replace it as it was, through natural renewal with a little help from man. The World Conservation Strategy (IUCN 1980) most notably endorses this view, maintaining that land can produce while still retaining some of its more abstract desirability.

In expressing a preference for the term 'protection', rather than the loosely used 'conservation', I recognise there will be a scale of values associated with it, which may look as follows. All items refer to land and water:

1 Reserved for non-human biological species, the most extreme form of wilderness. It will still be impacted by air and water pollution. Unused parts of military bases would fall into this category.
2 Wilderness entered by permit on the principle of 'leaving nothing but one's footprints.'
3 Areas set aside for recreation and contemplation, which activities have the least impact upon its biological species
4 Areas used for a wider range of recreation, some of which (eg skiing, off- road vehicles) can permanently disfigure the land
5 Areas which have both productive and recreational functions
6 Productive and privately owned areas, and some publicly owned ones, from which the general public are excluded.

Up to type 5 it should be possible for areas to renew themselves, or be helped to do so through sensitive management. Type 6 and onwards may lack this concern. It is not suggested that the above morphology is particularly original: it may be compared with the Forest Service's categories, and with IUCN's categories of protected land.

Environmentalism is thus a wide-ranging concept. Environmentalists want to protect sound interrelationships between humans, other animals and plants and landscapes, to perpetuate ways of being that are considered mutually valuable to these living components.

What is Heritage Land? Who Uses it?

Heritage land is defined for the purposes of this thesis as all federally-owned land with preservational, cultural, educational and recreational functions; it excludes land which is also exploited commercially (except for a modest provision of visitor services) or is used for military purposes. This definition is deliberately restrictive. Notably absent, in most of the thesis, are lands of similar quality owned by the states or lesser public authorities, lands within the voluntary and institutional sectors (for example owned by the Sierra Club or a University), and all private lands.

The term derives from 'heir', which concerns the handing on of precious items from the past. Thus it is essentially about continuity. Radford et al (1981,351) define three types of heritage: *National* 'That collection of resources important to Americans because they are significant aspects of our history and culture and/or significant elements of our natural environment.' *Historic*: 'The collection of districts, sites, buildings, structures, and objects significant in American history, architecture, archeology, or culture (adapted from the 1966 National Historic Preservation Act)' and *Natural*: 'Representative examples of the full array of discrete types of terrestrial and aquatic communities, geologic features, landforms, and habitats of native plant and animal species that may be eliminated without deliberate protection' (adapted from the proposed National Heritage Policy Act). This thesis relates to all of Radford et al's types.

The term 'heritage' is in wide use. There are World Heritage Sites. Britain has Heritage Coasts, an organisation called English Heritage, and an author Nicholson-Lord (1987,175) who discussed the forty heritage centres in Britain - these in their turn are concerned with finding roots, the foundations of a society. The US had for a while a Heritage Conservation and Recreation Service. Its Nature Conservancy runs a Natural Heritage Program whose progress is described by Roush (1985). There is also a Heritage Foundation, which Hays (1989,493) describes as a private enterprise think tank.

While it could be argued that the meaning of 'heritage' is self-evident, attitudes toward it and its use, influenced by ownership and mission, vary considerably. The Forest Service undeniably looks after

large areas of heritage land, but periodically removes large tracts of forest for commercial purposes, after which it is some years before 'heritage' is the appropriate adjective. The Fish & Wildlife Service would appear to be the apogee of land preservation; while that may be true, many of the birds and fish it conserves are taken care of so they can be shot or hooked: the Service therefore acts like an aristocrat's gamekeeper, but it serves the whole nation. Apart from the fact that all these agencies have been required by law to designate portions of their holding as wilderness areas, the National Park Service probably best fits the mantle of heritage preserver.

Why 'Park'? The very first US parks were urban: the National Capital Parks, which originated with the District of Columbia, in 1790. The commissioners of the District were appointed by George Washington to lay out the new federal district, and were to control all the public lands, including parks; it was not until 1933 that these parks were absorbed within the National Park Service (Mackintosh 1984,24). However, while the roots of the word 'park' come from Europe's royal and aristocratic hunting grounds, often outside towns, the term was also applied to 'a high plateau-like valley among the mountains' as early as 1808, according to the OED, which locates this type of park 'in Colorado, Wyoming, etc.' Interestingly, these were areas scarcely explored by white north americans at that time. Partly reinforcing this interpretation, the deputy superintendent of Rocky Mountain National Park told me that what was called a 'park' in the west, meant 'meadow' in the east of the US. In English law 'park' means an enclosed tract of land 'held by royal grant or prescription for keeping beasts of the chase' (OED). Not only does this mean it is set aside for pleasurable rather than productive uses, but it was a deliberate act of a particular social class, the aristocracy. A 'park,' while having almost identical functions, is clearly distinguished from a 'forest' because the former is both enclosed and has no special laws or officers. 'Park' therefore seems to be a more private place, protected by those living within it, as a private household with servants; this assumption is supported by another dictionary definition, 'a large area of land forming a private estate.' Thus it may be anomalous to call each US tract of protected land a park, except for the significant quality that it is land set aside for pleasurable uses. What made the term peculiarly North American was the addition of 'national' to 'park.' This emphasizes the democratic base, a far cry from those European parks establis-

hed purely for a king's game sports, where sometimes entire villages were razed to accommodate wildlife for the hunt. As Everhart said (1983,158) 'But all of these noble reserves were created to protect the land from, not for, the people.' This attitude continues today in the extreme preservation lobby which would like to keep the people out: certainly of wilderness areas, but often out of most of national parks' overall areas. This is a self-defeating attitude given the mission of the Park Service both to protect its lands and allow for public enjoyment on them.

But from that point on differences escalate. It is notable that the US distinction between 'park' and 'forest' is almost the reverse of English usage. Thus, a national park is quite restrictive toward the behaviour of its visitors, and has a comprehensive set of legislation enforced by a relatively large number of officers. A national forest, on the other hand, permits hunting, and a greater freedom of movement within less constraining laws and enforcing officers.

A recent attempt to quantify all these heritage lands was made by the President's Commission on Americans Outdoors (PCAO 1986, Working Papers), but it was not successful with the private lands. The public recreational lands are fully displayed in Table 1-1 to provide a context for the federal lands.

Superficially, Table 1-1 is quite informative. It apparently shows a ranking of federal land held for recreation, with the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) having far the greatest amount, followed by the Forest Service (FS), Fish & Wildlife Service (F&WS) and National Park Service (NPS). The area owned by the states approaches that of the NPS, though we need to remind ourselves that NPS land is only 3.4% of all US land. None of the remaining public sector agencies exceeds 8.3 million acres. In terms of visitor-hours, the FS is well ahead of the Corps of Engineers' land; NPS is a poor third. In fact, comparisons like these are untenable, because they are not comparing like with like. Those wanting to experience hunting bears in a National Forest, or shooting birds in a Fish & Wildlife Reserve, or ski down a BLM slope, are quite different people from those wanting, in the main, the solitude of a National Park. It seems that society contains a smaller percentage of the latter than of the former.

Table 1-1 : Public Sector Supply of Heritage Land and Visitation, 1985

Authority	Agency	000 Acres	Million Vis-hours	Visitor-hrs/acre
Dept. of Agriculture	US Forest Service	190 804	2 705	14.2
Dept. of Defense	US Army Corps of Engineers	8 362	1 721	204.9
Dept. of the Interior	Bureau of Land Management	337 091	246	0.7
	(alternative, see below	16 855	246	14.6)
	Bureau of Reclamation	4 296	289	67.2
	Fish & Wildlife Service	90 372	c200	2.2
	National Park Service	75 844	1 265	16.7
Tennessee Valley Authority		1 010	79	79.0
Total Federal		707 779	Thousand visitors	
Interstate		523		
State		61 264	661 916	
Region		536		
County		5 145		
Municipal		2 974		
Total Local Government		70 443		
Total Public Sector		778 222		

Sources: PCAO 1986, Clawson & van Doren 1984, US Dept of Commerce 1986

However, Table 1-1 presents other kinds of difficulty. The first is that the President's Commission saw fit to call all, of the federal lands quoted above, 'recreation land.' This cannot be true, for all have greater or lesser amounts not open to the public - FS lands being cleared or planted; hatcheries and other special areas in the F&WS; BLM rangelands: these are some examples. In support of my concern, the Bureau of Land Management (1988,46) states that 'Recreation management is focused on 150 areas comprising approximately 5 percent of Bureau-administered lands.' While this does not mean that parts of the remaining 95 percent are not used recreationally, it does seem quite unlikely that their entire area can be considered recreational.

The second difficulty is obtaining comparable use data. While the federal lands all have use expressed as visitor-hours, State facilities are expressed as 'visitors.' 'Visitor-day' is also used from time to time, normally meaning one stay of 12 hours or the equivalent (eg 12 stays of 1 hour). Most of these data's accuracy is questionable, being at best grossed up from detailed sampling. Most areas simply count the number entering and have no check on the duration of stay. Many entry points are not controlled. Some agencies use tubes across the road to

count cars, applying some occupancy rate, and ignoring those who come another way, or leave their cars outside. Using a performance measure of visitor-hours per acre, the Corps of Engineers is considerably ahead of any other agency. It has 2.5 times the visitor-hours per acre of the next best performer, the Tennessee Valley Authority. Then follows the Bureau of Reclamation. The National Park Service has only one quarter the performance that Reclamation shows, while the Forest Service is even worse if its entire acreage is used.

Nevertheless, Park Service data in the Statistical Abstract (USDC 1986) are also given in 'visits', which is roughly equivalent to 'visitors.' Such a comparison is of interest, for it shows that the National Park Service had 263 million recreational 'visits' in 1985, while the combined state total of 'visitors' was 662 million, 152% more visitors on just 80% of NPS' land area. Unfortunately no use data have been located for counties and cities other than a comment in Conservation Foundation (1987,288): 'City or community parks have the smallest acreage ... yet they also have the highest visitation of all public recreation areas.'

It is outside the scope of Table 1-1 to give information on Defense lands apart from Corps of Engineers holdings. However, the Department of Defense held 31 million acres of land in 1977, of which 18 million were for military purposes and 2.3 million were airfields (Nature Conservancy 1977,174). The total area has since reduced to 24 million acres but the principle remains. Some sites are enormous: for example Luke Air Force Range on the Mexican border in Arizona is 125 miles east to west, and the White Sands Range (with a Park Service unit, White Sands National Monument, within it) in New Mexico, is over 100 miles north to south; if it is associated with two other contiguous ranges, the total area is considerably larger than Yellowstone National Park. The point about these areas is that only small proportions are built upon or traversed by humans, and they therefore act as fundamental nature reserves over the majority of their area: heritage land which is rarely classified in this way, and land virtually free of exploitation.

I have left until last a discussion of heritage land users. Table 1-1 shows large numbers attracted to the recreational facilities of various agencies' land. A time series shows how they have grown. Using approximately 25-year leaps, in 1904 there were 121 000 visits to the nation-

al parks. In 1925 this had grown to 2.1 million (+1636%). In 1950 it was 33.3 million (+1486%), and in 1975 it was 238.8 million (+617%). The growth is therefore slowing, more slowly than the rate of population growth. In 1900 the population was 76 million and in 1925, 110 million (+45%). In 1950 it was 151 million (+37%). In 1975 it had reached 210 million (+39%) (USDC 1986 and Clawson & van Doren 1984).

Ise (1961,625) gives information on visits to particular parks, while saying that many national parks operate largely as state parks maintained by the federal government. He notes that Sequoia NP in California attracted 10 780 visits in 1916, of whom 10 521 were from California. Of the 8143 visits in 1920 to Mount Rainier NP 7383 came from Washington state. Of the 115 588 visiting Rocky Mountain NP 84 542 were from Colorado. Even in 1932 94% of those visiting Yosemite NP came from California. I can add more recent data to these figures. A visit to Mesa Verde NP in 1984 showed 43 licence plates from Colorado or adjacent states, 17 from California (many of whom were tourists who had flown in to Los Angeles International Airport according to the Superintendent), and seven from Texas. All other states accounted for the 34 remaining plates in the car park. The fact the majority were from outside the area supports Ise's contention that relative locals were accounting for a smaller proportion of the whole. A 1977 survey of Utah parks showed 58% from Mountain and Pacific NPS Regions, in other words relatively nearby, while a further survey in 1983 showed a modest increase to 65% from these Regions.

Demand for recreational facilities is also a function of population density. While 'crowding' is not a particularly useful term for the US, population density has been consistently increasing, and so has the desire for the great open spaces, whose use density has increased as more and more people visit them. In the coterminous US (excluding Alaska and Hawaii) there were 4 million people at a density of 4.5 per square mile of land area in 1790 - at a time when the US consisted of 867 000 square miles. By 1850, the land (not water) area had grown to nearly 3 million square miles: there were then 23 million people at a density of 8 per square mile. In 1900 the land area was slightly larger but the population density had become 26 per square mile. By 1950 Alaska and Hawaii had been added to create a land area of 3.55 million square miles - the density grew to 43 per square mile. The 1989 population of about 250 million gives a density of 70 per square mile.



Figure 1-2 : Distribution of US Federal Lands

Where is the Heritage Land?

How are the public recreational lands (a part of the 'heritage' according to the definition above) distributed geographically? The federal sites are located on Figure 1-2; Figure 1-3 quantifies this distribution of federal recreation lands by state.

Figure 1-3 : Distribution of Federal Recreation Lands by State



Source : National Outdoor Recreation Supply Information System (NORSIS), compiled by the Outdoor Recreation and Wilderness Recreation Group, Athens, GA. 1987.

What is immediately apparent is the bias toward the West and Alaska, but this can be quite misleading. The Forest Service (1981,15) showed the distribution and ownership of the US forest system in its entirety. In 1977 there was more forest in the east (381 million acres) than in the west (355 million acres - see Figure 1-4). 'East' is defined as Forest Service Northeast, North Central, Southeast and South Central regions, which take in Texas but not the 'Great Plains' States. 'West' is the rest, including Alaska and Hawaii. 9% of the eastern forest is Federally owned and 91% by States and privately, while in the west the proportions are 72% Federal and 28% State and private. The Bureau of Land Management and 'Other Federal' agencies owned more forest (143.7 million acres) than did the Forest Service (141.8 million acres) in 1977, but the combined federal total was much less than the state and private totals of 451 million acres. It needs to be asked whether, as



Figure 1-4 : Distribution of US Forest Service Lands

forest recreation is so popular, the eastern forests could, with management agreements, meet the demands of the predominant US population (79% of the 1980 total live in the east, as defined above)?

Is Heritage Land Adequately Protected from Development in the US?

Many would say 'no'. Among these are the environmental pressure groups and scientists. The Wilderness Society, the Conservation Foundation and the National Parks & Conservation Association have all been advocating considerable increases to the stock of protected heritage land; NPCA argued cogently for this to happen in its monumental 9-volume report (discussions with group members and NPCA 1988). Scientists argue extension is needed to protect biospheres of international importance (for example Gregg 1987) and most of those interested in nature conservation and ecology can provide evidence to show that specie protection often approaches the impossible within areas smaller than an animal's migration routes, or hunting territory. Thus, a progression is apparent: first, birds were protected, and then their habitats. When national protection became inadequate, it spread to international and then global spheres. Another way of looking at 'adequacy' of protection, because of many factors operating and problems of definition, is to compare US national park provision as a percentage of all land (3.4%) with the situation in other countries. IUCN (1985) show there are 28 countries in the world with more than 3.4% of their land allocated to national parks.

When asked whether sufficient heritage land was protected, others would say 'too much', for they want access to it for commercial reasons. They were listened to by James Watt when he was Secretary of the Interior in the first Reagan Administration, for large quantities of the federal domain were leased for mineral recovery in the early 1980s. But is their case strong? Griffith (1983,4) notes that constitutional law has established what he calls 'a zone of freedom' in which no government may legally operate; for a while it was thought that freedom of business enterprise was also included in the realm of immunity, 'but this concept has been profoundly altered.' If this concept were stronger, it could be argued it would assist with heritage protection, for it would form a natural buffer between conflicting land uses: currently it is often found that, for example, giant redwoods are felled right up to the relatively small protected area of Redwoods National Park in

California. The Park then forms a rather meaningless island from which its context is being removed.

These conflicts epitomise problems of defining what is meant by the federal domain, and what are its purposes. If we are considering here the part which contains heritage land, what is it for? Is it a buffer land separating large landowners? Is it a hangover from the Revolution and later territorial expansion, a power source for the federal government, but also a tool for first creating, and then cementing, a nation? Clearly it is something of all these things. Because it transcends state boundaries, is this a way of suggesting the continuing superiority of federal government? One useful view is that it represents the 'commons' that was being removed from many Europeans at the very time they emigrated to the US. One expression of this is large areas of public, cheap, grazing land. Another is the cheapness of wood from the nation's forests, wood being the universal building material for family homes in rural and suburban locations. Another is cheap water and hydroelectric power from federal dams.

We should also ask, who is it for? Stretton (1976,3) questions the honesty of some environmental causes. He observes:

> 'People can't change the way they use resources without changing their relations with one another. For example there are dozens of ways to economize energy: some would stop the rich wasting it, others would freeze the poor to death. Forests or beaches or country landscapes can be conserved to be enjoyed by many, by few or by nobody.' He continues (p10) 'There can be conflict about distributing the costs and benefits of conservation. The Left may want to make wilderness accessible to more and poorer people; environmentalists may want to preserve it from too much use by any people.' Nevertheless, he believes 'Many ... free, public, environmental and locational goods need (thoughtful distribution). Some of them are easier to distribute well than wealth and income: space, privacy, community services, access to nature, access to good city centres ...'

And what kind of conceptualising suggests it should be protected? Fleischman's (1969,26) views can create unease:

> 'There is no biological justification for conservation. Nature will not miss the whooping cranes or condors or redwoods any more than it misses the millions of other vanished species. Conservation is based on human value systems. Its validation lies in the human situation and the human heart.'

Is Heritage Land Under Threat?

The Constitution, remarkably little changed over 200 years, underwrites the relative sanctity of property in the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. The Homestead Act endorsed the distribution of federal land among the immigrants. While much of the federal holding remains in the public domain, large quantities have been leased to others for fossil fuel extraction should the present energy glut become a scarcity, and much of it is under pressure for urban expansion and the variety of uses many would like to impose upon it: chicken ranches, gold prospecting, gambling casinos, farming, forestry, gas stations, shopping malls ... usually underutilising the land (in our retrospective view), a natural response of most immigrants to the land poverty they experienced in Europe. Satisfaction of space-hunger is evident everywhere, in low density cities, particularly the newer ones of south and west, as well as in peripheral additions to the higher density cores of the eastern cities.

Because few of us have any meaningful contact with it any longer, conceptualising 'land' is a difficult task. Few seem able to appreciate land as something with an intrinsic progression of its own. Rather, it is viewed in a fragmented way, as something to move across, build a house on, grow potatoes in, extract minerals from: it is, we might say, self-evidently a commodity from which we can gain materially. My view, alongside that of a powerful body of public opinion represented by many Congressmen, those in the National Parks & Conservation Association, the Audubon Society, Sierra Club and others, is that only when we have passed beyond this type of understanding are we able to consider we might gain spiritually and physically by not materially exploiting substantial areas of land - by letting it follow its own progression, while the public uses it sensitively.

The contrasting view shows a suspicion of such relative inaction, the

underuse of a resource. Having been trained for five hundred years to conquer nature, we cannot resist devising an anthropomorphic schema for any land within our control. Only very recently have groups arisen demanding that human beings should keep out of certain areas. Yet, doing little or nothing with land, while appearing to undermine rationality and the conceptualising to which we are accustomed, is nevertheless precisely what many social organisations practice. For mystical, religious or practical purposes, much land has been (and is) protected from the notion that it should endlessly produce outputs of value to *homo economicus*. Because these beliefs have origins lost in antiquity, a *continuity* of land protection is apparent. It is remarkable how persistent social systems are, concerning land.

Despite this notion, high quality land is a diminishing resource: clearly, under expanding market economies, the higher the quality the greater the pressure upon it. But, in whose eyes is it high quality? Scarcity leads to alternative sources; when 'high quality' developable land in the plains is exhausted, the pressure must then turn to more marginal land - to those areas which, until relatively recently, have met a universal urge to protect land for any of a variety of reasons: historic, cultural, scenic, biological, archaeological, recreational, educational, social. While 'economic' does not appear in this list, arguably some monuments to the growth of wealth in a country could be considered part of its heritage.

If a sufficiently powerful group decides there is a need for better management of lands currently under the care of the Executive, improved control could be effected in various ways. It will be apparent from development of the thesis in subsequent chapters that management of the current stock of heritage land is fragmented among a number of agencies established at different times for different purposes. The result is a lack of a coherent power-base, and the agencies which are subordinated are also more subject to interference. Decades of adherence to outdated politico-organisational policies have created friction rather than smooth-running. Furthermore, the 'protection agencies' themselves operate within a standardised bureaucratic model not easily adaptable to a specific function such as heritage land protection. Federal heritage land in the US is therefore at risk.

Some pressures have been documented. A case in point is the National

Park Service's State of the Parks, produced in 1980. This was hastily put together in response to Congressional demand, and contains serious threats to the continuing health of various units of the Park System alongside ones which are relatively insignificant. Its findings rocked the nation. 73 different threats were identified, and can be placed in seven main groups. The numbers following each group are first the number of internal threats reported, and second those from outside the parks.

* Aesthetic degradation (land development, timbering etc) 423/662
* Air pollution (acid rain, hydrocarbon pollutants, etc) 83/609
* Physical removal of resources (mineral extraction, poaching etc) 376/262
* Exotic encroachment (animals, plants, blasting etc) 277/325
* Visitor physical impacts (campfires, trampling etc) 399/106
* Water quality pollution and water quality changes (oil spills, toxic chemicals, etc) 142/324
* Park operations (trails, misuse of biocides, etc) 254/103

Glacier National Park had most threats (56), then came Yellowstone NP (46), Everglades NP (41) and Great Smoky Mountains NP (41). The average number of threats for each of the 310 units responding was 13.6; the average number for the 12 Biosphere Reserve parks (ie of international importance) was 36.3. If one were looking for continuity of experience, these findings suggest a look back to the time when the Army took over the running of Yellowstone national park in the late 19th century. The park had one unpaid superintendent, no money to police it, and consequent depradation from every direction. Referring to the thesis stated at the outset of this chapter, exploitation had virtually subsumed preservation - as it was in danger of doing in 1980, though it is easy to get events at the latter date out of perspective.

Origins of the Public Domain

Shanks (1984) provides a definition: 'The public lands are common lands to be managed on behalf of a democratic people' and Stegner (1983) cynically anticipates Shanks: 'Democracy is still the worst form of government except all the others.' Therein lie repeated attempts over centuries by developers and exploiters to get their hands on land that otherwise is regarded as being of the people - the former being a

throwback to European landowning patterns, the latter being a particular characteristic of the United States.

From the first days of colonisation, the United States (though it had not yet invented that term) was set on an expansionist course. The thirteen original states, while hugging the eastern seaboard, territorially extended in the north to the Canadian border, south almost to the Gulf of Mexico, and west to the Mississippi; they also contained none of the public domain, for effectively it was only conceived with westward, and southward, expansion. Florida, ceded by Spain in 1819, and the Louisiana Purchase from France in 1803, were the principal initiators. Other accessions, apart from Texas, enlarged the public domain as far as the Pacific Ocean and Mexico, and ultimately added Alaska and Hawaii. Table 1-5 considers the progression of the public domain; it is derived from USDC (1986, Table 319).

Table 1-5 :Gross Area (land and water) of the United States and its Public Domain, in square miles

Year	Accession	Gross Area	Public Domain	% pub/tot
1790	US territory	891 364	312 500	35.1
1803	Louisiana Purchase	1 722 685		
1819	Florida	1 792 551		
1845	Texas	2 177 509		
1846	Oregon	2 460 948		
1848	Mexican Cession	2 991 654		
1850		2 991 654	1 875 000	62.7
1853	Gadsden Purchase	3 021 294		
1867	Alaska	3 612 298		
1880		3 612 298	1 406 250	38.9
1898	Hawaii	3 618 769		
1959	Hawaii + Alaska Statehood	3 618 769	1 200 938	33.2
1975		3 618 769	1 188 125	32.8
1985		3 618 769	1 135 469	31.4

The Table shows the rapid build up of the total land area of the US up to 1868, and its stability since that time (minor additions of islands in the Pacific and Caribbean, totalling 4 664 square miles, have not been included). It also shows how the public domain, as a proportion of the total, has fluctuated considerably. 1850 was the peak year for the public domain, and it then decreased from 63% of the total to 31% in 1985, largely because of disposal through the Homestead Act of 1862 and its successors.

As shown earlier, the size of the public domain directly reflects on the amount of land the Nation is able to protect within the concept of heritage land. We therefore now need to consider the formation of the various federal agencies all or part of whose responsibility was caring for the heritage. More detail will be provided in successive chapters.

The first custodian to appear was the General Land Office, which oversaw and disposed of the public domain: this Office was originally within the Department of the Treasury. Prior to 1848, another future Department of the Interior (DoI) agency, the Indian Affairs office, was significantly housed in the War Department. In 1849, agreement was narrowly reached to create an Interior Department, by a senate vote of 31 to 25 (Utley & Mackintosh 1988,2), and it incorporated the Land and Indian offices. An opponent spoke out '... it is one of the greatest steps that has ever been made in my time to absorb all the remaining powers of the States.'

DoI controlled the nation's forests through the rest of the nineteenth century. Perhaps this Department should have seen warning signals in the enactment of the Forest Reserve Act of 1891, which permitted the President to set aside forest lands in the public domain, within the custody of the General Land Office. After extensive lobbying for a transfer, and against Interior's 'unscientific and unproductive' management, the 1905 Congress agreed to the transfer of the nation's forests to the Department of Agriculture, in a new agency called the US Forest Service.

The Newlands Act of 1902 provided for the construction of dams and aqueducts 'to water arid and semiarid lands in the West' (Utley & Mackintosh p19). This was organised first through a Reclamation Service in the DoI's Geological Survey, becoming a separate Interior bureau in 1907; it became called the Bureau of Reclamation in 1923. The other dam-building agency is the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), championed by FD Roosevelt in his first presidential year, 1933 (Badger 1989,171).

The National Park Service, another Bureau of DoI, was established in 1916: Fig 1-6 shows distribution of its units through the 50 states. Because it is the major heritage land curator, it occupies many of the succeeding pages. It would be easy to see it as a closed system, barricading itself against other agencies which are out of sympathy with its



Figure 1-6 : Distribution of National Park Units

Alaska



Seven national park areas in Alaska have adjoining national preserves, counted as separate units of the National Park System. They are: Aniakchak, Denali, Gates of the Arctic, Glacier Bay, Katmai, Lake Clark, and Wrangell-St. Elias.

Guam

Hawaii

Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands

Figure 1-6 : (continued)

goals. However, it has learnt from Britain on 'greenlining' or the protection of areas largely in private ownership, and two-way flows are building up with other countries' parks systems. And Morgan (1986) considered organisations could be 'open systems that need careful management to satisfy and balance internal needs and to adapt to environmental circumstances;' the Park Service appears to have done this as well as, perhaps subconsciously, coming to terms with its mission.

As we shall see in the next chapter, national parks of a kind had been established since 1872, on Land Office land, but generally run by the Army. The Army's much more significant contribution to the creation of recreational facilities came through the establishment, as long ago as 1802, of the Corps of Engineers, at that time with a total of 20 men. It has since become an agency of great power and nationwide influence, referred to as a 'bureaucratic superstar' in Clarke & McCool (1985).

An independent Bureau of Fisheries was established in 1871 and absorbed by the Commerce Department; it and a Bureau of Biological Survey finally came together in DoI in 1939, and were named the Bureau of Fish & Wildlife (Utley & Mackintosh p30). The last of the agencies of interest to this thesis, Bureau of Land Management, was formed in 1946 through a merger of the General Land Office and a Division of Grazing, later the Grazing Service. The latter had arisen through the Taylor Grazing Act of 1934 (Clawson 1983, 30-31).

Since 1946 other changes have been made, but BLM, Corps of Engineers, FS, F&WS, NPS, TVA and other agencies have survived, to contribute partly or wholly to the protection of heritage land in the United States. Figures 1-7, 1-8 and 1-9 respectively show the present administrative structures of the federal government, the Department of the Interior, and the National Park Service.

Figure 1-7 shows that the Constitution, together with a vast body of case law on its interpretation, is the ultimate source of administrative wisdom. The three Branches of federal government - Legislative, Executive and Judicial - will be referred to frequently below. The Executive Branch, through the President, his personal offices, and the Departmental heads constituting the Cabinet, has to agree most of its actions with the Legislative Branch. The same requirement, stemming from the doctrine of separation of powers, is placed upon most actions

of the Congress, in seeking Executive approval.

Figure 1-8, perhaps unconsciously, contains a polarised continuum from the conservation agencies of the Department of the Interior through to those which primarily exploit the resources of the public domain. It will be noted that the National Park Service is at the conservation pole, and the Bureaux of Reclamation and of Mines at the exploitative pole.

Figure 1-9 shows the complex organisational structure of a large government agency, the National Park Service. While some field stations for research and training are included in the diagram, there is no reference to the Service's 10 Regional Offices, each with its own administrative structure. Nor are the Park Units (National Parks, National Historic Sites, National Lakeshores, for example) mentioned, though each has its own legislation for which its superintendent is responsible.



Figure 1-7 : The US Federal Government



Figure 1-8 : The Department of the Interior



Figure 1-9 : The National Park Service

Table 1-10 shows federal expenditure, to put land protection activities into perspective.

Table 1-10 : Selected Federal Government Expenditure at the end of Financial Years 1975, 1980 and 1986 (estimated)

	1975		1980		1986Est	
	Bn$	%	Bn$	%	Bn$	%
Social Security and Medicare	77.5	23.4	150.6	27.0	268.8	27.4
Department of Defense	85.9	25.9	131.0	22.2	258.4	26.4
Income Security	50.2	15.1	86.5	14.6	118.1	12.1
Food and Nutrition Assistance	6.6	2.0	14.0	2.4	18.7	1.9
Ground Transport	7.0	2.1	15.3	2.6	18.6	1.9
Natural Resources & Environment	7.3	2.2	13.9	2.4	12.9	1.3
of which, Water Resources	2.6	0.8	4.2	0.7	4.0	0.4
Conservation and Land Management	0.7	0.2	1.0	0.2	1.1	0.1
Recreational Resources	0.8	0.2	1.7	0.3	1.5	0.2
Pollution Control & Abatement	2.5	0.8	5.5	0.9	4.6	0.5
Other Natural Resources	0.8	0.2	1.4	0.2	1.7	0.2
All Outlays	332.3	100.0	590.9	100.0	979.9	100.0

Source: US Department of Commerce 1986 Table 480

The Table shows that for the natural resources and environment section, excluding water resources, the total in 1975 was $4.8Bn or 1.4% of the total. By 1980 matters had improved a little: $9.6Bn and 1.6% of the total, respectively. In 1986 it had fallen back to $8.9Bn, just 1.0% of the total. More information is provided in Table 1-11 (page 29).

The budgets in Table 1-11 exclude trust fund contributions. In some cases these contributions are quite significant; for example, BIA in 1988 was due to receive an additional $400m from that source, F&WS an additional $180m, but NPS only $13m. Third, the budget figures are 'budget authority', the amount authorised by Congress for that year; this is not the same as the amount actually spent, known as the 'Outlay', for the budget authority is often for expenditure which will extend beyond that year.

In terms of land, the Table shows that NPS had less than F&WS, and only one third of BLM's, in 1988. Employment is the other characteristic not comparable over time; here NPS had the greatest proportion of DoI employment in 1988. These are FTE figures and contain many part-time and seasonal workers; the other point about NPS is that it has over 330 units to administer.

Table 1-11 : Land, budget and staff of the Interior Agencies, various years to 1988; Table ranked according to 1988 budget. Some budgets of Departments of Agriculture and Defense provided for reference

	Land m acres	Budget $m 1973	1978	1983	1988E	Employees 1988 *FTE
BIA	52(10.4)	517(19.4)	920(17.3)	1187(19.4)	1045(18.3)	12871(18.5)
WPRS					1005(17.6)	7791(11.2)
BUREC		489(18.4)	689(12.9)	920(15.0)		
NPS	80(16.0)	231(8.7)	521(9.8)	1078(17.6)	787(13.8)	16200(23.3)
BOR		334(12.5)				
HCRS			924(17.3)			
BLM	270(54.0)	227(8.5)	780(14.6)	1141(18.6)	641(11.2)	9747(14.0)
F&WS	90(18.0)		366(6.9)	493(8.0)	454(8.0)	6161(8.0)
BSFW		157(5.9)				
MMS				182(3.0)	559(9.8)	2040(2.9)
GS		149(5.6)	585(11.0)	378(6.2)	420(7.4)	9727(14.0)
OSMRE			68(1.3)	274(4.5)	292(5.1)	1033(1.5)
TIA				237(3.9)	291(5.1)	55(0.1)
BOM		140(5.3)	138(2.6)	145(2.4)	119(2.1)	2241(3.2)
SEC-SOL		58(2.2)	54(1.0)	72(1.1)	76(1.3)	1682(2.4)
T	500(100)	2662(100)	5333(100)	6127(100)	5707(100)	60548(100)
FS		591	1777	1097	1628	
SCS		398	602	721	476	
CoE		1944	2790	3406	3084	

E = Estimated * = Full-time equivalent

Abbreviations: BIA=Bureau of Indian Affairs; WPRS=Water & Power Resources Service (ex BUREC or Bureau of Reclamation); NPS=National Park Service; BOR=Bureau of Outdoor Recreation; HCRS=Heritage Conservation and Recreation Service; BLM=Bureau of Land Management; BSFW=Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife; MMS=Minerals Management Service; GS=Geological Survey; OSMRE=Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement; TIA=Office of Territorial and International Affairs; BOM=Bureau of Mines; SEC=Secretarial and other; SOL=Solicitor; FS=Forest Service and SCS=Soil Conservation Service, of the Department of Agriculture; CoE=Army Corps of Engineers, Department of Defense T is the total budget authority for the Department of the Interior. It discounts receipts and income from Trusts, etc.

Sources: DoI 1987, Office of Management & Budget several years 1975 to 1988

Looking at the 15-year budget changes, it is evident that 1983 was the best year for DoI, partly boosted by the $1bn PRIP programme. From 1983 to the 1988 estimates, the Reagan Administration's cutbacks in public expenditure affected mainly the conservation agencies - F&WS, NPS, BIA and even BLM - while the exploitative agencies, and those which are profitable, generally had increases in current terms. BLM, with half the visitor-hours of NPS, stood to lose $500m in current terms, NPS $300m; NPS also saw its relative position in the DoI hierarchy fall - by nearly 4% in its share of the total budget.

While neither FS nor CoE are primarily recreational agencies, they still have major programmes, having more recreational visitor-hours than NPS. Given this, it is interesting to note that FS' budget increased 48% in current terms 1983 to 1988. CoE reduced by 9%, still much less than NPS with a reduction of 27%.

An important conclusion from Table 1-11 is that NPS is not as strongly placed in the Department of the Interior as its public esteem would suggest, nor in relation to other recreational agencies in different Departments. This results from political decisions, which were less biased toward commercialism in administrations prior to Reagan.

The Continuity of Heritage Protection

It is hoped the following chapters will show how heritage protection has survived all vicissitudes and power shifts in the US political system, over a relatively long period of time - at least from the 1860s through to the 1980s. Probably the time when it was most under threat is the most recent - the two Reagan Administrations. Even then an abrasive right-wing Secretary of the Interior, James Watt, was frustrated in many of his attempts to dismember the heritage and introduce market principles thought capable of sustaining and profiting from the resultant pieces.

One reason this has happened can be found in the checks and balances of the US political system, which result in tinkering, but not often major shifts, in an established order. Or, as Griffith (1983,5) puts it, these checks and balances tend to lead to conservatism nationally, tempered by freedom to experiment on the part of the states. Another is the strength of the voluntary sector's conservation lobby. Another the

worldwide change toward environmental awareness, and some conservation, early reflected by the US in its 1969 National Environmental Protection Act. It has also maintained a lead in some states, toward more stringent emission control standards than anywhere else. For road vehicles this does of course reflect that the US has 30% more per 1000 people than the next highest nation (Switzerland). We also need to remember that some new pressures on heritage land have yet to be experienced, and could come about in at least four very clear ways: first, a shortage of oil could reduce accessibility to heritage land, and demand the exploitation of oil shales in states like Colorado and Wyoming, adversely affecting the environment. Second, global warming causing a rise in ocean levels could inundate highly populated coastal strips, adding to pressures on other lands (Tickell [1989] talks of 'environmental refugees'). Third, accelerating world population increases could lead to spatial conflicts, having a similar effect to rises in sea level. Fourth, the exodus from cities to escape high pollution levels and other unpleasant issues could also accelerate, causing a demand for land elsewhere.

Fifth, I shall use the interdependence of the concepts of preservation* (asterisked items are defined at the end of this chapter, page 38) and exploitation*, and their relation to heritage land, to explain its continuity. Some notion of the interrelation of opposites existed in Ancient Greece, with the Stoic philosopher Epictetus' aphorisms that no one would sin if he knew how to achieve his ends without sinning, or that whoso would become good must first be convinced that he is evil (Encyclopaedia Britannica article on Epictetus).

The natural world, the beneficent human world and the human-exploited world, are similarly interdependent. Each is discussed often in the thesis, and data deriving from them, particularly in chapter 4, show that as exploitative forces increase, protective forces also increase to combat them. However, the response is often delayed until a 'critical mass', of those demanding change, has been reached. Such a situation is occurring in 1990 in relation to global environmental issues and their relation with national and local ones, and is discussed in chapter 8.

The interdependence also works the other way: if there is no exploitation, then the concept of 'preservation' becomes meaningless, for the

one literally requires the other for its existence. This also holds if extreme positions are reached: given a nuclear holocaust (the ultimate in exploitation) then preservation is meaningless. Given total preservation, creating a similarly disastrous situation as the world population would starve, then exploitation is meaningless. These extremes have not been experienced, but war and drought, poverty and hunger are only too familiar: in more developed nations such disasters tend to be combatted by environmentally protective* measures, as in the Depression years of the United States. In less developed nations attitudes toward environments like tropical rain forests are quite different: the concepts of exploitation and preservation are of less significance when the subsistence of greatly increasing populations is at stake.

Simply expressed, the extreme manifestations of exploitative and preservationist responses lie at the poles of a continuum. Mediating between them is the concept of conservation* or sustainability*. All activities to do with land can be located at some point between the poles (see Figure 1-12; Table 4-2 relates protective legislation to time and contributory causes of crises) and most tend to lie between exploitation and conservation - in fact, all actions within this section could involve exploitation to some degree. Many believe there is a quite inadequate amount of protected wilderness in the world, and one of the least exploited, Antarctica, is now severely threatened. The United States has set aside comparatively large areas, but even these are compromised by cross-frontier and cross-boundary pollution, the Valdez oil spill, the Alaskan pipeline ... The relationship of exploitation and preservation will often be referred to in chapters 2 to 8, using the terms *interdependence* or *symbiosis**.

Figure 1-12 : The Land Exploitation-Preservation Continuum



The conflict between the poles of preservation and exploitation of land is present at many levels. This conflict can be perceived in a number of ways. Some of significance to this thesis are: a. *within* a federal agency; b. *between* two or more federal agencies; c. *between* public sector protectiveness of heritage land and private (or public) sector exploitative action.

Intra-agency Conflict

As we have seen, the National Park Service's mission, as stated in its organic Act of 1916, appears to be internally inconsistent, for it implies that use is compatible with non-impairment. There is therefore 'conflict'. But I have argued above that the 'inconsistency' is in fact a necessity for the perpetuation of the Park Service as a national system. Everhart (1983,16) explains that the Park Service:

> 'was established to promote and regulate the use of the national parks and monuments, taking such measures as conform to the fundamental purpose of these preserves, "which purpose is to conserve the scenery and the natural and historic objects and the wildlife therein, and to provide for the enjoyment of the same in such manner and by such means as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations." '

However, in discussion with NPS' Chief Scientist (Sudia 1987) he questioned whether NPS *has* a mission: 'it preserves recreational resources without being fully aware of what they are.' Because the Interior Department is concerned with land management, then so is the Park Service. It should have primary missions of education, research and recreation, but neither of the first two is at all developed - see chapter 8.

Conflict occurs elsewhere within the Park Service. One reason for this is the distinction, for which the organic Act's mission bears responsibility, between those staff who wish to preserve wild places and those who believe in public access and recreation, broadly defined. This split has widened over the years with the addition of responsibilities toward historic military sites, and urban recreational facilities. There is also conflict within the administrative structure - the func-

tion of Superintendents of park units to uphold the terms of each unit's individual piece of legislation versus some Regional Office interference, and the politicisation of the Service which means that some of the key superintendencies have become political gifts. They used to be appointments from within the Service.

But a political architect of changes in Park Service administration seemed subject to conflict, as well. When I interviewed the Assistant Secretary for Fish & Wildlife and Parks, Bill Horn (1987) he appeared to be walking a tightrope, trying both to satisfy those who wanted to overfly the Grand Canyon, and the solitude seekers, walking or trekking halfway down. There was no consensus in the body politic, Mr Horn told me.

Inter-agency Conflict

Bearing in mind that this thesis is solely about federally-owned heritage lands, it is possible to concentrate attention on a few agencies responsible for them, and to use the findings to simulate what happens elsewhere in the federal, state and private domains. Conflict has long been evident between the two most important protectors of the heritage lands - the Forest Service and the National Park Service. There are various reasons for this, the first being that they are within different Departments, Agriculture and Interior respectively, so natural rivalries operate. More cogently, their missions are different. The Forest Service has a multiple use mission, while the National Park Services' mission is much more restricted.

FS are in no doubt of their mission: 'The Forest Service is a leader on the conservation and wise use of the Nation's forests and rangelands' (FS 1987,1). Yet, this proud statement needs disentangling: what is 'conservation' for example? Who determines what 'wise' means? What are 'the Nation's'? All United States forests, or just those within the federal domain? In Chapters 2 and 3, I attempt to describe what 'conservation' is for the particular circumstances of the US, and its Forest Service.

Comparisons between the Park & Forest Services can be difficult because of their different missions, which sometimes are expressed through indicators which do not match. Therefore, in terms of *visits*, standardising of statistics has first to be carried out, for the Park Service

uses 'visits' while the Forest Service uses 'recreation visitor days' or RVDs, of 12 person-hours. It is possible to interpret an RVD as consisting of 2.8 visits. Given this, the Park Service saw an expansion of 38% in RVDs from 1977 to 1987; over the same period, the Forest Service's expansion was only 11%. The absolute number of Park Service RVDs was only just over half those of the Forest Service, however. More meaningful, perhaps, is to look at the deficits of the Forest Service, as its primary function is commercial. In 1985 the Service had a deficit of nearly $1 bn - receipts were nearly one half of expenditures. By 1987 there was modest improvement - expenditures of $2.3 bn against receipts of $1.5 bn. Only about 10% of the deficit was accounted for by recreation.

Conclusions: How did Designation and Protection of Heritage Land Come About?

Five elements will contribute to an explanation in Chapter 2, and some of these elements will be referred to in later chapters:

* European origins of most of the settlers were characterised by frequent national conflict, class structures, land ownership by the few, maldistribution of wealth, etc. They emigrated to the US to find opportunity and, less certainly, equality. They recollected that European 'heritage' land was normally the exclusive province of the aristocracy and their côterie, and therefore saw US heritage land as being more widely accessible. 'Park' in Europe meant land set aside for hunting by the nobility.

* The US separation of powers meant that the public domain was administered by the federal government, while each state often followed different political and recreational goals. Federal land varied in area: in the nineteenth century it both expanded the nation and protected its frontiers, helping create a nation. Much federal land was also distributed to homesteaders and railroad companies, and to establish schools, but most of the heritage land was retained by the federal government. The states' land, on the other hand, changed little in area.

* The frontier, which shifted westward in the nineteenth century (ie the settlement of the west coast), officially was closed in 1892;

this meant the seemingly endless land suddenly became finite. Pressures increased for use of the land, leading to its exploitation, and therefore to the emergence of preservation.

