BRITISH AND AMERICAN RELATIONS WITH INDEPENDENT UKRAINE, 1917-1921 AND 1991-1994

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CONTENTS

ABSTRACT

Having emerged onto the stage of international relations ten years ago, independent Ukraine could not but affect them due to the magnitude of the transformation which it was undergoing since the breakup of the Soviet Empire. At the same time its relations with other states, particularly with the major powers, to a large extent influenced the course of its own nation-state formation. As this was the second attempt at state-building in Ukraine's history, the first one being a short-lived struggle for independence from Russia after the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, the thesis aims to provide a comparative analysis of the two periods in which Ukraine pursued its goal of national statehood. It focuses on how and to what extent the latter was affected by external factors, above all by the policies of the two key players in international relations, Great Britain and the United States of America.

Part 1 of the thesis examines the bilateral relations, political and diplomatic, between the two Western powers with Ukraine during the first period, namely from 1917 till 1921 when Ukraine was finally absorbed by Bolshevik Russia. Part 2 provides an account of these relations from the time Ukraine declared independence from the USSR in August 1991 until the end of 1994, a year in which the major stumbling-block to Ukraine's co-operation with the West, its possession of the nuclear arsenal inherited from the disintegrated Soviet Union, was removed and the two Western states in question alongside Russia signed a number of international agreements guaranteeing Ukraine's sovereignty. Finally, the comparative analysis of the two periods under consideration assesses the difference between the principles underlying relations of Great Britain and the United States with Ukraine at the end of World War 1 and in the early nineties and the ways these relations affected the process of nation-state formation in the Republic.

The research is based on original sources and data. Although some of the primary sources, mainly relating to the first period, had been published previously in collections of documents, many of them are introduced and analysed for the first time. While a great number of monographic studies and journal articles have been written on Ukraine, the sphere of its international relations has so far not been properly explored. The thesis thus contributes to the general study of Ukraine's foreign relations and for the first time closely examines the interconnectedness between its state-building performance and external factors.

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INTRODUCTION. THE NATION-STATE IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

Having emerged on the stage of international relations ten years ago, independent Ukraine could not but affect them due to the magnitude of the transformation which it was undergoing since the breakup of the Soviet Empire. The prolonged decline of Ukraine's economy accompanied by the arduous and contradictory process of its restructuring; fundamental changes in the political and state system; problems of national security fraught with profound international implications (above all, those connected with nuclear disarmament and the Black Sea fleet); the Chernobyl disaster which continued to pose a global environmental threat; and aspirations to be eventually integrated into Western economic and security structures, all meant that Ukraine could not be disregarded by the West. Furthermore, as over the years it proved sufficiently viable as an independent state, Ukraine progressed from being a mere subject of predominantly sceptical attention by the world's leading powers because of its potential to intensify regional and international instability to asserting itself as a recognised international actor with an increasingly vital role to play in the changing geopolitical realities.

In this context the study of independent Ukraine's place in international relations, in particular through the prism of its interactions with the key players both at present and from the historical perspective, can be beneficial in terms of identifying both the obstacles in the further development of its external connections and the conditions which facilitate productive bilateral and multilateral co-operation.

Although the history of Ukraine can be traced back to the tenth century (when the medieval state of Kievan Rus' had been formed) and the idea of creating a

sovereign Ukrainian state (as opposed to being a part of either Russia or Poland) had been first conceived over three hundred years ago, it was not until the end of the twentieth century that the Ukrainians finally attained independence. However, there was a brief period during the final stages of the World War 1 and the rise of Bolshevik rule in Russia when the first most serious attempt at securing national statehood had been made in Ukraine. Known as the Ukrainian national revolution of 1917-1921, it resulted in the formation of several successive national governments which directed a considerable part of their activities towards the expansion of Ukraine's contacts with the West. A fierce struggle against the Reds, the Whites and the Poles, all of whom claimed their rights to Ukrainian territory, required external support and since an anti-Bolshevik Ukraine was seen as a useful adjunct by the Entente and its war rivals alike such support was initially on offer from both parties. Thus Ukraine, perhaps for the first time in the modern history of international relations, entered the foreign-policy agendas of Western powers among which Great Britain was traditionally recognised as the 'patriarch' of the society of states and the United States of America was emerging as a new superpower.

Thus the chronological framework of the thesis is defined by the two periods in Ukraine's history when it endeavoured to lay the foundations of national statehood and therefore was able to conduct independent foreign policy: the time of the Ukrainian national revolution of 1917-1921 with its abortive attempt at independence and the dawn of the post-Soviet era of transition in 1991-1994 when the process of building a sovereign state delivered grounds for optimism. As the events of 1994 – above all the securing of long-awaited international guarantees of its sovereignty and territorial inviolability as well as Western economic assistance - signified a landmark in Ukraine's struggle for statehood, that year has been chosen as an end date of the second period examined in the thesis. The two periods, although approximately equal on a chronological scale, culminated in situations substantially different in weight not only for Ukraine but

for the international community as a whole. Consequently, a juxtaposition of their contents offers a logical conclusion to the above examination.

The thesis, therefore, is both historical and comparative. It is crucial to take into account the general changes that have occurred in international relations in the course of the 20th century. The collapse of the imperial system and the emergence of a large number of new sovereign states, the rapid technological progress resulting in the growth of global interdependence, the invention of nuclear arms, and the creation of security organisations at both regional and international levels all contributed to the formation of a significantly different international environment in which Ukraine undertook its second attempt at state-building and enormously affected the attitude of both the US and Great Britain towards this new player on the international arena.

On the other hand, there are important similarities between the two periods in question which also make a comparison of Ukraine's relations with Great Britain and the US in each respective period a valid and useful intellectual exercise. Thus certain parallels can be drawn between the circumstances in which Ukraine found itself at the beginning and at the end of the 20th century. Like the disintegration of the Russian Empire in 1917, the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991 resulted in the liberation of numerous nationalities which had been subjected to their autocratic rule for decades. Such fragmentation of a formerly powerful state in both cases encountered the resistance of the 'Great Russians' for whom Ukraine's separatist aspirations were a particularly distressing issue. Therefore Russia's reluctance to reconcile itself to this most substantial territorial loss inevitably jeopardised the chances of the Ukrainians of succeeding in their attempts at national state-building. The threat of Russian revanchism, either in the form of an open aggression or by means of economic and political pressure, impelled Ukrainian leaders to turn to Western democracies for support. This recurrent contradiction between the importance for Ukraine of maintaining traditional

deep-rooted ties with Russia and the desire to integrate as soon as possible into the Western structures as a means of securing national independence had a crucial impact on Ukraine's foreign policies in both periods.

Thus the thesis is intended to provide an insight into, and ultimately a comparative analysis of, the bilateral relations of Great Britain and the United States of America with Ukraine during the two periods in which it attempted to build an independent nation-state, namely 1917-1921 and 1991-1994. It examines the factors which shaped these relations and the effect the latter had on the development of the Ukrainian statehood.

The Theoretical Framework.

A recourse to theory is essential in any study of politics as it provides a certain guidance to both understanding empirical facts and deriving conclusions from them in order to explain complex phenomena.

As the underlying theme of the present research is the interconnection between Ukraine's state-building performance and its external relations two conceptual issues have been chosen to constitute the theoretical framework of the thesis, namely the nature of a modern nation-state and its place in the international system.

In order to address the first issue it is necessary to define the terms 'nation' and 'state' as used in the thesis. 'Nation' can be broadly defined as 'a numerous group of people united by certain cultural and psychological affinities, and by a will to constitute a state at some time in the future if they do not already do so'.[1] On the other hand, in order to constitute 'state' any such group has to occupy an exclusive territory under a government of their own which is constitutionally not

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[1]F.S.Northedge, *The International Political System*, (London, Boston: Faber&Faber, 1981), p. 15.

accountable to any other government.[2] Among numerous definitions of 'state' this particular one seems less specific and therefore more comprehensive as it is capable of accommodating almost all existing concepts of the nature, role and functions of sovereign state both as a supreme authority within the national boundaries and as an independent agent on the international stage.

The meaning of the term 'nation-state', however, is somewhat obscured by the discrepancy between the notions of 'nation' and 'state': not every nation possesses its own state and not every state consists of one nation. In order to avoid confusion caused by the ambiguity of this term it is often used to denote a sovereign state in its modern form irrespectively of how many nationalities it incorporates. In view of Ukraine's complex ethnic composition (72 per cent of its population is Ukrainian and 22 per cent is Russian, yet Russified Ukrainians amount to no less than one third and there are a number of smaller national minorities) the present study also resorts to this tactic applying the term 'nation' not only to ethnic Ukrainians but to the population of Ukraine as a whole.

Although the thesis focuses on the role of external factors shaping the construction of a nation-state, it is also important to outline the internal conditions required for the successful completion of this process.

Contemporary literature offers a number of theoretical approaches to the issue of nation-state formation in the twentieth century throughout which the majority of new states came into existence as a result of national liberation from foreign domination. Most of these approaches fall into one of the three major categories depending on a particular factor each of them emphasises as crucial in the process of attaining independence: socio-economic, state-centric and cultural.

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[2]R.H.Jackson, A.James, 'The Character of Independent Statehood' in R.H.Jackson (ed.) *States in a Changing World* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), p. 19.

The socio-economic approach is based on the concept of modernisation asserting that the processes of industrialisation, urbanisation and ensuing mass education create social conditions necessary for the formation of a nation. These conditions include, first and foremost, the rise of national elite capable of promoting the national idea as well as the growth of national consciousness among the general population stimulated by the activities of the elite. Thus the strengthening of the national movement leads to a situation when a previously powerless group begins to seek self-determination and self-rule in order to remove the obstacles restraining its further development.[3]

In contrast to the socio-economic approach stressing the precedence of the 'mobilisation from below' factor (albeit with the national elite playing a principal part in this process) the state-centric approach, advocating the factor of opportunity, asserts the primary role of a centralised state's failure to contain the expansion of separatism within its borders. While held in check by coercive mechanisms of a central state nationalism is usually reduced to the level of sentiments and occasional dissident strikes. However, when a state's control over the periphery is either loosened or becomes ineffective, an opportunity for an oppositional nationalist action arises provided that the necessary forces have been organised.[4]

The third approach suggests that nationalism as a cultural phenomenon provides a rationale of both the identity and legitimacy of any ethnic group. On the premise that 'loyalties that are generated in the cultural sphere are distinguished from material or political interests precisely by their capacity to meet deep-rooted individual and collective psychological and identity needs' and therefore tend to be indivisible and non-transferable, it implies that nationalism plays the dual role

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[3]B.Krawchenko, *Social Change and National Consciousness in Twentieth-Century Ukraine* (Oxford: Macmillan, 1985), p.p. xvii-xix.

[4]See P.Dunleavy, *Democracy, Bureaucracy and Public Choice: Economic Explanations in Political Science* (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991).

of a cohesive factor and a means of legitimating a separatist challenge to the centre.[5]

Of all three approaches the last one is perhaps least applicable to Ukraine's case as the prolonged phases of assimilation within the Russian-dominated tsarist and Soviet Empires considerably reduced the cultural resources necessary for the advancement of Ukrainian nationalism. As the introductions to Part 1 and Part 2 will demonstrate, national identity in Ukraine was clearly underdeveloped during both periods in question and thus could not become a driving force of statehood-building.

The other two approaches deserve a closer examination. According to the socio-economic approach the formation of statehood in Ukraine during the first period was impeded by its insufficiently developed social structures. In 1917 Ukrainian society was predominantly rural and illiterate. Nearly 80 per cent of Ukrainians were peasants whereas the educated elites were mainly Russian, Jewish and Polish. Russians constituted the majority of another distinct social stratum, the workers, thus reducing Ukrainians to a mere 30 per cent of the urban population.[6] In the absence of a popular base, as well as a skilled bureaucracy and a trained army, the attempts at independence made by a narrow politically inexperienced group of Ukrainian intelligentsia were doomed to failure. The major challenge presented by better organised Russian Bolsheviks who had military superiority and control of the industrial bases made their reassertion of central control almost inevitable. However, as in the course of Soviet modernisation Ukrainians found themselves on a par with Russians in the fields of education and employment the structural deficiencies of Ukrainian society were finally removed. Furthermore, since representatives of the national elite were gaining ground in the local

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[5]T.Kuzio, A.Wilson, *Ukraine: Perestroika to Independence* (London: Macmillan, 1994), p. 17.
[6]ibid., p. 6.

branches of the state apparatus, at some stage they were likely to seek control over their own society.

Although the socio-economic approach convincingly explains the determinants of the nationhood development it clearly overestimates the role of the national movement by claiming that it alone can bring about an independent state. Socio-economic progress resulting in consolidation of a nation guided by its competent elite can only produce the desirable result when the opportunity arises.

This leads to the state-centric approach which views the factor of opportunity as central in attaining independence. For Ukraine this was the case in both periods as the centralised control was removed, albeit temporarily, with the collapse of the Russian Empire and was to a certain extent relaxed when perestroika in the Soviet Union began. Whether the opportunity was seized is a different issue; yet without it neither pressure from below nor the endeavours of the national elite would become effective.

As stated above, during the first period there was no adequately organised force in Ukraine to take advantage of the opportune situation. Contrastingly, Gorbachev's reforms, which were designed to reinvigorate the stagnating Union but in fact undermined the power of the key Soviet central institutions, enabled the Republican leaders to challenge successfully the central government's monopoly of the 'public space'. Again the national elite (although this time the elite already in power) rather than masses initiated the process of separation and diverted all sorts of popular protest (for example against economic decline and political suppression) into a nationalist outlet. This is not to say that the bona fide nationalists and the national movement inspired by them did not play a part in the process. However, due to the fact that the latter did not comprise a majority of the population and was not sufficiently organised, it was the state, more precisely

Ukrainian communists in a state apparatus, who spurred the move towards independence.

In both cases Ukraine's independence came so unexpectedly that none of the political forces were prepared for the challenge of statehood-building. While autonomy and democracy were among the objectives of most liberal parties on Ukrainian territory after the outbreak of the World War 1 independence was not on their agenda until late 1917. After the Bolshevik coup in Russia the Ukrainian leaders were impelled to react to the events in that region and therefore most of their projects and undertakings were mere improvisations. A similar situation occurred in the second period and an equally unprepared Ukrainian elite had to cope with the responsibility of transforming a former 'colony' into a sovereign state.

Once independence is attained through the consent of the former centre and recognition by the international community the creation of an institutionally strong state and an effective political elite becomes the most pressing task of statehood-building. Establishing national identity (as opposed to exclusionary ethnic identity), the rule of law (in contrast to the passing of laws), civil society (in a sense of social institutions independent of the state), as well as a viable economy and democracy constitute a number of the next essential steps.

The primary task of founding law-making and law-enforcing institutions was hardly realisable for Ukrainians in the first period since centuries of colonialism left them with no approximation of a state apparatus or administrative experience and was also exceedingly confusing in the second period as years of totalitarianism endowed the Republic with bureaucratic structures capable of executing central orders yet incompetent to formulate policy goals and to manage the entire state machine. The other objectives presented an equally serious challenge as an embryonic civil society, practically non-existent national identity

and an urgent need for economic reform and the institutions of democracy were characteristic of Ukraine's situation in both periods.

The consequence of these and other predicaments of Ukraine's state-building transcended its national boundaries (to a greater degree during the later period) and agitated various concerns of other states. Great Britain and the US were among those whose reactions mattered most to both Ukraine and the whole international community as they could potentially influence the unpredictably unfolding course of events.

A conceptual interpretation of these developments can be based on the second issue constituting the theoretical framework of the thesis, the place of a modern nation-state in the international system. However, one should bear in mind that this remains a highly controversial subject in the field of international relations with numerous schools of thought offering conflicting and often mutually exclusive views (for example realism and idealism as well as their various modifications are two most prominent and long-standing yet ostensibly irreconcilable theories of international relations).[7]

Although contradictions surrounding this issue are impossible to avoid altogether, dealing with it generically and through the prism of globalisation seems to be the most reasonable approach.

The phenomenon of interdependence that arises within the broader debate on globalisation is the most useful concept for analysing the relative success or failure of the Ukrainian state-building process in the twentieth century from the

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[7]Thus while realism maintains that nation-states are the key actors of international politics which is defined by their perennial struggle for power in an anarchic environment, idealism contends that all social phenomena, including power politics, are products of ideas and that the expansion of education and freedom combined with appropriate international legislation and possibly a supranational mechanism regulating the behaviour of states can facilitate the 'harmony of interests' between all individuals constituting the world community.

point of view of external conditions. This phenomenon is considered to be the most distinct feature of international society in the second half of the twentieth century and has manifested itself in a number of ways.

Firstly, it is commonly acknowledged at present that internal developments in one state can have far-reaching implications for other, even remote, states. Consequently, politics in general became an activity with world-wide ramifications thus making the traditional distinction between the foreign and the domestic irrelevant. 'On the one hand, rapidly growing domestic needs and demands have become increasingly dependent upon international politics; on the other, international politics has become increasingly affected by domestic conflicts'.[8] Such permeability of national boundaries significantly decreases the capacity of nation-states to control issues which formerly were entirely within their jurisdiction.

Secondly, the extended scope of issues within the jurisdiction of states brought a realisation that co-operation with other states was more effective in facilitating some aims and interests than independent endeavours, and in certain cases simply impossible to avoid. For instance economic growth, security and the advancement of the welfare state were perceived to be most effectively sustained through collective action while such issues as human rights, terrorism, crime, drugs, space, etc. could be hardly resolved without it (due to their propensity to penetrate national boundaries). The internationalisation of production, technology, communications, trade and finance thus interlinked the well-being of nation-states across the globe.

Thirdly, as more and more new actors entered the stage of international politics, states' behaviour could be affected not only by the actions of other

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[8]J.Frankel, *International Relations in a Changing World*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 219-220.

states but also by inter-governmental (particularly, the UN, the EU, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund) and non-governmental organisations (i.e. multinational corporations, environmental pressure groups, professional associations and welfare organisations). Various international institutions, agencies, regimes and networks became more than ever involved in processes of decision-making and while some of them were merely used by national governments as the new arenas for negotiations, the others could influence the decisions and actions of individual states independently of the aims of the latter, thus performing the functions of transnational players.

The paradox of interdependence lies in the fact that, while having seemingly reduced both the external and internal power of modern nation-states, it simultaneously enhanced their viability. State sovereignty has not been diminished, as many globalists argue, but has undergone transformation from being 'a justification of a centralised territorial control and a barrier to intervention' to becoming increasingly 'a bargaining tool for influence over transnational networks'.[9]

Since the establishment of Ukrainian statehood is studied here in the context of its relations with Great Britain and the US, the general assessment of these key players of the international system is necessary in order to understand both their respective objectives and capabilities and the system's nature as a whole. In this view the juxtaposition of the status and principal policies of the two Western powers during each period is crucial for the completion of the comparative analysis as an ultimate objective of the thesis.

Great Britain and the USA in the International System of the First Period.

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9 R.O.Keohane, 'Sovereignty in International Society' in D.Held and A.McGrew (eds), *The Global Transformations Reader*, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000), p. 118.

By the 1870s Great Britain directly controlled about one fifth of the world, including India, Canada and Australia. It had the strongest economy accounting for nearly a quarter of total manufacture and a similar proportion of international trade.[10] Britain's maritime might, which rested on the possession of more battleships than all the other countries combined, enjoyed worldwide respect. Since sea-power was the dominant military technology at the time a mere threat that the British were ready to fight would be sufficient to restrain their opponents and to achieve the desired aims. Although it is not clear whether the British navy was in fact as strong as it was believed, since by the end of the century 'naval attention was devoted too much to paintwork and too little to proficiency', what mattered most was 'the legend of invincibility; everybody's policies for expansion overseas took this into account'.[11]

Such superiority rested on the insular position of the country. Unlike all other great European powers which shared land borders with their often hostile neighbours, Great Britain was situated on islands and separated from the mainland by the English Channel. Although this protection did not rule out a threat of foreign invasion, it ensured that a large standing army was not imperative. Therefore while other states were preoccupied with combating their continental rivals, Britain, having embraced the course of 'splendid isolation' intended to prevent its involvement in European disputes, could concentrate its resources on the contest for trade and colonies. Despite the loss of nearly all their American colonies in the late Eighteenth century the British managed to retain dominance in Canada and the British West Indies. As a result of the Napoleonic wars of 1800-1815, during which France's hegemony in Europe as well as its naval strength were overcome by Britain, the latter consolidated its control over India. In the last decades of the nineteenth century a large part of Africa was acquired while Australia and New Zealand became Britain's overseas

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[10]D.Reynolds, *Britannia Overruled*: *British Policy and the World Power in the 20th Century,* (London, New York: Longman, 1991), p. 1.

[11]M.Foot, *British Foreign Policy Since 1898* (London: Hutchinson's University Library, 1956), p. 10.

'branches': between 1861 and 1900 more than 1 million Britons emigrated there having retained a system of government similar to the metropolitan one. Thus by the end of the nineteenth century Britain possessed the status of a major colonial power stretching from the eastern coast of Africa (although a number of colonies were also situated in West Africa) to India and Australasia.[12]

However, British rule in these lands was diverse and often superficial. Thus such colonies as Canada, South Africa and Australasia where there was a large British community, exercised a considerable degree of autonomy. While foreign and defence policy remained within the jurisdiction of the imperial authorities domestic affairs were devolved to elected local governments. Contrastingly non-white colonies, particularly in Africa and the West Indies, were considered to be incapable of self-government and therefore were ruled by British Governors. Britain's dominance over India was rather different as in some parts of it the British ruled directly through their civil service while in others their control was executed through local nobility with whom alliances had been formed.

Although these colonies proved of considerable benefit during World War 1, providing 3 million men to reinforce the 6.7 million-strong British army, they were not crucial for Britain's peacetime economy, accounting for no more than a third of its exports and a quarter of its imports.[13] Moreover, with the gradual rise of nationalism which eventually came to the surface in the twentieth century in various parts of the Empire it was becoming increasingly costly to maintain British control there.

Britain's commercial hegemony stimulated a rapid technological progress and structural changes in its economy with a massive shift of the labour force from the countryside to town. Relying on imports of raw materials such as cotton,

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[12]K.Robbins, *The Eclipse of a Great Power. Modern Britain 1870-1975* (London & New York: Longman, 1983), pp. 18-23.
[13]D.Reynolds (1991), p. 30.

copper, tin, wheat, etc. by 1860 the country with only 2 per cent of the world's population became the largest exporter of manufactured goods whose share of international trade amounted to 40 per cent. Due to a striking growth in cotton manufacture and later in iron and steel production, as a result of railway-building, Britain produced half of the world's iron and steel and 20 per cent of total manufactured goods. Thus having become the first industrial nation the British reached the highest GNP in the world and the highest average per capita income. Besides, the country's 'invisible' earnings obtained from insurance, brokerage and income from overseas investment stimulated its financial expertise which was greater than anywhere in the world. 'Britain's dominance of the world economy in the mid-nineteenth century was greater than that of the USA at its peak a century later'.[14]

However, by the end of the century the rate of industrial growth in the country fell below that of Germany and the US, new technologies were spreading at a slower pace than in America whose share of world manufacturing output finally surpassed Britain's, and the latter's devotion to 'Free Trade' often brought undesirable results especially when other states such as Germany, France and the US adopted measures of protectionism.[15]

As mentioned above, Britain's nineteenth-century strength was dependent on the weaknesses of its rivals nearly as much as on its own wealth. Both the exhaustion of major powers as a result of the prolonged Napoleonic war in the early nineteenth century and their satisfaction with the existing status quo in Europe allowed Britain to proceed with expansion elsewhere. Therefore when other nations had accumulated sufficient economic resources and political unity a challenge to British supremacy began to rise in both hemispheres. By the end of the century the new German Empire proclaimed in 1871 created the strongest

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[14]ibid., p. 9.
[15]K.Robbins (1983), pp. 50, 56.

army in Europe and was building a highly efficient fleet thereby replacing France as Britain's main threat most likely to dominate the continent; the Russian Empire had spread to the Pacific and the borders of India; Japan was increasingly gaining industrial and military strength; and the United States, having overcome domestic disunity, was rapidly developing its economic potential, thus threatening to enter the international arena as a new formidable player.

These developments propelled British politicians to break with the course of 'splendid isolation' to formulate a new policy which would ensure the preservation of the existing balance of power by precluding any state's attempts to establish dominance in Europe. Although initially an alliance with Germany was considered in an attempt to reach mutual concessions it was soon ruled out and an informal Franco-British entente was concluded in 1904 with the aim of preventing German domination over Europe. In 1907 France's ally Russia was brought into the combination thus completing the formation of the 'Triple Entente' counterbalancing the 'Triple Alliance' between Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy.

Although World War 1 was triggered by Russia's defence of fellow Slavs in Serbia attacked by the Habsburgs, it was not until the German invasion of neutral Belgium on 4 August 1914 that the British Cabinet, which had long supported the ailing power of Austria-Hungary, joined the war on the side of its French and Russian allies. Since preventing the collapse of France was vital for the restoration of the European balance of power Britain's self-interest and its moral obligation to the ally coincided. Yet, the Allied victory would also mean the spread of the Russian influence in Central Europe which was almost as undesirable as Germany's domination. However, the Bolshevik Revolution in November 1917 removed this danger having replaced it with a new problem: the Bolshevik withdrawal from the war meant that the troops of the Central Powers

fighting against Russia could be transferred to the Western front thus jeopardising the positions of Great Britain and France. In this context America's entry into the war seemed crucial. Although it declared war against Germany in April 1917 a year was needed for US troops to reach Europe in sufficient numbers.

Such a situation caused panic in certain, mainly conservative, circles which pressed for a peace by negotiations on the grounds that, by the time the American army arrived in Europe, Britain would be plunged into poverty and revolution. However, David Lloyd George, a former Secretary for War who became Prime Minister in December 1916, declared in January 1918 that justice needed to be done to the 'great wrong' of 1871 (meaning Alsace-Lorraine) and Austria-Hungary had to be reconstructed on the basis of self-determination. Besides, he proposed the creation of a 'League of Nations' which echoed President Wilson's advocacy of an international organisation with the power to settle political and territorial disputes. It was deemed important by British politicians to keep in tune with American thinking on the post-war order.[16]

While Germany's aspirations to economic hegemony and a continental empire became the cause of Britain's involvement in the devastating war of 1914-1918 that marked the beginning of its decline as a superpower, it was the latter's transatlantic ally which achieved the ultimate victory, having come out of the war as a major economic and maritime power.

The US began its path to 'superpowerdom' straight after the Civil War of 1861-1865 which both united the nation and laid the foundations for its industrial rise. Within forty years (between 1860 and 1900) the country's population more than doubled to 71 million and its economy soared. The US share of total world manufacturing production jumped from 7 to 24 per cent and its exports of goods

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[16]ibid., p. 104.

rose by more than four times accounting for 12 per cent of world exports and exceeding the country's imports, which created a favourable balance of trade. Although it was still notably behind Great Britain with its 33 per cent of world exports, US traditional cotton and wheat production, combined with newly developed oil and coal industries as well as steel manufacturing, presented a serious challenge to the European powers in a struggle for the world markets.[17]

However, such an impressive boom was accompanied by a no less distinctive depression which began in 1873 and lasted for some twenty-three years. It was caused by the same advancement of the economy which, having produced more than could be domestically consumed, saw a drastic fall in prices and increasing unemployment.

In order to rid themselves of the hardships of the post-1873 depression, the Americans began a search for new markets. In the words of a leading US manufacturer of the 1880s 'an intelligent and spirited foreign policy' was needed to accommodate the growing economy.[18] Since the creation of American global sales networks, and not the acquisition of land, was the primary goal of the new foreign policy the US seized only 125,000 square miles in new territories between 1870 and 1900 in contrast to Great Britain which added 4.7 million square miles to its empire.[19]

The most reliable path for US expansionism seemed to lead to Latin America which had been the US trading partner since the beginning of the nineteenth century. Moreover, the policy announced by President James Monroe in 1823 (which later became known as the Monroe Doctrine) ensured that the US was potentially the strongest power in the Western Hemisphere. Having declared that

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[17]W.LaFeber, *The American Age. United States Foreign Policy at Home and Abroad since 1750* (New York, London: W. W. Norton & Company, 1989), p. 151.
[18]ibid., p. 154.
[19]ibid., p. 213.

any attempt on the part of the Europeans to establish their influence in the New World would be considered as dangerous to US peace and safety the President assured them that the Americans, in return, would not interfere with their existing colonies. Although such a policy was aimed at Britain as much as at Russia, France and Spain, the British were actually interested in supporting this claim out of fear that their European rivals might succeed in re-colonising newly independent Latin America.[20] Thus having removed tariff restrictions on its trade with Latin America, the US achieved complete economic dominance over it by 1896.

In order to conduct successful trade and to protect its foreign markets the US needed a strong navy. Its construction began in 1886 and resulted in the creation of the Great White Fleet which constituted the basis of the twentieth-century US Navy. Its baptism of fire took place in 1898 when the US defeated the Spanish fleet thus having made the first step towards obtaining 'the empire of the seas'.[21]

As a result of the war with Spain the Americans imposed their informal control over Cuba and annexed Puerto Rico and the Philippines. Besides, they conquered a number of other bases in the Pacific, established strong commercial ties with Japan, and through their 'open-door' policy (meaning equality of all trading nations) began a vigorous struggle for China's markets where at that time Britain held a predominant position accounting for two thirds of China's foreign trade.[22]

Thus economic strength gradually produced political prestige and the US entered the twentieth century as a new great power. The beginning of the century was marked by a further evolution of American foreign policy. President Theodore Roosevelt, having confirmed the validity of the Monroe Doctrine,

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[20]ibid., p. 83.
[21]ibid., 177.
[22]M.R.D.Foot (1956), p. 19.

added a new dimension to his state's role in international politics: an ardent believer in the superiority of the Anglo-Saxon race due to its accomplishments in the spheres of democratisation and industrialisation, he claimed that the Americans had a responsibility for maintaining world order and peace by any means, including the use of force. This prompted the Americans to modify the Monroe doctrine by both legitimating direct intervention in Latin America's internal affairs (in particular, the revolutionary movements in the region which caused serious US concerns) and actively engaging in the colonial disputes of the great powers in the Eastern Hemisphere.

With the outbreak of the World War 1 US involvement in European affairs intensified. Although at first President Wilson urged his fellow countrymen to be neutral and impartial, before long Americans were forced to take sides. Realising that if the Central Powers won, Germany's imperial ambitions would be gratified, while in case of the Entente's victory the Russian Empire could establish its control over Central Europe, most US policy-makers chose the latter. They hoped that Russian expansionism could be held in check and, above all, they felt it was necessary to support Britain which was America's long-standing partner: despite a few waves of tension between the two countries in the late nineteenth century their diplomatic relations had warmed since 1895. Among the most pro-British officials in the Wilson administration was Robert Lansing, a counsellor in the Department of State who became Secretary of State in 1915.

The first crucial step towards relinquishing US neutrality was Wilson's decision to allow American bankers to grant credits and loans to the belligerent powers. This decision was propelled by the need to boost the slumping American economy by way of lending financial assistance to both Britain and Germany which, being the largest markets for two main US exports, cotton and wheat, quickly depleted their currency resources. Over the next two years the Allies

who had stronger connections with American banks borrowed $2.5 billion while the Central Powers obtained less than one-tenth of that amount. As a result US exports of food and munitions rose by eight times between 1914 and 1916 which led to America's transformation from one of the world's biggest debtors with $3.7 billion in arrears to a creditor of $3.8 billion at the end of the war.

The next step was the commencement in 1915 of Wilson's 'preparedness campaign' which included both the creation of military training camps and presidential speeches on the importance of the nation's readiness to defend itself. By building military power Wilson intended to ensure that by the end of the war he would have a strong leverage against both warring parties. This became even more pressing when the Americans had learnt of the Allied secret plan drafted in May 1916 to protect themselves against US rising economic power by using government control over markets to offset American competition. Therefore by September 1916 Wilson resolved to sponsor a large appropriations bill to expand the US fleet: 'Let us build a navy bigger than [Great Britain's] and do what we please', the President told his foreign-policy adviser, House.[23]

Although they believed that a neutral status would entitle them to mediate a just peace, preferably a 'peace without victory', American policy-makers at the same time feared that a place at a future peace conference could only be secured by participation in the war. After Germany began total submarine warfare on 1 February 1917 and sank three US ships on 18 March, it became obvious that the days of neutrality were numbered. On 6 April 1917 the war resolution was approved by an overwhelming majority in Congress. The United States entered the war on the side of the Entente as an 'associated power'.

The Bolshevik coup in Russia prompted Wilson to announce US war aims in his celebrated Fourteen Points address on 8 January 1918. According to the

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[23] W.LaFeber (1989), p. 276.

President, permanent peace could only be obtained through the creation of a democratic collective security system while the principle of national self-determination was the key to the expansion of democracy in the world. However, the ensuing events demonstrated that the implementation of this principle encountered numerous objective and artificial obstacles.

Although Britain emerged victorious and enlarged its empire to the utmost as a result of the Great War, it proved to be in many respects detrimental to the country's status in the world: its wealth, empire and international position were all set on a path to decline and it was only a matter of time before the formerly insurmountable power irreversibly lost its superior position. Firstly, it had incurred great human casualties (723,000 servicemen were killed as opposed to the World War II figure of 270,000). Secondly, the loss of nearly 15 per cent of all the country's assets, aggravated by America's newly acquired role as the world's leading creditor, undermined the British economy to the effect that for forty years after the beginning of the war its total real wealth scarcely increased.[24] Finally, war-time demands for raw materials and labour caused severe food shortages and a tighter British control throughout the Empire which led to nationalist movements in India and Africa and drives for greater autonomy in Australia, New Zealand and Canada as well as in Ireland.

Apart from the domestic factors which influenced the shift in Britain's position on the international stage there were also external changes shaping the evolution of great-power relations. Despite the hopes of British policy-makers, Russia had survived in its imperial boundaries and, due to its new rulers' activist ideology professing the promotion of the world communist revolution, posed a tangible threat. America's economic superiority and assertiveness demonstrated during armistice negotiations secured its diplomatic success at the Washington naval

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[24]D.Reynolds (1991), p. 18.

conference of 1921-1922 which resulted in Britain's acquiescence in the principle of naval parity with the US in capital ships.[25]

Thus the Eurocentric world in which Great Britain still played a decisive role in the early twentieth century began to decline. As power shifted across the Atlantic the British tried to preserve their position by forming a close alliance with the USA which had undoubtedly assumed the role of world leader by the middle of the century.

Trading Places: the USA and Great Britain in the Second Period.

From the end of World War II until the late 1980s the evolution of international politics was largely defined by the Soviet-American superpower rivalry. Although throughout this period the US invariably remained the richest country in the world, massive defence expenditures stimulated by the escalation of the arms race took their toll on the national economy. By 1986 the US budget deficit soared to an unprecedented $220 billion a year.[26] In order to cover it the Government had to borrow from abroad, mainly from Japan and Western Europe. By 1988 excessive borrowing which amounted to $400 billion turned the country into the world's greatest debtor. Nevertheless, with the Defense Department as the nation's largest buyer military spending remained at $300 billion.[27] Despite President Reagan's public justifications of arms increases on the grounds of necessity to withstand 'the empire of evil' Americans were more concerned about domestic economic problems than external military attacks.[28]

The decline of the US economy, aggravated by the emergence of West Germany and Japan as major economic powers, began to raise questions about the

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[25]ibid., p. 108.

[26]D.Dimbleby, D.Reynolds, *An Ocean Apart* (London Sydney Auckland Toronto: Hodder&Stoughton, 1988), p. 308.

[27]W.LaFeber (1989), p. 698.

[28]D.W.White, *The American Century. The Rise and Decline of the United States as a World Power* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1996), p. 376.

prospects of its 'superpowerdom'. However, the inability of these two states to translate their economic strength into political influence due to domestic constraints, combined with the dollar's pivotal role in the international trade and monetary regimes and US military superiority, removed at least temporarily a challenge to its hegemony.[29]

At the same time far more critical problems experienced during the 1980s by America's rival, the Soviet Union, revealed that without fundamental restructuring the country would be speedily heading for economic and political deadlock. An audacious project undertaken by the new Soviet leader Gorbachev envisaged reducing military deployments, increasing participation in the world economy, opening the society, and terminating the struggle for the spheres of influence in the Third World. His course of perestroika and glasnost which was gradually introduced in the USSR from 1985 inspired peaceful revolutions in Eastern Europe where the satellite states of the Soviet Empire, burdened by inefficient economic systems and totalitarian regimes, succeeded in withdrawing from Moscow's control and launched democratic societies and market reforms. Their path was followed a few years later by most Republics of the Soviet Union and by the end of 1991 a giant which was a determinant of the international system for at least half a century encountered its demise.

Thus the beginning of 1990s was marked by the emergence of the 'New World Order' the basic components of which were rather vague and yet to be defined. However, the end of the Cold War which brought it into existence clearly meant that international relations would no longer be constrained by the stringent imperatives of the 'East-West' conflict.

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[29]A.G.McGrew, P.G.Lewis, *Global Politics. Globalisation and the Nation-State* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), p. 188.

As a result, at the end of the twentieth century the US was left as the only superpower with an almost unlimited capacity to regulate both regional and global developments. Even the most serious of previous infringements of the balance of power could not compare to a sudden transformation of the paradoxically well-balanced Cold War order into a unipolar world presided over by a single state. Although it is generally accepted that Great Britain played a leading role in world affairs at the turn of this century it still had to take into account the aspirations and actions of other, mainly European, countries. There were four other great powers, France, Germany, Austria-Hungary and Russia (with Japan and the US only beginning to enter the realm of power politics), and while none of them could compete with Britain separately, united in various configurations they could not but cause concern for British policy-makers. Clearly that was not the case in the 1990s when other states could only pursue their regional interests within the comprehensive framework of order managed by the US.

Although in 1991-1992 the US experienced a severe recession which instigated an extensive domestic debate about the cost of American international commitments, President Bush succeeded in overcoming Congressional restraints on federal spending for defence and foreign affairs. The events in Kuwait and Yugoslavia revealed the US determination to prevent by any means, including the use of force, not only challenges to its world hegemony but also mere manifestations of disobedience. In the case of the Gulf War the latter was thwarted through the US unilateral decision to take military action against Iraq while the former was suppressed in embryo by pressuring even the most reluctant of America's European allies to support it. The liberal assertion that the US 'has little use for diplomatic means or institutions of world order, unless they can be used as instruments of its own power'[30] was further proved during the Yugoslavian crisis. Having initially insisted that mediating a truce and securing

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[30]N.Chomsky, *Year 501. The Conquest Continues* (London: Verso, 1993), p. 91.

peace in Yugoslavia was an EC responsibility, the US demonstrated an increasing concern about the evolving crisis in the region when it became apparent that the newly unified Germany, having recognised the independence of Slovenia and Croatia unilaterally at the end of 1991, resolved to lead Western policy in Eastern Europe. Maintaining that any changes of existing borders in Yugoslavia through the use of force were unacceptable, Americans managed to secure UN support in the form of the latter's resolution to send peacekeeping forces to Croatia in early 1992. However, when an even more violent conflict erupted in Bosnia later that year the US resorted to a more assertive policy. The first step was made in autumn 1993 when the Franco-German Eurocorps, created in 1991 with a specific aim to counterbalance NATO's influence on the continent, was placed under the direct command of NATO's Supreme Allied Command Europe.[31] Ensuring that US-dominated structures, above all NATO, remained the primary instrument of maintaining European security became one of the top priorities of American decision-makers while such international organisations as the UN were to be kept on the periphery of policy implementation.

The same pattern was revealed in US policies towards the post-Soviet Republics where US influence was endorsed by way of both manipulations with economic aid and ambiguous promises of defence co-operation through the North Atlantic Co-operation Council.

In general, America's relations with the successor states were to a large extent influenced by its preference for a 'Russia first' strategy. US policy-makers convincingly justified the privileging of Russia by the necessity to contain its potential as a nuclear and revanchist threat through stabilisation, democratisation and market reforms. They warned that Russia's return to some

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[31]P.Gowan, 'The Twisted Road to Kosovo. The Political Origins of NATO Attack on Yugoslavia' in *Labour Focus on Eastern Europe*, No. 62, Spring 1999, p. 111.

form of totalitarian rule would jeopardise not only the existence of the newly-independent republics but also the stability of the former East European allies and hence of Europe as a whole. However, this exclusive approach was as much influenced by the traditional Western perception of Moscow as the only legitimate force in the region. As a result Russia's economic needs were treated preferentially by Washington while Ukraine and other Republics were left out of the focus of its attention and financial assistance. A gradual change in this policy took place only with realisation that it was Ukraine which had the potential both to wreak havoc and to contribute to stability in Europe.

In contrast to America which, despite its debt crisis retained the status of the world's leading economy, Britain's economic performance has been in a massive relative decline for several decades. Although in absolute terms by the beginning of the 90s it remained one of the four biggest economies in Europe alongside Germany, France and Italy, its relative wealth calculated in GDP per capita reduced Britain to the eighteenth place out of twenty four within the OECD (whereas at the beginning of the century it was number one).[32] Finally, its share of world manufacturing exports had decreased from 33 per cent at the beginning of the century to 6 per cent in 1990.[33] These facts indicate that its global economic interests were unable to sustain Britain's power during the second period.

However, as economic power does not always translate into political weight, the absence of it does not necessarily imply the lack of potential to influence external developments. In the case of Great Britain military considerations proved to be essential for enhancing its international reputation. 'Given that Britain's conception of security has revolved more around matters of defence and the provision of military force, the politics of the Cold War provided an

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[32]D.Childs, *Britain Since 1939. Progress and Decline* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1995), p. 254.
[33]ibid., p. 253.

effective vehicle for British influence that often exaggerated the real power of the country'.[34] The Cold War also motivated the promotion of the British-American 'special relationship' which was based on two major factors: the common language and culture as well as traditionally friendly ties between the leaderships of the two countries on the one hand and a close co-operation between their military and defence structures on the other. Both factors played an important part during the Gulf crisis in which the British provided their transatlantic allies with most support. A prompt Anglo-American action led to the UN resolution of 25 August 1990 allowing the use of force against Iraq and subsequently the British armed forces allocated to the campaign came under US command. 'Thank God for allies and friends like Margaret Thatcher when the going gets tough', remarked President Bush later.[35] The new Prime Minister, John Major, who replaced her as a result of the Conservative party crisis in November, succeeded in retaining the confidence of the Bush administration. During his first visit to Washington in December 1990 he claimed that there would be no change in British policy on Iraq which was particularly reassuring amidst the rising fears of a hard-line communist comeback in Moscow after the resignation of progressive Soviet foreign minister Shevardnadze.[36]

As much as this policy was affected by the desire of the British Cabinet (under the Thatcher and the Major leaderships alike) to obtain more international credit by aligning itself with the most powerful player in the world, it was spurred by its aspiration to take a stand in Europe where the recently unified Germany was assuming a leading role. Despite Britain's growing involvement in the European Community's affairs (e.g. by the end of the 80s half of its trade was with the EC and in October 1990 it accepted full membership of the European Monetary System) British policy-makers sought to ensure that it would remain a

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[34]M. Clarke, *British External Policy-Making in the 1990s* (London: Macmillan, 1992), p. 259.
[35]C.J.Bartlett, *'The Special Relationship'. A Political History of Anglo-American Relations since 194.* (London and New York: Longman, 1992), p. 175.
[36]ibid.

'Community of independent nations' not a federal state. The same reason underlay Britain's support for 'widening' the EC eastwards as opposed to 'deepening' it. Thus the importance of incorporating East European countries into the Community provided the British Government with a strong argument against the strengthening of EC centralised institutions on the grounds that the Community's further integration would make it harder for the East Europeans to conform their policies with its rules.[37]

Britain's position also differed from that of its EC partners on the crisis in Yugoslavia when the armed conflict erupted in mid-1991. While Germany, France, Italy and the Benelux countries were inclined to support WEU proposals to send troops to the region following the failure of successive EC arbitration efforts to terminate the bloodshed, Britain categorically objected to intervention. As the inability of EC governments to reach consensus on their common policy in Yugoslavia impeded any action on the part of the WEU the US-British partnership again proved to be more efficient both in the form of mediation efforts and peacekeeping operations under UN auspices.