* Heritage land effectively became a surrogate for certain types of culture that had been left behind by the immigrants from Europe. Initially, this land helped create a coherent nation, until later the lack of a 'high culture' on the European model was offset by the classical designs of state capitols, by the emergence of writers and painters, and by employment of a French town planner to lay out Washington. Then the US became a very special nation, with a wider range of culture accessible to the people than in most European countries. This too had to be preserved.

* Juxtaposition of apparent opposites, and their need one for the other: the interdependence of preservation and exploitation. It appears as if this condition has materially helped the protection of heritage land to endure, not least of which is that managed by the National Park Service. This lies at the heart of my thesis.

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Definitions

Conservation	'The management of human use of the biosphere so that it may yield the greatest sustainable benefit to present generations while maintaining its potential to meet the needs and aspirations of future generations' (IUCN 1980). When, as is usually the case, absolute values are avoided, the mediator *conservation* arises. Conservation will be accompanied by some preservation, and some exploitation - this condition is typified by the United States.
Exploitation	Taking advantage of, unethically or unjustly, for one's own profit; the action of utilising land and related resources for purposes against long-term environmental interests of a nation. Conspicuous examples of land exploitation occur during a world war, or an occasion like when Interior Secretary James Watt was selling mineral leases on the public domain. Both, as we shall see in subsequent chapters, mobilised the opposing forces of protectionism. In the case of war, a greater than usual flow of environmentally protective legislation ensued; in the case of James Watt, the opposition became so strong he had to resign his office.
Preservation	First, keeping land free of all human interference. Second, and more realistically if somewhat compromising the first definition, allowance for some human entry ('leave nothing other than your footprints'). This recognises that all land is affected by atmospheric and watercourse pollution.
Protection	'To defend from trouble, harm, attack, etc' (Collins ED)
Sustainability	The present does not compromise the future, while accommodating the needs of the present
Symbiosis	Using an adaptation of the sociological meaning: 'a close association of two mutually dependent concepts.'
Wilderness	Similar to the second category of preservation, above.

2 Origins of Environmental Protection in the USA

Chapter Summary

Jefferson was an early environmentalist. He extolled the natural scenic qualities of Harpers Ferry in 1784, and was told about Yellowstone in 1807. However, it was not until 1872 that Yellowstone became the 'first' national park. Creation of parks could be dated to Hot Springs National Park, established in 1831, though not with that name. More realistically, the urban parks came first, notably in Washington DC and New York, whose Central Park was designed by Olmsted in 1858. After Yellowstone some other national parks were established in the late nineteenth century, but for some time this was tokenism. Virtually no funds were allocated to their management and Yellowstone was supposed to be looked after by one unpaid superintendent; then the Army was sent in to all the parks, and some order was achieved. That was also the time of the 1891 General Provisions Act which enabled private lumberjack exploitation of the forests on the public domain to be curbed: the President could declare them as National Forests. And, New York State conserved the Adirondack region's forests in an area three times that of Yellowstone.

Many factors explain the establishment of the early national parks: there was a vast amount of land available, some being valued, some discarded as having no economic value; the moving frontier encouraged the feeling that the new nation and its resources were boundless; the finest scenery acted as a surrogate for some culture left behind in Europe by the new settlers; and exploitation of the land, for example of Niagara and Yosemite, was countered by protectionist acts.

The US land distribution system provided the necessary framework within which to develop a new culture. While that slowly happened, many of the new arrivals felt the lack of historical continuity and scenically beautiful land remedied this culture-lack. As an endemic culture evolved, the land culture waxed and waned in terms of the resources allocated to it, and to the pressures to exploit it, though it generally enlarged in size and significance - roughly in proportion to the growth in population and money wealth of the new nation. These *parallel* cult-

ural developments help us to understand the continuing importance of the 'heritage land' movement and of later environmentalism.

Part of the United States heritage land is devoted to physical recreation, though most is concerned with more passive recreational pursuits and the preservation of sites important to US history. The United States showed how to put into effect what were essentially European concepts of environmental concern. The difference between the regions is that in the US environmental protection was for the majority, not a minority. This chapter is mainly concerned with how such protection originated and developed to the end of the nineteenth century.

Early Approaches to Environmental Protection

In 1776, Thomas Jefferson drafted the Declaration of Independence. Eight years later, in 1784, he extolled the virtues of Harpers Ferry, where the Potomac River cuts through the Blue Ridge Mountains, saying these mountains were worth crossing the Atlantic to see. In 1784 the United States' frontier lay along the Mississippi River: the land to the west - mountains, watercourses, deserts, places of scenic beauty of a grandeur somewhat transcending Harpers Ferry - was known by few. But let us keep matters in perspective: looked at objectively in the late twentieth century, relative to its size the US is not overendowed in scenery of world uniqueness. Mountains that are higher and grander, steppes that rival the mid-west plains, broader rivers, more dramatic plunges of land into sea ... these can all be found elsewhere. But nowhere else is there a Grand Canyon, the trees of California, an Everglades, or the hydro-geologic formations of southern Utah. In fact, Glacier, Grand Canyon, Yellowstone and Everglades National Parks have been given world heritage status by the International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN).

With hindsight, Jefferson's enthusiasm can be seen as representative of the time, and partly a natural reaction to what had been left behind in Europe. The Rhine gorges for example may be considered at least as impressive as a particular scenic location in the Blue Ridge Mountains; however, Harpers Ferry in those mountains has symbolic value. It was to do with the formation of a nation, and therefore elicited an emotional response in the early settlers. Indeed, the Blue Ridge Parkway, which may be considered a posthumous tribute to Jefferson, in 1980 was

the second most visited unit of the National Park System, next to Golden Gate National Recreation Area.

In 1784 Jefferson, in his remarks about Harpers Ferry, extolled the virtues of nature and was therefore prophetic about the US' future strengths in environmentalism. When he became President 17 years later he extended his and the nation's vision quite remarkably with the Louisiana Purchase of 1803, which included most of the Great Plains and reached what later became Yellowstone National Park. In fact, 'first word of the Yellowstone region was brought back to civilization in 1807' (within Jefferson's second term) by Colter, a member of the Lewis and Clark expedition, who showed 'how easily men may be weaned from the habits of civilised life to the ruder but scarcely less fascinating manners of the woods' (Zaslowsky 1986,13). While Indiana, Illinois, Louisiana, Alabama and Mississippi had become states of the Union by 1820, it was the westward expansion which opened settlers' eyes, for the first time, to its spectacular scenery. The Louisiana Purchase (as far as the West is concerned) was succeeded by purchases, wars and takeovers that added the southwest, the northwest and Alaska to the public domain, all completed by 1867 (Clawson 1983,17).

The Frontier and the Wilderness

So, the concept of 'the moving frontier' was important because it meant moving into virgin lands, notably during the first half of the 19th century. If Colter's actions had to wait some years before they were repeated, Nevins & Commager (1986,175) explain this by defining 'frontier' as a social process: it was the place where a sparse population was engaged in 'clearing and breaking land and building homes.' Pioneering activities which were hazardous, back-breaking and ultimately rewarding - but they established priorities which had little in common with ideas about conservation and preservation. These were little known and less respected. Before 1850, the western settlers additionally had to contend with 'resettlement' of the indigenous population, women's and black issues, cholera, and attack by animals and humans who thrived in the lawless environment of the frontier. Brogan (1986,276) reflects on the corruptness of early US governmental systems, contrasted with the beginnings of US democracy during Andrew Jackson's presidency in 1828. At that time democracy was limited to white male suffrage, but even this was not universal until 1840 (Brogan,281).

While the frontier was on land, and not the Pacific Ocean, the future appeared limitless. There was so much land it could be utilised, or discarded. Valuable land, because of its agricultural potential, or minerals, or precious metals, was fought over in ways satisfying to few except market economists. One advantage of the selection process was that most landscapes that were later to be esteemed consisted of steep slopes, powerful rivers, lakes or desert. These were discarded because the technology for their exploitation was not developed. By the time it had been, the federal government, and less frequently, state governments, had already stepped in and secured it for general enjoyment, or for the somewhat more carefully delineated multiple use concept. These governments therefore brought order and management to the wilderness, but the Romantic Movement made it important in its own right. 'Civilisation' later made it important to preserve rather than exploit.

Another characteristic of wilderness (a concept with some affinities with 'frontier') was that it was unpopulated. This meant it could be designated a special landscape area and could be sharply differentiated from populated areas; it also differed from Indian reservations, equally useless economically at the time of their establishment (though some parks and some reservations have since leapt in value either as real estate or for what lay beneath them).

But the frontier, as a continually moving concept, could not last. Zinn (1980,290) says 'The year of the massacre at Wounded Knee, 1890, it was officially declared by the Bureau of the Census that the internal frontier was closed.' Yet, as he points out, 'the profit system, with its natural tendency for expansion, had already begun to look overseas.'

Creating a Nation: Heritage Land as a Surrogate for Culture

The chapter started with Jefferson's eulogy of Harpers Ferry. But others, intent on establishing a national culture, also compared European, particularly Swiss, natural wonders unfavourably with the US ones. The majority of immigrants from Europe had been surrounded by the high culture of the nobility and bourgeoisie; they also had their own culture of day to day experience, the continuance of tradition, the passing on of folklore, games and rituals. When they arrived in the United States they were often confronted by the confusion, kindnesses, aggression and double-dealing of a society less mature than the one

they had left behind. While most utilised this invitation to self-fulfilment positively, they often felt a lack of continuity and the gradual accretion of works of art, music, poetry, novels that constitute a substantial part of a heritage. Zaslowsky (1986,12) quotes Washington Irving writing in 1819, where he preferred to 'wander over the scenes of renowned achievement ... and lose myself among the shadowy grandeurs of the past.' He was expressing a yearning for a US culture, through return visits to Europe. This lack has been made good in the twentieth century, for now there are US schools of modern art, an abundant literature and scholarship, a wide range of music, and architecture which has often led the world.

But this was not the case in the mid-nineteenth century, nor was it much improved twenty years later. It is perfectly possible to sense an earnest desire for a national culture, an aspiration which continued to the twentieth century. The more the West became known, the more did scenic wonders become surrogates for that culture. In fact, Clawson (1983,4) supports Runte's suggestion that the natural wonders were used to construct a culture, a tradition, a history. These trends were parallelled by a certain parochialism, itself born of fierce individualism, and nationhood did not really come of age until after the Civil War. Furthermore, the ante-bellum period was the beginning of self-sufficiency in raw materials, food and manufacturing; this too led to introspection.

A manifestation of the cultural urge may be seen in the immigrants' treatment of the indigenous population. While there were many massacres and appalling treatment of the Indians, this characteristic of colonisation has been repeated in Australia, New Zealand and South Africa, among other countries. The difference is that in most of these places the ideal was to wipe out the original population or ignore it. In the US, it was decided that the Indians should have reservations, should participate in the settlers' way of life (for better or worse), should be educated and emancipated. In short, a culture was maintained, possibly originally as a hangover from the idea of the Noble Savage in the Romantic Movement, while at a later time collective conscience took over.

Audubon travelled through the south and midwest during the early 1830s (Shanks 1984,56). In the same decade, the area now known as Hot Springs National Park in Arkansas was set aside as early as 1831, according to Clawson (1983,27). Clawson suggests it was not unique, for 'hot springs, salt springs, and some other areas considered vital for general public use were reserved by special laws from disposition to private ownership.' Runte (1987,26) reminds us that Hot Springs was a medicinal not scenic park, in case we should mistakenly believe it preceded Yosemite and Yellowstone, as 'first national park'. This begs the question of what is a national park, if Hot Springs can attract that title today. In 1916, it had more than twice as many visitors as the next unit of the new System, Rocky Mountain National Park (Foresta 1984, Table 2-1). It is also important to remember that Hot Springs in the 1830s was how contemporaries saw a national park, particularly as the only precedent for the concept was the medicinal spas of Europe.

Shanks (p57) refers to Marsh's book of 1864 as being 'the first environmental text. Like Thoreau he did not live to see his ideas accepted.' On p58, Shanks makes an interesting speculation: 'more of the west stayed in federal ownership because of western aridity than because of the politics of conservation. Arid geography was the nation's best conservationist,' and Powell's (1878) book supports this contention.

As noted in Chapter 1, *urban* parks were better known. In the late eighteenth century Washington had parks, but it was quite untypical of US cities. In 1816 Sydney, Australia had one, as did several European cities. Somewhat later, the US introduced them more generally, in parallel with a growing awareness of natural values in the East, though the most famous one had to wait for some years after Hot Springs. Cranz (1982) shows that New York's Central Park was the first of the new US urban parks, for which Frederick Law Olmsted won the design competition in 1858. In part the inspiration for an urban park originated in a visit he made to Birkenhead Park in 1850, within what was then a new town, easing overcrowding in adjacent Liverpool. For him, 'Britain was not only the past, it was the most modern of nations in 1850' (Stevenson 1977,54) - a reflection of the US love-hate relationship with one of its founding countries. Olmsted also played an important part in the foundation of Yosemite. While he 'hated the

wilderness' it was the wilderness of men rather than nature he hated; he was enchanted with Mariposa Grove and the Yosemite Valley, whose estate of 200 square miles he managed in 1863-4, but the enchantment was of a cultivated man looking at unculti-vated nature. It is implicit there was a parallel move, in Olmsted's mind, to civilise everyone - ranging from the ruthless frontierspeople to the indigenous Indian, which necessitated a change of thinking from Rousseau's 'noble savage.'

Yosemite was federal land, but in 1864 Abraham Lincoln transferred jurisdiction for it, through the Yosemite Park Act, to the State of California. The inalienable preservation of 'Yosemite and a grove of the big trees' for public use, resort and recreation' was urged by one Israel Ward Raymond upon Senator Conness of California, in 1864. The Senator transmitted this to the commissioner of the General Land Office, Congress agreed, and President Abraham Lincoln signed the Yosemite Bill into law - within four months of Raymond's letter! The idea was that California should take over the park, but two years elapsed before this happened. Truly 'national' had to wait until 1905 when the state ceded it all back to the federal government.

Lincoln acted in fact in the midst of the Civil War - this juxtaposition of environmental protectiveness with major crises is a recurring theme uncovered by this thesis. Table 4-2 gives much more detail and shows the significance of years like 1916, 1929, 1933 and 1972: perhaps attempts to construct a better future soften the harshness of crises. Nicholson (1970,167), discussing the Civil War, attributes most of these parallel, if seemingly opposed, acts as follows: 'For the first, but by no means the last time a war-torn nation turned its thoughts, among other things, to caring for its natural environment and scenery.' At the end of September, Olmsted was named one of nine Commissioners of the park, and was then elected their president. In seeking to create a ' "wild park" for the people of the future' Olmsted paid for a survey of its boundary himself, no money having been allocated to the Commissioners (Stevenson 1977,264). This becomes a familiar situation in the parks set up during the rest of the 19th century, and the Park Service has been underfunded through most of its existence.

However, the small area involved, 44 square miles, 'ignored the ecological framework of the region, especially its watersheds; indeed the

term *ecology* was not even known. Monumentalism, not environmentalism, was the driving impetus behind the 1864 Yosemite Act' (Runte 1987,29). A touch of point-scoring against Britain is also evident, according to Runte: 'Senator Conness's ... reminder that Great Britain originally debunked the existence of the Sierra redwoods substantiates the cultural overtones to his legislation.' This is a reference to the display at the Crystal Palace Great Exhibition of 1851, of the stripped bark of a Californian redwood, which suggested a tree of such enormity to the onlookers that they believed it was a hoax.

The relative smallness of the original Yosemite was of particular concern to John Muir: he fought for its enlargement when it became a National Park in 1890. Muir, who had emigrated from Scotland and found the Sierra Nevada mountains enchanting, said in 1875 that the public - and therefore their elected representatives - ranked scenery according to its size and ruggedness, making their way through the (undesignated) foothills as if blind to their beauty. Continuing this early, and perhaps unconscious, foray into the need for biologically-determined areas, he even looked forward to a time when lowlands would be loved more than alps, and lakes more than waterfalls. He was probably unaware that their economic value would make designation quite difficult.

Olmsted's restless activity in Yosemite was not reflected among east coast thinkers. The influential US transcendentalist poets, Emerson and Thoreau, built on the foundations of Kant, Shelley, Wordsworth, Byron and Keats. Emerson, in the 1840s, was influenced by Kant to create a philosophy based on intuition 'as a means to knowledge or the importance of the search for the divine' (Collins ED). Transcendentalism has been criticised by some as vague, visionary or idealistic. *Walden, or, Life in the Woods* was published by Thoreau in 1854 and gained national acclaim for its sensitive exaltation of nature. Yet, Runte (1987,5) saw Emerson and Thoreau as admirers of nature, not activists: 'The intellectual subtleties of transcendentalism ... could hardly sustain the national park idea in a country as firmly committed to material progress as the US. The decision not only to admire nature but to preserve it required stronger incentives.' Wilderness was admired particularly by people not liking active recreation, therefore they were saying 'leave it alone!'

Runte suggests the 'stronger incentives' had their origins in the

commercialising of Niagara Falls between 1830 and 1860, an act which was severely criticised by European visitors - notably de Tocqueville (1835). Everhart (1983,5) notes that 'by 1860 there was no point on the US side from which the falls could be seen without paying some sharpie a fee.' And Runte's support for an eastern origin of protectionism (1987,18) is emphasized by his reproduction of Catlin's painting of Niagara Falls in 1827: Catlin five years later was calling for their designation as 'A nation's Park'; while Catlin's own book (1851) states he used the term 'national park' also in 1832, applying it tentatively to Yellowstone. It is significant that Catlin, an artist, was using the term to describe his representation of how the area *should* be. Olmsted and others later used the condition of Niagara Falls as an argument for the protection of scenic wonders. We can conclude from this paragraph that protection requires control of commercial activities, thus underpinning the main concept of this thesis.

The Scotsman, John Muir, had admired Thoreau and Emerson before he reached the remotest parts of the continent. But, Zaslowsky echoes (or was the inspiration for) Runte's disparagement of the authors by saying (1986,5) that Muir was 'as fervently committed to making changes as these men were to talking and writing about them. Eventually Muir dismissed Thoreau as the "captain of a huckleberry party." ' With a longer perspective, we can see Emerson, then Thoreau, inheriting Wordsworth's approach in their pursuit of the majesty of nature, even of nature as the origin of all good things; there is a slight irony in Wordsworth looking back to Rousseau for whom wilderness was anathema.

Eight years after Yosemite and its redwoods were preserved, the usually acknowledged 'first' national park was created at Yellowstone - with nearly 80 times the land area. Its origin, according to Runte (op cit, 34), was very similar to Yosemite's: the search for an identifiable national culture, exemplified by the geysers, waterfalls, canyons, mountains and other 'curiosities' of the Park. However, there was also a throwback to Niagara, a fear it would be consumed by developers, and thus pour criticism, rather than acclamation, on the United States.

In fact, the last third of the nineteenth century saw several protective designations of federal land, but the final decade was the most fruitful. In 1890, Sequoia, General Grant and Yosemite were added. Because California's management took the form of encouraging commercial

enterprise (Zaslowsky 1986,13 says 'the Valley was soon victimised by the same kind of exploitation ... that had made such a mess of Niagara Falls') Yosemite was returned to federal ownership, greatly enlarged in size, and established as a National Park (Foresta 1983,16). Commerce was calmed by federal protection.

Of the original parks, Yellowstone was looked after by a solitary unpaid superintendent. He was quite unable to stem the floral and faunal depredations that took place; in 1883 Congress finally recognised this and sent in the Army, which was already paid by the federal government, and which saw less and less active service as the frontier moved, within less than a decade, to the Pacific Ocean.

The Army epitomised federal power and federal intervention, in a period when the federal government lacked many of the civilian agencies they acquired in the early years of the twentieth century. In the 19th century the Army's prime function was to protect the frontier and break up internecine and white: Indian conflicts. Ultimately, its concern was protection of the integrity of the United States, as in the Civil War. Following Yellowstone, in 1890 the Army took charge of Hot Springs and Yosemite (Runte p98): they had become an instrument of federal authority and control. It is generally agreed their intervention was essential and successful. Possibly by default, the Army succeeded in one direction that was later overturned, and took a long time to change back: they let the natural ecology of the parks determine biological outcomes. Thus, no predators were shot; in Yellowstone in the 20th century the predators were nearly eradicated, in pursuit of what NPS' Chief Scientist calls 'the Bambi culture' - with resulting vast overpopulation of elk and other animals. Certainly not an ecosystem, which Cousins (1989) defines as 'The area covered by the social group of the largest predator.' Use of the Army did two other things: it demonstrated the lack of a coherent civil policy for the parks at Washington level while at the same time it held the new nation together, and controlled the unruliness of its own citizens as frontiersmen.

Some action was also taking place at the states level. For example, one state's action was ahead of its time conceptually. In 1890, Governor Hill of New York State 'prompted the State Forest Commission to respond to the onslaught of devastation occurring within the Adirondack forest region' (Mertes 1984). In fact, as Corbett (1983,3-4) notes, six

million acres were protected for economic as well as conservation reasons: 'nearly three times as large as the largest contiguous states' park - Yellowstone with 2 219 823 acres. Corbett continues:

> 'In an innovative move, New York set up an agency that would develop and implement a land use plan, coordinating public forest uses with private land development for the good of all. The agency's members include state commissioners for environment and commerce and a number of local residents. The group reviews proposals for new construction and commercial development. Townships develop and submit plans for orderly growth. The state provides funds to assist localities in developing these plans. This coordinating agency brought a unity of purpose to more than 100 local government agencies involved in zoning and planning for the area.'

So, not only was it the precursor of a concept 70 years later - 'greenlining' to which I shall return - it also showed how concerted public spirit can curb the excess zeal of the land exploiter.

If what has been said above suggests that all protection of US heritage land materialised as 'parks', the General Provision Act 1891 (colloquially known as the Forestry Reserve Act) effected more widespread change. Everhart (1983,10-11) describes these few lines added to an omnibus public land bill as 'one of the most far-reaching conservation measures ever enacted. It gave the president unilateral authority to establish national forests from the public domain; no congressional approval was required.' The reason for its enactment was to protect the federal forests from depredation by private lumberjacks: an early example of exploitation being met with a protectionist reaction.

Similar authority was given to the president to create National Monuments by the Antiquities Act of 1906, and both acts moved significantly away from the more cumbersome (if democratic) requirement for a separate Act authorising each new national park and, later, each new unit of the National Park System. The result was a widening gulf between the growth rates of national parks and national forests: by the time the executive authority to create national forests was abolished by Congress in 1907, 175 million acres of national forests had been created from federal land, in comparison with a total of little more

than 4 million acres of national parks (Mackintosh 1984,11).

The creation of federal parks and forests was greatly facilitated by federal ownership of land. Because the original 13 states contained no federal land, the federal government (created by them) expanded its political power and territorial reach through westward expansion. It therefore bought and annexed land, and created the western states initially in the form of a 'colonial' model, whose conservation and preservation included humans as well as land. Having these vast land resources at its disposal, the federal government could then consider various ways of deploying them. When it was beginning to feel more confident that a nation had indeed been created, it could consider the disposal of the public domain among the people, with a significant aim of persuading people to settle in the West. In what became a headlong rush to meet this new aim, disposal resulted in a diminution of federal responsibilities toward the public domain.

Federal Land: Part Relinquished, Part Retained

How then did the quantity of federal land stabilise at about one third of the US total land mass? First, much of it was deemed (at the time) to be economically unusable. Second, low fees for grazing rights on federal land, and under-market price selling of federal forest timber (which continues today), were attractive, for the management costs of ownership did not have to be borne by the buyer. Third, increasingly large areas were set aside for military purposes.

Fourth, despite continuing clamours for complete privatisation of the public domain - still to be heard from the Right, late in the twentieth century - many could see how the notion of public ownership curtailed a reemergence of an aristocratic landowning class from which they had escaped. In fact the public sector could not prevent the assembly of large parcels of private land, by the repurchase of plots from individual homesteads. A form of industrial aristocracy also arose, for example associated with railroad building, discussed below. In contrast, it was not long before England, under Lloyd George, would be thinking about land nationalisation, followed by the formation of a nation of plot holders - a throwback to the US Homestead Act of the mid-nineteenth century, if only the British concept had been legislated.

Fifth, the US government's lands were quite different from those of the states - most notably because they did not respect state boundaries. Sixth, disposal became regulated and systematic. And, while there are probably other reasons, a seventh reflects the federal government's desire to establish homesteads, schools, railways and so forth. The federal government's policies were matched at the local level by interests wanting to acquire the wealth and power that disposal of the public domain entailed.

Nevertheless this policy of land dispersal took on a large momentum of its own, until Franklin Roosevelt slowed the disposal of federal land in 1934. The greatest nineteenth century federal land problem was its redistribution to the settlers - who had emigrated largely because land was available. Vast amounts were sold, as an early example of the privatisation of a public resource, partly regulated by a rectangular cadastral system of land division, initiated by Jefferson and applied to all lands west of Ohio. It comprises N-S Meridians and E-W Bases, each state having one or more of each. The primary subdivision is the Township of 6 miles by 6 miles. Each of its 36 square miles is called a Section, which has 640 acres, subdivided into quarter sections, which have quarter-mile sides. The quarter quarter section (the '40') can be divided into eight tracts of 5 acres each. Of the greatest federal holding (this always excluded the original 13 States and Texas) of 1 838 million acres, including Alaska and Hawaii, nearly 1 145 million had been sold by 1980 (Clawson 1983,26 & Department of Commerce 1986).

Because of abuses of the land disposition programme, regulation had to be followed by legislation, the Homestead Act of 1862. It allowed any citizen, for a modest fee, to obtain up to 160 acres of land (a quarter section) from the public domain, on condition that he reside on and cultivate it. In 1909 this maximum was enlarged to 320 acres, and then to 640 acres (sold at a minimum of $1 per acre) in the Stock-Raising Homestead Act of 1916 to make some allowance for areas of land for cattle-raising, of an economic size, in the areas west of Ohio. But other Acts enabled larger areas to be taken from the public domain into private ownership, and of course such areas could be assembled through purchase of Sections from the original buyers. The railroads were very large landowners (they achieved 131 million acres, according to Brogan [1986,394], allowing speculators to make 'the west a province of New York'); to encourage construction they were given alternating sections

of land for a specified distance - often 10 miles, sometimes 20 - on either side of the completed railroad, a federal device to help create a homogeneous nation. If another party already held the land, 'in lieu' land was granted elsewhere often twice as distant from the line, though again it was of alternate sections. The intervening public domain checkerboard land was then sold at twice the price of other federal land (Clawson 1983).

The railroads apart, Federal munificence stimulated massive land speculation - the Homestead Act land was absurdly cheap to an east coast entrepreneur. If the original objective of land disposal was to create plots cultivated by families, then it seems to have misfired. First, the US was predominantly an urban country. Despite many immigrants' desire for land being the driving force behind federal land disposal, once they had landed they tended to stay in the cities, for the work was there; this had to be offset against the prodigious difficulties of reaching western lands, followed by the backbreaking and largely solitary effort in making it produce. As with Britain's privatisation programme of the 1980s, a consequence of disposal of the federal domain was the further concentration of ownership and power in the private sector. Techniques of land exploitation were improved, and the federal government was persuaded to assist with cheap natural resources. Here we can see not only the beginnings of corporatism, but also the emergence of the countervailing power - that of land preservation.

'Worthless Land'

The concept of preservation, in some areas, was assisted by the lack of competition for much of the land containing the 'scenic wonders' - it was not cultivable, there were abundant forests more conveniently located, and the presence of valuable minerals within this land was not then known. Penfold et al (1972) reinforce this: though there was an emerging environmentalism among the early settlers of the West, few of them were keen to conserve the magnificent scenery, which usually tended to be difficult to reach. Runte has pointed out that the US national parks were first established on what was then perceived to be worthless land (or, as Webster said in 1852: 'What do we want with this ... region of savages and wild beasts, of shifting sands and whirlwinds of dust, of cactus and prairie dogs? To what use could we ever hope to put these great deserts and endless mountain ranges?')

O'Riordan (1981,5) elaborates, 'Before being dedicated, the first national parks in North America were carefully scrutinised for their forestry and mineral wealth and found wanting.' Many European settlers displayed a simultaneous awe of natural majesty and a contempt of fellow humans with a different skin colour. For those possessed with a concern for the natural beauties of their adopted country, the sharpness of their conservationism was dulled by their systematic annihilation of the Indians' food - the buffalo. Or the attitude was patronising in the extreme: as a Federal Indian Commissioner said, the aim was 'to make the Indian feel at home in America' (Utley & Mackintosh 1988,7).

In essence, then, competition was for economically useful land. The indigenous population was continually resettled to progressively poorer land. Other useless land - mountains and waterfalls, desert and canyons, might just as well be preserved scenic areas. Appreciation of western landscapes developed slowly, in part because of the sheer difficulty of reaching them, though many did go, encouraged by the eulogies of returning travellers. Others visited the areas in their minds, because of the photographs and paintings that were becoming available. In the east the US heritage benefited greatly from the bequest of James Smithson in 1826 and statutory establishment of the Smithsonian Institution in 1846: in keeping with the Constitution's concept of equality of opportunity, the Smithsonian Museums were open to all. This close association with humanity's creations of high artistic quality probably spilled over into an enhanced appreciation of natural scenery. Both perceptions were heightened by the people's enthusiasm to achieve a new nation that would be larger and better than their countries of origin, and then hold tightly to this domestic bliss by erecting a wall of isolationism around it.

Land Preservation and Exploitation

The thesis that preservation and exploitation are interdependent was explained in Chapter 1. In this chapter have been found several loosely linked, but generally isolated, examples of incipient preservation. Some struggled for existence against the frontier spirit, and some involved no struggle at all, as no one wanted the land - it was uneconomic.

Furthermore, in the early years of the century, land was 'created' faster than it was needed, for example the enormous addition of land through the Louisiana Purchase occurred at a time when the population had not yet reached 10 million. It was not until after 1850 that the supply of land stabilised - the only major additions after the 1853 Gadsden Purchase were Hawaii and Alaska - while demand for its use, through population growth, increased rapidly: the beginnings of later conflict. Because initially supply exceeded demand, there was little or no need to exploit those parts with high landscape value: this explains why preservation as a concept was embryonic; few people were even concerned about it. In fact, 'preservation' applied to these times is a meaningless concept in the terms of my thesis, for that requires an exploitative act to effect it. What little was preserved was perhaps a response to exploitative actions in society at large.

The 'worthless land' concept aptly summarises this position about land which was quite simply ignored by those looking for economically developable land, and it anticipates different values which will emerge at later stages in this thesis. For example, O'Riordan's (1981,4-5):

> 'Although the early conservation period was noted for its battles to designate national parks and wilderness areas, the political motivations at the time were based less on bioethical notions than on commercial considerations of tourism and the promotion of national prestige ... but in modern times bioethical rhetoric is employed to protect wilderness areas, national parks, and wildlife habitats from the pressures of exploitation.'

Incrementalism and Critical Mass

Despite an evident abundance of land, certain areas were desired by both environmentalists and profit-seekers. Randomly scattered through the land though they were, they seem to exhibit a form of incrementalism - as they grew quantitatively so they provided a critical mass from which legislation flowed. And, as they grew, so did the exploiters believe there must be something there in which they should be interested. An interesting parallel is suffrage. Before 1828 democracy had to be expressed through riots. White male suffrage started, incompletely, in 1828; it had to wait until 1840 before it became universal

for them (Brogan 1986). Wyoming led the way to white women's suffrage in 1869, but it was well into the twentieth century before the process was completed. For blacks, it took until 1965 (Zinn 1980,450) before registration for voting was legislated. Thus, innovatory pockets became mass movements and legislation followed. Rather closer to the topic of this thesis is Olmsted's developing interest. A visit to Birkenhead Park seems strongly to have influenced his ability to win the competition for New York's Central Park. Only a few years after that he was working in California, and became president of the commissioners of the newly established Yosemite park, under California's overall management. Then he argued for national parks - a progression from the particular to the general.

Conclusions

While Europe was the conceptual cradle of environmentalism, the United States showed the world how to implement such concepts. Conception in the United States, birth and maturation took place over a comparatively long period of time - perhaps close to 200 years from the late eighteenth to the late twentieth centuries. In the United States the development of environmentally protective thinking was possible because of an unique set of circumstances, not least of which was a low density of population when measured against an abundance of land. The other motivational force was the reaction against European origins of most of the settlers. Their desire to make good the deficient lives they had suffered induced a federal desire to make land available in plots large enough for a family to be self-sufficient.

Unfortunately it did not quite work out like that, for only a small proportion of the vast incoming population actually wanted to work the land, once they had experienced the wealth many of them could create in the burgeoning cities. And the poor and dispossessed, seeking to better their lives, were not the only ones to emigrate from Europe. The others were the entrepreneurs, who joined an existing aristocratic class which had descended from the first settlers and had made sure they obtained and held a more than fair share of the nation's resources. This entrepreneurial class then set about wealth creation in perhaps three main ways. First, they developed industries that would provide the goods the incoming population needed and desired. Second, they sought and extracted the mineral, timber and other natural-

resource wealth of the nation. Third, they bought up land that had been distributed cheaply from the public domain and made it into large parcels. The corollary of the last act was that it required federal intervention to make it work - in terms of water management, cheap timber, cheap hydropower and a blind eye turned toward the exploitation of blacks, Indians and some whites for the labour source.

In these ways the exploitation of the US natural resources took shape. And this phenomenon, in its turn, gave rise to the movement that sought to protect areas of outstanding natural beauty. When such movements were coupled with these landscapes' rôle as surrogate for a high culture, and with development pressures on the land, then the preservation movement began to take on an aura of inevitability.

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3 Progressive Conservation : 1901-1910

Chapter Summary

This chapter is about a turning point in United States history, when it greatly developed economically to become a major industrial power. In doing this it stepped up its search for natural resources, thus further damaging the land in general, and the heritage land in particular, until various compromises were reached, largely through the intervention of President Theodore Roosevelt and the 'scientific conservationist' intrigues of his Chief Forester, Gifford Pinchot.

This chapter seeks to show that relationships with heritage land were neither wholly exploitative, nor wholly preservationist (in fact the attraction of the exploitation pole was in many ways more powerful than its opposite pole). What emerged was a compromise called 'conservation.' Yet, out of this compromise a firmer protection of preserved land was to be born. The chapter tackles these conflicts and solutions in four main sections: the first explains the political and economic changes of the period 1901-1910. It looks at what was carried over from the nineteenth into the twentieth century to help in a period of industrial expansion. It discusses exploitation not just by the private sector, but also of the public domain by the federal agencies. Roosevelt intervened in the affairs of the private sector in new ways and there is a brief notice of the corporatism which was to be more evident in the two world wars and the interwar period. Business and government certainly related more closely during the period of this chapter than they had for some time, and voluntary sector thinking was incorporated in the formulation of government policy.

Then, the protection of heritage land is considered. The small band of preservationists is described, together with their part in forcing a holding position of conservation until, more powerful, they could press their claims for expansion and stability of something more attuned to preservation, for a small sector of the public domain, when the National Park Service was created in 1916. 'Conservation' was the topic of the moment, initiated by Theodore Roosevelt, but claimed as his own invention by Gifford Pinchot. The concept 'progressive

conservation' was very much a creature of the times. It was also something of a conscience-assuager in allowing the economy to boom and to swallow resources while having the appearance of simultaneously protecting them.

The final section of this chapter looks at the continuity of protection, describing how the 19th century designated areas fared, and the additions made to them during the period 1901-1910. The basis they provided for future protection of heritage land in the United States is also examined.

The Spirit of the Times

Linking the Eras

The decade covered by this chapter was a major period of transition in US history. Generally referred to as the 'Progressive Era,' it was dominated by the character, actions and presidencies of Theodore Roosevelt, who was both attuned to, and helped secure, progressivism. 'Progressivism' indicated a reaction against the failures of society - the Trusts, concentration of wealth in a few hands, search for profit at the expense of the consumer or user of services, unhygienic food processing and so on. In other words, it was a paean for the type of democracy on which the United States had been built, and which was considered to have been lost. Nevins & Commager (1986,337) note 'the material achievements of the nation were impressive, but the social and cultural achievements disappointing.' They quote Wilson's first inaugural address in 1912:

> 'The evil has come with the good, and much fine gold has been corroded. With riches has come inexcusable waste. We have squandered a great part of what we might have used, and have not stopped to conserve the exceeding bounty of nature, scorning to be careful, shamefully prodigal as well as admirably efficient.'

Wilson here suggests another reason for the establishment of the National Park Service, the topic of the next chapter; in effect he is being retrospective about Roosevelt's successes, and failures. Brogan (1986,447) shows that the word 'progressive' had long been a favourite

in common speech. On the same page he is quite reserved about the success of the period: 'the US did in many respects move forward during the period before the First World War - did begin to tackle a good many serious problems intelligently. It is a moderately encouraging story.' We must therefore not get too carried away about civilising advances in the US, a topic returned to in chapter 6, for it was still some time before women were enfranchised, and a much longer time before blacks and north american indians received treatment appropriate to supposedly equal human beings, let alone votes.

The second half of the nineteenth century saw the reconstruction after the Civil War, some tentative beginnings in the realm of uncared-for national parks, official closure of the frontier in 1890, and the almost silent passage of the Forest Reserve Act in 1891 - which was to have great consequences in the distribution of the public domain among Departments and Agencies. This act was passed to stop illegal removal of federal trees by permitting a president unilaterally to establish National Forests. It is interesting to examine the difference between before and after, between having a poor conservation policy and none at all. Before, the private lumberjacks damaged the landscape by the random removal of trees which they made no attempt to replace. The Forest Service (since its establishment in 1905) has clearcut whole hillsides, leaving a massive scar on the landscape - but it has replanted these areas. If a forest is to be sustained, then only 10% of its growth should be removed in any one year, and that should be scattered, not concentrated; with its commercial remit the Forest Service could not countenance this approach, for retrieving the timber would have been much more costly.

It was a period of prosperity, consolidation, some complacency, and Republican domination: between Lincoln and Taft nine of twelve Presidents were Republican; between the 36th (1859-61) and 56th (1899-1901) Congresses, seventeen had Republican Senates and fourteen had Republican Houses. This is not to say there was no opposition; there even were socialists of whom William Jennings Bryan was a notable example. He published a newspaper *The Commoner* in Nebraska in which he demanded the unthinkable in 1900: for example, direct election of senators. After a trip round the world in 1905-6 he returned to the US burning yet more brightly: deploring 'intolerable expenditure on armaments' and calling for senatorial election again, a graduated

income tax, an 8-hour working day, federal ownership of interstate railroads and municipal ownership of streetcars and utilities. He was supported by the newspaper owner, Randolph Hearst (Painter 1987,191-5).

But these, and a few others', excursions into socialism played a minor rôle in US politics, which remained largely a two party race between Democrats and Republicans. William McKinley, deemed 'another worthy mediocrity' by Brogan (1985,443), became President in 1897 and was reelected in 1901. For McKinley's second term, Theodore Roosevelt was his Vice President for a few months before assuming the presidency after McKinley was assassinated. Both men were part of the continuing series of Republican Presidents which lasted until Woodrow Wilson, but Roosevelt was not of the standard model. While wealthy, he considered himself a man of the people, and this in itself set him apart from his predecessors and from many of his contemporaries. In the midst of powerful racial feelings, which came to the surface at this time, he astounded most of the White camp by inviting a prominent Black, Booker T Washington, to breakfast at the White House (Zinn 1980,203). Brogan (1986,462) eulogises: Roosevelt,

> 'was the ablest man to sit in the White House since Lincoln; the most vigorous since Jackson; the most bookish since John Quincy Adams ... author of several solid works of history ... But the robust and philistine society in which Roosevelt grew up had little time for mere intellectuals ... At various times he was a rancher, a big-game hunter in Africa, an explorer in South America, a soldier in the Spanish-American War ...'

It was not until 1913 that Senators were elected by the enfranchised public. Painter (1987,187) notes that before then 'the Senate functioned as an extension of the business relationships that controlled state politics because state legislatures elected US senators, and senators thereby owed their political power to various moneyed interests.' From 1913 to the present day, the distribution of senators has been rigid and unrepresentative, to put it mildly. Under the system whereby each state has two senators, the sparsely populated western states exert power identical to that of the densely populated eastern states. But the westerners' power is of particular significance to this thesis, as it was used to push the interests of large land-owners, forestry exploiters, demands for massive irrigation projects, and so forth.

It could also be said that, until 1913, senators were part of the US aristocracy of wealthy self-made industrialists, as was Roosevelt himself. A tendency of aristocrats is to rise above otherwise generally accepted law and custom, and believe in loftier ideals: some of the senators were imbued with this self-glorification. They saw themselves as inheritors of the earth which they intended to protect. Peculiarly to the United States, this sense of 'rising above' may well be connected with the previous century's Emerson-dominated Transcendentalism. Bradbury & Temperley (1989,92) point to 'the world's essential meanings (which Emerson held to be) derived from spiritual "laws" which "transcended" all received dogma and institutions, and came to men through their intuitive faculties.' So, in this interpretation, the transcendentalists received their guidance intuitively, while the aristocrats received theirs through accruing money and passing it on as an element of inheritance or heritage. Painter (1987,xlii) sees this aristocracy as a late nineteenth century evolution: 'economic privilege was therefore creating an aristocracy that would ultimately undermine democracy.' Some US citizens noted that 'a society in which the privileged wielded enormous power to further their own interests could not at the same time function as a democracy in which all were created equal.' Perhaps it was able to continue as a society precisely because of inequality, another case of opposites contributing toward a roughly common end, in this case the perpetuation of a particular kind of nation: individualistic, self-made, contemptuous of government unless it could be persuaded to espouse one's cause.

However, the gap between these opposites did narrow later, until there was a true consensus on the elemental aspects of US domestic policy, creating a world where the equality of opportunity was realistic, but the equality of power and wealth was not. The latter was normally accepted, however, because it denoted that an individual had been successful through his, and less often her, own initiative: it was as if the poor were peering prospectively into an American Grail. US citizens have always been rather suspicious of the federal government, concerned that it might override individualism: McKay (1987,31) underlines the importance of the people, saying '... even the Constitution is a document formalizing the people's power, not the State's'; two pages later he demonstrates convincingly that the US has a true democracy associated with 'exceptionalism' - by which was meant the US is unlike anywhere else, and the better for it.

Around 1900, then, the United States began to edge into a different period, one in which industrial, immigration and population expansion reached new heights (and therefore led to exploitation of heritage land, after the use of available ordinary land) while at the same time the preservation movement became strident, even though it was surrounded by conservation. This expansion can be seen in the following illustration.

Bradbury and Temperley (1989,213-215) provide some figures on the industrial change that took place at this time. For example: while in 1880 the United States already had the largest rail network in the world at 115 547 miles of track, by 1915 it had enlarged to 394 944 miles. 6.8 million short tons of steel produced in 1895 rose to 35.2 million by 1915. 3.6 persons per 1 000 had a telephone in 1890; by 1915 it was 1 per 10 persons. Los Angeles' population grew from 11 thousand in 1880 to 319 thousand in 1910, Seattle's from 3.5 to 237.2 thousand, Atlanta's from 37 to 155 thousand. A predominantly rural population quickly became a predominantly urban one, helped by large numbers of immigrants. The national population, as we have seen in chapter 1, rose rapidly. In fact, within the period of this chapter, between 1900 and 1910, it expanded by 21%, from 76 to 92 million. In parallel, the European population reduced and lost part of its skilled workforce - who were among the emigrants to the United States. This was one of the factors shortly to lead to manufacturing supremacy. Production of steel and extent and numbers of railroads and telephones were all the highest in the world, and increased further from this time on, enabling a powerful contribution to be made, if somewhat late, to the allied victory over the Central Powers in the first world war. Such rapid expansion involved major exploitation of the environment.

Exploitation

A rapidly growing population, massive industrialisation, and prosperity have at least one inevitable outcome: a seemingly insatiable demand for natural resources. Oil, coal, natural gas, iron ore, rarer metals and water; high quality land and poorer quality land enriched with chemicals; timber, human and non-human labour ... all were present in the US and all were cut, dammed, extracted, worked. A small part of this activity, excluding its products, benefitted the natural environment; most of the activity was quite damaging to it. It has continued this way,

though repeated dour warnings have acted as some kind of check on rapacity.

Rapacity is often portrayed as a grim and sometimes exclusive characteristic of the private sector, motivated by profit. This is undoubtedly an oversimplified judgment, particularly when it is remembered that almost all people in capitalist nations enjoy the products of private industry, always provided it curtails its damaging effluents. Yet, in the period we are looking at, the public sector was also involved in exploitation - and has remained so to this day. As noted above, the Forest Service exploited the forests, leaving bare hillsides, and sold the timber at below market prices. In fact, the Forest Service was so keen on its multiple use concept that it wanted to absorb the national parks as well, so they could be 'rationally used' and, probably, to pre-empt establishment of the National Park Service. The Bureau of Reclamation dammed most rivers in the western United States, and the Army Corps of Engineers dammed many of the rest. Several of the few that escaped later became protected under the 1968 National Wild & Scenic Rivers Act. The Fish & Wildlife Service maintained the animals in their care to ensure a stock for hunters and fishers. More recently, following this profligate tradition, the Department of Energy has covered many square miles of western deserts with wind generators and photovoltaic cells, and the Bureau of Land Management has let very many leases on its lands for energy exploitation - oil, natural gas and coal - should the present oil glut be transformed into scarcity. That a reduced consumption of energy would make this exploitation of public land unnecessary, seems not to be considered.

While these public exploitations of public space might seem inconsistent with a country whose environmentalism has led the world, we need to be very clear about that concept's limited application, in terms of land. I hope to make clear that while there is a large quantity of high quality scenic land in the United States, it is fragmented in terms of ownership and in terms of what is actually being protected. Most of the southern half of Utah and the northern half of Arizona would easily justify being designated a World Park. Within this area, Bauman (1987) is eloquent about the need to give national park status to the 900 square mile San Rafael Swell, and is supported by ex-Interior Secretary Stewart Udall. At least 50% of the Arizonan and

Utan area is public domain, but only about 15% is protected (within the National Park Service, that is: the other agencies became conservationist rather than preservationist). These are generalised comments, of course: it is both inaccurate to describe the NPS as totally preservationist because it has to accommodate visitors, and to describe the other agencies as totally conservationist as each of them has some statutorily defined wilderness area. The points I am making are first that protection of heritage land occurs in relatively small pockets, surrounded by indifference at best or rapacity at worst. Second, that heritage land is far more likely to be found within the NPS than elsewhere in the public lands (though NPS itself controls a mere 10.7% of the public land of the land-managing federal agencies).

Outside these protected pockets a great deal of the United States is environmentally destructive, and much of its urban area is space-extensive and energy-intensive in terms of the great distances that have to be covered. This is a widely-held European view, though it is salutary to remember that many Londoners gladly fled to the low densities of Milton Keynes. It is not difficult to achieve this kind of nonurbanism if first one has an abundance of land, second if control of its use and urban design are seen to be incompatible with the concept of freedom, third if most decisions are market-based, and fourth if the pursuit of individualism remains sacrosanct.

So, given these entrenched and widespread values in the US, there is considerable irony when the federal government move in to protect the public domain, and surprise that so much of it has survived relatively intact until the last years of the twentieth century. In fact, federal exploitation was already becoming quite significant, and was being encouraged, by Theodore Roosevelt's administrations. Here the federal government was not acting so much as a watchdog for preservation as an agency of the people, and using the resources of the public domain to sustain a developing economy. So, water and wood from forests (and later, mineral leases) were offered to the construction and agricultural sectors below market prices. This may have been practical at a time when the nation had to absorb and house and keep economically active a rapidly increasing population, but it still continues today. It is worth examining why this should be, for the federal government is not renowned for handouts in other areas, and the concept of a welfare state is anathema to the individualist aspirants of self-achieved

success. Perhaps it could be argued that the majority of its citizens benefit from this largesse - all benefit from home produced food, and a high proportion of the population live in wooden houses.

But, as with many bureaucratically-organised public endeavours, things can go wrong. We shall see more of this when discussing Theodore's fifth cousin, Franklin D Roosevelt, in chapter 5, and some questions will be asked in chapter 8 about practice today.

Intervention and the Rôle of the State

Seeing that those greedy for the nation's resources were beginning to be seen as atavistic and relentlessly demanding, and the natural heritage was endangered, Roosevelt faced the political problem of intervention head on. He was crucially aware of the need to reconcile the conflict between the small man who has a vote, and the big man who also has money. He started by reinforcing federal control of the public domain by setting aside large areas of forest (sustainable resources), and smaller areas of national park and monument (nationalism), as we shall see below. Second, he enforced anti-trust laws against monopolistic economic activity, confronting, and winning, a battle against J P Morgan's holding company, the Northern Securities Company. Thus, Roosevelt can be seen as nurturing continuity in the protection of the nation's heritage lands, and mediating in conflicts between those desiring either exploitation or preservation. This was not all of Roosevelt's anti-trust action during two presidencies; if we now see his overall achievement as less than perfect, we should remember that it was action demanding great courage at a time when most in his own party were supportive, or a part, of the industrial baronry.

It is fascinating to see that Roosevelt's actual, or threatened, intervention echoes the conflict between land exploitation and preservation. O'Callaghan (1987,12) elaborates:

> 'One of Theodore Roosevelt's main beliefs was that it was the duty of the President to use the power of the Federal Government to improve conditions of life for the people - to see that the ordinary man and woman got what he called "a square deal." One of the biggest dangers to this idea, he believed, came from the trusts ... his idea was to give the United States the best of both worlds - to allow business men enough freedom of action to make their firms efficient and prosperous, but at the same time to prevent them from taking unfair advantage of other people.'

His 'square deal' was followed and further developed by his cousin's 'New Deal' in the 1930s.

Corporatist beginnings (see Chapters 4 and 5 for more discussion) were emerging in Theodore Roosevelt's policies; not only was he trying to curb excessive industrial profits, he was also quietly working with capitalists and such organised labour as there was, in order to create a cohesive private:public compact. He was by no means anti-labour: for example he supported a strike of anthracite workers in 1902; he sent federal troops ostensibly to protect the mineowners' property but really to ensure fair play in the dispute; he then invited both sides to Washington, from which negotiations the mineworkers emerged with most of what they had wanted (Brogan 1985,464). At a time when Roosevelt was trying to pursue conservation policies, the corporatism he needed to achieve this was thoroughly dependent on the voluntary sector's thinking.

Protecting Heritage Land

The Preservationists

Other actors appeared on the scene. Notable was the Sierra Club, preceded by the National Audubon Society in 1885 (Nicholson 1970,174), and one or two others of lesser significance. The Sierra Club was founded in 1892 by John Muir, who persuaded Theodore Roosevelt to visit Yosemite National Park in 1903: there is a photograph of the two in the park in Zaslowsky (1986,54). But, more importantly, it is claimed 'There together, beneath the trees, they laid the foundation of Roosevelt's innovative and notable conservation programs' (Sierra Club 1987). The Sierra Club was also involved in a form of corporatism - using the State as the instrument to get what it wanted: a National Park Service. The natural corollary was for its policies then to cohere with those of the federal government.

Why was the Club founded at that time? We need to recall that in 1892 only two years had gone by since the new western national parks of Sequoia and General Grant had been created, and Yosemite had become a national park. It is not without significance that all of these were in Muir's beloved Sierra Nevada mountain chain, all were within California, and all were still subject to the depredations of loggers,

hunters, gold diggers and others seeking prosperity without necessarily also being concerned with the protection of natural beauty. Protection was entirely dependent on the military custodians, who could not be everywhere at once within these large areas.

Strong (1977) elaborates, showing how Muir believed the mountain chain to be 'the range of light,' and quoting the Club's major purpose: 'To explore, enjoy and render accessible the mountain regions of the Pacific Coast; to publish authentic information concerning them; to enlist the support and cooperation of the people and government in preserving the forests and other natural features of the Sierra Nevada...' Here is an indication of the growing power of the West, which was now able to challenge the previously unassailable East. A throwback can be visualised to the challenge of the new industrial towns of England - Sheffield, Manchester, Birmingham, for example, none of which had populations of any significance before the nineteenth century, suddenly sending industrial representatives to challenge the old seat of power in London.

Furthermore, in 1891 the Forest Reserve Act placed, in the hands of the Executive, power that would be extensively used until Roosevelt himself stopped it in 1907. Interestingly, Roosevelt did not simultaneously stop the presidential power of creating national monuments, for this was last used by Jimmy Carter in the late 1970s. Opponents of development, like the Sierra Club, must have seen this act as contrary to their beliefs: it constituted a further reason for the establishment of the Club. While these are reasons for the Club's establishment in 1892, it was very probably an embryonic Club in search of an appropriate moment to break out of its shell, which would have happened at some other time, had it not done so then. It owed much to the preceding part of the century, and in particular to the transcendentalists.

Concepts of Conservation

'Conservation' was defined in chapter 1, and that definition remains appropriate for the origin of its application in the United States. The needs of capitalist industry, of pioneers building their own homes, of people exploiting the land sensitively or insensitively for agricultural and mining purposes: all of these led to a solid mass of compromise - conservation - between the poles of preservation and

exploitation. For conservation is essentially an attempt to develop land and other resources in such a way that they keep renewing themselves, thereby establishing a cyclical pattern. Yet, it was never quite as simple as this, for land in particular does not have an innate renewing capability which melds with the time-scales demanded by humans; it therefore has to be 'helped' with the addition of fertilisers and insecticides, which set up cycles of their own without seeking the permission of Man, cycles which usually proved detrimental rather than beneficial. Similarly, when the concept of conservation is applied to a national park, sooner or later its popularity with the 'gazing in awe' group, let alone the sporty recreationists, will mean that paths wear out, that trees are removed to provide a view, that roads are built for the drivethru generation, large private sector concessions spring up to provide sustenance and rest facilities for the visitors, and often a virtual village is created to house the park administrators. Strictly speaking, all of these acts are inimical to preservation.

But the proponents of conservation, in the last years of the nineteenth and the first of the twentieth centuries, had no doubts about its meaning. As Utley & Mackintosh (1988,18) point out, 'conservation did not mean, as often alleged, that natural resources under federal control should be locked up and saved for the future. On the contrary, the conservationists advocated use - rational, planned, orderly use. Their goal was not an end to exploitation, not even private exploitation, but rather wise development and use guided by science, facilitated by technology, regulated by government, and benefitting society. Thus, power and irrigation sites would be leased to private enterprise and developed according to government standards. Mineral deposits would be mined under a lease system. Forests would be logged and grasslands would be grazed under permits that guaranteed sustained yields of timber and grass.' A grand concept which part succeeded and part failed. It had some rather large inbuilt assumptions - that resources, while not being infinite, were adequate; that it was logical to irrigate deserts and that water itself was abundant; that 'planned orderly use' was not a concept irreconcilable with the constitutionally-supported aims of most citizens; that the connotation of the word 'exploitation' would not make preservationists rise in protest, particularly when it was applied, as here, to public as well as private actions.

O'Callaghan (1987,14) popularises Roosevelt's position on conservation, saying his

> 'most important service to his country was to persuade Congress to pass a number of Conservation laws*. These were laws to conserve, or save, the country's natural resources from being carelessly and greedily used up. The United States desperately needed such laws. The President pointed out that unless action were taken to slow down the rate at which her forests, her mineral resources and the fertility of her soil were being used up, she would soon discover that much of her natural wealth had been destroyed forever. Congress listened to his advice and under the conservation laws millions of acres of land were protected, so that their forest and mineral wealth could be preserved for the use of future generations.'

The picture was more complicated, as we shall see below. (* probably refers in particular to the Newlands (Reclamation) Act of 1902 and the Reorganization Act of 1905).

Roosevelt was a key figure in protection - and use - of the Federal forests: he is credited by Nevins and Commager (1986, 355) as having placed the conservation of natural resources high within domestic priorities:

> 'The country had long been deluded by the concept of infinity with respect to its forests and its soil; at the end of the century it awoke to a realization that three quarters of the forests were gone, much of the mineral wealth had been wasted, water power was being exploited for private profit, and the soil was being washed away by floods or blown away by dust storms. Roosevelt's love of nature and his familiarity with the West gave him a personal interest in conservation.'

In the first years of the twentieth century, and in support of his conservationist tendencies, Roosevelt used the Forest Reserve section of the General Revision Act of 1891 to add 80 million acres of land to the forest reserves. I suggest below he bridged between preservation and conservation (as understood from the definitions in chapter 1), and this may explain why he appointed Gifford Pinchot as the new Forest Service's head, for in doing so he permitted Pinchot to introduce his view of a rational, economics-based conservation. Pinchot has stirred many writers to strong support or abuse: Zaslowsky (1986,75 et seq) for example says 'Pinchot, a hatchet-faced Yale graduate belonging to a well-to-do family of French extraction ... completed his silvicultural

studies in France. The neat rows of commercial timber there ... was a vision he wanted to transplant into the unruly forests of America. It was time, he felt, to introduce the European tradition of growing trees like a crop ...' Pinchot firmly believed that land was there to be used, and in rather fewer cases to be admired. If you used it, you did this soberly and not to excess, for you, or your heirs, would need it again tomorrow and in the more distant future. Thus came about the concept of *multiple-use* which was to be of profound importance in the development of the Forest Service, and those other Interior agencies which tended to locate themselves halfway between the poles of exploitation and preservation.

Thus also came about use of the term 'conservation', which Pinchot believed he had invented. In 1907, unused to cautious, unaggressive statement, he was struck with the idea that the 'wise use of all natural resources was the key to the safety and prosperity of the American people, and all the people of the world, for all time to come.' He had derived the word from the forest conservancies of British-ruled India. (Zaslowsky op cit,79).

Foresta (1984,14) contrasts what he terms 'utilitarian vs recreational uses' by examining the policies and aspirations of Pinchot and John Muir. He notes that the two were close friends in 1896 and bitter enemies in 1911. While Pinchot's first principle of conservation was development, Muir's conservation was diametrically opposed. Foresta quotes Muir's (1901,76) description of the Sierra Nevada range to underline the difference between the two men's concepts:

> 'benevolent, solemn, fateful, pervaded with divine light, every landscape glows like a countenance hallowed in eternal repose; and every one of its living creatures, clad in flesh and leaves, and every crystal of its rocks ... is throbbing and pulsing with the heartbeats of God.'

This difference is not hard to understand. Muir had arrived in the US from Scotland as a small boy, with damaged eyes. If he regained full sight, he pledged himself to live only in wild places. Sight restored, he largely kept his pledge, travelling widely, deeply absorbed in natural history. Pinchot's background was scientific. Perhaps these different approaches were absorbed by Roosevelt. The fact that he shot

big game in Africa is also not inconsistent if one accepts the spirit of the times. As an aristocrat, there was nothing incongruous about Roosevelt proclaiming conservation (he probably meant a blend of conservation and preservation) at one moment, and going to Africa to shoot big game the next. They were quite compatible concepts, and could be justified, if anyone dared to ask for justification, in ways similar to fox and deer hunting today - that these acts help maintain an equilibrium, culling specie excess, enabling it to stabilise its population and strong lineage ... etc. The right to bear arms, an active Army, a people habituated to hunting - all these were potent Americanisms of the time.

Roosevelt was not always well-supported by those close to him. His first Interior Secretary, Ethan Allen Hitchcock, seemed to get on with few people, but was replaced with 'James R Garfield (son of the President) in 1907, (when) the conservation coterie acquired another effective activist' (Utley & Mackintosh 1988,18-19). And yet, such a judgment from the historians of the Department of the Interior seems to fail to recognise - or is development-biased! - these Secretaries' involvement in the Hetch Hetchy dam controversy, proposed for construction in the middle of Yosemite National Park, and certain to flood one of its most beautiful valleys. The Mayor of San Francisco, which needed the dam's water, petitioned Hitchcock for permission to dam the gorge. 'Hitchcock, however, whose sympathies lay with preservationists, denied the request in 1903 as "not in keeping with the public interest" '(Runte 1987,78). Garfield, however, was a friend and supporter of Chief Forester Gifford Pinchot, and not unnaturally inclined toward the 'scientific conservation' benefits of the Hetch Hetchy dam, which he approved in 1908. The uproar that followed among preservationists meant the dam had to wait until a 1913 Congressional approval before finally being built (Runte,p79).

Everhart (1983,12) refers to a 1908 Conference on Conservation, convened at the White House. It emanated from Roosevelt's growing concern about overexploitation of natural resources, and 'brought together one of the most distinguished assemblages of national leaders ever gathered, including most of the members of Congress and the Supreme Court and the governors of 34 states. The president opened the proceedings with a disturbing declaration: 'It seems to me time for the country to take account of its natural resources, and inquire how long they are likely

to last." ' Everhart follows this by saying that Roosevelt's

> 'was a lone voice during an era when exploitation of the country's resources was the watchword and establishment of the early parks was a concession to a minority, rather than an expression of national purpose. The parks were little more than administrative stepchildren within the federal government, with operational responsibility scattered.'

Some of these comments reflect similar views elsewhere in this chapter, but the generally dejected air of the author appears somewhat out of place in an age which has, so far, been shown to be innovative and expansionist, not least within the realm of heritage protection.

Roosevelt immediately followed his 1908 conference with another initiative. He appointed a national conservation commission 'to prepare an inventory, the first ever made for any nation, of all the natural resources within the territory of the United States' (Theodore Roosevelt entry in Encyclopaedia Britannica), though I have found no evidence that it was carried out.

Then, anxious to push forward his conservationist/preservationist concerns in the short remaining period of his presidency, in 1909 Roosevelt tried to convene an international conservation conference in Washington. As a first step delegates from Canada, Mexico and Newfoundland met at the White House in February 1909. Recognising the need for conservation practices to cross political boundaries they recommended the President to call a world conference on the subject of world resources and their inventory, conservation and wise utilisation. Diplomatic soundings were made with favourable results. The Netherlands agreed to act as host. Invitations actually went out to 58 nations to meet at The Hague in September 1909, but the project was killed by Roosevelt's successor Taft. It is worth recalling that Roosevelt retired from the presidency when he could easily have secured a third term, instead nominating Taft to carry on his policies.

Progressive Conservation

Foresta (1984,13) suggests that progressivism 'was intimately tied to the emergence of an industrial economy and a modern, middle-class society in the decades following 1890, and one of its many articulated goals was to make government responsive to the rapidly broadening and increasingly powerful middle class ... to bring government in line with

the latest rational scientific principles ... (and to achieve) efficiency in government.' He follows this by saying that the conservation movement was 'directed toward accommodating the changes associated with the emergence of modern industrial society.' Hays (1959,265) discerns wider significance. He thinks the movement stemmed from the rôle it played in 'transforming a decentralised, nontechnical and loosely organised society into a highly organised and centrally directed society that could meet a complex world with efficiency and purpose.' And O'Callaghan (1987,166) defines 'The Progressives' as 'those people, both Republicans and Democrats, who favoured policies of social reform in the United States in the early years of the twentieth century.'

Pinchot fits well the technological aspects of this model. He headed the 'utilitarian conservationists' whom Everhart (1983,12) notes

> 'were at the height of their power during the progressive era of the twentieth century. The utilitarians demanded an end of unplanned and uncontrolled exploitation of natural resources. They advocated a scientific approach and proposed giant multipurpose development projects that made full utilization of timber, grasslands, mineral deposits, and hydroelectric power sites.'

In fact their, and subsequent, generations went a long way toward the objectives implied by the credo, with economic benefit some of the time, and environmental disbenefit most of the time. Because of available terminology at the time - 'conservation' was used for both the terms we would now use, 'preservation' and 'conservation' - it is possible to see progressivism and protection as not entirely compatible concepts. For, in the first decade of the twentieth century, they could stand both for multiple use, as with the objectives of the Forest Service, and for the relative exclusiveness of the National Park Service. So, in this burgeoning industrial/economic new world of the early twentieth century, there is an inherent conflict, which continues for us today, a conflict which was far less recognised at the time.

Compromising Conflict

Surrogacy

Since the first settlers landed in what was to become the United States, social cultures were complex and widespread. People transferred

whole ways of life, from all sectors of Europe, and often perpetuated these by clustering together in 'the Italian District' or the 'Irish Quarter', or in Jewish areas containing people from different national backgrounds. But Chapter 1 noted that during the nineteenth century heritage land had become a surrogate for certain types of 'high' culture that had been left behind in Europe, and were impossible to transfer - for example, Gothic cathedrals, Renaissance and Baroque sculpture, early medieval frescoes. However, in the first decade of the twentieth century, surrogacy became a less tenable concept than it was 50 years previously. There are various reasons for this. The United States was now brash and self-confident in its astounding material and population progress. The wealth accrued by the trusts was partly used - in certain cases like JP Morgan's - on visits to Europe to buy large quantities of its art. And the US was producing its own artists, writers and composers; already the invention of the electrically-powered elevator and accelerating production of structural steel were enabling the construction of skyscrapers, particularly in Chicago, that caused amazement in a Europe which was backward in this respect. No, the heritage land was now viewed - still by a minority - as having an independent and highly valued existence; no longer did it have to pretend to be what it was not.

The End of the Moving Frontier

Similarly, the frontier had ceased to advance, for the very good reason it had reached the Pacific Ocean some years earlier, and even Hawaii had been incorporated in the United States by 1898. Nevertheless, the new prosperity and boundlessly increasing industrial output - in fact, overproduction - had to find outlets. So, the manufacturers sought new markets oversea, and in Canada to the north and Central and South America to the south.

Interdependency

However, the interdependency of land exploitation and preservation remained of great importance as an explanation of the concept of heritage land protection. As soon as an industrialist or cartel started excessive exploitation, Roosevelt would pounce with anti-trust laws, trying to effect some kind of balance - the balance of conservation, which has been substantially the theme of this chapter. And, as we shall see

below, Roosevelt's concept of conservation was turned into reality in several different ways, notably through additions to the yet-to-be authorised park system, and to the creation and continuing expansion of the Forest Service.

The Continuity of Land Protection

The Nineteenth Century Protected Lands

Mackintosh (1985,16-17) lists the accretion of national parks and monuments mentioned in this section. In the nineteenth century there were Hot Springs reservation in Arkansas (1832), Yellowstone NP (1872), Mackinac Island NP (1875), Casa Grande Ruin reservation in Arizona (1889), Sequoia, General Grant and Yosemite NPs (1890) and Mount Rainier NP (1899). All survived to the period of the current chapter, though Mackinac Island NP was ceded to Michigan. As we saw in the last chapter, some of these had barely any attention until the Army took over their management. All had to await the 1916 National Park Service Organic Act to develop into part of a true system.

Roosevelt's enthusiasm to embrace the powers given him under the 1891 Forest Reserve Act was, to put it charitably, a myopic gesture. Certainly vast areas of forest, already within the public domain, were transferred to the Forest Service, which he himself created. But access to such vast amounts of timber for economic reasons was unnecessary (as noted in Chapter 1) and unrealistic - for they were disconnected from the main centres of population through their location in the West, and there were equally vast quantities of timber in the eastern forests. Had these been carefully culled, so as not to leave unsightly barren patches, the western forests could have been left alone, or in fact put under the preservationist care of the up and coming National Park Service. But, while it is quite unreasonable to expect these pioneering spirits to have had this kind of foresight, we cannot sensibly associate the Forest Reserve Act actions with additions of protected heritage land.

Additions in the Progressive Era

While there was not yet a National Park Service, there were parks of a kind whose numbers continued to be enlarged. The Antiquities Act of

1906 enabled the protection of Mesa Verde's cliff dwellings and pueblo ruins, and it became a national park. Roosevelt proclaimed Grand Canyon as a national monument under the same Act; it received national park status some years later. An advantage of the Act was that it gave sole discretion to Presidents to designate national monuments, and has been widely used by them for that purpose, though they often strayed outside the requirements of the Act.

In fact, the complete list of NPS additions 1901-1910 contains six new national parks and 16 national monuments. This gives an oversimplified view of the neatness of protective policy. Runte (1987,98) quotes McFarland in 1911 saying 'of the 28 national monuments created by executive action, 13 are under the Forest Service and 15 under the Interior Department.' Inevitably, 'none were being adequately controlled or logically handled.' Runte continues

> 'Preservationists found special cause for alarm at the Grand Canyon and Mount Olympus, the two largest monuments. Since both were carved from property managed by the US Forest Service, and thus remained with that agency, it seemed reasonable to conclude that utilitarian biases would prevail in the parks.'

The two new agencies created during Theodore Roosevelt's administrations turned out to be more concerned with exploitation than preservation. First was the Bureau of Reclamation (or 'wreck the nation' as its opponents call it), launched through the 1902 Reclamation Act, which initiated a prodigious dam-building and irrigation programme - within the Department of the Interior, first as part of the Geological Service and later as a Bureau with its own director. Clarke & McCool (1985,94) give some feel for the Act's intentions, sufficient for many sleepless nights of those who are preservation-inclined:

> 'the original mission of the Bureau was a lofty and even romantic one. It envisioned nothing less than the transformation of the West "from a land of sprawling cow towns and crude mining settlements in the midst of barren desert waste into prosperous modern communities supported by lush farmland." '

The metropolises of Los Angeles, San Diego and Phoenix are testimonies of the Bureau's mission-fulfilment and Denver would scarcely survive without water transferred by tunnel from the western side of the Continental Divide to the east. Whether these are real achievements or

not is a very different story, upon which several scathing commentaries have been written. However, it would be wrong not to give BUREC some credit. Looking forward to the 1970s, when it ran out of dam building possibilities during the period of the Carter Administration, it wanted to transform itself into a conservation body, but was prevented from doing so (interview with a senior NPS officer November 1988).

The other was the United States Forest Service as part of the Department of Agriculture, and therefore a shift away from the Department of the Interior. Roosevelt had 'used the Forest Reserve Act of 1891 to set aside some 150 million acres of land as a forest reserve and withdrew from public entry another 85 million acres in Alaska and the Northwest, pending study of their forest and mineral wealth' (Nevins & Commager 1986,355; the actual figures are different from those quoted from Zaslowsky, above): for a brief period these 85 million acres therefore enjoyed the sensation of preservation. In fact, much of the Forest Service's vast land-holding is superficially preserved; if an uncut forest is viewed from a distance it can be difficult to imagine otherwise. An instance, repeated many times, is at the source of the Colorado River. One side of the river is Arapaho National Forest; on the east it is called Rocky Mountain National Park: to the casual onlooker they appear identically forested slopes.

The Forest Service, under Gifford Pinchot, started in an apparently protective mode, but by 1910 it had become aggressively utilitarian in its outlook and aims under his direction. Foresta (1984,17) tells us that while the Forest Service 'was authorised under its organic act to manage its land for a mix of ends, including recreation and preservation, it showed little interest in activities other than those which involved resource extraction or harvesting.' Foresta also notes that Pinchot tried to bring the national parks under the jurisdiction of the Forest Service, but this was defeated by preservationists in the voluntary bodies, and a sprinkling in the Congress. This, and the controversy over the Hetch Hetchy dam in Yosemite national park, can be said to be the true beginnings of the campaign to establish unified control of these national assets. Otherwise, Foresta says, 'the parks could fall to development schemes one at a time.'

Painter (1987,256-257) does not have quite the same perspective. He says that 'Pinchot, like Roosevelt, advocated protection of public

lands from abuse by the extractive industries.' Painter then moves ahead to Taft's presidency; Taft's Interior Secretary, Richard A Ballinger, 'reversed that policy' (of Pinchot). He wanted to open the public domain to business and to lease Alaskan public lands 'to a combination of western businessmen and the notorious Morgan-Guggenheim mining syndicate.' This was too much for Pinchot, who opposed Ballinger and Taft, and lost his job as a result. During a court case his counsel, however, 'managed ... to paint Ballinger and Taft as the agents of rapacious capital and enemies of conservation.' Nicholson (1970,176) sees these conflicts as being of great importance to the future of environmentalism:

> 'As the Roosevelt administration's policy had involved building up powerful federal offices ... to vindicate the public interest ... the immediate effect of this reversal (ie the Ballinger/Taft attitudes) was to create something of a civil war in Washington. (While the conservationists won on points) the resulting suspicion and ill feeling, involving the Department of the Interior on one side and the Department of Agriculture on the other, were to continue for many years.'

The Basis for Future Protection of Heritage Land

The activities of the small band of preservationists - the Sierra Club, the National Audubon Society, and several smaller and more localised groups, and a few politicians (notably Senator Reed Smoot of Utah and Representative John E Raker of California) - had done little to expand the area or care of protected heritage land. What it did do was help to force a compromise called 'conservation' upon largely unwilling industrialists and federal land managers. As it gathered strength toward the end of the first decade of the twentieth century it could build from the base established during the Roosevelt administrations, and push relentlessly toward the designation of a national park service - to look after a part of the land in which these active proponents were interested, following on from the probable originator of the concept (discussed in chapter 4), Representative Lacey, in 1900.

Conclusions

Between 1901 and 1910 the United States experienced one of its first great periods of economic, industrial and population expansion, following closure of the frontier a few years earlier. In several areas the United States' production overtook Britain's or Germany's, occasionally

that of both combined. In others it was without parallel in the world. It had all the potential of a world power, which was achieved within the next decade. But industrial expansion requires prodigious resources and many of these - coal, iron ore, oil, water, timber - are extracted from the land. In some cases their exploitation debited the heritage land bank, often producing debts that could not be repaid, for the resources were non-renewable. Both public and private sectors were involved. As this thesis has now made us aware, the very concept of 'exploitation' cannot exist without its opposite - preservation.

This time was not particularly different from others in showing a healthy disregard of government. The norm was to pursue one's individual interests; when larger issues had to be resolved, then associations arose to provide strength through unity. At this time conceptualising, guarding, pressuring for ... preservation was in the hands of a relative few, among whom were the members of the Sierra Club, the National Audubon Society, some lesser local groups, and a few who had hung on from the nineteenth century, notably John Muir and Frederick Olmsted (mainly his memory: he died in 1903).

The small number of preservationists achieved little or nothing in terms of their own aspirations. What they probably *did* achieve was a compromise called 'conservation', performing a sometimes acceptable, sometimes insidious, balancing act between the poles of exploitation and preservation. Without doubt they achieved out of all proportion to their numbers. More importantly, they built the foundations of the National Park Service, discussed in detail in the next chapter.

Theodore Roosevelt called himself a conservationist, probably without initially seeing it in terms of compromise. Roosevelt is to be honoured for achieving what he did. But his interventionist policies *could* have gone further if the concept of environmentalism had also been progressed at this time. His henchman, Gifford Pinchot, was in no doubt of his interpretation of 'conservation', to mean economic use up to the point where a resource remained renewable. Roosevelt allied himself with Pinchot for several years, but toward the end of his second term became disillusioned with him and launched two conferences whose topic can be seen to be more to do with preservation than conservation. This may have been his true legacy, to be carried forward by those trying to legitimise a national protective bureau for the federal

parks - and therefore preservation.

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4 The Formulation of a National Park Service

Chapter Summary

In covering the period 1910-1919, we follow the United States in its plunge from isolationism to involvement in a world war, and thence back to isolationism. This chapter covers the running down of progressivism, a nation at war shortly after creating a National Park Service, and a series of social movements any one of which would have totally preoccupied a lesser nation: female emancipation, prohibition, and a curtailment of immigration. While the first two years were uninterestingly administered by President Taft, the rest of the chapter's time period was under the care of Woodrow Wilson, the first Democratic President since Grover Cleveland in 1893.

This decade was a time of much struggle, and some achievement. It was notable for the operation of democracy at grass roots and extension of constitutional concepts. Many major changes had their origins in social unrest which was then articulated and made of concern to the power brokers in Washington: it was a time of 'bottom-up' activity.

Creation of the National Park Service resulted from unremitting pressure from a growing band of senators and representatives, but the contribution of the voluntary sector was also vital. While the Park Service thus started with a fairly substantial constituency it had to build continually upon this; arguably its constituency has never been sufficiently large to protect the Service from external depredation. In part explanation it could be argued the Service has never been fully understood: it had to stand alone as the agency most nearly related to preservation while all other federal agencies, many of whom had charge of heritage land, had a multiple-use mission which endeared them to the economic-use-of-land lobby.

This chapter describes an interesting epoch in terms of the conflict between exploitation and preservation. Certainly it had moved away from progressive conservation by about 1914, but the Forest Service continued its antagonism toward NPS, one excellent reason being that

its land was often poached by NPS (via the Secretary of the Interior) to create new park service units. A fascinating time surrounds the prelude to, and entry in, the first world war. While these periods were exploitative of people and resources for armaments, this was a time when not only the Park Service was established, but a number of other new Acts of concern to conservation and preservation were passed. An analysis of this period and later ones, when international conflict was significant, shows some correlation between the number of environmental acts and their appearance at such times.

Continuity of heritage land protection was evident again, but additions to NPS' stock of land were rather modest during the decade. Nevertheless, at the end of this chapter's period, Albright was made superintendent of Yellowstone NP and responsible for all NPS field services, and the National Parks & Conservation Association was established, not too overtly as part of NPS' constituency, to argue the Service's case in the outside world.

A World Power

For most people, 25 August 1916 was not one of the most memorable days in the history of the United States. For many, it was close to US involvement in a world war, however much their President proclaimed neutrality. For others, it was a day like any other, unless it were enlivened by being part of a vacation. For the preservation movement, however, it climaxed decades, if not a century, of attempts to protect some at least of the heritage land of the United States. In reaching a climax, this event could also be expected to be a kind of *fin de siècle*, an end of an era, after which there would be an afterglow, or at least a different way of operating.

However, too much is anticipated in this opening paragraph. This chapter directly continues from the last one, spanning the period 1910 to 1919. It therefore considers the final lead up to the NPS Organic Act, its birth in the midst of chaos, and the energy with which its concept was progressed in the decades after, 1916-1919 forming something of a microcosm of that later time.

Several examples of the exploitation : preservation conflict will be noted. For example, between the anti-progressivism of President Taft

through to the first Democrat for some time, Woodrow Wilson; between the actions and consumption of a nation at war, and the consummation of the NPS; and the continuing conflict between NPS and the Forest Service. According to McKay (1983,171), Wilson elevated the United States to 'a world diplomatic and military stage.' This was also the time for a temporary end to the isolationism which had continued from the Monroe Doctrine: the 'deep wish to be left alone and a rather pathetic belief that the US would be so left if it made its wishes and intentions plain' (Brogan 1985,262). The resource base therefore had to be further exploited to support these grand actions. Tables 4-1 and 4-2 underline the argument.

The Political Base

President Taft only had one period of office, sandwiched between the two of Theodore Roosevelt, and the two of Woodrow Wilson. As we saw in the last chapter, Taft was Roosevelt's choice of successor; as he, Roosevelt, could easily have gained a third term, he must have regretted not going for this, for Taft proved to be a man with an independent mind, whose policies differed considerably from those of his predecessor. Roosevelt was so disillusioned he managed to gain the Republican nomination for the presidential election in 1911 so as to put matters back, as he believed, on the right tracks again. But he did not succeed in this tactic, for Woodrow Wilson received more votes and held the office from 1912 to 1920.

A man without private means, Wilson had nevertheless been sent to Princeton, to law school in Virginia and to Johns Hopkins University where he gained his doctorate. He later became President of Princeton. With such an academic background, some were doubtful about his ability to take the highest political office in the land, but he succeeded well, only suffering set-backs when confronted with the problems of the League of Nations, after which his health deteriorated (Brogan 1985).

During his first administration Wilson also had to contend with problems in neighbouring Mexico. In 1913 a counterrevolutionary movement overthrew and assassinated Francisco Madero, the liberal President; the movement's leader Victoriano Huerta, took over and external capitalists, with interests in Mexico, were delighted. They were not joined by Wilson who refused to condone Huerta's revolution and Wilson

regarded him as a murderer. He spoke out in a way that anticipated his attitude to the first world war: 'We hold that just government rests always upon the consent of the governed, and that there can be no freedom without order based upon law and upon public conscience and approval' (Nevins & Commager 1986,391). His stand also portrayed a conscience and a sense of public morality which contrasted with the private sector's profit-based attitudes.

Wilson was very wary of entering the first world war and took a pacifist stance during its first three years. Then, several US ships were sunk by the Germans, culminating in the loss of the Lusitania. Here was the opportunity for change, and in 1917 the US switched from isolationism to becoming a world power, involved in foreign policy. After victory in the war, there was something of a reaction against the profiteering arms manufacturers, who were arraigned before the Senate to explain themselves, though not until the mid-1920s. And, in 1919/20 the US quite easily slid back into isolationism; it had to await the early 1940s to be jolted into world action once more. In fact, the war had made a break between the liberalism of the first decade of the twentieth century, and the conservatism of the third decade. Wilson complemented the war, for his intervention in the nation's banks through the Federal Reserve Act was quite a radical measure, which he justified in terms of 'Control must be public, not private, must be vested in the government itself, so that the banks may be the instruments, not the masters, of business and of individual enterprise and initiative' (Nevins & Commager 1986,389).

Brogan's view (1985,477-478), that the people were leading the leaders, was expressed in many different ways during the period covered by this chapter. First, the campaign for women's suffrage was powerful and very successful, spreading from enlightened western states to the east; New York State did not concede votes for women until 1917, and the Constitution was not amended until 1920. So, while white women of 30 years or more could vote throughout the US at this time, British women had to wait until 1929. Second, there were strong moves toward Prohibition, a kind of war from which bootleggers and crime syndicates, rather than arms manufacturers, profited. Third, restrictions were placed on immigration, primarily to safeguard the lifestyles of those already inboard - a common enough trait in various countries which were attractive to the migrant. Not only were these movements 'reformist'

according to Brogan (p 479), they were also seen to support a generally introspective nationalism, perpetuating a vaguely defined 'American Way of Life' which the rest of the world (on the occasions when it was recognised by the United States) unfortunately had not yet achieved.

Brogan (p475) judges Wilson rather harshly:

> 'Yet, even if we concede that his goal was the right one, it cannot be said that he really attained it. By comparison with the past, even the recent past, his achievements were impressive; measured against what needed to be done, they were almost trivial.'

And the judgement also reflects badly on Taft, if not Theodore Roosevelt. One final political comment is necessary. The first world war introduced a significant, if temporary, interlude between the liberalism of the first decade of the twentieth century, and the return to conservatism of the 1920s. All wars exploit large numbers of a nation's people, and this was no exception. We have seen that one group of winners was the arms manufacturers, while the other group - at enormous cost in terms of lives and physical disability - were the American people. As we shall see below, the preservationist counter to the exploitation of the war was the creation of the National Park Service.

Approaching a Climax

I have noted in chapter 3 that the Hetch Hetchy dam and Pinchot's attempts to take over the national parks reinforced others' perceptions that a new agency was needed. It was another ten years before it took place, and some of the reasons for this are explored below. When Hetch Hetchy was finally authorised by Congress in 1913 the storm it arose, the emotion of the Sierra Club's final hike through the valley before it was flooded, and the authorisation's reputedly causing John Muir's death through heartbreak ... all these added to the clamour for a park agency (Conservation Foundation 1985,7). Hetch Hetchy represented the first of many attempted assaults on the parks, by both public and private sectors, most of which were rebuffed by pressure groups. It shows how thinking on the utilisation of natural resources had 'advanced' now that most available private land had been put to some use.

One of the main reasons for wanting to establish a national park administration was that power was separated (perhaps consciously echoing the constitutional concept). At least three Departments were involved in conservation: Agriculture through the Forest Service, established in 1905; the Army through the Corps of Engineers, established in 1802; and Interior, through its General Land Office and various other agencies - Interior was established in 1849.

In a similar vein, Runte (1987,97-98) considers the 1906 Antiquities Act did not help the park movement of the time, for it disintegrated management of heritage land rather than integrating it, the concept many in the movement were advocating. I have noted in the previous chapter that in 1911 the National Monuments were almost equally divided between the Forest Service and Interior; Runte shows how 'preservationists' worst fears' were confirmed when Woodrow Wilson, 'partly in response to Forest Service pressure, reduced the size of Mount Olympus National Monument by more than a half to allow lumbering operations.' Even the Army, still caring for the national parks at this time, testified to the absence of unified management.

Runte (pp94-99) suggests that the first attempt to rationalise park administration was by Representative John Lacey of Iowa, who had introduced legislation in 1894 to protect Yellowstone from poachers (Everhart 1983,121). And, in 1906 he was the chief proponent of the Antiquities Act, which some authors name after him. Midway, in 1900, he produced a bill to establish and administer national parks. It failed, and nothing further was done until 1910. Then, Secretary of the Interior Richard A Ballinger bowed to pressure from J Horace McFarland to draft a bill providing for a 'Bureau of National Parks.' McFarland, according to Albright & Cahn (1985,7), was a 'leading private sector advocate' of a new bureau within the Interior Department; he was first President of the American Civic Association, formed in 1904. In fact, at that Association's annual meeting, President Taft made a speech advocating a parks bureau. These men, among others mentioned below, constituted one arm of the progressive movement.

Though McFarland was a businessman, he had nevertheless condemned the exploitation of Niagara Falls and was to be an ardent opponent of the Hetch Hetchy dam in Yosemite national park. Public support came from three unlikely sources: Robert Marshall, chief topographer of the US

Geological Service, who thought a unified park system would make men healthy and prepared for war, should that be necessary, rather than the straphanging working men in street cars who 'forget they have legs.' His chief, the Director of the Service, had endorsed Marshall's view by saying in 1909 'the maintenance of industrial supremacy presupposed conserving not only minerals but men.' But Marshall was not wholly altruistic: he wanted to 'manage the national parks on a business basis and work for good transportation facilities to and from them, so the multitude may visit them.' In fact this is exactly what the railroads did, overtaken by the automobile later.

Then came Mark Daniels, a 'respected landscape engineer of the Interior Department,' whose comments might have been made yesterday. Daniels (called an architect by Albright & Cahn) was hired by Professor Miller. Miller, from the Department of Economics at the University of California, had been hired as his assistant by Interior Secretary Lane, and Miller was also instrumental in persuading his student Albright to assist him. Daniels challenged Marshall's viewpoint as being 'due principally to the popular misconception of the value of idealism as a factor in our economic development. The capitalist has been prone to call the idealist an impractical crank,' he stated in 1914. Daniels went further, correlating idealism with something which is economic - the two were inalienably related, in his view. Given one's acceptance of this, national park advocates and planners would not compromise themselves by considering the economics of their calling. It is not clear whether Daniels was speaking tongue in cheek, believing his approach to be persuasive and more likely to be accepted by Congressmen, but his speech was certainly another plank in the construction of an Act. The 'constructors' so far mentioned were representatives of the progressive movement; we should now turn to the pressure groups, themselves inevitably influenced by the progressivism of the time.

To return to Ballinger's draft bill, various people suggested amendments, most notably Frederick Law Olmsted Jnr and other members of the American Civic Association, and in 1911 it reached the Congress (the first bill of a succession to go to the Congress between 1911 and 1915), sponsored by Senator Reed Smoot of Utah. There was strong opposition to his bill, particularly from the Forest Service which felt, correctly, that creation of future parks would be largely a matter of land transfer from them to a park bureau. The Forest Service seemed to

imagine it could retain not only its existing national monuments, but the overlordship of all future national parks carved from its territory; while this Service was very powerful, it succeeded with neither of these hopes. Furthermore, Runte says (p99) 'some members of Congress were antagonistic to the formation of still another full-fledged bureaucracy. Accordingly, in January 1912 preservationists renamed their proposed organization the National Park 'Service' rather than 'Bureau' for the latter implied greater political power, placing the new agency above the Forest Service when in fact it was intended that the two agencies should compete for funding and other forms of support.

Separating out these originators of the Park Service idea might suggest that no one else was involved. But others in the voluntary sector made important contributions, particularly the Sierra Club. Runte (p85) speaks of others: the Appalachian Mountain Club of 1876, the Boone and Crockett Club of 1888 and, by 1910 'nearly 20 distinct organizations directly advocated scenic protection.' Albright & Cahn (1985,34) add the General Federation of Women's Clubs. What all these groups and associations were doing was catching a mood, and effecting a bridge between particular interests and the legislators. de Tocqueville (quoted in Task Force 1988,30) noted in the first half of the 19th century the importance of associations, which he found to be rather uniquely of the United States - he contrasted this with Europe: 'Wherever, at the head of some new undertaking, you see the government in France, or a man of rank in England, in the United States you will be sure to find an association.' This predeliction continues until to-day and partly explains the strong voice of the voluntary sector.