The importance for Britain of its 'special relationship' with America translated into an inclination of British policy-makers to advocate the preservation of US-dominated NATO as the most effective mechanism of enhancing European security in the post-Cold War era. Resisting the Franco-German plan of strengthening the Western European Union as a basis of the new European defence identity, the British Government opposed any substantial US troop withdrawal from Europe and insisted on the maintenance of NATO nuclear capability there. The British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd argued in Berlin in December 1990 that 'European security without the United States simply does

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[37]J.Peterson, *Europe and America in the 1990s. The Prospects for Partnership* (Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 1993), p. 150.

not make sense. If we were ever foolish enough to try it, we would soon realise what nonsense it was'.[38]

When, however, negotiations on arms reductions between the US and the Soviet Union (and later Russia) in 1991-1992 led to lowering both the US military presence in Europe and NATO's reliance on nuclear weapons, Great Britain refused to offer any cuts in its nuclear arsenal. This indicated that a tendency towards securing a basis for a new exclusive European security structure had emerged.[39] It intensified considerably in the course of the 1993-1994 developments, the war in Bosnia in particular, when it became obvious that the Americans had their own agenda in Europe not so much concerned with enhancing the latter's security as with ensuring their predominance in the region. Thus an alternative to Britain's role as the close partner of the US and a manager of its relations with the European Community began to gain more weight in British policy-making circles: the British-American relationship was increasingly seen as an integral part of the EC-US co-operation developing from within the structures of European institutions.[40]

The Sources.

The research is based on original sources and data. Documents of the Public Record Office, the US Information Centre in London and the Ukrainian Central Historical Archives constitute the basis for the analysis of the events during the first period. Among them are various reports, memoranda, letters written by ambassadors, consuls, heads of military missions and their superiors in the respective ministries as well as investigations conducted by specially appointed agents. Parliamentary and governmental materials (particularly papers issued by the US Department of State, the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the

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[38]C.J.Bartlett (1992), p. 177.
[39]J.Peterson (1993), p. 163.
[40]M.Clarke (1992), p. 262.

Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well as by the Defence Ministries of the three countries) provide primary information on the developments in the second period. Press publications as well as interviews with the relevant officials have also been used. While some of the primary sources used in the thesis, mainly relating to the first period, had been published previously in the collections of documents many of them are introduced for the first time.

Although there is extensive secondary literature on Ukraine in both English and Ukrainian, the sphere of its foreign and especially diplomatic relations has so far not been properly explored. It is also important to note that all monographic studies dealing with the issues of Ukrainian statehood concentrate exclusively on internal factors which makes examination of Ukraine's international standing in terms of the latter's impact on its formation as a nation-state even more pressing.

The Structure of the Thesis.

The following aspects of the subject are considered in the thesis: the British and the American attitude towards Ukraine and the latter's activities aimed at securing their support after the collapse of the Russian Empire in 1917 until the time when Ukraine was absorbed by Bolshevik Russia in early 1921; the perception of Ukraine's place on the international stage following the demise of the Soviet Union as reflected in the policies of the two Western states in question regarding Ukraine and vice versa; and finally, the role which Great Britain and the US respectively played in the development of the Ukrainian statehood with the emphasis on juxtaposing each country's policies in the first period with those of the second, as well as comparing their positions within the same chronological limits.

In correspondence with the topics discussed above the thesis is divided into four chapters. Chapters 1 and 2, giving an account of British-Ukrainian and US-Ukrainian bilateral relations in 1917-1921 respectively, constitute the first part of the thesis which aims to determine the conditions that shaped the attitude of the British and the US Governments towards Ukraine and the effect which their policies in the region had on the rise and fall of its statehood in 1917-1921.

The second part of the thesis deals with the events which took place after an essential shift in the balance of power had occurred: while Great Britain was the most powerful state defining world politics during the first period in question, by 1991 this status undoubtedly belonged to the US. Therefore Ukraine's relations with the USA during the later period are examined before those between Ukraine and Britain. Thus Chapters 3 and 4 consider the evolution of the US and the British course towards Ukraine from its declaration of independence in August 1991 through to the end of 1994 when, despite numerous uncertainties, the foundations of independent existence had been built in Ukraine.

In order to provide a contextual framework in which the development of relations between Ukraine and the two Western states took place each part begins with a concise account of the major events and conditions defining the corresponding socio-economic and political situation in Ukraine.

Finally, the conclusion analyses and compares the developments of the two periods: the international situation in general and the position of each of the three countries in particular; the state of the Ukrainian national movement with its drawbacks, advantages and targets; the objectives of Great Britain and the US in the region and the extent to which they influenced each other's policies towards Ukraine as well as the evolution of its state-building.

A note should be made with regard to the use of Ukrainian geographical names in the thesis. Most of them have been transliterated directly from Ukrainian into English, with the exception of the regions traditionally known under their Russian or English names (for example, Kiev and Crimea as opposed to Kyiv and Krym). Also Ukraine as an integral part of Russia is referred to as 'the Ukraine'. However, as an independent state it is addressed without the definite article.

PART I. THE FIRST ATTEMPT AT NATIONAL STATE-BUILDING IN UKRAINE: 1917-1921

'It will be the end of Russia, not indeed as a Great Power but as a European danger, if the Ukraine ever secedes from the Empire ... It matters comparatively little to Russia, if she loses Poland or even Finland. But without the Ukraine, Russia becomes an Asiatic Power'.[1]

This categorical opinion was expressed by Bedwin Sands in his book *The Ukraine* published in London in 1914. Although at that time the Ukraine's separation was not even on the agenda, Sands' assumption emphasised the importance of this land for the Russian Empire. It constituted one of the three most developed areas in European Russia and together with Moscow and Petrograd regions produced 62 per cent of all industrial output.[2] Several cities of the Ukraine such as Kiev, Kharkiv, Odessa and some new mining and metallurgical towns in the Donetsk basin were among the few big urban centres that existed in the Empire at the time.[3] R. Butler in his book *The New Eastern Europe* published in London in 1919 wrote that Ukrainian provinces which contained the best part of the black earth zone, most of the coal and iron, nearly all of the oil, all of the salt, 80 per cent of the beet, 70 per cent of the tobacco, etc., were one third of Russia's 'bone' and 'flesh of her flesh'.[4]

Despite the widespread Russian misconception that Ukrainian was only a dialect of the Russian language, the Ukrainians constituted a separate ethnic group estimated at twenty four million within the borders of the Russian Empire, about four million in Austria-Hungary, mainly in Eastern Galicia and the Carpathians, and a few thousand in Bukovina.[5] Although the Ukrainians

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[1]Quoted in R.Butler, *The New Eastern Europe* (London: Longman, 1919), p. 131.
[2]L.Kochan, *Russia in Revolution 1890-1918* (London: Weinfield and Nicolson, 1966), p. 20.
[3]S.Fitzpatrick, *The Russian Revolution* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 11.
[4]R.Butler (1919), p. 131.
[5]Rubicon, 'The Ukraine Problem', *The New Europe* 16 August 1917, p. 133.

separated by the Austro-Russian border were in close contact their status was notably different.

Russian Ukraine was subjected to a policy of Russification by the tsarist government for more than two hundred years. Publication of books and periodicals in Ukrainian was banned, so was the study of it in schools. The Ukrainian Orthodox Church was subordinated to the Patriarch of Moscow. Ukrainians did not participate in the political life of the Empire (except as assimilated intellectuals) and although in the First and Second Dumas (Russian Parliament in 1906-07) there existed a Ukrainian Club of some forty members advocating Church autonomy and the use of the language, by the beginning of the First World War the Ukrainians had no representatives either in the Duma or in the local authorities.[6]

At the same time the Austrian Government which actively exercised a principle *'divide et impera'* in co-operation with the Germans adopted a policy of encouragement of the Ukrainian movement in Galicia directed equally against the Poles who constituted the majority of the Galician population and the Russians. The Austrian Ukrainians had their own Uniate Church different from both Russian Orthodox and Polish Catholic Churches, a relative freedom of cultural growth and a certain number of seats in the Austrian Reichsrat. Thus being officially allowed to develop their national education and literature on the one hand and covertly mistreated by the local Polish administration on the other, the Galician Ukrainians were destined to become 'conscious rebels' and consequently to play a very important part in a process of the whole nation's revival.[7]

The Revolution of February 1917 in Russia overthrew the monarchy and brought some democratic changes. After this the national movement of the 'Russian'

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[6]Ibid., p. 137.

[7]H.Seton-Watson, *Eastern Europe Between the Wars, 1918-1941* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986), p. 330.

Ukrainians inspired by their counterpart in Galicia also began to acquire a certain degree of political importance. Nationalist intelligentsia took charge of it and on 5 April 1917 called the Ukrainian National Congress in Kiev. Most political parties which existed at that time in the Ukraine were represented at the Congress and the idea of the national territorial autonomy within the future Russian Republic was largely supported. The boundaries of the Ukraine were suggested as follows: 'The western frontiers were to be the Governments of Lublin and Grodno, the south-eastern the River Kuban, the northern the River Pripet, and the southern the Sea of Azov and the Black Sea without the southern shore of the Crimea'.[8] In other words the provinces of Chernihiv, Kiev, Kharkiv, Kherson, Podolia, Poltava, Volhynia and Yekaterinoslav were claimed to constitute the Ukrainian territory.

Apart from that the Congress elected the Central Rada (Council) where the majority of seats went to the Ukrainian Socialist Revolutionary Party. An outstanding public figure and an historian, Professor Mykhailo Hrushevsky, became the President of the Rada. Among its political demands the Central Rada put forward the recognition of the Ukrainian autonomy by the Provisional Government and the formation of a separate Ukrainian army. This was the beginning of a long-lasting conflict between the aspirations of the Little Russians to autonomy and the determination of the Great Russians to retain control over this important territory.[9] The Provisional Government replied that the Rada's demands had to be considered by the Russian Constituent Assembly as the question of Ukrainian autonomy was a matter to be decided upon by all the peoples of Russia. It meant that Ukrainians could not expect favourable results as they would inevitably be outnumbered by Russians in the Assembly. The demand for nationalisation of the armed forces was soon repeated at the Ukrainian Army Meeting and was also rejected by the Russian Government on the grounds that

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[8]Rurik, 'The Ukraine Problem Since the Revolution', *The New Europe* 23 August 1917, pp. 175-192.
[9]L.Schapiro, *1917. The Russian Revolutions and the Origins of the Present-Day Communism* (Harmondswoth: Penguin Books, 1985), p. 71.

the regrouping of the Army on the principle of nationality in wartime could disorganise the troops at the front.

In June 1917 a Ukrainian deputation went to Petrograd with a request to the Provisional Government to approve the autonomy of Ukraine, to appoint a special Minister for Ukrainian affairs and to agree to put forward the Ukrainian question at the future peace conference in connection with the destiny of Eastern Galicia. The head of the Government, Prince Lvov, answered once again that these claims could not be satisfied before the Constituent Assembly met.[10]

Having realised that all its attempts to obtain concessions from the Petrograd Government had failed the Central Rada issued its First Universal on 23 June 1917. Accusing the Government of failing to recognise the right of the Ukrainian people to autonomy the Rada proclaimed that henceforth it alone would regulate life in Ukraine and for that purpose appointed its executive body, the General Secretariat.

These actions caused alarm in Petrograd. The Provisional Government immediately despatched to Kiev its representatives, Tereshchenko and Tsereteli, for negotiations with the Central Rada. As a result it was agreed that the Government would recognise the General Secretariat as the highest administrative organ in Ukraine and the Rada would prepare a constitution of the autonomous Ukraine. Satisfied by this concession the Rada issued its Second Universal on 16 July 1917 which stated that the constitution of the Ukraine should be approved by the Constituent Assembly.

However, back in Petrograd the Cadet members of the Government accused Tereshchenko and Tsereteli of exceeding their powers by signing the agreement with the Central Rada. This discord led to a Cabinet crisis which resulted in the

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[10]Rurik (1917), p. 178.

formation of a new Government under the Socialist Revolutionary Kerensky. Although his political platform was very close to Hrushevsky's in general their disagreement on the national question left the Russo-Ukrainian conflict open. After Kerensky's Government was overthrown by the Bolshevik coup d'état on 7 November 1917 the Central Rada, who did not recognise the Soviets, prepared its Third Universal. Published on 20 November 1917 it declared the creation of the autonomous Ukrainian People's Republic which, nevertheless, remained a part of Russia. Looking for popular support in its struggle against the Bolsheviks' endeavour to establish the Soviets in Ukraine, the Rada realised that the only social class which could form the basis of the broader national movement was the peasantry. The urban population in Ukraine was mainly Russian (or largely Russified) and Jewish whereas peasants were of Ukrainian origin and therefore were expected to be more cooperative with the national government.[11] Therefore the Rada had to adjust its policies to the interests of this class. Since the majority of peasants possessed very small land allotments and constantly suffered from the pressure of big landlords, the Rada decided that they would greatly benefit from the abolition of private property and the redistribution of the land. These were declared in the Third Universal. Its provisions also included the introduction of state control over production, the eight-hour working day and the abolition of the death penalty. Besides, the Universal announced elections to the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly which was to be convened on 22 January 1918.

In the meantime the Bolsheviks began the implementation of their Peace Decree issued on the first day of the October coup. When their call for an immediate armistice was dismissed by the Allies, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Leon Trotsky directly approached the leaders of the Central Powers and on 15 December 1917 they signed an armistice with Bolshevik Russia. This caused anxiety for the Entente since the withdrawal of Russia from the war would

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[11] S.Jones, 'The Non-Russian Nationalities', in R.Service (ed.) *Society and Politics in the Russian Revolution* (St. Martin's Press, 1992), p. 52.

inevitably improve the position of the Central Powers on the Western front. Apart from that the Bolsheviks dealt the Allies another blow by publishing their secret treaties with the tsarist government and by refusing to pay Russia's old debts. All this intensified the Entente's hostility to the new 'masters' of Russia and consequently led to the Allied intervention at the end of 1917.

On 18 December 1917 the Soviet Government, having recognised the Ukrainian People's Republic, immediately issued an ultimatum demanding that the Republic stopped disorganising the fronts, disarming Red Army troops on Ukrainian territory and allowing counter-revolutionary forces to pass through to the Don region. The Central Rada rejected the ultimatum and Bolshevik troops were sent to Ukraine under the pretext of 'helping' the Ukrainian Soviet Republic by that time formed in Kharkiv. After Kiev was attacked by the Red Army on 21 January 1918 the Rada was pressed to act more decisively. In order to gain international support and terminate Russia's interference, the Rada proclaimed the independence of the Ukrainian People's Republic in its Fourth Universal on 22 January 1918 (the day when the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly was supposed to commence). The General Secretariat was renamed as the Council of People's Ministers and charged with the primary task of concluding a peace treaty with the Central Powers in order to put an end to the exhausting war and get help in clearing Ukraine of the Bolsheviks.

For their part, Germany and Austria-Hungary were interested in forming an alliance with the Ukrainian Republic as much if not more eagerly since its separation from Russia meant the end of the latter's receipt of one third of its food and 70 per cent of coal and iron from Ukraine.[12]

Thus when the Soviet delegation headed by Trotsky arrived in Brest-Litovsk on 22 December 1917 to resume the negotiations with the Germans it was

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[12]R.Pipes, *The Russian Revolution, 1899-1919* (London: Collins Harvill, 1990), p. 580.

unpleasantly surprised to find that representatives of the Central Rada were already holding separate talks. On 12 January the Central Powers recognised the Rada as the official Ukrainian Government. On 9 February 1918 a peace treaty signed at Brest-Litovsk made Ukraine a de facto German protectorate. German and Austrian troops were to move into the Ukrainian territory to restore order. In return the Central Rada was obliged to supply Germany and Austria-Hungary with provisions. The border between the Ukrainian Republic and Austria-Hungary remained unchanged as it had been between the latter and the Russian Empire. The Ukrainian-Polish border was to be defined by a joint commission taking into account the will of the population and the ethnographic factor. Both parties mutually renounced any claims of reparations and contributions. According to a separate peace treaty signed in Brest-Litovsk by the Central Powers and Soviet Russia on 3 March 1918, the latter had to recognise the independence of the Ukrainian People's Republic.

Although it had alienated the Allies, Ukraine gained certain benefits from signing a treaty with the Central Powers. Red Army forces withdrew from Ukrainian territory and the German troops arrived to protect it from another Bolshevik invasion. This enabled the Ukrainian Government to begin a reconstruction of destroyed areas and a series of economic and social reforms announced in its Third Universal.

However, the Central Rada did not manage to stay in power long. Ironically, it was dissolved at the end of April 1918 by the Austro-German authorities in Kiev, mainly because it could not stem the rising peasant discontent with their occupation policies. Although some historians see this as a scheme of the German occupation authorities dissatisfied with the Rada's inadequacy at fulfilling its obligation to collect the required amount of provisions, it is also true that the Rada really began to lose its popularity and control at the local level and the Germans simply let the things go their natural way. Indeed, the Rada's big

mistake was its agrarian policy. The system of communal land ownership, which the Socialist Revolutionaries who dominated the Rada tried to introduce in Ukraine, was alien to Ukrainian peasants. Even in tsarist times they owned small allotments in contrast to the Russian peasants among whom communal ownership was traditional. The confiscation of the land from large landowners was accepted by peasants with satisfaction but the abolition of private property undermined the very basis of their lives and therefore set them against the newly introduced order. A misunderstanding of the Ukrainian peasant psychology was the main reason for the Rada's failure.[13]

Still, it was the Germans who endorsed its demise by declaring it disbanded on 29 April, after having learnt about the general election to the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly secretly held by the Rada in March despite their objections. On the same day a new regime was established at a meeting of landowners and wealthy peasants who 'elected' a large landowner and an ex-General of the Russian Army, Pavlo Skoropadsky, as Hetman of Ukraine (formerly, the highest post in the Cossack hierarchy). The new Hetman immediately proclaimed the restoration of private property and cancelled all the Rada's Universals. However, being a descendant of Ivan Skoropadsky who was the Hetman of the Ukraine at the time of Peter the Great, he had a certain sentimental interest in creating a moderately liberal government in the country. Although most of the ministers who formed it were of pro-Russian orientation as the Ukrainian parties refused to co-operate, his Government did not display any ethnic intolerance. The process of national mobilisation which began under the Rada's leadership continued as manifested in the increasing number of publications in Ukrainian. In 1917-1918 Ukrainian-language editions constituted 70 per cent of the total book production in the country.[14] Besides, having obtained authorisation of the German Headquarters, he began to build national armed forces (the Germans were interested in

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[13]S.Jones (1992), p. 52.
[14]B.Krawchenko (1985), p. 94.

strengthening Ukraine as a counterweight to Poland supported by the Allies). On 2 June 1918, Germany and Austria-Hungary officially recognised the Hetman's Government.

One of the most pressing tasks the new government had yet to accomplish was the conclusion of peace with Bolshevik Russia envisaged by the Soviet-German treaty of Brest-Litovsk. Negotiations between the Ukrainian and the Russian governments began in May and resulted in the signing on 14 June 1918 of an agreement on a cease-fire and the restoration of railway communications.[15] The main problem was to set boundaries between the two states since both parties claimed sovereignty over the Don region, northern parts of the Chernihiv region, some areas of the Kursk and Voronezh regions and the Donetsk coal basin. As the positions of the Central Powers weakened the Russians began to show less interest in further negotiations and finally suspended them in October 1918.

With the general armistice of 11 November 1918, German control of Ukraine was brought to an end. The Allies ordered the occupation troops to stay on Ukrainian territory to prevent a Bolshevik invasion until Ukraine's future had been decided at the forthcoming Peace Conference. However, German soldiers, tired of fighting and disorganised by Bolshevik propaganda, started evacuating Ukraine. This gave the Red Army an opportunity to invade it from the south and south-east. The Hetman's relatively small army was not capable of defending the country against this offensive. Exposed to the external threat presented by the Reds and weakened by the nationwide discontent with the earlier exportation of nearly all food, textiles and raw materials to the Central Powers, Skoropadsky's regime collapsed. On 14 December the Hetman resigned and hastily left Kiev for Berlin.

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[15]R. Pipes (1990), p. 580.

By that time the former Central Rada's Minister of War, Symon Petlyura, had gathered some military forces and in co-operation with Volodymyr Vynnychenko, former head of the General Secretariat, formed a Headquarters at Bila Tserkva (near Kiev). They proclaimed the restoration of the Ukrainian People's Republic and the formation of its new government, the Directory. After the Hetman's flight to Germany the Directory's troops moved towards the capital and on 18 December 1918 entered Kiev.

At the same time significant changes had occurred in Eastern Galicia. The collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire resulted in the creation of a number of nation-states, among them the Western Ukrainian People's Republic proclaimed on 19 October 1918. The Ukrainian National Rada under the leadership of Dr. Eugene Petrushevich declared that the territory of the new state included Eastern Galicia, North-Western Bukovina and Carpathian Ukraine. On 11 November 1918 the Ukrainian Military Command took power in Lviv, the capital of Western Ukraine, but under military pressure from the Poles who claimed Eastern Galicia to be a historical part of Poland, the Ukrainian Army had to leave the city on 21 November. The Ukrainian National Rada retired first to Ternopil and then further eastward to Stanislav (later Ivano-Frankivsk).

As soon as the Directory had settled in Kiev it sent military aid to the Government of the Western Ukrainian People's Republic. On 22 January 1919 at the opening of the Labour Congress in Kiev a union of Western and Eastern Ukraine was declared. However, the Red Army troops, having performed a series of successful attacks, drove the Western Ukrainian forces into Rumania and soon disarmed them. Petlyura's forces were facing the same threat. On 4 February 1919 the Directory had to leave Kiev giving way to the Bolsheviks. On 14 February the Government of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic headed by Khristian Rakovsky moved from Kharkiv to Kiev. According to its first Constitution, 'independent and sovereign state' Ukraine was given the powers to conduct foreign policy, to

organise its own army, to declare war and peace and to control financial and other domestic issues. But all this was a mere demagogy since the activity of Ukrainian Bolsheviks was directed from Moscow.[16]

In the late summer the essentially restructured Army of the Directory started military operations against the Bolsheviks and on 31 August recaptured Kiev. However, at the same time the Volunteer Army of White General Denikin, who controlled most of South Russia, also reached the Ukrainian capital. This Army was stronger than the Directory's one and was supported by the Allies favouring Denikin's aim of the restoration of a 'united and indivisible' Russia. Under his pressure Ukrainian forces had to retreat from Kiev to Vasil'kiv leaving the territory to the arbitrary rule of the Russian General. Adverse acts of Denikin's troops in Ukraine, humiliating not only national but at times human dignity, caused resentment of the population. The Directory published a Declaration calling on the Ukrainian people to fight against the Volunteer Army and its policy of Russification. However, Denikin's onslaught did not last long. In October 1919 the Red Army assumed the offensive and soon recaptured Ukrainian territory.

By this time the prospects of Ukraine's independence were increasingly grim. At the Paris Peace Conference which opened on 18 January 1919 a view that Ukraine should be treated as a part of Russia prevailed .

In these circumstances Petlyura decided to take one more chance and ventured a coalition with the Polish Government of Jozef Pilsudski which was also fighting against the Soviets. He saw such an alliance as the only possibility of preserving a non-Bolshevik Ukraine, ignoring the fact that it would make Ukraine a Polish satellite. The treaty of Warsaw signed between Poland and the Ukrainian People's Republic on 21 April 1920 endorsed the recognition of Petlyura's Directory by

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16 I.Mazepa, 'Ukrania under Bolshevist Rule', *Slavonic and East European Review* Vol. 12, No. 35, 1934, pp. 323-346.

the Polish Government, determined the border between the two states and stipulated the mutual guarantees of national and cultural rights. Besides, each party agreed not to conclude any international treaties to the prejudice of the other. For its right to independence Ukraine ceded Eastern Galicia, Western Volhynia, Polesie and the Kholm district to the Poles, placed its Army under Polish Command and let the Polish government take charge of its economic affairs. Although this agreement showed the weakness of the Directory, Petlyura did not see any other possibility of driving the Bolsheviks out of Ukraine.[17]

On 25 April 1920 the joint armies of Poland and Ukraine began their march on Kiev. On 7 May the capital was cleared of the Soviets but due to the lack of supplies the Polish troops had to withdraw back to Warsaw under the renewed attacks by the Bolshevik forces. At the end of July the Revolutionary Committee headed by Dzerzhinsky was declared by the Bolsheviks the highest authority in Poland and local committees were created in the towns captured by the Red Army. However, before long traditional Polish hostility towards the Russians, enhanced by the help of the French, enabled Marshal Pilsudski's army to launch a counter-attack threatening the Red Army with total defeat.

By this time the Allies were gradually transforming their strategy towards the Bolsheviks. Having realised that the counter-revolutionary forces in Russia were not sufficiently strong and united to oppose the Bolshevik forces effectively and that the continuation of the fight against a country with such a large territory and resources would entail unjustified human and financial sacrifices, on 16 January 1920 the Allied Supreme Council declared the end of the blockade of Soviet Russia. Without changing their attitude towards communist ideology the Allies decided to adopt a tactic of peaceful negotiations and trade believing that it would 'do more to oust or modify Bolshevism than armed intervention ever

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[17]R.Ullman, *Intervention and the War. Anglo-Soviet Relations, 1917-1921* (New Jersey, London: Princeton, 3 Vols, 1961-1972), Vol. 1, p. 46.

accomplished'.[18] The Anglo-Soviet negotiations on the trade agreement started in March 1921. This was one reason why Great Britain decided to become a mediator between Poland and Soviet Russia thereby perhaps preventing the defeat of the Red Army. On 12 October 1920 the preliminary peace was concluded in Riga and on 18 March 1921 Poland signed two separate treaties: one with Soviet Russia, another with Ukraine. Since the Directory had ceased to exist as an independent Ukrainian government and had almost no control over Ukrainian territory, local Bolsheviks became a signatory to the treaty in which the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic was recognised by the Polish Government. Thus while Eastern Galicia was given to Poland, the rest of Ukraine returned under Russia's control.

For more than seventy years it became a part of the Soviet 'Empire'. However, the short period of struggle for national liberation in 1917-1921 played an important part in the development of the Ukrainian nation and the eventual creation of its own statehood. It awakened the national self-consciousness of the masses and gave their leaders an opportunity to test and improve their policies which conditioned the transition of the Ukrainian national movement onto a higher level.

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[18]S.White, *Britain and the Bolshevik Revolution: A Study in the Politics of Diplomacy, 1920-1924* (London: Macmillan, 1979), p. 1.

CHAPTER 1. BRITISH-UKRAINIAN RELATIONS, 1917-1921

This chapter gives an account of British-Ukrainian bilateral relations in a broader context of the Entente's policies towards Ukraine during the last stages of the First World War and in its aftermath. As four major periods in the political history of Ukraine between 1917 and 1921 can be distinguished, the chapter is divided into four parts. The first deals with the events in Ukraine after the collapse of the Russian Empire, during the establishment of the first government of the newly formed Ukrainian People's Republic up to its de facto recognition by Great Britain and the subsequent suspension of their relations as a result of the conclusion of a separate peace treaty between Ukraine and the Central Powers. The second part considers the foreign policies of the next Ukrainian government, under the Central Powers' occupation, in the setting of their gradual decline and eventual defeat in the war, its plans to improve relations with the victorious Great Britain and other Allies as well as their response. The third part examines the attempts of the Directory, the Government of the second Ukrainian Republic, at obtaining British recognition and assistance, the activities of the official Ukrainian Mission in London and the attitude of various political circles in Britain to the question of Ukraine's independence. Finally, the fourth part examines the role that the British Cabinet played in resolving the problem of Western Ukraine at the Paris Peace Conference as well as in the Soviet-Polish war of 1920-1921, the outcome of which determined Ukraine's destiny for the next seventy years.

The Allies: The Ukrainian People's Republic and Great Britain in the War.

From the onset of the first Russian Revolution in February 1917 the pressure posed by the problem of nationalities throughout the former Empire became clearly evident. After the Provisional Government had declared the independence

of Poland and Finland the question of whether the Ukraine should get some degree of autonomy arose, attracting more and more attention both at home and abroad.

One of the main British sources of information on the Ukrainian situation was John Picton Bagge, at the time British Consul-General at Odessa. When the Congress of the Ukraine's political parties took place in Kiev in April 1917 Bagge reported on its principal decisions to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Arthur Balfour. Bagge noted that the major issue discussed at the Congress was the principle of national territorial autonomy which was seen as a basis for the future federal democratic Republic of Russia. The overwhelming majority of the delegates agreed that such a state should be established by the Constituent Assembly where all the nationalities of Russia would be represented. Among other decisions of the Congress was a resolution stating that the forthcoming Peace Conference should be attended by the representatives of not only the belligerent governments but also of those nations 'whose territory, including the Ukraine, had been fought over'.[1]

Similar information about the development of the political tendencies in the Ukraine came from Petrograd. British Ambassador to Russia, Sir George Buchanan, had never before been particularly interested in the Ukrainian movement. Yet when it became obvious that the Central Rada's political influence was beginning to grow he decided to send a special informant to Kiev. It was Professor Bernard Pares, one of the few scholars who had started making contributions to the development of knowledge about the Ukraine in Britain long before the outbreak of the First World War. His articles on the Ukrainian question had been published in *The Cambridge Modern History* since 1910.[2]

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[1]FO 371/3012/105711, 30 April 1917, p. 531.
[2]D.Saunders, 'Britain and the Ukrainian Question (1912-1920)', *English Historical Review* No. 103, January 1988, p. 43.

After the Central Rada issued its First Universal on 10 (23) June 1917 Pares met with the President of the Rada, Professor Hrushevsky, and asked him questions about plans for the Ukraine's future. Analysing information which he received from the Ukrainian leader, Pares sent a series of letters to Buchanan who transferred them to the Foreign Office in July 1917. Thus the Foreign Office learnt that while some politicians in the Ukraine desired to achieve a complete sovereignty for their country 'as a means to treating with Russia on equal terms' the majority of political parties sought federation on the basis of local autonomy.[3] Pares was convinced that the Ukrainians were 'for the frontiers of peoples and not for the frontiers of states' and that their aim was 'a Federal Russia with union of army, foreign policy and customs, to be realised by the agreement with Russia after the Constituent Assembly has met'.[4] Trying to persuade the British authorities, who suspected the Ukrainian movement of being pro-Austrian, that there remained no real forces supporting the Central Powers in either part of Ukraine any longer he stated that 'the Ukrainians are all for the continuance of the war in full union with the Alliance till peace is secured on the basis of frontiers of peoples'.[5]

However, at the same time the Director of the British Intelligence Division received confidential information that Metropolitan Sheptytsky, the head of the Ukrainian Uniate Church, had contacted the German and Austrian emissaries in Switzerland. The evidence indicated that he had been 'delegated by the Ukrainian Government to conclude an accord for a separate peace in the event of the armies of the Central Powers invading Ukrania'.[6] Among the claims put forward by the Central Rada was the separation of the Ukrainian provinces from Austria-Hungary. Representatives of Germany and Austria in return asked Ukraine for the termination of all the supplies to Russia and, should it become necessary, for an

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[3]FO 371/3012/145773, 12 July 1917, p. 537.
[4]ibid.
[5]ibid.
[6]FO 371/3012/N.I.D.14586, 17 August 1917, p. 548.

armed conflict with the latter.[7] Although these facts were extracted from a private letter and therefore could not be taken as absolutely trustworthy they gave the British grounds for concern.

However, officially Great Britain continued to assert that the Ukrainian movement was entirely a Russian domestic affair and preferred to leave it in the jurisdiction of the Provisional Government. Asked in the House of Commons whether certain sections of the population of Austria-Hungary and Rumania should be encouraged to unite with the Russian Ukraine and how the principle of national self-determination was to be implemented in this case, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Balfour answered that the British Government firstly 'have never accepted this impossible principle' and secondly could not interfere with Russia's internal arrangements.[8] However, such an attitude towards the principle of national self-determination soon had to be revised (at least publicly) by his Cabinet.

The Bolshevik insurrection on 7 November 1917 impelled the Rada to undertake a decisive action. On 25 November 1917 the Foreign Office received a telegram from Consul General at Odessa Bagge reporting that 'the Central Rada assumed full power over [the] whole of the ethnographic territory of Ukraine'.[9] In its Third Universal the Rada proclaimed itself in charge of all the domestic and foreign affairs of the Ukrainian People's Republic, having stated, however, that its ultimate goal would be a federation with Russia. Yet, informing the Foreign Office about his meeting with President Hrushevsky, Bagge noted that in spite of the Rada's declared intention to maintain the unity of the federal Russian Republic, the Ukrainian movement struck him as separatist and 'engineered' by Austria. 'I had interview today with President of Ukraine', wrote the British Consul, 'I gathered distinct impression that he was no friend of England, accusing

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[7]FO 371/3012/164013, 14 August 1917, p. 546.
[8]FO 371/3012/206201, p. 550.
[9]FO 371/3012/224704, p. 554.

England of never having done anything for them and of only having given money and little blood in common cause whereas they had made large sacrifices in men'.[10] The Ukrainian President contended that there were no economic gains for Russia as a whole in the war waged by Britain and Germany 'for world's market' and that its continuation would mean only more useless bloodshed and the exhaustion of the combatants. He disregarded the Consul's argument that 'premature peace meant war again in near future' and emphasised the imperative need for an immediate democratic peace. Therefore Bagge warned that 'unless most energetic and firm action is taken by Allies, if such is feasible, cooperating with some elements, then peace will be concluded on any terms'.[11]

In view of Bolshevik Russia's imminent withdrawal from the war to lose another ally, thus further improving the position of the Central Powers, was especially unacceptable. Therefore British interest in the events taking place on Ukrainian soil started to increase dramatically.

The actual and possible actions of the Ukrainian Government and, correspondingly the Allies' attitude towards the newly-founded state, became a constant subject of Foreign Office communications. The Office experts were instructed to familiarise themselves with the situation in Ukraine, and the scrupulous study of all reports sent by British ambassadors, consuls, military attachés, intelligence agents and even private persons from the territory of the former Russian Empire and Rumania began.

On 7 December 1917 Buchanan forwarded to the Foreign Office a thorough report on the political situation in Ukraine written by Major Rome, an officer in the Mission of General F.C. Pool. He stated that while ordinary Ukrainians, like all the other peoples of Russia, desired an immediate termination of the war, the

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[10]FO 371/3102/224708, 25 November 1917, p. 556.
[11]ibid.

Ukrainian Government did not wish to reconcile itself to 'a peace at any price'.[12] 'As their national aspirations include Lemberg [Lviv], part of Galicia and the internationalisation of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles their peace would seem to require victory', reasoned Rome.[13] On the basis of his interview with Petlyura, the new Ukrainian Minister of War, Rome confirmed that the Rada did not recognise Lenin's Government as the legitimate authority in Russia and planned to form a political and military bloc with other anti-Bolshevik forces in the south which would eventually extend its control over the whole country. Having ordered all the Ukrainian troops 'to remain at their posts, and not to fraternise or begin any truce with enemy', the Rada began the reorganisation and reinforcement of its army. Therefore, despite certain reservations regarding the reliability of the Ukrainian troops (a large part of whom were Russian soldiers 'flocking into Kiev from the Front and elsewhere and declaring themselves Ukrainians' in the hope of better life), Major Rome concluded that the Ukrainian movement was worth taking seriously.[14]

Since sustaining the war against the Central Powers was a primary object of British policy at the time, it determined the general direction of the Cabinet's foreign course and its attitude towards Ukraine in particular. The fear that the conclusion of the German-Russian peace treaty would strengthen Germany's positions was so strong that the British preferred to avoid any hostile action towards the Bolsheviks even when they proposed an armistice to the Central Powers. The Cabinet saw such a cautious policy towards the Soviets as a means of making Russia 'a continued cause of aggravation to Germany'.[15] Therefore while Trotsky was promoting his strategy of 'no war - no peace', the British Cabinet adopted the approach of 'no recognition - no non-recognition' with regard

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[12]FO 371/3102/243338, p. 583.
[13]ibid.
[14]ibid.
[15]J.Rakowsky, *'Franco-British Policy toward the Ukrainian Revolution, March 1917 to February 1918'*, Ph.D. Diss. (Case Western Reserve University, 1974), p. 136.

to both Soviet Russia and all the other political units which emerged on the territory of the former Empire.

Still, the British were covertly in touch with various forces, even openly hostile to the Bolsheviks, if they could be of help in keeping the Germans fighting in the East. As Prime Minister David Lloyd George stressed at the Inter-Allied Conference which opened on 29 November 1917 in Paris, Britain would feel free to support all those elements in Russia who were willing to fight the Central Powers.[16] Therefore the actual British policy in this matter presented a balance between supporting certain anti-Bolshevik forces and not antagonising the Soviets.

Although the General Secretariat declared its loyalty to the Allies, thus having secured a place among the belligerent elements favoured by Britain, it remained unclear whether Ukraine was actually capable of continuing the war. As a matter of fact, most of the forces mentioned above were unlikely to achieve any significant results in fighting either the Central Powers or the Bolsheviks separately. Therefore the British Government rightly considered them only as components of a broader scheme which envisaged the creation of a front of combined anti-Bolshevik forces effective in continuing the war against the Central Powers. Ukraine was regarded as a potential section of this front alongside Rumania, the Don and the Caucasus. Thus in forming its policy towards Ukraine Great Britain was to a large extent influenced by the events in other parts of the former Russian Empire and even outside its borders.

Among these Rumania was one of the most important factors affecting the British position with regard to Ukraine. The Bolsheviks' peace initiative forced the Rumanian government to consider withdrawal from the war as both the sources of provision and the possibility of retreat were denied to the Rumanian troops.

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[16]ibid., p. 136.

The Entente leadership realised that by overrunning Rumania, the Central Powers would be able to make contact directly with their allies, Bulgaria and Turkey, and thereby would gain access to the resources of Mesopotamia. Thus the task was to find a source of supply for Rumania in order to keep it in the war.

On 21 November 1917 the Rumanian question was discussed at the War Cabinet meeting. It was suggested that the Rumanian troops should join forces with the Don Cossacks headed by Ataman Kaledin. However, the fact that the Ukrainian-Rumanian frontier was the only one Rumania had with the former Russian Empire made it necessary to approach the Ukrainians first. Lord Robert Cecil, Under Secretary of State and a Minister of Blockade at the time, stated that 'the Ukraine is really the key of the situation since it not only contains some of the richest land but lies between Roumania and the Cossacks'.[17] The next day the Cabinet made a decision to provide support for Rumania's neighbours loyal to the Allies which were unspecified but presumably included Ukraine. Thus the pressure imposed by the Rumanian situation urged Britain to look to the Ukrainian Government in order to find an avenue of supply for Rumanian troops as well as for their retreat.

Events in the Don Cossack lands in the South of Russia constituted another factor which played a significant role in the shaping of British policy towards Ukraine. Leading anti-Bolshevik elements, including members of the former Russian governments and generals of the tsarist army, gathered there thus forming the core of the counter-revolutionary forces in Russia. Therefore, the Entente saw this region as the most suitable area for support and even possible intervention which was considered at a meeting of the Allied Prime Ministers on 1 December 1917.[18]

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[17]FO 371/3018/229278, pp. 175-176.

[18]Z.A.B.Zeman, *A Diplomatic History of the First World War*, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1971), p. 296.

A few days later Lord Cecil sent a telegram to Ambassador Buchanan suggesting that 'if a southern block could be formed consisting of the Cossacks, the Ukraine and the Roumanians it would probably be able to set up a reasonably stable Government and would in any case through its command of oil, coal and corn, control the whole of Russia'.[19] In order to strengthen these forces Buchanan was urged to provide the Cossacks and the Ukrainians with all the necessary funds. A copy of the telegram was also forwarded to Sir George Barclay, the British Minister at Jassy, authorising him 'to spend any sums necessary to secure the good will of the Ukraine authorities'.[20] It was decided that the British Consul at Odessa should be also informed of this policy and instructed to assist in its implementation 'without regard to expense'. Thus the British began to carry out the Allied plan of the formation of the new Southern front to be furnished by the Rumanian Army in the west, the Ukrainians in the centre, the armies of the Caucasus and the Cossacks in the east and the Czech and Polish legions between Ukrainian and Rumanian troops.[21]

However, at the same time opposition to the creation of the Ukrainian-Cossack union was growing among British officials. In early December 1917 the British Military attaché at Petrograd, General Knox, tried to dissuade Buchanan from encouraging and financing the alliance between the Cossacks and the Ukrainians on the grounds of their incompatibility and insufficient potential for fighting. Apart from that, as he rightly observed, there was a certain risk for the members of the British Embassy in associating with anti-Bolshevik forces in Bolshevik surroundings.[22]

Indeed, those who devised the Allied strategy with regard to the South of Russia overestimated the probability of such an alliance for they did not take into

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[19]FO 371/3018/229192, pp. 365-367.
[20]ibid.
[21]J.Rakowsky (1974), p. 161.
[22]O.Pidhainy, *The Formation of the Ukrainian Republic* (Toronto, New York: New Review Books, 1966), p. 323.

account the principal political discord among the forces which were to be brought together. While the main goal of the Ukrainians was to secure the independence of the Republic and develop national statehood, the aim of the Don Cossack leaders was to restore the great Empire. They refused to recognise the right of nationalities to self-determination and therefore resented co-operation with the Central Rada as a representative of a separate state. The Central Rada for its part could not have any friendly feelings towards those who denied the very existence of the Ukrainian nation. Therefore those who, like General Knox, objected to the Allied decision to generously finance this project proved to be more insightful.

'Ukro-sceptics' were vocal in the Intelligence Bureau of the Foreign Office which also possessed information unfavourable to Ukraine. Its memorandum written in mid-December 1917 said that the assurances of the Ukrainian Government of its loyalty to the Allies should not be accepted at their face value:

> 'In the first place the influence of the Rada over the Ukrainian people is not established on a very firm foundation, their territorial claims in Russia are disputed, and the success of their nationalist propaganda in the eastern districts they claim is still uncertain... there may be an anti-nationalist reaction headed by the Soviets in many of the towns the Rada claims as supporting its programme. In the second place there is always a danger that any recognition on the part of the Allies might be used by the Ukrainians simply to get better terms out of the Germans, while the Germans on their part might use it in order to complicate still further the relations between Britain and Russia'. [23]

General Knox, persisting in his attempts to alarm the authorities, also intimated to the Foreign Office that the Ukrainians were going to join peace negotiations with Germany. Doubts about the expediency of supporting Ukraine started to increase in Britain; the Central Rada's explanations that its dealings with Germany were designed only in order to gain time were received sceptically.

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[23] R.Ullman (1961), Vol. 1, p. 50.

However, there remained one more issue which kept the Cabinet's attention on Ukraine. Since one of Britain's traditional interests lay in the area of Persia and the Near East the development of events in the neighbouring Caucasus was closely followed by the Government. On 5 December the Commander of the Russian forces in the Caucasus informed the Allies that he was forced to conclude a cease-fire with the Turks but managed to secure as one of the conditions of the agreement the mutual abstention from any regrouping of forces which could affect the British troops in Mesopotamia. Therefore, in order to hold their positions the Commander asked the Allies for material help. On 8 December the War Office received a dispatch from the British Military Mission with the Caucasus Army stating that it would still be possible to improve the situation in the Caucasus if all the counter-revolutionary elements in Transcaucasia joined forces with the Ukrainians and the Cossacks, provided that the British Cabinet would give them financial assistance.[24]

Thus on 14 December 1917 in spite of the efforts made by Knox and Buchanan to prevent the spending of money for this purpose, the Cabinet approved two advances of £10 million: one of them was to be distributed by the British representatives in Rumania among those forces which would be willing to continue the war on the Rumanian and the Ukrainian fronts, the other was intended for the Cossacks. There was also a third unspecified amount for allocation to the forces in the Caucasus.