Foresta (1984,17) points out that the Sierra Club, in 1910, 'took up the cause of a bureau to run the national parks and appointed a special promotion committee to advance the idea.' Not only that, 'in 1911 and 1912 national parks conferences were convened by an alliance of public interest groups' (the 1911 conference was held at Yellowstone). Foresta also notes that Taft in 1912 supported the concept of a parks bureau, for the proper management 'of those wonderful manifestations of nature, so startling and so beautiful that everyone recognizes the obligations of government to preserve them.' Everhart (1983,13) elaborates: while Taft was supportive, Pinchot entered the scene again, opposing the formation of a parks bureau and the Forest Service launched

an active lobbying campaign, arguing that the Forest Service was the logical agency to administer national parks.

There are still more contributors to the 'movement' that effected the National Park Service, and Runte (1987,98-105) discusses them. Notably, the cavalry's running of the early parks led them to understand the need for a unified management at Washington level. Runte notes 'the same might be said of the US Army Corps of Engineers, which primarily planned and built roads in .the parks, most notably in Yellowstone.' And, the railroads serving the parks were made to realise the significance of the proposed new agency: once they realised, they became active in its support.

Albright & Cahn (1985) are an important source of information on the run-up to designation of the National Park Service, for Albright was Mather's (the first Director's) assistant, and later the second Director of the NPS. Cahn acted as an amanuensis in preparation of the book which, because it is Albright's story, will be attributed to him from here on. Albright notes (pp34-35) that bills to establish a parks bureau were unsuccessfully introduced each year between 1911 and 1915. He attributes this lack of success to the parks having few friends in Congress: an adequate constituency had therefore not yet been formed, and in fact this has continued to be a problem for NPS since that time, as Clarke & McCool (1985) point out.

Albright continues: 'At the end of 1915 and in early 1916 a group of us were meeting fairly regularly for talks on the substance of the new bill ... and on political strategies for getting it passed.' The group usually contained Representative Kent from California, McFarland, Albright representing Mather, Olmsted Jnr and others; they all discussed each item of the bill scrupulously, often having to come to compromises that Mather later said they would take out some time after the bill passed into law. One such was permitting cattle grazing in the parks, to placate one Congressman; another limited the budget; another permitted a charge on automobiles on the basis that money had to come from somewhere to pay for park management, for the bill's proposed budget only paid for the Washington headquarters staff.

Others contributed to debates in Congress. McFarland's was one of the strangest pieces of inverse eloquence:

> 'I think sometimes we fall into a misapprehension because the word "park" in the minds of most of us suggests a place where there are flower beds ... the park has passed out of this category in the United States for it met a practical need. It is the direct competitor ... of the courts, of the jail, of the cemetery and has come to be the idea of service and efficiency, and not an idea of pleasure and ornamentation at all' (quoted in Runte 1987, 100-101).

A possible explanation is that McFarland was attempting to bridge the gap between the first and second decades of the twentieth century. This involved accommodating those Congressmen who believed they were still living under progressive conservation on the one hand, through to those who were demanding preservation of the finest areas of the land on the other.

Shortly before McFarland's appearance at the congressional hearings, Interior Secretary Franklin Lane had set up campaign headquarters within his Department at which Stephen Mather and Horace Albright worked to build a constituency large enough to pressure the parks bill through the Congress. Albright was a young Interior lawyer. Mather was something quite different, a westerner by adoption, for he had been born in Georgia; a borax miner and manufacturer; and, significantly, a member of the Sierra Club. He and Lane had graduated from the University of California. Many linkages were therefore in position when Mather, angered over the poor state of Yosemite National Park during a visit in 1914, protested to Lane. Lane found Mather to be the man he had been looking for, with wealth, dedication and business experience (Runte p101) and wrote back an oft-quoted 'Dear Steve, If you don't like the way the national parks are being run, come on down to Washington and run them yourself.' Mather stayed 14 years in total, becoming the first Director of the NPS in 1918; Albright succeeded him in 1930 for four years as the second Director.

Mather's influence on the establishment of the parks service was evident almost as soon as he had accepted Lane's invitation. One of his favourite activities was the 'junket' - entertaining key figures to a stay in the West. They invariably returned home convinced of the rightness of his arguments. He and Albright also toured the West, Mather covering 30 000 miles on one extensive tour using trains and automobiles. He also obtained the support of the media: notably the National Geographic and the Saturday Evening Post. This was important in an era when the mass circulation magazine was closely associated with progressivism, and continued to influence the nation's thinking.

with progressivism, and continued to influence the nation's thinking.

As Runte (p102) later shows, Muir, McFarland, Daniels and others had laid the base for the Park Service. What Mather and Albright did was to institutionalise its concept: 'Henceforth an attack on a reserve would not be an affront to it alone, but to the very fabric of American society.'

Getting in on the Act

As we have seen in Chapter 1, the NPS' mission was set out in its 'Organic' Act, the following sentence (here repeated) having been drafted by Frederick Law Olmsted, Jnr:

> 'To conserve the scenery and the natural and historic objects and the wild life therein and to provide for the enjoyment of the same in such manner and by such means as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations.'

As noted above, its apparent inconsistency has caused problems of interpretation ever since: nevertheless, Mackintosh (1984,10) notes it was also present in the 1872 Act designating Yellowstone National Park. In both cases it could be argued that the Park Service's and Yellowstone's continued existence in the face of prodigious difficulty are explained by the interdependence of the concepts within the above sentence. Albright & Cahn (1985,35) add:

> 'We were well aware of the inherent conflicts between use and preservation, but the political reality was that the issue could not be settled in an "Organic Act" because Congress would never agree to close off enormous chunks of land and exclude them from public use. So we had to find a way to provide for use.'

Congress may have been trying to please the preservationists (Albright's term) while not excluding the rather larger constituency - 'We the People', but NPS inevitably if unwittingly became a *con*servation agency. Such a general comment clearly must have exceptions. These may be found in the Park Service's declared wilderness areas, and many of its remote units, for example in Alaska, have very low visitation.

One of the most fascinating parts of the mission statement above, is

its new definition of conservation. Until this Act, there had been perhaps 15 years of utilitarian conservation, by which was meant care not to deplete natural resources *because of their intrinsic economic value.* Here, for the first time enshrined in a congressional piece of legislation, 'resources' embraced the intangible. The implication is that they include concepts like 'beauty', 'inspiration', and 'recreation' in its original sense of rebuilding a derelict body and mind into a healthy one, usable by its owner to advance his or her desired quality of life.

There is another crucial achievement. In previous chapters, the concept of natural beauty was seen as a surrogate for the high culture left behind in Europe, and we have seen in chapter 3 how the developing indigenous culture had removed the need for such a concept. In the 1916 Act 'natural beauty' is actually protected for the people: an approach at that time unique on the face of the earth. By taking this step, the United States had become *a cultural innovator.* As Mackintosh (1985,13) tells us, McFarland in 1916, when testifying before the House Public Lands Committee in the run-up to enactment, said

> 'The parks are the Nation's pleasure grounds ... the national parks, Mr Chairman, are an American idea: it is one thing we have which has not been imported ...these great parks are ... a sheer expression of democracy, the separation of these lands from the public domain, to be held for the public, instead of being opened to private settlement.'

Thus, after years of trying, at one stroke the management of the parks and monuments, and all the varied additions in the future, effectively became part of the federal establishment: it was a nationally established charitable trust, whose remit was to achieve the impossible. The previous period of confusion and lack of concern about the national parks was over, and a new age of administration responsive to congressional and executive demands, to budgets and bureaucracy, and to manifold conflict, had dawned. Henceforth the Park Service would have to compete for resources within the Interior Department, and feel the effects of Interior's competition with other Departments. It would have to face up to demands on its land both from visitors to it, and those covetous of its economic resources. Its land would be affected by the actions of neighbouring land owners and, through chemicals carried by winds over long distances, the actions of a high proportion of north americans, whose automobiles in particular were to be profligate

in their gifts of carbon dioxide, nitrogen oxides and hydrocarbons to the forests and the ozone layer.

But the park service's organic Act was not the only one of environmental concern to be passed just before or during a major world war. At this point I pause to look backwards and forwards from the strict period of this chapter. Using the *Statutes at Large of the USA* for 13 Congresses (selected as times of overt conflict or apparent quietude, internally and internationally) I made a check to see whether environmental Acts were more frequent at times of major national conflict or crisis than at other times. The results are in Table 4-1. The 68th to 70th and 84th Congresses were used as controls, in the sense that the US was not involved in a war, though all 'controls' under these circumstances will be affected by other factors. In most cases legislation was simply provided to extend the boundaries of a national forest or park, to accept a gift of land or sell it to a concessioner, to provide protection for birds in a certain location: only a minority of Acts concerned establishment of a new national park or a major restructuring of a federal agency. The data below also have to be seen in the context of enabling legislation, for example the National Park Service organic Act of 1916 or the Fish & Wildlife Act 1956. As environmental legislation of that kind increased through time, it might have been expected environmental acts in general would increase, but this does not seem to have been the case during the Congresses cited.

Table 4-1 : Environmental Legislation at Times of Crisis

Congress	Occasion	a.Total Acts	b.Environmental Acts	Percent b of a
64th 1915-17	Approach WW1	458	22	4.8
65th 1917-19	WW1	406	9	2.2
68th 1923-25	Control	709	35	4.9
69th 1925-27	Control	851	21	2.5
70th 1927-29	Control	1146	32	2.8
73rd 1933-34	Depression	541	23	4.3
74th 1935-36	Depression	988	31	3.1
75th 1937-38	Depression	761	37	4.9
78th 1943-44	WW2	568	15	2.6
84th 1955-56	Control	1028	32	3.1
90th 1967-68	Vietnam	640	21	3.3
91st 1969-71	Vietnam	695	35	5.0
92nd 1971-72	Vietnam	607	32	5.3

Table 4-1 suggests many interesting, if imprecise, findings. First, the two world wars were relatively insignificant in terms of environmental legislation during the height of hostilities though the approach to World War I was significant - almost as if environmental interests had to be secured while there was the opportunity. The control period 1923-29 shows a mean of 3.3% environmental of all Acts, while the other control period, 1955-56, shows 3.1%. The three Depression years' Congresses - 1933-38 - show a mean of 4.0%, and the mean of the Vietnam period (partly shown here for 1967-1972) is 4.5%. In terms of statistical significance, Chi^2 at a 5% level of significance gives a critical value of 3.84: comparing the 64th and 65th Congresses gives a chi^2 of 3.88, while a comparison of the 68th-70th Congresses (the control period of the 1920s) with the Vietnam years of the 90th-92nd Congresses shows a chi^2 of 4.70. Comparing the 1920s with the depression years shown no significance at the 5% level.

The text in this chapter and elsewhere mentions the major pieces of environmental legislation, which are generally associated with internal or external US conflict. Table 4-2 summarises the primary legislation affecting the public domain, shows which agencies it affected, and compares all with the state of the nation at the time they were enacted.

Table 4-2 : Primary Public Domain Legislation

Year	Act	Notes	Agencies	Adversities
1862	Homestead	160 acres to any settler		Civil War
1864	Yosemite	Passed to Californian care		Civil War
1872	Yellowstone	'First' National Park		
	General Mining	Opened all public lands to private prospecting & development		
1877	Desert Land	640 acres to settlers as long as they irrigate it		
1891	General Provision	S24 called 'Forest Reserve Act' giving President design. power		
1897	Forest Reserve	Care of forests to General Land Office of D of Interior	DoI	
1902	Newlands (Reclamation)	Fed. irrigation on W public lands restricted private use of public water; set up BUREC	BUREC	
1905	Reorganization	Forests from DoI to DoA; Forest Service created	FS	
1906	Antiquities	President proclaims National Monuments unilaterally	FS,NPS	
1909	Homestead	cf 1862, increase to 320 acres		
1911	Weeks	Purchase private land as NF in eastern states	FS	

1916	Natnl.Park Service		NPS	Nr WW1
	Stock-Raising Homestead	cf 1909, increase to 640 acres		Nr WW1
1920	Minerals Leasing		MINES	
1924	Forest Protection		FS	
1933	Executive Order	Transferred FS NMs, historic military and DC sites to NPS	NPS	Depression
	Tennessee V.A.	Set up TVA		Depression
1934	Everglades NP	First biological park	NPS	Depression
	Great Smoky Mountains NP	Park designated for *preservation*	NPS	Depression
	Taylor Grazing	DoI controls grazing, see 1946	DoI	Depression
	Duck Stamp	Helped wildlife conservation	F&WS	Depression
1935	Soil Conservation		SCS	Depression
	Historic Sites		NPS	Depression
1936	Park Parkway & Rec Area Programs	Established NPS as federal recreational coordinator	NPS	Depression
1937	Federal Aid in Wildlife Restor.	Helped wildlife conservation	F&WS	Depression
1946	Reorganization	Merged Grazing Office with General Land Office to form BLM	BLM	
1955	Clean Air	+ amendments 1963,70,77;	All	
1956	Fish & Wildlife	Created Fish & Wildlife Service	F&WS	
1958	Outdoor Recreation Resources Review Commission	Set this up. Bureau of Outdoor Recreation a principal outcome	BoR	
1960	Multiple-use and Sustained Yield		FS	
1964	Land & Water Conservation		F&WS · FS,NPS	Kennedy assassination, Johnson steers
	Classification and Multiple-use		BLM	
	Public Lands Sale		BLM	Kennedy program through Congress
	Wilderness		All	
1966	National Historic Preservation		BoR	Vietnam
1968	National Wild and Scenic Rivers		All	Vietnam
	Trail Systems		All	Vietnam
1969	Environmental Policy		All	Vietnam
1972	Federal Water Pollution Control	Public and private water	All	Vietnam
1973	Endangered Species	See table note	All	
1974	Forest & Rangeland Renewable Resource Planning		FS	
1976	Federal Land Policy & Management		BLM	
	NF Management		FS	
1977	Clean Water Act	Public and private water	All	
1978	Omnibus Parks	The first of the 'park barrel' acts, the other being in 1980	NPS	
1980	Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation		Most	Carter anticipates Reagan shift
1981	Executive Order	HCRS returned to NPS	NPS	

Sources: Clawson 1983, Zaslowsky 1986, *Statutes at Large* various years

Note: Clawson (1983,52) says the Endangered Species Act had the potential to stop virtually all use of federal land, so it was amended in 1978 to allow a Cabinet level committee to weigh the costs and benefits of applying the law to particular locations.

Table 4-2 suggests the contrary to what one might expect. A straightforward view might consider that environmental legislation, where it dealt with health issues, would occur whenever there was a need for it. But where it concerned the protection of heritage land, then a relatively conflict-free time might seem to be the most likely for legislation to be enacted. On the other hand, legislation which had an economic outcome - like making forests more accessible or increasing their size, or permitting grazing on public lands, for example - would seem most likely at times of internal or external conflict. In fact, the Table does not wholly endorse these concepts, except for the health one: during times of adversity, 17 of the cited Acts clearly concern heritage land protection, while 8 are of the economic type. These findings support that part of the thesis which sees a symbiotic relationship between protection and conflict.

After the Act

Once Mather and Albright were in post, establishing the National Park Service, they sought to increase people's awareness of the park units at their disposal, and thus to meet both the 'people's enjoyment' aspect of the Organic Act and McFarland's enthusiasm for public use. They started a trend in interpretation that would continue until the present day. Their rapid attempts to dilute the utilitarianism of the preceding ten years shows they were clearly aware of this, yet they had to some extent to blow with the wind. This occurred through the emphasis they placed on the economic value of the parks, which were attracting people who would otherwise have gone abroad for their holiday.

Another aspect of Mather & Albright's energies was the conference on the national parks, initiated by Mather, in Washington DC in January 1917, only five months after Woodrow Wilson had signed the Act. Those invited included Congressmen, and representatives from the parks, the railroads, and many civic groups. Held at the National Museum, the conference's aim was to discuss the future of the Park Service and its charges (Runte 1987,104). Extolling economic benefits of the parks in this way at least changed the congressional view and made Congress more likely to add to the system than do anything damaging to it.

The need for stability was also apparent in the new agency. It started with a staff of five in Washington, and a modest number in its territories. While it had the continuing support of those who had backed its designation, it remained vulnerable: some new agencies survive while others collapse. For example, the complications surrounding the Fish & Wildlife Service, or the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation, which became the Heritage Conservation and Recreation Service, which in its turn was reabsorbed into the National Park Service in the first Reagan Administration. The Office of Economic Opportunity, set up by President Johnson, defunct 10 years later, is a further example. The National Archives, independent since 1985, was also independent from 1934 to 1949 when it was absorbed by the General Services Administration (NARA n.d.). So, the NPS Director had to adapt himself to the concept of 'administrative politician' whose style is expected to be one of 'managerial activism,' to quote Foresta (1984,19). The bureaucracy it had now become had to make its way within other bureaucracies. Luckily, the combined talents of Mather the industrialist and Albright the skilled insider, proved formidable.

These skills were certainly necessary, according to Forester (p19). The NPS, he says, 'was born into an unsettled bureaucratic environment of ideological conflict and interdepartmental rivalry' not least of which was the Forest Service, and soon the involvement of the nation in a world war. One lack did not initially concern the wealthy Mather - the new agency had no money. As Albright & Cahn (1985,44) point out, the Act 'remained little more than a piece of paper for almost eight months, because it was April (1917) before Congress appropriated any funds at all to start the Service.' This did not stop Mather using his own money to keep things rather more than ticking over during the interregnum: a visit to Glacier National Park was organised late September 1916, and then Albright went to Yellowstone to organise the handover from the military. While that was relatively simple, the position with the existing park concessioners was not. There were five of them, involved in running five hotels, stagecoaches, permanent and travelling camps. Conditions were bad: on the day of Albright's visit 20 cases of ptomaine poisoning were reported at one of the camps. Mather instructed the army to force the operators to make improvements, but the situation continued, so one of the franchises was withdrawn. The owner appealed to friends in Congress, and one Senator Walsh violently criticised Mather through Lane, and demanded that any who wanted concessions should have them. Mather stood firm and Lane backed

him: had he not done so, Mather would have resigned and the course of NPS history would have changed.

Mather, as assistant to Lane, then sacked the administrator lined up to be first director of NPS, Robert Marshall, for incompetence and sent him back to the Geological Survey. This occurred inconveniently just when Marshall and Albright were organising the fourth conference on national parks (Albright & Cahn p49) which was somewhat different from the previous ones in 1911, 1912 and 1915. This celebrated an event, while the others anticipated it. It was also broader-based, with papers on national parks for all the people, the role of women in park development, the value of parks to artists, teaching through pictures (National Geographic ones, that is), the spiritual uplift the scenery provided, and Orville Wright's prediction that people would soon be visiting the parks in airplanes! But the conference, attended by many senators and representatives, also enhanced political support. For the purposes of this thesis, perhaps the most important speech came from Senator Smoot, who had presented the parks Bill to the Senate:

> 'I do not want to see our national parks robbed of any of their beauty on the ground that it must be done to secure money sufficient to pay the expenses of maintaining them. I do not want to see any of the natural resources taken from them that would in any way mar their beauty' (quoted in Albright & Cahn p50).

In 1919 Albright was appointed superintendent of Yellowstone National Park (this has remained the premier posting in the Service), but also field director of the Service. He was 29, and worked tirelessly to raise the standards of rangers and park administration generally.

Conflict

The creation of land-protective legislation within or close to a war has been explored in Tables 4-1 and 4-2. At first sight it is strange that the United States, within eight months of declaring war on Germany, should enact far-reaching environmental legislation. But this is precisely the common thread of this thesis: exploitation, in this case of natural and human resources, cannot exist without its opposite, preservation. But they are not simply opposites, they have a symbiotic relationship. 'Preservation' in this case was doubly important because it was correlated with a future that could be looked forward to, in the

midst of the bleakness of the time. Because of the importance of both concepts to the US at that time, we find the resources of the Park Service being defended against 'the war effort': a case in point is quoted in Albright and Cahn (1985,73) where food manufacturers were prevented by the federal government from slaughtering bison in parks so they could make the food available to the population. And we should remember that this period was not just a matter of a world war, the US had had years of trouble with the Mexicans, and was about to experience labour problems with factory workers from about 1916 until 1919.

Cultivating Constituencies

Foresta (1984,19-20) recognises a problem referred to above, the need for a constituency. He says the Park Service, after it had been established, 'had to consolidate and expand the first and fundamental source of power for administrative agencies - outside support: first the agency had to keep together the coalition which brought it into being.' Not just this, it had to get them used to working with it, but as a government agency, not a nongovernment group. 'These differences can cause friction between a public agency and private group even if they completely agree on policy goals.' And, there is intra-agency and inter-agency friction, as we saw in Chapter 1.

Foresta even suggests the Forest Service, following its own success in establishing a broad constituent base (primarily because of its multiple-use mission, which in part allowed it to sell public domain timber more cheaply than private domain timber), forced the 'fledgling Park Service to form alliances, cultivate clients, and work out a sense of agency purpose.' According to Foresta, the Forest Service permitted, even encouraged, creation of the Park Service. It may be that Pinchot was hoping to transfer his obsession with utilitarianism over to the new Agency. It seems unlikely to have been altruism, though it is strange that his action acted against his (and the Forest Service's, after he was dismissed) interest. In other words the bewilderment at his pronouncements meant the FS was deemed unsuitable to be entrusted with the task 'of preservation of great scenic areas or the provision of public access to them.' It is also significant that Pinchot's successor as Chief Forester was Henry Graves, a pragmatist who chose to abandon Pinchot's utilitarian ideology 'and thereby make the Forest Service a functional competitor with the new Park Service.' Foresta

notes that the most dangerous organizations are those with closely related goals, or act as functional competitors.

Clarke & McCool (1985,6-12) try to categorise the constituency problems of NPS, often comparing it with the Forest Service's multiple use mission. The conclusions may reflect the authors' own views, but their emphasis on economic outputs of bureaucratic decisions seems rather constricting. In tabulating 'sources of agency power' they look at various characteristics that should be sought or rejected by an agency and simply grade them as + = positive influence or characteristic, - = negative influence of characteristic, o = no discernible effect:

Nature of Mission

+ pro-development; multiple use; utilitarian values
+ created by an organic act
+ contains a mission that is expandable
o age of organization
- the product of executive orders or reorganizations
- narrow or esoteric mission; dominant use; preservationist values

Dominant, established profession

+ scientific, military bases of expertise
- interdisciplinary; melting pot of professions

Astute leadership

+ scientific or military leadership
+ a strong founder
+ recruitment from within
- political appointments to head agency

Esprit de Corps

+ coherent public image
+ well-defined agency character
+ integrated organization
- servile attitude; inferiority complex
- lack of a competitive edge

Clarke & McCool also consider their ideal agency's constituency should be large, evenly distributed, well-educated and well-funded; that it should be linked to concrete economic interests and/or defense contractors, and to neither the poor nor ethnic minorities; that it should have a service* orientation; and that it should have congressional and presidential support within government (*those that generate benefits for, rather than restrictions on, the public).

Clearly the Forest Service would score highly among the above criteria, but the Park Service would not. It has a 'narrow and esoteric mission', it is 'interdisciplinary', it is full of 'political appointments' today, but conversely it did have a strong founder, it did have a well-defined agency character while lacking a competitive edge. Clarke and McCool may be too inflexible: NPS certainly does not match all their criteria, but a different basis of support has sustained the Service.

For example, it has a large constituency though it is not economically sustained: it does not sell a service. Its constituency derives from being known to most US citizens, from its integrity, and from its national significance. As we shall see in Chapter 8, its symbolic rôle also extends to a reciprocal relationship with global environmental issues. In my view the variations in its mission make it ideal to manage part of the nation's heritage, and that this has been understood by policy-makers in ensuring its continuity, relatively unscathed, over nearly 80 years.

Clarke & McCool (p50) *do* recognise the difference between con- and preservation when they suggest that by 1916 an intense rivalry had developed between the two supportive groups. Pinchot continually had to intervene: about this time he stated the 'creation of a preserve where timber cutting was illegal, was nothing more than an indefensible attempt to outlaw scientific forestry.' In fact, it is instructive to remember that his various attempts to stop, encourage, and mould, the new agency were virtually discounted by its creators, who then proceeded to build their land empire substantially out of the Forest Service's holdings.

Despite Pinchot's attempts at educating the new agency, the National Park Service was not wholly successful in enlarging its constituency. But one significant attempt to do this was made in 1919. In that year

the National Parks & Conservation Association was founded. Its first Executive Director, Robert Sterling Lord, was a friend of Mather's who had brought him into the Park Service soon after it had been set up. It was agreed with Mather that he should then leave NPS and lead NPCA so the Park Service could have an external voice, lobbying on its behalf and, in recent years, producing substantial reports on its future (Jarvis 1990). Effectively this action strengthened NPS' constituency. It is interesting that it is echoed 50 years later in Britain where 'charities' were set up to further local government aims (Hatch 1978).

Continuity

By 1919 the National Park Service had charge of 22 national monuments and 17 national parks. The years 1917 and 1918 were not very active in terms of new designations: two relatively uncomplicated additions in Alaska were made - Mount McKinley National Park and Katmai National Monument, and a national monument was proclaimed presidentially in Verendrye North Dakota; the latter's status was abolished in 1956. 1919 was a rather better year, for Grand Canyon NM was transferred from the Forest Service to NPS and then declared a national park. Lafayette NP was created in Maine, the gift of Rockefeller, to be redesignated Acadia NP in 1929. And Zion NP was created in Utah as well as two national monuments (Mackintosh 1984,22).

Despite these encouraging events, the parks themselves were in poor condition. Albright (1985,61 et seq) set out in 1917 to visit all the western parks. In Rocky Mountain National Park he came face to face with the workings of concessioners' minds. Enos Mills had spent his life establishing the park. Although 'a great conservationist' he accused Albright of working too closely with the Forest Service, when the Park Service should be adding some forest lands to the park; he also wanted 'to ban all transportation and lodging concessions while still retaining his own inn and his own property within the park.' More generally, he found insufficient personnel; the ones who were there were often not of the right quality and in Yellowstone there was confusion during the hand-over by the Army. The selection criteria for superintendents were rarely met - they had to be willing to live in somewhat primitive and often isolated conditions, at very low salaries. The ones who were in post had got their jobs through political patronage, with a changeover by Interior Secretary Lane to 'deserving Demo-

crats' in 1913. Later this practice was abandoned, only to return in the Reagan years - see chapter 7.

Not only were some of the parks mismanaged, Clarke & McCool (1985,50) note 'throughout the first thirty years of its existence, the Park Service failed to broaden its mission. Rather it existed on a shoe-string budget and continually grappled with the dilemma created by its conflicting dual mandate.' This comment seems to me consistent with an agency concerned mainly with preservation: it was selling a service that catered for the rest, recreation and spiritual enlightenment of the body rather than fuelling it, clothing it, or sheltering it. The Park Service, in my view, inevitably faced a difficult beginning. When it became fully accepted it was able to enlarge its mission as we shall see in the next chapters, but funding has never matched the reality of its commitments. Perhaps, as has been suggested (Whalen 1987, NPCA 1988), it should look toward creating a more independent financial base, in ways akin to the Smithsonian Institution. This concept has some validity: the Smithsonian resulted from a bequest of money to purchase and safeguard heritage, in its case fine art. The National Park Service was a bequest of the State to purchase and safeguard another form of heritage - the highest quality scenic land.

Conclusions

This chapter portrays a number of changes in the United States. First, it covers a period with a Democrat President, a Democrat Senate, and a Democrat House which continued except for 1917, until 1931, after 16 years of Republican administrations. Second, it included the first world war and the US' change from isolationism to world power, both preceded by several years of strife in neighbouring Mexico. It was also a time of industrial action, a 'bottom up' exercise of power from workers' rights to enfranchisement, and Wilson's partial control of the banking system. And yet, for this thesis, the most important event was signing of the National Park Service Act in August 1916, a fascinating counter to the human and European land exploitation by war. The United States joined this war only eight months after signing the Parks Act. This chapter therefore seemed the appropriate place to dwell on the parallelling of heritage land-protective legislation and times of crisis, and offers a range of examples in support of this contention.

Why did the National Park Service happen? The actors pressing for legislation were enlightened Congressmen collaborating with the voluntary sector and a handful of imaginative industrialists. Their conjunction, together with the previous support of Presidents Roosevelt and Taft, made a powerful body (perhaps the necessary critical mass) who drew on what they saw around them, or had happened relatively recently. A Forest Service had been created in 1905. The Hetch Hetchy dam had been an emotionally-charged issue. Land protection, which in any event was in its infancy, was in the hands of several federal agencies: there was a desire to integrate, though it was not well-fulfilled because of the crusading of the Forest Service against any such concept as a Park Service unless it were in its control. Perhaps this aggression helped the NPS cause. Because the US is associative (in de Tocqueville's and others' observation) a factor was the strength of the voluntary sector, most notably the Sierra Club. This was also the time of 'bottom-up' pressures for change - suffrage, union power, moves to control alcoholism. A further persuasive suggestion is that the campaigning for a Park Service came from an early and incomplete example of corporatism - several sectors of society worked together on a common cause. We shall see how successful this was at its apogee during the Franklin Roosevelt administrations.

However, the Park Service's mission, as laid down in the Act, directly reflects these many years of eloquent argument and counter argument about its establishment. In other words, it became a major compromise, an appeasement of different societal values, which led to an internally inconsistent set of ground rules. Realistically, it is impossible both to preserve and to allow public use of heritage land; this difficulty has polarised the Service since 1916. Yet, this chapter asks whether the 'conflict' is in fact intentional and subtle.

On the other hand, the compromise which effectively led to *de facto* conservation, has worked reasonably well. The United States had large areas of land awaiting protection under some conservationist guise or other (observers of United States' environmental policy had to wait until 1934 for the Great Smoky Mountains National Park Act, and the 1960s' Wilderness Act for *pre*servationist legislation). It therefore had an easier task allocating parts of the public domain to the new Park Service than many other countries. The chapters which follow track its progress, among other protective agencies.

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5 Public Construction & Environmental Destruction 1933-42

Chapter Summary

A retrospective glance at the excitement of the Twenties, characterised by overindulgence, provides a context. The decade ended with the Wall Street Crash which led into the Depression years, the period of most concern to this chapter. There were not many accessions to the National Park Service during the Twenties; in the years on either side of 1930 private philanthropy was briefly evident, through John Rockefeller's donations. Gradually this petered out, possibly signalling the end of an option for the future of heritage land protection - the Smithsonian Institution is instanced as a successful mix of public and private funding.

Franklin Roosevelt's major office holding spans the Wall Street Crash, the Depression, and the Second World War. During this period the rise of corporatism is noted, with federal : private sector cohabitation later joined by the union movement. Some authors see Roosevelt as part of a continuum with nineteenth century origins rather than of being a particular innovator. Nevertheless, his achievements were prodigious - no sooner had he tackled the problems of the Depression than he was rearming for, and being fully involved in, a world war.

Much of what he did toward the nation's recovery inevitably led to environmental adversity. The federal government temporarily took over from the private sector as exploiters of the land; they did this mainly through schemes to promote water conservation and hydroelectric power. Of these, the Tennessee Valley Authority is the most famous, but the Bureau of Reclamation was not idle in the West. TVA was at times only marginally cost effective, if environmental damage is included in the evaluation. BUREC often used vast federal funds toward unrealistic ends: for example, irrigating the desert and powering farmers' activities all at well below market cost.

But Roosevelt was also a conservationist, a philosophy he inherited from his cousin Theodore Roosevelt. He set up the Civilian

Conservation Corps, and effected the transfer of national monuments from the Forest Service, and of historic military sites from the War Department, to the National Park Service.

The federal land managers, who range from exploiters like the Corps of Engineers and the Bureau of Reclamation, through the Bureau of Land Management (with a different name at the time) to the conservationists of the Forest Service and Fish & Wildlife Service and thence to the rather more preservationist National Park Service, are briefly examined for their contribution to the period's environmental conflict. This seems to have been directly related to their ability to combat the Depression. ACE and BUREC did much damage while fulfilling their assigned missions; FS seems to have been less active than previously, for priority was given to assisting impoverished private foresters; the F&WS (with another name until 1940) were administratively accident prone.

It might be imagined, therefore, that no such thing as preservation could be possible in this period, but this was not the case. In fact, the period is notable for some of the first examples of designations whose motivation was preservation. Following on from Shenandoah and Great Smoky Mountains National Parks came Everglades NP. The latter, of all the national parks, gets closest to the concept of preservation, if for no other reason that most of it is inaccessible, being covered with densely-matted mangroves. It was also the first *biological* rather than *geological* park. The Act of 1934 (ratified in 1947) was the first to designate a national park with the term 'wilderness' written in.

The Twenties

If the 1920s seemed at first sight to be an inactive period in terms of environmental protection, in retrospect we can see that they are important, if negatively, since the developments of the 1930s were a reaction against them. Hence, the 1920s will briefly be reviewed. In their turn they were a reaction to the first world war, and became a time for wild living on limited liquor, an industrial and commercial bonanza with little thought for its consequences, and structured and intense criminal activity.

O'Callaghan (1987,40) talks of 'The Roaring Twenties': perhaps he was referring to the output of Henry Ford? Between 1908 and 1927, fifteen

million Model 'T's had been produced; not unnaturally they led to a mobility not previously experienced except by railroad, which not everyone could afford for regular, everyday travel. The automobile enjoyed perhaps the halcyon period of its existence. As numbers of vehicles and their use grew, they became an increasing hazard to most people's definition of 'civilisation'. Ford was singularly unconcerned about the effect of his product on natural and man-made environments. In fact, his ideal town was linear, the apotheosis of ribbon development, on either side of a multi-lane freeway. As an environmental exploiter Ford has had few rivals. And the federal government supported him with a massive growth in road building, an act to be repeated after the second world war when the Interstate highway system was built (Deakin 1990).

The Republican administrations that followed Wilson tried to create favourable conditions for business men, with high tariffs on imported goods; the rich had their taxes reduced; attempts to control the trusts and industrial corporations were virtually abandoned. Most industry prospered, if not from the spin-off from automobile production (steel, rubber, glass and gasoline were needed in large quantities), from the mechanisation of leisure. The first radio station opened in Pittsburgh in 1920 and soon there were many stations and millions of receivers (O'Callaghan p42), and it was a peak time for the cinema. Skirts progressively rose higher and the Charleston and tango made older people say the condemnatory things that older people say.

There was contempt for the law, particularly because of Prohibition, but when gangs became established their power and wealth led to other antisocial activities. The Twenties were also a time of intolerance, particularly of blacks and North American Indians. The Ku Klux Klan grew and, in some states, formed a constituency that influenced politicians.

If the above presents a world reverberating with excitement and pursuit of the new amidst violent competitiveness, there was a snag. Farmers were not doing well because demand was static and exports were less needed in a Europe self-sufficient once again. And the penchant for buying shares, which had affected everyone with a few dollars to spare, gradually became a mania, which meant that share prices rose beyond their real value and then rose again. The more prudent noticed this,

and that company profits were not as good as they should be to sustain high share prices, and quietly starting selling their stock. That became noticed after a while, and the less prudent were next to sell. Then everyone sold, and fortunes as well as the life savings of the poor, were lost. The decade ended with The Wall Street Crash. It presaged many lean years, most of which were presided over by Franklin Delano Roosevelt.

The Twenties were not remarkable for additions to the National Park Service's territory. There were no additions in 1920 and 1921. From 1922 to 1929 five new national parks were created one of which, Grand Teton NP in Wyoming, was assembled from land the majority of which had been secretly bought by John D. Rockefeller, who also gave the nation Acadia NP in Maine, and contributed to Great Smoky Mountains NP in North Carolina and Tennessee. This *noblesse oblige* has since retreated in the face of the business world only giving if it can see a return. It is possible the Rockefeller-type donations petered out because land is more valued by the private sector than, say, donating a new museum to the Smithsonian Institution. Similarly, apart from much smaller donations via the National Parks Foundation, a body authorised by Congress in 1935 to receive private bequests to the Park Service, the Service did not pursue private donations. The Foundation, however, has not received bequests much larger than a few million dollars, which may not simply be parsimony in terms of the nation's benefactors, but reflect a lack of effort by the Park Service itself in approaching potential sponsors: perhaps it was being purist.

The contrast with the Smithsonian Institution is apposite, for it seems to have successfully achieved its stated goals through a combination of public and private patronage. It does appear NPS would have been stronger if it could have devised a formula of this nature for its own purposes. Similarly, it might have done better in the Reagan era if it had shown it was receiving money from both public and private sectors. Returning to the 1930s, the long drawn-out affair of the Grand Tetons bequest was only concluded in 1933; thereafter it may have been difficult for Roosevelt to sanction private land donations because they might have been seen as 'buying from the poor.'

During the decade of the 1920s 11 national monuments resulted from presidential decrees, four of which were redesignated national parks in

subsequent years. A further nine national monuments, and one more national park, were designated from 1930 to the time of the beginning of this chapter, 1933 (Mackintosh 1984). The 1920s thus maintained an interest in protection of heritage land. This was partly stimulated by the greater freedom to get around in automobiles, and partly as an antidote to the kind of society outlined above. The Sierra Club continued to add members and other environmental groups arose. However, the comparative lack of action since establishment of the Park Service may possibly be explained because, for many, it was a time of freedom of expression, enjoyment, and carefree living. Except for a small minority of citizens, protection of the finest natural resources was not an issue.

Depression Politics

Roosevelt was sworn in as Governor of New York State on 1 January 1929. His career in the two main political offices of the nation therefore spanned the Wall Street Crash, the entirety of the Depression, and most of World War 2 until he died on 12 April 1945. His period as Governor did not allow fine tuning of the state's politics, for Roosevelt was largely involved in the fundamentals of life: ensuring that the aftermath of the Crash and the outset of the Depression were made as tolerable as possible. He supported the people, and in particular persuaded a distrustful Republican majority State Legislature to pass a law authorising the spending of $20m on the unemployed. From a tiny majority in 1928 he was reelected Governor in 1930 with one 28 times as large.

His success naturally led to clamours for him to stand for President in 1932, though for a long time he was unsure whether to accept Democrat Party nomination. Once he had decided, he threw himself into whistle-stop tours, radio broadcasts, and meetings with as many of the US people as he could. The most important of his campaign speeches was in San Francisco in 1932, when he clearly advocated interventionism. The federal government, he believed, should 'not be content to sit on the sidelines of the nation's life as it had done ... in the 1920's ... it should use its power to help its citizens to make better lives for themselves (and) ensure ... every man was given the chance to earn for himself a fair share of the nation's wealth. It ought, too, to protect his savings ... to face with confidence "childhood, sickness, old age" when money could not be earned' (quoted in O'Callaghan 1987,65). On 9

November 1932 he received nearly 23m votes, and Hoover nearly 16m.

Roosevelt's predecessors, Presidents Coolidge and Hoover, provided a relaxed non-interventionist context for US capitalist economy to which he could react; he watched those Presidents' political foundations crumbling from the effects of the Wall Street Crash to the height of the Depression, the very time he took over. He believed that many things had to change, not least of which was the political response to crises. While Theodore Roosevelt and Wilson had tried trust-busting, they were some distance from total success, and the *laissez-faire* Twenties had effectively undone their work. Gradually, a corporate partnership evolved between government and private industry (see for example Moran 1989,146 and Cawson 1982,36-7; Parry & Parry 1989 briefly define corporatism as 'the institutionalized collective voice of interest groups, including the trade unions representing the labour movement'). Initially, there were two main prongs - the increased size and power of industrial units and conglomerates, and an increasingly powerful interventionist federal government arguing that was the only platform from which to resolve the nation's ills. This was a time when managing land and the economy came together: the Tennessee Valley Authority (see below) is an example of this, for it married individual development with land control. The inter-war years and particularly the slump of the Depression affected land owners badly. Republicans to the last man, they rose up saying to the government, 'do something.' Roosevelt was the only one who did, and so established a relationship with the most unlikely people.

But the Congress was never willing to accede to all of Roosevelt's demands, so loose ties with industry gradually tightened: they started with the provision of cheap water and electricity, explained below, a bonanza of public resources which had been funded by the taxpayer at large. This had precedent, of course, in the cheap timber from federal forests and nominally-priced grazing on public lands. The ties became strongest when Roosevelt started rearming for ultimate entry into World War II. At the latter time, the Congress also loosened its purse strings so the public-private partnership was strengthened. During the Roosevelt presidencies, Union power also increased and became more effective, enabling a triple pillared corporatism to be erected.

Badger (1989,3-4) discusses the consequences:

> 'The New Deal did not nationalise the banks or discipline American businessmen; rather the corporate leaders themselves drafted the financial and industrial stabilisation legislation. Reform defused the threat of radical protest by incorporating potentially threatening groups into the system. Measures designed to help large commercial farmers at the expense of the rural poor alleviated farm discontent. Recognition of trade unions channelled the militant protest of rank-and-file industrial workers into ... safe and responsible unionism.'

Such an explanation apparently demeans Roosevelt's achievements, but a closer look shows they could not have happened without his stimulus. Badger (p 67) then notes that, having failed to nationalise the banks,

> 'in March 1933, Roosevelt ... patched up and underwrote the existing system. When the economic conditions cried out for central economic planning, corporate liberals made the National Recovery Administration into an agency that sanctioned cartels.' In case this leads to disenchantment with Roosevelt, Badger then says 'The explanation of New Deal limitations lies less in a failure of radical will, and more in the dictates of the economic emergency which demanded speed of action and its vital corollary: the consent of the participants.'

Nevins & Commager (1986,420) usefully conclude this discussion of the political background, by viewing the New Deal as not particularly new, having had an historic background stretching back to the 1880s. They say:

> 'To many contemporaries the New Deal seemed like revolution. Actually it was deeply conservative - conservative in the same sense that Jeffersonian and Wilsonian democracy had been conservative. It aimed to protect, against violence from the left or from the right, the essentials of American democracy - to conserve natural and human resources ...' They continue 'The conservation policy of the New Deal had been inaugurated by Theodore Roosevelt; railroad and trust regulation went back to the eighties; banking and currency reforms had been partially achieved by Wilson ...'

Franklin Roosevelt can thus be seen as having consolidated past innovations to the extent they expanded into corporatism, with federal government, industry and (later) labour unions cohabiting in the mansion of state. What was significant about this time was that somehow they succeeded in making their offspring serve the American people.

Roosevelt and the Environment

It must be said first that Roosevelt's giant strides in five-league boots across the impoverished areas of central and western US, *were* environmentally destructive. However, given that a nation was being destroyed by the Depression harsh judgements are out of place. And, in a sense, it was 'clean' exploitation, being federally stimulated and funded; its 'profit' was intimately tied up with the people's recovery. Profit in industry, provided it was not excessive as often happened with the Trusts when they bought out the competition and could charge what they liked, was vital for the economy - on the one condition that it was adequately distributed among the workforce, who then provided a market for the company's goods. Not observing the latter rule was one of the reasons why the Depression continued - companies were caught in a spiral where they broke up their local market by pricing their goods beyond what it could afford; or they reduced wages; or they laid off workers; or they tried all of these.

While it may appear, particularly with hindsight, that Roosevelt's New Deal policies were largely environmentally damaging, it should be remembered that the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) was one of the agencies he introduced shortly after taking up presidential office. As O'Callaghan (1987,71) remarks:

> 'Roosevelt had been interested in conservation work ever since Theodore Roosevelt had aroused the nation's conscience in the matter, thirty years earlier. He therefore took particular pride in the work of the CCC. By August 1933 it had housed 250 000 young men in camps all over the country ... cutting fire lanes through forests, strengthening river banks, planting trees in areas threatened by soil erosion, and carrying out many other useful tasks.'

While such activity bridges between conservation and preservation, it does give a more balanced picture of the man.

One of the principal environmental issues for Roosevelt was water. It has been said that the area of the US west of 100° longitude is semi-arid, and much of the area between the Rockies and the Sierra Nevada is almost completely arid. This, combined with loss of tree-cover, inappropriate crops, and freak windstorms, served to erode the area's soil.

The Council on Environmental Quality (1987,69) graphically describes these conditions and shows how in 1934 a study of the National Resources Board recommended that the government should buy and redevelop 75 million acres of this submarginal farmland, and relocate the farmers on better quality land. It is of interest that, between 1933 and 1946, 11.3 million acres were acquired: more than 9.5 million acres 'were redeveloped for range, forest and related multiple uses such as wildlife protection, watersheds and recreation. The other 1.8 million acres were transformed into wildlife refuges and parks.' Irrigation was thought to be the answer to the dust bowl, as it was to the deserts. The government set up a Soil Erosion Service to parallel the works of TVA, BUREC and ACE. The following paragraphs describe water control policies in a little more detail.

The Tennessee Valley Authority was generally regarded as the greatest success of the New Deal. It originated in a range of problems, though perhaps its most important goal was to accommodate climatic aberration and rectify human agricultural error. The Valley was high quality agricultural land when the first settlers moved in; they planted maize, tobacco and cotton which gradually removed nutrients from the soil so that subsequent crops became poorer. Second, the crops were planted and harvested from spring to autumn; in the winter the land was unprotected, and rainstorms eroded it. Third, exceptionally heavy rains in 1933 flooded many parts of the Valley. If the Tennessee River were controlled through hydropower dams, the argument went, its waters could be distributed rationally, and its power would be available to produce chemical fertilisers to rejuvenate the land, to power other factories to provide employment and enrich the area, and to light streets and dwellings. Finally, the river became navigable by large freight barges as locks were provided at each dam; this action also helped resuscitate dying towns alongside the river.

Existing power generating firms naturally took exception to the federally provided electricity. Their reaction persisted to the extent they were eventually bought out by the federal government. Thenceforth, all electricity to the area was provided at a cheap rate - an action reminiscent of the heavily subsidised timber from federal forests, and the cheap water for irrigation of western deserts, that have been mentioned above. While some of this recycling of tax moneys appears irrational and inefficient, TVA helped revive an existing area so it could once

again stand on its own feet.

But what were the environmental consequences of the TVA experiment? Zaslowsky (1986,299) says 'The TVA engineered hope, and conservationists, believing in the authority's goals of land restoration, were proud to help.' It is not said whether they were disappointed or not. To-day we would be less sanguine about the quantity of fertiliser put on the lands which then washed off into the river. We might applaud the tree planting intended to curtail erosion, but we would also need to consider net gains. Clarke & McCool (1985,23) suggest this when noting that the Carter administration considered several damming projects in 1977. Out of these, the three most marginal were examined: the Meramec Lake project would inundate 12 600 acres to protect 11 900 acres from flooding, and provide new recreational facilities for the area; the Atchafalaya project would benefit two oil rig companies at a cost of $20.3 million and would inundate 7 500 acres; and the Bayou Bodcau project would benefit 60 families at a cost of $240 000 per family. In other words, on these bases, they were cost ineffective, and probably environmentally ineffective when considered holistically.

To what extent do the TVA dams and lakes fall short of the achievement of net economic and environmental gains? As the Authority did not respond to my request for information, I am not able to say with any precision. But I can quote Hays (1989,49) who, when talking about environmental conditions in the southern Appalachians, said:

> 'A special target was the TVA, which in its drive for regional development with a special emphasis on expanded energy facilities, not merely opposed but defied the environmental movement. Its actions provoked a vigorous counterattack that helped to promote the steady growth of environmental action in the region.'

And Badger (1989,176) notes the disparity between the goals of helping 'the people' and what actually happened with TVA: 'Rural development served the needs of the more substantial, rather than the poorer farmer. The TVA also conformed to local racial norms and largely excluded blacks.' It was also not long before it was supplying cheap electricity to industry that moved into the area, and thereby subsidising firms of the calibre of Monsanto and Alcoa, who had little or no connexion with the area. The US Government Manual suggests that Alcoa built their own dam and hydro-power generating facility, though this was

probably in later years.

It appears that TVA's contribution to the economy of Tennessee, and some adjacent states, was considerable; it is also the case that it was only possible through massive federal cash injections, changing rôle of the federal government from a *facilitator* to an economic *agent*. At the same time, impact on the environment was very substantial: some good, in terms of tree planting and soil conservation; some bad, in terms of the large areas permanently flooded by lakes behind the 18 or so dams to save other areas being temporarily flooded, and the extensive use of fertiliser to offset bad farming practices. Environmentalism in its developed form today allows us to be critical of TVA. But we need to remember that TVA in its time represented *progress*, and it (and Roosevelt himself) broadcast its achievements, while probably being largely unaware of its shortcomings.

If TVA's activities met some goals we can applaud, what of the Bureau of Reclamation's and Corps of Engineers' activities during the period of this chapter, for they are the other two principal agencies statutorily concerned with hydrological engineering in the US? The Bureau, set up by the 1902 Reclamation Act, has extraordinary engineering achievements in its name, which can also be seen as major environmental disbenefits. Furthermore, it is questionable whether they were needed. Ralph Nader became interested in this question, and inspired Berkman & Viscusi (1973) to write a condemnatory book. More recently, Reisner (1990) discusses the use and abuse of water power: he questions the irrigation of western deserts, at both prodigious capital cost and with low-priced water, for *rice production*. Rice requires heavy rainfall and sun, both of which are found in parts of India, Bangladesh and SE Asia ... and Louisiana, where farmers are paid *not* to produce it. Growing rice in deserts is akin to establishing a swimwear shop at the South Pole. But Reisner also points to the urban developments which are utterly dependent on water: Los Angeles, San Francisco, Phoenix, Denver etc. Scarce-veiled questions arise: why? What for? Why such artificiality? Why such *exploitation* of a scarce resource? One answer is that if the two agencies supply the water cheaply, then people will use it, which has the effect of easing pressures on demand for land, for the desert otherwise has no attraction.

One of the reasons for over-active exploitation of scarce water

resources is the peculiar position of the Bureau of Reclamation. It competes continually with the Corps of Engineers, but it competes from a position of weakness. Clarke & McCool (1985,95) explain this. First, the Corps had exactly 100 years headstart on the Bureau. Second, local and state government, for which the Corps works, are required to make contributions in cost or in kind toward a project that benefits them - planning and construction costs, provision of rights-of-way, easements, the condemnation (compulsory purchase) of land for example - that involved the concept of 'cost-sharing' and lessened the load on the federal government. The Bureau did not have these advantages. It also had a higher fail rate than the Corps. But, it had to justify its position within the Department of the Interior and therefore dammed every watercourse in sight, mainly in the west, though the Corps had carved out its own territory in the extreme north west. Overprovision then made the Bureau search around for new projects, several of which were within National Parks. The Congress refused to entertain each of these proposals. The Bureau therefore became more and more emaciated, and Carter actually refused to permit any new starts during his administration.

What did the two agencies achieve during the period covered by this chapter? BUREC was primarily involved in the west, in fact its main mission as a result of the 1902 Act. So, a tunnel was bored through the Rockies under the Continental Divide to bring west flowing water to Denver east of the Rockies. Major dams were built on the Colorado and many other majestic rivers. Irrigation schemes watered the deserts. The environmental consequences of these actions, tacitly if not overtly supported by Roosevelt, were severe. They also cannot be justified as part of the New Deal, for the west was not as badly afflicted by the Depression as other areas - they were more to do with a lingering sense of frontier spirit, and of a government prepared to pour millions into the opening up of the west, than any careful consideration of consequences.

Why was water conserved? Objectively to provide drinking water, irrigation, and hydroelectric power. But another reason is that it was part of a political programme, in which it was necessary to be seen to be doing something. The political programme in itself was partly concerned with the alleviation of poverty, and partly with other issues. Whatever the reasoning, irrigation of arid lands with inadequate water which was then wasted on a profligate scale can also be seen as federal resource

exploitation, even though it seemed rational at the time. Nowadays it would most probably not meet the requirements of an environmental impact statement. A large proportion of the lands being irrigated or otherwise opened up was also of interest to the preservationist. Protection of parts of the desert has taken place - Death Valley NM, Joshua Tree NM and the recent Great Basin NP, are some examples.

During the period 1933-1942 these were not real issues, however. The job of government was to minimise the impact of the Depression on the people as a whole, and then to prepare for, and fight, a world war. The quiescence of industry, at least until rearmament, meant that their exploitation of the land was minimised. So, in accordance with my thesis, there was no private sector battle to fight and therefore little incentive to think of preservation. There *was* a potential public sector battle, but it was not fought because of the mitigating circumstances of the times.

Other Federal Agencies

Clarke & McCool (1985,77 et seq) are abrasive about the Fish & Wildlife Service, one of whose problems was that it kept changing its name and the extent of its functions. They quote an Alaskan Senator as saying, of the period 1940 to 1959, that the Service 'instead of regulating the industry were regulated and controlled by it.' This might be seen as a further example of corporatism if it were not for the chaotic administrative state of the F&WS at the time - control from outside replaced the kind of working partnership between public and private sectors that corporatism would suggest. The Bureau of Fisheries was part of the Department of Commerce until Franklin Roosevelt transferred it to Interior. It then experienced a partial transformation from the wildlife exploitation of the Bureau to a conservation bias in the new Fish & Wildlife Service, set up in 1940. F&WS also has some preservationist responsibilities. While such a change might be envisioned during the period 1910-1916, or in association with the environmental upsurge that followed Rachel Carson's *Silent Spring* (see the next chapter), there is less to explain it at this time.

The Army Corps of Engineers was greatly strengthened in its exploitative actions through the Flood Control Act of 1936. At this time the Congress authorised the Corps to extend its activities west of the

Mississippi River, so it conflicted with the Bureau of Reclamation's 'territory,' as noted above. Clarke & McCool (1985,16-17) note the Corps could 'embark upon comprehensive water basin studies - including navigation, flood control, and hydroelectric power generation.' The exploitation was mixed with recreation to produce conservation, but not at this time - it had to wait until 1944 when the Corps was authorised to develop 'public use' facilities at its projects: by 1964 it had 50% more visitor-days than the National Park Service.

Clawson (1983) considers the period of this chapter to have been a combination of 'reservation' and 'custodial management.' *Reservation* was necessary because of 'the excesses of the disposal process' (p 27) but it had been progressing for some time, and has largely been covered in previous chapters. Roosevelt was instrumental in curbing the disposal of the public domain in 1934: managing land and the economy became parallel policies of the time. It was well known by this time that previous disposals had led to only a few yeomen farmers, while it had enabled large areas of land to be assembled by the rich. Roosevelt also wanted the public lands to be used publically, benefitting the maximum number; public ideology changes meant the small man could not stand alone and increasingly grouped with others so collective defence of their interests became possible.

Of significance to our period, however, is the Taylor Grazing Act of 1934 (Clawson p 31), to be administered by the Department of the Interior through a new Division of Grazing; in 1946 that was merged with the General Land Office to form the Bureau of Land Management. BLM, from their annual publication of Public Land Statistics, say they are 'responsible for the balanced management of the public lands and resources.' They make slight reference to the National Park Service, the Fish and Wildlife Service, and the Bureau of Reclamation on page 1; the Forest Service is entirely ignored. It is not known whether this delusionary view permeated the original Division of Grazing whose holding started with 80 million acres - about half 'the remaining unappropriated and unreserved public domain in the 48 contiguous states' - and was extended to 142 million acres in 1936. This concept, of effectively conserving a large part of the public domain not previously reserved for any function, and probably exploited while no one was effectively controlling it, makes a useful transition to the next section of this chapter.

Clawson (p 34) discusses *custodial management* mainly in terms of the Forest Service. He makes two interesting points, first that the volume of timber sold was modest during the period 1905-1950. Even during the second world war private timber was much more accessible, and during the Depression years 'national forest timber sales were intentionally held low to reduce the pressure on stumpage prices in order to force even faster liquidation of the private timber, much of which was being held under conditions of financial distress.' The second point concerns recreation on public forest lands. Clawson notes that 'Pinchot scarcely recognized the existence of outdoor recreation, and it was not until 1924 that the Forest Service regularly collected any statistics about the extent of this activity.' At that time annual recreation visits to national forests were less than 5 million, against 200 million visitor-days when Clawson was writing in the early 1980s. In my chapters 3 and 4 Pinchot made frequent appearances, continually making claims around the related concepts of multiple use / utilitarian conservation / progressive conservation. From Clawson's comments above we can see that Pinchot was more concerned with the theory than the actuality, of these concepts; it appears he was using them to construct and influence constituencies, and for empire-building (we should recall his attempts to embrace the fledgling Park Service within the Forest Service and, for that matter, the NPS' attempts to absorb the FS as mentioned above.)

Preservation

In chapter 6 we shall see how Nixon fired one of the Park Service's best Directors, Hartzog, because the latter wanted to create a new national park where Nixon's favourite sports club was located. Chapter 7 shows how Carter's Democrat policies were overturned by Reagan. At this point in time, 1933, we can see a Republican presidential act whose outcome had been partly anticipated, and which endorsed a policy shift of equal acceptability to the Democrats. The outgoing President Hoover had approved an act of Congress authorizing the President to reorganise the executive branch of government; only a few months after the beginning of his presidency, and *almost exactly coincidental with The Wall Street Crash*, he had received the Park Service's recommendation that the historic military sites should be absorbed by the Service. The Congress at that time refused to allow Executive reorganisations by presidential order, so the change had to await the end of Hoover's presidency.

The incoming President Roosevelt, three months in office, used this Congressional Act to transfer all national monuments in the care of the Forest Service, all national military parks in the care of the War Department, and the parks of the national capital, to the National Park Service. This was the culmination of an 18-year effort, which started with Albright's plea in his report as Acting Director of NPS, to bring the War Department's historic areas into the NPS (Albright & Cahn 1985, 244). Though the early 30s anti-bellum period represented the height of isolationism, anti-industrialism of the time allowed conservationists their greatest power so they could push for what they wanted. Roosevelt, well aware of these societal moves during his period as Governor of New York State, responded by transferring the monuments and historic military lands. Furthermore, his actions can be seen as a preservationist gesture countering the federally-exploitative measures of the New Deal at a time of economic stringency.

Not everyone in the Park Service was enthusiastic about the historic area additions to the System. King (1988,281) links this to the training and experience of park managers, and their inappropriateness to the protection of historic areas. He notes their backgrounds are in visitor management and protection, recreation or natural resource management. King quotes a conversation with a 'highly placed Park Service official' who said that he 'thinks there is value in these historic places' as though he had just discovered something new. There is also constant indecision as to the proper location and type of management of the historic areas - as I found in late-1980s Washington, there were once again moves to try and remove this function from NPS and give the historic areas some independence. Large questions arise. Should government agencies have a restricted mission or should they also embrace the management of activities and artefacts *related* to that mission? The latter is certainly the way NPS has developed, and we have noted the Forest Service's multiple-function mission. On the other hand, several Interior agencies are quite constrained by their mission: Reclamation, Fish & Wildlife, Mining, Land Management, Geological Surveying, for example.

The missions of two federal agencies - the National Park Service and the Forest Service - are central to this thesis. Both have met the requirements of their missions, one with preservational, educational and recreational objectives scantily supported by the US taxpayer, the

other through commercial success heavily subsidised by the same taxpayer. Yet this is a gross oversimplification. The Forest Service is directly aligned to a market economy; it apparently provides economic benefits, though it is subsidised to give these benefits to a selection of the US population. It can be seen as offering cheap timber, utilising a natural asset, and generating a multiplier effect. It can also be seen as being exploitative of natural beauty and competing, within a different set of rules, with the private sector timber industry. On the other hand, the National Park Service does not offer a saleable product and, in prohibiting hunting, it alienates many of its potential visitors. Each, in quite different ways, supports my thesis. Thus, the Forest Service's exploitation of an economic good, and the Park Service's exploitation of a visual good, both give rise to demands for preservation. Both have met these demands with their designated wilderness areas, though the Forest Service has performed much worse, in terms of wilderness as a proportion of its total land holding, than has the Park Service.

There have been many attempts to 'rationalise' the above dilemmas, either by the Forest Service absorbing the Park Service, or *vice versa.* Roosevelt unwittingly recruited a rationaliser, by having Harold Ickes as his Interior Secretary. Though most of his staff were terrified of him, he cleaned up his Department and ran it very efficiently for 12 years, personally patrolling the miles of corridors of Interior on the look out for slackers, and setting up his own investigation service one of whose tasks was to watch out for concessioner fraud - these were a response to years of dishonourable practice within his Department. His rationalist (expansionist?) tendencies meant he constantly tried to enlarge the functions of the Department, even trying to regain control of the Forest Service, through its transfer back from Agriculture to Interior (Badger 1989,82). Unfortunately this did not succeed - unfortunately because it might have enabled the Park Service to have gained at least the highest quality forest areas as heritage land under its care, while perhaps one of Interior's exploitative agencies took care of the commercial side of the Forest Service.

Perhaps Roosevelt felt that transfer of the Forest Service's National Monuments and the War Department's historic holdings was enough for NPS to contend with at one time. Perhaps, as Utley & Mackintosh (1988,42) note, 'Roosevelt was unwilling to jeopardise less controversial aspects

of government reorganisation.' They continue by discussing Ickes' concept of a Department of Conservation, which would have absorbed the Forest Service and the civil functions of the Army Corps of Engineers. Then, in 1937, the President's Committee on Administrative Management assigned natural resource functions to Interior - by implication this included the Forest Service. The Plan was sent to Congress with Roosevelt's endorsement but then the Forest Service drew on its large constituency and Gifford Pinchot was recruited to the cause of fighting Interior's aspirations. In passing, Utley & Mackintosh remind us that another government reorganisation body in 1949 recommended a Department of Natural Resources, combining the Forest Service with Interior, and in 1973 Interior Secretary Rogers Morton proposed a Department of Energy and Natural Resources. None succeeded, and in fact the last one misfired: a new Department of Energy was established, which took some Interior lands.

Right up to the formal starting date of this chapter, 1933, Albright remained Director. He resigned in August of that year to become Vice-President of the United States Potash Company, a move he had to make so that his salary as Director, still only $9 000 a year, could be increased to look after his children's education and his own later years. This move is of interest to this thesis for it suggests a bridging between preservation in the Park Service and the commercial world, some of which was trying to open up preserved areas to resource exploitation. The interest heightens when we see that Albright, when negotiating for the new job, insisted on retaining an interest in Park Service affairs. The Company readily agreed he should do this, as a private citizen, and were happy for him to serve on unpaid committees or commissions if asked to do so either by government or by industry. It does appear as if the corporate state was alive and well.

Albright's job involved new potash mines on leased Bureau of Land Management land in New Mexico; he saw this as being 'conservation of a resource for use, as contrasted with the duty of the National Park Service to protect scenic and historic resources for the benefit of present and future generations' (Albright & Cahn, 1985,313). This seems important, for it suggests the fluidity with which conceptual transfers can take place within the field of conservation, this great grey area poised between preservation and single-minded utilitarianism. Albright continued to be involved in conservation issues right up to

the time, at 95, when he was dictating his memories to Robert Cahn - he was invited to dinners at the White House, he advised Kennedy's Interior Secretary, Stewart Udall, he attended conferences in Poland and Seattle, he pursued the interests of the Sierra Club, the National Audubon Society and the National Parks & Conservation Association, as a member of each, and he proffered advice, often not asked for, to all his successors as Director of the National Park Service. He was also almost certainly in touch with the Wilderness Society, founded in 1935 to protest against ridgecrest roadways, which it considered an intolerable intrusion on the natural environment. It then grew to become 'the most influential citizen force behind the Wilderness Act of 1964' (Mackintosh 1984,55).

However, to return to the main period of this chapter, 1933-1942, only three new national parks were designated, and 16 national monuments. This seems no better, perhaps worse, than the Twenties accessions discussed above. But this does not reflect badly on the thesis, for that juxtaposes preservation with exploitation - this period was one of depression rather than exploitation, and inordinate expenditure on park units would have seemed inappropriate. What is notable for the period, however, is designation of the first national recreation area of the system, Boulder Dam NRA in Nevada and Arizona, in 1936. This utilised the vast impounded lake (the NRA was later called Lake Mead, and is over 100 miles long) behind the dam for watersports; perhaps BUREC, who built the Boulder Dam, thought this recreational provision would counter preservationist complaints about damming the Colorado and other rivers to irrigate desert. It is unlikely it did: Mackintosh (1984,56) says

> 'fierce conservation battles were fought during the period against dam proposals that threatened to inundate unspoiled canyons ... there was some displeasure, then, when the Service joined forces with the dam builders to administer recreational developments ... at major impoundments.'

It was to be 10 years before the second NRA was designated, Coulee Dam NRA in Washington state.

CEQ (1987,89-90) provides further information on environmental policies of the period of this chapter. In the early 1930s, Aldo Leopold

(Pinchot's successor as Chief Forester) published *Game Management*, 'a text that altered the course of wildlife conservation.' So far, so good, but 'he recognised the role of legal protection for wildlife and provided a set of management principles to help maintain wildlife populations at optimum levels *consistent with man's requirements*' (my italics). In 1934 the Duck Stamp Act provided funds from hunting permits to purchase and develop wetland areas for a national system of migratory fowl refuges. Then, in 1937 the Federal Aid in Wildlife Restoration Act was passed. This authorised the allocation of revenues from the 10% excise tax on sporting arms and ammunition to the states for wildlife research, land acquisition, development and maintenance. As a result, 38 states acquired 900 000 acres of refuges and management areas.

In the park system, the Historic Sites Act of 1935 was noteworthy: it required NPS to carry out nationwide resource surveys, and, as noted above, it set up the NPS Advisory Board, which continues to this day to advise the Service on major policy areas. The Park, Parkway and Recreation Study Act of 1936 required an inventory of the outdoor recreation needs of the country, and the provision of technical and planning assistance to state and local agencies (a truly federal function) became a significant activity, which also continues to this day (Everhart 1983, 24). Foresta (1984,62) adds that this Act explicitly gave NPS federal responsibility for recreation planning, a role not at all to the liking of those NPS officers who were drawn toward the preservationist pole.

Apart from the extensive enlargement of the Park Service's heritage land, there was another, often overlooked, seminal piece of protection of the New Deal era. Apart from mountains, the area protected had all the characteristics of the earliest nineteenth century parks: it was a kind of frontier, with poaching, fights and shooting, and it was considered developmentally useless. It was surrounded by intensive agriculture and close to a large and burgeoning centre of population; culturally it was half Spanish. This area, the Everglades in the south of Florida, is nearly at sea level and there is little height variation. The area it covered before the overwhelming expansion of Miami and much of the Gulf coast, the citrus and hydroponic tomato plantations, and a virtually unused airport constructed to international standards, occupies roughly the lowest third of the 'panhandle' part of the state of Florida. More than half that area has now been so manipulated by

developers, farmers and the Army Corps of Engineers that it is unrecognisable as a wetlands of supreme world importance. But man, under extreme pressure from environmental groups and the more sensitive citizens of the state and federal systems, has conceded the protection of three areas, shown on Figure 7-2. Biscayne National Park, at the south east tip of Florida, is more a marine than a wetlands preserve, but Everglades National Park, and Big Cypress National Preserve, designated to protect Everglades' water flows from the north and north west, are substantial bastions against exploiters. As I studied Everglades National Park in some detail, I shall return to examine its present-day pressures in chapter 7.

For the moment it is sufficient to look at its origin. Runte (1987,108-9), when talking of the controversy surrounding establishment of Grand Teton National Park says:

> 'It remained instead for Everglades National Park, Florida, authorized in 1934, to mark the first unmistakable pledge to total preservation. The commitment seemed all the more convincing in light of the kind of topography represented in the Everglades. For the first time a major national park would lack great mountains, deep canyons, and tumbling waterfalls; preservationists accepted the protection of its native plants and animals alone as justification ... in the quest for total preservation, no less than the retention of significant natural wonders, the worthlessness of the area in question was still the only guarantee of effecting a successful outcome.'

Runte (pp 117-8) continues discussing the preservation theme in connexion with the designation of Shenandoah and Great Smoky Mountains national parks in 1934-5:

> 'The cornerstone (of a more enlightened environmental perspective) was total preservation. Its meaning was not yet fully defined; still, gradually more Americans were coming to realize that, essentially, the difference between all parks and *national* parks lay in the one feature that the latter had had from the beginning - primitive conditions. State and city parks could be said to be scenic; few but the national parks offered scenery unmodified.'

Runte concludes by quoting Robert Sterling Yard 'no tree, shrub or wild flower is cut, no stream or lake shore is disturbed, no bird or animal is destroyed.' The national parks, in short, were unique by virtue of 'complete conservation' though the introduction of this new phrase is not particularly helpful to our understanding, even if Runte uses the

term as a chapter title.

While this chapter ends in 1942, it is worth glancing at the impact of the second world war on the Park Service. Everhart (p 25) paints a dour picture:

> 'World War II nearly closed it down. Vacation travel was almost at a standstill due to gas rationing and a moratorium on automobile production. If Congress had been agreeable many of the concessionèrs would have been glad to sell their empty facilities to the nation at bargain prices. All except essential park operations were discontinued, the agency lost two-thirds of its employees, and ... headquarters was moved to Chicago to make room for more important wartime functions in Washington.'

So, oversight and control were tenuous at best. Under these conditions the exploiters tried to move in. As an example, a shortage of Sitka spruce for aircraft production threatened the forests in Olympic National Park for a while, but awareness among environmental groups of what was at risk followed, and a strong case against use of the spruce was successfully mounted. After all, as the opponents pointed out, there was an abundance of this timber in Canada which could be culled without undue environmental damage, and it was not long before timber aircraft gave way to ones made of metal.

Conclusions

This chapter's period of interest was led into by a brief review of the Twenties. They were a period in which rampant capitalism prevailed. France and Britain were sending the US money to pay for the goods they had received during the first world war, and this helped capitalism further. Whereas Britain was the richest nation pre-1914, the effect of these actions was to make the US the richest from 1918 onwards; that is, until it overreached itself in 1929. That free-wheeling Republican period terminated with the Great Crash, the Depression and the New Deal, a period as close to socialism as the US seems likely to reach. These events gave rise to overwhelming problems of malnutrition, poverty, bankruptcy, a nation on the edge of economic and social collapse - comparatively, as always has to be said about the United States in view of its enormous resource base. Roosevelt threw his great energies into their solution: he was the right man at the right time at the right place. He countered apathy with government intervention, rather as his cousin had done 30 years previously. Under such circum-

stances, one would have imagined that environmental issues would be given short shrift, and the irony is that some were, and some were not.

Where exploitation of the environment was at its greatest was precisely where attempts to solve social problems were also at a peak - the vast areas of water impounded behind the many dams of the period probably achieved a net benefit in the case of the Tennessee Valley Authority, and a much larger net disbenefit in the case of the Bureau of Reclamation's dams in the West. The latter produced cheap water and electricity (if the cost of the civil engineering structures was ignored) through which deserts could be opened up. The motivation for such apparently irrational action may be traced to the fact that corporatism affects *government* as well as private sector activity, and to a belief in technology, used to show US' engineering preeminence. Looked at in terms of food production, opening up further areas is questionable. It leads to overproduction, which usefully aids foreign policy when exported to needy areas, but is quite unnecessary for domestic purposes.

In the same context, this chapter has shown the difficult-to-explain production of rice in arid regions while its logical growth in humid high rainfall areas is met with handouts to rice farmers to lower or stop production. Actions like this appear in retrospect to be those of an Executive whose power is slipping away, as a result of public domain land disposal, and whose every move has to be endorsed by the small-constituency-minded Representatives in Congress: how better to reinforce its position than through grand, and extremely expensive, engineering projects that dammed virtually every river in the United States for often dubious reasons?

Perhaps this is one of several explanations for the diminution of private philanthropical support for extension of the National Park System. Irrespective of how this is understood, it appears not to have helped NPS to further some of their goals. In the late 1920s-early 1930s John Rockefeller made many land donations of great value to the System. These were expressions of a public: private funding sharing, akin to the Smithsonian Institution, but also akin to the Forest Service's funding - except that the latter takes in its private moneys through sales of a tangible product, timber, rather than enlightenment.

Where the consequences of conservation-approaching-preservation were of

less significance to economic recovery, this type of heritage protection was applied. Various examples are quoted - the expansion of the National Park Service through absorption of the Forest Service's National Monuments, and the War Department's historic military sites, is particularly notable, for it happened at the height of the Depression, in 1933. It is possible to view Roosevelt's action here as offering quasi preservation as the necessary antidote to the federal land exploitation that was shortly to follow. Similarly, the Park Service's first National Recreation Area, in the giant lake caused by the Boulder Dam, perhaps was a sop to the environmental destruction caused by damming the Colorado River, and flooding an area approaching the scenic quality of the Grand Canyon. It is also necessary to view these actions as a belief in a better future that would arise once these debilitating wars were out of the way (see Table 4-2 above).

These manifold actions during the period of this chapter were provocative, and led to a clearer understanding of relationships between the private sector and the State, under the circumstances of corporatism. Having persuaded the private sector and unions to work with the State, the federal government then realised it had to satisfy them all according to their particular interests: stable or increased production by industry, protection of heritage land for the environmental lobby, and better working conditions for labour. Roosevelt somehow managed to achieve these imposed objectives, helped in his third term by the onset of the second world war and the upsurge in military production that followed. He also did not overlook the significance of resource protection, nor ways that protection could be achieved through the many agencies at the Executive's command - always provided the Congress agreed. This period also showed the lessened significance of private industrial and commercial exploitation during a depression - a task taken over by the federal government!

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6 Renewed Conflict, Strengthened Environmentalism 1962-1972

Chapter Summary

A twenty year period between this and the last chapter is shown to have been politically violent, with a world war and a subsidiary war in Korea to contend with. Much of the violence, however, was oversea. The home base was untouched by bombing; the closest the United States came to territorial invasion was the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor, thousands of miles from the mainland. Detonation of the first hydrogen bomb effectively started the Cold War's arms race, benefitting only the armaments industry. While there was not much compensation in terms of newly created park units, there was a substantial rise in provision for outdoor recreation, a programme facilitated by 'Mission 66' which originated in 1956, and the deliberations of the Outdoor Recreation Resources Review Commission, which culminated in the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation.

And yet, the period covered by this chapter, excepting the use of nuclear weapons, was almost equally violent, with US armed intervention in many countries, and manipulation of governments by the CIA in many others. The war in Southeast Asia was particularly devastating; little was gained from it, though a vast amount of human, financial and environmental resource was expended. Because the 1960s also witnessed an extraordinary flowering of environmentalism this chapter has to be seen as a pivotal point in this thesis.

Mission 66 and ORRRC suggest a diminution in preservationist values immediately before the surge in environmentalism which characterised the period of this chapter. Environmentalism had other parents, though: wide disparity between rich and poor, black and white, armaments and other manufacturing industry. The public land was misused and the concept of homesteading gave way to large agribusinesses. Land exploitation was at its height in the early 1960s.

Initiative to do something came from on high - Interior Secretary Udall's 1963 book almost parallelled Rachel Carson's Silent Spring.

Many Acts flowed from Congress which attempted to correct the environmental destruction, perhaps the most notable for this thesis being the Land & Water Conservation Fund Act, the Wilderness Act, and the National Environmental Policy Act.

By 1972 environmentalism had attained world significance, culminating in the Stockholm Conference which gave rise to the United Nations Environment Programme. This was also the centennial year of Yellowstone's foundation and much blowing of trumpets, offset against a Park Service exploited through the recreational surge and still poorly staffed. But the Congress kept adding to the System.

A Bleak Period for Heritage Protection: 1942 to 1962

The previous chapter ended in 1942. This thesis does not consider these war years, for their concerns were not the same as mine. The hot war continued and, after Roosevelt's death in 1945, Truman took over. He was immediately confronted with decisions few mortals have had to make, the most notable concerning dropping atom bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. After that, peace treaties had to be negotiated and the Cold War began. But, while the nation emerged from the war with a massive debt, it also had a massively increased industrial capacity, a greatly expanded scientific knowledge, and burgeoning manufacturing, agricultural and transport achievements. These expansions continued: 'by 1950 national income was $275 billion, as against $40 billion in the depth of the depression' (Nevins & Commager 1986,471-2). And Truman kept the New Deal going, except it became the Fair Deal. It was based on interventionist federal government ('if needed', Truman added; fortuitously, Roosevelt had prepared the ground for him in the 1930s). Though it was not as successful as the New Deal, mainly because it met fierce opposition from Republicans and many southern Democrats, at least it held on to many achievements of the New Deal.

The other vital culmination of several years' oversea struggle was that the US was now irrevocably out of isolationism, and the Secretary of State became a key Executive position. It seems that as much attention to the affairs of other nations as to those at home now became acceptable; in many cases this action was a form of protectionism from 'the Commies.' FBI chief J Edgar Hoover maintained the hysteria by proclaiming the US Communist party to be a deadly enemy to American security,

when its membership was just 10 000 (0.007% of the total population). This was in the Fifties, in the early years of which Senator McCarthy carried out his witch hunts; unfortunately for him and the damage it did to the nation, there were very few witches. Arthur Miller (1987), a suspect, chronicles this time with his personal involvement and experiences. Even the celebrated Marshall Plan, without which Europe would have had great difficulty surviving the post-war years, was described by Truman as being an anti-communist measure. And, inevitably, the New Deal years were sufficiently socialist to condemn Franklin Roosevelt as having been a communist.

Other reasons for the end of isolationism were that the armed forces had experienced the world outside the US, and were often intrigued by what they found. Trade expansion became attractive to commerce and industry; the new and astonishing productive capability needed outlets beyond the United States, and countries reconstructing after a war were natural markets. Their attraction increased when the US started providing aid, and the Marshall Plan effectively expanded the horizons of the New Deal. Marshall was junior to Eisenhower in the military ranking, and Eisenhower's elevation to Presidency gave him additional powers to get rid of Marshall when he rose too high. A third reason for the US's embrace of the world beyond its boundaries was altruistic: its liberals sought a better world, and they echoed the feelings of both left and right politicians of the time, all of whom were keen on oversea involvement.

Expressions of this conceptualisation appear repeatedly in the attitudes to personal land ownership - the heritage might be easier to preserve simply because it was largely in the public domain, echoing the larger conservation ethic of a politically conservative nation. It was not a time to take preservation of the heritage too seriously, for there were few attempts to exploit it, and *pre*servation of private land was (and is) largely incompatible with personal financial gain.

Just before McCarthyism Truman had to contend with participation in a UN force, US-dominated, which reasonably successfully countered communist advances through Korea toward SE Asia, and the US exploded the first hydrogen bomb at Eniwetok Atoll in 1952. More than anything else that act, and the Russians' replication of it, started the Cold War's arms race, passing the advantage to arms manufacturers.

Otherwise this balancing of excessive destructive power was an odd state of affairs. Seen in historical perspective it allowed the US still greater prosperity, while scientific and military demands on weak communist economies led to worsened living standards for their populations.

Truman's second administration was not as successful as his first, and his successor Eisenhower cut into a relatively long reign of Democrat presidents, though they returned in 1961 with Kennedy and Johnson. The Congress did not follow this pattern. In the Senate and the House, Democrat majorities held power in all the Congresses except the 80th (1947-9) and the 83rd (1953-55). The first exception was during the Truman presidency, the second during Eisenhower's. 1958 and 1960 were notable years territorially, the first seeing statehood conferred on Alaska, the second on Hawaii.

Chapter 5 showed how the National Park Service in particular suffered a crippling budget cut, and a headquarters move to Chicago, as the Nation went fullscale into the second world war. Very little happened in terms of System expansion 1942 to 1945, as might be expected - three new national monuments and two national historic parks, which must have been run on virtually negative budgets. From 1946 to 1961 there were only three new national parks (four if we count Everglades National Park - authorised in 1934, though not formally designated until 1947) and nine national monuments, but historic and recreational areas loomed large. During this period 23 historic sites of various denominations were authorised; Coulee Dam became a national recreation areas, as did Shadow Mountain (later to be transferred to the Forest Service) and Glen Canyon, the flooding of which was one of the greatest environmental disasters perpetrated by the Bureau of Reclamation. The first of several national seashores was designated at Cape Cod, 20 years after a survey had shown that urgent protection was needed before development spread along most of the US coasts.

A substantial issue in the post-war (World and Korean) periods was that the veterans, or returning ex-servicemen, would demand a better standard of living, and part of that would involve outdoor recreation. There was also a general surge in outdoor recreation among the US people, leading to overcrowding of many federal sites - and, by inference, lowering their preservation threshold toward the point of

exploitation. There were two major responses to this. One was set up in 1956 and termed 'Mission 66', its intent being to resolve, within ten years, the inadequacy of provision, to renew a range of run-down facilities within the Park Service, and to boost the morale of its employees. Conceived by Director Conrad Wirth it was therefore purely a Park Service initiative. While much has been written on whether it was the right solution to the increased demand for outdoor recreation it nevertheless did achieve its objectives. It was able to do that for two reasons: first, Wirth conceived the idea (for the first time, apparently) of packaging all the Service's appropriations requests to Executive and Congress, rather than presenting each park unit's request for funds separately; second, it was initiated in 1956, 10 years before the Service's 50th anniversary - this, and Wirth's enthusiasm, careful preparation, use of the word 'mission' and other actions, meant the project received Eisenhower's enthusiastic approval, which was then echoed by the Congress. Eisenhower's support also resulted from his experience of veterans' problems, and because popular tourism had been enhanced by the military seeing oversea countries for the first time - not too common an event for all income-groups in the pre-war United States. The result was an appropriation of $1 billion for the 10-year period, an amount unheard of for NPS at any previous time (Everhart 1983,26-27).

Runte (1987,173) says 'preservationists were able to substantiate their fears that Mission 66 was indeed road- and big-development oriented. Frome's (1982,52-3) future embraced three anti-car points:

> 'close Yellowstone NP for five years to automobile traffic; establish vast quiet zones, free of automobiles, dune buggies, motor-powered boats, low-flying airplanes and helicopters; reduce automobile access (to parks), encourage restoration and resumption of train travel, within the parks develop extensive systems of shuttle buses.'

But Abbey (1968,65-66) was the most outspoken, suggesting a billboard at the entrance to each park:

> 'Howdy folks. Welcome. This is your national park, established for the pleasure of you and all people everywhere. Park your car, jeep, truck, tank, motorbike, snowmobile, motorboat, jetboat, airboat, submarine, airplane, jetplane, helicopter, hovercraft, winged motorcycle, rocketship, or any other conceivable type of motorised vehicle in the world's biggest parking lot behind the comfort station immediately to your rear. Get out of your motorized vehicle, get on your horse, mule, bicycle or feet, and come on in. Enjoy yourselves. This here park is for *people.*'

Clarke & McCool (1985,51-52) see this time as the only one where NPS competed successfully with the Forest Service. FS lost 4.5m acres to the Park Service 'through 1960' (meaning unclear), and then it saw NPS receiving $1 bn. NPS ...

> 'was successful in this instance primarily because it decided to compromise its preservation goal by opting for more publicly attractive utilitarian goals. Although the Park Service may not have consciously abandoned its preservation mission, the agency did not fully appreciate the impact that Mission 66 would have on that primary aspect of park management.'

Darling & Eichhorn (1967,77) add:

> 'the US Forest Service was ... much more politically aware of the trend of the times, as the NPS was naive. Mission 66, instead of being a far-sighted planning operation to conserve these choice areas, seems to have been conceived to allow more complete infiltration and uncritical use.'

Hartzog (1972,171) reminds us that the Yosemite Park & Curry Company 'advanced $125 000 of its private money to test' the feasibility of a shuttle bus system in Yosemite Valley long in advance of its approval by the administration and the Congress. It has continued to run the shuttle at its own expense: when I interviewed a member of the Company in 1984 he said it was their wish to get cars out of the Valley altogether but that it would take some time before the public would accept this.

The other event was the establishment of the Outdoor Recreation Resources Review Commission (ORRRC) by the Congress, with Department of the Interior backing, in 1958. It was chaired by Lawrance Rockefeller, whose public-spirited actions are still significant to-day; in fact Foresta (1983,73) quotes a NPS administrator 'the Service had a golden opportunity to use the tremendous resources of the third generation Rockefellers the way Mather and Albright used the second, but it didn't. (These Rockefellers) were willing to help (the Service), but they were never asked.' It was suggested to me in Washington that Lawrance Rockefeller would be the ideal person to chair the controlling body of an independent National Park Service; whether this would work seems questionable given the Service's rejection of his talents in the early 1960s. But the Service has rarely shown any affinity with the industrial aristocracy of the US, perhaps because it was so often in conflict with industry's exploitative goals.

To return to ORRRC, Hays (1989,117) suggests the original initiative for it came from Joseph Penfold of the Izaak Walton League 'to establish federal leadership in outdoor recreation.' These seem rather strange ideas, for a pressure group like this would normally favour the National Park Service's expansion and, however visualised, the federal government was already powerfully placed in terms of recreational provision. Perhaps Penfold's real intention was to deflect most physical, rather than contemplative, recreation away from the great national parks and into newly conceived urban recreation areas, and something of this did indeed happen. Another possibility was the general economic climate. Whereas Franklin Roosevelt had used the State to develop industry, an approach supported by Democrat and Republican alike during the Depression, Keynes had looked to a time when production was taken for granted, allowing the State to look at other issues. And so it worked out: probably during the 1950s, certainly in the 1960s, the production problem had been solved and the business world was turning to new areas like leisure and heritage. It is very likely this approach rubbed off onto federal decision-making.

Whoever or whatever was responsible, ORRRC was to have a far-reaching impact on the National Park Service in particular, and many other of the federal land management agencies to a lesser extent. It is extraordinary it should have been set up only two years after Mission 66, though apparently it originated in the Congress (an unusual way of operating) because of dissatisfaction with the Executive - ie the performance of Eisenhower. It seems this routeing was decisively against NPS interests, whose proposals previously were agreed with and shielded by the Interior Secretary, who then sought Executive approval before the Congressional debate started. Yet both initiatives were intended to rationalise recreation provision. Rather than have it under the control of several agencies, ORRRC argued it was logical to put overall management functions together in one agency - the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation as it was to become. Foresta (1984,62-63) covers the setting up of the Commission; its findings will be discussed below in the main part of this chapter. He quotes a Park Service official: 'The NPS objected to the study itself, which it saw as a threat to its position. It cooperated with ORRRC only when it had to.' This tactic appears to have misfired, for the taxpayer had to find very large sums of money to sustain the greater enquiries that ORRRC undertook in order to obtain data, while NPS sustained the subsequent damage emanating from the

studies' recommendations.

The Park Service maintained that the Parks, Parkway and Recreation Act of 1936 had explicitly given it federal responsibility for recreation planning (though it seems here to be ignoring the rôle of the Forest Service). Yet Foresta points out that NPS' recreational domain had been poorly defended and for which its claims were eroding. He tabulates recreation visits to show that NPS share of all federal agencies' visits fell from one third in 1950 to one fifth in 1960, while the Corps of Engineers' share nearly doubled from 16% in 1950 to 31% in 1960. 'Furthermore', he says, 'the Service had paid little attention to its rôle as federal recreation advisor over the previous 15 years,' though he concedes this neglect may have been a natural consequence of appropriations problems in postwar years: it could not even command the resources to keep its units in good repair.

Mission 66 and ORRRC taken together suggest both conflict within the federal government and a diminution in preservational values, both of which took place immediately prior to the new environmentalism exemplified by the 1960s and early 1970s, to which I shall return below. Alarm signals were already being sounded, as Everhart (1983,27) shows:

> 'Always wary of "development" in the parks, conservationists were less enthusiastic about Mission 66 than the 2000 park families who moved into new residences. There were criticisms that Mission 66 was primarily a construction program and that better facilities would encourage more people to come to the parks - an accurate prediction, if a philosophical dilemma.'

If the Park Service faced difficulties, the Forest Service's position was strengthened in 1960 by the Multiple Use-Sustained Yield Act, which underwrote the kind of management the Service had been following since 1905. As Clawson (1983,44) says, 'The agency sought the legislation, fearing (and as events proved, rightly so) that without such a mandate it might be under legal and political attack for its multiple-use management.' Clawson then gets to the heart of the Act and FS' enhancement:

> 'Multiple use is a term that has great conceptual, ideological and emotional values for many persons; its very ambiguity enables each to interpret the term as desired. Only when attempts are made to put the general idea into practice is the wide disagreement in its meaning evident.'

This turbulent historical period opens with Kennedy's brief reign. It is noteworthy that in the year of his assassination no additions to the National Park Service were authorised, though in 1962 ten were added. Kennedy had to face the culmination of years of struggle for Black integration into a dominantly white society, he had to counter the Russian intent to locate missiles in Cuba and, in another sphere altogether, he pushed the US space programme, which had not been doing as well as the Russian one. This urbane, intelligent and charismatic president was succeeded by his deputy, Lyndon B Johnson who, political aspirations apart, was a quite different personality: at home with the people, in the Congress, in a prairie farm. Nevertheless, in a matter of months after Kennedy's death, Johnson pushed through much of the legislation - particularly on civil rights -that Kennedy had hoped to achieve. He also initiated what he called 'the Great Society' which followed logically from Roosevelt's New Deal and Truman's Fair Deal. Johnson was elected in his own right in 1964, and declined to stand in 1968 when his authority had waned because of Vietnam and the southeast Asian holocaust. Richard Nixon took over; he promised peace and instead escalated the savage assault on the people, their homes, and their vegetation: the ten years of US involvement in southeast Asia saw more bombs dropped than in the entirety of the second world war. Nixon himself fell when impeachment was imminent; despite making statements to the contrary his successor, Gerald Ford, pardoned him in 1974. Nixon's unprecedented misuse of Executive power and cynical dismissal of the people's trust in their president had not been exorcised by Ford when his short reign gave way to Jimmy Carter in 1976.