In order to determine channels for the supply of financial assistance to Ukraine Major Fitzwilliams of the British Military Mission and the French Military attaché on the South-Western front, General Tabouis, visited the Ukrainian Secretary for Foreign Affairs Oleksandr Shulgin on 1 December 1917. They expressed the understanding that the creation of the new state was a difficult task in the existing circumstances and therefore proposed technical and financial

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[24]Ibid., p. 51.

support from the Allied Governments. However, Shulgin in accordance with the Rada's decision, refused to accept these offers and instead insisted on the official recognition of the Ukrainian People's Republic or at least on the establishment of diplomatic connections.[25] After this meeting Fitzwilliams sent a report to London. Although having admitted that in case of the official recognition of Ukraine Britain could face a risk of 'backing a possible non-starter at long odds in the hope of getting a winner and thereby making a big coup', he nevertheless advocated recognition, maintaining that Ukrainian pro-Germanism was not dangerous any more and it was the Bolsheviks to fear in this regard.[26]

Indeed, the actions of the Soviet leaders confirmed the suspicion of the Allies that the Bolshevik revolution had been part of a German plot to remove Russia from the war. First there was the proclamation of the Peace Decree and the publication of the Entente's secret treaties and correspondence. Then the fraternisation with the enemy troops at the front was officially approved by the Soviet Government and the acting Commander-in-Chief of the Russian forces, General Dukhonin, was ordered to arrange an immediate armistice with the German Command. Encouraged by the Allies, Dukhonin attempted to disobey this order but was branded an enemy of the people by the Bolsheviks and died at the hands of a crowd agitated by the arrival of the new Soviet Commander Krylenko. The Allied Military Missions headed by British General Baxter, French General Lavergne, Generals Romelli, and Tagainaki of Italy and Japan respectively, as well as representatives of Rumania, Serbia and Belgium, were forced to transfer their headquarters from Mogilev to Kiev at the invitation of the Ukrainian Government. The latter organised an official military greeting, including bands and the inspection of Ukrainian troops. One more blow was struck against the Allies when the Bolsheviks signed an armistice with the Central Powers on 15 December. And although there was still a possibility that the Soviets would

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[25]J.Reshetar, *The Ukrainian Revolution, 1917-1920. A Study of Nationalism* (New Jersey: Princeton, 1952), p. 98.
[26]D.Saunders (1988), p. 63.

choose to fight rather than accept the German terms of a separate peace after the commencement of the formal peace negotiations on 22 December, the Allies decided to ensure that in the worst case scenario they would still have an option.

On the same day as the Bolsheviks opened their negotiations with the Germans a British delegation consisting of Lord Milner and Lord Cecil arrived in Paris for talks with the French Government. In order to spell out the Allied policy in the South of Russia and to co-ordinate the efforts of the two countries the British prepared a Memorandum which indicated that they had finally decided to depart from their course of non-interference. They suggested informing the Bolsheviks that although the Allies did not intend to interfere in Russian internal affairs they deemed it necessary to maintain as close relations as possible with Ukraine, the Cossacks, Finland, Siberia and the Caucasus 'because these various semi-autonomous provinces represent a very large proportion of the strength of Russia'.[27] The Memorandum emphasised that 'in particular, we feel bound to befriend the Ukraine since upon the Ukraine depends the feeding of the Rumanians to whom we are bound by every obligation of honour'.[28] Saving Rumania was declared the principal objective of the Allies. The next priority was preventing Germany and Austria from obtaining Ukrainian raw materials and food, wheat in particular. 'This makes another reason why we are anxious to support and strengthen the Ukraine', the British policy-makers stated.[29]

Since the most crucial point was money 'to reorganise the Ukraine, to pay the Cossacks and Caucasian forces, and to subsidise the Persians' the Memorandum suggested a division of responsibilities between Great Britain and France: the French would finance Ukraine, the Crimea and Bessarabia while the British would be responsible for the Caucasus, Armenia, Georgia, Kurdistan and the Cossack territories. Both Allies would appoint agents and officers 'to advise and

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[27]Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, Vol. 1, p.330.
[28]ibid.
[29]ibid., p. 331.

support the provincial governments and their armies' while 'the utmost unity of action' was to be ensured 'through carefully selected liaison officers'.[30]

Clemenceau and Pichon, who represented the French Government at the meeting, agreed to the terms suggested by the British. The agreement was officially signed as the 'Convention between France and England on the subject of activity in southern Russia' on 23 December 1917.

Referring to Ukraine in the Memorandum as a separate political unit indicated that the British had finally made up their mind with regard to Ukraine's independence. In order to prevent the danger of Ukrainian supplies falling into German hands the Allies naturally preferred to admit, at least temporarily, the existence of an independent Ukrainian Government than to treat the region as a part of Russia which was likely to succumb to unfavourable terms proposed by the Germans. Although Ukrainian representatives were also sent to Brest-Litovsk the Central Rada assured the Allies that it would not undertake any actions either at the fronts or with regard to the prisoners of war as it believed that it was 'indispensable to push on [peace] negotiations in agreement with Allies'.[31]

On 25 December the Ukrainian Government transmitted a note addressed to all belligerent and neutral powers in which it declared that it would not recognise any peace signed solely by Soviet delegates. As stipulated by the Rada's Third Universal the Ukrainian Republic entered into independent international relations until the formation of a Russian federation and therefore would consider obligatory only a peace treaty which had been accepted and signed by the Ukrainian Government. Among the other conditions of a general peace which the latter put forward in the note were guarantees of complete self-determination for every nation; denunciation of all annexations and contributions; material

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[30]ibid.
[31]FO 371/3012/240021, p.570.

assistance to small nations ruined by the war; and Ukraine's participation in all peace negotiations, conferences and congresses on a par with other states.[32] In conclusion the note stated:

> 'Firmly supporting the demand for a universal, democratic peace, the General secretariat, striving at the same time to hasten this general peace to the utmost of its power, and recognizing the great importance of efforts to speed its realization, finds it necessary to have its representatives in Brest Litovsk, hoping, at the same time, that the final peace will be crowned with an international congress, to which the government of the Ukraine republic summons all belligerent powers to take part'.[33]

In these circumstances Great Britain and France opted for a policy of recognition of the Ukrainian People's Republic. On 29 December 1917 the French envoy to Rumania Saint-Aulaire signed a letter appointing General Tabouis a Commissioner of the French Republic in Ukraine. A few days later John Picton Bagge, the former British Consul-General in Odessa, was chosen by the Cabinet for the post of the British Representative in Ukraine. Since there was no possibility of sending a letter of appointment from London it was done by telegraphic communication. Bagge presented himself before the head of the General Secretariat V.Vynnychenko and read a short Declaration written in French:

> 'Your Excellency,
>
> I have the honour to inform you that His Britannic Majesty's Government has appointed me by cable as the sole representative at present of Great Britain in Ukraine.
>
> I am directed by my Government to assure you of its goodwill. It will support the Ukrainian Government to the utmost of its ability in the task which it has undertaken of establishing good government, maintaining order, and resisting the Central Powers who are enemies of Democracy and Humanity.

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[32]Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, Vol. 1, 1 January 1918, p. 416.
[33]ibid., p. 417.

As far as I, personally, am concerned, I have the honour to assure Your Excellency of my whole hearted support in the realisation of our common ideal.

Picton Bagge
British Representative in Ukraine'.[34]

Thus de facto relations were established between Great Britain and the Ukrainian People's Republic.

It can be argued that this act cannot be qualified as diplomatic recognition of Ukraine by Britain or France as neither Tabouis nor Bagge had the letters of credence signed by a head of state. It would not be difficult to agree that by sending their representatives to Kiev the Allies rather followed 'a policy of explorative opportunism prompted by military considerations'.[35] However it is impossible to deny that Great Britain, as well as France, de facto acknowledged the existence of Ukraine, was compelled to regard it as independent from the rest of Russia and deemed it an essential factor when forming its policy in the region. Thus what had been achieved by the Rada by the beginning of 1918 (due to both its own efforts and external circumstances) can be considered as the first international success of the Ukrainian People's Republic.

However it was not destined to enjoy the fruits of its success for long. The rapid advance of Bolshevik troops prompted the Central Rada to complete the negotiations it began with the Central Powers in December 1917 and the day following the capture of Kiev by the Red Army the peace treaty of Brest Litovsk was signed. The Allied representatives stayed in Kiev for a few more weeks. Having immediately abandoned the policy of befriending the independent Ukrainian government they tried to settle relations with the Soviets which were establishing their power in Ukraine. A day after Kiev was occupied by the Reds

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[34]A.Margolin, *Ukraina i Politica Antanty* (Berlin: S. Efron, 1921), p. 371.
[35]J.Reshetar (1955), p. 101.

the Bolshevik commandant of the city held a conference with the Consular Corps. He asked the British Vice Consul whether the British Commissioner Bagge 'intended to remain in Kiev, and whether it was true that the British had recognised the Rada government'.[36] He stressed that although the Bolsheviks wished to remain friendly with Great Britain this was the question they needed to have answered. The Vice Consul replied that the Commissioner was already conferring with the Bolshevik Commander in Chief and explained that as far as he knew the British Government had not recognised Ukraine, having appointed Mr. Bagge only 'unofficially to look after British interests'.[37] Such behaviour by British diplomats was understandable as the volatility of the situation demanded a flexibility of reaction and in view of the fact that the Rada concluded 'a separate peace with the Central Powers entirely against the interests and wishes of the Allies' the latter had little moral obligation to abide by the policy once declared.[38]

Immediately after Ukraine signed a separate peace treaty the British government formulated its attitude towards the Bolsheviks. As it was deemed 'most undesirable to risk a complete rupture with them' the most rational solution would be to instruct the representative of the British Embassy at Petrograd, Lockhart, to continue 'informal and unofficial' negotiations with the Soviets. 'The British Government would in this way be entering into relations with the de facto Bolsheviki government at Petrograd in exactly the same way as they had done with the de facto governments in the Ukraine, Finland, and elsewhere'.[39]

Due to the impending arrival of the Austrian and German forces in Kiev the consulates of all the Allied powers were closed on February 24, and the French, British, and American consular representatives left that evening for Moscow. Commissioners Bagge and Tabouis, appointed respectively by Britain and France

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[36]Foreign Relations, Russia, Vol. 2, p. 674.
[37]ibid.
[38]ibid., p. 673.
[39]ibid., Vol. 1, p. 378.

to the Ukrainian government, left two days earlier with the military missions of their countries.[40] Thus relations between Great Britain and Ukraine were temporarily terminated.

A Time of Drift: The Hetman Regime and the British Attitude.

However, even after recalling their diplomats from Ukraine the British continued to follow the evolution of events there. Diplomats remaining in Russia tried to collect as much information on Ukraine as possible and the British Mission in Berlin regularly sent to London reports on the development of German-Ukrainian links.

When it became obvious that the Rada was neither competent to control the country nor able to proceed with the implementation of the peace treaty it was replaced by the regime of Hetman Skoropadsky, which was branded by its adversaries, Russian in particular, a 'German puppet'. A new government was faced with the obligations its predecessor could not accomplish: to supply the Central Powers with provisions while maintaining their troops on Ukrainian territory. The Hetman government vigorously undertook this responsibility at the same time making every effort to benefit from the situation, primarily to establish order in the country and to reach a political settlement with Russia. To this end the presence of German and Austro-Hungarian troops whose arrival was greeted by the Ukrainian population tired of constant fighting and especially of the Red terror certainly was of use. Besides, the new Ukrainian leaders were devising a scheme which indicated that Hetman's regime was not entirely a puppet. They realised that it would not be in Ukraine's interest if either the Central Powers or the Entente took the upper hand in the war. A victory of the former would have meant the strengthening of the German control over Ukraine while in case of the Allied victory Ukraine would have had to pay the bill for the treaty of Brest-

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[40]ibid., p. 672.

Litovsk and the chances of winning back their support would have been minimal. Therefore, the new Ukrainian government decided to invest in the future strength and independence of its country by building national forces while hoping that, due to the exhaustion of the both warring parties, they would eventually reach a compromise.

However, the British, who had never quite given up the idea that the Ukrainian separatist movement was instigated by the Central Powers and later convinced themselves that the treaty of Brest Litovsk was an ultimate proof of that, refused to believe that the new Ukrainian government was anything but a German puppet.

Embittered by Ukraine's betrayal the British Government did not see (or did not want to see) that such co-operation could be the only option the former had at the time. As Hetman's Minister for Foreign Affairs, Vasilenko, stated shortly after his appointment in May 1918, despite the unfavourable conditions and the disadvantageous commercial treaties, it was better to make use of what was on offer than to let the Bolsheviks 'come again and repeat all their experiments' which would put Ukraine on the path of destruction. 'The moment is sure to come when it will be possible for the Ukraine to exist independently and when she will have to work at the establishment of a Ukrainian national state', enthused the Minister.[41] Referring to the nature of his country's relations with both the Entente and the Central Powers Vasilenko admitted:

> 'I have long ... been convinced that historical conditions are such that our economic and commercial interests are united to the Central Powers, chiefly to Germany. Some may reply that we have obligations to the Allies. It is true that we gave the Allies our word, but we have not kept it. That was [a] difficult psychological moment but we have lived through it all and are faced with bare reality. ... A country always must stand on the basis of state interests and the attitude of a country is susceptible to change. ... It is necessary to stand on a basis of effective relations with the Central powers

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[41]Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, Vol. 2, 22 May 1918, p. 690.

and lead them of course in the interests of the establishment of a free Ukraine'.[42]

The Minister argued that Ukraine's relations with Germany were in all aspects closer than with Britain: Ukrainian science and commerce always drew strength from Germany; their political interests predominantly coincided ('...and England's often differed', e.g. the loss of the Dardanelles and Constantinople 'due to English diplomacy'); finally, Ukraine and Germany were geographical neighbours whose interests 'should intertwine'.[43]

Although such a close friendship between Ukraine and Germany did not cause many objections at home for some time, there existed an opinion that in fact Germany was not interested in the prospects of developing relations with independent Ukraine but was rather concerned with extracting from it all available resources in the shortest possible time.[44] This scepticism turned out to be justified.

Shortly afterwards information was received in London that the forced collection of grain initiated by the Hetman Government was causing discontent not only among peasants but also among landlords who were to pay the German authorities 10 to 20 per cent of the value of the owned land.[45] Zealous efforts by the Germans to strip Ukraine of foods, textiles and raw materials, while failing to keep their promises of manufactured goods supply, led first to passive resistance and later to open riots in different regions of Ukraine. The British started anticipating the prospects of a mass revolt in Ukraine. In November 1918, shortly before the armistice, *The New Statesman* predicted a peasant revolution 'of the fiercest character' in both Russian and Austrian Ukraine.[46] However, such a

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[42]ibid.
[43]ibid.
[44]ibid., p. 691.
[45]M.Hrushevsky, A History of Ukraine (London, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1941), p. 540.
[46]D.Saunders (1988), p. 64.

revolution was not destined to happen as the Central Powers collapsed. After the armistice was signed on 11 November 1918 the Allies ordered the German troops to remain temporarily on Ukrainian territory in order to maintain a bulwark against the Bolsheviks. But the discipline among German and Austrian soldiers was impaired by Bolshevik propaganda as well as by rumours about uprisings back home. Therefore, they began to evacuate Ukraine which significantly weakened the Hetman's position. In order to stay in power the Hetman undertook a hasty action intended to outmanoeuvre both the Allies and the pro-Russian forces in Ukraine. He declared himself a champion of the federation with non-Bolshevik Russia, hoping to regain a sympathetic attitude towards Ukraine on the part of the White Russians and the Entente which was supporting them. The far-reaching plan was to invigorate Ukraine by the time a non-Bolshevik Russia had reappeared.

In order to back its claims about the exigency of co-operation with non-Bolshevik Russia the Hetman's Government initiated contacts with General Denikin's Volunteer Army and some other counter-revolutionary groups. Thus, in its note to the representatives of Don, Kuban, Terek, Georgia and the Volunteer Army, the Ukrainian Government emphasised that for a successful re-unification of Russia and its liberation from the Bolsheviks it was crucial to consolidate all efforts and suggested calling a conference in Kiev to decide upon future joint actions.[47] Such a conference was convened, although in Jassy, on 16 November 1918 and after 23 November was moved to Odessa where it continued until 6 December.[48] The Allied envoys, who also attended it, were asked for military help in order to overthrow the Bolshevik Government. Despite Skoropadsky's assurances of devotion to restoring Russia, representatives of all the other regions were concerned about the danger his regime presented to the common cause of re-unification. Russian delegates believed that the delay in the withdrawal of

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[47]Ukr. M.F.A. 3766/1/146, p. 8.

[48]G.A.Brinkley, *The Volunteer Army and Allied Intervention in South Russia, 1917-1921*, (University of Notre Dame Press, 1966), p. 81.

German troops from Ukrainian territory was connected with the Hetman's efforts to complete the formation of his own national army capable of fighting the Russians. They warned the Entente's representatives that 'only the immediate arrival of Allied forces can prevent a rising of anti-social and narrow nationalistic elements which will plunge the country into the chaos and anarchy' referring both to the Hetman Government and the emerging Directory.[49]

Ironically, this was exactly what the Hetman counted on. The situation in Ukraine and especially in Kiev was quite difficult. The evacuating German troops left the territory open to the Reds who began their occupation at a daunting pace. The local Bolsheviks, encouraged by these moves, began to incite revolts and to establish Soviets throughout Ukraine impeding the provisioning of Kiev. At the same time Petlyura's troops, hostile to both the Hetman's regime and the Bolsheviks, were moving towards the capital. 'The salvation of the country entirely depends on the states of the Entente' wrote the Hetman's Prime Minister Gerbel in his telegram to General Rauch. 'The immediate advance of the Allied troops towards Kiev is of the greatest importance', he pleaded.[50]

Thus both anti-Bolshevik parties - the White Russian leadership and the Ukrainian Government - concurred in regarding the intervention of the Entente as the only appropriate course of action (albeit for different reasons) and the latter admitted that further delay in following it could render the situation irreversible.

At the meeting of the Allied envoys at Jassy the French Vice-Consul in Kiev Henno was appointed a plenipotentiary of the Entente powers in South Russia. Upon his arrival in Odessa in the first week of December 1918 he forwarded to the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry a series of telegrams which indicated that the

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[49]J.Reshetar (1955), p. 236.
[50]Ukr. M.F.A. 3766/1/146, p. 14.

Allies decided to recognise the Hetman's regime and to provide it with necessary assistance:

> '...the Entente powers intend to support, with all their force, the existing authority at Kiev represented by the hetman and his government, in the hope that he will be able to maintain order in the cities and provinces until the arrival of the Allied troops in the country. The soldiers of the Entente powers do not desire to enter your territory as enemies or police. They come as friends of people who for two years have fought in the same ranks. Every attack upon the existing authorities, every revolt which will render [harder] the task of the Allies, will be severely punished. The Entente powers urge you to preserve calm, to return to your work, and to aid in the maintenance of order'.[51]

This surprising determination was the product of desperate efforts to curb the spread of the 'red menace' by any means: as the existing government of Ukraine 'represented the only organization which could at present be utilized against Bolshevism' it had been resolved to support it 'without making engagements any time for the future'.[52]

Henno declared that political and economic issues as well as the question of Ukraine's self-determination would be examined upon the arrival of Allied armed forces and political representatives. On 18 December 1918 twelve thousand French troops crossed the Black Sea and entered Odessa. However, at exactly the same time the Directory had settled in Kiev and, having declared the establishment of the Ukrainian People's Republic, began to perform as a new state authority.

The Stalemate: Directory's Foreign Policy and Britain's Aloofness.

Although little was known about Petlyura in either Britain or any other Allied country two facts to which various sources pointed - his opposition to

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[51]Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, Vol. 2, p. 701.
[52]ibid., p. 702.

Skoropadsky's new doctrine of a federal Russia not to mention Denikin's ambitions, and his possible connection to the Bolsheviks - prompted the British Cabinet to adopt a hostile position with regard to the new Ukrainian government.

At the meeting of the Allied leaders preceding the opening of the Paris Peace Conference the British Prime Minister commented with regret:

'As to the Ukraine, where we had supposed a firm Government had been established, our information was that an adventurer with a few thousand men had overturned it with the greatest ease. This insurrection had a Bolshevik character, and its success made it clear that the Ukraine was not the stronghold against Bolshevism that we had imagined. The same movement was therefore beginning in the Ukraine which had been completed in Great Russia. The former Government of the Ukraine had been a Government of big landlords only maintained in power by German help. Now that the Germans had withdrawn, the peasants had seized their opportunity. We were going to spend our resources in order to back a minority of big landlords against an immense majority of peasants?'[53]

The British leadership was convinced that at a time when the Bolsheviks were strengthening their power it could not countenance the fragmentation of the counter-revolutionary forces. Such a fragmentation was viewed as an opportunity for the Bolsheviks to defeat them one by one and to establish a new Empire on a different footing yet more formidable. The Bolsheviks, widely advertising their principle of an equal union between the Great Russians and the non-Russian population, had a fair chance of winning the support of the national minorities on the territory of the former Empire and thereby achieving their ideal of restoring the country in its previous borders. The only real force which could be opposed to the Bolsheviks at that time was General Denikin's Army which was therefore getting most of the Allied assistance. However, having the same aim as the Bolsheviks, of restoring a 'united and indivisible' Russia, Denikin was more straightforward and did not hide behind the slogans of co-operation with the national movements. It was obvious that he would never be reconciled to the idea

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[53]ibid., 1919, Russia, p. 14.

of an independent Ukraine. Therefore the situation at the beginning of 1919 was unfavourable for the Ukrainians in terms of Allied help.

However, the Directory did not give up its efforts to improve relations with the victorious Entente. In January 1919 the Government appointed the Ukrainian Diplomatic Mission to London. It was headed by Dr. M.Stakhovsky and was composed of ten members: counsellors M.Melenevsky and Y.Olesnycky, attachés L.Bazilevich and S.Shapharenko, two secretaries and four junior officers.

The Mission arrived in London in May 1919 and in the first issue of its weekly bulletin declared that its main objectives were to secure the recognition of the Ukrainian People's Republic by the British Government, to obtain the latter's moral and material support and to establish commercial relations between the two countries.[54] Naturally, these goals were a distant prospect and in the meantime the Ukrainian diplomats had to perform numerous everyday tasks on a much smaller scale.

First of all, they had to spread information about Ukraine, its history, traditions and aspirations, thereby expanding British knowledge about the country and increasing the number of its supporters. However, as Melenevsky wrote in his letter of 13 July 1919 to the Ukrainian Minister for Foreign Affairs Temnitsky, the process of gaining supporters in Great Britain was very slow. Since its arrival in London the Ukrainian Mission had been received neither by Balfour nor by his Under Secretaries. The only person who met with them was J.D.Gregory, a Foreign Office executive in charge of the issues related to Russia. He proved to be well acquainted with the Ukrainian situation and after the amicable first encounter continued to keep in touch with the members of the Mission.[55]

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[54]D.Saunders (1988), p. 67.
[55]Ukr. M.F.A. 3696/1/39, p. 45.

The reluctance of the British establishment to get involved in any serious relations with the Ukrainians was one of many problems the Mission encountered from the start. The rest were connected with the lack of funding which greatly affected all aspects of its activity. For instance, due to financial difficulties the Information Bureau of the Mission had to be dismissed even before its departure and all the necessary information was supposed to be publicised with the assistance of British journalists. Counsellors Melenevsky and Olesnycky assured Minister Temnitsky that in addition to saving money this would minimise the suspicions on the part of the British Government that the Ukrainians were actively engaged in propagandist activities.[56]

Thus the task of developing links with the British press arose. The Mission decided to publish its bulletin not once but twice a week and for this purpose the services of local volunteers, both British and Ukrainian émigrés, were to be utilised. However, the Mission's limited funds did not allow its members to perform at an appropriate level, not to mention securing access to influential circles, which certainly did not assist in promoting Ukraine's image in Britain.[57].

In the meantime renewed turmoil was spreading in Ukraine. At the beginning of February 1919 the Directory had to leave Kiev, which was once again occupied by the Bolshevik forces. To be able to handle this state of emergency in the best possible way Petlyura was proclaimed the President of the Directory and the Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Army. The Government had settled in Vinnitsa and immediately started negotiations with the French Command in Odessa. The French were asked for support and recognition in exchange for transferring to them control over finances, railways and the entire internal policy. The French Command agreed to recognise the Directory as the only Ukrainian authority until the final decision on Ukraine's sovereignty had been made at the

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[56]Ukr. M.F.A. 3639/1/39, p. 5.
[57]Ukr. M.F.A. 3639/1/39, pp. 44-47.

Paris Peace Conference and guaranteed technical aid to the Ukrainian army in its struggle against the Bolsheviks. A draft of the agreement was ready by the end of March 1919.

This caused discontent in the British Cabinet which submitted a Memorandum to the French Ambassador on 20 March 1919. It read:

'His Majesty's Government are of course unaware of the reasons which have prompted the French authorities to establish relations with the Ukraine Directory, but they would point out that all the information they have received is to the effect that that body, in so far as it stands for the independence of the Ukraine, can never hope to control the masses of the people of the Ukraine, who are decidedly in sympathy with the maintenance of union with Russia, and that consequently to rely on this body to the detriment of General Denikin can only be attended with disappointment, if not with disaster. It must never be forgotten that the idea of an independent Ukraine had its origin in Germany, was supported by a block of political intrigues, and is not justifiable either geographically or ethnographically. It can in effect only finally serve the ends of Germany and is consequently neither in the best interests of the French and British Governments'.[58]

Although it remains unclear what had a greater influence - political considerations stated in the British Memorandum or the fear of the open war with the Red Army - at the end of March representatives of the French Command informed the Directory that they had been ordered to stop negotiations. In a few days the French troops, surpassed by the Red Army in number, began to evacuate Odessa. Political power in Ukraine was captured by the Bolsheviks once again.

However, on 30 August 1919 the Bolshevik Government was driven out of Kiev under the simultaneous offensive of Petlyura's troops and Denikin's Volunteer Army. Yet, instead of advancing towards Moscow, Denikin declared that his current aim was Ukraine and the defeat of Petlyura's army. He even refused to listen to Churchill who insisted that he should be reconciled to the Ukrainian

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58 BDFA, P. 2, Series A, Doc. 12, p. 64.

movement for the sake of Russia's salvation from the Bolsheviks. Everything that looked distinctively ethnic became his target. He banned the Ukrainian language, books and newspapers, and the very land could only be referred to as South Russia or Little Russia. His Army, without proclamation of war, attacked the troops of the Ukrainian People's Republic, assaulted the headquarters of various national organisations including the Red Cross, and organised anti-Jewish pogroms.[59]

In these circumstances the Directory was compelled to issue a note on 7 October 1919 'To the States of the Entente and to the States of the Whole World' openly protesting against the arbitrary acts of General Denikin who disregarded not only the will of the Ukrainian people to build their national state but also the sensible advice of the Allies who were supporting him. The Government of Ukraine disclaimed all responsibility for the bloodshed and expressed the hope that the Allies, who assisted Denikin in his struggle against the violence of the Bolsheviks, would not encourage him to violate the rights of the Ukrainian people. The states of the Entente were asked to force Denikin to leave Ukraine and give the Ukrainian Government an opportunity to restore order and law in the country.[60]

In these circumstances the most urgent and difficult task of the Ukrainian Mission in London was to fight Russian propaganda. The latter proved very effective in impeding any improvement in British-Ukrainian relations due to three factors: its long-term expertise, the large numbers of Russians living in Britain, and the traditional economic ties between the two countries. The existence of numerous Anglo-Russian societies, joint industrial and commercial companies, political groups mainly of monarchist character as well as the White Russian Military Headquarters which was attached to the War Cabinet and participated in

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[59]Ukr. M.F.A. 3693/1/38, pp. 56-57.
[60]ibid.

the planning of military operations, enhanced the determination of the British Government, above all the head of the War Cabinet Churchill, to support the idea of a united and indivisible Russia. As a result, by the beginning of October 1919 the British authorities pledged to provide General Denikin with £40 million worth of material assistance.[61] All this inevitably reinforced the negative attitude of the Government towards an independent Ukraine.

Yet, Ukraine's cause found sympathisers. As opposed to Churchill, who was the most vigorous supporter of Denikin, Sir Robert Cecil believed that the conflict with the Bolsheviks should be resolved by way of peaceful negotiations and insisted on the withdrawal of the British troops from Russia and the termination of all material aid to the Volunteer Army. Besides, the Liberals had particular respect for the principle of national self-determination and defended the Ukrainian cause in periodicals such as *The Nation* and *The Liverpool Courier*.[62] The Ukrainians were also strongly supported by the British Labour movement, and *The Daily Herald* published favourable articles about Ukraine. Such support from British political organisations strengthened the Ukrainian propaganda against Denikin. Discrediting him by means of diplomacy was seen by the Ukrainian Government as an important complement to military strikes. It hoped that such a combination would prove detrimental to the Allied policy of intervention, that its failure would lead to a crisis of the British Cabinet and subsequent parliamentary elections, resulting in a new Government which would be much friendlier to the Ukrainians than its predecessor.[63]

By this time officials both in the Foreign Office and in the War Cabinet themselves realised that large-scale help to the Volunteer Army and the other anti-Bolshevik Russian forces was not going to bring about the desired results. By the end of 1919 General Denikin's troops were in retreat before the Red Army

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[61]Ukr. M.F.A. 3639/1/39, p. 60.
[62]Ukr. M.F.A. 3639/1/39, pp. 60-61.
[63]Ukr.M.F.A. 3639/1/39, pp. 60-64.

which recaptured Kiev in December. However, the expectations of the Ukrainians that the collapse of Denikin would entail changes in their favour in British foreign policy were not justified. The British chose the strategy of reconciliation with the Bolsheviks.

Thus the Ukrainians were doomed to fail in their attempts to gain British sympathy. In reply to their requests for recognition, military aid and help in returning Ukrainian prisoners of war from Italy, Germany and Czechoslovakia in order to make military formations from them, the same J.Gregory who was so friendly to the members of the Directory's Mission half a year ago, noted: 'We have never had any dealings with the Ukraine at any time, and there is no reason why we should have any now. The bandit Petlyura, who called himself head of the Ukrainian Government, is now fugitive in Poland'. 'Ignore this note', he summed up with regard to the application for at least a de facto recognition made by the Ukrainian Mission on 23 January 1920.[64] By 'dealings' he most probably meant diplomatic relations or military alliances since Gregory himself had contacts with the official Ukrainian representatives as well as some representatives of industrial and financial circles. Cultural relations between the two countries also existed.

By this time some changes in the composition of the Mission in Great Britain occurred. A famous public figure Arnold Margolin was appointed as head of the Mission and in early 1920 came to London. On his arrival Margolin undertook vigorous attempts to improve the situation. He met with J.Gregory, wrote a detailed letter to the new Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Lord Curzon, and made an appointment with Permanent Under Secretary, Lord Hardinge. He noted later in his memoirs that interest in Ukrainian affairs seemed to start growing again in Britain.[65] Although the official stance on Petlyura's regime could hardly

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[64]BDFA, 11786;111818, appendix 2, file 21.
[65]A.Margolin (1921), p. 213.

be changed, the Ukrainians managed to strengthen the sympathies of the British Labour movement. However, as soon as the Ukrainian Government signed the treaty of Warsaw with the Poles on 21 April 1920, the attitude of the Labour Party towards Ukraine started deteriorating because of Labour opposition to support for Poland against Russia as well as to the growth of Franco-Polish influence in Eastern Europe in general.

The fact that the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not send the text of the agreement with the Polish Government to the Mission in London caused dissatisfaction among its members who had learned about this event from unofficial sources. In general the Mission was cut off from Ukraine and received very scarce information about the Government's policies and the situation at home in general.

An indicator of the increasing irrelevance of the Ukrainian question in British policies was the fact that the Ukrainians were not invited to the Conference of the representatives of Soviet Russia, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania and Finland which was planned to commence in London and was intended to remove all inconsistencies and to establish peace between the Bolsheviks and their neighbours. When members of the Ukrainian Mission in London asked British officials why they were ignored while the Galician Ukrainians had a right to take part in the negotiations, the reply was that since one of the responsibilities of the Paris Peace Conference was to solve the problem of the Austro-Hungarian heritage the question of Eastern Galicia had to be considered as a part of this problem. The British assured the Ukrainian Mission that they appreciated the Ukrainian movement but pointed out that the future of the peoples of the former Russian Empire was not on the Paris Peace Conference's agenda and therefore could not be considered at the conference in London. However, they assured the anxious diplomats that when the Ukrainian people gained independence and built

their national state Great Britain would be pleased to recognise this fact.[66] Thus the British finally filed away the question of an independent Ukraine.

Down and Out in Paris and London: The Ukrainian Missions, the British Response and the End of Independence.

The Paris Peace Conference, intended to establish a just international order after the capitulation of the Central Powers in the First World War, opened on 18 January 1919. One of the problems which the Conference had to resolve was the future of Eastern Galicia. This region was of particular importance to the Allies owing to two factors. First of all, it was a part of the Austro-Hungarian legacy which required an immediate settlement according to the principle of national self-determination. Secondly, the Poles, favoured by the Allies as a bulwark against Bolshevism, began to carry out an exceedingly independent policy in the region which provoked an undesired Bolshevik reaction. Claiming Eastern Galicia to be a historical part of Poland since the fourteenth century the Polish Government refused to recognise the Western Ukrainian People's Republic which was formed there after the collapse of the Dual Monarchy. Polish troops were located in the region threatening the existence of the new state.

In December 1918 Dr. Petrushevich, the President of the Ukrainian National Rada, appealed to the Allies in the name of the principle of national self-determination to force the Poles to evacuate Eastern Galicia.[67] While the French remained adamantly pro-Polish the British Cabinet proved to be quite sympathetic to the Galician Ukrainians. Asserting that each nation of the Habsburg Empire had its right to liberty and equality Lloyd George adopted a policy of restraining the Poles in their excessive demands. According to the maps at his disposal, the majority of the population in Eastern Galicia was Ukrainian.

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[66]Ibid., p. 239.
[67]J.Reshetar (1955), p. 272.

Therefore he believed that Poland should not be allowed to seize the territory which ethnically was foreign.[68]

In February 1919 the Allies sent to Lviv a Commission whose task was to overcome the hostilities between the Ukrainians and the Poles. It was headed by General Barthelemy and included British, French, Italian and American representatives. By this time the Western Ukrainian People's Republic had proclaimed a union with its Eastern neighbour. Their armed forces were consolidated and subordinated to Petlyura who became Commander-in-Chief of all Ukrainian troops. Although the Allies did not recognise Petlyura's Directory the Commission met with the representatives of both Poland and Ukraine in order to take into account the views of both warring parties and to conciliate their territorial demands.

The Ukrainians were ready to cease fire if the frontier were established along the River Syan and the Polish troops withdrew from the railway between Lviv and Peremyshl. However, the Poles put forward the demand for the River Zbruch frontier which lay 160 miles to the east of the Syan and embraced Eastern Galicia.[69]

Having tried to find a middle ground between those demands, the Commission eventually had to recognise that its efforts were futile. In order to bring the negotiations to a conclusion the Supreme Council decided to undertake one more attempt. On 18 April it formed another Inter-Allied Commission for the negotiation of an armistice between Poland and Ukraine. The Commission consisted of one military and one civilian representative from each country of the Entente concerned with the question of Eastern Galicia and was presided over by the British General, Louis Botha. It was to meet with the representatives of the

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[68]H.Elcock, 'Britain and the Russo-Polish Frontier, 1919-1921', *Historical Journal* Vol. 12, No. 1, 1969, pp. 137-138.
[69]J.Reshetar (1955), p. 273.

Polish and Ukrainian delegations at the Paris Peace Conference and determine the conditions upon which the confronting parties would be ready to conclude a peace treaty.[70] At these meetings the Ukrainian side was represented by the President of the Mission of the Ukrainian People's Republic, G.Sydorenko, the Vice-President, Dr. B.Paneyko, as well as two special delegates from Western Ukraine, M.Lozynsky and D.Witowsky.

Before it began its participation in the negotiations of the armistice the Ukrainian Mission had to accomplish an important task on its way to Paris. Its members contacted representatives of Belorussia, Kuban and Don, who arrived in Odessa for a meeting with the French Command who at that time still remained there, and suggested submitting a joint Declaration to the Allies in order to secure support in their struggle against the Bolsheviks. A draft of the Declaration written by Margolin was approved by the majority of the delegates. The first point of the Declaration touched upon a form of the state organisation in the political units represented. The second one suggested ways of suppressing anarchy and Bolshevism in the former Russian Empire. The Declaration said that although after the first Russian Revolution in February 1917 different parts of the Russian Empire, among them Ukraine, Kuban, Belorussia and Don, had voted for the federation, the seizure of power by the Bolsheviks made federation from above impossible. The only way to implement the federative principles was from below, by means of a voluntary agreement between all the units established on the ruins of the Russian Empire. Therefore, representatives of Ukraine, Belorussia, Don and Kuban argued that the question of the state organisation of these four territories could be resolved only by means of separate development of their state structures. However, after anarchy had been suppressed and the population had an opportunity to express its free will, the conditions would arise on which an agreement could be signed. In regard to the second point the attention of the Allied Command was drawn to the fact that a struggle against Bolshevism would

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[70]BDFA, Vol. 2, Doc. 29, p. 181.

be really effective if it were the struggle of a local population defending its homeland. In a general request for technical aid, representatives of the four regions emphasised that for combating the Soviets successfully they first needed a common headquarters to co-ordinate all the operations on the basis of an agreement between their governments and the states of the Entente. Such a headquarters, however, was not supposed to interfere with the political life of the newly established states.[71]

This Declaration was submitted to the Supreme Military Staff of the Entente in Odessa on 5 February 1919 and at the same time published in all the city newspapers. It was widely attacked by those who were awaiting the deliverance of Russia by the Volunteer Army of General Denikin and surprisingly neglected by the French who at the time claimed their support for the Directory. The British attitude was unaltered and, as a result, this appeal for Allied support of the local anti-Bolshevik forces did not secure any support by the Entente.

In the middle of April the Ukrainian delegation arrived in Paris. In May 1919 it dispatched Margolin to London in order to settle some organisational problems encountered by the diplomatic Mission of the Ukrainian People's Republic to Great Britain. As it got stranded in Denmark waiting for visas to enter Britain he had to meet with British officials and to obtain the necessary permission.

At the time the 'Russian Department' of the Foreign Office was supervised by Walford Selby. During his meeting with Margolin he declared that the British Cabinet was very sympathetic to Denikin's Army and its objective of restoring order in the whole of Russia. Therefore, it thought that 'the best way for the successful struggle against Bolshevism would be the co-operation between, or even an entire blending of, the Denikin and Ukrainian armies'.[72] After Margolin

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[71] A.Margolin (1921), p. 118.
[72] D.Saunders (1988), p. 66.

informed him about the nature and goals of the Ukrainian movement Selby admitted that the British were not well acquainted with it. Presenting to Margolin a copy of the Declaration of the Russian Political Conference in Paris made on 9 March 1919 he requested a written commentary for the Foreign Office.

The Declaration submitted to the president of the Paris Peace Conference stated that, although the right of the nationalities of the former Russian Empire was to be respected and the regimes temporarily instituted by them could be recognised by the Allies, the final decision about the future of these units could not be made without the consent of the Russian people. Therefore, only when Russians were able to express their will and take part in handling these political and territorial issues, could a solution be made.

In his comments Margolin focused on the following aspects. Since the Declaration implied that the national problem should be resolved by the All-Russian Constituent Assembly elected by all the peoples of Russia it was inevitable that in the end the Russians would have twice as many votes as the Ukrainians, four times as many as the Belorussians and many more than any other nationality on the territory of the former Russian Empire. And, thereby, in such an Assembly the minor nations would be suppressed by the larger ones with the Russians having the most decisive vote. Therefore, it was clear that no other nation except Russia would agree to hand their future to the All-Russian Constituent Assembly. Contrary to the claims of the Russian Political Conference the only solution against Bolshevism Margolin saw was a strengthening of national movements and Allied support in a form of recognition of the independence of such new states as Ukraine, Lithuania, Kuban, etc. After Bolshevism and anarchy had been suppressed each state would convene its own Constituent Assembly on the basis of universal suffrage. Only in this case would it be possible to determine the real will of the peoples and decide which form of government should be adopted. And only a federation resulting from a free

contract among the nations could be regarded as a union of equals. Regarding Ukraine's position in this matter Margolin stated that almost all the political parties had been prepared for the federation of Ukraine with the other nations of the former Russian Empire, but the spread of Bolshevism and the partition of the country intensified the drift towards complete independence. In conclusion Margolin admitted that 'we can still expect many changes and much evolution in views on these issues depending on the behaviour of Great Russia towards the other parts of the former Russian Empire as well as on the attitude of the states of the Entente'.[73]

On his return to Paris Margolin acquainted the Ukrainian Mission with his action and was reproached by its members, especially by the head Sidorenko, in connection with the last part of his summary. In their opinion it left too much hope for the possibility of federation with Russia which did not reflect the real will of the Ukrainian population.

Since Selby recommended Margolin to get in touch with the British delegation at the Peace Conference he visited one of its senior members, the chief advisor on Poland Sir Esme Howard. In Margolin's view this meeting was a continuation of his dialogue with Selby, but, unlike the latter, Sir Howard did not have such a great belief in the strength of General Denikin's Army. At the same time the Ukrainian Mission was visited by a Professor of Edinburgh University, J.Y.Simpson, who was appointed to participate in the Paris Peace Conference by the Political Intelligence Department of the Foreign Office with a view to providing information on the question of non-Slavonic nationalities of the former Russian Empire. However, being a specialist in Government he was interested in familiarising himself with the constitution and the state organisation of Ukraine as well as other parts of the former Russian Empire. Reporting to the Foreign Office in June and July 1919 he paid considerable attention to Ukraine. A strong

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[73]A.Margolin (1921), p. 384.

advocate of a federative Russia, he claimed that the Ukrainians were 'inclined to take the lead in having a discussion amongst all the representatives of the non-Great Russian Governments on the question of a Russian Federation of States'.[74] However, it was no longer possible to change the sceptical attitude of his superiors in the Foreign Office towards Ukraine.

In the meantime the Inter-Allied Commission drew up a draft of the armistice convention and submitted it to both the Ukrainian and the Polish delegations for examination. The Ukrainians accepted it with some corrections, extending the demarcation line northwards and making some modifications with regard to the withdrawal of the Ukrainian troops from the territory which would go to Poland. However, the Polish delegation put forward demands which were beyond the jurisdiction of the Commission raising a 'question of general policy'. Therefore, the Commission considered its mandate at an end and could 'only report to the Supreme Council the proposals which it has put forward with a view to bringing the two parties to an agreement, and the causes which prevented the success of its efforts'.[75]

After Poland refused to accept the conditions proposed by the Commission, the Supreme Council sent a note to Polish Prime Minister Paderewski, warning him that the Allies would withdraw their support if he did not conclude peace in Eastern Galicia. However, Paderewski, who appeared before the Supreme Council on 5 June 1919, accused the Ukrainians of having violated the suspension of hostilities on 12 May and announced that Poland wanted to annex the whole of Eastern Galicia.[76] Lloyd George was the only Allied leader who resisted the Polish claims. At the beginning of June he was joined by President Wilson in insisting on a plebiscite for the people of Eastern Galicia in order to let them define their own future.

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[74]D.Saunders (1988), p. 66.
[75]BDFA, Vol. 3, Doc. 29, p. 184.
[76]J.Reshetar (1955), p. 281.

By that time the Government of Western Ukraine was in crisis. The Polish advance eastward presented a real threat to the new country and in these circumstances the Ukrainian National Rada decided to grant President Petrushevich dictatorial powers. Although he made changes in the military command it did not improve the whole situation.

The Galician question was again discussed at the meeting of the Foreign Ministers on 18 June. However, this time British resistance to Poland's claims was not supported by the Americans. The latter agreed with the French that the Polish demands should be met on the grounds that all the educated population in Eastern Galicia was Polish while the remaining 60 per cent who spoke Ruthenian (Ukrainian) were predominantly illiterate and therefore could not govern themselves. The main argument was that if this land was not handed over to Poland social disorder would continue there.[77]

Britain had no other choice but to agree with the majority at the Conference to allow the temporary Polish occupation. However, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Balfour, insisted on a plebiscite to be held on a fixed date in order to define the future of the territory with justice. Robert Lansing, his American counterpart, backed this suggestion as well as the one concerning the appointment by the League of Nations of a high commissioner to the occupied territory. This proposal was rebuffed by the representatives of France and Italy who wanted to arrange this question once and for all in favour of the Poles, giving Ukrainians autonomy within the Polish borders. Lansing conceded without much resistance but Balfour was adamant that it should be made clear to the Poles that their occupation of East Galicia could not prejudice its future status.

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[77]H.Elcock (1969), p. 139.

At the next meeting of the Foreign Ministers on 25 June Sir Eyre Crowe, substituting for Balfour, repeated the British request for the nomination of a high commissioner. A proposed candidature of a Pole was rejected by Balfour upon his arrival on the grounds that it would indicate the endorsement of Poland's right to that territory. Eventually the British succeeded in their attempts to give Western Ukrainians at least a hope for a better future. A final decision about the occupation of East Galicia by the Poles was made at the meeting and the note of the Supreme Council was sent to Warsaw:

> 'With a view to protecting the persons and property of the peaceful population of Eastern Galicia against the dangers to which they are exposed by the Bolshevist bands the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers decided to authorise the forces of the Polish Republic to pursue their orientations as far as the river Zbruch [which separates Galicia from East Ukraine]....
>
> 'This authorisation does not, in any way, affect the decisions to be taken later by the Supreme Council for the settlement of the political status of Galicia'.[78]

However, the Polish Government was not satisfied with such an arrangement. During the autumn of 1919 Polish delegates to the Paris Peace Conference continued to press the Allied, in particular British, representatives warning them that if Polish troops found out that Eastern Galicia was given to Poland only temporarily they would 'lose all heart in their fight against Red Army'[79]; subsequently if Poland lost Eastern Galicia it would be defenceless in the face of future Soviet attacks and thereby the West would lose its bastion against Bolshevism. Therefore, after some revision it was decided that Eastern Galicia would come under the Polish control for the next twenty five years after which its status would be reconsidered by the League Council.