The period of this chapter was thus characterised by a war of extraordinary violence parallelled with US intervention by its armed forces, the CIA or both, in the affairs of many other countries - Chile, Greece, Cyprus, Taiwan, the Philippines, South Korea; in supporting Pakistan against India; and in relaxing sanctions against Rhodesia and South Africa. Yet, as we shall see below, it was a time of such environmental concern and activity as had not previously been experienced anywhere - another juxtaposition of opposite poles. We can also contrast the assassinations, in 1968, of Martin Luther King and of Robert Kennedy, with the advent of flower power. In this same year 100 000 marched on Washington against the Vietnamese War. In the next year the

numbers swelled to two million, and were accompanied by outbreaks of civil war in various parts of the country. When the US finally withdrew from southeast Asia, the decade of war was 'not only a military defeat; it was a political, diplomatic, psychological, and moral disaster' (the two paragraphs above acknowledge Nevins & Commager 1986,562-576).

Environmentalism Blooms

The context for the environmental renascence in the decade of this chapter was not just federal violence, but wide disparities between rich and poor and between black and white, and excess profits of armament producers and some other industries. Nevins & Commager (pp584-587) show that, as a result of the Vietnam war, the national debt 'skyrocketed to $395 billion, cities and states went ever deeper into debt and public services, like transportation and health, deteriorated. In the meantime, major corporations tightened their grip on the nation's economy: by 1971, 1% of American business controlled 86% of the net assets of manufacturing corporations ...' The sad story continues:

> 'Taxation continued to be regressive. The wealthiest 1% of the population paid taxes at a lower rate than did most Americans owing to a variety of tax breaks, incentives and loopholes ... in 1969 300 persons with incomes over $300 000 paid no federal income taxes at all ... Nixon underpaid his taxes by more than $400 000 - which eventually he was forced to pay.'

The manipulation of federal land and the final demolition of nineteenth century concepts of homesteading and distribution of the public domain among 'We, the People' reached previously unknown heights.

> 'Huge agribusinesses, with the help of government subsidies, accelerated the end of the family farm and the decline in the number of farmers ... the average farm increased in size from 215 to 380 acres ... in 1971, the wealthiest 7% of the farms received about 63% of the total government subsidies and the poorer half got only 9.1%.'

It is not difficult to imagine that the profitability of the large farm, the attempts of those who had sold out smaller units to find farming land elsewhere, population increases, and ever-expanding low density urban areas, would together put pressure on the remaining public domain and on land previously deemed unsuitable for development

- much of which is categorised in this thesis as 'heritage land'.

Nevins & Commager (pp586-587) then turn to the state of the US environment during this period. 'The conservation movement launched by Theodore Roosevelt ... and renewed by Franklin Roosevelt ... ran out of steam.' Many factors combined to threaten the very survival of the nation: the destruction caused by logging companies and strip miners, oil spills, industrial pollution of lakes and rivers, city smog, the universal use of detergents and insecticides, the depletion of oil reserves. Various laws were enacted, 'But these measures did little to arrest environmental abuses. The energy crisis and the recession of 1974-1975 demonstrated how eagerly Americans, and their governments, would sacrifice environment for jobs and profits ... how readily they would sacrifice the interests of posterity to their own immediate needs.' While this may sound a familiar human predicament, the actions of previous generations discussed in chapters 2-5, showed then a concern for posterity. The US had to wait until Carter for a brief interlude in this story of environmental exploitation, though it started again in the first Reagan Administration and has continued since that time. The mass of environmental legislation, which has been noted above, did of course curb these activities. But one problem that is rarely resolved is that ameliorative measures become overtaken by continuing growth in industrial production, or car use, for example: controls on carbon dioxide emissions from vehicles in the 1990s will be negated by the growth in ownership and use of these vehicles.

Anticipating some of these difficulties, two books appeared within a year of each other, one by an academic who for a while worked for the US Fish & Wildlife Service in the Interior Department, the other by that Department's Secretary. Both titles have the noiselessness of death: Silent Spring (Carson 1962) and The Quiet Crisis (Udall 1963). Carson's concern - as a scientist herself - was with pesticides and their effect on food, plants and non-human animals. Reflecting on chapter 5, Roosevelt's interventionist and corporatist State had experienced science linked with the federal government in engineering projects, development of new weapons and the development of crop-spraying. Then, over twenty years later, Silent Spring started the environmental movement's reaction against science. Two extracts from Carson's book will have to suffice to show the environmental damage was not simply attributable to US farmers (p72): in the Bridger National

Forest in Wyoming, the Forest Service sprayed 'some 10 000 acres of sagelands ... yielding to pressure of cattlemen for more grasslands. The sage was killed, as intended.' But so were the willows, crucial for moose, and for beavers who used the wood to construct dams. The dammed water held large trout and attracted waterfowl, and all of these attracted recreationists. Moose and beavers left, the dam broke and the fish reduced to a tiny size compatible with the shallow stream that was left, and the birds went too. 'The living world was shattered.' On page 220, Carson discusses the Forest Service's spraying of 885 000 acres of forest lands with DDT, in 1956. The intention was to control spruce budworm; this happened, but then the spider mites moved in, creating a much worse problem. What is interesting here is that these are governmental actions of an agency which prided itself on its scientific approach to forestry, underpinned by university courses: Yale has what was probably the original Department of Forestry, but there are several others.

The Land & Water Conservation Fund (LWCF)

In 1964/5 federal government action of far-reaching importance culminated in the Land & Water Conservation Fund Act (Hodges 1984). Its intent was to provide funding for outdoor recreation planning and for acquisition and development of public outdoor recreation areas and facilities. At first the fund's revenues came from a variety of entrance fees, motorboat fuel tax, and receipts from the sale of federal property. In 1968 receipts from the mineral leases on the outer continental shelf were added, considerably enlarging the money theoretically available. The disposal of the money has remained, with little change, at 60% for the states and smaller local authorities within them, and 40% for the federal agencies.

The catch is that any money deposited in the fund, and not authorised by the Congress for expenditure within the two fiscal years following the one in which the money was credited to the fund, had to be transferred to the Treasury. Table 6-1 shows the total obligation (the amount actually spent), and the number of acres of land or water purchased, by federal agency. For the states, the amount spent is shown. All are for the periods 1965-1972 (within this chapter) and 1973-80.

Table 6-1 : Use of Land & Water Conservation Funds 1965-1972 and 1973-80; million $ and thousand acres

	NPS		FS		F&WS		BLM		States
	$	acre	$	acre	$	acre	$	acre	$
1965-72	299	398	116	589	14	35	.8	.7	596
1973-80	1286	1015	355	480	114	152	11	13	1831

NPS= National Park Service; FS= Forest Service; F&WS= Fish & Wildlife Service; BLM= Bureau of Land Management; 'States' excludes Outlying Areas of Puerto Rico, Virgin Islands, Guam and American Samoa
Source: Hodges 1984

Table 6-1 shows that the federal agencies received 42% of the total obligated in the first period, and 49% in the second. This does not necessarily mean the Act's requirement was being ignored, for the amounts *appropriated* may have been closer to the 40:60% split. The National Park Service, with little commercial income, had much the largest of the federal allocations in both time periods, and these were quite large in absolute terms - nearly $300 million in the first period and $1.3 billion in the second, each spread over seven years. Each agency, and the states, experienced substantial increased allocations from the first to the second period. One final comment: the Forest Service seems to have spent much more on land acquisition, or on cheaper land, or both than did the Park Service, although the quantities are not particularly great when compared with the total land holdings of each agency - 1.4 million acres of 75 million for the Park Service and just over 1 million of 180 million for the Forest Service.

So, the benefits of LWCF appear to have been useful rather than major for the federal agencies. Perhaps the states and smaller authorities benefitted more in relation to their much more modest baseline land holdings. I shall discuss use and misuse of the fund in chapter 7.

Environmental Legislation of the Udall Era

The decade of this chapter saw many environmentally-related new Acts. Utley & Mackintosh (1988,43) mention the following, some of which are discussed in more detail in this thesis, from the Kennedy/Johnson administrations and Interior Secretary Udall in particular: the Federal Clean Air Act of 1963; the Wilderness Act of 1964; the Land & Water Conservation Fund Act of 1965, the National Historic Preservation Act

of 1966, the Wild & Scenic Rivers Act of 1968, the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, and amendments strengthening the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1956. There were also the establishment, at federal and state levels, of emission standards for vehicles.

Looking first at the Wilderness Act, 50 000 years ago nearly all the earth's surface could be regarded as wilderness. Burch (1974), prefacing his remarks with 'Wilderness is a mythical construction, it exists only at the sufferance of human society' and then with Thoreau's 'In wildness is the preservation of the world' went on to note 'Though Thoreau found Concord suffocatingly populated he, as the human generations before him, lived in conditions of infinite space.' In the mid-19th Century US there were less than 16 million inhabitants of the vast continent, leaving a considerable amount of wilderness. Most demographers project a US population approaching 300 million by the year 2000.

Everhart (1983,93) quoted another sceptic, Roderick Nash, as saying 'Wilderness does not exist. It never has ... we act as if wilderness were real - rocks, trees, canyons, mountains - but it is actually a state of mind evoked by a state of nature, a quality associated by some people with some places.' On another occasion Nash (1987) said that Orwell's Big Brother's first concern was to eliminate wilderness, for he could not control thought in wild country. Nash also pointed to the psychological value of wilderness:

> '... our minds developed under wilderness conditions for millions of years. Suddenly in the last few hundred we have been propelled into a world of bewildering speed and complexity. For some people occasional relief is a vital mental necessity. They covet the chance to drop back into the older and more comfortable channels.'

Wilderness is defined in the Wilderness Act of 1964:

> 'A wilderness, in contrast with those areas where man and his own works dominate the landscape, is hereby recognized as an area where the earth and its community of life are untrammeled by man, where man himself is a visitor who does not remain.'

However, the Wilderness Act, while important, remains a compromise. Its authors could not bring themselves to exclude existing uses of the lands to be designated, so established users of aircraft and motorboats

could continue using them, for example.

The concept of such an Act to protect wilderness largely derived from the efforts of the Wilderness Society, formed in the 1930s. The concept had been opposed by both the Park and Forest Services. And yet Wallace Stegner, writing in the early 1960s in favour of an Act, is summarised by Foresta (1984,61) as saying the US was moving into a

> 'brave new world of a completely man-controlled environment ... whose consequences would be awful. This negative view of progress, which increasingly dominated preservationist thinking, was not one of stasis or complementarity ... Given this perception development itself, not just isolated instances of inappropriate development, became a threat.'

Foresta then suggests one of the ramifications of this view was that the facilities which made the national parks accessible to people appeared to be just as destructive as those which aimed at physically exploiting the natural resources. However, to return to the Wilderness Act, this required all federal land-managing agencies to propose areas that could be set aside as wilderness, together with a programme for their implementation. Hays (1989,120) shows some problems of implementing the Act; of particular interest to this thesis is his comment 'But at an early stage pressures from commodity groups to keep the acreage (of wilderness) as small as possible came into sharp conflict with the desire of environmentalists to expand it.'

Forest Service wilderness provision is poor by comparison with the National Park Service: FS had 32.1 million acres in 1984, 16.8% of the total lands administered. NPS had 36.8 million acres in 1984, 49% of its area. If it is argued that FS' multiple use mission precludes the setting aside of as high a proportion as NPS have done, then it has to be questioned whether FS' exploitation of much of its forests makes economic sense, and is not rather to do with fulfilling the multiple use concept at all costs. Even the Fish & Wildlife Service, which can also be considered to have a multiple use mission, had 19.3 million acres of wilderness in 1984, or 21.3% of its total area.

The **National Historic Preservation Act** is discussed in Everhart (1983, 60). It greatly expanded federal involvement and extended financial aid to locally significant sites outside federal ownership. This aid has extensively been used by the states and lesser authorities to

restore thousands of historic properties. The states also nominated nearly 25 000 properties for inclusion in the National Register of Historic Places (something akin to Listed Buildings in the UK); this protects them against damage by any *federally-funded* project - italics are used because the private sector is again excluded, as with the requirement for Environmental Impact Statements only from federal developers. The Register is kept by the National Park Service, though it was in the hands of the Historic Conservation and Recreation Service during its brief reign (1977 to 1981).

An Act not mentioned by Utley & Mackintosh is the **Classification and Multiple Use Act** of 1963, which can almost be coupled with the **Public Land Sale Act** of the same year. Clawson (1983,47) discusses their purposes, to give the Bureau of Land Management authority to examine and classify the public domain for retention or for disposal. In the event, classification was given more importance than disposal, but it is particularly important to realise the agency has the power of disposal of the public domain 'for industrial, urban and related purposes, subject to a classification of the land as suitable and needed for such purposes. So, while Franklin Roosevelt's policy of curbing disposal of the public domain was reversed, reference back to Table 1-4 will show that the public domain, as a proportion of all US land, only reduced by 1.8% between 1959 and 1985.

Environmentalism: A World Phenomenon

The decade of this chapter saw the growth of a world interest in the protection of areas of natural beauty. Carson's book coincided with the First World Conference on National Parks, held in Seattle in 1962; the second was to follow in 1972, celebrating the Yellowstone Centennial Runte (1987,183). In the 1960s, Britain showed its predeliction for a cosy glove over the iron fist of its vested interests; O'Riordan (1981, 53) notes there was little radicalism, just 'the rather wishy-washy, establishment-orientated and middle class views of the British country-side amenity movement which dominated conservationist philosophy.' The 1970s changed this. Barry Commoner (1972) provided two rather homely definitions: Environment was 'the house created on earth for living things' while Ecology was 'the science of planetary housekeeping.' Goldsmith et al (1972), in particular, by publishing **Blueprint for Survival** changed attitudes almost overnight. But change was occurring

in many countries simultaneously. In Italy, Aurelio Peccei founded The Club of Rome with the help of industrial money and produced, through MIT's computer world model, **The Limits to Growth** (Meadows et al 1972). While both these publications have been criticised, they profoundly raised the level of debate, making environmental issues the concern of all. 'Limits' appeared in over twenty languages and sold more than two million copies. Also in 1972 the Stockholm Conference was held, one of whose offspring was the United Nations Environment Programme and, in this extraordinary year, the Ehrlichs' books appeared.

To move back three years, the United States gained another international 'first' by passing the **National Environmental Policy Act** (NEPA) into law in 1969. Utley & Mackintosh (1988,44) trace its origins through an oil well blow out in the Santa Barbara Channel near Los Angeles. The Nixon-appointed Interior Secretary Hickel acted quickly to control the oil slick, but the event so shocked an environmentally-aware nation that support for the new Act became widespread. In retrospect, one of its most interesting features is that it only covers the development proposals of the public sector - the private sector is excluded. This Act, signed by Nixon, seems almost to be encouraging private sector environmental destruction. We have noted earlier how public developmental initiatives have sometimes resulted in land exploitation on a scale larger than anything the private sector was able or willing to do, but it almost seems as if a function of the Act was to bring the public sector to heel. In fact it provided a great boost in employment, both within government agencies and in consultancies who were frequently commissioned to prepare Environmental Impact Statements.

Not all was well with NEPA's early years, in the view of some commentators. Liroff (1976,291) quotes environmentalists as believing that NEPA 'has done more to preserve and protect the environment than all of the previous environmental protection measures combined' though he qualifies this (p293) by describing the Act as a 'vague mandate for action' and warning (p295) that 'because of its brevity and lack of precision, NEPA has given administrators considerable discretion in deciding how it should be implemented.' Kraft (1976,146) considers the Act in terms of ecological politics when there was:

'...devotion to incrementalism - that is, to "muddling through", to business as usual, to satisficing* behaviour as a way of life, to preoccupation primarily with short-term goals that are immediately "feasible" or "realistic", to dealing with problems in a piecemeal and fragmented rather than comprehensive and coordinated manner.' Kraft then summarises: 'In short, the political response has favoured inertia and old priorities rather than vigorous and imaginative progress and new priorities. Our goals have seemingly been more the achievement of short-term comforts and socio-political stability with a minimum sacrifice of customary conveniences and a minimum irritation of traditional political sensibilities than the heralding of a new environmental ethic.' (*defined by Simon, in Dessler [1980,393], as firms not seeking to maximise profits, but rather setting a minimum level of acceptable profits which they do not aggressively try to exceed).

Not every agency coped well with NEPA. The Environmental Protection Agency, which it created, needed biologists and 'brain-drained' many from the Fish & Wildlife Service. Clarke & McCool (1985,18) show how the Army Corps of Engineers, of all agencies, was the one which most quickly adopted the new requirements of the Act: 'Its response record was often better than that of federal agencies with a more overtly conservationist orientation.'

Exploiting the Parks

Mission 66 and the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation combined with like minds in the Park Service to encourage visitor use of the System's units. After all, this was what the ORRRC and NPS endeavours had been about, and Congress had enthusiastically paid them large sums to bring them to fruition. Table 6-2 gives some basic statistics of the Park Service, with some inferred performance measures. It shows some effects of increased recreational provision in the first decade, and effects of inadequate budgets in the second.

The period 1965-1975, roughly corresponding with Mission 66's climax and BOR initiatives, showed a 97% increase in visits. The next decade showed a 44% increase. The difference between the two decades in the Table was even more marked in terms of overnight stays, at +28% and -4% respectively. This seems to suggest that the two initiatives had cons-

Table 6-2 : Principal Statistics of the National Park Service 1965-85, in real terms, 1965=100

	unit	1965	1970	1975	1980	1985	% change 65-75	% change 75-85
Visits	mill	121.3	172.0	238.8	300.3	344.9	97	44
- o'night stays	mill	13.0	16.2	16.7	16.5	16.1	28	-4
Total park area	mill acre	26.55	28.54	29.10	70.94	75.75	10	160
Consumer price index		100	121.8	166.7	252.3	327.7		
Total expen'ture	$ mill	131.65		205.0		327.2	56	60
- salaries	$ mill	48.6		91.2		116.0	88	27
Total expen'ture								
- per visit	$	1.09		0.86		0.95		
- per acre	$	5.00		7.04		4.32		
Salary expen'ture								
- per visit	$	0.40		0.38		0.34		
- per acre	$	1.83		3.13		1.53		
Visits per acre	No.	4.6		8.2		4.4		
Full-time equiv.	No.			11 852*	13 897	16 261		37'
Visits/FTE	No.			20 152	21 620	21 212		
Acres/FTE	No.			2 455	5 105	4 661		

Sources: US Department of Commerce 1986 and various NPS Budget Justifications
* 1976 ' 1976-1985

iderable responsibility for increased visits (even if this was a negative effect in terms of the environment). Another possible explanation for the lower growth rate of the 1975-1985 period was that the popular park units were approaching, if not capacity in visitor numbers, at least a feeling of crowding which was inimical to the park experience sought by visitors.

Another important finding in the Table is that while the total park area expanded by 160% 1975-1985, the change in expenditure was scarcely any different from the previous decade, and expenditure on salaries grew by only 27% 1975-1985, *as against 88% 1965-1975.* Salary expenditure per visit steadily decreased 1965 to 1985; on a per acre basis it halved 1975 to 1985.

At the foot of the Table it can be seen that the number of Full-time Equivalent Staff (FTE) increased 37% 1975-1985, yet visits per FTE scarcely changed, and acres/FTE *nearly doubled 1975-1985.* So, there was no improvement in care of visitors by staff, and the staff were

spread more thinly over the 75 million acres of the park system.

Separating NPS Functions

To return to ORRRC, one view suggests that a combination of the way it was set up, and its ignoring of NPS during its work, indicate a 'divide and rule' policy: perhaps ORRRC was influenced by agencies opposed to NPS. An alternative, more straightforward explanation, is that ORRRC 'found policy chaos and wrote that "lack of anything resembling a national recreation policy is ... at the root of most of the recreation problems of the federal government" ' (Foresta 1984,63-64). It relegated the National Park Service 'to a small niche in the whole field of outdoor recreation.' Importantly for our understanding, its report asserted that preservation by the NPS was not 'one of the nation's leading recreation problems.' It emphasized the lack of recreational facility close to where people lived, and ultimately recommended:

* first, the establishment of a fund for the federal government to use to purchase land, and out of which it could make grants to state and local governments to do the same for recreational purposes;
* second, it recommended the creation of a federal bureau of outdoor recreation: use of 'bureau' is notable, for the last chapter suggested an agency with this title was more important than a mere 'Service.'

From NPS' point of view this was bad enough, but there was a further sting: not only would the new bureau be the conduit of federal moneys to the states, it would also coordinate the recreational activities of the federal agencies, even undertaking 'studies of the national significance of areas being considered for inclusion in the NPS. In other words, it was a supra-NPS body. Not only that, it was to be under the control of the Interior Secretary. In 1962, Kennedy's Secretary was Stewart Udall, brother of 'Mo' Udall, an Arizona Representative who, over more recent years, chaired the House Interior Committee. When the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation was established, '*to ensure against undue influence by the Park Service* (my italics), a Forest Service administrator was selected to head it' (Foresta p64), who was then careful to search for his new bureau chiefs elsewhere than the NPS - the ultimate indignity.

If the Park Service was reeling from these events, Foresta (p65) shows how Udall added to the Service's confusion. Udall was a progressive, joining in Kennedy's wish to inject new thinking into the federal government. Fitch & Shanklin (1970,81) refer to Udall as 'one of the most conservation-minded Secretaries of the Interior' and he designated his approach *New Conservation.* Foresta (p65) noted this 'involved at least a partial rejection of the vision which informed the conservation movement of the early century.' Foresta maintains that Udall's use of the term 'progress' was often ironic, as when he suggested the vision of Olmsted was 'too advanced for the apostles of "progress" '. Foresta then makes the important point

> 'He (Udall) like many preservation-minded conservationists of the 1960s saw technological innovation and the economic growth it engendered as mixed blessings. His view was clear: "In a great surge toward 'progress' our congestion increasingly has befouled water and air, and growth has created new problems on every hand ... noise and confusion have mounted with the rising tempo of technology; and as our cities have sprawled outward, new forms of abundance and new forms of blight have oftentimes marched hand in hand. Once-inviting countryside has been obliterated in a frenzy of development that has too often ignored essential human needs." '

What did BOR achieve? Not a great deal, according to Clawson (1984,xv):

> '... we hoped BOR ... would publish an annual report on statistics concerning outdoor recreation ... The Bureau never undertook such publication, choosing instead to devote its energies and funds to the preparation of rather grandiose national plans for outdoor recreation ... the omission was a serious mistake on the agency's part, for annual publication would have ... earned the agency a reputation for solid accomplishment which it sadly lacked throughout its existence.'

In fact, BOR seems to have been singularly unremarkable, despite having the future Interior Secretary, James Watt, as its Director in the early 1970s. There is virtually no reference to it in the standard texts which frequent these pages. In 1976 it came under the assistant secretary for fish, wildlife and parks; as we shall see in the next chapter, in 1978 it had NPS' historic sites added and became the Heritage Conservation and Recreation Service; in 1981 James Watt transferred HCRS back to the Park Service. Perhaps significantly, BOR makes no appearance in Utley & Mackintosh's (1988) short history of the Interior Department.

The National Park Service Historian, Barry Mackintosh (1984,82), shows how the System was divided into natural, historical and recreation management categories in 1964, a division which has affinities with the recreation planning hive off to the BOR. Mackintosh acknowledges that recreation management was the chief source of difficulty, mainly because it overlapped the others and, because labelling areas as 'recreation' implied that natural conservation within them would be secondary to development for heavy public use, both of which could be ecologically harmful. In fact, this was simply a restatement of the old problem surrounding the Service's dual mission, dating from its 1916 Organic Act. Looking forward a little, the three categories were proving cumbersome by the mid-seventies, and in 1975 the Service's three policy manuals were replaced by one whose management policy addressed the range of characteristics that each park possessed; in 1977 the area categories were officially abolished.

Continuity of Protection

Perhaps nothing shows the inconsistencies of this chapter's decade more than an event at the very end of it. After noting how the federal government had removed some of the Park Service's responsibilities at the beginning of the decade, starved it of funds after Mission 66 was completed, and at the same time expanded its territorial area and heritage protection responsibilities, we arrive suddenly at a short period of excitement: the Yellowstone Centennial celebrations. The nation congratulated itself, gloried in its protection of God's supreme works of art, made sure the world was listening ... while its President defoliated Vietnam, carried out nefarious activities in Watergate, and fired one of the best NPS Directors, Hartzog.

The 1972 ceremonies at Yellowstone have affinities with the most heroic of Westerns, or commencement of the Olympic Games. Runte (1987,182) sets the scene. Mrs Nixon and the Interior Secretary, Rogers Morton, re-enacted the perhaps apocryphal event in 1870 when the members of the Washburn Expedition sat around a camp fire in what was to become Yellowstone National Park in 1872, and dedicated themselves to achieving its protection. The fire symbol was transferred to a torch handed by Mrs Nixon to Morton who held it up saying, 'With the lighting of this torch we hereby rededicate Yellowstone National Park to a second century of service for the peoples of the world.' Runte continues:

'As symbolized by the presence of Mrs Nixon, national parks had become a revered American institution; from the White House down the United States took pride in the knowledge that it was both the inventor and exporter of the national park idea ... major newspapers, magazines, television networks, and government reports told and retold its story.' And, the final affirmation of the nation-state, 'While Americans must seek the roots of Western civilisation abroad, by the same token the world must come to the United States to pay homage to the birthplace of the national park idea.'

Others were more circumspect. The Conservation Foundation, founded in 1947, ran its own Symposium at Yosemite National Park in 1972 and published its findings in book form (Conservation Foundation 1972). Its recommendations for the future of the national park concept at first appear bland or unattainable until one realises that statements like this have to be made, continually, for them to seep into the pores of the legislative machine. Some examples may be quoted: 'We recommend that the National Park System reassert its traditional role as conservator of the timeless natural assets of the United States' or '... that the National Park System serve urban America by assuring a distinctive recreational opportunity based on natural values' or '... that the National Park System be used as a showcase of man's proper stewardship of land, water, and air.' However, from that point on, whole sections are devoted to areas needing attention and it is worth glancing at some of their proposals in the light of what later happened. *Historic and cultural aspects should ultimately be removed from the Service's care* - this was done when HCRS was created, though James Watt put them back in the NPS. *NPS should not be concerned with urban national recreation areas* - no change was made. *There should be a general policy of automobile prohibition in park units* - if anything the situation has worsened. *Research should be expanded* - to an extent this has been accepted. *Wilderness should be just that* - this message seems to have been accepted. *Some Alaskan areas should be absorbed in the System* - Carter probably did more than the Foundation hoped for.

Expansion

The decade of this chapter is also notable for its additions to the Park System. About one third of these are recreation areas of the type associated with water sports, sunbathing, horse riding and so forth, rather than the more passive enjoyment expected in the great scenic national parks. Why were they not allocated to BOR? Because it was

not a land-managing agency, rather its concern was recreational provision, management and planning. Clearly this placed NPS in an invidious position - managing its land holdings, which were continually being added to, yet not being responsible for the recreation aspects. This anomaly opens up to surgical examination the curious mission of NPS. Reference has often been made to it for it stimulated this thesis: being required to preserve the land in its care while encouraging recreational use. At a particular moment in time, the early 1960s, two factors influenced this mission: the first said 'outdoor recreation is burgeoning and is not being accommodated by the Park Service' while the second pointed to Udall's (and others') *New Conservation* and a desire to reinforce the protective focus of the mission.

Of these park units with a dominantly recreational bias we can note 23 between 1964 and 1972; no fewer than ten were national recreation areas, including the major ones of Gateway near New York City and Golden Gate near San Francisco. But there were also three national scenic rivers, five national seashores (whose origins and slow start were noted in the previous chapter), and entirely new concepts like the three national lakeshores, all bordering one of the Great Lakes. Various presidents unilaterally designated a further four national memorials, and the Congress and Executive combined designated a further four national parks.

This extraordinary and conflicting activity was held together, so that heritage land protection could continue, by two principal actors: George Hartzog as NPS Director and Stewart Udall as Secretary of the Interior. Hartzog is placed first because, in such an unpredictable time, he had to defend the entire system against human predators, overseeing its discreet expansion to contain areas that were predominantly recreational, and watching the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation manage their facilities. Oddly, he makes no reference to BOR in his book (Hartzog 1988).

Hartzog was one of the best NPS Directors. But perhaps he was too good to survive longer than his eight years. He certainly developed a profound knowledge of how to 'play the Hill' though this may have alarmed his political chiefs. After him no Director has lasted more than four years, most having two or three years in office. This fragmentation-by-time enabled Interior Secretaries and Assistant Secretaries to maintain much better control over the activities and aspirations of the National Park Service.

Conclusions

This chapter has shown the greatest polarisation of exploitation, through the violence of wars and the self-aggrandisement of President Nixon, US intervention in other sovereign states' affairs, and demands on the land, on the one hand ... and preservation, through the extraordinary rise of environmentalism, on the other, that has been seen in this thesis. The period 1962-1972 is therefore central to an understanding of the symbiosis of these poles.

It would have been imagined it was also a time when the National Park Service flourished, full of enthusiasm to meet greatly renewed interest in its responsibilities and facilities. On the contrary, it seems to have been unsure of what it was doing or where it was going. It scarcely cooperated with the ORRRC, and was certain to lose recreational responsibilities which it had not tended properly. While it set up Mission 66 it seems to have used this as an opportunity to open up the parks to automobiles and commercialism instead of abiding by its preservationist remit. Its historic functions were understaffed and there was unease about being responsible for management of those units. It had the opportunity to work with the private sector and perhaps gain funds from that sector, but passed this up: Lawrance Rockefeller was the dominant and largely ignored philanthropist of the time, and would have been wooed by Mather and Albright.

The Congress was reasonably helpful, first with the unprecedented $1 bn Mission 66 money, and second with the creation of a large number of new units. Apart from this, NPS struggled on with a poor constituency base, neither arguing well for the satisfaction of its obvious financial and staffing needs, nor having the right people to argue with. Hartzog's appointment in 1964 changed this for a while - he was enthusiastic and energetic in tending to NPS' needs, but the title of his book 'Battling for the Parks' is telling. The nation then lost one of its best NPS Directors because of a petty argument with President Nixon. From 1972 onwards the Park Service has experienced a succession of Directors, all presidentially appointed, without there being need to seek the Senate's consent.

While the Forest Service is fond of exaggerating its importance and achievements - for what in fact happens is that it makes an annual loss

close to $1 bn on its operation, its timber is in the wrong part of the country (and private sector timber was boosted by the federal government up to and during the second world war), and it has a poor record in wilderness designation, by way of examples - it has a *stability* greater than the Park Service seems to have. This stability appears to have three main components. First, its Chief Foresters all come from experienced foresters who have worked their way up, and are not political appointees; second, a high proportion of its field staff are university graduates - a scientific approach to conservation is therefore fostered; and third, it has a broadly-based constituency, partly due to selling its timber cheaply and partly to its acceptance of hunting as a legitimate recreational pursuit.

The chapter has been revealing in other ways, not least of which has been the preeminent rôle of the military establishment. There was a continuity of war through Eisenhower in Korea, to Johnson and Nixon in Vietnam, and the development of the hydrogen bomb. The military's power increased greatly through this period, though it suffered something of a defeat in Vietnam. Nevertheless, while its position as an agent of the State was reaffirmed by government, it was increasingly questioned by the people. There was an initial reaction against the use of nuclear weapons on human grounds; this later became disillusion on environmental grounds. Furthermore, the relationship of the military to science, and of both to industry, began to alarm people and this alarm has not subsided since: military spending has meant a virtual takeover of many university departments. Thirdly, the military retained strong visibility in its civilian rôle, as characterised by the Corps of Engineers. In other countries, these tasks would have been performed by the civil authorities or the private sector; in the US there was a long history of military use to cohere the emergent State, as we have seen in the first two chapters. Fourth, Vietnam polarised the United States, and many young people turned toward peace movements, rejecting the current lifestyle.

Some of these events influenced the pursuit of leisure and use of the heritage lands. Growth of per capita income and of car ownership and use, and the new demands of those returning from service to their country, meant that recreational aspects tended to take precedence over preservational aspects. Many in the Park Service found these new tenets difficult to work with, particularly the advent of commercialised recreation.

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7 A Policy Pendulum 1978-83

Chapter Summary

This chapter portrays abrupt policy changes, each of which has earlier roots, and some of which are contradictory. Nixon's activities lost public support for the presidency. Ford's amiable yet truly Republican follow-on, in pardoning the excesses of his predecessor and in vetoing liberal congressional laws, did little to ameliorate the situation. When Carter became president, one of his aims was to create a leaner executive bureaucracy; he started this by reducing the Corps of Engineers' and Bureau of Reclamation's water projects. The Congress was acrimonious about this, and Carter's grand plans became much reduced, though he clung to them throughout his presidency.

Carter also expanded the powers of the Nixon creation, the Office of Management and Budget, using it for certain actions that bypassed normal channels of scrutiny. His battles against bureaucratic overspending did not stop him vastly expanding the Park Service, and other federal agencies, through the Alaskan additions. There was a remarkable lack of policy consistency toward expansion of the federal heritage lands at this time. In Gary Everhardt's first year as Director (1975) a policy shift took place, to the effect that no new parks should be added if they could be established by bodies outside the System, provided they could do the job as well as the Park Service. It seemed to have little effect on the Congress' enthusiasm for creating more park units.

At much the same time a law was passed requiring the Service to provide the Congress each year with a list of potential additions. to the System, and may have prepared the ground for Representative Burton's 'park-barrel' acts, which added many new park units to the System. Less connected with the Congress' dictum, the Executive vastly expanded designated areas in Alaska. The anomalous situation was that very little additional money was voted to administer the new units. Five staff were running an Alaskan park three times the land area of Yellowstone, and those five - repeated many times in other additions to the System - had to be found elsewhere in the System, with a consequent thinning of managers and rangers System-wide. Furthermore, the Service found it

had 62% of its land holding within Alaska, virtually inaccessible to a large number of US citizens.

While the Park Service, and its ultimate authority, the Interior Secretary, had very little to do with Burton's bills, it was greatly involved in the Alaskan additions. If it could not cope with these additions, why did it - and the administration - support them? An explanation is offered to the effect that it appeared unlikely Carter would be reelected in 1980, and that the incoming Republican, Ronald Reagan, would show virtually no interest in the natural environment. So, make the additions while you can, may have been the argument. The predictions about Reagan were certainly borne out. He was antienvironmentalist, and his Interior Secretary James Watt mirrored his master at every opportunity. Park Service Director Russell Dickenson had warned, immediately before the Reagan administration, that there should be consolidation rather than further expansion. Reagan happily took this up, and Watt stopped park expansion. He also issued a large number of leases for minerals exploitation on federal lands, though the Park Service was less directly affected by this than were other agencies. A side effect of this action was to enhance the Secretary of the Interior's status in Reagan's Cabinet, because his involvement in commercial activities was greatly increased.

In the late 1970s the Conservation Foundation, the National Parks & Conservation Association, and finally the Park Service itself, produced reports showing the bad state of the park system. Watt responded to this with PRIP, the Park Restoration and Improvement Plan of 1981. It had a $1bn budget and superficially seemed excellent, though the Wilderness Society said it was 'partial, biassed and limited.' Certainly its 'improvements' meant better roads, which meant yet more cars and people within the park units. In fact it was a highly political gesture, for there was no shortage of money, only the lack of will to release it, in the Land & Water Conservation Fund.

The chapter then asks a heretical question: how well has the US performed with its much-vaunted national parks and other protected areas? Not particularly well when compared with parks around the world, is the answer. When those countries with the same or greater population densities are examined, it is found that there are 21 with more area of national parks as a percentage of the national land area. The chapter

ends questioning whether symbiosis or in fact an approaching nemesis had been achieved in the period from 1972 to 1983. Federal exploitation of its own land had been accelerating, and the continued growth in personal wealth for the majority led to similar exploitation of private lands. So, arguably, the very large additions of Alaskan lands to various public agencies was a symbiotic act. On the other hand, some argue that the sudden concern with money in the Interior agencies (because of Watt's leases for example) diminished its stature, as did its continuing politicisation.

While the Forest Service and Fish & Wildlife Service's Directors normally rose from the ranks and were in any case subject to approval of the Senate, the Park Service's directorship was a gift of the President, without anyone's advice or consent. There were five Park Service Directors in the 1972-83 period. All of these actions undermined the morale and stability of the Service, and the continuing lack of funds that should, by law, have been made available to it (Watt even refused to release L&WCF moneys voted by the Congress) suggest it was an agency not so much exposed to dire happenings, as one which politicians blithely thought was looking after itself.

And yet ... the Park Service *did* expand, *did* increase both its visitation and its esteem with the public. It does appear that the apparent conflict in its organic Act of 1916 has helped ensure its continuity.

Nixon-Ford-Carter

On occasion Chapter 6 overlapped this chapter. The dying embers of Nixon's presidency added little light to the brief term of Gerald Ford, who was remarkable only for the number of times he vetoed Congress's liberal social and economic program bills. Ford's other problem concerned inflation, and his deflationary experiment lost him the 1976 presidential election. Also in that year he gave some support to the bicentennial celebrations, though the Nixon debâcle had suggested to many that it was not a time for self-congratulation as a nation. Yet, as so often happens in politics, a period of excesses in one direction demands a complete change toward an alternative system ... perhaps with its own excesses. The change was provided by Jimmy Carter, the first Democrat president since 1961. Carter was the complete outsider in the election, and may have won because 'he seemed a David fighting so many

Goliaths ... because the nation was weary of professional politicians and office holders ... (or) because his evangelical piety appealed to an instinct in the American people for simple morality and faith in public life' (Nevins & Commager 1986,600-601).

Carter had briefly been Governor of Georgia. He appeared to the voters as a sincere and honest politician, one who might regain their trust in a strong and fair federal government. In fact, when he took office, much changed. An engineer by profession and peanut farmer by trade, he brought a business acuity to the White House which few realized he had. Yet his inaugural speech was full of meaningless homilies, and to underline his humility, he then walked hand in hand with his wife from the Capitol to the White House, unheard of for a President. Then, the complexity of his character became apparent in the way he assembled his advisory team, and the policies he supported. The domesticity of his campaigning philosophy had rapidly to be partnered with an active foreign policy. As Nevins & Commager (1986,605) put it, in both domestic and foreign policy 'the old litanies had changed' and Carter was not wholly the person to accommodate and meaningfully direct these changes.

Carter tried hard to effect the kind of change he believed to be necessary amidst a lot of opposition. He was concerned to cut back on federal government overspending, and put moratoriums on many favoured projects of the Interior Department, particularly new dam construction by the Bureau of Reclamation, as we have seen in chapter 5. Clarke & McCool (1985,19-24) discuss the other agency that frustrated him: the Corps of Engineers. 11 of 19 water projects slated for termination were being built by the Corps, and Carter's cutbacks 'were greeted with a storm of protest from western governors and powerful southern and western congresspersons.' This came as a surprise to Carter, for only one week previously 74 members of Congress had sent him a letter expressing support for 'your efforts to reform the water resources programs of the Army Corps of Engineers and the Bureau of Reclamation.' Carter, new to Washington politics, had not understood that the Corps and the Bureau would quickly lobby those in Congress who had previously supported their actions. In other words, it was these agencies' bureaucracies who held the power and who, by supporting or rejecting operations in a particular constituency, could strongly influence its representative's local standing. In the end, Carter was able to achieve rather fewer of the cuts he had had in mind; a disappointment for he may have believed

this was the ideal time to check the Corps, as the Army had just lost a war - that in Vietnam.

It is fair to say that Carter was not alone in wanting to control the power and spending of the Corps and the Bureau - considered excessive because the end result often provided heavily subsidised water or power in areas like deserts that more sensibly would have been left alone. Clarke & McCool (pp21-22) note the Coalition for Water Project Review, consisting of 20 environmental groups that opposed not just the constructional activities of the Corps, but also challenged, for the first time, the economic base of the projects. The type of project they were opposing brings to mind the TVA and BUREC western dams whose net outputs were questioned in chapter 5. An example, not mentioned there, was the Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway. The Corps' cost-benefit analysis, according to its opponents, 'was calculated to make it appear that the project would result in a net economic gain.' But, the opponents claimed, it would only benefit a small group of private barge operators and simultaneously destroy 30 000 acres of forest and 17 000 acres of farmland.

Carter continued to try to control the Corps through his entire administration. In 1979 he suggested the establishment of a Department of Natural Resources, which would have combined most of Interior with the Corps of Engineers. Clarke & McCool (op cit p25) consider the function of this reorganisation was 'to increase the president's control over (the Corps) by reducing its autonomy, and with it attenuate its strong alliance with the Congress.' The Congress liked the Corps because it tended to do things that were attractive to constituents either in the large patch of a Western Senator, or in a smaller area to which a Representative was answerable. As Clarke & McCool remind us, this very idea had been suggested by the Hoover Commission just before Franklin Roosevelt's first presidency, and Nixon had also wanted a Department of Natural Resources, though his was to control federal spending, not because of enlightened environmentalism or a dislike of the Corps' power. 'All of these proposals threatened the *status quo* and all of them failed.'

Carter also furthered the protective goal of the original mission of the National Park Service in two ways. He supported massive expansion of the Park System on the one hand, and removed its historic site

responsibilities on the other, handing them over to the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation, which was then renamed the Heritage Conservation and Recreation Service. Both moves were short-lived. After he departed the White House in 1981 very little was added to the System, and James Watt abolished HCRS, handing all its responsibilities back to the National Park Service.

Mackintosh (1984) ends his brief history of the Park Service with a section entitled 'Rounding Out the System' in the period 1973-1984. Declared during the period 1973-1977 were two each of national monuments, national preserves and national recreation areas, a national seashore and a wild & scenic river, and 14 historic sites. Given that the nation was exhausted from its involvement in Southeast Asia and elsewhere, and had greatly overcommitted its resources, we need not be surprised that little happened in this period: either the System *was* largely 'rounded out', or there was little further exploitation to react against. The former explanation seems untenable for a number of reasons. First, reports by various voluntary bodies, specially that by the National Parks & Conservation Association (1988,VIII,35) suggest many new park units are needed. NPCA recommend 46, many of which would be national parks. Second, the Park Service itself, under Hartzog's direction, completed a review of the system's composition which judged the adequacy of representation of the nation's natural regions and broad themes of American history, according to NPCA (op cit,34). This National Park System Plan concluded that a minimum of 196 further areas should be added to the System. Third, as noted in earlier chapters, the US does not perform particularly well, in world terms, in the quantity of land to which it has given protected status: this is examined in more detail later in this chapter, specially in Table 7-4.

In 1975 a policy shift took place, under Gary Everhardt in his first year as Director of NPS. Previously, national parklands had had to satisfy various criteria to be admitted to the System. An area should be nationally significant, but it also had to be administrable and be suited to both preservation and public use. In 1975 the area also had to be inappropriate to protection outside the System, or not available for public appreciation and use under those circumstances. If it could be protected outside the System, then that was what should happen (Mackintosh 1984,80-81). It is likely this change was stimulated partly by an ultra-conservative Ford, and partly by federal government

inconsistency, which remained over the next decade: it was enthusiastic about extending the System, but it kept it starved of funds, and therefore of the staff needed not just to run it, but to maintain the high standards now expected by the public. Doubtless the Park Service felt it could not continue stretching itself in all directions. But matters considerably worsened over the next few years, particularly with Carter's massive addition of Alaskan lands to NPS care.

The profound change determined by the Park Service was, however, treated with some indifference by the Congress. In 1976 they passed The General Authorities Act, Section 8 of which specifically encouraged Park Service expansion:

> 'The Secretary of the Interior is directed to investigate, study and continually monitor the welfare of areas whose resources exhibit qualities of national significance and which may have potential for inclusion in the National Park System ... each fiscal year, the Secretary shall transmit (to the Congressional chamber leaders) comprehensive reports on each of those areas on which studies have been completed.'