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[78]J.Reshetar (1955), p. 283.
[79]H.Elcock (1969), p. 140.

The British warned the Poles that they would not interfere with their struggle against the Bolsheviks. British support would be possible only if Poland was attacked by Soviet Russia after the attempts of the former to establish an equitable peace. At the meeting with the new Polish Premier, Patek, Lloyd George cautioned him that if Poland wanted to preserve within its borders the areas which, according to the principles applied by the Peace Conference, belonged to Russia the Bolsheviks might attack Poland in order to recapture these territories. 'It would be very difficult, if not impossible, for the British Government to get public opinion to support military and financial outlay in these circumstances', warned the British Prime Minister.[80]

In this statement the attitude of the British leadership towards Petlyura's Government was demonstrated particularly clearly. Asserting that Eastern Galicia belonged to Russia Lloyd George did not even question whether Ukraine was a separate country or merely a Russian province and was satisfied that in uniting Eastern Galicia with 'Russian' Ukraine Russia would justly restore its boundaries.

On 28 January 1920, the Soviet Government proposed to start peace negotiations, and although it was ready to hand over a territory greater in extent than that determined by the 'Curzon Line', the Polish Command supported by the French refused to accept these conditions. After signing the Treaty of Warsaw with Petlyura's Directory in April 1920 the Poles launched their offensive. Analysing the treaty, Foreign Office officials agreed that it was to the advantage of the Poles to create a buffer state between them and the area controlled by the Bolsheviks. At the same time they pointed out that it was 'anomalous' to have two governments in the region - Petlyura's Directory recognised by the Poles as a de facto government and the authority of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic virtually controlled by Russian Bolsheviks. From what was suggested next it appears that

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[80]Ibid., p. 143 .

the British Government decided to ignore any inconsistencies in the actions of the Polish leaders and see if this could raise the Allied stakes against the Bolsheviks:

> 'If, however, the Poles are satisfied that the future of the Ukraine is not hereby prejudged and that they themselves will not be saddled with commitments which they cannot manage, there seems to be no reason for us to do anything but wait and see. It seems illogical that Poland - herself the creation of the Allies - should recognise as 'de facto' independent States other Governments unrecognised by Paris, but as a temporary expedient it may be desirable; at any rate it would clear the Polish Government of the accusations that they wished to annex territories to which they had no right'.[81]

The policy of 'wait and see' had to be brought to an end when the Poles found themselves under the threat of 'sovietisation' by the Red Army troops. The British feared that if Poland was captured, Czechoslovakia and Hungary would follow and even Germany could be affected. Then a socialist coup would become a reality there and after the Socialist Government was formed it would refuse to comply with the peace treaty provisions. The worst outcome would be a new war. Therefore, Lloyd George emphasised that the Allies must secure an independent Poland.[82] Since the Polish Government was placed by the treaty with Petlyura in control of all Galician territory there was no risk for the Allies to appear as backing the aggressor. They sent a message to the Soviet Government proposing an armistice on the basis of the 'Curzon Line' and warning that a refusal would entail the Entente's help being given to Poland.

However, soon the situation at the front changed again and in August 1920 the Poles began a counter-offensive. Although such rapid changes at the front caused uncertainty as to which side would gain the upper hand, with regard to the future of Ukraine as an independent state the British officials had no illusions. The only question which had to be resolved was who would get Ukraine in the end.

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[81] BDFA, Vol. 3, Doc. 73, 28 April 1920, p. 98.
[82] S.White (1979), p. 2.

Thus, Churchill admitted that the existence of Petlyura's Government on Ukrainian territory 'sheltered and assisted ... by a strong Poland' was possible.[83] Foreign Office officials were of the opposite opinion. They thought that, although Petlyura had command over a certain part of the Ukrainian territory, it was mostly controlled by Ukrainian Bolsheviks. 'Rakowsky's proposal for the merging of the Ukraine with Soviet Russia is interesting...' wrote Gregory in the Minutes to the report about the Ukrainian situation.[84] Nobody predicted the future of Ukraine as an independent state.

The preliminary peace treaty was signed in October 1920. It established the borders further to the east of the 'Curzon Line'. In March 1921 the treaty of Riga was signed by Poland, Soviet Russia and Soviet Ukraine. Thus, the attempt of the Eastern and Western Ukrainians at statehood was suppressed. Western Ukraine became a part of Poland, while Eastern Ukraine returned to Russian rule.

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The content of British-Ukrainian political relations in 1917-1921 appears very complex and specific. The international situation at that time turned so that the two countries of directly opposite status, the greatest world Empire and the newly born state, needed each other's assistance. Ukrainians, fighting against the efforts of both the Bolsheviks and the Whites to restore the Russian Empire, needed first of all protection of their national statehood by means of international recognition and financial assistance. The British, for their part, were interested in keeping in the war as many loyal forces as possible and therefore were ready to undertake some steps desired by the Ukrainian Government, including diplomatic contacts and financial support. However, neither party was in fact able to deliver what was

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[83]R.Ullman (1972), Vol. 3, p. 48.
[84]BDFA, Vol. 2, Doc. 345.

desired by the other. Ukraine could not sustain simultaneous war against the Central Powers and the Bolsheviks, while Great Britain could hardly offer sufficient protection against both of them. Thus, at that time co-operation between the two countries was impeded by the objective circumstances which nevertheless brought some positive results. Ukraine, which did not attract much of Britain's attention before, became a subject of constant interest and study and the very question of its right to independence was raised for the first time.

After the first Ukrainian Government made the agreement with Germany for the sake of terminating bloodshed at the front and disorder at the rear, the course of British-Ukrainian relations entirely changed. The British, who played a more active part in the mutual contacts in 1917 and the beginning of 1918, took on the role of observers. On the contrary, the Ukrainians, while being given a choice between the Allies and their enemies at the earliest stage of their state-building, took the initiative later on in order to regain the sympathy and support of Great Britain. All their activities in the subsequent years were directed towards establishing firm contacts with the victorious Allies and inducing them to recognise the Ukrainian People's Republic threatened by the Bolsheviks and the Whites in the East and by the Poles in the West.

However, at the stage when the war was over and the British were inclined to reconcile themselves to the Soviet state, independent Ukraine was of no interest to them any longer. Still, it would be wrong to accuse Great Britain of not protecting the Ukrainians from their aggressive neighbours. The British, quite realistic in their policies, understood that separatist tendencies in Ukraine did not have firm foundations and the last national government was not able to establish its control over the whole territory. The national self-consciousness of the Ukrainian people was not strong enough to provide the idea of an independent existence with the necessary backing. Therefore the population of Ukraine

without much resistance was again subordinated to Russian (and in the case of Eastern Galicia, Polish) rulers.

CHAPTER 2. US-UKRAINIAN RELATIONS, 1917-1921

This chapter focuses on the evolution of the US attitude towards Ukraine from the near absence of any policy to its partial involvement in Allied actions in the region. It also looks at contacts, mainly unofficial, between representatives of governmental institutions and public organisations of the two countries. As in the previous chapter it is divided into four sections corresponding to the four phases distinguished in the process of Ukraine's national state-building during 1917-1921: the inquisitive yet uncommitted approach of the US authorities towards the formation of the Ukrainian People's Republic; their growing indifference to Ukraine as it ceased to be a potential ally during the Hetman rule; the openly hostile stance adopted by the US with regard to the Directory's policy of securing Ukraine as a state independent from Russia; and the part which the Americans played in the final determination of Ukraine's future at the Paris Peace Conference and during the Soviet-Polish war .

Noncommittal Attention: US Focus on The Central Rada.

At the beginning of 1917 the US was perhaps one of the Allied states least interested in the Ukraine. It was a land the Americans knew almost nothing about and, taking into consideration their reserved political behaviour in Europe at the time, they could not be expected to do more than just comply with the Entente's common strategy towards Russia as a whole as well as particular parts of it.

With the exception of the US consulate in Odessa, one of the most important strategic centres in the south of Russia, there was no American presence in the Ukraine until almost the end of 1917. When the Ukrainian movement became too serious to ignore the information about its development began to reach Washington mainly through Allied sources. Some US diplomats placed in

Russian cities mentioned the Ukraine occasionally in their communications with the Department of State.

For instance, the US Consul General in Moscow Maddin Summers reported in mid-May 1917 that there was a 'state of chaos in Russia' complicated further 'by the lack of national patriotism'. 'A Pole cares nothing for Russia', he claimed, the same applied to 'the small (Little) Russians'.[1]

Prior to the Bolshevik insurrection the US Ambassador in Petrograd, David Francis, made a single significant reference to the Central Rada in connection with the fall of the Lvov government in July. In a report to the Secretary of State, Lansing, he explained that the governmental crisis in Russia was caused by the fact that the Ministers of War, Foreign Affairs and Ports and Telegraphs who had just returned from the Ukraine after the talks with the Rada 'had granted that province concessions with which the Cadet Party was unable to agree'.[2]

The next report regarding the Ukraine was dispatched by the Consul at Odessa Ray on 20 November, shortly after the Bolshevik uprising and just before the declaration of the autonomous Ukrainian People's Republic by the Rada's Third Universal. Informing the Secretary of State that the Ukrainians had proclaimed the annexation of Odessa a few days earlier he described this move as 'unpopular among Jewish population but supported by the Black Sea Fleet and railroads'.[3]

As soon as it became obvious that the implementation of the Soviet peace initiative was only a matter of time the US Government joined its European Allies in a quest for forces which could keep the Central Powers fighting in the East. This was necessitated by the realisation of the threat posed by Germany's ability to transfer reinforcements to the Western front: if it happened before the

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[1]O.S.Pidhainy (1966), p. 311.
[2]Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, Vol. 2, 16 July 1917, p. 648.
[3]ibid., p. 649.

troops of the US, who entered the war in April 1917, arrived there in substantial numbers, the Allied prospects of victory could be destroyed. Therefore, since Russia's most significant political and military forces opposed to the Bolsheviks and consequently to their plans of withdrawing from the war were consolidated in the south, Allied attention turned to that region. However, the formation of the Entente's collective policy and particularly the US accession to it was gradual and circumspect.

The first urgings to consider supporting anti-Bolshevik forces in South Russia came from Consul Smith in Tiflis while the officials at the Embassy in Petrograd were openly hostile to this idea. Smith emphasised in his communications shortly after the October coup that it was necessary to gain advantages in holding the line from the Urals to the Volga and thence north to the Don basin and the Black Sea. In this case most of the resources would be within Allied reach while the Germans would not be able to get any supplies from Russia. For this reason he insisted on assisting by all means the national movement in Transcaucasia.

The Department of State asked Smith to explain how, under the circumstances which he described, the proposed financial support 'will not tend to encourage sectionalism or disruption of Russia or civil war'. The Department emphasised that it could not 'encourage tendencies in any of these directions'.[4]

Such reluctance on the part of the US authorities to support centrifugal forces in Russia, thereby facilitating its dismemberment, reflected the traditional American strategy of favouring a strong Russia as a counterbalance to Germany in Europe. Limited awareness of the nature of the Bolshevik Government also affected the initial resistance by the US to the policy of assisting counter-revolutionary elements in the region. Besides, the lingering hope that the Bolsheviks would

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[4]O.S. Pidhainy (1966), p. 313.

refrain from signing a separate peace with the Central Powers created a belief that any Allied move which could precipitate this was unwise.

However, Colonel Edward House, President Wilson's personal representative and a trusted adviser, was quite sympathetic to Smith's ideas. On 18 November he wrote to the President that the 'situation in Rumania was serious and they may be compelled to make a separate peace because of inability to get food from Russia' and two days later he suggested to British Prime Minister, Lloyd George, that Rumania 'should be made a rallying point for Polish and Cossack troops that are willing to continue fighting'.[5] The idea of supporting Rumania and all anti-Bolshevik forces in the South of Russia who were prepared to stay in the war was backed by the British who, as has been shown, later developed it to the point of taking Ukraine into consideration and even viewing it as a crucial component of the scheme.

On 30 November the situation in the former Empire was considered at the Inter-Allied Conference in Paris in connection with House's suggestion of sending aid to the Cossacks and elsewhere. Although the Allies did not reach an agreement on what approach to adopt on this issue they decided to dispatch an unofficial mission to investigate the situation in the South of Russia and particularly in the Don region. Lloyd George proposed making a declaration emphasising the absence 'of a regular government' in Russia but encountered objections on the part of some Allied representatives, above all, House. Favouring the strategy of support for anti-Bolshevik forces House warned at the same time against any overt steps which would be interpreted by the Bolsheviks as directed against them and which would thereby strengthen their determination to conclude peace.[6]

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[5]ibid.
[6]R.Ullman (1966), Vol. 1, p. 42.

Thus while the Soviets were gradually progressing with their peace policy the Allies began unofficial co-operation with the anti-Bolshevik forces in the South. In the first two weeks of December British and French policy-makers had finally overcome their indecisiveness and made several concrete decisions concerning financial assistance to the forces in South Russia.[7] Watching how confidently its allies were shaping their policy in the region the US administration began to get interested in assuming a more active role than that of an external adviser. Whereas the Memorandum issued by the Department of State on 2 December determined that the present US policy would be to 'do nothing' (both with regard to the recognition of the Bolsheviks Government and the aid to the counter-revolutionary groups in the region) until the 'black period of terrorism' ends, on 10 December Lansing prepared another Memorandum which indicated the administration's intention of changing this policy in favour of establishing contacts with anti-Bolshevik forces in Russia and even assisting in the formation of the Russian army in the Don region. As direct American intervention in the South of Russia was ruled out it had been decided to support the Allied actions in the region discretely. On 13 December Walter Hines Page, the US Ambassador in London, was informed of the official resolution that the 'movement in the south and southeast under the leadership of Kaledin and Korniloff offers at the present time the greatest hope for reestablishment of a stable government and the continuance of a military force on the German and Austrian fronts'.[8] However, it was emphasised that in order to avoid confrontation with the Bolshevik authorities the proposed 'practical course' was 'for the British and French Governments to finance the Kaledine enterprise in so far as it is necessary, and for [the United States] to loan them the money to do so'.[9] Page was instructed to get in touch with the British and French officials in order to discuss with them the implementation of this plan confidentially.

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[7]See Chapter 1 of the thesis, p. 58.
[8]G.A.Brinkley (1966), p. 27.
[9]ibid., p. 28.

While the British were concerned with the Cossack lands and the Caucasus and the French were focusing on Rumania and Ukraine, the US government had no direct interest in these areas. However, having found itself pressed, on the grounds of wartime necessity, to participate in the Allied course, the Americans began to show more interest in Ukraine in pursuit of their aim to keep as many allies as possible in the war.

Although its wish to withdraw from the war matched that of the Soviet Government in Petrograd, the Rada in contrast to the latter did not arrogantly brandish its determination to defy the Allies. On the contrary, it seemed rather hesitant, thus raising the Entente's hope that Ukraine would remain on their side contributing to the settlement of the situation in their favour.

This optimistic perspective was further encouraged by the contents of two Ukrainian declarations received by Ambassador Francis simultaneously with the Ambassadors of other Allied states in Russia at the beginning of December. Both declarations were signed 'Shulgin', yet expressed two different viewpoints on the prospects of Ukraine's commitment to the Entente's cause.

The first one came from the Secretary of State for International Affairs, Oleksandr Shulgin, who informed the states of the Entente that owing to certain undesirable developments (for example the commencement of the armistice by General Shcherbachev, Commander-in-Chief of the Russian troops on the Rumanian front; the arrival of the Soviet Commander Krylenko at the general headquarters in Mogilev; and the lack of Ukrainian troops on the South-East front) the Central Rada felt compelled to begin an armistice without 'having had time to get in accord with the Allies...'.[10] However, having assured them that the Ukrainian Republic considered itself 'always [the] ally of all the powers which were fighting with Russia against the Central Empires', Shulgin stated that his

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[10]Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, Vol. 2, p. 649.

Government would 'receive with pleasure all the suggestions and all the advice which our allies will give us for the defence of the common interests'.[11] Despite the appeal to the Entente 'to strive together ... for immediate peace' the instructions and resolutions of the Ukrainian Government, attached to the declaration, contained information on practical measures taken by it in which the Allies could perceive a vestige of reassurance.[12] In a move intended to defend the Republic's territory the General Secretariat merged the South-Western and Rumanian fronts into a single Ukrainian front and assumed its entire command through an agreement with the Rumanian government. It also instructed the delegates representing Ukraine at the armistice negotiations to promote the grouping of their national troops by means of an exchange for non-Ukrainians and to oppose any attempts at raising a question of demobilisation which it regarded as 'absolutely inadmissible'.

Thus, in comparison with Bolshevik Russia's assertive peace policy manifesting itself in fraternisation with enemy troops and calls for demobilisation, Ukraine's determination to preserve and even enhance its national army (if only as a means of territorial self-defence), as well as willingness to co-ordinate its actions with the Allies seemed rather promising to the latter.

The other Ukrainian declaration submitted to the Ambassadors of the Allied states on behalf of the Assembly of the citizens of Kiev by a certain Shulgin further misled the American judgement of the situation. Having subjected Bolshevik policies to acute criticism and generally denouncing them as German agents, the author entreated the Allies 'to believe that a separate peace without the consent of [our] allies produces in us feelings of indignation and disgust, that we consider it to be black treason to our friends, and that we shall make every effort to redeem this shameful action if it take place against our will'.[13]

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[11]ibid., p. 651.
[12]ibid., p.652.
[13]ibid., p. 650.

Forwarding this petition to the Secretary of State on 12 December, Ambassador Francis noted that the above mentioned Shulgin (a cousin of the Ukrainian Foreign Secretary) was a well-known public figure in a way responsible for the demise of the Russian Empire as he, together with Guchkov, approached the tsar in March 1917 inducing him to abdicate. Although in his address Shulgin made no distinction between Russia and Ukraine, expressing confidence in 'the future recovery of the Russian nation' as a whole, this message reflected the views of a certain influential group of Ukraine's population whose position was more uncompromising and therefore more favourable to the Allies than the official one.

Concluding his dispatch Francis reported that the same evening he was sending Douglas Jenkins, formerly Consul at Riga, to Kiev in order to assess the possibility of establishing a consulate there. A decision with regard to the consulate had been approved by the Department of State some time ago and only the permission of the Provisional Government was awaited. However, since the latter was 'deposed before replying' the plan remained unaccomplished. 'Cautioned Jenkins against recognising any government; gave him discretion as to opening consulate', Francis clarified.[14]

The dispatch of Jenkins to Kiev proved to be advantageous as the new Consul managed to provide prompt and insightful information on the developments in Ukraine despite being instructed to avoid direct regular contacts with the Ukrainian authorities. Owing to his reports as well as dispatches by DeWitt C. Poole, the Consul at Novocherkassk, the State Department was informed better than its European counterparts about the nature of the relations between Kaledin and the Central Rada when the question of including the Ukrainians in the Allied plans finally arose. At the time when the British Cabinet had just approved a

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[14]ibid.

decision to allocate a considerable sum to the Ukrainian Government the US Consul at Moscow Summers, receiving information from both Ukraine and the Don region, warned of the inadvisability of financial support for the Ukrainians. Reporting to Washington on 15 December that the 'relations of the Cossacks and Ukrainians do not seem to be as good as they were some time ago' he explained this by the dissatisfaction of the Ukrainians over the martial law proclaimed by Kaledin in the Donetsk coal basin which was their crucial source of fuel. Besides, the Ukrainians were allegedly 'bent on independence' and disposed to lean on Austria-Hungary rather than 'any Russian party'. Therefore while the prospect of the Ukrainians joining in any attack on the Cossacks was doubtful so was their reliability as the allies of the latter. 'Whether they will actively assist the Cossacks in their proposed march to the north in the late winter or spring remains to be seen', concluded Summers.[15]

However, the Cossacks and the Ukrainians had one thing in common - their attitude towards the Bolsheviks - and the degree of the threat the latter posed in the region conditioned their readiness to set differences aside. As the Bolsheviks intensified their violent activities Summers' scepticism with regard to the probability of the Cossack-Ukrainian alliance gave way to more hopeful forecasts. 'General indignation is being shown by all classes against terrorism of Bolsheviks', he wrote to Washington on 18 December informing the Secretary of State of the conflict between the Bolsheviks and the Ukrainians who refused to take part in the expedition against the Cossacks. 'At Kiev Ukrainian forces [are] disarming all Bolsheviks and will probably support Cossack troops in reestablishing order', the Consul General reported.[16]

On 29 December he submitted another account of the progress of Ukrainian-Cossack co-operation: 'Bolshevik forces [are] defeated in [the] Don section...

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[15]ibid., Vol. 1, p. 312.
[16]ibid., Vol. 2, p. 593.

Moscow Bolshevik garrison refuses to march against Cossacks and Ukrainians who are joining forces'. According to his information this alliance, which was 'progressing favourably', was supposed to constitute a part of the forming Southeastern federation that would serve as a nucleus 'from which Russia may be reconstructed on a federative basis through the action of the Constitutional Assembly'.[17] Now the Consul's opinion sounded rather optimistic resembling the erroneous resolve of the British policy-makers:

> 'Undoubtedly a [beginning?] has been made for bringing into a close working union the regenerative elements in Russia which can be expected to act effectively against the Bolsheviki and the Germans. Poole is of opinion, and I thoroughly share his views, that the Government of the United States and the Allies should immediately lend this nucleus all possible moral and material support and thereby fortify the one remaining serious hope of saving Russia and Rumania from complete German domination and a catastrophe for the Allies in Asiatic Turkey'.[18]

However, such enthusiasm was caused to a large extent by desperation. Having pointed out that the increasingly bitter verbal attacks of the Bolsheviks on the Allies, and particularly the US, demonstrated that northern Russia was completely controlled by Germany who would not stop until 'anarchy is the result and the monarchy is restored in all its former horrors', Summers concluded that the Russia welcomed by the Americans as a democratic nation was in the South, as was the only organised power capable of coping with the situation: 'The eyes of all Russia are turned to the south and the Ukraine as the deliverers of the country'.[19]

Forwarding to Washington a few days later the text of the General Secretariat's declaration of refusal to recognise any peace concluded without the participation of the Ukrainian delegates, transmitted on Christmas Day, Summers called on the

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[17]ibid., p. 602.
[18]ibid.
[19]ibid., p. 603.

authorities to pay special attention to it 'in view of the growing importance of the Ukraine front'. He reported Ukraine's intention not only to participate 'on a parity with other powers in all peace negotiations, conferences and congresses' elaborating conditions of a general peace, but also to convoke a congress representing all parts of the former Empire in order to form the government of a federal republic exclusively authorised to sign a peace treaty should it be done in the name of the whole of Russia. Commenting on this decision Summers asserted that such 'evidences of vanity to be found in the utterances of the Ukraine government' should not 'lead to inattention to it as a powerful factor in the reconstruction of Russia'.[20]

At the same time the US Ambassador in France, Sharp, assessed these developments more realistically. Informing the Department about the agreement reached between the British and French representatives in Paris on 23 December he described their general plan of action as support for anti-Bolshevik organisations in Russia with a view to delaying 'the time of establishing general peace between Germany and whole of Russia' which would correspondingly delay 'German enjoyment of Russian resources'.[21] However, he remarked that the movement in the south of Russia was driven by internal discord rather than by desire to continue the war with Germany. Warning that Ukraine was likely to conclude a separate peace Sharp argued:

> 'Leaders in Ukraine may resist application of land doctrines advocated in Petrograd, but it is not expected they will be willing to make the great sacrifices involved in continuing military resistance to Germany and Austria unless extraordinary hardships should appear in terms [of] peace proposed by Germany'.[22]

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[20]ibid., Vol. 1, 1 January 1918, p. 417.
[21]ibid., Vol. 2, 27 December 1917, p. 598.
[22]ibid.

Nevertheless he had to admit that the agreed British-French policy seemed 'the wisest from present indications' as it would prevent the establishment of peace conditions necessary for realising any commercial deals between producers and merchants in the south of Russia and Austro-German purchasers.

With regard to the decision of the British and French Governments to establish their exclusive control over the non-Bolshevik territories of Russia on the grounds that 'they have many more representatives in all these regions than American Government' the Ambassador concluded that 'they feel their special interests are so involved that they would prefer to use American direction only in case it should appear that they cannot accomplish objectives indicated above'. In this view he proposed to dispatch to Jassy, Kiev, Odessa, and Tiflis American representatives not entrusted with any official functions yet qualified to take an 'official action instantly when instructed so from Washington'.[23]

On 9 January 1918 Francis, informing the Department of his meeting with the French Ambassador in Petrograd, reported that France was disposed to support independent Ukraine yet preferred a 'concerted action' with other Allies. In this view and taking into consideration the fact that the Ukrainian delegation had been admitted to peace negotiations in Brest Litovsk which was 'very significant' as it indicated the departure on the part of the Bolsheviks from their policy of 'all-Russian subjection' the US Ambassador suggested an initiative 'to recognise Ukraine simultaneously with Finland, Siberia and Don Cossacks Province as well as the Soviets as de facto government of Petrograd, Moscow and the vicinity'.[24]

By this time the news of Ukraine's recognition by Great Britain and France reached Washington. The French Ambassador Jusserand informed the Secretary of State on 7 January 1918 about the appointment of the French Commissioner to

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[23]ibid., p. 600.
[24]ibid., Vol. 1, p. 336.

Ukraine whose independence had been recognised by France at the end of December 1917. Explaining that reports about Austro-German activities in Kiev led the French Government to the conclusion that 'it could not defer any longer taking a more clearly defined attitude toward the Ukraine' the Ambassador inquired whether the US Government would be disposed to take a similar step.[25]

In reply to this note the Acting Secretary of State Polk informed the French Ambassador that his 'Government is giving careful consideration to the whole situation, but as yet has reached no determination as to acknowledging separate governments in Russia'.[26]

A similar message was sent to Francis on 15 January advising him that the US would take action when 'the will of Russian people has been more definitely expressed on this general subject'.[27] The underlying motive was to wait and see how the situation would develop in terms of the Bolsheviks' potential to stay in power. Yet it was camouflaged by declarations of American adherence to the principles of democracy and self-government.

Although even concrete steps by the British and the French towards the recognition of regional governments on Russia's territory did not change the determination of the US authorities to support its territorial integrity, they acknowledged the significance of independence movements and therefore paid particular attention to further data collection and systematisation. Thus at the end of December 1917 Lansing sent to Ambassador Francis in Petrograd a questionnaire for circulation to consular representatives in the regions. The information on the structure of the local governments, their inclination towards separatism, Bolshevik influence, conditions of transport and food supply, etc. was to be gathered, summarised and returned to the Department of State as soon as

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[25]ibid., Vol. 2, p. 655.
[26]ibid.
[27]ibid., p. 657.

possible. Consuls at Moscow, Odessa and Tiflis received additional queries regarding the number of troops and their state in the region, their political platforms, relations with the general population and attitude 'toward movements of Ukraine, Kaledin and Caucasus to continue the war'.[28]

On 14 January 1918 Summers transmitted to Petrograd the report on economic and political conditions in his consular district required by the State Department. In the introduction he elucidated the nature of both the Bolshevik and separatist movements. Having pointed out that the land question was at the root of the trouble in Russia he argued that the success of either party in any part of the country depended on the local 'level of prosperity and contentment and on exposure to the general currents of the world's thought'.[29] Since the level of prosperity in Ukraine, the Don region and Siberia was higher than in central and northern Russia while the intellectual level was lower, their population was bound to resist the Bolshevik policy of land nationalisation thus giving rise to demands for autonomy. Stating that the Allies could be of considerable help in halting Russia's decadence and speeding up its recovery the Consul warned against exaggerated expectations, such as the hope that Ukraine could maintain an army capable of holding in check the troops of the Central Powers on the Ukrainian front or that the Ukrainians and the Cossacks would be able to defeat in the near future Bolshevik forces in central and northern Russia. 'What may be hoped for is the relative success of checking the withdrawal of hostile forces to other fronts and of making an organized offensive against the south-west as difficult and as expensive as possible, to say nothing of the limitation of trading with Germany, whether legal or illicit', Summers stated.[30] However, even a moderate success of the Allied efforts to prevent the spread of anarchy and hinder the subjection of Russia to German control in his opinion 'would justify great

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[28]ibid., Vol. 1, 24 December 1917, p. 324.
[29]ibid., Vol. 1, p. 338.
[30]ibid., p. 339.

exertions'; 'and generous solicitude for helpless small peoples by no means precludes due consideration of the menace of anarchy in a helpless large one'.[31]

Further to this, the Consul General submitted a completed questionnaire concerning the situation in 'central Russia, Ukraine, the Southeastern (Cossack) federation, Siberia to Irkutsk, White Russia and Central Asia'. The section entitled 'Ukraine' offered the analysis of mainly political developments in the country since the rise of the Central Rada. Focusing on the ratio of nationalist versus Bolshevik influence it noted that while the Ukrainians had a broad support of the 'ignorant peasantry' and were succeeding at building a well-organised national army the Ukrainian Bolsheviks ('Maximalists') were gaining ground in the cities (e.g. Kharkiv, Ekaterinoslav, Chernihiv) where the industrial workers were inclined to sympathise with their policies. 'Both sides are disposed to negotiate and to outwit one another', the report emphasised and thus the conclusion which Summers himself might have found excessively pessimistic a short while ago was reached: 'The Ukrainians can not be relied upon now to take a firm stand with the Cossacks against Maximalists'.[32]

In addition to this report the Consul General presented a summary of 'interesting and judicious' insights into the situation in Ukraine sent by Jenkins from Kiev. His first-hand information made an equivocal impression: it was to some extent encouraging and increasingly alarming at the same time. On the one hand, according to his report, 50,000 to 75,000 men had been already recruited into the Ukrainian army which British and French officers hoped would be sufficiently numerous and organised within a few months to oppose the Central Powers in a defensive campaign; there were both pro-Austrian and pro-Entente groups in the government despite the Allied suspicions of the Ukrainian national movement being a product of an Austro-German conspiracy; and in general Kiev showed a

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[31]ibid., p. 340.
[32]ibid., p. 347.

greater sense of security than Moscow and Petrograd, mostly due to a more advantageous food situation. On the other hand the activity of numerous Austrian secret agents seemed to produce results unfavourable for the Allies who were only beginning to boost their propaganda in Kiev (Austria-Hungary reportedly placed 3,000,000 roubles to the credit of the Central Rada; the Rada's President was said to be 'working for union with Austria' and the pro-Entente Minister of War Petlyura resigned without giving any explanation); besides, the growing Bolshevik influence and social unrest in the region created a feeling of an imminent crisis.[33]

In these circumstances a remark made by Jenkins suggested a more constructive alternative to the policy adopted by the US administration at the time: 'Like all Russians the Ukrainians are ready to welcome foreign interference, and noninterference on the part of the Entente powers would simply leave them at the mercy of the Central powers'.[34]

Subsequent events confirmed this prediction. In the last week of January the US Ambassador in France Sharp forwarded to Washington a series of joint telegrams from the Allied Ministers at Jassy which reflected the dynamics of negotiations between the latter and the Ukrainian delegates authorised to represent the Central Rada at Brest Litovsk. The head of the delegation, Under-secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Galip, appealed to the Allies for the recognition of Ukraine's independence, the appointment of their diplomatic representatives at Kiev, financial support for the Ukrainian Government and the facilitation of manufactured goods supply to Ukraine. In reply the Allied Ministers put forward their demands referred to as 'the five points' stipulating the conditions for agreeing to the Ukrainian request: to refrain from concluding a separate peace; to guarantee an abstention from 'any degrading relations with our enemies'; to

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[33]ibid., Vol. 2, 16 January 1918, p. 659.
[34]ibid.

complete with Allied assistance the formation of armed forces capable of resisting both internal and external attacks; to co-operate closely with other Russian autonomous states as well as Rumania in order to present a solid front to the Central Powers; and finally, to facilitate the 'revictualing of Rumania' and providing a regular service of the railways.[35] However, at the same time the Entente representatives had already sensed that no effective help should be expected from Ukraine as in order to achieve the improvement of the general situation including the enticement of the Ukrainian government to act 'in a manner conformable with the interests of our case', they suggested sending an international force to Russia.[36]

In the next telegram the Allied Ministers sounded even more resolute. Claiming that even if the government at Kiev succeeded in maintaining its independence and forming the army it would most certainly refuse to continue the war, they insisted on the dispatch of American or Japanese troops to Russia as the only means of preventing the establishment of German control there.[37]

When Galip informed the Allied representatives at Jassy that his delegation had received full powers to negotiate peace with Germany, yet assured them that after the signing of the treaty Ukraine would endeavour to maintain good relations with the states of the Entente and to minimise the amount of provisions sent to their enemies, the Ministers sceptically remarked: 'It is doubtful in the present state of anarchy and in presence of the German occupation, whether the Ukraine will have the means of conforming to the intentions if they are sincere'.[38]

Thus having chosen to abide by their policy of non-interference the Americans, as well as the other Allies, consciously predetermined the ensuing course of events.

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[35]ibid., 22 January 1918, p. 662.
[36]ibid., p. 663.
[37]ibid., 24 January 1918, p. 33.
[38]ibid., 26 January 1918, p. 664.

Justifying the Entente's inactivity by 'the impossibility of all direct help from the Allied powers' to Russia the Ministers concluded that its situation could not 'be compared to that of Belgium and Serbia who are in immediate contact with the Allied powers' and therefore was 'inextricable and without precedent'.[39]

On 1 March 1918 the former Consul at Kiev, Jenkins, who by that time fled to Moscow, reported to the Secretary of State on the withdrawal of the Allied forces from Kiev. Most of them left the city on 24 February giving way to the approaching troops of the Central Powers. Finally Jenkins could confirm the allegations that the 'moving spirits' in the Central Rada, including Hrushevsky and Vynnychenko, were pro-Austrian and that, with the aim of suppressing the Bolsheviks and restoring order in the country, they designed a plan of a 'friendly invasion' of German and Austrian forces in Ukraine. However, he argued that it seemed impossible to build national statehood, despite the Rada's intention to do so, since firstly Ukraine was 'in no position to govern itself' and secondly it was doubtful that 'the people as a whole were in favour of complete independence' preferring a confederation with Russia.[40] Besides, the objectives of the Central Powers did not exactly concur with those of the Rada as the former were planning to establish their control in Ukraine gradually turning it into an Austrian protectorate. Once again, Jenkins insightfully predicted that, in their attempts to profit from Ukraine's rich grain supplies, the Central Powers would encounter considerable difficulties due to the hostility of the peasants, especially if their hopes for the redistribution of the lands of big owners proved to be unjustified.[41]

Laying down his responsibilities Jenkins notified the State Department that, before leaving Kiev, he had burned all archives of any importance and turned over American interests to the Spanish Consul.

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[39]ibid., 28 January 1918, p. 665.
[40]ibid., p. 673.
[41]ibid., p. 674.

After the US representatives withdrew from Kiev, Odessa and all other places where an American presence had been established before the conclusion of the peace treaty, the State Department, in order to follow the development of events in Ukraine, had to rely predominantly on the information which could be obtained by Summers and later Poole in Moscow, as well as on reports of the US envoys in France, Sweden, Switzerland and the Netherlands.

Thus the Ambassador in France, Sharp, regularly informed the Secretary of State of Allied findings, transmitting to him, as before, texts of joint telegrams received from the Entente Ministers in Jassy. In one such telegram dated 2 April the Ministers reported on the plan of the Central Powers to extend arbitrarily the boundaries of Ukraine to all regions which they wanted to exploit politically and economically including 'the valley of the Black Sea, a portion of Bessarabia, the Don, Crimea, Caucasus, thus marking out the road to Persia and India'.[42] In the meantime, according to this dispatch, the Central Powers had achieved immense results in Ukraine alone: they had increased their food stock by 20 per cent without a visible effort.[43] In the next telegram informing Washington of 'a rumour that the Austro-Germans intend to dissolve the Rada at Kiev and to install the German Government' the Ministers concluded: 'In fine Ukrainia is in process of transformation into a German colony'.[44]

The Interval: US Indifference and The Hetman's Rule.

As soon as the new Ukrainian Government under the Hetman was established the US diplomats telegraphed to Washington about its platform, composition and intentions. Thus at the beginning of May 1918 the Consul at Moscow, Poole, who until this time had been stationed in the Don region providing information on the general developments there as well as on Ukrainian-Cossack relations in

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[42]ibid., p. 678.
[43]ibid.
[44]ibid., p.679.

particular, transmitted to Lansing a text of Skoropadsky's open letter to the Ukrainian people which outlined his future policies. The Consul added that this proclamation was accompanied by a fundamental statute 'giving the hetman practically autocratic power'.[45] Reporting in his next dispatch on the affiliations of the new Ukrainian Cabinet, Poole noted that, according to the previous records, some of its members were more pro-Ally than pro-German and 'individual tendencies' were 'not separatist or specifically Ukrainian but rather pan-Russian'.[46] In this respect the Consul commented:

> 'This is interesting from two points of view. First, it suggests that the Germans, having made use so far of the fiction of a Ukrainian nationality, may henceforth support a movement for the reconstruction of Russia through amalgamation of Great Russia with the Ukraine under government similar to that now seated at Kiev, which is strictly non-socialist and subservient to Germany. Secondly, the participation of men of moderate political views and previous pro-Ally tendencies in a government created by Germany shows concretely what has long been felt, namely, that in the continued absence of active Allied support, the non-socialist elements of Russia and even the more sane socialist elements will be forced into the German camp'.[47]

Fearing that such a prospect could become a reality the US Government found it necessary to remind the Russian people of the threat to the liberties which they won by overthrowing the monarchy and establishing a more democratic rule in February 1917. While avoiding any reference to the Soviet regime in the hope that it would collapse soon it was resolved to demonstrate that the Americans, having always regarded Russia as an ally, protested against the persistence of the Central Powers in 'removing from Ukraine food supplies which the rest of Russia requires and must have, if it is to live'.[48] An instruction sent by Lansing to the Ambassador in Russia, Francis, obliged him 'to reflect the friendly purpose of the United States towards Russia, a purpose which will remain unaltered as long as

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[45]ibid., 8 May 1918, p. 683.
[46]ibid., 16 May 1918, p. 687.
[47]ibid.
[48]ibid., Vol. 1, 8 May 1918, p. 525.

Russia does not willingly accept the autocratic domination of the Central Powers'.[49] In accordance with this guidance Francis gave a statement to the Russian press at the end of May in which he emphasised that the policy of non-interference in Russian internal affairs declared by his Government had never been violated. Stating that 'America entered war to fight for a principle, not territorial conquest nor commercial advantage, and will never lay down arms until all peoples are given a right to self-determination, until the world is guaranteed an enduring peace', the Ambassador assured America's trusted ally that the Allied missions in Russia were willing to endure any inconveniences and ill-treatment to which they had been subjected in order to give the Russian people all possible support and to prevent them from becoming German subordinates.[50]

By this time the situation in Ukraine was undergoing considerable changes. As early as June Poole reported that the growing anti-German tendencies there, including 'frequent individual acts of violence and sporadic local outbreaks', compelled the Central Powers to increase the army of occupation. Poole's observers in Ukraine concluded that people did not regard the occupation as permanent: 'They speak of it as though unfortunate passing phase saying that they [Bolsheviks?] have taken Russia and the Germans the Ukraine. When the Bolsheviks are gone the Ukraine will somehow, they expect, become once more a part of Russia'.[51]

With a view to strengthening both pro-Allied and anti-Bolshevik sentiments in Russia Francis suggested that the Americans took the lead in the Entente's course of intervention. Telegraphing to the Secretary of State from Archangel that the British were 'feared, disliked, Americans welcomed fraternizing with Russians' he enquired about the possibility of appointing an American general in command of the Allied forces in Russia. Disturbed by Britain's readiness to conduct de

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[49]ibid.
[50]ibid., 25 May 1918, p. 543.
[51]ibid., Vol. 2, 17 June 1918, p. 695.

facto relations with the Bolsheviks the Ambassador cautioned in October: 'If British policy dominates *[it?]* will drive many socialists to Bolshevism which will be ... a menace to well-regulated government everywhere if not eradicated'.[52]

A threat of Bolshevik expansion was becoming equally tangible in Ukraine. The Hetman regime, although supported by large estate owners, encountered a growing discontent by the general population, peasants and workers in particular. Consequently, their resistance to the foreign occupation authorities which were behind it also intensified. In September Poole, summarising observations of his informant in Kiev, wrote that hostility towards Germany in Ukraine was 'more acute than ever' threatening to give rise to a new Bolshevik upheaval in protest against the extreme reaction it supported.[53] The more obvious it became that the defeat of the Central Powers in the war was imminent the less doubtful it seemed that internal riots would pave the way for the invasion of Russian Bolsheviks into Ukraine.

In this view in early November representatives of Ukraine's influential business organisations appealed to the President of the United States 'in the name of humanity and safeguarding the rest of civilization' to enforce upon the Central Powers a responsibility for maintaining order and preventing the spread of Bolshevism in Ukraine 'until the situation is changed' as a part of their armistice obligations.[54]

The Allies for their part also regarded the prevention of Bolshevik expansion in Ukraine as a task of paramount importance. However, the rapid disintegration of the Austro-German troops capable neither of preserving order in Ukraine generally, nor of defending its northern border from the invasion of Soviet troops

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[52]ibid., Vol. 1, 14 October 1918, p. 557.
[53]ibid., 9 September 1918, p. 668.
[54]ibid., Vol. 2, 9 November 1918, p. 699.

in particular, aggravated the situation. As a result, the coal fields of the Don region, its metallurgic factories and considerable military stores could be seized by the Bolsheviks thus enabling them to achieve complete control over the whole of Ukraine.[55]

Therefore the Allied Ministers in Jassy urged the Entente Governments to send inter-Allied troops to Odessa thence proceeding to Kiev and Kharkiv. 'Failure [of] effect[ive] and speedy intervention for the suppression of the rebellion with numerous forces and without delay would necessitate later on the use of perhaps larger forces and a regular campaign of several months', warned the Ministers.[56] A decision to dispatch Allied troops to Ukraine was promptly made and the intervention began.

Informing one of the US diplomats in Russia of the Allied policy to support the Hetman's regime the Acting Secretary of State, Polk, wrote on 12 December 1918:

> 'Allied powers other than the United States have issued statement that they propose to restore order in the Ukraine by lending friendly support and assistance to the authorities established there. It is understood that British and French troops are already arriving at Sevastopol and Odessa for this purpose'.[57]

As before the US leadership was actively following the development of events in Ukraine without making any commitments. The situation was too unstable to get involved, Bolshevik influence was reportedly increasing, hence it was deemed more sensible to wait and see who would gain an upper hand in the region before taking any action.

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[55]ibid., 25 November 1918, p. 699.
[56]ibid., p. 700.
[57]ibid., p.703.

As was anticipated, the Hetman Government did not manage to retain power for long. The news about Petlyura began to arrive in Washington. He was first mentioned in a report forwarded on 19 December by the US Minister in Rumania, Vopicka, in connection with the hand-over of arms and ammunition by the retreating troops of the Central Powers to his army.[58] Later outlining his political platform the Minister stated that Petlyura embarked on a fight for Ukraine's independence against the Hetman who recently declared his commitment to federation with Russia. Vopicka cited the demand of the new self-proclaimed Ukrainian authority that the Ukrainians had a right to rule themselves and that this right should be recognised by the Allies and concluded: 'I shall investigate this new important movement fully and report later'.[59]

The Resistance to Separatism: The American Stand on Petlyura's Directory.

More information acquainting the State Department with Petlyura's activities came in early January 1919 from the Minister in Sweden, Morris. Notifying his superior that the Hetman's Government had finally collapsed, the Minister who had a meeting with a 'prominent editor just from Kiev', conveyed the anxiety existing in Ukraine that Petlyura had certain links with Moscow Bolsheviks and, in opting for a coalition government of Ukraine including socialists, federalists and Bolsheviks, he paved the way for a purely Bolshevik rule and even the 'possibility of the Moscow-Berlin-Kiev combination' in the future. Among other data obtained by Morris was the number of Petlyura's troops which amounted to at least 150,000 trained men as opposed to 120,000 Denikin's Volunteers as well as the allegations that Petlyura was conducting negotiations with the Allies.[60]

By this time the latter, despite their unanimous feeling of apprehension towards the Bolsheviks, were still trying to reach an agreement as to what official policy

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[58]ibid., p.704.
[59]ibid., 21 December 1918, p. 705.
[60]ibid., 2 January 1919, p. 706.

should be adopted with regard to the Russian Soviet government which was proving to be more long-lived than had been hoped for. The British, who advanced further than any other state of the Entente in dealing with the Bolsheviks, were accused of appeasing them to the extent of offering their delegation a place at the forthcoming Paris Peace Conference. Such a recognition seemed absolutely unacceptable to the Allied majority and the Prime Minister Lloyd George hurried to assure his counterparts that British policy had been misunderstood and the only suggestion made by the Cabinet was to invite representatives of various governments in Russia to Paris in order to offer them assistance in accommodating their differences.[61] Lansing, who was taking notes of confidential discussions held by heads of government and Foreign Ministers of the Allied states at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris prior to and during the Peace Conference, recorded on 21 January that President Wilson suggested a modification of the British proposal to the effect that various organised groups in Russia should be asked to send their representatives not to Paris but rather to some other place, such as Salonica, in order to discuss with the Allied intermediaries the means of restoring order and peace in Russia. The US President pointed out that, although the Allied intervention was caused by a worthy intention of saving Russia from the Bolshevik terror, in fact it served the Soviets as 'an excuse to blame imperialistic and capitalistic governments endeavoring to give land back to the landlords and thus to raise the Soviet Army'. Therefore he assumed that if the reverse tactic was applied and the Bolsheviks were given a chance to express their beliefs together with the other groups, thus allowing a close comparison of views, it would increase the general feeling of resentment towards them. Furthermore the US President warned against any, even partial, recognition of the Soviet Government as it would strengthen its position which, in his opinion, was particularly undesirable in view of the increasing Communist influence in America. It had been decided at the meeting

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[61]ibid., 1919, Russia, 16 January 1919, p. 13.

on would make a draft of the invitation to all organised parties in Russia, icipation being conditional on the cessation of hostilities.[62]

to acquire the most thorough understanding of the situation in Russia, arding Bolshevik rule and other 'Russian affairs', the US Commission to e Peace at Paris dispatched a field party to Odessa on 12 February. by the former US military attaché at Petrograd, Lieutenant Colonel t was instructed 'to study and report on political, economic and military ns in such parts of southern Russia and the Caucasus as its members may to visit'.[63] It was especially stressed that no member of the party was to enter into either official or personal relations with the Bolsheviks.

later Riggs reported from the headquarters of his Mission at Odessa that ation with provisions in the city was critical and urged the Allies to send pplies and merchandise along with qualified personnel as a means of ng speculation as well as waging successful anti-Bolshevik propaganda. , he urged the adoption of a consolidated Allied position with regard to and Denikin as, at the time, the former enjoyed French support while the as backed by the British, who considered 'perhaps with reason that the weak Petlioura government is nothing but an advance guard of ikism'. An immediate resolution of this issue was especially important in an increasing tension between Petlyura's troops and the Volunteer Army ikin which resulted even in armed conflicts thereby benefiting the iks.[64]

end of March Jenkins, appointed the Consul at Odessa in January 1919, ed an account of the economic, political and military conditions in the reported that the situation was far from promising: of 50,000 formerly

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. 19-25.
February 1919, p. 750.
March 1919, p. 752.

employed workers 40,000 were out of a job; refugees from Russia enlarged the population by 30 per cent; speculation was thriving; prime necessities were scarce; and the unsanitary conditions caused an epidemic of typhus. Despite the determination of the French to hold Odessa it was becoming increasingly difficult due to the general dissatisfaction and the tendency among the workmen to lean towards the Bolsheviks. The only way of improving the situation was, according to Jenkins, in the arrival of strong reinforcements.[65]

However, the rapid advance of the Red Army in combination with local disturbances compelled the insufficient Allied forces, weakened by poor morale and inadequate management, to evacuate Odessa. Jenkins informed the Department that on 5 April he closed the Consulate in Odessa, transferred all American interests to the Swiss vice consul and set off for Constantinople as in his opinion there was no suitable place for the US consulate in the South of Russia.[66]

As Bolshevik rule brought even worse conditions of life the initial enthusiasm of the Odessa workers quickly abated. Opposition to the Bolshevik regime began to increase and by the end of August the American Commissioner at Constantinople, Ravndal, claimed that 'a thousand determined men with proper arms can take Odessa'.[67]

This forecast proved to be rather precise and as early as 1 September the High Commissioner at Constantinople, Bristol, informed the Secretary of State that both Odessa and Kiev had been recaptured from the Bolsheviks. Communicating the impressions gained by Americans returning from South Russia, Bristol reported on general bitterness in Denikin's circles in connection with US passivity. 'The British are assisting with war material for which they get a good

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[65]ibid., 26 March 1919, pp. 753-754.
[66]ibid., 11 April 1919, p. 757.
[67]ibid., 20 August 1919, p. 768.

ıd considerable praise, but we have done nothing beyond sending a . of Red Cross supplies'. He further bitterly noted that the US military which had not accomplished anything 'because it was headed by a instead of a general' had been withdrawn and in all South Russia there d a single vice consul representing the United States of America. He ıe US Government to abandon such policy of complete neglect and to an economic commission to South Russia. Stating that it would be ɔle to dispatch there up to a hundred million dollars worth of goods Russian raw materials the High Commissioner asserted: 'It would seem ssible for our country to render a signal service towards rehabilitation of ussia. This year's crops in that section are exceptionally abundant'.[68]

ɔposal echoed the idea advocated by President Wilson who, as early as recommended to the US Liquidation Commission at Paris an undertaking vould combine considerations of expediency and benevolence alike. The tion presented to the President by Herbert Hoover, the Chairman of the ın Relief Administration, concerning 'the critical clothing conditions in :ated countries' on the one hand and enormous stocks of these and other possessed by the War Department on the other, inspired Wilson to put a suggestion to sell these stocks to the governments of the 'liberated s' at reasonably low prices. In his view these countries would constitute , if not the only, market for the materials which were produced under the ditions and would soon become practically unsalable. At the same time pathetic interest which American people must have in the alleviation of ımongst the liberated people' would be demonstrated and 'an opportunity :m a fine human service' seized.[69]

771.
March 1919, p. 787.

Along the same lines was a petition made by Denikin to the US President at the end of August and received by the Secretary of State on 19 September. Claiming that the Bolsheviks destroyed everything in his country including religion, family values, private property and 'trampled upon every right except force' the General pointed out that if decisive action against them was not taken immediately Bolshevism would spread 'beyond the borders of Russia and across the ocean'. In this view he appealed for American help, both moral and material. As South Russia was cut off from the world for a long time it suffered a severe shortage of clothing and the US assistance in procuring it would be indispensable especially since the winter was approaching.[70]

Responding to this solicitation in his traditional manner, Lansing contacted Ravndal on 13 October authorising him to proceed to Kharkiv, Odessa 'and other important points in South Russia' in order to collect information on economic and political conditions there. 'Your itinerary should be planned so as to afford the Department as soon as possible a general view of the situation in South Russia and as much of the Ukraine as you can readily enter', the Commissioner was instructed.[71] As usual the Department of State preferred to observe and accumulate data rather than to take part in any, even the most urgent, enterprise provided that US direct interests were not faced with an immediate threat.

Only in November Lansing finally made a decision with regard to the suggested plans of aid provision. On 12 November he wrote to the Secretary of War, Baker, informing him of his Department's positive attitude towards proposals to send surplus materials of the War Department to South Russia. 'This Department believes that all proper encouragement should be given to such transactions', the Secretary of State stated, justifying this decision by two factors: first, 'a distinct

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[70]ibid., p. 772.
[71]ibid., p. 773.

arian purpose' would be accomplished, and second, an incentive for the nt of raw products out of South Russia would be furnished.[72]

to this note the Secretary of War agreed with such policy and informed that the War Department had already made contacts with certain tive societies in Russia which were to obtain vital materials on very ole credit terms.[73]

r, it proved that Ukraine was not included in these plans. In fact by this y idea of dealing with the Ukrainian Government, not to mention ng it with assistance, met with an adverse reaction by the US authorities. attitude was propelled by their discontent with the escalating conflict Petlyura and Denikin. A report from a member of the US Mission ating Jewish matters in Poland, Brigadier General Edgar Jadwin, who Ukraine from 15 until 30 September, confirmed that all attempts to induce and Denikin to fight together against Bolsheviks were absolutely futile. er, Petlyura declared war against Denikin and, despite having only 24,000 an and 70,000 Galician troops opposite Denikin's 225,000 strong Army, n open fight against him.[74]

into account the fact that the official Allied course was supporting the eaded by General Denikin as the only real opposition to the Bolsheviks, artment of State on 29 October finally formulated its position on Ukraine: olicy of the United States, while leaving to future events the determination xact character of the relations to exist between Great and Little Russia, end in the meantime, rather to sustain the principle of essential Russian an to encourage separatism'.[75] In order to align this statement revealing

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775.
November 1919, p. 776.
October 1919, p. 781.
784.

the neglect of the principle of national self-determination with previous declarations of American adherence to the latter, the Department maintained that the Ukrainian separatist movement was to a large extent a result of Austrian and German efforts to destroy Russia. Having contended that the Ukrainian Government had no adequate ethnic basis for the establishment of a national state it expressed doubts as to whether there was an actual popular demand 'for anything more than such greater measure of local autonomy as will naturally result from the establishment in Russia of a modern democratic government whether federative or not'.[76]

In the meantime the High Commissioner at Constantinople, Bristol, whose appeal to restore the American presence in South Russia was left unattended for nearly four months, persisted in his attempts to persuade the US Government of the utter importance of such step. He explained that not only proposed trade between America and South Russia intended to relieve the latter's suffering was inconceivable without the consular protection of US interests, but more imperatively, it was needed to assist American citizens in the region as, according to his information, about five hundred Americans with valid passports were unsuccessfully trying to leave Kiev.[77]

Eventually conceding to these solicitations, in December 1919 the Department of State appointed E.Young Consul General to Odessa, authorising him to station vice consuls within his discretion at other cities in the south of Russia.[78] The War Department also contributed to the expansion of the American presence in South Russia by dispatching two military observers, Colonels Castle and Cox.

Furthermore, at about the same time the State Department designated Admiral McCully as its special (yet temporary) agent in the region with the aim of

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[76]ibid.
[77]ibid., 12 December 1919, p. 777.
[78]ibid., 1920, Vol. 3, 18 December 1919, p. 573.

reporting on political and economic conditions there. Once again, the priority was given to observing and collecting data, while the establishment of informal relations with Denikin and his associates was deemed only a secondary task. Despite the recognised importance of demonstrating a friendly attitude by the US Government towards Russia the word 'informal' was particularly emphasised. McCully was strictly instructed: '...you are accredited in no way to any Government of Russia nor are you charged with a particular diplomatic mission or clothed with authority to commit this Government in any way'. Besides, he was advised that in the absence of a lawful authority in the region the US Government could not extend any loans or credits nor had it supplies available for distribution. However, the Department stressed that it would appreciate 'reports as to the needs of the people of southern Russia and will use its best endeavors to further any practicable project which may be suggested for bettering their material or moral condition'.[79]

Thus by the end of 1919, after an almost two-year withdrawal (with the exception of a few months between the fall of the Hetman regime and Ukraine's occupation by the Bolsheviks), the US revived its role, if not that of a participant, at least of an active witness in Ukraine's affairs, as well as in the whole of South Russia. However, as it proved in early 1920, if a Bolshevik threat was to be eradicated more than just explorative activity was needed from the Allies.

As Bristol reported at the beginning of January 1920, amidst the predictions of the ultimate triumph of Bolsheviks, Denikin's situation passed from a critical to a desperate state. The latter warned that unless the Allies sent him a large trained army their missions should leave the country.[80] Bristol insisted that the US Government offered its share of assistance, if only by furnishing coal necessary for the evacuation of Odessa population. He stated that the city with its 100,000

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[79]ibid., p. 571.
[80]ibid., 2 January 1920, p. 573.

inhabitants and refugees was facing a greater terror than Kharkiv where the Reds murdered 25,000 people during the recent seizure of the city. Informing the Department that British and French ships were already carrying out the evacuation of Odessa to Sevastopol he stressed: 'Any aid on our part in this most serious matter would be amply rewarded in future prestige. We are prejudicing ourselves not only in the eyes of the Russians but of other nations by being forced to hold ourselves aloof'.[81]

In April reports from Admiral McCully in Theodosia stated that as a result of the recently assumed Allied policy of mediation between the Bolsheviks and the Whites in the Crimea a representative government might be established in the region. General Wrangel, appointed as Denikin's successor, expressed his willingness to enter into negotiations with the Bolsheviks regarding the cessation of hostilities provided that the Allies supported his claim that the Crimea should be preserved as a refuge for all those Russians who were compelled to leave the country. McCully also reported that the Ukrainian delegation visited Wrangel's headquarters and the agreement on co-operation between his army and Petlyura's forces had been achieved.[82] The far-reaching plan devised by the Whites was to turn the Crimea into a bastion of anti-Bolshevik forces which would strike a decisive blow upon Soviet rule when the time was considered to be favourable.

The Curtain Falls: Wilsonian Self-Determination and the Ukrainian Question.

While Great Britain and France were deliberating the future of Eastern Galicia at the Paris Peace Conference, the Americans, loyal to their strategy of non-commitment, were observing and accumulating information. Thus in June 1919 the Commission to Negotiate Peace examined and forwarded to the Secretary of

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[81]ibid., 7 January 1920, p. 574.
[82]ibid., 24 April 1920, p. 594.

State a report written by Major Lawrence Martin of the US Army General Staff who had been travelling through Galician Ukraine and along the border of Volhynia until the beginning of the Polish offensive on 14 May. Forwarding his report the Commission, however, commented that it 'should be accepted with considerable reserve as no confirmatory information available at present, and Martin has no opportunity to estimate conditions in greater part of Russian Ukraine'.[83]

Commenting on the outcome of a union between Eastern and Western Ukraine proclaimed in January, Martin asserted that all classes in the region favoured an independent Ukraine and that the Ukrainians were sufficiently distinct from Great Russians to be able to achieve their goal of establishing a strong and stable government as the country was unusually rich in soil and minerals and had a commercial opening through Odessa. He characterised the Holubovych administration in Galicia[84] and Petlyura's Government based at the time in Volhynia as 'capable of organizing the country satisfactorily' and reported their categorical rejection of Rakovsky's proposal to create a coalition between Kiev Bolsheviks and Galicians against Poles and Roumanians. Therefore concluding that the partition of Eastern Galicia between Poland and Rumania would endanger the future of both countries and imperil the peace of Europe he suggested that 'as the portions of Ukraine under Petlyura and Holubowitz are absolutely non-Bolshevik we can best drive entering wedge into Russia by helping these Ukrainians against Polish imperialism'.[85]

This opinion, in particular the last part regarding the need to restrain Polish imperialism, significantly differed from the official American line adopted at the time. Thus at the beginning of May the US Minister, Gibson, declared during his reception by the head of the Polish state Pilsudski:

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[83]ibid., 1919, Russia, 11 June 1919, p. 778.
[84]Sydir Holubuvych was the head of the Secretariat of the Western Ukrainian Republic at the time.
[85]ibid.

'Even before America assumed the responsibility of participation in the world war, our President voiced the views of the whole American people in stating that no peace could last or ought to last which did not provide for a united, independent Poland. The reconstitution of your country therefore represents to the people of the United States a logical expression of the idea on which their own national life is founded'.[86]

Therefore those American observers who were acquainted with this course judged all events in the region through the lens of unconditional support for 'a united, independent Poland'. In October 1919 the US Mission to Poland, authorised by the US authorities to investigate the conditions of Jews on the territory of the former Habsburg Empire which were causing concern, submitted its report to the Commission to Negotiate Peace. Pointing out that most anti-Jewish excesses were perpetrated by undisciplined Polish recruits who wanted 'to profit at the expense of that portion of the population which they regarded as alien and hostile to Polish nationality and aspirations' the head of the Mission Henry Morgenthau explained that the anti-Semitic feelings of the Polish troops were propelled by the rumours that most Jews were Bolsheviks and that they were co-operating with the Ukrainians. He stated that a solution of the Jewish problem required a comprehensive examination not only of the economic situation of the Jews, 'but also of the exact requirements of Poland' which would not be definitely known prior to the final determination of Poland's boundaries and the regulation of its relations with Russia. However, since Poland had stated its allegiance to the principles of liberty and justice as well as to the rights of national minorities in a special treaty with the Allied Powers,[87] Morgenthau expressed his confidence that the Polish Government would fulfil its promise to settle the Jewish situation as efficiently as possible.[88]

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[86]ibid., 1919, Vol., 2, 2 May 1919, p. 743.
[87]The Treaty of Peace with Poland signed in Versailles on 28 June 1919.
[88]ibid., 14 January 1920, p. 785.

The report of the Mission also included the analysis of the ethnic composition and geopolitical situation of Poland provided by General Jadwin and Homer Johnson who were members of the Mission. Noting that there were five distinct districts constituting 'the modern Polish state ... when its boundaries are fixed' - Congress Poland, Poznania, Western and Eastern Galicia, and portions of Lithuania and White Russia - they emphasised that while in Western Galicia, centring around Cracow, the Poles reached 75 per cent, the territory of Eastern Galicia was shared by them equally with the Ukrainians with the exception of Lemberg where the former prevailed. However, due to the 'peculiar agrarian conditions' which existed in the Russian Empire, the Poles owned nearly half of all real estate in Ukraine before the war. Having mentioned that there had been a notable movement of the Poles eastward to the effect that Polish infiltrations extended as far as Kiev, the authors drew the Government's attention to the more important fact of the continuing Polish emigration to America and other Western countries which could have serious implications and require an international solution in the future. This prospect, combined with the far more undesirable possibility of Russian and German revanchist aspirations in the region, necessitated, in their opinion, the economic and territorial protection of Poland by the Allies.[89]

Although at the meetings of the Allied leaders Wilson initially supported the British Premier's claim of the right of Eastern Galicians to determine their own future, the Americans succumbed to the pressure of the French and the Italians to pronounce this territory Polish. Yet, it was not the intricacy of satisfying Polish appetites and simultaneously upholding the principle of self-determination which caused the main concern of the US Government. It was more distressed by the fact that the conclusion of a peace treaty between the Polish and the Soviet Governments would automatically entail the recognition of the latter on the part of the US.

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[89]ibid., p. 798.

Thus on 2 August 1920 the new Secretary of State, Bainbridge Colby, notified Davis. the US Ambassador in London, that although the Department was interested in maintaining the integrity of Poland and therefore sympathised with the arrangements for a Polish-Russian armistice it was unwilling to participate in the Allied plan 'to extend the armistice negotiations so as to bring about a general European conference involving the recognition of the Bolshevik Government and a settlement of the Russian problem in a way that would almost inevitably be based on a partition of Russia'.[90] As much as they resented the recognition of the Soviet regime, branding it a tyranny which disregarded all the principles of international relations as well as the will of the peoples of Russia, the US authorities opposed the latter's dismemberment. Maintaining that the most enduring solution to the problem of Russia would be an assembly comprising representatives of all regions of the former Empire 'for the consideration of the reciprocal needs' Colby warned:

> '...A decision aimed at in any international conference to recognize as independent governments the factions which now exercise some degree of control over territory which was part of Imperial Russia, and to establish their relationships and boundaries, is not advisable and will seriously prejudice the future of Russia and an enduring peace'.[91]

He expressed confidence that such a compromise would be short-lived as all these new governments would undoubtedly fall when faced by a revived Russia determined to restore its territorial integrity. Regretting that the most sensible solution expressed above was impracticable at the time, the US policy-makers agreed to deal with the Bolsheviks in 'the narrowest limits within which the arranging of an armistice can be kept'. Instructing Davis to pass this guidance confidentially to American diplomats in Warsaw, Paris and Rome, the Secretary, however, made a reservation that, since on many important aspects of the

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[90]ibid., 1920, Vol. 3, p. 462.
[91]ibid., p. 463.

situation the information at the Department's disposal was conflicting and fragmentary, its views 'may be corrected and amended as the realities of conditions are revealed'.[92]

The official position was also expressed on 10 August in the note of the Secretary of State to the Italian Ambassador in the USA, Avezzana, who earlier requested the US Government's views on the situation created by the Russian advance into Poland. Confirming that the US Government firmly supported Poland's political independence and territorial integrity and would do everything in its power to guarantee this, Colby notified the Italian envoy that America would not participate in the Allied plans owing to the two considerations discussed above 'from both of which this country strongly recoils, viz the recognition of the Bolshevist regime and a settlement of Russian problems almost inevitably upon the basis of a dismemberment of Russia'.[93] The Secretary expressed faith in the ability of the Russian people to overcome the existing crisis and to restore a free and united Russia which would 'again take a leading place in the world, joining with other free nations in upholding peace and orderly justice'. Until this time the US felt obliged to protect Russia's interests and to delay all decisions which could impede them, 'especially those concerning its sovereignty over the territory of the former Russian Empire'. Summarising his Government's position Colby stated:

> '...It would regard with satisfaction a declaration by the Allied and Associated Powers, that the territorial integrity and true boundaries of Russia shall be respected. These boundaries should properly include the whole of the former Russian Empire, with the exception of Finland proper, ethnic Poland, and such territory as may by agreement form a part of the Armenian state. Each was forcibly annexed and their liberation from oppressive alien rule involves no aggressions against Russia's territorial rights, and has received the sanction of the public opinion of all free peoples'.[94]

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[92]ibid., p. 461.
[93]ibid., p. 464.
[94]ibid., p. 468.

In reply to this note Chicherin, the People's Commissary for Foreign Affairs, made a statement intended to denounce Colby's 'false and malicious accusations of a character quite unusual in diplomacy' and 'to bring them before the bar of public opinion'.[95] Objecting to Colby's understanding that non-Russian territories of the former Empire other than Finland, Poland and Armenia were not annexed by force, Chicherin claimed that the aspirations of the Ukrainian as well as the Georgian, Azerbajani, Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian peoples, were perfectly legal. Expressing his surprise at the favourable attitude the US Government assumed towards some nations while discriminating the others, he ascribed this inconsistency to the 'lack of information concerning national conditions in Eastern Europe'. Further accusations put forward in the statement were connected with the US desire to befriend Russia on the condition that its government was any other but Soviet and to preserve the country's territorial integrity within its Imperial boundaries. The first point Chicherin explained by the awareness of the US authorities that only the Soviet Government would not allow the domination of American financial groups in the country. With regard to the second one he noted that the US resolve to maintain Russia's territorial integrity not only differed from the policy carried out by Great Britain but actually was a struggle against it. 'Obviously the groups he represents perceive that other, viz, British, interests have established themselves in the new states separated from Russia, and Mr.Colby sees no other way of combating those interests than to abolish the independence of these states', was the Soviet Commissar's conclusion.[96]

This criticism, although tinted by the bitterness of the Bolshevik leaders whose every attempt at establishing official relations with the US Government was at best ignored and at worst denounced, was to a certain degree justifiable. It was particularly well-grounded with regard to the unfamiliarity of the Americans with the question of nationalities in Europe. For example, Arnold Margolin, having

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[95]ibid., 4 October 1920, p. 474.
[96]ibid., p. 477. (?)

met US statesmen at the Paris Peace Conference in his capacity as a member of the Ukrainian delegation, also concluded that most of them displayed a 'lack of knowledge about European political and economic problems in general, and about the Ukrainian problem in particular'.[97] Besides, he saw another reason for inconsistencies in the US approach to the principle of self-determination: 'Americans ... are also instinctively opposed to radical changes of the political map of the world, changes which lead to the formation of new states rather than the amalgamation of existing smaller states within federations on the United States pattern'.[98]

Thus his attempts at promoting the Ukrainian cause at a meeting with Lansing on 3 June 1919 proved absolutely futile as the latter declared that 'he recognized only a single, indissoluble Russian nation' and demanded 'the submission of the Ukraine and the complete recognition of Kolchak and Denikin'.[99]

Perhaps, the only tangible action the Americans undertook in relation to Ukraine was a deal concluded between the US Army authorities and the Ukrainian Mission representing Petlyura's Government at the Peace Conference. However, even this single attempt at assisting the Ukrainians in their fight against the Bolsheviks encountered a negative reaction by the US Government which, being initially uninformed of the deal, made every effort to overrule it before it had been accomplished.

At the beginning of October 1919 the administration of the American Red Cross in Paris informed the Secretary of State that it had dispatched two officers, Major Ryden and Captain Irvine, to Ukraine, Kiev in particular, in order to investigate the situation in the region. They were to meet with the leaders of all civil and

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[97]A.Margolin, *From a Political Diary: Russia, the Ukraine and America, 1905-1945,* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1946), p. 40.
[98]ibid., p. 41.
[99]ibid., p. 48.

military factions yet had instructions to refrain from making any commitments on behalf of the Red Cross. It notified the Secretary that Ryden, while still in Paris, met with both Denikin's representatives and 'the recognised Ukrainian Mission' and reported that the latter had purchased a large amount of the American Army supplies. The alarmed Secretary of State who was totally unaware of these developments immediately telegraphed to Polk in Paris asking him what 'the recognised Ukrainian Mission' was and what stance should be taken towards the action of the Red Cross.[100]

Polk replied that the visit of the representatives of the American Red Cross to Ukraine should not be objected to as their findings could prove useful to both the Commission to Negotiate Peace and the State Department. This reassurance came from General Jadwin who, whilst preparing a report on his own visit to Petlyura and Denikin, met with the Red Cross representatives and expressed his approval of their mission to Polk.

'With regard to the "recognized Ukrainian Mission" in Paris, there has been for a good many months a Ukrainian mission here which has flooded this delegation with propaganda', Polk elucidated further. He admitted that to his knowledge it had not been recognised by anyone and was dealt with on the same basis as the numerous delegations of other unrecognised groups. The Vice President of the Mission, Dr.Paneyko, confirmed the reported purchase of the American Army war stocks yet said that his Mission was unable to ship them out of France. 'Do not know who American army authorities consulted in connection with sale but it would seem to have been an extraordinary action for them to take without getting views of the Department', Polk summarised perplexedly.[101]

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[100]ibid., 1919, Russia, 8 October 1919, p. 779.
[101]ibid.

Lansing immediately placed matters under extensive scrutiny. Requesting details of the supposed transaction between the Ukrainian Mission and the US military authorities, the Secretary of State resolved: 'I believe this matter should be thoroughly investigated'.[102] Polk's inquiry revealed that the Government of the Ukrainian Republic submitted a proposal to the Liquidation Commission regarding the sale of quartermaster and medical supplies as well as motor equipment. According to the inquiry, the agreement reached $8,557,771.59 worth of the US Army surplus reserves had been transferred to the Ukrainians since June 1919, with the exception of the motor equipment, cancelled due to the objections of the French Government. Enclosing a list of articles contained in the Ukrainian proposal Polk stressed that the Peace Commission had not been consulted on this transaction.[103] 'Did "Ukrainian Republic" pay cash? If not what [are] terms and security?', was the Secretary's next question.[104]

On 17 November Grew, the Secretary-General of the Commission to Negotiate Peace, submitted to Lansing a letter from Parker, the Chairman of the Liquidation Commission, giving an account of his Commission's activity since it had been contacted by President Wilson on 24 March 1919. Parker reported that, having considered the President's suggestion with regard to surplus supplies, the Liquidation Commission reached a conclusion that it would be 'to the interest of the United States to make sales of such clothing and subsistence stocks on a credit basis to the so-called "Liberated Nations" ... and at the same time in a measure relieve their distress...'[105] It had been decided that Senator Hollis, a member of the Liquidation Commission, would be in charge of all questions of sales and international credits as well as the liaison with Hoover's agency and the US Treasury. When in April 1919 Ukrainian representatives made a request to the Commission with regard to the purchase of supplies it was initially refused on the

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[102]ibid., 21 October 1919, p. 780.
[103]ibid.
[104]ibid., 29 October 1919, p.783.
[105]ibid., p. 785.

grounds that the Ukrainian Republic had not been recognised by the US. However, having consulted Hoover's Relief Administration, the Commission found it possible to form a partnership consisting of Ivan Petrushevich, Voldemar Timoshenko and Simon-Jean Cerf, who submitted the above mentioned proposal. It envisaged the transaction amounting to $11,500,000 which was approved by the Commission on 6 June. However, since the latter was instructed to interrupt the process of delivery, the Ukrainians received only $8,000,000 worth of goods. The payment was made in the Treasury notes of the Ukrainian Republic signed by three delegates of the Ukrainian Mission at the Paris Peace Conference and subsequently endorsed by the President of the Mission Sydorenko. Having given this thorough explanation the Chairman of the Liquidation Commission pointed out:

> '...A Committee of the Peace Conference who had visited Russia, Esthonia, Ukrania and neighboring Provinces, waited upon this Commission several times, and with great earnestness urged that in the interest of humanity, as well as for business and political reasons, the surplus stocks of the American Army should be sold to these peoples, including the Ukrainians'.[106]

In an attempt to further justify the actions of the Liquidation Commission Polk pointed out in his dispatch of 5 December that the deal had been made at a time when Petlyura's forces were co-operating in fighting the Bolsheviks. Yet 'in view of events subsequent to the sale, the apparent collapse of the Petliura movement and the anti-Polish and anti-Denikin trend it has taken', the Chairman of the Liquidation Commission reportedly himself regretted that the sale had ever been made. Notifying the Department that the bulk of the goods acquired by the Ukrainian Mission was apparently still stored in warehouses in France, Polk warned of 'a number of embarrassing possibilities in the present situation'. In his opinion the Ukrainians could dispose of some goods in France and utilise the procured money to increase their propaganda or to ship supplies to forces in

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[106]ibid., p. 786.

South Russia 'which we might not particularly desire to assist at the present time especially as we have done so little to assist Denikin' who might be discouraged by such news. Taking all this into consideration Polk suggested three ways of resolving this 'delicate' matter 'of the most extreme urgency': firstly, it could be left to the Liquidation Commission which could retract the deal on the pretext of self-protection against the financial loss; secondly, the Department of State could intervene and in co-operation with the French authorities seize the supplies; thirdly, having allowed the shipment of the supplies the US authorities should arrange a supervision of their distribution by the American Red Cross.[107]

Trying to decide which of the three points suggested by Polk should be resorted to, Lansing telegraphed to Wallace, the US Ambassador in France, on 23 December that in order to annul the effects of the transaction the Department would welcome any efforts 'which would not embarrass the American authorities'. Advising him that the distribution of medical supplies by the Red Cross was under consideration Lansing appealed to the Ambassador: 'Can you devise method to prevent Ukrainian use of other supplies?'[108]

Wallace replied that the Liquidation Commission had already cancelled the contract signed with the Ukrainian Mission without giving a formal reason yet indicating that this decision was based on the assumption that the de facto Ukrainian Government ceased to exist and consequently could not fulfil its obligations. This led to a protest by the head of the Ukrainian Mission who declared on 16 January that Petlyura was still the President of the Ukrainian Republic and the Commander-in-Chief of the national army striving 'in close union with Polish and Roumanian Governments to liberate its country from foreign and enemy intrusions'. He maintained that his government continued to consider itself responsible for assumed obligations and insisted on the

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[107]ibid., p. 788.
[108]ibid., p. 789.

implementation of the contract. Remarking that this note was the first contact that the US Embassy had on this subject with the Ukrainian Mission, the Ambassador requested instructions as to what reply should be given to it.[109]

The answer which came from the Department at the end of January was not in the least surprising: it was emphasised that although the US authorities maintained the inadvisability of allowing the Ukrainian Mission to obtain surplus army supplies they did not wish to appear as active participants in the negotiations. 'You will, therefore, tell the Ukrainian Mission informally, if you consider it advisable to correspond with it, that the matter rests entirely in the hands of the Liquidation Commission and the Department of State can take no action in the matter', was the final and categorical resolution.[110]

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Summarising the content of the US policy towards Ukraine during the first period it should be said that the United States played a fairly insignificant part in the rise of Ukrainian statehood. While the Ukrainian authorities as well as non-governmental organisations made a number of appeals for assistance to both the US President and diplomatic representatives, the American official attitude remained that of non-commitment during the whole period in question. Closely following the evolution of events in Ukraine the Americans acted mainly as observers rather than as either sympathetic or obstructive agents. However, their course of non-interference, albeit seemingly harmless, indirectly reduced the chances of the Ukrainians to succeed. Intensive correspondence between Washington and US diplomats in the region, thorough analyses of the developments in Ukraine, the presence of US Consuls in Kiev and Odessa, and even deliberations regarding the possibilities of unofficial American involvement, were to no avail as the embryonic Ukrainian cause required external support in

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[109]ibid., 20 January 1920, p. 790.
[110]ibid., 28 January 1920, p. 790.

order to survive. Relatively independent (more precisely, independent of Russia) Ukrainian governments managed to stay in power for as long as foreign assistance was provided. This very fact, however, can justify the US inactivity, which precipitated their demise when all the other help had been withdrawn: being a pragmatic nation the Americans had no intentions of wasting money and time on potentially abortive undertakings provided that their interests were not directly involved. The US leadership, receiving comprehensive information from the field, was only too well aware of the character of the Ukrainian movement and having no direct interest in the region it justifiably chose the role of a bystander.

PART II. THE POST-SOVIET INDEPENDENCE OF UKRAINE: 1991-1994

'The greater part of today's Ukraine has not just been linked with Russia to a far greater degree and for far longer than any of the former Soviet dominions of Eastern and Central Europe - historically, culturally, economically and ethnically, it has been merged with Russia. The extent of Ukraine's unique importance for Russia is evidenced by the consequences of the Ukrainian proclamation of independence: it broke apart the USSR irreparably, and unhinged the Russian Federation (by strengthening centrifugal forces within Russia)'.[1]

While almost every issue connected with Ukraine's emergence on the political map of the world caused great controversy among policy-makers and observers alike, the above view expressed in a British research paper a few months into the Republic's independence was unreservedly shared by everyone. Although Ukraine's separation had been seen as the most undesirable, if improbable, loss for Russia as early as the beginning of the century, it could not even compare to the ruinous effect it had on the latter's future as a great power in the 1990s. Moreover, unlike the first attempt of the Ukrainians at state-building, their post-Soviet path to independence had serious international implications.

On the eve of independence Ukraine accounted for one fifth of the overall industrial output of the Soviet Union, one sixth of its arable land and a quarter of its food production.[2] According to most analysts, both domestic and Western, Ukraine had one of the best starting positions among the Soviet Republics to make a successful transition to a prosperous market economy. Two years later, however, the newly-independent state found itself on the verge of economic collapse.[3]

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[1]J.B.K.Lough, *Prospects for Ukrainian Independence,* SSRC Occasional Brief: No 11, 15 May 1992, p. 1.

[2]M.Bojcun, *The Ukrainian Economy since Independence*, UNL, May 1999.

[3]C.Barner-Barry, C.A. Hody, *The Politics of Change. The Transformation of the Former Soviet Union* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), p. 197.

When Ukraine's independence was proclaimed by the Verkhovna Rada (the Ukrainian Parliament) in August 1991 it became the second largest state in Europe in terms of territory and the fifth in terms of the population. The overwhelming support for the Rada's decision expressed by the majority of Ukraine's inhabitants in a referendum on 1 December 1991 (over 90 per cent)[4] constituted one of the major components of the new internal environment which proved to be more favourable for the process of nation-state formation than that of the first period. Other gains which contributed to the creation of this environment included a substantial growth in general education and professional training, compared with the situation back in 1917 when literate Ukrainians were few, as well as a final territorial consolidation as opposed to the virtual non-existence of clearly defined boundaries at the beginning of the century.

However, apart from delivering obvious advantages, each of the newly developed features mentioned above retained certain drawbacks which considerably inhibited the process of state-building.

Firstly, despite a large number of highly educated and skilful people, there was a serious lack of experienced professionals (as well as corresponding institutions) in the fields of politics and public administration.

Secondly, although all regions where Ukrainians formed a majority of the population had been united in one Republic during the Soviet era, its inhabitants could hardly be described as a unified self-conscious 'nation'. An underdeveloped national identity primarily resulted from the phenomenon of biethnicity which was common in Ukraine. Although Ukraine's 52 million population consisted of 73 per cent ethnic Ukrainians and 22 per cent ethnic Russians according to the

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[4]*Stanovlennya Vladnykh Struktur v Ukrayini (The Formation of the Power Structures in Ukraine)*, (Kiev, 1997), p. 166.

last Soviet census of 1989, many identified themselves as both Ukrainian and Russian, with 37 per cent ethnic Ukrainians using Russian as their main language.[5] Consequently, the Republic's population could be divided into three major groupings: Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians, Russian-speaking Ukrainians and Russian-speaking Russians, plus a variety of small minorities such as Jews, Poles, Ruthenians, Hungarians, Bulgarians, and Belarusans, etc.[6]

This division was most expressly manifested in Ukraine's regionalisation: despite decades of existence as a coherent territorial unit, ethnic and linguistic differences between Galicia, Central Ukraine, the Donbass and the Crimea did not disappear. Thus Western Ukraine (Galicia) was populated mainly by Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians (90 per cent) whose nationalism at times was extreme; the central part of the country, representing a mixture of all three groupings, displayed a moderate degree of national self-consciousness; while the Ukrainian ethnos in the mostly Russified South-East was clearly underdeveloped. Thus 51 per cent of the population in the Donbass described themselves as ethnic Ukrainians yet only 32 per cent stated that Ukrainian was their mother tongue[7] which meant that Russian-speakers amounted to nearly 70 per cent in the region. In the Crimea (the only region where Ukrainians were in a minority) Russians constituted 67 per cent of the population, while the Tatars represented another considerable ethnic group.[8] Although both the Donbass and the Crimea voted for Ukraine's separation from Russia (84 and 54 per cent respectively) this was motivated primarily by the hope that an independent Ukraine would be more prosperous economically rather than by a commitment to national ideals.[9]

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[5]V.Khmelko, A.Wilson, 'Regionalism and Ethnic and Linguistic Cleavages in Ukraine' in: T.Kuzio (ed.) *Contemporary Ukraine. Dynamics of Post-Soviet Transformation*, (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1998), p. 74.

[6]A.J.Motyl, 'The Conceptual President: Leonid Kravchuk and the Politics of Surrealism' in: T.J.Colton, R.C.Tucker (eds) *Patterns in Post-Soviet Leadership*, (Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford: Westview Press, 1995), p. 105.

[7]G.Simon, 'Problems Facing the Formation of the Ukrainian State', *Aussen Politik, German Foreign Affairs Review*, Vol. 45, January 1994, p. 63.

[8]J. Sherr, *Ukraine, Russia, Europe*, Conflict Studies Research Centre, F55, October 1996, p. 2.

[9]T.Kuzio, A.Wilson (1994), p. 187.

These divisions meant that the task of state-building faced by Ukraine's new leaders had to be paralleled with that of nation-building, that is creating a nation that would encompass all ethnic groups in the country united by a strong sense of common identity and political allegiance.

The first Ukrainian President, Leonid Kravchuk, elected in December 1991, launched an elaborate programme of nation-building, rightfully considering it one of his top priorities. While actively engaging in the establishment of the national symbols formerly banned as 'nationalistic' (the national anthem, the blue and yellow flag, and the state emblem - the trident), Kravchuk also employed more subtle nation-building measures. Thus he embraced the official terminology aimed at creating a sense of national identity, referring to fellow citizens as 'the people of Ukraine' as opposed to 'the Ukrainian people'. While his Government depicted Russia as a threat against which 'the people of Ukraine' must be defended, the Russians in general were never criticised so as to avoid alienating the Russians of Ukraine. Moreover, a wise policy of accepting Russian as a commonly used language was adopted: although Ukrainian was declared the Republic's official language it was not rigorously imposed in all spheres of public life.

Largely owing to this inclusive approach to nation-building, Ukraine found itself in a better position to handle minority problems and nationalistic excesses than most of the other successor states of the former Soviet Union. In contrast to those Republics where ethnic-based national movements were more uncompromising, Kravchuk's cautious course of consensus politics ensured that the factionalisation of Ukrainian society did not mount to inter-ethnic violence or regional conflicts. Although there was a certain predisposition to ethnic tension, aggravated by Russia's policy of encouraging discontent and unrest in some Russian-speaking

parts of Ukraine (such as the Crimea), President Kravchuk managed to avoid serious civil strife.

However, having successfully established the attributes of nationhood Kravchuk, the former head of the Verkhovna Rada and the ideology chief of the Ukrainian Communist Party, implemented his policy of maintaining stability in the country at the expense of economic and social reform. 'Stability' was conservatively perceived by his Government as the avoidance of any change as a means of retaining control over the country. Instead of adopting decisions aimed at freeing prices, reducing enterprises' dependency on cheap state credits, and privatising certain sectors of the economy, the Government continued the Soviet practice of subsidising industry and agriculture. As this inevitably led to a massive budget deficit, more money had to be printed which resulted in severe inflation at 50 per cent a month.[10]

The Ukrainian leaders' failure to break with the centralised Soviet command-administrative system in the first years of independence plunged the country into a deep socio-economic crisis which manifested itself in decreasing industrial output, mounting energy deficiency, progressing hyper inflation and, as a consequence, a dramatic fall in living standards. Thus inflation, boosted by price increases for imported oil and gas and the emission of domestic currency to support the Government's growing budget deficit, soared from 290 per cent in 1991 to about 2,000 per cent in 1992 and to over 10,000 per cent in 1993. Ukraine's industrial production and GDP plummeted by 20 per cent and real wages fell by more than 80 per cent in 1993.[11] The latter resulted in deep dissatisfaction in the national workforce, which aggravated the state of the ailing economy. A large proportion of Ukrainians were forced to seek supplements to

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[10]J.F.Dunn, *Instabilities in Post-Communist Europe. Ukraine*, Conflict Studies Research Centre, January 1994, p. 7-2.

[11]*The Ukrainian Challenge: Reforming Labour Market and Social Policy* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 1995), pp. 10, 12, 132.

their official incomes by juggling a few jobs at once or moving into private enterprise; some engaged in black market activities (for instance, according to some estimates, half of Ukraine's $6.5bn worth of exports in 1993 were not reported to the Government); while others turned to strikes.[12] Thus the strike of the Donbass miners in summer 1993, which was provoked by major price increases designed to reduce the budget deficit, paralysed the country's eastern industrial base and eventually compelled the authorities to concede to the workers' demands. However, despite ending the strike, new government subsidies and higher pay triggered further inflation.

The fact that the Donbass miners' demands were not only economic but also political (e.g. greater regional autonomy, a referendum on the competence of the President and new parliamentary elections by the end of 1993) signified the inability of the Ukrainian state to exercise its authority fully (i.e. to maintain the public sector, to administer the territory, and especially to control the provinces). Kravchuk's earlier decision to enhance the state's administrative functions through the appointment of presidential representatives in the regions failed largely due to the opposition of the Verkhovna Rada which was anxious to preserve the Soviet-era system of subordinate local Radas. Its Chairman Ivan Plyushch even openly encouraged the demands of the regions for greater autonomy as a means of checking the power of the President who believed that a unitary state was the only way to ensure the progressive development of the coherent Ukrainian nation while federalism would 'even endanger the possibility of preserving the integrity of the state as such'.[13]

In the hope of placating the Donbass workers and preventing a general strike Kravchuk dismissed Prime Minister Kuchma, who in November 1992 had been authorised by the Parliament to advance Ukraine's economic liberalisation and

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[12]'Ukraine: Rising from the Ashes' in *Strategic Survey 1994/95* (The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Oxford University Press, May 1995), p. 90.
[13]*Literaturna Ukraina,* 26 November 1992.

was thus subsequently held responsible for the miners' dissatisfaction, and concentrated executive power in his own hands. Yet the insufficiency of these measures forced him to accept concessions put forward by the Verkhovna Rada, including a referendum on popular confidence in both the President and the Parliament itself (but not new parliamentary elections).