Then follows the requirement that a list in priority order of not less than twelve potential areas shall be submitted for Congressional consideration. This was enacted during Everhardt's Directorship and the last months of Ford's administration. In fact, during the Carter Administration and William Whalen's Park Service Directorship, what came to be known as 'park barrel' bills were introduced, adding many new units to the System, and I return to these below.

Carter-Reagan

While comparisons of Carter and Wilson would be very interesting - they are made by several of the historians who have been quoted within this thesis - the nub of this Chapter is the abrupt change that took place when Carter's brief Democracy gave way to Reagan's Republicanism. It is difficult to find a similarly profound turnaround in the entire history of US presidential administrations. From 1955-1989 the House of Representatives has had a Democrat majority; the Senate had a Democrat majority 1955-1981. It was Republican until 1987, and then returned to a Democrat majority. Two questions need to be asked: was the Senate so powerful an ally during the two Reagan administrations that the Congress' position, when disagreeing with Reaganite policies, was

undermined? Or did the Congress, despite its Democrat majority, agree with the major changes Reagan was making? From discussions I had in Washington it appears neither was the case. The explanation was that Reagan's power, as a charismatic leader providing tax cuts and an apparent rein on federal expenditure (until 'Star Wars', that is), filtered right down to constituency level. It was said that an out of line Representative could be persuaded to be supportive of Executive policy by the threat of damaging remarks in his/her constituency.

We have to remember that the Executive had been steadily increasing its power. The misadventures of Nixon had not really been corrected. He had originated the Office of Management & Budget to control those two functions, primarily the budgets of the Executive Departments. Carter had quickly learnt that certain of his functions could be put across via the Office without him personally appearing responsible, and it was natural that Reagan should follow this idea. He also elevated the Office's powers, particularly the management ones, so it had oversight of a large number of the functions of his Departments, and therefore helped with the centralisation of federal power. As Hays (1989,493) says

> 'One of the least observed of the changes in governance during the Reagan administration was the growth of the power of the Executive Office of the President vis-à-vis other branches of federal and state government. The key to that change was the Office of Management & Budget, which lay beyond the reach of agencies, courts, and Congress and sought to change policy by both budgetary and nonbudgetary means.'

While Reagan's influence upon a Congressperson's constituency may appear to be unconstitutional and unlikely in a country with much-vaunted separation of powers, some explanation has to be sought for the relative ease with which he completely changed policies which had had a broad consensus since the beginning of the century.

Alaskan Cornucopia

The very size of Alaska, nearly twice the area of Texas, is reflected in the relatively enormous additions to the Park Service's, and other agencies', acreage, in 1980: a process started in 1978 when Carter had to make a holding motion by declaring many areas to be national monuments. They could later be given more appropriate designation. In

1971 the Congress enacted the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act which had a clause, Section 17(d)(2), which gave the Interior Secretary two years to carry out studies of 80 million acres of the 'd-2' lands, as they became known, and to recommend their establishment as national forests, parks, wildlife refuges and wild and scenic rivers. He could also add to the 80 million acres. Then Congress had a further five years, until 1978, to act on the proposals. Many Alaskans regarded the national park proposals as one more example of federal interference. Furthermore, Everhart (1983,123 et seq) makes an interesting point where he considers Alaska as a second frontier (it will be recalled that the original frontier was declared closed in 1890):

> 'Looking at ample evidence of past mistakes in states where developers looted the land of its resources, there were many who took the view that Alaska must not be a replay of the Old West. Incredibly, the country was being given a second chance and the consensus seemed to be: this time let's do it right.'

We are thus taken back to chapter 1 of this thesis, and the suggestion that the frontier was one explanation for the designation and protection of heritage land. The argument is that once the ultimate frontier is reached, then exploitation cannot look to new lands beyond this new horizon, but has to turn in on itself, not simply devouring the available private lands more intensively, but looking expectantly at the public domain as well.

Cecil Andrus became Interior Secretary in 1977; he produced a package in which the Park Service would receive 41.8 million acres.

> 'Carter called the bill the most important conservation measure of the century and committed his administration to its support. In an unprecedented example of cooperation, 52 national conservation organizations formed the Alaska coalition. It became a strong factor in deciding the outcome.'

Stewart Udall's brother Morris, who chaired the Interior Committee then and into the late 1980s, led the House's support for the bill, but it was lost in the Senate. Carter responded by placing the d-2 lands under various federal agencies, 50 million acres of which were proclaimed as national monuments. At that point, Andrus said 'We have no

intention of letting Alaska become a private preserve for a handful of rape, ruin and run developers.'

Late in 1980 both the House and the Senate passed a new bill, the Senate having paired it down a little. The Alaska Coalition favoured waiting another year to get a more substantial Senate response, but it is as well this did not happen. Carter actually signed the bill after having lost the presidency to Ronald Reagan, one month before he had to quit the White House, and the Senate had achieved a Republican majority.

Taking the 1978 Alaskan additions, some earlier Alaskan preserves and monuments, and translating them all into their 1980 status, the National Park Service gained Denali NP and NPreserve, Gates of the Arctic NP and NPres, Glacier Bay NP and NPres, Katmai NP and NPres, Kenai Fjords NP, Kobuk Valley NP, Lake Clark NP and NPres, Noatak NPres, Wrangell St Elias NP and NPres, and Yukon-Charley Rivers NPres. Using the largest park in the 48 states - Yellowstone National Park's 2.2 million acres - as a baseline, Wrangell St Elias is 13.2 million acres, Gates of the Arctic 8.4 million, Noatak 6.6 million, Denali 6 million acres, while Katmai, Lake Clark and Yukon-Charley are all larger in area than Yellowstone.

The Table below shows the allocation of lands, to a number of agencies, between the contiguous states and Alaska: not all the recreational agencies gained Alaskan land.

Table 7-1 : Recreational Land Holdings by Federal Agency

	Million acres of recreational land	Mill. acres in Alaska	% in contiguous states
Bureau of Land Management	'majority of' 338	162	52
National Forest Service	191	19	90
Fish & Wildlife Service	90	77	14
National Park Service	76	47	38

Adapted from USDA 1987 and Mackintosh 1983

The Table shows the Fish & Wildlife Service's and the Park Service's dependence on Alaska for a high proportion of their recreational land, while the Forest Service in particular has a very high proportion of

its recreational land within the contiguous states.

Preservationists must be relieved the Forest Service had the smallest portion of the Alaskan lands. Walker (1990a) shows what is happening to Tongass National Forest in Alaska. He notes that the 200 foot-tall Sitka spruce trees have taken 400 years to reach their maturity, but 'these days you can buy one for the price of a cheeseburger. The US Forest Service sells tham for $1.60 a piece.' The subsidy system has, Walker says, meant that since 1982 'the US taxpayer has shelled out $386m, while receiving only $32m back in sales.' A Congress majority has voted to impose strict new regulation upon the Alaskan timber industry, but Alaska's two senators and one representative are opposed to timber reform bills.

Other Expansion

The 'park barrel' bills were the initiative of Representative Phillip Burton of California, who had in fact recommended Whalen as Director. Burton was favoured to become Democratic Majority Leader of the House in 1977, but he failed by a single vote (Everhart 1983,146-7). He determined to achieve it next time round, and looked for a committee assignment that would help him. To his colleagues' surprise he passed up the Education and Labor subcommittees, choosing instead to take control of the Interior subcommittee on national parks and territories: 'from this seemingly insubstantial base he proceeded to build a power base.' Burton was a remarkable Chair of the House of Representatives parks subcommittee; he conceived the idea of a Bill with a multitude of components which would contain a piece of park unit for each of a wide number of Representatives' constituencies. He thus gained a sympathetic hearing from a substantial part of the House which would almost certainly lead to the Bill's acceptance. The analogy with the 'pork barrel' was that there was a piece of meat for everyone within it.

Two omnibus bills led to Acts which were passed, one in 1978 and the other in 1980. In 1978, ignoring additions to the Alaskan units of NPS, which were to be revised in status and title in 1980, there were 16 new units, many boundary changes, and other matters relating to existing park units that required legislation. Everhart (p147-148) says the first bill had provisions affecting 200 members of the House, in 44 states. Yet, in 1979, 'Congress actually reduced the number of full-

time Service employees and cut the operating budget by $40 million.' Contrast with the pre-Burton period is stark: in 1977 only one new unit was added to the System, Eleanor Roosevelt National Historic Site.

In 1980, again in the hectic days just before Congress adjourned, 10 new units were added. The bill 'traveled through Congress so quickly that Interior pleaded with the Speaker of the House for a short delay so that the Park Service could at least read the measure and comment on the provisions, but the request was ignored.' It was also a matter of quality. Burton had not been qualitatively selective in assembling his omnibus bills; the main criterion seems to have been the number of Representatives he could satisfy to assure the bill's success. Thus, the very high standards previously intrinsic to the creation of the Park System were being diluted.

Here is another case of a weak Park Service, not determining its own future in the way the Forest Service would do; yet, their constituencies were so different - one appealing to constrained recreational and high-minded public principles, and one with commercial and unconstrained recreation principles. But these actions also comment on the position of the Executive, whose Interior Secretary was unaware of a bill's contents, despite its great significance to one of his agencies - and this was a bill the head of the Executive, President Carter, would sign into law. Thus, some of the problems besetting the Park Service, and therefore the main protector of the nation's heritage land, were to do with the separation of federal powers. Clawson (1983,53) suggests that the 1970s were a period in which federal agency leadership (and therefore under the ultimate control of the President) was passing to congressional initiative - a change that in many cases was spurred on by special interest groups. This is a far cry from the time when Gifford Pinchot, as head of the Forest Service, or George Hartzog, as Director of the Park Service, had great influence over Congressional lawmaking. However, it was to return when James Watt became Reagan's Interior Secretary.

Why were so many new units created in the late 1970s? There was not, at that time, any particular exploitative crisis to which they were responding. However, it seems possible that dissatisfaction with Carter led many to believe he would not achieve a second term in 1980, and that an incoming Republican President - especially if it happened

to be Ronald Reagan - would turn away from environmental issues in favour of a quite different set of priorities. So, add to the System while you may, could have been in many people's minds.

The end of the Carter administration also nurtured two significant publications: by ex-Park Service Director Wirth (1979), who had initiated the Mission 66 program, and Sax (1980), a professor in California. Sax contributes significantly to my thesis, saying

> 'The happy convergence of many disparate interests permitted Congress and the public to sustain contradictory, but compatible, beliefs that permitted a park system to flourish: on one side the repugnance of the seemingly boundless materialism that infused American life, a spiritual attachment to untrammelled nature, and a self-congratulatory attitude toward the preservation of nature's bounty; and on the other a commitment to economic progress wherever it could be exacted, nationalistic pride, and the practical uses of nature as a commodity supportive of tourism and commercial recreation.'

He picked an apposite time to be saying this.

In 1978 another extraordinary event took place. For years the federal government and Congress had been finding (apart from Alaska) increasingly fewer areas of the public domain which could be transmuted into park service units. One area which had inadequately been explored was the purchase of private land for this purpose. Some private lands had entered the Service in the past, but the majority of these were donations from rich men: examples are parts of Grand Teton National Park and Acadia National Park, from John D Rockefeller. The Service had been examining for several years an idea which came to be called 'greenlining'; it echoed the British practice of creating 'national parks' which do not meet IUCN criteria as only small portions are in public ownership. Greenlining was intended to be a form of cooperation between public and private sectors, with negotiated access agreements much as in Britain. The first such 'Greenline Park' was the Pinelands National Reserve in New Jersey, and it is administered by the Park Service's Mid-Atlantic Region (Corbett 1983, Mertes 1984, Collins & Russell 1989).

There were no new units in 1981, and only one in 1982. The System had to wait until 1986 for its next new national park, at Great Basin in Nevada, which combined a smaller park unit with Forest Service territory.

Hays (1989,491 et seq) explains the paucity of new units. It resulted, he believes, from Reagan's approach:

> 'Earlier Democratic and Republican administrations had responded to environmental objectives with some degree of favor. But the Reagan administration began with a pervasive and determined commitment to turn the environmental tide. Environmentalists were rejected as legitimate participants in the give-and-take of public affairs. The administration set out to undo the environmental work of the preceding two decades of Republican and Democratic leadership.' Hays continues 'Implicit in this radical thrust was an assumption that environmental objectives were not deeply rooted in American society and politics but were the demands of a few environmental leaders rather than of the greater public. The environmental phenomenon, it was thought, could be swept aside by vigorous presidential leadership. The resulting drama tested the strength of popular support for environmental objectives, which proved to be much greater than the administration had anticipated. Its opposition, in fact, provided an opportunity for those who shaped environmental institutions to demonstrate the breadth of concern in the broader society. In being forced to recognize that environmental affairs were not momentary, limited and superficial, the administration, in fact, more firmly rooted their legitimacy on American politics.'

Hays (pp428-434) provides further illumination on the supporters of environmentalism: the cities provide the most (and middle class suburbs the most of all), while rural areas oppose the concept, except where tourism is the dominant industry, as in Aspen, Colorado or Jackson Hole, Wyoming. Looking forward to the Watt era, we can see that Reagan's antienvironmentalism shook the environmental movement, and made it reconsider its priorities. Everhart (1983,143) quotes the president of the National Audubon Society in support of this view:

> 'A gang of modern buffalo hunters has been appointed to protect the nation's air, land, water and wildlife ... but from it comes new hope. Thanks to ... Watt and other resource exploiters in high office the environmental movement is really moving again.'

Here again we have the influence of conflict on environmental action, though this time it was not evidenced by enlargements to the park system. Rather it took a preventive course, the environmental movement trying to stop Watt overturning years of achievement. Nevertheless, these events underline the fact that there was no consensus on environment - there was not at this time, any more than in the previous 200 years, any absolute concept that could be called 'environment.'

State of the Parks

Underfunding combined with expansion was one reason for the deterioration in park unit condition. Another was the impact of external activities, air pollution being notable as it knows no boundaries. NPS' (1980) **State of the Parks** Report shows impacts upon a resource which its 1916 Organic Act enjoined should be conserved for eternity. One year before the NPS report, NPCA (1979) produced their own description of impacts upon the park units from the outside; when Conservation Foundation data (produced in 1977 from a commission by seven federal agencies - see Keiter 1985,359) were added, the result was a 90% coverage of the entire System. In two articles NPCA document, through the use of photographs, the impacts of clearcutting right up to the boundary of Redwoods NP, of industrial air pollution at Indiana Dunes National Lakeshore and from the Navajo power plant in Arizona, and of roads, overlook towers, shanty towns catering for tourists, dams and overflying.

Prodded into action by the voluntary sector and Representative Burton, NPS (1980) hastily prepared **State of the Parks** for the House National Parks Sub-committee (note the Legislative Branch demanded that of an Executive Branch agency). There is little doubt that the serious and the relatively insignificant lie side by side, claiming a similar degree of attention. The report caused nationwide interest and alarm. Many threats concerned domestic energy supplies, which were intended to reduce dependence on imported sources. Energy conversion also causes problems - the coal-fired generating station at Page in northern Arizona coupled with the smog of Los Angeles to obscure the vistas from Bryce Canyon and Zion NPs, Death Valley NM, Grand Canyon NP and many other places of very high landscape quality. What is more, the obscuration violates the requirements of a 1977 amendment to the Clean Air Act (Fayad 1988,293): this questions the integrity of the Judiciary.

It will be recalled that **State of the Parks'** 73 different types of threat lie in seven different groups, and that these were enumerated in Chapter 1. Also in that chapter may be found the total number of internal threats of each type, and those originating outside the park units. However, it may be useful here to repeat the seven main groups: aesthetic degradation (land development, timbering etc); air pollution (acid rain, hydrocarbon pollutants, etc); physical removal of resources (mineral extraction, poaching etc); visitor physical impacts (campfires, trampling etc); water quality pollution and water quality changes (oil spills, toxic chemicals, etc); and park operations (trails, misuse of biocides etc). 1954 internal, and 2391 external threats were reported.

Everglades National Park is a clear example of threats. Biscayne National Park and Big Cypress National Preserve are attempts to buffer southern Florida's biological resources against some of its water loss. Some of these issues have been discussed in chapter 5, but general pressures on Everglades NP do not just continue, they enlarge. The Park's unique wetlands have caused it to be designated both an International Biosphere Park and a World Heritage Site; there are about six of the latter in the entire United States. It has problems of protecting the endangered Florida panther, of which only about 30 specimens have survived hunters and the automobile; it has problems of attaining a natural water flow, when the Corps of Engineers have made it unnatural through diversions toward the resident and visiting population and agricultural interests. For a long time the Park's water requirements were not understood and in many respects a natural régime would permit nature to offset relatively dry with relatively wet seasons, and their impacts on fecundity: but this has proved impossible. The complex history of water control in southern Florida is described by Wagner & Rosendahl (1986) and MacVicar (1987); I am also indebted to the 1987 Superintendent, Michael Finlay, for information.

Walker (1990b) has written about the state of the Park at the time of this thesis. Quoting the present Superintendent he says 'The Everglades ... is in mortal danger. Even now, when we have started to put together this restoration project, we could still lose this entire eco-system.' He goes on 'This is not simply an ecological problem, but a clash of interests. Whatever repairs are done over the next decade or so will have little lasting result until humans can be taught,

Figure 7-2 : Threats to Water Supply, Everglades National Park



persuaded or commanded to restrain their appetites for water. With Florida still booming - an average 1 000 people move in every day - the pressure on water supplies looks certain to intensify.'

What Everglades shows is that the actions of another federal agency, in this case the Corps of Engineers, toward exploitation of the land, have caused a counterattack from the scientists within the Park and many others interested in its survival, not least of whom was the Governor of Florida, now one of its Senators, Bob Graham. He, more than anyone, mounted a 'Save the Everglades' campaign. Figure 7-2 shows Everglades' present surface and groundwater supply, and some of the pressures it has to contend with.

Some of these impacts could have been avoided, or mitigated, if the Land & Water Conservation Fund (L&WCF) had been fully available. And, the scarcity of money (apart from PRIP, see below) during the Reagan administrations could also have been ameliorated, had he been concerned about environmental issues, or about funding available under existing law. A broad review of L&WCF's use up to 1980 is provided in Table 6-1, whose source does not give later data. Table 7-3 provides another view by comparing the presidential budget request for Fund moneys with what was congressionally appropriated, under the Presidents relevant to this chapter and the two preceding years.

Table 7-3 : Budget Requests vs Congressional Appropriations for L&WCF, in $m

President	FY	Request	Appropriation	President	FY	Request	Appropriation
Ford	1976	95.2	96.9	Carter	1980	137.7	152.9
Carter	1977	204.8	253.3		1981	53.9	80.2
	1978	348.0	366.8	Reagan I	1982	26.6	127.2
	1979	212.6	253.7		1983	59.8	67.6

Source: Kloepfer 1983

Table 7-3, in showing L&WCF disbursements over a number of years, demonstrates one principle, and suggests another. First, that the Executive was at all times tighter with Fund disbursements than was the Congress. Second, neither federal branch was prepared to use the full assets of the Fund. Such locked-up money became a major issue in late-1980s Washington. As we saw in Chapter 6, the Fund was established by

an Act of 1965 to provide money for agencies at all levels of government so they could buy land to develop new parklands. Its sources were royalties paid to the federal government by private companies with energy leases on the Outer Continental Shelf, from proceeds generated by the sale of surplus federal lands, and from the Motorboat Fuels Tax (Kloepfer 1983,4). Rarely has the Fund's potential been exploited; during the Reagan era there was reluctance to part with any of its moneys. Watt wanted to shut down the Fund, to stop establishment of new parks. But neither Reagan nor Watt had the power to do this without Congressional approval (Everhart 1983,28-29). Yet, as Runte (1987, 260) has noted, Watt resolutely refused to spend the amounts voted by Congress. And, grants to the states were almost eliminated. In 1987 Representative Mo Udall was trying to make L&WCF moneys more readily available, while Representative Bruce Vento, who chaired the national parks sub-committee of Udall's Interior Committee, wanted all L&WCF money for NPS.

According to a discussion in NPS headquarters in Washington, in 1986 the Fund stood at no less than $5 billion, which resulted from years of under-appropriation. The authority to appropriate $900 million a year was due to expire in 1989 - however, at present rate of uptake, the backlog would last well beyond then. A Senate Bill was being prepared to extend authority to 2015 at $900 million a year, spread among many agencies. Around 1972 Congress said annual appropriations of $200 million should rise to $900 million by 1978, but only Carter appropriated the full amount, during the period 1977 to 1979. One of the great problems of the 'freeze' on L&WCF moneys is that land prices continue to increase. Over a decade there has been a 300% to 400% increase, resulting in the cost of Redwoods NP in California, originally estimated in 1968 to be $250 million, having increased to $1 billion in the late 1980s. Another outcome is that no privately held land has been bought to create a new park since 1965, though some inholdings within existing parks have been bought. This is a crucial issue, for many of the parks that NPS would like to create do not lie within the Federal domain, as we have seen above in the discussion on 'greenlining'.

James Watt

Russell Dickinson was apppointed Director of the Park Service in 1980, in the final months of Carter's presidency. He believed in

consolidating the park units already within the System before embarking on any further expansion, and Reagan's first Interior Secretary, James Watt, agreed with Dickenson when he took charge in 1981. The 97th Congress (1981-82) went along with the new approach, and eliminated appropriations for the new area studies even though they were required by Section 8 of the General Authorities Act.

James Gaius Watt was born in 1938 in Wyoming. He obtained a BS and JD (law) degrees from its University, and held a number of posts in the Department of the Interior for much of the time from 1969 until his appointment by Reagan as its Secretary in 1981. Notably he was Director of the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation 1972-1975. His 2½ year Secretaryship ended shortly after he said (supposedly lightheartedly) that an advisory commission he had established contained 'a black, a woman, two Jews and a cripple.' Congress and the US people had already had enough. Certainly his treatment of Federal lands, biassed toward the private sector, conflicted with many views of what should happen to the public domain. His successor William Clark was generally felt to be pursuing similar policies while maintaining a distinctly lower profile (an 'agenda of inaction', Dumanoski [1984]). Donald Hodel, appointed in 1985, was more acceptable to more people.

Watt was a passionate believer in market economics, minimum Federal expenditure on the NP System, and a private sector he considered far more capable than government officers. Evidently he also cared little about the national parks under his care: when asked about the Energy Department's desire to send in 'huge drilling rigs in its search for a nuclear waste dump immediately outside Canyonlands National Park, Watt declared he would not "flinch" ' (Dumanoski op. cit.) His evident disdain for his own staff is clear from his bypassing of the Director NPS, and his Assistant Secretary Fish & Wildlife/Parks was dealing direct with Superintendents (information from an NPS Senior Officer).

Thus we see a policy transformation. Before Reagan-Watt the public domain had *contained* commercial interests in the relatively modest concessions in the national parks, grazing rights on BLM lands, and cheap timber from the national forests. Watt saw the public domain as fair game for exploitation. Below is a discussion of the vast areas covered by his mineral leases, but we shall also see how he encouraged park concessioners to pursue a reversal of previous interventionist

policy - this time it was the private sector intervening in the affairs of State. Similarly there was a conflict between a Reaganite non-interventionist market economy on the one hand, and a formidable defense expenditure on the other. Shortly after the period of this chapter, much of US infrastructure, public and private, has deteriorated.

Sale of the Century

Watt's desire to sell leases for minerals extraction on Federal lands, usually either BLM lands or those on the Continental Shelf, was at the heart of conflict between him and a large number of officials and the general public. Very often the leases were contiguous with National Park Service units: for example, the Channel Islands NP off Los Angeles could have been directly affected by Watt's plans to open one billion acres of the outer continental shelf to oil and gas exploration. At the last minute the opposition's views prevailed, and 35 tracts near the Islands were removed from the lease offer (The Register, 24.12.81). He also stopped land acquisition by NPS so that, for example, purchase of land for the Santa Monica Mountains NRA was halted at 3000 of the 40 000 acres to be purchased, with the land price increasing by 15-35% annually (Jones 1981). According to the Los Angeles Times of 24 June 1981, Congress had authorised spending of $155m for the land, but by then only $29m had been spent: 'Now NPS says the land may end up costing $650-800m.' So, Watt won a Pyrrhic victory against the Congress, and the US taxpayer. Yet, many of Watt's efforts were blocked by environmentalists and outraged public reactions, by Congressional vote and court-ordered prohibitions. Congress blocked Watt's efforts to open up wilderness areas to energy leasing, and some of his offshore oil leasing (National Journal 11.6.83). Watt side-stepped these issues by saying that his responsibility was to put in order the land already held by the Park Service.

How serious are the implications of Watt's leases? They have little importance at a time of energy glut, experienced in the 1980s. And yet, if there is a recurrent energy crisis, or oil/shales/coal become less affordable, we could expect to see coal strip mining, and oil derricks, in very close proximity to some of the NPS 'jewels'. The terms of the leases are also transparent. They were issued in 1981 (generally speaking) for 10 years. If no development takes place by

the end of that time, they become void and revert to the Federal Government: however, it seems highly unlikely there will be no onsite activity during the period of the lease. If extraction does take place, then the leases are extendable.

PRIP

So as to put the Park System in order, Watt introduced the $1 bn PRIP (Park Restoration and Improvement Plan) programme in 1981, making money available for urgent work on roads, toilet provision and their drainage, roof repairs, water supply, and similar work.

The Wilderness Society produced a report on Watt (Kloepfer et al 1983). The PRIP programme is seen as partial, biassed and limited: other internal problems, not touched by his programme, could lead to destruction, not merely degradation, of the parks' natural resources. Wider and smoother roads are useless if there is nothing much to see from them. Watt's position on park resource threats is also closely examined. The conclusion is that Watt's policies, if extended through time, would cause irrevocable damage: they were obsessively inclined toward the private sector. Frome (1982,35) quoted Watt's support for concessioners whom he told 'You are going to play a tremendously important and growing role in the administration of our national parks, and we are going to reach out to involve you in some areas you haven't been asked to be involved in before.'

US Heritage Land in a World Context

Almost all this thesis has been concerned with US protected land, without putting it into a world context. How does the quantity of US national parks, and of other protected areas, compare with provision in other countries? IUCN (1985) shows there were 3514 protected areas in the world within their Categories I-V, totalling 4.24 million km^2. The categories are scientific reserve/ strict nature reserve, national park, national monument/natural landmark, nature conservation reserve/ managed nature reserve/wildlife sanctuary, and protected landscape or seascape. Table 7-4 utilises IUCN material; my analysis is confirmed by a more recent World Bank publication (Ledec & Goodland 1988,78-82). Two fundamentals are shown: National Parks where they exceed 3% of a country's land area, or the total protected areas where they exceed 5%

of that area (these arbitrary limits are the author's). Each country's population density provides rough comparison though of course there are other variables like soil quality, climate, topography and socio-economic conditions, which determine whether human beings wish to develop land or leave it to be enjoyed more passively. Population density is for 1979 (UN 1981), land area for 1980 (UN 1981), and protected areas for 1985 (IUCN 1985). Countries are ranked according to the proportion of land allocated to National Parks, and those countries with a population density the same as or greater than the US, are in bold type.

Table 7-4 suggests that the US collection of protected areas is unremarkable in terms of its proportion of the total land mass: 24 countries do better in terms of protected areas, while 32 do better in terms of national parks, as a percentage of the total land mass. Looked at in terms of those countries with an equal or greater density of persons per square metre, there are 21 countries with more area of national parks as a percentage of total land area. This suggests that the NPS (and others responsible for the natural heritage) should expand their land holdings. Foresta (1984) said endangered ecosystems, not necessarily beautiful in human terms, should be added to the Park System. Nash (1987) went further, suggesting wilderness should be preserved for the non-human animal and plant life within it, saying it was not to do with humans. Nash echoed the split in the US ecological movement discussed by Reed (1988) who suggested there are many in the US who are discrediting anthropomorphism.

Because of the arbitrarily drawn thresholds of 3% and 5%, and choice of protected-area-as-%-total-land-area as a measure, many well-performing countries have been omitted. Australia and Canada each have more than 100 000 km^2 of national parks. Those with more than 10 000 km^2 are Bolivia, Brazil, India, Iran, Mauritania, Mongolia, Mozambique, Paraguay, Peru, and South Africa.

Symbiosis or Distancing?

The pendulum in this chapter's title keeps swinging, but its movements are erratic. It is not a straightforward swing between exploitation and preservation, for we also need to know who is perpetrating either act, and on whose land. So the full set of 'actors' would be: exploiters and preservers; federal agents and private operators; the federal

Table 7-4 : Some Countries' National Parks and Protected Areas

Country	Land area km²	Km² national parks as % all land	Rank	Km² all protected areas as % all land	Rank	Persons per km²
Bhutan	47 000	17.7	1	20.2	2	26
Seychelles	280	10.3	2	78.2	1	214
Rwanda	26 338	9.9	3	9.9	9	177
Dominica	751	9.1	4	9.1	13=	107
Zambia	752 614	8.9	5	8.9	15	8
Chile	756 945	8.8	6	16.8	4	14
Panama	75 650	8.7	7	8.7	17	25
Bahamas	13 935	8.6	8	8.8	16	16
Venezuela	912 050	8.0	9	8.1	19=	15
New Zealand	268 676	7.6	10	10.4	8	12
Benin	112 622	7.5	11	7.5	23	31
Costa Rica	50 700	7.2	12	8.1	19=	43
Ecuador	283 561	6.9	13=	9.3	11	28
Zimbabwe	390 580	6.9	13=	7.1	24	18
Botswana	600 372	6.4	15	19.8	3	1
Sri Lanka	65 610	6.0	16	9.8	10	225
Norway	324 219	5.9	17	14.5	5	13
Malawi	118 484	5.8	18	9.1	13=	49
Nepal	140 797	5.7	19=	6.9	25=	97
Togo	56 785	5.7	19=	8.3	18	43
Ivory Coast	322 463	5.5	21	5.8	31	25
Kenya	582 646	5.2	22	5.3	33=	26
Senegal	196 192	5.1	23	11.1	7	28
Ghana	238 537	4.7	24	4.9	35	47
Cent.Afr.Rep.	622 984	4.5	25=	6.3	29	d.k.
Dominican Rep.	48 734	4.5	25=	4.5	37	108
Tanzania	945 087	4.0	27	11.2	6	18
Zaire	2 345 409	3.6	28	3.8	38=	12
Colombia	1 138 914	3.4	29	3.5	40	23
Uganda	236 036	3.3	30	5.6	32	56
Honduras	112 088	3.2	31	3.8	38=	32
Malaysia	327 749	3.0	32	4.7	36	40
and, not meeting the condition of national parks being 3% or more of total land area, though exceeding 5% of land which is protected in some way:						
Indonesia	2 027 087	2.4	33=	6.8	27	73
USA	9 363 123	2.4	33=	6.9	25=	24
Thailand	514 000	1.8	35	5.3	33=	90
Iceland	103 000	0.7	36	7.7	22	2
Pakistan	803 903	0.5	37	8.1	19=	95
Czechoslovakia	127 869	0.4	38	9.0	12	119
Japan	372 313	0.1	39	5.9	30	311
UK	244 046	0.0	40	6.4	28	229

public domain, all other publicly owned land and privately owned land. 'Actors' 1, 2, 3 and 5 were presented with a pivotal act in 1969/70: the National Environmental Policy Act, for it provided legal redress against federal exploiters of federal land.

This was an important moment, for we have seen that Franklin Roosevelt's first administration quickened the pace of federal exploitation of its own lands, a process begun a long time before that though not particularly noticeable *because few people were there to notice*, and their concerns lay elsewhere. Carter's attempts to curb the activities of the Corps of Engineers, as discussed in this chapter, showed federal exploitation of the federal lands was still proceeding at a substantial rate - it is interesting to conjecture what would have happened had there been no NEPA.

In using NEPA extensively, conservationists were able to prevent, or soften, a wide range of federal projects that would have had adverse environmental effects. Everhart (1983,141) makes the point that there is no established national policy which balances environmental protection and resource development, and this results in resource development becoming an issue in most political campaigns. He also notes that the federal lands contain 80% of the nation's oil shale and 40% of its coal reserves, along with extensive deposits of minerals, oil and natural gas. This has transformed the position of Interior Secretary from a sleepy sinecure to one of considerable political significance. James Watt, as we have seen, was well aware of the new powers granted him, and proceeded to exploit them with little consideration for an environment which his chief executive (Reagan) had anyway discounted.

Conclusions

This chapter demonstrates conflict at most levels of the public sector. While the corporatism of Franklin Roosevelt managed to hold the nation together at a time of extreme distress, it was quite the opposite policy to that followed by Reagan and Watt. In Britain, Thatcher also reacted against corporatism, as being incompatible with a market-driven economy. In both countries Democrat and Labour policies respectively were wholly unacceptable to the incoming Right, as was environmental concern, except where it concerned one's own land. The roots of the conflict go back further: they were growing in the nineteenth century,

but the decisive piece of legislation was enacted in 1969. The National Environmental Policy Act was the first time that *federal* assaults on the nation's heritage land were held in check, partly by the requirement that their developments had to be defended by an Environmental Impact Statement, a long and laborious process of self-justification. Federal 'non-developments', like the neglect of its Park System, could not be expected to arouse the ire of the Council for Environmental Quality (the 'watchdog' of NEPA), however. Reaction against this apathy and neglect had to await the prodding of the Conservation Foundation, the National Parks & Conservation Association and finally, under duress, the Park Service itself. To complete this thread of activity, Interior Secretary Watt introduced the Park Restoration and Improvement Program - something that could have been done long before if only the moneys from the Land & Water Conservation Fund had been released, as they should rightly have been under the law, to the extent that they were available. Watt even tried to prevent allocation of the moneys that *had* been agreed, and refused to apply them.

The other thread which we should follow concerns additions to the stock of federally-protected land. Park Service Director Everhardt instituted a policy saying that when a new park was being considered, if it could be administered outside the System, then that should happen. One year later, in 1976, Everhardt's directive was followed by the conflicting General Authority Act which required the Secretary of the Interior to provide lists of potential new park units, each year. Then came the Burton 'park-barrel' Acts, adding much that was desirable, and some that was not, to the Park System. These Acts were produced in parallel with the Carter-orchestrated vast additions from Alaska. In 1980, Park Service Director Dickenson said the System was growing too rapidly; a period of consolidation should be contemplated. Watt agreed, but promptly returned the Heritage Conservation & Recreation Service to the Park Service, greatly increasing the Service's management responsibility.

In attempting to explain these seemingly arbitrary acts, various matters have to be recalled. First, little of the conflict during the period 1972-1983 concerned *private* land, though it continued to be exploited - it seems as if the large-scale federal actions helped to obscure this fact. Second, the Congress is effectively made up of microcosmic interests of the states brought to Washington, while the President and his executive departments are concerned with macro

federal issues, and only with the Congress if it decides not to support the Executive interests. Generally speaking the Executive and Congress have different goals, and their interests operate at different levels; this decade showed them to be more widely separated, and the Congress showing more initiative, than usual.

Then, if the protection of heritage land is seen to be an important goal, its achievement is bedevilled by the competing interests of many federal agencies with different missions, so there is no coherent power-base for environmental protection. The separate agencies become vulnerable to the larger, organised, environmental, public and private interests. While most agencies are concerned with selling a product, this concern became considerably enlarged through the mineral rights leases granted on much of the public domain during the Watt era, and the Interior Department suddenly achieved greatly enhanced status because of the large sums of money it was handling. While the Park Service rarely participated in this, attempts were made to commercialise it through involvement of the concessioners in park policy. The PRIP concept made the parks more accessible and every car that passed the entrance had to pay a small fee, so an 'improvement' became a source of money. The environmental movement itself was also still somewhat fragmented and not well integrated before it mounted a closely-coordinated campaign against Watt's policies. His policies provided a focus for the opposition. Stretton (1976,9), while writing a decade previously, clearly understood this problem:

> 'some reformers want to limit population by stopping economic growth, others by accelerating growth. Some want to stop science and investment; others think intensified research and investment offer the best chance of arresting population growth and economising or substituting for scarce materials. Some want threatened resources to become public property, others think they will be safer as private property ...'

Watt's return of HCRS to the National Park Service at first sight seems to exacerbate rather than solve problems. But a radical like him, while finding existing organisations conservative, nevertheless felt HCRS was too new and brash - and not of his doing - so its reabsorption in the conservative agency of NPS enabled him to clip its wings.

The moral of this chapter seems to be that when a society has reached the degree of complexity and sophistication (and occasional banality)

evident during the period 1972-1983 in the United States, the symbiotic relationship between preservation and exploitation is furthered. In previous chapters symbiosis has been observed between two polarised *concepts*. This chapter elaborates on this theme, but sees the symbiosis extended, so it may occur in *human and organisational* terms. Thus, while exploitation of land by the private sector continues 1972-1983, and pressures from private toward public lands are exacerbated, there are various parallel conflicts within the federal and state governments. The separation of powers is preeminent: the differences between state (and therefore more a Congressional area of operation) and federal (more the Executive's province) government are fundamental. But there is also a proliferation of agencies within the Executive, many having remits which conflict with others'. The National Park Service, the most prestigious and worst funded of these agencies, is also the one with least opportunity to add to its meagre budget from sales of its services. Perhaps the final complication was the diffusion of interest within the voluntary sector, though policies tended to cohere from the early 1980s onwards. The voluntary sector only rises up when its interests are severely affected because, unlike the State, its resources are limited.

Out of all this lack of clarity, competition and conflict, arose the phoenix of a greatly enlarged National Park Service: its area was more than doubled by Carter, and its full responsibilities in terms of preservation of natural areas, recreation, and care of historic sites, were restored during the first Reagan administration. The Park Service also broke new ground by moving into areas in private ownership, to initiate the 'greenlining' concept. The Forest Service, Fish & Wildlife Service, and Bureau of Land Management, gained very large tracts of land in Alaska. Federal government therefore had a renascence, enabling it to smooth over the abuses of its power during the Nixon administrations. In fact, his period provided an insight into the advantages and disadvantages of the governmental system: while we may be saddened by Carter's failures to control excesses of federal power, his failures associated with Watt's depredations led to another rebirth - of the conservation lobby. Checks and balances, perhaps not envisaged by the founding fathers, therefore arose.

Is this indicative of the future of heritage land protection in the United States? This issue will be taken further in the final chapter.

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8 Preserving the Future?

Chapter Summary

The historical approach of this thesis has enabled the continuity of US federal heritage land to be explored 1784-1990. Many threads run through this thesis, like *leitmotivs* from a Wagner opera. Each is resumed here and the central theory, that the opposed concepts of land preservation and exploitation operate interdependently, is shown to embrace global, as well as national and local, environmental problems. Conservation is a convenient mediator for those seeking conflict resolution, not the symbiosis, of the polar concepts.

The threads are expanded, where appropriate, so they include political and environmental changes 1983-1990, together with the way such changes might influence future protection of the heritage land. The politics of the immediate past suggest an attempt to achieve economic stability while acknowledging (and doing little about) its dependence on environmental exploitation. The conservationists, dominated by the World Conservation Strategy, Brundtland and Pearce, tend toward this view. Preservationists advocate a lessening of economic growth and higher levels of environmental protection, and they are beginning to influence change.

The Park Service has just concluded a three-year study of its own future; draft information suggests this will be of considerable interest, though it is likely to be circumscribed by its inability to recommend the changes necessary in the federal administration as a whole. NPCA's 1988 proposals are less circumspect: they (and many others) demand independence from the Interior Department for the Park Service, and the new agency's absorption of heritage land held by other agencies. One eminent drafter of the National Environmental Policy Act believes nothing less than Constitutional amendment is necessary to protect the environment. Certainly global warming, acid rain, and specie elimination suggest substantial changes to the surface of the planet. One school believes electronic advances are so rapid that the natural environment, places and scenes, will be replicable in one's own living room by the turn of the century, and another believes in direct

action to stop environmental depredation.

The chapter ends with a view that the new global environmental impacts complement and extend the more localised ones with which the heritage land has to contend. This interplay suggests that global impacts can be fought in ways similar to prospective public and private sector exploitatiom of heritage land. In fact they have to be, to maintain protection, for the global impacts now materially affect the US heritage land. Resolution is not wholly achieved, however: in 1990 there is a wide spectrum of response, internationally, to world issues, with the least helpful one coming from the US. But this seems likely to change. These events and dour predictions, viewed in the context of at least 150 years of heritage land protection, and that protection's evident *dependence* on conflict, suggest the future of US heritage land is reasonably secure.

A Retrospective and Prospective View

Since the 1780s in the United States, the evolution of the concept of heritage land has gone hand in hand with the development of a nation state. In part these developments were a reaction against aspects of the Europe most immigrants had left behind, in part they were an expression of the boundless energy poured into opening up the New World and the optimism of the founding fathers' conception of the ideal State, as expressed in the Constitution.

We have watched the pleasures and pains of this new nation state's development, and seen how they have been reflected as conflict - between the impulse to protect land and the impulse to exploit it. There is also the compromise position which asserts that if less were extracted, then bounteous nature would renew the land's resources to provide for tomorrow. These different approaches gradually clarified over time. Nevertheless, raw conflict and resolution paired up, and recurred with the predictability of Yellowstone's Old Faithful geyser, at times of war or economic catastrophe.

The National Park Service, the prime heritage land protector of all the federal agencies, was launched into the world with an apparent contradiction and potential conflict actually incorporated in its organic Act of 1916. I hope to have shown; however, that this was to prove vital

to the Service's endurance through 74 years of manipulation by Executive and Legislature alike: we should not be surprised that the 'conflict' paragraph* was drafted by Frederick Law Olmsted Jnr, benefitting from his father's wisdom as well as his own. In other words, rather than being a statement intended to placate the Congress as has been suggested by others, I consider it was written in this form because of an intuitive belief it would lead to continuity of preservation, in keeping with my principal thesis concerning the interrelatedness of preservation and exploitation (*'To conserve the scenery and the natural and historic objects and the wild life therein and to provide for the enjoyment of the same in such manner and by such means as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations').

US concern with its environment has always been double-edged. To those used to the urbanity of many European cities the banality of many US ones comes as a shock. Perhaps their inhabitants feel similarly, deep down, turning to a flood of environmental legislation and deep respect for its scenically beautiful lands, as antidotes.

The above comments incorporate a number of principal threads which have run through this thesis: they are discussed in more detail below. Each draws from the previous chapters, is updated (where appropriate) to 1990, and is viewed tentatively in relation to how the future might flow. A final section to this chapter states current, and relevant, environmental concerns, and shows how various agencies and individuals are responding to them.

Threads

Building the Nation State

1 Structure of government; separation of powers; movements like corporatism, progressivism, intervention, isolationism
2 Land: power; distribution, holding and protecting
3 The Commons
4 Rôle of Army

The Evolution of Environmental Protection

5 Reasons: protect from commercial and federal exploitation, surrogate, upsurge of environmentalism, world-wide movement
6 Increasing amounts of land protected; incrementalism, critical

masses

7 Inadequate federal funding, unuse of private funds

8 Symbiosis

Building the Nation State

1 Federal Government

The Constitution was drawn up in such a way that power would be controlled, and excesses proscribed. It has been more successful than many other governmental systems, though the doctrine of separation of powers has led to conflict, to inaction and to overaction; it has also led to one Branch of federal government temporarily being more powerful than another - both the Executive and the Legislature have held the high ground from time to time. But the separation was also evident in federal and state powers, and in the policies and powers of agencies under the Executive's control. These might be in different Departments (the conflict between the Forest and Park Services, for example) or within the same Department (Park Service and Bureau of Land Management, for example).

Another doctrine of the Constitution was a supposed equality. Equality of opportunity, certainly, but not of wealth distribution nor, for a long time, one which led to enfranchisement. But this was an ideology which the world had scarcely seen, in which citizens could own substantial amounts of land and cultivate their fortunes, or open a bar in New York, or become part-owner of a world-dominating computer business, or become President. Individual freedom came first. Then, as the nation grew, the individual voice became inadequate: this brought about the need for association. While representatives had been elected by the few that were enfranchised, the beginning of the twentieth century showed great advances in the concept of constituency, in parallel with ever-extending enfranchisement. The concept of 'constituency' is now powerful; if you have a particular interest, and have gathered sufficient like minds, you have a good chance of pushing it wherever appropriate, most usually on 'the Hill' - in the offices of senators and representatives. The strength of association, and thence of constituencies, was also the hallmark of environmentalism; groups sprang up with common cause and lobbied until they achieved what they wanted. The United States' voluntary sector - in the case of this thesis

represented by NPCA, the Sierra Club, the Wilderness Society and so forth - gathered its strength in this way.