The tension between the President and the Parliament, although having markedly increased during the turbulent events of summer 1993, had been a defining feature of Ukraine's state-building process from its onset. Propelled to a certain extent by personal rivalry within the country's political elite, it was mainly caused by the absence of a new constitution (until 1996 an amended version of the Soviet 1978 constitution was still in force), and consequently a clear division of powers. As a result, the competences of all three major branches of government were confusingly overlapping, the issue of subordination of the state administration and local authorities remained unresolved and the whole state mechanism 'was driven by an incomprehensible array of political machinations' rather than by the application of established rules and procedures.[14] These problems were complicated by the fact that Ukraine's Parliament was elected during the Soviet era and hence controlled by the old communists who, despite having adopted democratic slogans, were prepared to do very little in order to change the pre-independence status quo. Only 25 per cent of the 450 seats in the Verkhovna Rada belonged to the democratic bloc which meant that any moves on the part of the President towards democratisation and market reform were inevitably blocked by the Parliament.[15]

However, the President's real predicament paradoxically lay in that, while seeking to incorporate the nationalist democrats into the mechanisms of government, he had no choice but to rely heavily on the former Communist apparatchiks as the

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[14]K.Wolczuk, 'The Politics of Constitution Making in Ukraine' in: T. Kuzio (ed.) (1998), p. 124.
[15]M.Nordberg, 'State and Institution Building in Ukraine' in: T. Kuzio (ed.) (1998), p. 47.

country's only political elite at the time. Democratic forces, being a product of the Soviet Union's disintegration rather than its cause, remained inexperienced and disunited and often readily adaptable to the existing power structures. Although a survey conducted at the end of 1992 revealed that 70 per cent of Ukrainians believed that a multiparty system was a crucial element of democracy, most of Ukraine's numerous political parties were rather weak both organisationally and in terms of their ties with the public.[16]

With regard to institutionalising the state (as opposed to fashioning its symbols) Kravchuk's most successful move was the construction of national armed forces. In December 1991 Kravchuk announced the nationalisation of the 700,000 - 800,000 troops of the Soviet Army based in Ukraine. In January 1992 80 per cent of them took an oath of allegiance to Ukraine despite the fact that less than a half were ethnic Ukrainians.[17] Although most top posts were still held by Russian officers, who chose to continue their service in Ukraine due both to the Government's promises of attractive benefits and the fear of being involved in military conflicts Russia was waging in other parts of the CIS, Kravchuk appointed a number of Ukrainians to the high command. Thus whereas the Russian officers' genuine loyalty to Ukraine remained untested Ukraine nevertheless acquired control of the second largest army in Europe after Russia.

This was a significant achievement in view of the important role assigned by the Ukrainian Government to the spheres of national defence and security in a state-building process which was strongly affected both by domestic complications and factors of external instability. Relations with Russia, whose imperial mentality was perceived as a major threat to the viability of the Ukrainian state, were aggravated by the bulk of strategic issues inherited from the defunct USSR. The

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[16]K.Dawisha, B.Parrott, *Russia and the New States of Eurasia*, (Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 139.

[17]B.Pyskir, 'The Silent Coup: The Building of Ukraine's Military', *European Security*, Spring 1993 (Vol. 2, No. 1), pp. 140-161.

weapons of mass destruction on Ukraine's soil, which made it the third largest nuclear power in the world; the Republic's heavy dependence on formerly subsidised Russian energy supplies; and the complications of the Black Sea Fleet division, all affected the choice of the Ukrainian Government's state-building strategies.

Ukraine's new geopolitical image was largely defined by the fact that, having separated Russia from Eastern Europe and 'pushed' it closer to Asia, the Republic found itself right along the potential division line in Europe connected with the imminent NATO expansion and the eventual EU enlargement eastward. This presented Ukraine with a complex foreign policy dilemma. On the one hand, it was Russia with its vast resources and considerable military potential which was to play a major part in shaping the political climate in the region. This factor, combined with the importance for Ukraine of deep-rooted economic, social and cultural ties with Russia, rendered the maintenance of amicable relations between the two countries vital. On the other hand, being a European state, Ukraine justifiably aspired to engage in relations with European structures. Besides, its eagerness to ensure that the continuation of economic co-operation with Russia would not lead to a subsequent political or military reunification necessitated a closer association with the West as a guarantee of its national security which, in turn, increased Russia's concerns. This dilemma was further complicated by the regionalisation of Ukraine, discussed above, as the Russophile South-East favoured a stronger integration within the CIS and the more nationalistic West was mainly concerned with removing Ukraine from Russia's orbit.

One cause of periodic crises in Ukrainian-Russian relations was the twin issue of Crimea's status and the future of the Black Sea Fleet. Being the only region in Ukraine which enjoyed the rights of autonomy and had a definite Russian majority at 67 per cent of the population, Crimea developed strong separatist tendencies. They were intensified by the prevailing perception of both the local

political elite and the masses that the peninsula was not an integral part of Ukraine (as it was transferred to the Republic in 1954 by the Soviet leader Khrushchev to mark the 300th anniversary of Ukraine's unification with Russia). Although it approved Ukraine's independence in December 1991 by a small majority, calls for the return of the Crimea to Russia soon began to challenge Ukrainian territorial integrity. In May 1992 the Crimean Parliament declared independence from Ukraine yet was forced to suspend it under threats of economic pressure from Kiev. However, a consensus subsequently established between Crimean and the Ukrainian central authorities was endangered by Russia's strategic interests in the region, particularly in the city of Sevastopol, which served as the base of the Black Sea Fleet. The statement made by the Russian Parliament in May 1992 that the transfer of the Crimea to Ukraine lacked the force of law and its declaration of Russian jurisdiction over Sevastopol in July 1993 exacerbated the situation: although denounced by President Yeltsin, these claims prompted Ukrainian nationalists to adopt a harder line on Crimea. In the course of 1992-1993 Kravchuk and Yeltsin made numerous attempts at resolving the issue of the Black Sea Fleet division and the status of Sevastopol and after a series of meetings and preliminary agreements it was decided that Russia would continue to use the Sevastopol base and would buy Ukraine's share of the fleet in part payment for the latter's debts incurred by energy supplies.

Finally, the Crimean conundrum was increasingly influenced by the return of the Tatars exiled from the peninsula by Stalin during World War 2. Their historic animosity towards Russians gave rise to confrontation with the local population and the authorities and hence motivated their support for the Ukrainian Government. Yet the latter's inability to assist the Tatars' integration financially somewhat strained relations between them and the centre. Thus the combination of ethnic and religious tensions, strategic considerations and political intrigues endowed Crimea with great destabilising potential, making it a primary concern in both the domestic and international policies of the Ukrainian Government.

However. the linchpin of Ukraine's foreign policy was the question of the Soviet nuclear arsenal on the Republic's territory. Although Ukraine's intention to become a non-nuclear-weapon state was declared as early as June 1990 in the Declaration of State Sovereignty, its leaders persistently delayed the resolution of this issue. Propelled both by the ambition to have a deterrent against Russia's military threat and the desire to draw Western attention to Ukraine, the Kravchuk Government regularly used the nuclear weapons as a bargaining chip in its negotiations with both Russia and the West. Although initially it worsened relations with the former and created tensions with the latter while having produced few gains (i.e. an additional leverage in handling the Crimean dispute), this policy eventually succeeded in both advancing Ukraine's international profile and obtaining financial assistance and guarantees of national security. These came in the form of the Trilateral Agreement signed in January 1994 by Ukraine, Russia and the US 'which officially transformed Ukraine from an obstacle to denuclearization into a genuine interlocutor of the United States and Russia' as, without the ratification of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START1) by the Verkhovna Rada, further steps in this sphere negotiated by Moscow and Washington were impossible.[18]

President Kravchuk's choice of international ventures undoubtedly helped, albeit gradually, to advance the state-building process. Having laid the foundations (both symbolic and institutional) of statehood Kravchuk, while failing to initiate economic progress, nevertheless facilitated the conditions necessary for launching the transformation of the national economy without disrupting the society and state. In a complete reversal of the first presidential election of 1991 when Kravchuk won on a predominantly nation- and state-building platform, his successor Leonid Kuchma, Kravchuk's one-time Prime Minister and a former director of one of the largest missile plants in the FSU, was elected due to the

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[18]A.J.Motyl in T.J.Colton, R.C.Tucker (eds) (1995)., p. 117.

widespread support (particularly in the industrial East) for his electoral campaign's focus on economic reform and closer co-operation with Russia. Although Kravchuk's supporters were convinced that his political opponent would sell Ukrainian independence to Russia, their fears proved wrong as the new President quickly adopted his predecessor's views on the importance of the nation, the state and the necessity to protect them from their eastern neighbour's ambitions.

Thus during the July 1994 presidential election political power, for the first time in Ukraine's history, was peacefully transferred to another government. That was a remarkable achievement in comparison with Ukraine's own history of state-building during the first period and the experiences of many other Soviet successor states, where the transition of power often occurred as a result of violent conflict. Apart from being a major test of the nation's political maturity it also ensured a certain continuity in the process of state-building.

The election of the new President was preceded by the parliamentary elections which took place in March-April 1994. Although calls for the dissolution of the old Soviet-era legislature were repeatedly made since Ukraine had become independent, it was not until the miners' strike in the Donbass that the Verkhovna Rada was forced to announce the early elections, both parliamentary and presidential. While initially it planned only a referendum on confidence in itself and the President, the Parliament subsequently changed its decision in favour of new elections for fear of losing the popular vote during the referendum. By opting for new elections the old Communists in the Rada gave themselves another chance to stay in power. Having rejected the proposals of the democrats to elect at least 50 per cent of seats on party lists, they passed the majoritarian election law in November 1993, which was likely to ensure their predominance in the new Parliament.[19] Among the thirty-two parties registered for the first round

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[19]A.Bilous, 'Na Vybory - Ukrainskym Velosypedom?' in: *Polityka i Chas*, No. 1, 1994, pp. 40-43.

of elections the Communist Party of Ukraine had the largest number of candidates contesting two thirds of all constituencies. Apart from the Radical Left represented by the Communist and the Socialist Parties, there were three other major blocs in Ukrainian politics: the Centre, the National Democrats and the Extreme Right. The Centrists were represented by the Inter-Regional Bloc of Reforms supporting Kuchma and competing with the Radical Left for the influence in the South-East. The National Democrats, mainly based in Western-Central Ukraine, included Rukh, the popular movement which led the struggle for Ukraine's independence and always remained in opposition to President Kravchuk, and the Congress of National Democratic Forces formed by a number of parties in his support in summer 1992. Finally, the Radical Right, consisting of three overtly nationalistic parties, was influential predominantly in the Western parts of Ukraine.

As a result of the first round of the elections in March 324 out of 450 parliamentary seats were elected. The Communist Party, having found a major support base in the Donbass, won 90 seats and became the largest faction in the new Verkhovna Rada.[20] They joined forces with the other two parties of the Extreme Left, the Socialists and the Agrarians, and thus were in a position to elect Oleksandr Moroz, the leader of the Socialist Party, Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada. The majority of parliamentary committee chairmen also came from their ranks. In contrast, the Radical Right failed to fill even the 21 seats required to register as a parliamentary faction. The largest number of elected deputies (above 50 per cent) had no political affiliations which meant that the democrats, despite their optimistic expectations of winning at least half of the seats, only managed to preserve the percentage held in the previous Parliament.[21] However, following Kuchma's appeal to reconcile their differences (e.g. the closer co-operation with Europe favoured by Rukh and the reintegration with

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[20]*Holos Ukrainy*, 27 April 1994.

[21]M.Bojcun, 'The Ukrainian Parliamentary Elections in March-April 1994' in *Europe - Asia Studies*, Vol. 47, No. 2, March April 1995, p. 245.

Russia advocated by the Inter-Regional Bloc of Reform), both the National Democrats and the Centre united into a non-communist faction and thus were able to create the parliamentary majority required to back President Kuchma's course of reform.

Having succeeded in achieving a parliamentary pro-reform consensus the new President launched a comprehensive economic reform programme in early Autumn 1994. It tackled all those aspects which the previous Government had tried to bypass: macroeconomic stabilisation including deep cuts in subsidies and the introduction of the national currency; privatisation of state-owned enterprises in all sectors as well as of land and housing; price liberalisation, reorganisation of the tax system, etc. On the strength of this radical reform plan Kuchma succeeded in securing Ukraine's first deal with the International Monetary Fund which was signed at the end of September. By the beginning of November his Government managed to reduce the rate of inflation, liberalised most prices and export controls, and minimised Ukraine's imports.

Besides, realising that Ukraine was unlikely to be incorporated in the EU structures in the near future, Kuchma directed his Government's external activities at rebuilding a productive economic relationship with Russia which remained Ukraine's dominant trading partner and its main supplier of oil and natural gas (approximately half of Ukraine's total trade, both exports and imports, was with Russia which also provided 90 per cent of Ukraine's oil and 70 per cent of its natural gas).[22]

While economic co-operation with Russia and the CIS as a whole became one of the top priorities of the new Ukrainian Government President Kuchma nevertheless pursued the continuation of his predecessor's policy of closer

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[22]G.Nemiria, 'Ukraine: Prospects and Constraints' in: R. Weichhardt (ed.) *Economic Developments and reforms in Cooperation Partner Countries: The Social and Human Dimension* (NATO Economic Directorate, Colloquium, 26-28 June 1996, Brussels), p. 261. C. Barner-Barry, C.A. Hody, op.cit., p. 199.

integration with both European and international structures (i.e. the Council of Europe, the EC, GATT and the Central European Initiative) in order to diversify Ukraine's foreign trade and subsequently lessen its dependence on Russia. Although by the end of 1994 Russia and other CIS Republics remained Ukraine's major trading partners, it had created an extended framework of international co-operation, carrying out both import and export operations with more than 150 countries.[23] Besides, aiming to secure financial support for his reform programme, Kuchma initiated a dynamic and rather productive dialogue with the G-7, the IMF and the World Bank.

Thus having acknowledged that Ukraine's viability as a nation-state was conditioned by both external and internal factors (the latter being the necessity to bridge regional divisions, to gain access to resources and to build links which would best assist the country's economic revival), President Kuchma managed to synthesise two seemingly irreconcilable positions, pro-Russian and pro-Western. This helped to remove serious obstacles both in conducting efficient foreign policy encountered by the Kravchuk Government and overcoming Ukraine's continuous regionalisation. Kuchma's success was manifested in the increasing support for his course in Western Ukraine which, having initially suspected his platform to be a 'sell-out' of Ukraine to Moscow, had credited him with less than 10 per cent of the vote during the Presidential election.[24]

While the focus of Kuchma's state-building efforts was on strengthening the domestic foundations of Ukraine's independence (substantiating his famous claim that economic stability was the best guarantee of national security) he also paid considerable attention to cultivating ties with Western defence and security organisations. Thus despite its declared non-bloc status Ukraine proceeded to expand its participation in NATO (through the North Atlantic Co-operation

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[23]J.F.Dunn, *The Determinants and Future of Ukrainian Foreign and Security Policy* Conflict Studies Research Centre, Sandhurst, F45, February 1995, p. 20.
[24]'Ukraine: Rising from the Ashes', op. cit., pp. 87-88.

Council and the Partnership for Peace initiative), the WEU, the UN and the OSCE, on the grounds that neutrality did not exclude regional co-operation in a world which was no longer divided into blocs. A major breakthrough in Ukraine's relations with the West, though, came with its accession to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in November 1994 which removed all the doubts as to its nuclear intentions and put an end to the West's disposition to rely on the formula of political bullying and economic manoeuvring with regard to Ukraine.

It can be concluded that, while lacking both national integrity and an indigenous elite and facing an unfavourable environment for the creation of a sovereign state in 1917-1921, Ukrainian society had reached a considerably higher degree of coherence and political experience by the beginning of the 90s. Thus the internal elements necessary for the creation of a nation-state had been accumulated thereby contributing to the formation of a new political reality which influenced changes in attitude of both Great Britain and the US towards Ukraine and enabled the formation of mutual links on a different basis during 1991-1994.

CHAPTER 3. US-UKRAINIAN RELATIONS, 1991-1994

This chapter considers the course of political and diplomatic relations between the United States and the Ukrainian Republic from its declaration of independence in August 1991 through to the end of 1994. Focusing on the evolution of the US policy towards Ukraine, it examines the circumstances in which the bilateral relations progressed and the influence of those circumstances on the process of decision-making in each country. The chapter is divided into three sections corresponding to the major phases in the development of the US-Ukrainian relationship: the sceptical attitude to Ukraine's independence underlying the whole course of the Bush administration's policy and the Ukrainian Government's corresponding unwillingness to co-operate; the gradual realisation on the part of American leaders of the necessity to conduct a constructive dialogue with the new, effectively nuclear, state which resulted in a lengthy process of nuclear bargaining; and the final breakthrough in the nascent co-operation between the world's leader and the rising nation-state during the Clinton years.

Tacit Opposition: The Bush Administration and The 'Breakaway' Ukrainian Republic.

'The end of the long Cold War opens opportunities to forge a new relationship. Through increased trade, expanded exchanges, through American medical assistance, efforts aiming at helping you cope with the after-effects of Chernobyl, the United States and Ukraine can build a future based on shared aspirations and common interests'. With these optimistic words President Bush greeted America's newly acquired friends during his first visit to Kiev on 1 August 1991. However, the visit which was positively intended to 'mark a beginning', in fact provoked a

reaction of a very wide spectrum.[1] In particular, his comments before the Verkhovna Rada (Parliament) of Ukraine caused indignation among his Ukrainian hosts and consternation back home. Qualified by numerous critics as the President's 'Chicken Kiev' speech, it immediately placed Bush in the ranks of the opposition to independence movements in the Soviet republics. What seemed most unjustifiable was his warning against the dangers of 'suicidal nationalism' just a few weeks before the declaration of Ukraine's independence.

Naturally, the President's advocates, his National Security Adviser, Brent Scowcroft, among them, came up with a quick retort, in turn accusing the critics of wrenching 'those lines' badly out of context.[2] They argued that facing the complexity of Soviet realities the President demonstrated 'flexibility and an appreciation for nuance'.[3] Indeed, taking into consideration the predisposition of the region to economic confusion and ethnic conflicts often resulting in bloodshed, one can agree that Bush simply conveyed words of caution against breaking all the old ties (the tendency prevailing in Ukraine at the time), against focusing excessively on the problems of ethnicity instead of placing the accent on the issues of human rights in general (the worrisome practice the Baltics were already experiencing), and against ungrounded hopes that independence would bring instant prosperity with minimum responsibility.

It was not impossible to interpret Bush's address even as an encouragement to Ukraine's independent development since he claimed that only Ukraine can 'shape its own future...' and only Ukrainians 'will bear responsibility' for making their land more prosperous and free.[4]

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[1]'US Will Support Forces of Reform in Ukraine', *Bush Luncheon Statement, USIA,* 1 August 1991.
[2]'Mr. Bush in the Ukraine', editorial, *Washington Times,* 7 August 1991, p. G2.
[3]B.Scowcroft, 'Bush Got It Right in the Soviet Union', *New York Times,* 18 August 1991, p. E15.
[4]*Bush Luncheon Statement,* 1 August 1991.

However, looking in retrospect, this rhetorical struggle around one undoubtedly confusing statement of the American leader seems insignificant in comparison with his Government's subsequent actions. Regardless of what the various interpretations of the President's speech offered and even what its true meaning was, the facts meant that it was not at all easy for the Bush administration to introduce 'perestroika' into their policy towards the conglomerate, which was shifting impetuously from what had been known for seventy years as the Soviet Union. For decades American politicians were used to dealing exclusively with Moscow, while the rest of the vast country barely touched their imagination. The collapse of communism caused the dissolution of a huge multinational empire, reminding the world of the existence of a number of nations each of whom 'threatened' to become a subject of international relations, an event unprecedented in its scale in modern times and aggravated by the realities of the nuclear age.

In these circumstances American policy-makers preferred to continue relations with the old, familiar and relatively predictable centre, hoping that it would retain a certain degree of control over the emerging units, rather than to disperse their activities among the latter. Were they to blame for a delayed response in the unexpectedly changing circumstances, when a sudden realisation of their long-term efforts to destroy the 'empire of evil' revealed the absence of any policy and perhaps confusion in the face of a 'dream come true'? Probably not. To the US Government, which was mainly concerned with preserving stability and order in the region formerly firmly controlled from Moscow, supporting the centre seemed logical. However, it gave his opponents an opportunity to charge Bush with insensitivity to those who wanted to escape the totalitarian yoke and to embark on the path to democracy.

While the Soviet leadership was agonising in its attempts to preserve some kind of unity and the US administration persisted in its support and 'misjudged loyalty'

to Gorbachev[5], the Verkhovna Rada proclaimed Ukraine's independence in its declaration of 24 August 1991. A few days later Gennadiy Udovenko, Ukrainian Ambassador to the United Nations, announced that thenceforth his mission would act separately from the Soviet one and that Ukraine was working on the formation of its own foreign policy.[6]

By the end of the first month of Ukraine's independence the US administration managed, however, to come to grips with the new realities and although the preservation of an economic and military union between the republics remained its preference, during his visit to Washington in September 1991 Leonid Kravchuk, Chairman of the Ukrainian Parliament, was received by President Bush twice which was seen by many observers as a rare courtesy. This was meant to be a beginning of the White House's 'new course', less aligned with the centre and more supportive of the democratic reforms in the republics. During his meetings with President Bush Kravchuk noted that, since the central government in Moscow was ineffectual, it would be more rational if the US dealt directly with the republics and recognised Ukraine as a sovereign state after the referendum on independence scheduled for 1 December that were expected to bring positive results.

However, despite the friendliness with which the Ukrainian leader was received in Washington, there was a lot of controversy in the US Government as to what official position should be assumed with regard to his country. On the one hand, Under Secretary of State, Robert Zoellick, acknowledged on 30 October that 'power has shifted almost completely to the republics'.[7] On the other, Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Niles, at about the same time, emphasised that the trend towards independence in the republics was not irreversible. His opinion was

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[5]J.Aita, 'Ukraine Distances Itself from Soviet U.N. Mission', *USIA United Nations Correspondent,* 28 August 1991.
[6]ibid.
[7]D.Brooks, 'Ukraine: Turning to America', *Wall Street Journal,* 20 November 1991, p. A16.

echoed by US Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Robert Strauss, who remarked that the republics, 'like teen-agers', would retreat 'back home' as soon as they found out how tough the real world was.[8] All this indicated that, although the Bush administration did not want to sound categorical about supporting the centre any longer, it was not sure how to treat the republics either. As one observer pointed out, 'on bad days, the administration has an anti-Ukrainian policy; on good days, it is wait-and-see, that is, no policy at all'.[9]

What were the obstacles in the way of elaborating a relatively consistent policy towards Ukraine as well as a more general strategy which would ensure that, whatever the outcome of developments in the USSR might be, it would pose no threat to European and international stability?

First of all, as US officials admitted themselves, they were not sure exactly what kind of political system they wanted to encourage in the region. Secondly, one of the greatest fears the administration had in this respect was to undertake any action which could upset Moscow and provoke a nationalistic response there. Finally, there existed a certain discord among the different governmental departments on the issue. While the Defence Department advocated a quick recognition of Ukraine which would make easier the settlement of military, in particular nuclear, issues, the Department of State insisted that the recognition should be withheld until the republic's leaders had taken steps to fulfil the obligations of the arms treaties to which the Ukrainian Parliament had proclaimed its adherence. These included the 1990 CFE Treaty governing the status of more than a million soldiers and hundreds of tanks on Ukrainian soil, the 1991 US-Soviet START Treaty, concerning hundreds of nuclear weapons deployed in Ukraine, as well as international treaties barring development of biological and chemical weapons. Besides, according to Secretary of State James Baker, the

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[8]ibid.
[9]ibid.

administration would gain more time to figure out what kind of government was going to run the country if it did not recognise Ukraine immediately but indicated that it intended to do so and needed certain assurances. It would also enable the US to test Russia's reaction to this move.[10]

By the end of November a middle ground was found between Defence Secretary Richard Cheney's argument for a prompt recognition and Baker's call to let Ukraine and Russia 'play it out' first. It had been decided to take steps to strengthen bilateral ties with Ukraine soon after the referendum with its anticipated vote in favour of independence and eventually to establish diplomatic relations. As one official put it, this decision reflected the administration's desire 'to help manage peaceful dissolution of power to the new states being formed'.[11]

The way the US would handle the issue of the Ukrainian independence appeared to be the most important test of the administration's evolving policy towards the disintegration of the Soviet Union. It would set a precedent for dealing with forthcoming demands for recognition from other Soviet republics as well as from some East European 'breakaway' states.

However, just a few days after the administration had approved its course regarding Ukraine it was privately reconsidered by Bush when he received Gorbachev's telephone warning. Alarmed by well-leaked information about the US intention to recognise Ukraine expeditiously, the Soviet President predicted apocalypse if this happened and, as a proof, overwhelmed his American counterpart with previously undisclosed details about borders, nuclear weapons, currencies, etc. Impressed, Bush decided to postpone the recognition.[12] After all, it was not concern about the national self-determination of the Soviet peoples that

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[10]R.J.Smith, 'US Officials Split over Response to an Independent Ukraine', *Washington Post,* 25 November 1991.

[11]J.Yang, 'Bush Decides to Accelerate US Recognition of Ukraine', *Washington Post,* 28 November 1991, p. A61.

[12]R.Evans and R.Novak, 'Ukraine Time Bomb', *Washington Post,* 6 December 1991, p. A31.

underlay his policies in the region (he did not oppose it nor was he too eager to throw himself into promoting this democratic value). Problems of nuclear security and non-proliferation were the major preoccupation of his administration, while collisions between the secessionist republics and the authorities in Moscow were seen as another great potential threat.

Having reformulated the US position, Bush therefore telephoned Gorbachev back to discuss a statement on Ukraine which the White House was going to issue after the results of the vote had been publicised. In the new version the administration intended to 'welcome' the independence vote but at the same time outlined a number of issues to be observed by the new Ukrainian leaders. However, it set no timetables for resolving those issues nor for granting formal recognition.[13] Bush also spoke with the Russian President Boris Yeltsin and found out that he as well as Gorbachev was ready to join the Americans in seeking 'constructive and realistic approaches to the changes' occurring in the region, as White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater reported.[14]

The day after the independence vote in Ukraine the US published a statement which set four main areas of concern which, according to Press Secretary Fitzwater, were by no means conditions for recognition but merely 'the things that we believe are important in the progress towards independence...'.[15] Those areas closely paralleled the five principles for dealing with the Soviet Republics announced by Secretary of State Baker on 4 September after the failed coup attempt in August 1991, and included: compliance with all international accords (the Helsinki Final Act, the Charter of Paris and other documents of the CSCE) calling for respect for human rights and the peaceful resolution of border disputes; commitment to the arms treaties (including CFE, START and

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[13]D.Hoffman, 'Bush to "Welcome" Ukraine Vote', *Washington Post,* 1 December 1991, p. A33.
[14]A.M.Sullivan and D.Brashears, 'US Sending Special Emissary for Talks in Ukraine', *USIA Staff Correspondents,* 2 December 1991.
[15]ibid.

Biological Weapons Convention) and to a single Soviet command over the nuclear weapons; support for democracy and market reforms; and an obligation regarding the foreign debts of the Soviet Union. Among these the nuclear issue clearly stood out and from the very beginning heavily affected the whole course of US-Ukrainian relations.

Taking into account the fact that out of 27,000 Soviet nuclear weapons 1,750 nuclear warheads on strategic missiles (which constituted over 14 per cent of the total amount) and 4,000 (one third) tactical nuclear weapons were deployed in Ukraine (more than in Great Britain and France combined), Ukraine's separation from the 'mainland' with all these weapons on its soil did contribute to 'a paramount concern of our times' posed by the destiny of the Soviet nuclear weapons in general.[16] Although the Ukrainian leaders declared that they wanted their country eventually to become neutral and non-nuclear, they resisted Yeltsin's demands to transfer all the nuclear weapons to Russia immediately. Ukraine's newly elected President Kravchuk insisted on the creation of joint control over Soviet nuclear forces. However, after some initial talks the two leaders agreed to defer this issue for a while.

Ukraine's nuclear policy was the first matter to be discussed with the republic's leadership by the US special emissary sent to Kiev in early December 1991. As State Department spokesperson Margaret Tutwiler pointed out, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs, Thomas Niles, was going to Ukraine not with the ambassadorial mission but with the task of meeting senior Ukrainian officials to find out their position on outstanding military, political and economic issues, including all those concerns listed in the White House statement of 2 December.[17] Niles' visit as well as the subsequent call by Secretary Baker on

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[16]L.Feldman, 'US, Europe Take Cautious Steps Toward the Ukraine', *Christian Science Monitor,* 5 December 1991, p. 7.

[17]News Briefing, *State Department Report,* Tuesday, 3 December 1991, .

18-19 December were seen just as a consultation phase which would enable the administration to make a final decision concerning recognition.

It remains unclear how long it would take the US to reach this stage had the leaders of Belarus, Russia and Ukraine not assembled on 8 December resolving to create the Commonwealth of Independent States and thus finally overruling the defunct Soviet centre. This was at least an approximation of that desirable union to which President Bush and his advisers referred to and, perhaps because it promised to settle all potential tensions between Ukraine and Russia, it relieved the American Government's anxiety that by recognising Ukraine prematurely it could be accused of encouraging hostility between the two republics .

Letting Russia 'play it out' as was suggested earlier by Baker and thereby getting a chance to examine the situation, the US Government, although still somewhat reluctant to betray its favourite Gorbachev, was left with very little choice. When on 15 December Russia applied for the formal diplomatic recognition of all three republics the Bush administration promised to 'give full consideration' to this request, once again reminding the newly independent states that they were expected to adhere to 'certain basic American principles'[18], such as either destroying nuclear arms or putting them under a single central control; guaranteeing the rights of minorities; recognising that border disputes could only be resolved by means of negotiations; and undertaking the responsibility for Soviet debts. The obligation to prove allegiance to free markets and democracy was reduced to the permission just to be on the right track. '...The US will attempt to discern how much a country is committed to the "concept" of free markets and democracy even if they have not been fully achieved', one of the officials commented.[19]

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[18]T.L.Friedman, 'Russia Asks Baker for a Recognition of Independence', *New York Times,* 16 December 1991, p. A1.
[19]D.Hoffman, 'US to Recognize Republics by Year's End', *Washington Post,* 21 December 1991.

Before long President Bush was characterising a moment, which he resisted for months, as 'a day of great hope for all Americans'. In a special Christmas Day broadcast he announced the end of the Soviet Union which brought liberation to all its peoples. As a welcome to the old enemies, who became America's new partners 'committed to building democratic and civil societies', the President declared the recognition of all twelve former Soviet republics (as the Baltic states had been recognised earlier) and promised to 'move quickly to establish diplomatic relations' with six of them - Russia, Ukraine, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Belarus and Kyrgyzstan, which had already given their assurances 'concerning democracy, free markets and control of nuclear weapons'.[20] Thus the era of the US-Ukrainian diplomatic relations began.

After finally reconciling themselves to the dissolution of the old centre and the necessity to deal directly with the newly independent states, the Americans began vigorous activity aimed at ensuring the security and control of nuclear forces throughout the disintegrating Soviet empire.

In late December 1991 Bush wrote to the presidents of the former Soviet republics housing nuclear weapons on their territory, Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan, offering US assistance. He suggested that a senior delegation of high-level US officials and experts on nuclear weapons visited each country to discuss practical steps of preventing nuclear proliferation.

In early January 1992 Under Secretary of State for International Security Affairs, Reginald Bartholomew, led such a delegation to Kiev as well as to three other capitals and on his return to Washington reported to the Senate Armed Services Committee on the results of discussions with the republics' leaders on military issues. The core task of the Bartholomew mission was to push for the rapid disabling and consolidation of tactical nuclear weapons which posed the major

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[20]'Bush on Death of Soviet Union', editorial, *Voice of America,* 27 December 1991.

threat due to their easy transportability and potential for falling into the hands of third parties. When the three countries with these weapons (Russia, Ukraine and Belarus) reached an agreement that all tactical nuclear weapons were to be disabled and transferred to Russia by 1 July 1992 this issue seemed to be resolved.[21]

Regarding strategic forces the US delegation was assured by Ukrainian leaders that all 176 Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles on Ukraine's territory would be withdrawn to Russia by the end of 1994. It was agreed that while Russia would be the only party to ratify START, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan should seek the 'parliamentary approval' of the treaty and provide the US with legal documents expressing their commitment to observe and implement the treaty. Apart from this the US delegation encouraged Ukrainian leaders, who confirmed their intention to join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear-weapons state, to do so even if nuclear weapons were still on Ukrainian soil since all the arrangements to place them under the joint CIS command and control had been already made.[22]

As Bartholomew assured the Senate Committee, the Ukrainians were 'moving very much in the direction' the US had been pushing them since last September, when President Bush announced the US initiative to dismantle some of its nuclear arsenal unilaterally.[23]

The situation changed, however, quite soon. Territorial claims made by Russian parliamentarians with regard to the Crimea in early March 1992 caused serious concern among Ukrainian leaders. Believing that these claims posed a threat to Ukraine's integrity and stability, they decided to take measures to prevent Russia

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[21]R.Bartholomew, 'US Effort to Halt Proliferation in the Former Soviet Republics', *US Department of State Dispatch,* 10 February, Vol. 3, No. 6, 1992, p. 89.
[22]ibid., p. 93.
[23]ibid., p. 90.

from possible actions. As a means of deterrence President Kravchuk announced on 12 March the suspension of the tactical weapons transfers to Russia on the pretext that it was not dismantling them as agreed. By this time, having removed approximately half of all tactical nuclear weapons (2,000), Ukraine demanded guarantees from Russia and the establishment of an international commission to ensure their destruction.

Although it was evident that a debate on the possession of nuclear weapons was emerging in Ukraine, the State Department tried to convince itself and the international community that the Ukrainian government had not changed its intention to meet the 1 July deadline. The Department's spokesperson asserted that the US administration was in a 'very close contact' with the Ukrainian government and that its nuclear obligations were an issue the Americans paid particular attention to.[24]

At about the same time important changes occurred on the diplomatic front. After a few months delay the American President finally nominated an Ambassador to Ukraine. Having formally commenced diplomatic relations with Ukraine on 23 January the US Government confined them to upgrading its Kiev Consular Office opened in March 1991 to the Embassy status and to appointing former Consul General, Jon Gundersen, Charge d'Affaires ad interim. Perhaps the delay was connected with a rather difficult task to set up embassies in ten other former Soviet republics where, besides 'circuit riders' occasionally coming from Moscow, there was no American presence whatsoever. Official embassy operations had to be started there from scratch, encountering such problems as staffing, equipping, and housing. Therefore inasmuch as the major objective was to get American representatives on the ground, the policy towards Ukraine seemed indicate a special treatment. In view of its size and strategic importance the State Department saw a larger American presence in Ukraine as a prerequisite

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[24]News Briefing, *State Department Report,* Thursday, 26 March 1992.

for effective diplomacy and therefore decided on an initial staff of 13 officers which was almost twice as much as in any other newly independent state.[25]

By the end of March, when the most urgent task of setting up new embassies in the republics was completed, the president's nominee for the post of the first US Ambassador to Ukraine had been finally announced. It was Roman Popadiuk, White House Deputy Press Secretary for foreign affairs, himself of Ukrainian origin. During the confirmation hearing in the Senate in April 1992 he was extensively asked about his prospective activities in Ukraine. Some of the questions focusing on organisational issues were remarkably critical of the insufficient number of the US Embassy staff in Kiev. Thus Senator Joseph Biden asked why there should be only thirteen American representatives in Ukraine 'while France, a country of similar size to Ukraine, has 1,000'. Popadiuk explained that this number comprised solely State Department personnel and that in fact it would be bigger. He noted that a commercial attaché, a defence attaché, two US Information Agency personnel, and possibly several employees of the Agency for International Development would be also dispatched to Kiev, so that the overall staff would amount by the end of the year to about twenty five people. 'It's a new embassy', said Popadiuk, 'It will grow'.[26]

In the meantime, since no progress on resuming shipments of tactical nuclear weapons from Ukraine's territory had been achieved, the US administration decided to intervene. In early April a high-level delegation led by State Department policy planning chief, Dennis Ross, went to Kiev to discuss the situation with Ukrainian officials and to find an effective solution. For that it was necessary first to overcome a complex of mutual accusations made earlier. According to the Americans, Ukraine made 'impractical and unreasonable' demands insisting on the dismantling of the missiles under Ukrainian supervision

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[25]J.F.W.Rogers, 'New US Embassies in the Former Soviet Union', *Dispatch,* Vol. 3, No. 10, 1992, 9 March, p. 193.

[26]D.Pitts, 'Ambassadorial Nominees to Ukraine, Iceland Testify', *USIA Staff Writer,* 8 April 1992.

on Ukrainian territory and at the facilities built by the republic (the last condition was, however, withdrawn at the end of March when Ukrainian Defence Minister Konstantin Morozov stated that his government abandoned its plans to build a nuclear weapons dismantling plant). The Ukrainian officials for their part argued that the American primary interest was to complete the transfer of nuclear weapons to Russia and as soon as Ukraine became nuclear-free the US would turn its back on the 'special partner'.[27]

In order to make Ukrainian leaders more compliant the Americans chose a twofold approach. On the one hand the Ross delegation made clear that the US would not support Ukraine's demand for guarantees from Russia before the resumption of the weapons transfers. On the other, back home Secretary of State James Baker, after meeting with Ukraine's Defence Minister Colonel General Morozov, hinted that his administration would be willing to assist in supervising the destruction of the 600 battlefield nuclear missiles still on Ukrainian soil in order to ease frictions between Russia and Ukraine, 'provided all the parties were amenable to that course'. This double tactic helped to put an end to the postponement of the transfers and on 14 April Ukrainian Foreign Minister Anatoly Zlenko announced that his government would resume the removal of tactical nuclear weapons to Russia 'in the coming days'.[28]

As the nuclear issues seemed to be settled for the time being both governments could concentrate their efforts on more 'mundane' affairs. Thus Kravchuk's first Presidential visit to Washington on 5-7 May was dedicated to discussing US economic and technical assistance as well as trade and investments at the meetings with President Bush, Secretary of State Baker and Vice President Gore. However, nuclear issues had been referred to on several occasions, in particular, with regard to security guarantees which the Ukrainians had been seeking for a

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[27]M.Sieff, 'Ukraine Reversal on Nukes Praised', *Washington Times,* 15 April 1992, p. A7.
[28]ibid.

while and which Kravchuk mentioned once again. Realising that any such guarantee would not only harm US relations with Russia but also, in case of an external threat to the Ukrainian territorial integrity, would commit the US to actions which it could not possibly deliver, Bush managed to remain suitably vague on this subject emphasising that the best guarantee of Ukraine's security was 'rapid and close integration into Western institutions'.[29]

Incidentally this time the statements were backed by practical decisions and in order to give impetus to the process of integration a number of important economic agreements were signed by the two presidents. Among them were the Agreement on Trade Relations, providing reciprocal most-favoured-nation tariff treatment to the products of each country, and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation agreement, designed to encourage US private capital and technology to invest in Ukraine. Finally, it was decided to establish an International Science and Technology Centre in Kiev in order to enable Ukrainian nuclear scientists and engineers to redirect their efforts to civilian pursuits. The White House endorsed its intention of providing $10 million for this purpose from the total $400 million appropriated by the Senate in 1991 for assistance in eliminating weapons of mass destruction in the former Soviet Union.[30]

Having signed the agreements which made much-needed economic aid available to Ukraine (as well as assistance in such areas as the establishment of legal and tax systems), President Kravchuk concluded his visit by opening the Embassy of Ukraine in Washington on 7 May. In his inaugural speech the Ukrainian Ambassador Oleh Bilorus admitted:

> 'I should tell you that my impression when coming here really was that now modern history works on Ukrainian territory and works for good. Now I feel that modern history works for Ukraine even here, and I am ready to do my

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[29]A.M.Sullivan, 'Bush, Kravchuk to Focus on Democracy, Market Reform', *USIA Correspondent,* 6 May 1992.

[30]'US-Ukrainian Agreements, Fact Sheets', *Dispatch,* Vol. 3, No. 19, 1992, 11 May, p. 369.

best for [the] deepening of Ukrainian-American relations, friendship and cooperation in all fields'.[31]

Thus despite the obvious prevalence of the 'Russia first' trend among US foreign policy-makers, the Bush administration began to realise the importance of finding a balance between giving preference to Russia as strategically and economically 'first among equals', and strengthening Russia's neighbours, above all Ukraine, to enable their resistance to its imperialistic ambitions should anti-democratic forces come to power there (the policy most ardently advocated by Zbigniew Brzezinski).[32]

Nevertheless, the desire to protect their country without resorting to American help was growing among Ukrainian politicians. Although the Americans, having demonstrated to the Ukrainian President their readiness to build new bilateral ties, managed to entice him into joining the START treaty, the pro-nuclear minority in Verkhovna Rada gradually became increasingly vocal. Therefore after Ukraine signed the Lisbon Protocol on 23 May together with three other nuclear republics and the US, thus becoming a party to the START and undertaking to eliminate all strategic nuclear weapons in a seven year period from the time of its ratification, the determination of the Ukrainian 'hawks' only strengthened.

Participating in a Washington conference on nuclear non-proliferation in September 1992 two members of Verkhovna Rada claimed that their country might keep the nuclear arsenal deployed on its territory despite the pledges made in the Lisbon Protocol. Yuriy Kostenko, Chairman of the Nuclear Disarmament Committee, and Major General Volodymyr Tolubko, a member of the parliamentary Defence Committee and formerly Commander of Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces, argued that since Ukraine did not participate in the process of

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[31]'Ukraine Opens Embassy in Washington', Transcript of remarks at the ceremony released by the *Department of State Office of the Assistant Secretary,* 7 May 1992.
[32]Z.Brzezinski, 'The Cold War and Its Aftermath', *Foreign Affairs*, Fall 1992, pp. 31-49.

elaborating START whose conditions had become 'obsolete ... and impossible to fulfil', the Ukrainian Parliament should carefully analyse the treaty before ratifying it. Yuriy Kostenko added that in the legislation passed by Verkhovna Rada in October 1991 there was no commitment to a fixed timetable of the nuclear disarmament but 'only a mention of Ukraine's intention to become a nuclear-free state in the future'.[33]

The following month, during a closed session of the Ukrainian Parliament, hard-liners attempted to force the resignation of the Chairman of the parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee, Dmytro Pavlychko, who was among the architects of the Ukraine's Declaration on the non-nuclear status, and Defence Minister Morozov, who advocated giving up nuclear weapons on the grounds of the prohibitive costs of maintaining and controlling them as well as their unsuitability for the country's defence needs. Calling them traitors, extreme nationalists and ex-communists insisted on the rejection of the new military doctrine presented by Morozov and pressured the Rada into returning it to the Ministry of Defence for 'amendments'.[34] Thus the possibility of the Ukrainian Parliament's refusal to ratify START and consequently the NPT treaty was dangerously increasing.

Notably, not only hard-liners in the Rada were concerned about the future of the nuclear weapons. The pro-nuclear stance was gaining support in the Ministry of Defence and even in the Foreign Ministry. Thus after the initial promise to remove all ICBMs from Ukraine by 1994 and later by 1997, the Foreign Ministry stated that 'for technical and financial reasons' it was preferable to extend the period to seven years.

Besides, as President Kravchuk announced, Ukraine had already gained a negative command of the missiles on its territory (a technical capability to

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[33]M.Sieff, 'Despite Pact, Ukraine Keeping Nuclear Weapons, Officials Say', *Washington Times,* 18 September 1992, p. A7.
[34]'Heels Dug in', *Economist,* 9 January 1992, p. 37.

prevent their launching by Moscow) and was seeking administrative control. Although the US experts doubted this, they admitted, however, that it could be possible in the future.[35]

The changing tone in Ukraine's disarmament debate became more obvious after Leonid Kuchma, the director of one of the largest missile plants in the former Soviet Union, was appointed Prime Minister of Ukraine on 13 October 1992. While assuring the US leaders that his government was committed to the dismantlement, he insisted on additional Western support which would enable Ukraine to get rid of its nuclear arsenal. 'What did we get for the tactical nuclear weapons we gave to Russia? - the new Prime Minister deliberated. 'Nothing', was his own categorical reply.[36]

Although initially Ukraine was not supposed to get any compensation for transferring its tactical nuclear weapons, since Russia decided later to make a profit by selling fissile material from the deactivated warheads, it was reasonable that Ukraine, having fulfilled its obligations well ahead of the 1 July deadline, demanded a part of the proceeds. It would not be right if it disarmed 'in exchange for a thank you' and was left with billions of expenses 'while Russia, where all these nuclear weapons will remain, will get billions of dollars in aid', rightfully objected Kuchma.[37]

Having tried for a long time to effect Parliament's adherence to the pledges made earlier, President Kravchuk in mid-November eventually yielded to a growing movement of opinion to delay START ratification. As opposed to Kuchma he decided to concentrate more on security guarantees rather than financial aid,

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[35]C.Freeland, 'Ukraine Having Second Thoughts about Giving Up Nuclear Weapons', *Washington Post,* 6 November 1992, p. A20.
[36]M.Mycio, 'Ukraine Toys with Nuclear Second Thoughts', *Los Angeles Times,* 17 November 1992, p. C3.
[37]ibid.

arguing that, once nuclear-free, Ukraine would be left vulnerable to its unstable eastern neighbour as well as to Western nuclear states.

During his Kiev meeting with John Shalikashvili, the Commander-in-Chief of NATO and American forces in Europe on 16 November 1992, President Kravchuk declared that the ratification of the START treaty would be delayed until NATO or the UN Security Council addressed the future security of the three republics that were giving up their nuclear weapons voluntarily.[38] The Americans, being reluctant to grant any security guarantees unilaterally, rated Ukrainian demands as a mere ploy to get as much financial assistance from the US as possible. Although their assumption was partly correct such a tactic was to a certain extent justifiable since the half-paralysed Ukrainian economy could not afford all the costs of the dismantlement process. Besides, the unwillingness of Ukrainian officials to destroy silos by explosion on the grounds that it would threaten fertile black-earth lands around the ICBM bases led to a suggestion to convert the emptied shafts into agricultural storage facilities which, according to the US experts, was more expensive than mere destruction and therefore required additional aid.[39]

With the strengthening of Ukraine's pro-nuclear stance, American domestic critics of the policy conducted by the Bush administration raised their voices as well. Not only did they reproach Bush for clinging to the belief that the situation in Ukraine was under control but also charged his aides with contributing to Ukraine's backsliding by wording the Lisbon Protocol so that it could be interpreted as extending by five years the time during which Ukraine had to remove nuclear strategic weapons from its territory.[40] On the whole it was claimed that his inadequate performance in this field had created a major foreign policy problem for the newly elected President Clinton.

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[38]C.Lapychak, *Christian Science Monitor,* 19 November 1992, p. 1.
[39]ibid.
[40]W.Potter, 'Ukraine's Nuclear Trigger', *New York Times,* 10 November 1992, p. A23.

Nuclear Bargaining: Kravchuk *vs.* Clinton

Eager to ward off these accusations before leaving office on 20 January 1993 Bush sent a letter to Kravchuk offering $175 million in US funds to assist in the dismantling of nuclear warheads and storing them temporarily on Ukrainian soil if the Verkhovna Rada ratified the START and the NPT treaties. The money would be drawn from an $800 million Nunn-Lugar fund designed to help the former Soviet republics in eliminating their nuclear weapons. Besides, Bush stated that the security guarantees requested by Ukrainian leaders were under consideration by both the US and the Russian Governments.[41]

In addition it was announced that the US team led by retired General William Burns would resume negotiations in Moscow with regard to the planned US purchase of highly enriched uranium extracted from the dismantled Soviet warheads, whose value was estimated at between $4 billion and $6 billion. A part of the deal was to go to Ukraine and two other 'nuclear' republics under an arrangement yet to be worked out.

Despite this offer the Ukrainian Parliament did not rush the ratification of the treaties. As Foreign Minister Zlenko informed Acting Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger at an international conference in Stockholm on 15 December, Ukraine still had to resolve 'several concrete issues' before the treaties could be ratified. Expressing the US respect for 'Ukraine's parliamentary processes' Eagleburger emphasised how crucial it was 'that START and NPT questions get resolved as fast as they can'.[42]

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[41]D.Oberdorfer, 'Bush Offers $175 Million for Nonnuclear Ukraine', *Washington Post,* 10 December 1992, p. A12.

[42]'Ukraine Delays on Treaties', *Washington Post,* 16 December 1992, p. A36.

A few weeks later Eagleburger met with Zlenko's Deputy, Boris Tarasiuk, who brought a high-level Ukrainian delegation to Washington to discuss the same issue. In addition to talks with the State Secretary the Ukrainian delegation, comprising Deputy Defence Minister Ivan Bizhan, Presidential Adviser Yuriy Malko, and a senior Foreign Ministry official Yuriy Bogaevsky, met with various US Governmental and Congressional officials such as Under Secretary of State for International Security Affairs Frank Wisner, State Department policy planning chief Dennis Ross, and Nicholas Burns who represented the National Security Council.[43]

Remarking that the Ukrainian Parliament had 'a mind of its own' Tarasiuk outlined three main questions which prevented it from ratifying START1: security guarantees from the US and Russia provided in return for Ukraine's disposal of the nuclear weapons, in the form of a declaration at 'the highest political levels'; funds to assist Ukraine in the dismantling process; and regulations regarding the conditions, placement and methods of dismantlement.[44]

Despite intense discussions described by the State Department spokesman Richard Boucher as 'very useful', none of the previous stumbling blocks was removed.[45] As before, the Americans replied that they would be happy to provide Ukraine with security assurances and financial help of $175 million, far exceeding the sum agreed upon at the Kiev meeting between President Kravchuk and Senators Nunn and Lugar in November 1992, but only after the Verkhovna Rada gave its approval to both treaties. As before, the mutual mistrust rendered 'an excellent opportunity' to resolve the situation abortive once again.

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[43]News Briefing, *State Department Report,* Wednesday, 6 January 1993.
[44]D.Oberdorfer, 'Administration Rejects Ukrainian Appeal on START I Ratification', *Washington Post,* 7 January 1993, p. A27.
[45]News Briefing, *State Department Report,* Thursday, 8 January 1993.

Thus by the beginning of 1993 the state of US-Ukrainian relations was gradually approaching a deadlock in spite of their seemingly placid style. The Ukrainians, while regularly issuing official assurances of allegiance to their original anti-nuclear posture, in fact did not hurry to rid their country of the nuclear weapons, using them as a bargaining chip for obtaining security guarantees and increasing financial assistance. The Americans, presenting their dealings with Ukraine as a mutually respectful 'special relationship', did not want to risk millions of dollars in case of Ukraine's failure to respect its pledges and, moreover, did not think that the US strategic interest in that region necessitated their military interference in the event of the Russian aggression.

On the one hand Ukrainian leaders had the right to ask for assistance in eliminating the nuclear arsenal which the country could not bear alone (after all, this was a security concern of an international scale and the Americans more than anyone were interested in resolving it as soon as possible). On the other hand, the worries in the US camp were quite understandable as well. They were not sure how long pro-democratic forces would stay in power either in Ukraine or in Russia, and the extremely slow pace of reforms accompanied by the activities of vocal nationalistic groups did not alleviate those worries.

Therefore new effective solutions were needed urgently and it was up to a new administration headed by President Clinton to ensure that relations between the US and Ukraine did not become dangerously strained.

The first Ukrainian official to be received by the Clinton administration was Foreign Minister Zlenko who came to Washington in March 1993 for three days of talks with a new Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, on various issues including nuclear dismantlement, co-operation in the military sphere and broader economic exchanges. He notified the US officials that the Ukrainian Parliament was studying the START 1 treaty 'to prepare it for hearings and the coming

ratification'. Estimating the cost of the dismantlement at $2.8 billion which covered all economic and ecological expenses Zlenko stated: 'We understand it's a huge figure, and for our economy it will be extremely difficult to raise that. We would be very much obliged if your country could assist us'.[46]

During his meeting with Christopher on 24 March Zlenko commented on the situation in Russia where reform-minded President Yeltsin was locked in a political and constitutional crisis with the Parliament. The Ukrainian Foreign Minister expressed a hope that a wise compromise would be found in Russia since 'national accord is a key element for success' of the reforms that were underway in that country.[47] For his part, the State Secretary pointed out that it was 'very much in the interest of all Russia's neighbours that there be a continuing trend toward peace and free markets in Russia. Indeed, they have a very large stake in that just as the rest of the world'.[48]

Perhaps US officials were thereby preparing Ukraine for the fact that while Russia was going to receive a pledge of a 'relatively modest' $1.6 billion aid package at the forthcoming G-7 Vancouver summit Ukraine would get nothing at all. The strong support Yeltsin received from Clinton at the summit on 4 April 1993 may have contributed to a stiffening of Russia's attitude towards Ukraine. The Russian Foreign Ministry alleged that after the summit there was 'more understanding that the [US and Russian] positions are similar' on Ukraine.[49]

However, the deterioration of relations between Russia and Ukraine could only play into hands of Russian chauvinist hard-liners who criticised Yeltsin for taking Nunn-Lugar money to carry out nuclear cuts, thus disarming Russia in the face of

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[46]J.Shevis, 'Ukraine Hopes Compromise Will Be Found in Russia', *USIA Staff Writer,* 25 March 1993.
[47]ibid.
[48]R.Dybvik, 'Russian Crisis Adds Urgency to US-Ukrainian Talks', *USIA Diplomatic Correspondent,* 25 March 1993.
[49]T.Zimmermann and B.B.Auster, 'Are Nukes on the Loose', *US News and World Report,* 19 April 1993, p. 41.

the American threat. Therefore rather than indulging Russia as an indisputable 'first among equals' the US should have concentrated more on advising it that as long as Russia tried to base its foreign policy on the new 'Monroe doctrine', failing to keep its international commitments, Ukraine would use this as an excuse to hold on to the third largest nuclear arsenal in the world.

Although Clinton embarked upon a post-Soviet course, largely utilising his predecessor's legacy, his approach changed soon. During a tour through the former USSR in May 1993 his special envoy, Strobe Talbott, made a two-day stop in Kiev for 'encouraging' talks with Ukrainian leaders before going to Russia. This symbolic gesture indicated the beginning of change in the US policy towards Ukraine. A strategy of carrot-and-stick, with the latter long prevailing, began to turn into a more carrot-emphasised line. Although the Americans had not yet progressed to anything more tangible than promises, at least those ceased to be as peremptorily conditional as before. Talbott offered Washington's mediation in disputes between Kiev and Moscow and deliberated the question of financial assistance in Ukraine's disarmament. He proposed regular high-level meetings between American and Ukrainian defence officials at the Assistant Secretary level as well as exchange visits by Defence Secretary Les Aspin and General Morozov. He also suggested collaboration between Deputy Defence Secretary William Perry and his Ukrainian counterparts on converting military industry to civilian use. In conclusion Talbott assured his Ukrainian hosts: as soon as 'we can get over this hurdle of ratification and accession, which was promised in the Lisbon protocols, the relationship between our two countries can greatly improve'.[50]

In accordance with the agreement which had been reached Les Aspin arrived in Kiev on 6 June to work out the details of the START 1 implementation. These

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[50]R.Dybvik, 'New Tone by Ukraine on START II Called Encouraging', *USIA Diplomatic Correspondent,* 12 May 1993.

included the elimination of 130 SS-19 missiles to be dismantled on Ukrainian territory, placed under international inspection and eventually transferred to Russia, provided that Ukraine was reimbursed for the value of the uranium extracted from them. In addition Aspin suggested forming a joint group of experts for re-examining the cost of the dismantlement, adding that the US contribution might exceed Bush's pledge of $175 million already reiterated by the new administration.[51]

While the visit of the American Defence Secretary to Ukraine was described as the first step to developing a broad range of security as well as economic and political discussions, in fact it reflected the administration's growing concern over the Ukrainian nuclear policy. According to intelligence reports received at this time by the US Government Ukraine could acquire an operational control over the weapons in twelve to eighteen months while the Russians feared that it might happen sooner. Besides, the poll conducted in spring showed that twice as many Ukrainians as eighteen months earlier were in favour of retaining the nuclear weapons. The anxiety intensified further when Reuters quoted Ukrainian legislators mentioning the Prime Minister's suggestion, at the closed session of the Verkhovna Rada on 3 June, of declaring Ukraine a nuclear power at least temporarily.[52]

'American policy toward Ukraine has warmed in recent weeks, but it is too little, too late', wrote the Wall Street Journal on 30 June, just two days before the Ukrainian Parliament approved a declaration identifying Ukraine as the owner of 176 ICBMs on its territory. The article entitled 'How we bombed on nukes in Ukraine' argued that the US insensitivity to Ukraine's concerns had created a situation which the Americans feared most: Ukraine was going to keep its missiles thereby unravelling the whole web of the Western security arrangements.

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[51]C.Lapychak, 'US Changes Its Strategy to Help Ukraine Disarm', Christian Science Monitor, 10 June 1993.

[52]News Briefing, *State Department Report,* Friday, 4 June 1993.

'After Yugoslavia, the conversion of Ukraine into a nuclear power will be the next great failure of post-Cold War American policy', asserted the article.[53]

In these circumstances the Clinton administration had resolved to further its new strategy of treating Ukraine as 'more than a repository of nuclear weapons, but as an important state geopolitically in Europe'[54] despite the latter's contradictory behaviour.

Receiving the Ukrainian Defence Minister, Morozov, in Washington on 26-29 July as a follow-up to Aspin's visit to Ukraine, the Americans spoke pointedly about the legitimacy of Ukraine's security concerns. On 27 July Morozov and Aspin signed the Memorandum of Understanding which set up a framework for dialogue between the two defence establishments. Being the first agreement of this nature signed with a former Soviet republic it envisaged actions aimed at helping Ukraine to ensure its security by both addressing its most urgent worries and handling such longer-term issues as defence budgeting, logistics, military law, conversion, and environmental protection. The Memorandum set up the US-Ukrainian Bilateral Working Group whose first meeting was planned for Autumn 1993.[55] At the signing ceremony Aspin reiterated the US intention to launch the release of $175 million designed to help Ukraine with the deactivation and storage of the nuclear weapons on its soil. This was an obvious concession indicating the eagerness of the Americans to ensure that Ukrainian warheads were at least 'in a storage bunker instead of on the tip of a missile' aimed at them.[56]

It was with this perspective in mind that the US greeted the Ukrainian government's move to dismantle the first regiment of 10 SS-19 ICBMs targeted

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[53]A.Applebaum, 'How We Bombed on Nukes in Ukraine', *Wall Street Journal,* 30 June 1993.
[54]T.Zimmermann and B.B.Auster, 'Ukraine and the Bomb', *US News and World Report,* 9 August 1993, p. 44.
[55]J.Shevis, 'Ukraine's Defense Chief Confirms SS-19 Dismantlement', *USIA Staff Writer,* 30 July 1993.
[56]T.Zimmermann and B.B.Auster, *Economist,* 9 August 1993, p. 44.

on American territory. Morozov notified them that it was planned to complete the dismantlement in September after which the deactivation of the second regiment would begin. He stressed, however, that the more modern SS-24 would be dealt with after the Parliament had ratified START 1 and the NPT as these forty six missiles were not covered by START 1.[57] In reply to this statement the Americans emphasised that under the Lisbon Protocol Ukraine was obligated to eliminate all strategic offensive arms from its territory.[58]

Despite some progress achieved during General Morozov's visit to Washington, the deal designed to trigger American aid fell apart at the end of September due to Ukraine's internal stalemate. The discord between the Ukrainian executive and legislative branches over the whole complex of issues including nuclear disarmament and economic reforms resulted in the resignation of the reform-minded Prime Minister Kuchma on 21 September and of Defence Minister Morozov on 4 October. Thus when a US delegation came to Kiev to conclude the documents on Safe and Secure Dismantlement (SSD) the new Ukrainian Ministers refused to sign the already-initialed agreements.

These worrying developments, accompanied by the economic decline and the deteriorating conditions of the nuclear weapons, propelled American activity. Beginning a careful preparation for a first visit of the State Secretary to Ukraine the Government dispatched to Kiev two high-level teams led by Assistant Secretary of State, Lynne Davies, and Assistant Secretary of Defence, Ashton Carter. Both of them had the task of pressing for the signature of the SSD agreement intended to specify the details of the dismantlement and the use of $175 million for that purpose. At about the same time Nicholas Burns, a National Security Council official, went to Ukraine to discuss the economic situation.[59]

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[57]R.J.Smith, 'Ukraine Begins to Dismantle Nuclear Missiles Aimed at US', *Washington Post,* 28 July 1993.

[58]News Briefing, *State Department Report,* 30 July 1993.

[59]T.Lippman, 'US Aides to Visit Ukraine', *Washington Post,* 15 October 1993.

On 25 October Christopher arrived in Kiev and, after lively talks with President Kravchuk and Foreign Minister Zlenko, he managed to induce them to sign the much-needed SSD 'umbrella' agreement. Realising that in its absence the US dismantlement funds would remain frozen, Kravchuk assured the State Secretary that Ukraine was going to give up all nuclear weapons including SS-24 ICBMs and that the statement concerning their irrelevance to START 1 was a misquotation. However, Christopher's meeting with senior members of the Verkhovna Rada showed that not all obstacles on the way to Ukraine's nuclear disarmament were removed. As he was notified by the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, Dmytro Pavlychko, Ukraine could not sign the NPT treaty yet: 'We go to a non-nuclear state but the road may take seven years, or maybe ten years, or maybe twenty years. It depends on Russia'.[60]

Admitting the importance of resolving the question of security guarantees Christopher suggested a twofold approach to it. Firstly, Ukraine together with the other former Soviet republics and the states which previously formed the Warsaw Pact, would be invited to participate in President Clinton's proposed 'Partnership for Peace' initiative which was seen as a basis for the evolution of NATO. Christopher emphasised that the objective was to create 'an inclusive security structure for a new Europe - one in which we hope Ukraine will play a key part'.[61] Secondly, once it had acceded to the NPT, Ukraine would receive the same guarantees as were given to the other non-nuclear-weapons signatories - that an attack on the part of nuclear states against them was ruled out.[62]

As to the requests for financial assistance, the Secretary of State dismissed the $2.8 billion estimate reiterated by Zlenko, offering instead $155 million in

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[60]T.Lippman, 'US Clears Way to Give Ukraine $175 Million to Destroy A-Arms', *Washington Post,* 26 October 1993.
[61]W.Christopher, 'Statements in Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Belarus, and Latvia', *Dispatch,* Vol. 4, No. 45, 8 November 1993, p. 783.
[62]T.Lippman, *Washington Post,* 26 October 1993.

addition to $175 million in dismantling money. If approved by the Congress the total package for 1994 would amount to $330 million. This additional sum was meant to provide economic and technical assistance, mainly in the sphere of agriculture. In addition, Christopher promised that the US would promote Ukraine's admission to the GATT and support it in the international financial institutions which could invest in the country to the value of several billion dollars if Ukraine demonstrated its adherence to economic reforms.[63]

The pledges made by Christopher, in particular with regard to financial assistance, caused certain disquiet in America. Clinton's opponents called this policy a multi-million-dollar gamble, arguing that the prospect of the treaties' ratification by the Verkhovna Rada was rather doubtful.[64] Indeed, the strengthening of the pro-nuclear stance in the Rada backed by a growing popular support only substantiated the worries that the Ukrainian Government would escape its commitments, having pocketed the American money.

Still, on 18 November 1993 the Verkhovna Rada ratified the START 1 treaty by a vote of 254 to 9. However, having put forward numerous conditions it generated irritation in the US instead of the desired relief. 'In essence it had rejected it', commented director of the US Arms Control Association, Spurgeon Keeny, on the Rada's START 1 ratification.[65] Among the thirteen conditions stipulating the treaty's implementation the Rada's reservation on the Article 5, which contained a commitment to accede to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapons state in the shortest possible time, particularly stood out. Apart from that the Rada reiterated its claim to ownership and administrative control over the nuclear weapons on Ukrainian territory and stated that only 36 per cent of all the launchers and 42 per cent of the warheads would be subject to elimination.[66] This meant that the enactment of

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[63]*Dispatch,* 8 November 1993, p. 783.
[64]T.Lippman, *Washington Post,* 26 October 1993.
[65]D.Pitts, 'Ukraine Seen As in Essence Rejecting START I", *USIA Staff Writer,* 23 November 1993.
[66]M.Sieff, 'Kiev Works to Crack Nuke Codes', *Washington Times,* 30 November 1993.

START 1 as well as the NPT extension in 1995 were seriously impeded. Besides, the START 2 treaty signed by the US and Russia in January 1993 regarding further reductions would become a dead letter if START I had not been implemented first.

Remarking at a news briefing that the US-Ukrainian discourse on non-proliferation had reached 'a fairly aggressive and sensitive moment', State Department spokesman, Michael McCurry, stressed that the administration did draw a distinction between the legislative and executive branches of the Ukrainian government and, since the latter repeatedly stated its intention of eliminating all ICBMs, the administration's approach was 'to remain in close dialogue with those who we think can affect the outcome of Ukraine's deliberations on the weapons'.[67] This was to a large extent an expression of hope that after the parliamentary elections in March 1994 the new Rada would be more supportive of the commitments made by the Ukrainian President. Remarking that the possibility of withholding the already announced US assistance as a means of influencing decisions in Kiev had not been ruled out, the spokesman emphasised, however, that this concerned only funds for dismantlement under the Nunn-Lugar programme and that US economic support to Ukraine was not linked to the progress on the nuclear question.[68]

While the Americans perceived such a tactic as fair play, to the Ukrainians it seemed both oppressive and insidious. They were becoming increasingly convinced that regardless of their performance the US would continuously extend and further specify its conditions. Thus even after the conclusion of the SSD agreement, the previous absence of which was allegedly the major obstacle in releasing Nunn-Lugar funds, there was not much money flowing to Ukraine in

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[67]News Briefing, *State Department Report,* Tuesday, 23 November 1993.
[68]News Briefing, *State Department Report,* Monday, 22 November 1993.

American aid as it proved that a few more 'implementing agreements' were needed in order to give effect to the main one.[69]

In addition to financial pressure the US administration resorted to diplomatic levers. Commenting on the administration's objection to Kravchuk's visit to Washington before the end of the year, a senior US official stated: 'It's not going to happen. They can't clip Article 5 from the Lisbon Protocol'.[70] With the same purpose it was mentioned that President Clinton would be unlikely to visit Ukraine during his tour to the region the next year.

For its part the US administration believed that it was Ukraine which was playing a double game. On the premise that the Ukrainians were trying to figure out Soviet codes in order to gain operational control over their nuclear weapons, it suspected the Rada of deliberate feet-dragging with a view to completing this project. Both US and Russian intelligence experts expected this to happen before the March parliamentary elections which complicated the situation even further. On the one hand the Americans were hoping that Kravchuk's promise to resubmit START 1 for consideration by the new Rada would bring positive results, on the other they feared that by this time the Ukrainians would have gained operational control thus becoming more reluctant to give up their nuclear weapons.[71]

The future of Ukraine's nuclear and general foreign policy depended, to a large extent, upon the development of the political situation in Russia. The outcome of its parliamentary elections which took place on 12 December 1993 and brought victory for ultra-nationalistic forces headed by extremist Vladimir Zhirinovsky caused well-grounded worries in Ukraine. On the one hand, the prospect of falling prey to a resurgent Russia naturally contributed to a strengthening of pro-nuclear sentiments in Ukraine. On the other, dependence on Russian energy

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[69]News Briefing, *State Department Report,* Tuesday, 30 November 1993.
[70]*State Department Report,* 22 November 1993.
[71]*State Department Report,* 30 November 1993.

imports to a certain extent restricted its freedom of action. Thus the Ukrainian Government, despite its unwillingness, had to deactivate seventeen of its forty six most modern SS-24 missiles in an effort to induce Russia to cancel Ukraine's $2.5 billion debt for oil and gas.[72]

In order to understand whether Ukraine's nuclear disarmament was imperative from the point of view of the US national interest as well as international security it is necessary to analyse the basic assumptions upon which the US policy towards Ukraine was built.

The first assumption which underlay America's insistence on the prompt removal of all nuclear weapons from the Ukrainian territory was that otherwise the foundations of the START 1 treaty would be destroyed, which would render the follow-on START 2 agreement worthless. This stance revealed the inflexibility of US policy-makers who did not even allow for the possibility of re-negotiating START 1 in view of the changed political realities. Ukraine could have been accepted as a nuclear-weapons party to the treaty and new dismantlement targets could have been set for each country. At any rate Ukraine's ambitions did not extend to becoming a new nuclear superpower nor had it sufficient financial and technical resources to sustain such a mechanism without causing further damage to its economy. Therefore it would readily engage in the dismantlement process but only simultaneously with other nuclear states. Consequently if every state concerned was an equal party to the agreement the ratification of START 1 would not have caused so much controversy and mutual distrust .

The second assumption was that Ukraine's unwillingness to give up its nuclear arsenal would undercut its stated commitment to subscribe to the NPT thereby creating an additional impetus for other nations to acquire nuclear weapons. Still, if START 1 was modified as suggested above, Ukraine would not have to give its

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[72]E.Goldstein, 'Radio Days in Ukraine', *Washington Times,* 28 December 1993.

promise to accede to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapons state, which would make its accession much quicker (like that of Russia). On the one hand, it would feel secure enough, having nuclear deterrence against Russia, on the other, the Americans would not have to resist impracticable demands for security guarantees on Ukraine's part. As for motivating other states to develop their own nuclear potential. it should be noted that those nations which could be attracted to this idea had been working on it already and therefore did not need any extra incentives.

The third assumption expressing concern about the safety of nuclear arsenals and the possibility of transferring either weapons or technologies to third parties can be viewed as a prejudiced US attitude towards Ukraine, as this charge could be equally applied to Russia. The US doubt about Ukraine's ability to maintain its missiles in the appropriate condition was based on overcritical assessments made by Russian experts to which both Bush and Clinton proved to be rather sensitive. When the Russians stated that the security of nuclear weapons on Ukrainian soil was deteriorating since their staff were not allowed to carry out routine maintenance, this was somewhat exaggerated by their desire to regain ownership of the weapons. At the same time it was the Russian Tomsk-7 nuclear weapons facility where an explosion occurred, proving to be the worst disaster of this nature after Chernobyl. With regard to the proliferation of nuclear weapons or their accidental use, this had an equal chance to happen in both Ukraine and Russia. However, because of Russia's internal instability and increasing national conflicts, it was more predisposed to further proliferation than Ukraine as some of its nuclear weapons storage sites were located in the midst of civil unrest. Reportedly weapons were still present at a bomber base at Mozdok in the Caucasus region when the secessionist movements began there.

Finally, the assumption that Ukraine's nuclear status would provide a pretext for Russian hard-liners to steer the Kremlin policy in more militaristic and

hegemonistic directions could be disputed on the grounds that, without a nuclear deterrent, Ukraine would never have sufficient means to resist Russian attack and therefore would become an even more tempting target for Russia's super-power ambitions. Besides, Russian chauvinistic hard-liners did not need the presence of nuclear weapons as a pretext for their expansionist policies (as proved by the events in Chechnya, Tadzhikistan, Moldova and other regions).

The only indisputable argument against Ukraine becoming nuclear was that, if it did so, its economic dependence on Russia would increase the likelihood of its eventual subjection to Russian influence. A pressing need for Russian energy supplies as well as some other products, which could be aggravated by a Russian policy of economic revenge, would leave Ukraine with little choice but to yield its independence.

However, Russia's potential for exerting economic pressure remained a real threat to Ukraine's independence even in case of the latter's compliance with its denuclearisation pledges. Therefore in order to avoid the undesirable finale it needed to mobilise all internal resources and to make the most efficient use of foreign help which the Americans could have facilitated. After all, support for a strong Ukraine could not only improve US-Ukrainian bilateral relations but also enhance stability in Eastern Europe where an independent democratic Ukraine could serve as a bulwark against possible revanchism from Moscow.

As William Miller, appointed new US Ambassador to Ukraine on 13 October 1993, emphasised at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee confirmation hearing, US-Ukrainian relations were vital to the Americans 'not only because of Ukraine's military and economic potential, but because the failure of democracy and democratic institutions to firmly take root in Ukraine could lead to chaotic instability and a return to militant totalitarian rule'.[73]

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[73]'Nominee Sees Ukraine's Goals Only Partly Fulfilled', *USIA,* 9 September 1993.

The Ultimate Breakthrough: Nuclear-Free Co-operation.

The year 1994 began with an unexpectedly promising turn. On 10 January the news about a forthcoming agreement between Ukraine, the US and Russia made front-page headlines. It was announced that Clinton would make a previously unplanned stop in Kiev on 12 January before commencing his state visit to Russia in order to discuss with President Kravchuk details of what State Secretary Christopher called 'one of the most important non-proliferation steps ... taken in years'.[74] The Trilateral Denuclearisation Agreement signed in Moscow on 14 January 1994 by Presidents Yeltsin, Kravchuk and Clinton stipulated that Ukraine would eliminate all strategic nuclear arms on its territory within a seven-year period, getting in return US economic and technical help; its share of the $12 billion which would be paid by America for the highly-enriched uranium from disassembled warheads; a supply of fuel for its nuclear power stations; the cancellation of a large part of its debt to Russia; and renewed assurances from the US, Great Britain and Russia that as a non-nuclear state it would never be attacked with nuclear weapons. In addition, Russia gave its pledge to respect Ukraine's territorial integrity.[75]

The agreement was unanimously hailed in America as a 'major triumph' of the US President's trip and a 'giant step' towards international peace and stability.[76] However, even in the heat of the moment the more sceptically-minded warned that the Verkhovna Rada's past record of obstructing disarmament initiatives should not be disregarded while preparing for a major breakthrough this time. Subsequently it became obvious to everyone that confrontation between the executive and the legislative branches of power in Ukraine was almost inevitable.

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[74]A.M.Sullivan, 'Clinton Announces Agreement on Ukrainian Nuclear Weapons', *USIA Staff Correspondent*, 11 January 1994.
[75]'NATO's Battle-Plans for Survival', *The Economist*, 15 January 1994, p. 39.
[76]*White House News Report*, 11 January 1994.

The fact that representatives of the Ukrainian Parliament were not invited to be present at Kiev airport where Clinton's brief visit took place was seen as an ominous sign.[77]

Deliberating the reason which underlay Kravchuk's decision to undergo a potential confrontation with the Verkhovna Rada, American observers pointed out that the Ukrainian President was left with very little, if any, choice. Caught between the threat of a Russian fuel embargo and US pressure over withholding much-needed economic assistance, he realised that only by disarming Ukraine could he save its crippled economy, thereby preventing the possibility of regional divisions and social unrest.[78]

'We feel that President Kravchuk has shown real political courage and statesmanship here, and that he should be rewarded for it in numerous ways', stated Strobe Talbott, the US special ambassador and Deputy Secretary of State-designate, in his testimony to a Senate Foreign Operations subcommittee on 24 January.[79]

One of these ways lay in inviting to Washington a high-level Ukrainian economic delegation for a discussion of the most effective utilisation of US assistance to further economic reforms in Ukraine. A delegation headed by Ukrainian Minister of Economy, Roman Shpek, visited the US on 24-30 January where, at the meetings with senior officials from the White House, the Departments of State, Treasury, Defence, Commerce, Energy, Agriculture and various business agencies, it considered numerous American proposals on promoting bilateral

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[77]L.Weymouth, 'US Can Calm Ukrainian Jitters', *Washington Post*, 24 January 1994.
[78]M.Bilinsky, 'Ukraine's Nukes and Mr. Kravchuk's Big Gamble', *Washington Times*, 25 January 1994.
[79]J.Schaffer, 'US to Play Continued Role in Russia-Ukraine Nucear Deal', *USIA Staf Writer*, 24 January 1994.

economic and commercial co-operation as well as on increasing US technical and humanitarian assistance.[80]

This impressive package of American generosity was undoubtedly among the 'benefits' which, as was implied by the State Department spokesman McCurry at a news briefing on 2 February, were due to arrive in Ukraine with the ratification of the treaties. Pointing out that these benefits were expected to serve as a crucial incentive for the softening of the Ukrainian Parliament's stance the spokesman claimed that there had already been 'some encouraging reports' of 'a growing support within the Rada' for START 1 and the NPT.[81] These reports proved to be rather accurate as the very next day, on 3 February 1994, the Ukrainian Parliament ratified the START Treaty and the Lisbon Protocol.

With regard to the NPT this was further confirmed during President Kravchuk's visit to Washington on 3-5 March 1994. Having stated that the majority in the Rada had come to favour the accession to the NPT Kravchuk won high praise from his American counterpart for providing courageous leadership on the de-nuclearisation of Ukraine. Describing his visit as 'the beginning of a new era' in US-Ukrainian bilateral relations, with the emphasis shifting from the excessive concentration on nuclear issues to the 'normal kind of business', the Americans announced that all three objectives they envisaged for the Ukrainian President's visit had been achieved. These included promoting Ukraine's integration into the international community, supporting its identity as an independent state and undertaking new engagements in order to expand bilateral co-operation, especially in the economic sphere.[82] Thus, the two Presidents signed a joint statement on the development of relations and treaties on the promotion of investment and the avoidance of double taxation. Additionally, Ukraine was

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[80]'US-Ukraine Bilateral Economic Talks', Statement Released by the Office of the Department Spokesman, Washington, DC, 31 January 1994, *Dispatch*, Vol. 5, No. 6, 7 February 1994, pp. 69-70.
[81]News Briefing, *State Department Report*, 2 February 1994.
[82]A.M.Sullivan, 'Clinton Urges Ukraine's Integration with Western Europe', *USIA White House Correspondent*, 4 March 1994.

included in the US list of beneficiary developing countries under the Generalised System of Preferences which offered a duty-free access to American markets.[83] Finally Clinton stated that, despite going through a difficult period of transition Ukraine, with its abundant natural and human resources, had an enormous economic potential. He announced that US economic assistance to it would be increased in 1994 to $350 million. This included $240 million in the form of technical and humanitarian grants, $60 million in US Department of Agriculture concessional credits, and $50 million in Overseas Private Investment Corporation insurance and financing. Together with $350 million in Nunn-Lugar funds pledged to help Ukraine with its nuclear dismantlement, the total package constituted $700 million thus making Ukraine the fourth largest recipient of US foreign assistance.[84]

Such overtures were not only a way of rewarding Kravchuk for his exertions in denuclearising Ukraine but also a part of Washington's new strategy in the region which manifested itself most expressively in the appropriation of more than half of US assistance to the republics in 1994 while, during the two previous years, more than a half had been received by Russia alone. Although American officials denied any change in US official post-Soviet policy, the developments of the first months of 1994 indicated that the Clinton administration finally began to alter its course, adopting a tougher stance towards Russia and focusing more on the other republics. 'They are changing their policy somewhat, but reluctant to admit it', claimed Carter's security adviser Brzezinski who repeatedly criticised Clinton for overindulging Russia, 'They ... are emphasising much more than in the past that they're interested in what I call "geopolitical pluralism", meaning the preservation of states other than Russia'.[85]

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[83]'Clinton Adds Ukraine to GSP List', The White House Office of the Press Secretary, 4 March 1994.
[84]'Fact Sheet: Ukraine', *Dispatch*, Vol. 5, No. 18, 2 May, 1994, p. 267.
[85]S.Greenhouse, 'Stung by Criticism, Clinton Altering Policy on Former Soviet States', *New York Times*, 21 March 1994.

Indeed, the administration's reasoning that supporting Russia was most crucial, as the failure of economic reform and democratisation there would greatly affect other republics, gave way to actual help for the Ukrainian and other republics' economies in order to ensure their viability as independent states. This was caused by an unexpected surge of nationalist forces in Russia after its December 1993 parliamentary elections. Since then the Kremlin's foreign policy statements, in particular with regard to the significance of Russia's economic and 'peace-keeping' role in the near abroad, had grown more intense and Yeltsin's 'State of the Union' address indicated a change of priorities from building a liberal Russia to building a powerful one.[86] These worrying tendencies combined with the resignation of Russian reformist ministers, Russia's intervention in the Bosnian conflict on the side of Serbia, and the arrest of the senior CIA officer Aldrich Ames, contributed to the growing scepticism in the US regarding Russia's trustworthiness as an ally. In these circumstances the strengthening of Russia did not seem to the US Government as the best option and Brzezinski's claim that, with Ukraine Russia was a Euroasian empire while without Ukraine it was not, left little doubt as to what should be the preference of the moment. A strong independent Ukraine was increasingly regarded in the US not only as a restraint to Russia's great power aspirations but also as a natural buffer between the latter and the Central European states which were applying for a membership of NATO and the European Union.[87]

In this view the inviolability of the Ukrainian borders was repeatedly emphasised at the highest levels of the US Government when Russian nationalists began agitation around the Crimea. This had first been done by President Clinton who reaffirmed the US commitment to Ukraine's 'independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity' during President Kravchuk's visit.[88] Subsequently, on 24

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[86]*Congressional Record - Senate*, 24 March 1994, S3645.
[87]R.Seely, 'A Bigger Role for "Little Russia"', *Independent*, 8 March 1994.
[88]President Kravchuk in Washington', An editorial reflecting the views of the US Government, broadcast by *The Voice of America*, 12 March 1994.

March the Senate unanimously approved Senator's McConnell's amendment to the resolution on US policy in Eastern and Central Europe which declared that the US would resist any 'attempts by the Russian Federation to intimidate, use military force or engage in economic coercion to establish a sphere of influence over the former republics of the Soviet Union, the Baltics, or Central and Eastern European nations'.[89]

Focusing on the importance of overcoming the US policy bias towards Russia, whose attempts at dominating its neighbours posed a threat to democracy and stability in Europe, Senator McConnell made a number of points revealing Russia's disturbing actions in support of his amendment. One of them related to the latter's inaccuracy in fulfilling its trilateral agreement obligations to supply Ukraine with nuclear fuel rods in return for nuclear warheads, thus aggravating the energy crisis in the republic.

As Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister, Valeriy Shmarov, informed Secretary of Defence, William Perry, visiting Kiev on 21 March, Ukraine received no fuel supplies after its 120 warheads had been shipped to Russia, which jeopardised the Moscow agreement. Having assured the Ukrainian leaders that the problem would be settled soon, Perry praised them for their successful efforts at eliminating Ukraine's nuclear arsenal and signed three agreements worth $100 million as a part of the $700 million US assistance package.[90] The dismantlement of Ukraine's most modern SS-24 missiles was the subject of the first agreement providing $50 million for this purpose. Since their operational life was expected to last until the end of the decade, while the ageing SS-19 would be unusable within 18 months, the destruction of 46 SS-24 was the US priority as it guaranteed that no future Ukrainian government would have an opportunity to renegotiate the concluded treaties. The other two deals of $40 million and $10

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[89]*Congressional Record - Senate*, 24 March 1994, S3644.
[90]S.Erlanger, 'Ukraine's Opportunity: Western Suspicions of Russia', *New York Times*, 4 April 1994.

million were intended for the conversion of the defence industry to civilian use and for the safe storage and transportation of the nuclear materials.[91]

As the American aid started flowing to Kiev the ebbing anxieties began to grow again in Washington. The uncertainty about both the future actions of President Kravchuk, whose inability to curb economic crisis caused a dramatic decline of his popularity at home, and the course to be adopted by the new Verkhovna Rada, which for the first time in Ukraine's history came to power as a result of a free general election, caused concern among US officials. On the one hand Kravchuk was seen by the US Government as a crucial guarantor of Ukraine's promise to become non-nuclear and therefore had to be supported, on the other, there were well-grounded suspicions that, reluctant to cede state control over the economy, he would continue to oppose reforms, while trying to obtain as much American financial assistance as possible, or would even retrieve the nuclear bargaining chip in order to increase economic aid. Furthermore, the expanding regional division in Ukraine, which manifested itself in the parliamentary elections, caused doubts as to whether the new Parliament could create a coherent government capable of dealing with a whole complex of problems, in particular with the ambivalence of Ukraine's political preferences: the Russified east tended to support an alliance with Moscow while the centre and the west were in favour of more Western-oriented development.[92]

This concern was exacerbated when on 10 July 1994 Leonid Kuchma was elected the new President owing to the extensive support of the Russian population in Eastern Ukraine and the ex-communists. Having declared the continuation of Kravchuk's policy on the most important issue for the West, the denuclearisation of Ukraine, he resolved, however, to substitute his predecessor's 'romantic' approach to other problems with more 'pragmatic' policies which combined

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[91]R.Seely, 'Perry Offers More Money to Ukraine', *Washington Post*, 22 March 1994.
[92]C.Meyer, 'Ukraine's Time of Troubles', *Washington Times*, 25 March 1994.

market reforms and closer economic ties with Russia.[93] These intentions were bound to bring him into conflict with the nationalist forces in the Rada which were placing absolute independence above economic welfare. And this, in the opinion of American observers, would further aggravate the Crimean problem, already the most pressing for the newly elected President.[94] Of the 2.5 million population on the Crimean peninsula 70 cent were Russian who, despite their initial vote approving unity with Ukraine, had changed their preference in favour of reaffiliation with Russia. Reassured by repeated declarations of the US Government about its unconditional support for Ukraine's territorial integrity, particularly in relation to the Crimea, Ukrainian nationalists were likely to impose economic pressure on the peninsula in an attempt to check unconstitutional manoeuvres by the Crimean leaders. Such a move would increase pro-Russian sentiments there and consequently trigger Moscow's aggression disguised as the protection of ethnic Russians in the region (which was highly probable after similar incidents in Georgia and Moldova). Thus President Kuchma was faced with an extremely difficult task of blocking his own Parliament's excessive actions and simultaneously fighting Crimean secessionist tendencies covertly encouraged by the Russian Government. Failure to solve this issue threatened to result in an open clash which, according to some predictions, could be worse than the war in the former Yugoslavia.[95]

In these circumstances US policy-makers should have tried to find a way, not only to avoid a dilemma between supporting Ukraine and openly confronting Russia, but more importantly to prevent the possibility of military conflict between the two countries. However, diverse and often conflicting propositions, ranging from an intensive military co-operation between the US and Ukraine and a preventive deployment of UN troops in the Crimea, to an indication that the US

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[93]'A "Pragmatic" Ukraine?', Editorial, *Christian Science Monitor*, 21 July 1994.
[94]J.Clarke, 'Again, the Helping Hand is All Thumbs', *Los Angeles Times*, 25 July 1994.
[95]C.Freeland, 'Ukraine: The Next Yugoslavia', *The Oxford International Review*, Vol. 5, No. 2, Spring 1994, pp. 31-33.

would be content with any solution including a territorial transfer as long as it was peaceful, eventually resulted in minimum action.

Instead, the Clinton administration found it more important to concentrate on the process of Ukraine's denuclearisation. While eager to ensure that the new Ukrainian Government would complete the transfer of warheads to Russia and accede to the NPT in the shortest possible time, the Americans for their part had been unable to effectively fulfil their pledge of Nunn-Lugar assistance. Thus during Vice President Al Gore's visit to Kiev on 2 August 1994 it emerged that, while Ukraine was consistently proceeding with the implementation of the Trilateral agreement, the US had only provided $60 million as an advance payment to Russia for the low-enriched uranium from deactivated warheads to help finance the deliveries of nuclear fuel for Ukraine's power stations.[96] Such accomplishments as the ratification of START 1, commitment to respect the guidelines of the Missile Technology Control Regime intended to prevent missile proliferation, and the transfer to Russia of 300 warheads surpassing the goal, established in the Trilateral agreement, of 200 warheads by November 1994, entitled the Ukrainian Government to reciprocal concessions by the US administration. However, apart from new promises of increased access to international markets for Ukraine's aerospace and rocket industries when the country acceded to the NPT, the American Vice President could not deliver much.[97]

Having admitted themselves to the failure in implementing the Nunn-Lugar programme State Department officials announced after Gore's visit that they were taking steps, both within the US Government and with the Government of Ukraine, to accelerate the delivery of assistance and promised to have transferred,

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[96]L.E.Davis, Under secretary for Arms Control and International Security Affairs, 'Progress on Denuclearisation in Ukraine', *Dispatch*, Vol. 5, No. 33, 15 August 1994, p. 557.
[97]G.Winestock, 'Gore Offers Trade Carrotts for Ukraine Co-operation', *Journal of Commerce*, 4 August 1994.

by the end of 1994, at least $130 million of the $350 million committed to Ukraine for that year.[98]

Still, President Kuchma's resolve to relinquish what he described as the 'illusion' of security offered by nuclear weapons in favour of the more enduring stability resulting from economic prosperity remained adamant. At the beginning of October 1994 Kuchma launched a radical comprehensive reform programme which included price liberalisation, mass privatisation and land reform, stabilisation of the national currency, and reorganisation of the tax system. On the strength of this reform plan Kuchma succeeded in securing Ukraine's first deal with the International Monetary Fund which was signed at the end of September. By the beginning of November his Government managed to reduce the rate of inflation, liberalised most prices and export controls, and minimised Ukraine's imports. However, it was obvious that with the annual trade deficit of $3 billion mainly caused by imports of oil and gas from Russia the country needed serious financial support from the international community.[99]

In this respect the US administration proved to be far more efficient than with implementing its own security assistance programme. During the July G-7 summit in Naples President Clinton, having shown himself as Ukraine's most ardent supporter, induced his counterparts to sign an agreement on a $4 billion assistance package for Ukraine. The G-7 Donors' Conference held in Winnipeg at the end of October was seen by the Clinton administration as an opportunity to convince Western European countries and Japan to expand their own financial support for Ukrainian reform. While the IMF announced its $371 million in balance-of-payments assistance for Ukraine the Clinton administration pledged to

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[98]'Trilateral Statement and the NPT', *The State Department Fact Sheet*, 8 August 1994.
[99]L.Kuchma, President of Ukraine, 'Ukraine's Blueprint', *Financial Times*, 30 September 1994.

provide $100 million towards financing its imports during the coming winter thereby setting an example to other G-7 states.[100]

A further proof that Ukraine regarded economic growth as a better guarantee of its lasting independence than nuclear stockpiles was its Parliament's decision to make the last and long-awaited step towards the country's nuclear disarmament. On 16 November 1994 the Verkhovna Rada ratified the NPT by a vote of 301 to 8 which meant that Ukraine would formally accede to the 1968 Treaty as a non-nuclear weapons state once it received official security assurances from nuclear states-depositories. This move not only ended a phase of prolonged international struggle around Ukraine's nuclear inheritance but also opened new prospects for the further reductions of nuclear arsenals in the US and Russia.