The changing nature of the political élite can be seen in the way the United States, up to about 1913, had lived with the concept of aristocracy, of certain members of its society whose hereditary status and wealth enabled them to rise above everyday matters. Often the Senators would perform this function - they were not elected by the people. Theodore Roosevelt himself acted in this way, preaching conservation one moment, going to Africa on safari to shoot its animals the next. Yet, in the second decade of the twentieth century Senators had to be elected, which cut down their self-esteem somewhat. They then tended to be superseded by the industrial aristocrats - the Gettys, the Rockefellers, the Morgans. Some acted solely out of self-interest, some were philanthropic. John Rockefeller presented the nation with all or part of three National Parks, but members of his family, notably Lawrance, have not been asked to help since then.

The federal government experimented with many ways of accomodating the needs of society during the period covered by this thesis: each profoundly affected environmental protection, and each has since been theoretically examined. Corporatism was first evident in the early years of this century, and reached its apogee during the administrations of Franklin Roosevelt. Its success was in bringing together in common cause the elements of State - government, industry, unions, the voluntary sector. Its shortcoming was that it only proved possible under crisis conditions, and sympathetic ideologies. But, it was essential in allowing the Sierra Club to align itself with the State to achieve its own end, the National Park Service Act of 1916: the National Parks were institutionalised.

Progressivism lasted about ten years, mainly under Theodore Roosevelt. Its goals were elegant enough: to react against failures of society like the Trusts, wealth concentration, search for profit at the expense of the consumer, unhygienic food, etc. It stood for efficiency in government, and to make it responsive to the rapidly broadening middle class. Its democracy was therefore distinctly selective. Only some of its decadent targets were successfully countermanded. Progressivism spun off progressive conservation, which also was about efficiency, this time of the use of land. It was a compromise that worked in

theory but not very well in practice.

Isolationism formed a sort of medieval wall around the country: it did not have to repel invaders, because there were none of consequence, but it did ensure an ideology unblemished by external political systems, while exporting to those locations the products of its vast industrial base. Two world wars, which opened the gates in the wall while being disastrous in terms of human life, were admirable in terms of the economy. Except for the case of southeast Asia, internationalism improved the US' world status. Becoming an industrial power however was not good for the environment as it made greater demands on its resources. Nevertheless, it *was* the time when many of the most important environmental bills were enacted.

For a country personifying the market economy, any idea of intervention in its affairs was heretical. And yet Wilson and both Roosevelts practised this, with some success - some of the market economy's larger imperfections, like the power of the trusts and the dissolute banking system, were checked. Organised labour also determined a degree of bottom-up decision-making. The disinterest in the state of the nation and concentration on the stock market and the rise and fall of companies led Franklin Roosevelt to upset all established federal practice. He can be seen, perhaps unconsciously, as using any concept - corporatism, intervention, internationalism - that would serve his ends of minimising the suffering of the Depression. But some things mis-fired. TVA, the wonder agency of the Thirties, can be seen in retrospect to have removed more land through lakes behind dams than was gained through the absence of flooding. The policies served rich farmers rather than the poorer ones. No blacks were employed. Big industry moved in to take advantage of cheap electricity. In the west, BUREC dammed other rivers and set out to irrigate the deserts at formidable cost to the taxpayer, and at minimal cost to the cultivator. And yet ... Roosevelt carried out some of the most important preservationist actions.

In the 1960s the federal government again became greatly involved in the affairs of one or two of its agencies, trying to rationalise recreational provision whose control was scattered; these actions became necessary because of the growth of affluence and car ownership, and because those involved in wars oversea had tasted the fascinations

of travel. Public benefit was the goal; internal strife was one of its costs. If the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation was not successful, perhaps any combining of agencies or their parts might not be either, though the National Park Service did grow from repeated snatches of Forest Service land.

The most abrupt change in the time period of this thesis was perhaps between the Carter and Reagan administrations. Carter was enthusiastic about adding very large areas to those protected by several agencies. Yet, when he tried to control the federal exploiters, like the Corps of Engineers and BUREC, he had little success. Reagan had scant interest in protection of the heritage, and followed two decades of consensus in favour of environmental protection with his antienvironmentalism. In freeing up the economy and selling mineral leases on federal lands he did not understand the potential strength of the environmental movement, once mobilised. Reagan's Interior Secretary James Watt found himself checked in his policy of selling off federal land.

Another form of land exploitation came from the federal government's lack of control over development. While states, counties and the larger cities have all progressed an interest in land use zoning, there is often little control over development. The 'presumption in favour' of development in Britain is a concept carried much further in the United States. While it might be asked what harm this does, in a country as large as the US, the form it takes is significant. For example, few people paused to question the opening up of Florida and of the Southwest sunbelt's impact upon fragile environments, their demands for water and other services, and the dereliction often left behind in the first generation industrial cities of the northeast. The federal government has much responsibility for such effects: for example, the growth in expenditure on military bases was one impetus. And the more general trend in the growth of leisure and recreation industries, while not attributable directly to the federal government, nevertheless rode on the back of certain inviolable freedoms. There have also been long-term trends associated with the decline of traditional industries fostered by Roosevelt's opening up of the West, and the creation of cheap infrastructure like roads, water and electricity. If the federal government does not have control of development, it can exploit an area's resources to enable development to take place.

One other difference between Carter and Reagan: during the Carter period the Congress became increasingly powerful, initiating its own policies, correctly assuming Carter would sign their bills. He was poor at managing the Congress, and at controlling his own executive departments. Reagan put the Executive back on top; he expected Congressional support and was prepared to undermine a representative's constituency if it were withheld.

Politics and the Environment

President George Bush is a self-proclaimed environmentalist. Some of his public statements seem to be at odds with this, but a senior Park Service officer advised me to try to determine whether it was Bush or his chief of staff John Sununu talking. An example is Bush's statement on 17.4.90 that the evidence for global warming was still uncertain; immediate responses which could put the overall economy at risk should be rejected. 'What we need are facts, the stuff that science is made of' he told an unconvinced audience of experts and officials from 17 countries. 'Environmental policies that ignore the economic factor - the human factor - are destined to fail' (reported by Walker 1990). Using the meaning applied to this thesis, Bush appears to be the arch-conservationist rather than environmentalist, for Walker also notes that Bush presented his policy 'as being in the sensible middle between the extremist on both sides.' A New York Times poll had shown 68% of respondents believed Bush's environmental statements to be rhetoric.

When Bush took office in 1989 he appointed a new Secretary of the Interior (Manuel Lujan) and Assistant Secretary Fish & Wildlife and Parks (Constance Harriman), as would be expected, but also both a new Director of the National Park Service *and* a new Deputy Director, which is unusual. The well-respected Director Mott was replaced by James Ridenour, who came from a state park service, and the highly regarded Deputy Director Dennis Galvin was replaced by Herbert Cables, ex-North Atlantic Regional Director of the National Park Service, and one-time Superintendent of Gateway National Recreation Area in New York City (USDI 1986).

While these moves suggest a shift toward recreation as the driving force of the Service, discussion (25.3.90) with a high-ranking official of the Service provided a different view. Rather than a change in

direction, there was no direction, he said (this view was echoed by another distinguished official of the Park Service in a further telephone discussion [30.4.90]). Appeals were made at Secretary level to ex-Director George Hartzog, asking 'What should I do?' Hartzog then apparently advised from the depth of his experience, but nothing resulted from this. There has also been rearrangement at the top of the Department of the Interior. The second-ranking Under Secretary is now effectively number three, while an Assistant Secretary Project Management and Administration is effectively the Secretary's deputy.

The first informant added that, apart from the Bush administration's intent to form a Department (name not yet determined) from the Environmental Protection Agency, little was happening of significance for heritage land protection (one hopes the administration is learning from Chesterton: 'All conservation is based upon the idea that if you leave things alone you leave them as they are. But you do not. If you leave a thing alone you leave it to a torrent of change' [quoted in Chase 1986]). The new Department would take the lead in environmental issues away from the Park Service, but was unlikely to swallow it. In these circumstances the Park Service would literally become just that, when 'Park' includes recreational and historic area protection missions.

This 'non-event' situation is to be expected for it accords with my thesis that preservation of heritage land only becomes meaningful when such land is prone to exploitation - from the private or public sectors. It is also to be expected politically. Bush's position firmly on the Right requires him to protect business interests, and to concern himself with damage limitation. To ensure this state of affairs continues, there must be a bland and unruffled image, with no controversy. Bush's past careers in the oil industry and as a Director of the CIA not only left him with a reputation for administrative skill, it allowed him to achieve things surreptitiously, while maintaining an apparent equilibrium. A third explanation of inactivity, particularly as the Park Service is concerned, is that action has been diverted to global environmental problems.

As a result, we should expect nothing dramatic to happen, but of course it does and will do. The Valdez oil spill was a case in point: a random, unexpected, incident to which business was quite vulnerable. Bush's appearance of masterly inactivity can shield some disasters, but

not all. The rundown of the communist world and concomitant reductions in arms expenditure may also be seen as unfortunate both for business and for policy toward the voluntary sector. As the Watt era fades into history, so the voluntary sector *could* lose unity if it had no disasters to respond to. This state of affairs is not useful for those wishing to extend protection to other federal heritage lands - for this to occur, something has to happen and be translated into a political momentum.

The New Capitalism has taken some disasters in its stride. The problem of ozone layer depletion provided an opportunity for the oil industry to show how it is 'protecting' the environment by misleading or false statements that divert attention elsewhere. The power play carries on in takeovers, but the consumer remains sovereign - that is where the emotional response takes place.

2 Federal Government and Land Policy

The ownership of land is a source of power for a federal government which was established by the original 13 states, but within which it owned little land. Accessions, purchases, appropriations ... later corrected this deficit and, from about 1850 onwards, it has maintained about one third of all the nation's land in its control. Much of the federally-owned land is in Alaska or the West and not, apart from California, much connected with where the people lived. Yet, the western lands were arid, a major reason why the land has stayed in federal ownership.

However, a federal government concerned with promoting both the ideology of individualism and with nation building decided it should make much of this land available to settlers. In the mid-nineteenth century the Homestead Act, and its later successors, enabled a settler to obtain increasingly large areas of the public domain provided it was worked for a minimum of five years. Having removed the indigenous 'Indian' population to make the policy work, the government settled back to wait for a myriad yeoman farmers to make the west flourish. As it happened the great majority of immigrants found work in the cities and were reluctant to move out into the unknown. Those who did, soon found they could profit from their land and sold it to speculators after the statutory five years. So, a concentration of land ownership,

and hence of power, took place. The irony was that while the entrepreneurial class bought up the land, federal intervention was necessary to make the policy work. So, federal schemes of water management, the provision of cheap timber and hydropower to the consumer, followed.

There have been continuing federal manipulations of the land. At the beginning of the twentieth century vast areas were transferred by Presidential decree to the newly created Forest Service. Over the next eighty years the Park Service has benefitted from transfers of forest land into its management.

3 The Commons: the People's Use of Federal Land

For a long time the public domain was regarded as a sort of free and exploitable commons, there for the use of frontiersmen, and their followers. During the nineteenth century the public domain gradually became better controlled, often by the Army for want of other paid representatives of the federal government, pending the proper introduction of localised legal systems. Over the years the concept of 'the commons' has been reinforced: it was attractive to those settlers from Europe whose commons rights were being diminished or extinguished, a continuous process of attrition in Britain over the last 2-300 years. The stark difference between the US and the British commons is that the former's owner and lord is the State, not the nobility, or the squirearchy who often usurped the people's rights.

The public domain contained two particular resources of interest during the nineteenth century - timber for housebuilding, and vast meadows for grazing cattle. These were always in demand from those who had chosen to settle in such areas, which were largely in the sparsely populated West. Enlargement of the commons in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries then followed two routes. First, land was set aside for public enjoyment, and several public agencies were involved in its management apart from the National Park Service. Second, the Army Corps of Engineers, the Bureau of Reclamation and, later, the Tennessee Valley Authority and Soil Reclamation Service, set out to control the nation's rivers. Because the vast construction costs were not amortized through charges, the outcome was cheap electricity and water, often in areas otherwise uninhabitable.

The second half of the twentieth century showed the commons being brought to the cities, when the urban national recreation areas were established, managed by the National Park Service. In several cases these were *additions* to the commons, involving the purchase by the federal government of private land. The final utilization of the commons, at least to the mid-1980s, took the form of James Watt's selling off of a large number of mineral leases on the public domain, both over land and out on the continental shelf, an area previously unnoticed as US public territory.

Initially the beneficiaries of the public domain were a comparatively small proportion of the population. As noted above, the majority lived in urban areas and their benefit was a modest spin off from rural industries. Then the beneficiaries of the commons gradually extended, quite the opposite of the process in Europe, until today perhaps the majority of the population can enjoy them in some form or another. The *degree* to which the average citizen enjoys them does, however, vary widely from the day tripper to Golden Gate NRA to the leaseholder on a large area of land when the next oil crisis occurs.

There have been many extremist clamours for the final disposal of the public domain to private hands, a notable occasion being the Taylor Grazing Act of 1934 whose preamble says 'Pending final disposal of the public domain ...' This has never been fully understood, but the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 clarified matters to the extent that it appears to make permanent the great majority of what is left of the public domain. One hopes there will be no US *Tragedy of the Commons*, though it is of great interest that it *has* been preserved for grazing, timber, recreation and relaxation.

4 The Rôle of the Army

The US Army has been vital to the formation of the State at least since the War of Independence. It had two functions of interest to us: a protective function, carried out by the Cavalry, and an engineering function, exemplified by the 1802 establishment of the Corps of Engineers, whose rôle was similar to that of the British Army in India - it was used to construct dams, divert watercourses, irrigate land, and carry out other engineering works. Particularly since the boost it had received in the Civil War, the Cavalry helped quell the native

population during westward expansion, helped safeguard the frontier, and generally enabled the land to be exploited by the new settlers; later it was to be involved with protecting the public domain, in particular the emergent National Parks in the late 1800s and early 1900s. Historians praise the Army's protection of Yellowstone NP in particular, for they left natural predators to behave naturally rather than, in later times, extinguishing them so as to protect the 'Bambi culture' which was so appealing to many visitors.

Under the Roosevelts' ideology of nation building, there was a progressive belief in engineering: it could achieve the major objectives of government while showing the world its technical skills. The Corps of Engineers was therefore thought of as a 'good thing', an attitude which scarcely changed until the 1980s. Disenchantment with the Corps grew very gradually over a period of 40-50 years.

Thus, there were times when the Corps seemed to be becoming too powerful, and doing things that had ceased to be wanted, except by small minorities for their personal gain. Their engineering works also adversely affected the environment. The Corps of Engineers therefore became a target for Carter when he took office, pledged both to reduce federal spending, and entrenched power within the executive's departments. It was an advantageous time to try this, for the Army had effectively been defeated in southeast Asia. However, it was more resilient than Carter had realised and, perhaps more importantly, it was active in many of the constituencies of Representatives in the Congress.

As the power of the military developed, particularly during the second world war and the cold war which followed, it became part of the military-industrial complex that Wright-Mills termed *The Power Elite* - a form of corporatism which combined the talents of the military, industrialists and the Congress. Similarly, the business and academic worlds had to combine to satisfy the nation's needs for research, development and implementation of new weaponry. While this was happening, an occasion many citizens feared, the Corps of Engineers continued to carry out what in other countries would have been the domain of civilian authorities or the private sector. This continuity through nearly 200 years has frequently meant major disruption of environments with a none-too-clear list of benefits. But the Corps has

been able to show its massive contribution to active recreation, its readiness to respond to the requirements of the Environmental Policy Act, and its ability to bend with winds of change. In 1990 it is undoing much of the damage it has perpetrated over the last 50 years or so in Southern Florida. This reaction should enable natural water flows once again to supply Everglades according to the whims of nature rather than of man: for variations in supply meant variations in bird, alligator and other populations - an ecosystem of great complexity.

The issue of the rôle of the military has recurred in 1989-1990, for Bush inherited from Reagan commitments to enormous military expenditure. A massive budget deficit could not be solved, because of ideology, through tax increases, so money had to be borrowed abroad. This led to the Japanese, and the British to a lesser extent, buying up land and buildings like the Rockefeller Center in New York City. In early 1990 there have been moves to reduce defense expenditure: in its turn this entails problems with the Army, industry and defense-funded universities. One positive consequence is the 'peace dividend' which allows expenditure in previously-neglected areas like education and the environment. The Corps' domestic responsibilities, specially if the green Floridan experience spread to the rest of the US, seem already to be benefitting from this, and suggest this sector of the Army's future is assured.

The Evolution of Environmental Protection

5 *Emergence and Development of Environmental Protection Movements*

My first chapter attempted to explain the reasons for heritage land protection versus commercial and federal exploitation. A sequence of particularistic changes was apparent. First was the concept of *frontier*, which officially stopped moving westwards late in the nineteenth century; land then became finite rather than seemingly infinite, and competition for it increased, not least for the preservation of its finest scenery. Second, high landscape quality became a *surrogate* for the high culture that had been left behind in Europe. Third, there were increasing demands for *general enjoyment* of high quality land, in contrast to land of this type enjoyed by the few in Europe. Finally there was the concept of the *interdependence* of apparent opposites, discussed in section 8 below.

Chapter 2 traced the origins of environmentalism in the United States, while subsequent chapters showed how it developed over the years, with particularly significant advances taking place during the first 16 years of the twentieth century, in the 1960s and early 1970s, and in the late 1980s. In the last period there was a fundamental shift from a particularistic to a holistic perspective, with an emphasis on the concept of impacts affecting the world, rather than countries, or areas within them.

Not unnaturally the above themes have recurred in many parts of the earlier chapters. Once the concept of heritage had been defined it soon became clear that it had been almost continually under threat. Population, economic and military expansions had all made their demands on the land; in 1990 we can see that global warming could reduce the supply of land worldwide as the oceans inundate it, and this will put further pressure on the heritage lands. Cross-frontier pollution, and the effects of acid rain are considered the motivators of change by the media, environmentalists, and a high proportion of the population at large - but not, it seems, by all politicians. A policy toward reducing the use of motor vehicles is a significant way of reducing carbon dioxide emissions, but the Japanese and US governments (abetted by Britain) have emasculated the recommendations of a report of the UN Inter-governmental Panel on Climatic Change (Lean 1990).

Preservation of high quality scenery was closely associated with the process of nation formation. Moves to protect it followed the commercial exploitation of Niagara and Yosemite Valley, then followed the early national parks and the innovatory action of New York State toward protection of the Adirondacks through extensive public participation - as early as the 1890s.

During Franklin Roosevelt's administrations environment was one moment protected, at the next exploited. The Tennessee Valley Authority, the Bureau of Reclamation, the Corps of Engineers were all very active in calming unpredictable rivers: the outcome helped with controlled irrigation, the rivers sometimes became navigable, they generated 'cheap' electricity and they provided for watersports. These control policies also led to the flooding of vast areas of productive land, and questionably irrigated deserts.

In the 1960s we saw the great upsurge in environmentalism, and a vast outpouring of environmental legislation. In 1961, Cape Cod National Seashore was created: this was the first example of 'greenlining' involving the National Park Service; the concept, somewhat reliant on British practice, allows federal land purchases interspersed with private land holdings, some of the latter having management agreements that permit public access. Greenlining will have importance in the future, for many areas that deserve National Park System status are now outside the public domain. Similarly wide-ranging were the Wilderness Act, requiring all land managing federal agencies to declare areas of wilderness, and the Land & Water Conservation Fund Act, which theoretically opened a new bank account, with large sums of money, for the land-protective agencies and the states. Unfortunately, the moneys available have never fully gone to their proper destinations, and a high proportion went to the Treasury for other purposes. The legislation which culminated the 1960s was the National Environment Policy Act: for the first time it required federal agency developers to justify their exploitative actions. A mass of court cases followed, making these agencies much more cautious in proposing anything environmentally questionable.

A large expenditure of human energy has provided the United States with a superb system of heritage land protection. However, it is not particularly remarkable when compared with other countries of the world, and few of its elements are unique in world terms. Its management is also fragmented, and attempts to follow different missions - some verging toward preservation, others going for multiple use, a concept of dubious success when one views the exploitative actions of loggers making a hillside barren.

6 *Incrementalism and Critical Mass*

A few national parks were declared from 1864 onwards, but an occasion of almost equal importance occurred when the 1891 General Provision Act gave the President full powers to establish national forests from the federal lands. In 1905 all these forests were transferred from the Interior Department to a new Forest Service. At any point in time much of these lands are pure forest, unaffected by logging, and their area has always been much greater than that of the Park Service. But all the areas designated for particular functions which were taken out of

the public lands had some protective rôle, and all have continued to increase in size - at least until the end of the 1970s. From 1934 onwards it has tended to be the National Park Service which has shown the most dramatic growth - transfer of historical military sites, the Burton Bills, the Alaskan lands.

Some of these occasions have been likened in earlier chapters to the achievement of a critical mass, which caused some significant response. Examples are the gradual build up of national parks, and of public - particularly voluntary sector - demands for action, which culminated in the National Park Service Act in 1916. Presidential accessions to the national forest stock, and Interior's General Land Office's incompetent administration of them, led to the formation of the Forest Service. Many 'bottom-up' initiatives before and during the first world war led to greater participation in the political process. An outpouring of literature, within a 'flower-power' ethos, contributed to much environmental legislation in the 1960s. Threats of a loss of public control over the last remaining arctic wildernesses led to nomination of 300 million acres for protection by various federal agencies.

But the 1980s were not a time of meaningful system-wide expansion, partly because Director Dickenson of the National Park Service advised against it, partly because it was ideologically untenable, partly because the voluntary sector were not pressuring for expansion (though they did so later in the 1980s). In the period 1985-1989 nearly one million acres were added to the Park System (+1.3%). 26% of this amount went to Southern Florida: Big Cypress National Preserve, which protects Everglades National Park's water supply from the north, was enlarged from 570 000 to 716 000 acres, while Everglades NP itself was enlarged from 1 398 939 to 1 506 588 acres.

Undeniably the US government has been responsive to demands for action, when the pressure has become too great to be brushed aside. The holistic, world view of environmental problems has built up slowly to reach its own critical mass - and it derives from the population at large, complementing minorities in environmental organisations. Internally, the Park Service is underresourced, as explained below, and for the moment may be less significant as an environmental guardian. The irony is that presidential rhetoric coupled with inaction may be compared with great activity individually and locally. Internal pressures

combine with international concerns and obligations. Emergency action to resuscitate the Everglades occurs because it is seen to be an international issue.

7 *Underresourcing and Constituencies*

Lack of resources for protection of the heritage lands has been a problem from the outset, though it has affected the Park Service worse than the multiple-use agencies, for the latter generate funds within themselves and have some discretion about their deployment.

It was explained in Chapter 1 that 'natural resources and the environment' received just 1% of the 1986 federal budget; NPS received an estimated 14% of the total Interior Department budget in 1988 with $787m; the Forest Service received $1628m and the Corps of Engineers $3084m, though of course these agencies' functions are different. From 1983 to 1988 the conservation agencies' budgets were cut (NPS -27%) while the Forest Service gained 48%.

A substantial proportion of available Land & Water Conservation Fund moneys was withheld from the federal agencies and states; recently the states have received very little. The Congress have reduced available amounts, while the Executive, not only during the Reagan administrations, has attempted to stop the Fund's use altogether.

Carter's Alaskan expansion of the National Park Service was actually accompanied by a Congressional budget reduction, so existing resources had to be spread more thinly. And private funding has lain largely untapped. John Rockefeller made major purchases of land to make possible Acadia, Grand Tetons and Great Smoky Mountains National Parks. However, his relative, Lawrance Rockefeller, while willing to assist the Park Service, was perhaps snubbed because he chaired the Outdoor Recreation Resources Review Commission, whose actions were thought to be inimical to the Park Service. Closer to the end of the twentieth century, the NPS' new Director explicitly wants his staff to pursue private sources of revenue, and sees some room for manoeuvre in park fees - maintaining low entrance fees, but charging for special facilities within a park (Ridenour 1989).

Figure 8-1 : Funding to the Smithsonian Institution, 1965 to 1987



While both are curators of the nation's heritage, there is a great difference between NPS and the Smithsonian Institution, which has accepted federal and private money since its foundation. Figure 8-1 plots the Smithsonian's funding 1965 to 1987. It shows that by 1987 the federal appropriations and trust funds contributed almost identical amounts; these, together with a small amount for government grants and contracts, made up the total budget of $400m for that year. Given this form of budgetting it supplies an admirable public service, with free entry to its museums, and carries out an extensive research programme.

To what extent are these budget shortages attributable to inadequate constituencies? There appears to be a strong connexion. The multiple-use agencies (Forest Service, Corps of Engineers, Bureau of Reclamation, Bureau of Land Management, Fish & Wildlife Service, Tennessee Valley Authority) each provide subsidised products and services that are highly attractive to consumer and electorate, often the same thing. They therefore have ready-made local constituencies who will influence their congresspersons. Representative Burton was the only one who showed how this could also (largely) benefit the National Park Service with his park-barrel acts, even though they occurred at the time of federal budget cuts.

8 *Symbiosis*

The very foundations of the United States political system established the concepts of complementarity and interdependence: separation of powers. This was applied to the three Branches of federal government - Executive, Legislature and Judiciary. It operates, perhaps less deliberately (though it was the intention that the National Park Service should compete with the Forest Service on establishment in 1916), in the different Departments of the Executive, and within those Departments. It operates between the federal government and the powers of the 50 states. Each of these is expected to work with all others, despite frequent differences in objective, enabling legislation, funding, calibre of staff and so on. Almost without realising it, they have to work *symbiotically.*

Why was this term used? Chapter 1 suggested two interacting continuums - inaction-conservation-preservation, and inaction-conservation-exploitation. The interaction was then shown to be symbiotic.

Exploring the concept of conservation a little more, one aspect is to do with recycling land so that, theoretically, it can be bountiful and/or beautiful at one moment in time, be cropped or enjoyed the next, with full expectancy that it will have returned to its original condition after an unspecified further period of time. This terminological distinction between 'preservation' and 'conservation' *and* between exploitation and conservation, is not often made in either the legislation or the literature, though I believe it to be important. While not said in so many words, 'preservation' seems to be the intent of the phrase in the National Park Service Act which requires conservation of scenery, historic objects and wildlife, provision for their enjoyment, while leaving them unimpaired for future generations. It certainly seems likely that the phrase drafter, Frederick Law Olmsted Jnr, was firmly committed to preservation. It is interesting to reflect on the use of words: 'unimpaired' today means not reduced or weakened in strength; 'enjoy' at the time probably meant passive recreation in the sense of nineteenth century biologists and explorers who went to see, but not be seen - it was unobtrusive 'enjoyment'.

In chapter 1 it was made clear that if there were no exploitation of the land, then the very concept of preservation could not exist; similarly, if there were total exploitation, preservation would not exist. Opposites need each other. Use of the concept of symbiosis has spread through much of the thesis. It has also helped to cohere seemingly disparate activities. Thus, as recreation progresses unchecked from passive to active, so it tends to become more land-consumptive, and the contemplative areas more preserved to compensate for this. Examples of exploitative recreation are all off-road vehicles - snowmobiles, dune buggies for example - the regular motorcycle rallies across the Arizonan desert (a frail ecosystem in which most wildlife is immediately under the surface, away from the heat, but likely to be crushed by the bikes), campers parked at the water's edge of national recreation area impounded waters, hunting, skiing, overflying. There is some correlation between the most visited lands - the Corps of Engineers with 205 visitor-hours/acre, TVA with 79 and BUREC with 67 - and man-made water-based recreation. NPS with 17 visitor-hours/acre and the Forest Service with 14, are in general more contemplative.

The terms of the National Park Service Act have been quoted often in this thesis and indeed in this chapter. They are of interest because

they suggest an empathy with my interdependence argument. Instead of there being conflict between the dual goals of preservation and opening up for the people's enjoyment, it appears as if the relationship between these two poles has in fact been an important factor in saving the Park Service from an exploitative end.

Another symbiotic example is the Defense lands, particularly in the west and southwest. The parts not used by the military, and they are often very large indeed, effectively are among the largest wildernesses in the United States, for they are substantially untouched by humans. Nuclear testing sites show this in particular, as do missile testing sites, for they have to have large safety buffers around them. But Cape Canaveral's NASA site is immediately next to a Fish & Wildlife reserve, which teems with fish, reptiles and birdlife.

I have also shown, particularly in chapter 4, that preservational acts have tended to be closely associated with times of war or internal economic stress. This phenomenon has been identified with the Civil War, with the first world war, with the Wall Street Crash, the Depression, the Vietnam War, and the period when the nation felt Carter would not get a second term. Periods have also been identified when the nation was supine, or was not exploiting the land too severely, or when private sector exploitation was superseded in immediate significance by federal exploitation dressed up as an economic benefit. At such times the preservationist response was at its lowest.

Some Views on Environmental Futures

What Are the Major Environmental Issues?

Two issues which have become increasingly important concern wildlife and the biosphere. The UN Environment Programme (1987,32-33) report elaborates. Of significance to protected natural areas everywhere are:

* the world-wide deterioration of natural environments, especially severe in the tropics, causing the extinction of species at an unprecendented rate
* few species with potential economic importance have been utilised. Of the 7 000 plants that have been used as food, 20 supply 90% of the world's food

* destruction of natural environments is reducing the number of species and the amount of genetic variation within individual species
* two approaches to protecting and managing wildlife are the species and ecosystem approaches. The first protects and manages a population of a given species to ensure its abundance and survival. The second manages and conserves a natural community, all the species within that community. To date this has happened largely to species with a known economic value
* methods of protection include legislation, habitat protection, wildlife management, artificial maintenance of individuals in zoos, botanic gardens etc
* protected areas offer the best defence against wildlife loss
* the biosphere reserve consists of a core area with strict protection, and other zones where people live and work, usually in farming and forestry. In 1985 there were 243 reserves, of 121 million ha, in 65 countries. They are an important element in UNESCO's Man and the Biosphere (MAB) Programme (Gregg [1987] describes the Programme as seen from within the National Park Service, a whole issue of Parks [1985] discusses MAB worldwide, and Runte [1987,185] provides the perspective of an historian).

Part of the biosphere concept is that protected areas should be large enough for the species within them, and that concept suggests the addition of 'buffer lands' to the main protected area. There is new thinking about how to achieve such buffers. It concerns debt redemption, and stems from moves at government and voluntary sector levels to 'buy' debt in countries like Brazil in exchange for easements on sectors of their tropical rain forest: in other words, they must remain fundamentally as they are. They are neither cut down nor burned (see Bramble 1988). Much of United States farmland has been developed with federal loans; if there is, say, continued drought over several years or commodity prices fall too low, a farmer will find the debt cannot be repaid. Discussions in Washington led me to believe that where such private land adjoins federal land which needs to be 'buffered' there seems to be a case for the federal government to redeem the debt on condition the farmer retains his/her land for agricultural purposes, and does not develop it in other ways. Furthermore, s/he would be required to respect wild animals using the land as a migratory route, or wintering area, and not to pollute watercourses or groundwater. An incidental

benefit would be that such farms became models of new forms of environmental protection. This action would be beneficial where private land is involved. Where it is part of the public domain, then federal policies should be changed, as necessary, to permit federal land agencies to provide a buffer.

Those were issues facing biospheres - areas large enough to contain the grazing, hunting and migratory routes of the animals inhabiting them. Further problems have arisen within the recent past, at a higher, global level. These have been mentioned frequently in the text: global warming through the 'greenhouse effect' and disruption of the upper atmospheric ozone layer and intensification of the lower ozone layer; extensive removal of forests which acted as absorbent 'sinks' for the carbon dioxide contributing to the greenhouse effect; and acid deposition which damages trees and other plants, and doubtless human beings. These effects have been extensively documented elsewhere; Byrne (1989) has provided a useful commentary for his colleagues on the NPS' 21st Century Task Force.

Environmentalists' Different Views of the Future

Toward the end of the twentieth century environmentalists still adopt different positions, varying from those who try to reach a near-virgin state of preservation, to a more general world-wide awareness of the major threats facing the planet. There is also a large and influential movement toward conservation, or sustainability as it is called by some. I have expressed doubt about this elsewhere in this thesis, for it predicates two perhaps dubious concepts: first, that the need for economic growth is given, and second that natural resources are renewable without human intervention, for example with chemicals. The high priests of the latter ideas have been those who drafted the World Conservation Strategy, the ex-Norwegian Prime Minister Gro Harlem Bruntland's World Commission on Environment and Development, Pearce et al (1989) and, as an example, Elkington and Burke (1987). Pearce attracted attention as adviser to the British government, and his book seems to have adapted, chameleon-like, to the political colours of his client. Bowers (1990) has produced a carefully considered environmental-economics response. Pearce (xiv) takes Bruntland as his starting point, from where she argues for sustainable development - future generations should be left a wealth inheritance comprising a stock of

knowledge and understanding, a stock of technology, a stock of man-made capital and a stock of environmental assets. Pearce then notes that environment and the economy necessarily interact, showing how economic systems impact the environment, while not even considering how a less-exploited environment could benefit a different kind of economy, most notably in terms of lower levels of consumption among the rich nations of the world. On p4, Pearce notes a two-way interaction while talking about a one-way one: 'climate warming and sea-level rise will affect the performance of economies.' What is not noted is that these dilemmas were *caused* by the 'performance of economies.' Bowers, of Leeds University's School of Economic Studies, has a preface which says:

> '... for at least 25 years (there has been) a serious mismatch between the pictures of the world presented by ecological science and by the mainstream of economic theory. What appeared to make economic sense made ecological nonsense ... During this period, too, there have been new advances in economic thinking, seeking to find economic justification for sustainable patterns of development.'

Bowers' own contribution uses clear economics language. His first criticism of Pearce is about the latter's contention that non-sustainable policies result from market failure: appropriate solutions are, therefore, market-based. This demands a perfect knowledge which does not exist, particularly about environmental issues. Second, distributional effects are underplayed. Bowers maintains that the costs of correction must fall most heavily on the rich - the first world nations and the higher income groups within them - though this cannot be achieved by the market. Then, there has to be population control, not mentioned by Pearce. The final point we need to understand is that intervention in the market has to be done carefully - Bowers shows that environmental problems arose from interventionist agricultural policies in Britain. One other comment on sustainability might be quoted: the Council for the Protection of Rural England 'accused the British government of embracing the fashionable concept of sustainable development in order to cloak policies which supported growth at the expense of the environment' (Erlichman 1990).

While the last three paragraphs have dwelt on problems discussed outside the United States, their treatment will not surprise US experts.

The voluntary sector has been active at times of environmental stress, and more quiescent at other times. In the last decade, since the Park Service's State of the Parks in 1980, there has been much to rouse them. The National Parks & Conservation Association produced in 1988 a major combat document, of nine volumes, discussing most aspects of future national park policy. The Conservation Foundation produced an epic State of the Environment in 1987. NPCA were advocating independent status for the Park Service, a theme pursued by the National Recreation and Parks Association, ex-Director of the Park Service George Hartzog, ex Deputy Director Galvin, and Chase (1987,44) among others. The likelihood of this happening does not appear too great, for the Park Service is considered the jewel in the Interior Secretary's crown, even if it is kept unpolished: furthermore, is independence simply a natural refuge for those under pressure? Adding other heritage areas to the Park Service to produce a national heritage protection system, while very attractive, demands that other agencies give up parts of their empires, and we have seen (Forest Service under Pinchot, Carter's attempts to control the Corps of Engineers and BUREC, for example) that officers fiercely protect 'their' land as if it were in their personal ownership.

An important article by Caldwell (1989) makes the ultimate demand for an amendment to the Constitution to make environmental protection a right of the people: his proposal was countered by several sceptical experts who believed that the days of Constitutional amendments had gone - it was now just too difficult to obtain a majority for such a change. Nevertheless they agreed with the need for stronger protective powers against environmental exploitation. It is worth remembering that an attempt to make an Equal Rights amendment failed recently. But Caldwell's case is strong: as one of the original drafters of the National Environmental Policy Act he notes that 'experience with NEPA appears to confirm the proposition that a statute lacking an explicit constitutional referent is more easily neglected than one with a specifically identifiable constitutional basis.'

Because some groups are dissatisfied with the progress toward a much larger area of environmentally-protected heritage land in the United States, direct action is emerging as a meaningful force. Abbey (1975) recorded some of its early manifestations, while Halaska (1990) brings the story up to date. Enraged at the removal of forest trees in many

locations, some environmentalists first inserted heavy nails which mutilated sawblades (and sometimes their operators). Detection equipment foiled this for a while: now ceramic nails are used which cannot be detected with that equipment. These and similar tactics first attracted the term 'monkey-wrenching'. More recently a word akin to sabotage, 'ecotage', has been coined. Halasa notes that such action is not evident in Britain where negotiation is preferred.

The National Park Service will conclude its own three-year investigation of its future in 1990, shortly after completion of this thesis. Its preliminary findings are more positive than might have been imagined, given the political context; they are broadly congruent with current world environmental problems. The Chairman of the 21st Century Steering Committee (Regional Director, SE Region of the National Park Service) asked each member to provide eight recommendations. The first six from one of the responses are quoted below, to suggest the kind of outcome that might be expected:

> '1 Redirect existing priorities to respond to the Global Preservation Environmental Imperative ... give parks a real rôle to play in directing society's goals away from: militarization, political polarization, economic exploitation, consumptive use of resources and social deterioration ... and toward: living in harmony with nature, and social/family/environmental life enhancement.
>
> 2 Recognize and manage park lands as reservoirs of biological diversity.
>
> 3 Reorganise staff structures so specialists are used for resource management and interpretation.
>
> 4 Actively participate in the nation's education initiative by infusing environmental and social parameters to the education program. Parks - federal, state and local - should play a leading rôle in the education of America.
>
> 5 Stress how various ethnic and cultural backgrounds of our citizens contribute to ... environmental, social and economic growth.
>
> 6 Promote park development programs and demonstration projects showing how modern man can live in environmental harmony with the natural world. Show how economic exploitation and non-sustainable consumptive use of resources is not

necessary to provide a rewarding life for people ... parks can show how economic exploitation is not essential to human happiness.'

Further indications of the final report are contained in a draft report to those who responded to an invitation in the NPS house magazine, *The Courier*, as to how staff thought the agency should change. Six descriptors of the Park Service emerged. It should be: 'A *steward* that needs to greatly expand its knowledge of ecological systems as a basis for preserving resource values; a *leader* that should strongly assert its rôle as a global conservation advocate; an *educator* that needs to lead by example and actively promote an environmental ethic; a *partner* that needs to join forces with others in a united conservation effort; a *host* that needs to recognize the changing nature of park visitors; and an *organization* that needs to invest more in itself - its resources, programs, people and facilities - if it is to effectively meet the challenges of the 21st century.' It is very interesting to see how closely some of these relate to Sudia's (1987) attempt to produce a mission statement, in which scientific research, education and recreation were his three guiding principles.

A quite different view of the future was provided by Gale (1990) when discussing 'Virtual Reality'. Utilising the runaway expansion of electronics a great range of visual effects becomes possible by the year 2000. Among its many attractions (to some) will be the ability to call up natural environments into one's living room - Everglades or Yellowstone is not just visited while in one's armchair, a part of it actually surrounds you complete with smells and sounds. This is an 'advance' on the IMEX display of Grand Canyon, just outside the park boundary, and visited by many who do not progress to the real thing.

Conclusion: Is the Future Like Now?

This thesis has traced the history of protection of United States heritage land over 200 years. Two characteristics have motivated this exploration: continuity and change. In their turn these have had to relate to the bedrock of US democracy: the largely unaltered Constitution, whose environmental aspects devolve from other concepts rather than being explicit; the law-making system; the aspirations which accompanied all migrants to the US; and, perhaps the most important,

the doctrine of separation of powers.

This separation leads both to conflict and interdependence. The Congress may not like what the Executive wishes to do, yet one cannot progress without an agreement, probably a compromise, with the other. Conceptually, this safeguard against the corruption of power may have trickled down to other levels of society, for example the inbuilt 'conflict' of the National Park Service Act of 1916. While the United States may claim some uniqueness for its separation of powers and peculiarities of the NPS, the interdependence of opposites is experienced in other countries. I suggest for the United States it has been intrinsic to national policy concerning protection of its heritage land.

What might govern the future of US heritage land protection? One component is that since the major environmental legislation of the 1960s, environmentalists have increasingly gone to the Courts (the Judicial Branch) to resolve or interpret issues which were previously the domain of the Legislative or Executive Branches. They thus found a way of bypassing their elected representatives. Similarly, and more recently, they can look to international groupings of countries interested in protecting themselves from environmental deterioration. Thus the Netherlands' fight against air pollution is supported by West Germany and Scandinavian nations. If, as with the Thatcher and Bush administrations, local groups can make no progress, they can circumvent the administration and go to the international level to achieve some action. In this way, *nations* can be brought into line, too.

Issues surrounding heritage land until recently were confined to local, state and national levels; they now have a worldwide dimension. Because of the relationship of local level concerns with informed opinion on world environmental issues, a two-way interaction between local level and the global level is beginning to take shape. As an example, the issue of water supply in the world biosphere park, Everglades National Park, is critical to its survival. Because it is seen locally as an issue of world significance, Washington has been prodded into action. As noted above, the Park and Big Cypress National Preserve have been enlarged; second, the Corps of Engineers is undoing some of its past work, blocking canals that take water away from the Park, for example. The Park's problems have had much media attention, so it is acting as an exemplar of global environmental problems.

Perhaps it is also reminding us that ocean rises resulting from global warming could rapidly inundate the entire Everglades wetlands. A threat of this nature has increasingly been defined by the environmental movement as a political problem, which must be reacted against, and thus become part of the symbiotic system.

A future emerging from problems of this nature would therefore operate on both global and local levels. There would be a quantitative .rather than qualitative change to the continuing interdependence of preservation and exploitation: now, the exploitative issue is global, and Figure 1-12 suggests the preservational response will similarly be on a grand scale. Attempts will be made to counter the macro threats, while there will be continuing efforts, by most agencies and voluntary organisations, to prevent damage to the heritage lands. They corporately represent the preservationist views necessary to keep exploitation not simply in check, but as a partner in the continuation of heritage land protection. In fact, in the last decade of the twentieth century a new form of corporatism can be detected; unlike the Franklin Roosevelt model, this time it is predominantly bottom-up: it involves the environmental interests of federal government, voluntary sector groups and individuals, the Army, and some industry, working in concert. This is consolidating the heritage movement with new blood, and a new force. Such a tide in favour of environmentalism, dissenting from political inaction, begins to lay down a new policy direction, as with the Greens in Europe. Environmentalism in the United States has had a similar power, but without direct political representation by a party such as the Greens. Under this view, we can see a substantial part of the nation uniting to fight the combination of local and global environmental exploitation: effectively, a *critical mass* is being achieved which will force action.

If the above view has some validity, what form might it take? Reagan constricted the National Park Service and the environmental sectors of some other agencies, partly by underfunding, partly by not permitting them to be involved in the governmental decision-making process. Simultaneously, the Forest Service and Corps of Engineers, tending toward the exploitative pole, were given more money. The timber industry on the one hand, and Congressmen receiving pork barrel benefits on the other, were kept happy. These actions also made many people deeply pessimistic of the State as an instrument for protecting the

environment during Reagan's administrations. They therefore looked for a way out: typically it tended to be represented by the Smithsonian model which, it was conceived, would have provided independent status for one consolidated heritage protection agency.

And yet ... in 1990 such a concept has lost much of its relevance, not least because people's conceptualisations of solutions relate to the politics of the moment. The politics of 1990, necessarily influenced by global environmental issues, are beginning to enhance the National Park Service's status. Its own future projections, as with the 21st Century Task Force, are taking up these global issues, for the Service can see how they can help them locally to pursue their objectives. In their turn, the federal government will have to adopt a corporatist stance, looking back toward interventionist policies of pre-Reagan years; and they need to bury some political goals of half a century or more ago, which are still being pursued despite their irrelevance to to-day's problems.

Thus, it is probable that the defenders will continue their passionate involvement in environmental protection, and that the exploiters (locally, regionally, nationally and globally) will endeavour to maintain their position of public power and private profit - or indifference to the consequences of their actions. To use Constitution-type language, in this symbiotic act will the protection of United States heritage land be assured.

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