While the Ukrainian Foreign Minister Udovenko hailed the NPT ratification as a 'triumph of Ukrainian diplomacy and Ukrainian independence'[101] the Americans credited themselves with this achievement, calling it 'one of the most significant things the president has done in foreign policy'.[102] While both statements perhaps reflected the truth, the end result proved that both countries finally renounced principled inflexibility in favour of the advantages offered by a pragmatic approach to bilateral relations. The US administration, having realised Ukraine's importance as a factor of stability in post-cold War Europe, decided that encouragement would be more effective in promoting the virtues of nuclear disarmament and economic reform than pressure and threats. The Ukrainian leadership for its part came to an understanding that their country needed money and support by the West more than a costly nuclear deterrent in a hostile environment.

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[100]S.Talbott, Deputy Secretary, 'Ukraine's Future and the Future of Europe', Address Before the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC, 18 November 1994, *Dispatch*, Vol. 5, No. 47, 21 November 1994, p. 774.

[101]ibid., p. 775.

[102]'Europe Lags Again', *The Economist*, 26 Novemebr 1994, p. 65.

Thus by the time of President Kuchma's first official trip to Washington relations between the US and Ukraine reached their highest point. In order to demonstrate US appreciation of Ukraine's accomplishments Clinton upgraded his counterpart's trip on 22-23 November 1994 to a state visit which became only the fourth such event during his presidency. In his remarks at the arrival ceremony President Clinton greeted his Ukrainian guest with the following words:

> 'Seventy-seven years ago today, Mr. President, on November 22, 1917, another generation of Ukrainian leaders declared the independence of Ukraine. It was a tragedy that civil war and bolshevism doomed that new state while it was still in its infancy.
>
> Today, we are pleased and honored to welcome you, the leader of Ukraine that is conquering the challenges of independence - poised to fulfill its hopes, a nation that will grow into one of the great nations of Europe'.[103]

Having expressed their determination to open a qualitatively new stage in the growing bilateral relations the two presidents signed a Charter of American-Ukrainian Partnership, Friendship and Co-operation which envisaged the development of a close, mutually beneficial relationship across a full range of political, economic, cultural, environmental, and security issues. In order to broaden US-Ukrainian co-operation in new areas Kuchma and Clinton signed an Agreement on Co-operation in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for Peaceful Purposes, brought into force a bilateral customs co-operation agreement, and discussed the possibilities of joint efforts in combating crime and corruption as well as promoting the rule of law in Ukraine. It was also announced that expanding contacts in the fields of science, technology and education would be encouraged.

With regard to US economic assistance the Presidents reviewed the progress in its implementation and agreed to work together in order to ensure the full disbursement of all current and previous commitments. Special attention was paid

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[103]'Challenges Facing Democracy in Ukraine', President Clinton, Ukrainian President Kuchma, Joint Statements, *Dispatch*, Vol. 5, No. 49, 5 December 1994, p. 797.

to the expansion of trade and investment in Ukraine due to its crucial importance in the success of Ukrainian economic reform. Both presidents also agreed to work together on the G-7 Naples Action Plan designed to ensure the future closure of the Chernobyl reactors.[104]

Addressing security issues President Clinton announced that in addition to the Nunn-Lugar programmes intended to assist Ukraine with the dismantlement of nuclear weapons and the conversion of defence industries the US would support Ukraine's participation in the Partnership for Peace, which it joined in February 1994, through the funds under the Warsaw Initiative. Praising Ukraine's farsightedness in ratifying START 1 and the NPT and recognising the positive international role it played through participation in UN peacekeeping and CSCE preventive diplomacy missions, Clinton reaffirmed the US commitment to provide security assurances by signing a corresponding Memorandum at the forthcoming Budapest CSCE Summit.

The Memorandum on Security Assurances in Connection with Ukraine's Accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was signed in Budapest on 5 December 1994 by Ukraine, Russia, Great Britain and the United States. The three states-depositories undertook to respect the independence and the existing borders of Ukraine in accordance with the principles of the CSCE Final Act; reaffirmed their obligation to refrain from threat, use of force ('none of their weapons will ever be used against Ukraine except in self-defence') or economic coercion with regard to Ukraine and to seek immediate UN Security Council action to provide it with assistance should it become a victim of a nuclear aggression or an object of a threat of such aggression.

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[104]ibid., p. 800.

Thus while in 1991-1993 US-Ukrainian relations remained in a state of distrust, in the course of 1994 a final breakthrough had been achieved. US policy-makers gradually progressed from an attitude of resentment towards a former vassal territory of the Soviet empire starting to assert itself as an independent state in Europe and thereby jeopardising the American arms control agenda, to an appreciation of its importance as a potential strategic partner. The Bush administration's reluctance to reschedule its new post-Cold War policy in order to appease separatist ambitions standing in the way of smoothing US relations with the Kremlin was replaced by Clinton's realisation that further pressure would alienate Ukraine, lock it in with all its nuclear weapons aimed at the US and thereby increase the threat to American security. Having acknowledged Ukraine as an important political and economic partner the Clinton administration declared that ensuring its transformation into a democratic state with a market-oriented economy was the US strategic goal. Failure to achieve this goal could be detrimental not only to Ukraine and the peace of its immediate neighbours but also to stability in the whole of Europe. On the eve of President Kuchma's visit to Washington in November 1994 Deputy State Secretary Strobe Talbott stated: 'Because of its geographical position, its size, and its wealth in human and natural resources, Ukraine will have an especially powerful influence on the economic, political, and security landscape of the entire region'. Therefore 'American support for European integration entails, as a high priority and, indeed, as a prerequisite, support for a unitary and independent Ukraine'.[105] And, inasmuch as European security was a crucial component of international stability, independent Ukraine was finally recognised as an important factor of world politics.

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[105]S.Talbott, Deputy Secretary, 'Ukraine's Future and the Future of Europe', *Dispatch*, Vol. 5, No. 47, 21 November 1994, p. 775.

CHAPTER 4. BRITISH-UKRAINIAN RELATIONS, 1991-1994

This chapter examines the development of links between Great Britain and Ukraine during the most crucial years of Ukrainian state-building. It embraces the period from early 1991, shortly before the proclamation of independence, until the end of 1994 when the acclaimed breakthrough in Ukraine's dialogue with the West occurred. Through the prism of political decision-making it gives an insight into both the efforts of the Ukrainians to strengthen their national independence through comprehensive interaction with Western Europe and the British contribution to this cause. The division of the chapter into three parts is based on the three consecutive phases in the course of British-Ukrainian relations during the period in question: negotiations between the two Governments resulting mainly in mutual assurances and provisions for future co-operation; the gradual unfolding of practical bilateral connections cautiously approached by the British, testing new ground, and eagerly embraced by the Ukrainians; and the long-awaited realisation of the pledges to denuclearise the country and to proceed with reforms on the part of the Ukrainian Government but not reciprocated by Britain's willingness to promote economic partnership which reflected the general lack of enthusiasm towards Ukraine in Europe.

A Time of Planning: Ukraine's Independence and Britain's Indecisiveness.

The first significant contact between the British and Ukrainian leaderships once the question of Ukraine's state independence emerged on the agenda took place on 19-20 of March 1991. In the tradition of those times when Kiev was just a stop-over for high foreign guests on their way either to or from Moscow, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Douglas Hurd, called in to meet the Prime Minister of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Vitold Fokin, Head of its Supreme Soviet, Leonid Kravchuk, and Foreign Minister, Anatoliy Zlenko, before setting off to Russia. However, despite the fact that an overwhelming

amount of the Foreign Secretary's time in Ukraine was assigned to cultural and educational engagements (e.g. historical sightseeing, laying a wreath to the tomb of the Unknown Soldier, a lecture on the international situation for students and staff of Kiev State University and a visit to one of the few Soviet-British joint ventures), this very gesture indicated that the British Government was beginning to pay close attention to the developments in Ukraine once the March ballot on Soviet unity revealed a peculiarly contradictory tendency in the republic: support for the Union and for Ukrainian sovereignty alike. Trying to redefine Ukraine's status within Soviet borders as well as the actual foundations of the weakening Union the Ukrainian leaders pressed for a revision of the existing Constitution. Having announced the beginning of 'a real and practical fight for a sovereign state'[1] the Speaker of the Parliament, Kravchuk, assured the visiting Foreign Secretary of his Government's determination to 'force a stubborn Kremlin to acknowledge the Ukraine's economic independence'.[2]

After this appeal to the West for assistance in strengthening Ukraine and other Soviet Republics both economically and politically as the only, albeit paradoxical, way to prevent the Union from plunging into chaos became increasingly vocal. 'The West must help manage the crisis not so Mr Gorbachev can reinforce the empire but so he can decolonise it', Dmytro Pavlychko, the Deputy Head of both the Ukrainian and the Soviet Parliaments, insisted.[3] Expressing the viewpoint of most Ukrainian democratic leaders he advocated the necessity of transforming the old Soviet autocratic apparatus into a council comprising the heads of all the republics, however, with no executive power and no authority in foreign and military matters: the renewed Union was to be based primarily on economic co-operation between the republics.

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[1]B.Clarke, R.Seely, *The Times*, 20 March 1991.
[2]S.Viets, 'Leader's sights set on free Ukraine', *The Independent*, 23 March 1991.
[3]L.Unger, 'Manifesto for an Independent Ukraine', *International Herald Tribune*, 8 June 1991.

Shortly before the approval of the historical August Declaration of Independence, the Ukrainian leadership made a few trial steps down the independence path. Thus, in June the Verkhovna Rada voted to seize all Soviet assets on the Republic's territory.[4] At the beginning of July, in another move to assert national sovereignty, Prime Minister Fokin announced that Ukraine would refuse to make payments on any loans accepted without the republic's prior approval, referring to Gorbachev's expected solicitation for Western credits at the G-7 July summit in London.[5] By August a de facto customs control was set up in the republic.[6] However, most importantly, the Ukrainian Parliament decided to postpone consideration of the draft Union Treaty until its next session in September, thus ruining Gorbachev's plans to have it signed in August.[7] This decision reflected a growing mood in Ukraine to oppose the republic's entry into a reformed Union until its new constitution had been ratified, which seemed unlikely to happen before the end of the year.

The next step towards strengthening Ukraine's self-reliance was the establishment in July of an international council of advisers. The new body, due to hold its first meeting at Kiev in September, was supposed to advise the Ukrainian Government on the issues of privatisation, banking, taxation and constitutional law. Chaired by the Ukrainian émigré and ex-head of the International Management Development Institute in Switzerland, Bohdan Havrylyshyn, it included ten prominent international businessmen and politicians, among them Sir Geoffrey Howe, formerly a Chancellor of the Exchequer and a Foreign Secretary in Margaret Thatcher's Cabinet, and Shirley Williams, a one-time Labour minister.[8]

In early August Norman Lamont, the then Chancellor of the Exchequer, went to Kiev on the final leg of his post-G-7 fact-finding mission in the Soviet Union.

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[4]M.Kniazkov, 'Ukraine's quiet secession', *The Cristian Science Monitor*, 28 June-4 July 1991.
[5]C.Freeland, 'Ukraine asserts its rights against Moscow's laws', *Financial Times*, 9 July 1991.
[6]C.Freeland, 'Ukraine sets up customs control', *Financial Times*, 19 August 1991.
[7]M.Dyczok, J.Rettle, 'Ukraine defers Soviet linkage as Bush calls', *The Guardian*, 1 August 1991.
[8]'Eastward Howe', *Financial Times*, 24 July 1991.

The Chancellor met with Victor Antonov, the Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defence and Conversion and visited one of the factories undergoing the process of converting military production to civilian purposes. Antonov informed the British guest that Ukraine's control over defence enterprises on its territory had risen from 6 to 50 per cent in two years, and many had already been listed for conversion. On the whole, 97 per cent of Ukraine's 1,500 defence enterprises could be transformed into joint-stock companies. However, in order to build a high-technology industry the Republic needed substantial foreign investment. 'That's why we wanted the British Chancellor here; we don't have enough hard currency', the Defence Minister explained to the press.[9]

For his part, Lamont noted that Ukraine had good opportunities for the investment of British capital into its economy. Having also visited a collective farm in the Kiev oblast where progressive technologies for grain production were being implemented with the help of British experts, he concluded that the mood 'for market economics, privatisation and economic reform' prevailed in Ukraine.[10]

This view was especially encouraging in the light of Ukraine's strained relations with the US after President Bush's implicit warning earlier that month that future economic dealings between the two countries could be jeopardised by 'suicidal nationalism' and the 'hopeless course of isolation'.[11] Therefore pinning great hopes on Western Europe, Ukrainian leaders expected the Chancellor to express his favourable opinion at the October G-7 meeting in Bangkok. Since Great Britain was chairing the Group at the time such a lobby was likely to increase Ukraine's chances of obtaining financial aid from European G-7 members which would significantly reduce its dependence on Russian oil and gas. Thus

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[9]S.Viets, 'Ukraine sees Lamont as Saviour', *The Independent*, 5 August 1991.
[10]ibid.
[11]ibid.

Chancellor Lamont was seen in Ukraine as its potential saviour from Russia's imminent economic pressure.

Soon after the proclamation of independence Ukrainian leaders met with members of the Council of Advisers including Sir Geoffrey Howe and American billionaire financier George Soros in order to begin the drafting of an economic reform programme.[12] Sir Geoffrey proposed a monetary reform involving the introduction of Ukraine's own currency. Emphasising its importance as a means of economic protection rather than symbolic self-assertion, he claimed that it would 'allow investment and prevent a flood of roubles in search of Ukrainian food and goods'.[13] With regard to privatisation it was suggested that half of the Republic's assets should be denationalised by way of offering vouchers to all citizens, a quarter should be sold through national auctions, while another quarter could go on sale open to foreigners thereby bringing much-needed currency into Ukraine's economy. 'With all hard-currency reserves held in Moscow, the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry cannot even pay for a trip abroad', sympathised *The Guardian* at the end of September.[14]

Despite a severe lack of funding the Foreign Ministry began active operations aimed at promoting Ukrainian national interests, first of all by concluding trade agreements with states of the former communist bloc, even before the August coup, at a time when the Ukrainian leadership was still struggling for the Republic's political and economic sovereignty within a Soviet framework. Therefore the same day as the Verkhovna Rada declared Ukraine's independence, the decision to form and conduct an independent foreign policy was clearly stated in a diplomatic note submitted by the Head of the Ukrainian UN Mission Udovenko to the Secretary General Perez de Cuellar. Yet, as Udovenko stressed, the foremost goal was 'to fulfil our international commitments, first of all the

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[12]C.Freeland, 'Economists plot go-it-alone strategy for the Ukraine', *Financial Times*, 27 September 1991.
[13]S.Greenberg, 'Rouble-free currency', *The Guardian*, 27 September 1991.
[14]ibid.

Charter of the United Nations - which was drafted with the active participation of Ukraine...'[15]

Although the West gradually recognised the necessity of dealing with Ukraine directly, its practical realisation was a slow process with Britain lagging far behind its most influential partners on both sides of the Atlantic. While Germany and France already had large consulates in Kiev and the Americans opened theirs in March, the British were only promising to do so.[16] However, with the forthcoming referendum on independence scheduled for 1 December 1991 the British Cabinet was left with very little time to postpone crucial decisions regarding its official policy towards Ukraine. After a series of consultations with the US administration aimed at co-ordinating their positions, it agreed that the acceptance of new realities was the only sensible reaction to the developments in the region. When the US unofficially indicated that it would recognise Ukraine's independence if approved by the popular vote, so did Great Britain. 'Until then, wrote *The Independent,* Western diplomacy towards the disintegration of the Soviet Union was in a time warp'.[17]

As soon as the results of the referendum were publicised, Kiev turned into a swarm of diplomatic activity. Consuls of the USA, Canada, France and Germany together with Britain's newly appointed representative Michael Holmes met at the German consulate to discuss the outcome and to formulate their response. Although, according to one diplomatic source, they concurred that the referendum had been a 'clear expression of the popular will' which needed to be acknowledged, only the Canadian officials promptly announced the recognition of Ukraine by their Government. The others were still awaiting corresponding instructions. As Holmes, a former British Consul at Moscow, upon his arrival in Kiev just a few days before the referendum became the sole official representing

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[15]J.Aita, 'Ukraine distances itself from Soviet UN Mission', *European Wireless File*, 29 August 1991.
[16]J.Steel, 'Separatist Ukraine to print its own money', *The Guardian*, 3 October 1991.
[17]P.Pringle, 'A nation discovers itself', *The Independent*, 2 December 1991.

Britain in Ukraine, *The Times* rightly noted that 'London may now find itself having to by-pass the stage of consular relations and move towards establishing a full embassy'.[18] However, this forecast proved to be exceedingly optimistic as two weeks into Ukrainian independence, on 14 December 1991, consular relations between Ukraine and the United Kingdom were opened after the signing of a Joint Communiqué in Kiev. Thus the establishment of a 'full embassy' had to wait for better times.

On 26 December 1991 the EC recognised Russia as the successor state to the defunct Soviet Union. Recognition was also given to Ukraine and Armenia as they provided the 'required assurances' including a commitment to human and ethnic rights asserted in the Helsinki Final Act, respect for borders and compliance with other international obligations such as non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament agreements.[19] The following day the Minister of the British Foreign Office Douglas Hogg met with senior officials in order to address separately the question concerning official recognition of the newly-independent states. It was planned to examine first the cases of the 'big three' - Ukraine, Belorussia and Kazakhstan. After some consideration the British Government agreed that Ukraine satisfied the EC criteria and granted it full diplomatic recognition on the New Year's eve.[20]

Ten days later, on 10 January 1992, the two countries opened diplomatic relations by an exchange of letters between Ukrainian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Zlenko, and British Foreign Secretary, Hurd. The latter was expected to name the first British ambassador to Ukraine shortly.[21] In the meantime the British Consulate General in Kiev was upgraded to embassy status while all day-to-day functions were performed by David Gladstone, a Charge d'Affaires. Thus Great Britain

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[18]M.Dejevsky, R.Seely, 'Money men sweep Kiev', *The Times*, 4 December 1991.
[19]A.Robinson, I.Dawnay, 'Chinese Government fires parting shot', *Financial Times*, 27 December 1991.
[20]ibid.
[21]*Sunday Telegraph*, 9 January 1992.

became one of eighty countries which recognised Ukraine by the beginning of 1992 and of only fourteen which established diplomatic relations with it.

Meanwhile, the month between Ukraine's referendum and its diplomatic recognition by Great Britain was marked by an increasing number of contacts in various spheres.

The Director of the Bank of England's European division Michael Foot visited Kiev in mid-December to advise Ukrainian leaders on the functions of national banks and modern banking techniques. Although he described the payment system operating in the former Soviet Union as 'appalling', the British Government did not hesitate to encourage the newly independent states to seek early membership of the IMF and the World Bank.[22] Unlike President Bush, Prime Minister John Major, a chairman of the G-7 at the time, had been backing this idea since the suppression of the August coup, arguing that it would provide an institutional framework for long-term aid to the republics.[23] Ukraine was first among them to apply for full IMF membership and, largely due to the influence of the British Prime Minister, the Americans ceased their opposition to it in December 1991. Major emphasised that while such membership would enable the newly established states 'to draw on the considerable financial resources of these institutions in support of an agreed reform programme', it also offered an advantage to the industrialised nations by relieving pressure on them to provide financial aid individually.[24] As a condition of access to million-dollar loans available through the IMF and World Bank membership, the Ukrainian Government was supposed to follow an economic reform plan approved by the IMF. In December the IMF team proposed changes in Ukraine's budget mechanism, taxation system and social welfare net.[25]

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[22]R.Seely, 'IMF says Ukraine underestimates the economic challenge', *The Times*, 24 December 1991.
[23]R.Cornwell, 'Major to plead Soviets' cause with Bush', *The Independent*, 28 August 1991.
[24]'Ukraine applies for full membership of IMF', *The Times*, 2 January 1992.
[25]C.Freeland, 'IMF cautions Ukraine over balanced budget', *Financial Times*, 23 December 1991.

At the same time the Ukrainian Government declared, as its more distant goal, membership of the European Community. At a seminar on Ukraine's strategic security which took place in Kiev, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Zlenko informed visitors from Oxford and Harvard Universities of his country's intention to apply to the EC.[26] One of the British participants of the seminar, a senior research fellow at Oxford University, pointed out on his return to Britain that Ukrainian leaders, whether former communists or former dissidents, concurred that their country could secure its future only by a rapid reorientation of political and economic ties towards the West. According to him, they also agreed that, owing to the lack of skills, technology and finance, independent Ukraine was unlikely to survive the next two years without substantial Western assistance. Expressing his views in *The Guardian* he argued that the training of personnel was one of the most crucial tasks of the moment and the one Britain could help with: 'One hundred British officials prepared to spend a year in Ukraine could make an immense difference to Ukraine's future prospects; there are requests even for help in retraining police and customs officers'.[27] By concluding that Ukrainian leaders were trying to present their country as an investment in Europe's long-term stability for which it should therefore be prepared to share the financial burden the author objectively conveyed Ukraine's aspirations which in time gained appreciation by Great Britain as well as the West as a whole.

The new year of 1992 began in Ukraine with the Government's attempts to reduce the Republic's economic dependence on Russia by introducing the coupon as an interim currency parallel with rouble. This move which was to be taken further in March, when the coupon was expected to become the only currency valid in Ukraine, met with more than a sceptical reaction by Western economists. Although some of Ukraine's high-powered foreign advisers, including Sir

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[26]W.Wallace, 'New Ukraine struggles to keep its balance', *The Guardian*, 24 December 1991.
[27]ibid.

Geoffrey Howe, argued that the Ukrainian Government should introduce a proper national currency as soon as possible, the IMF experts believed that a common currency in the former Soviet republics was more practical as it would increase trade and promote long-standing economic ties among them. However, the establishment of a coupon system was unanimously seen as a wrong step in conducting a monetary reform in the country.[28] Thus George Soros, another member of Ukraine's international Council of Advisers, called it 'a machine for inflation' in view of the Government's intention to dispense new coupons every month without an effective mechanism of getting them back.[29]

Sir Geoffrey Howe, who was equally critical of the Ukrainian Government's policy in this sphere, in an attempt to explain its inability to implement effective economic reforms, identified as one of the reasons the inadequacy of the political system. He claimed that it was not just individuals who were to blame but the whole governmental structure, referring in particular to uncoordinated relations between Ukraine's Parliament, President and Cabinet.[30] Since the Republic's old constitution no longer corresponded to the recently changed realities and the new one was still in the making, the delineation of power in Ukraine was mainly regulated by temporary amendments to the existing constitution as opposed to rigid rules and procedures. This situation, therefore, allowed politicians representing different branches of power to struggle for greater authority in both domestic and foreign matters. Thus President Kravchuk, arguing that a strong executive was a necessary means to secure independence, tried to overpower the Parliament by concentrating in his hands such matters as appointing ministers directly and issuing decrees which had the force of law. This provoked objections by the Prime Minister who demanded more freedom in economic decision-making. The Parliament, for its part, strove to retain power resisting the

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[28]L.Uchitelle, 'Kiev cashes out of Russian economy', *International Herald Tribune*, 14 February 1992.
[29]C.Freeland, 'Ukraine takes dim view of colourful coupons', *Financial Times*, 16 January 1992.
[30]ibid.

executive's attempts at 'dictatorial' rule and consequently blocking the course of reform.

The development of the economic and political situation in Ukraine and the ways in which Great Britain could provide assistance in carrying out reforms were discussed during Foreign Secretary Hurd's one-day official visit to Ukraine on 19 January 1992. Having paid particular attention to the question of Ukraine's membership in the International Monetary Fund he noted: 'We see it as an essential accompaniment of effective Western aid and to reform being carried out in Ukraine'.[31] However, since the underlying objective of the Foreign Secretary's visit to Kiev in the context of his three-nation tour of the former Soviet Union was to confer with the Ukrainian leadership on security issues, including the division of the Black Sea fleet, nuclear disarmament, and especially the situation with tactical nuclear weapons, he emphasised that British economic, political, and other help could be made available to Ukraine only on condition that his Government found the developments in all of these spheres satisfactory.

At the meeting between the Foreign Secretary and the Ukrainian Minister of Foreign Affairs it was noted that, while the recognition of Ukraine's independence by the UK and the subsequent establishment of consular and diplomatic relations had opened the way for bilateral co-operation, it was necessary to create a legal basis for its comprehensive development. In this view Hurd and Zlenko signed a Protocol on mutual consultations between the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and resolved to set up consular institutions independent of the former Soviet diplomatic establishment. They also agreed to form direct links between the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry and the FCO department responsible for Know-How funding. Having exchanged views on a wide range of international problems they acknowledged that their mutual interest lay in the fields of disarmament, human rights, and Ukraine's integration into all-

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[31]R.Seely, 'Hurd plays down fears for fleet', *The Times*, 20 January 1992.

European structures. In this respect Zlenko notified his counterpart that since Ukraine aspired to become a member of the CSCE it counted to a large extent on British support in its structures, in particular at the conference of the Foreign Ministers of the CSCE member states in Prague to be held at the end of January 1992.

Hurd was also received by President Kravchuk with whom he discussed the development of bilateral relations, the problems of nuclear and conventional arms control and the situation in the CIS. In reply to Kravchuk's indication that Ukraine could withdraw from the CIS as a result of undesirable developments in Moscow, in particular the formation of the Military Council by the assembly of senior Soviet officers, Hurd asserted that Ukraine's decision to resign its commonwealth membership would be 'a pity' and pointed to the EC as an example of a community of nations which managed to find common ground despite day-to-day differences between them.[32]

Thus the British Government which would shortly come out of the exchange-rate mechanism and whose Europhobic tendencies were stronger than in other countries of the EC, was lecturing the Ukrainian statesmen on the virtues of collective inter-state decision-making.

On the heels of the Foreign Secretary's visit, a British parliamentary delegation led by Sir Geoffrey Howe came to Kiev in February 1992 in order to get acquainted with the activities of the Ukrainian Parliament and to establish closer relations between the legislatures of the two countries. The delegation was received by the chairman of the Verkhovna Rada Ivan Plyushch who briefed the British MPs on the political and economic situation in Ukraine and informed them of the progress in the creation of the Republic's own armed forces.[33]

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[32]ibid.

[33]*Ukrayina na Mizhnarodniy Areni (Ukraine on the International Arena) (Kiev: Yurinkom Inter, 1998)*, 2 Vols, Vol. 1, p. 236.

In addition to proceeding with building a national army, defence planning, and shaping a military doctrine, the Ukrainian Government sought both to establish broad bilateral military contacts with Great Britain as well as other Western states and to promote Ukraine's participation in certain NATO structures. Despite a declared commitment to non-alignment it intensified attempts at expanding relations with NATO. Since the latter saw Ukraine as a counterweight to Russia's influence in Europe it responded with a reciprocal readiness to forge closer ties. This promoted the rapid development of UK-Ukrainian military co-operation. Throughout 1992 a number of important steps had been made by the Governments of the two countries in this sphere.

At the end of May 1992, when the withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons from the Ukrainian territory to Russia had been completed, a delegation of British military experts visited Ukraine at the invitation of Georgiy Zhivitsa, the Ukrainian acting Chief of Staff. The delegation headed by Michael Alexander, the director of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, met representatives of the Ukrainian parliamentary Committee on defence and state security as well as the leaders of the Centre for Strategic Research under the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence and visited a number of military sites.[34]

In December 1992 Ukrainian Minister of Defence, General Konstantin Morozov, paid an official visit to Great Britain. Having discussed with the British Defence Secretary, Malcolm Rifkind, a wide range of issues representing their common interest Morozov informed him about Ukraine's approval of an international initiative aimed at achieving greater transparency and predictability in the military sphere. This included the exchange of information on the numbers of personnel, the structures, training and equipment of the armed forces, as well as on defence policies, doctrines and budgets. The Ukrainian Minister also

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[34]*Summary World Broadcast,* 29 May 1992.

confirmed his country's intention of attaining non-nuclear status and contributing to the strengthening of the international non-proliferation regimes. Finally, he announced that the Ukrainian Government planned to take certain steps towards the reduction of conventional forces which, in contrast to nuclear weapons, were to play the most decisive role in view of the changing political and military situation both in Europe and worldwide.

The leading London newspapers paid considerable attention to the meeting of the two Defence leaders and concluded that, although no agreements had been signed between Ukraine and Britain during Morozov's visit, it helped to further the constructive partnership which was forming between the two countries.[35]

At the beginning of September 1992 the first British Ambassador to Ukraine appointed by the Foreign Secretary earlier that year handed his credentials to President Kravchuk. Simon Hemans, who had previously had two postings to Moscow and served as the head of the Soviet Department in the Foreign Office from 1987 to 1990, noted in his interview to *Pravda Ukrayiny (The Truth of Ukraine)* that Ukraine was becoming a new member of the 'European club of free and democratic states'. He asserted that Ukraine's independence was of benefit to Great Britain as much as to the whole of Europe. 'Independent, democratic, nuclear-free Ukraine is another guarantee of European security', the Ambassador concluded.[36]

Two months later, at the end of October, the Ukrainian Ambassador to the UK Professor Sergui Komissarenko presented his credentials to the Queen. This was the culmination of the preparatory work he embarked upon in July, having to set up the embassy from scratch. Upon consideration of all possible solutions to the problem of finding the premises (including the claim to a part of the property

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[35]*Summary World Broadcast*, 16 December 1992.
[36]*Pravda Ukrayiny*, 1 September 1992.

which used to house the former Soviet diplomatic mission) he opted for the Ukrainian emigrant organisation's office in Notting Hill offered to the Ukrainian Government at a nominal fee. On the one hand it was of great practical help since the latter had extremely limited resources which complicated the acquisition of property abroad. On the other, it was seen as a present given by Ukrainians, who in the 1940s fled the country dominated by a Soviet Russia, to their finally freed motherland. In addition to the organisational work which delayed the formal opening of the Embassy, the Ukrainian diplomats had to make arrangements for the first official visit to Great Britain by the Ukrainian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Foreign Minister Zlenko arrived in London on 15 September 1992 and during his two-day stay met with numerous British officials who were primarily interested in Ukraine's vision of its future role in European organisations, in particular the CSCE and the Council of Europe; in the NATO structures; and in the CIS development.

Despite two previous meetings between the Foreign Minister and his British counterpart resulting in joint utterances of the necessity to promote bilateral relations the practical accomplishments had been insufficient so far. As the Foreign Secretary himself admitted, the level of Ukrainian-British co-operation did not correspond to Ukraine's actual geopolitical importance. However, his view on improving the situation was primarily confined to the suggestion of a joint effort by the experts of both countries at strengthening the legal basis of the relations in the form of a comprehensive political treaty. Thus in addition to the previously signed Protocol on mutual consultations and the Joint Declaration on consolidating bilateral co-operation adopted during the visit, a main Treaty on the principles of relations between the two countries was to be added. Although the development of a productive partnership certainly required the creation of an appropriate statutory framework, the time assigned to it by the British

Government reflected the lack of enthusiasm on the part of the latter regarding its involvement with an insecure Ukraine.

The question of the British-Ukrainian partnership received more appreciation at the Ministry of Defence which, being concerned with the progress of Ukraine's nuclear dismantlement, had more interest in its affairs than any other governmental or business organisation in Britain. MoD officials, at the meetings with the Ukrainian Foreign Minister, expressed their readiness to elaborate and implement measures of bilateral trust-building in the military sphere and to address the major issues of Ukraine's strategic security as long as it continued to eliminate nuclear weapons on its territory. They also pledged to organise professional training for Ukrainian officers at British military institutions.

At a meeting with the Minister of Trade, R.Needham, Zlenko discussed the prospects of bilateral co-operation in the spheres of the chemical industry and agriculture, in the establishment of a modern financial credit system, as well as in overcoming the after-effects of the Chernobyl disaster. Conveying his Government's determination to remove British prejudices with regard to Ukraine's reliability as a business partner, Zlenko presented a draft of the Investment Protection and Promotion Agreement. It envisaged the extension of UK-Ukrainian business links in various spheres of industry and technology by way of creating a favourable investment climate in the country. The Ukrainian guest also visited the world's largest commercial security printer, Thomas De La Rue, based in Hampshire, where both temporary coupons and the new Ukrainian currency hryvnia were being printed.

On his return, Zlenko announced in an exclusive interview with Ukrainian TV that the two sides had resolved to create a political and legal basis for 'cultivating our efforts towards the development of our relations on an equal and mutually

advantageous basis'.[37] He pointed out that concrete decisions had been reached with regard to the expansion of economic co-operation. The leaderships of both countries considered the latter to be most profitable in such sectors as the conversion of defence enterprises, avia and naval transportation, agriculture, the ecological safety of energy production, and most importantly for Ukraine, sources of energy supplies. 'You know, I was pleasantly impressed by the fact that I discovered for myself personally a desire in government circles and in business circles to develop economic co-operation in our country', the Foreign Minister commented on the attitude in Great Britain towards Ukraine.[38]

The Tentative Partnership: The Road to Europe?

Although the first year of British-Ukrainian relations was prolific mainly in the resolutions adopted at meetings of high-level Governmental officials containing provisions for activities in future years, by the beginning of 1993 a positive start, not only in a form of intentions, was put to bilateral co-operation.

In order to assist Ukraine in improving its performance in management and administration the British Government offered it participation in the Chancellor's Financial Sector Scheme. It was set up in 1992 with the aim of sponsoring young executives from the former Soviet Union in gaining first-hand experience of the functioning of a free market economy.[39] The Scheme was managed by the British Council on behalf of the Joint Assistance Unit of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Furthermore the Foreign Office contributed to the accumulation of Ukraine's expertise by helping to train personnel for the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This was of great significance as the Republic, lacking practice in the field of foreign affairs, urgently needed professionals in order to effectively shape and enforce its foreign policy decisions.

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[37]*Summary World Broadcast*, 19 September 1992.
[38]ibid.
[39]*The Chancellor's Scheme Newsletter*, 6 May 1996.

Co-operation, albeit slowly, was advancing in the economic sphere. About 10 British companies, among them Rank Xerox and Ezra Consultants, opened their representations in Ukraine, while in the agricultural sector Ukrainian organisations established links with 12 British firms in such fields as technology implementation, methods of plants protection, selection and genetics, and food industry. The list of partners included ICI and Barter Central Europe. British Petroleum and Shell also expressed their interest in close co-operation, particularly in the sphere of exploration of the Black Sea resources. Besides, British companies which had links with the Ministry of Chernobyl negotiated with the FCO the possibility of obtaining Know-How Fund assistance and were allocated $500,000 for the programme of renovating the territories affected by the Chernobyl disaster.[40]

In June 1992 BBC World Service opened a Ukrainian section thus commencing its transmissions to the former Soviet Union in a language other than Russian. Broadcast in Ukrainian which became BBC's first new language in more than a decade, the service began with a discourse between Prime Minister John Major and President Leonid Kravchuk. Elizabeth Robson, the new section's head, emphasised: 'It is a challenge to be starting this when the country is feeling its way as an independent State for the first time since the collapse of Ukrainian statehood in 1920'.[41]

In November 1992 the British Council opened its branch in Kiev with the purpose of sponsoring an exchange between institutions of higher education of the two countries which had already begun in the Soviet times. The same month Ukrainian Airlines launched direct non-stop scheduled flights between Kiev and London.

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[40] *Ukrainian MFA Briefing*, November 1992.

[41] J.Thynne, 'BBC World Service for Ukrainians', *Daily Telegraph*, 1 June 1992.

Britain's support also proved helpful in a broader context of Ukraine's efforts to secure international aid for its economic recovery. Under Britain's chairmanship the G-7 states worked out a programme of technical and financial assistance to the former Soviet republics, while during its presidency in the EC (in the second half of 1992) the decision was made to 'forge new and equal partnerships' with the CIS countries and to seek 'full integration of these states into the world's political and economic systems'.[42]

Although the scope of Ukraine's needs at a time of arduous transition to democracy and a free-market economy greatly exceeded the amount of help which Great Britain was prepared to offer, every practical step bringing the two countries closer together contributed to the strengthening of Ukraine's position as an independent state in view of Britain's still tangible status in world politics. As a policy planning official at the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry emphasised, an elaborate system of links between Ukraine and Great Britain embracing industry, agriculture, the military sphere, financial institutions, culture and education, as well as naval and air connections, would ensure a certain economic and political flexibility in Ukraine's European orientations, improve its image on the international arena and, in future, allow it to use the British connection as a basis for building a stable and reliable partnership with North America.

As a firm foundation for the development of relations was established, it appeared appropriate to take them onto a higher level. Thus it was agreed that President of Ukraine Leonid Kravchuk would come to London on 9 February 1993 on his first three-day state visit to Great Britain at the invitation of Prime Minister John Major.

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[42]P.Gowan, 'The European Community and Ukraine', *A Paper presented at the Conference 'Ukraine and New Europe'*, 23-24 April 1993.

The Ukrainians saw the main objective of the visit as the establishment of close personal links with the British leadership which would thereby encourage a mutually advantageous partnership between the two countries. In this view the President's policy-makers found it essential to familiarise the British political elite as well as public opinion in general with the national concept of Ukraine's place in Europe and in the world, to inform the British Cabinet of the Republic's proposals regarding the creation of an all-European security system, and to elucidate the detrimental effects of inaccurate information on Ukrainian home and foreign policy spread by some, in particular Russian, mass media.

This was a long-term strategy designed to promote Ukraine's gradual ascent onto the Olympus of European politics in the capacity of an equal and well-recognised player. However, the most urgent objective for the country whose economy spiralled downwards with inflation reaching 10,000 per cent a year was to secure immediate economic assistance.[43] From the moment of the President's arrival the British press was energetically speculating on his chances of achieving this primary goal. The main obstacle was seen by the observers as the nuclear issue since Great Britain, like most Western states, implicitly connected the delivery of financial help with the ratification by the Verkhovna Rada of START 1 governing the dismantlement of the 176 long-range nuclear missiles on Ukraine's territory as well as its accession to the NPT.[44] The shut-down of the Chernobyl power station was also on the list of conditions. However, since in return for the elimination of its nuclear arsenal, Ukraine demanded security guarantees which neither Britain nor its trans-Atlantic associate were yet prepared to deliver, the situation was increasingly turning into a catch-22. Therefore in view of the mutual unwillingness to concede in principle the main question was which side would gain more concessions during every particular encounter.

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[43]P.Hare, M.Ishaq, S.Estrin, 'Ukraine: The Legacies of Central Planning and the Transition to a Market Economy' in T.Kuzio (ed.) *Contemporary Ukraine* (1998), p. 182.
[44]M.Simmons, 'Ukraine seeks to calm British fears over missile sites', *The Guardian*, 11 February 1993.

Realising what response to his requests he was most likely to receive in London, the enthusiastic President, nevertheless, asserted before leaving Kiev: 'If the West wishes to provide help it must be done now and not, as is often said, after essential things have been done or specific reforms carried out'.[45] Warning that the West might have to face dangerous consequences should the attempts at building a market economy and democratic society in Ukraine fail he said: 'Western aid will determine which path Ukraine and other former republics choose, whether or not our countries become democratic'.[46]

At a Downing Street lunch with Prime Minister Major, President Kravchuk repeated his earlier request for a security guarantee from Britain in case of a conflict with Russia. However, Major, although having acknowledged Ukraine's 'disturbing uncertainties', in particular its dispute with Russia over Crimea, said that the republic's security would be stronger if Ukraine met 'its non-nuclear undertakings'.[47]

In an attempt to utilise his nuclear bargaining chip most effectively the Ukrainian President chose a tone of ambiguities in his discourse with the British hosts. Thus while confirming that Ukraine remained committed to its pledge to become non-nuclear, he indicated that the Verkhovna Rada would not ratify START 1 hastily as its members needed time to examine the text of the agreement. 'The treaty is many volumes thick. The deputies asked for only two months to study it and it is right that they should. This should not be seen as a delay'.[48] Having also reminded British leaders that the denuclearisation of Ukraine was an expensive process Kravchuk repeated his request for extensive financial aid which would help his Government to cover the costs of the dismantlement and the removal of nuclear weapons from Ukrainian territory. Discussing the expenses involved as well as

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[45]D.Fairhall, 'Ukraine seeks emergency help from Britain', *The Guardian*, 9 February 1993.
[46]C.Freeland, A.Robinson, 'Kravchuk set for tough UK talks', *Financial Times*, 9 February 1993.
[47]"Britain rejects security plea from Ukraine', *Daily Telegraph*, 11 February 1993.
[48]E.-A.Prentice, 'Kravchuk denies delay in ratifying weapons treaty', *The Times*, 12 February 1993.

possible assistance with the Prime Minister, the Ukrainian President, although refraining from naming the desired sum, mentioned that the United States had already pledged $175 million in Nunn-Lugar funds for dismantlement.

The central document signed during Kravchuk's visit, the Treaty on the principles of relations and co-operation between Ukraine and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, contained an assurance that Ukraine would never become a target of a British nuclear attack if it did not use any nuclear weapons against Britain. However, this was a standard security pledge given by a nuclear power to any state declaring its non-nuclear status by acceding to the NPT.[49] With regard to the security guarantees sought by Ukraine in case it was forced to enter into a military conflict with Russia, Britain, as well as the US, preferred to avoid any commitments. Most mass media covering the course of Kravchuk-Major negotiations inferred that the only offer made by the British Government to the Ukrainian President in this respect was an assurance that it would assist his country by political rather than military means should it become a victim of a third nation's aggression.[50]

In addition to discussions with the British Prime Minister the President's stay in London was filled with other political engagements which included meetings with John Smith, the Leader of the Opposition, Howard Davies, Director-General of the Confederation of British Industry, Jacques Attali, the head of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, as well as the leadership of the Corporation of London. The President also had lunch with the Queen to whom he offered free help by Ukrainian experts in rebuilding the Windsor Castle. As the Ukrainian Ambassador commented on this proposition later, 'Ukraine cannot send billions of pounds to help Britain, but then Britain is not likely to send billions of pounds to help Ukraine'. Nevertheless, while other countries moved by the

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[49]'UK strikes nuclear deal with Ukraine', *The Independent*, 12 February 1993.
[50]ibid.

pictures of the burning castle were donating money to a specially organised fund, Ukraine was prepared to contribute by sending a team of highly professional restorers. The offer made by the President was reported to be seriously considered by the National Heritage Department.[51]

During conversations with the leadership of the CBI, Kravchuk notified them of the establishment in Ukraine of a preferential regime for foreign investors which rendered them exempt from taxation for a period of two to five years. He also asserted that, in the near future, the National Bank of Ukraine would open a currency exchange and create favourable conditions for the activity of joint ventures involving foreign capital.[52]

Besides the main Treaty on Co-operation, a whole package of bilateral documents was signed during the President's visit, including the Convention on double taxation, the Investment Protection and Promotion Agreement, the Agreement on co-operation in the field of education, science and culture, the Memorandum on mutual understanding regarding technical assistance and the Transport Agreement.

At the press conference held on his return at Borispol airport outside Kiev the President summarised the results of his visit to Great Britain:

> '...during the visit we introduced our policies, introduced our aims in Europe, in the world and in the CIS. That is, in this way we showed the world, through such a great country as Great Britain, that there is such a state, that there are such policies which need to be conducted. I understood from the conversation and meeting with Mr Major ... that Great Britain's attitude is one of respect towards our state and towards our policies; that it understands these policies and is prepared to co-operate with Ukraine. And we laid down the legal foundations of such co-operation'.[53]

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[51]I.Murray, 'Ukraine offers to help restore castle', *The Times*, 22 February 1993.
[52]*Summary World Broadcast*, 18 February 1993.
[53]ibid.

Commenting on the widespread perception of security guarantees and economic aid as a quid pro quo for the Verkhovna Rada's ratification of the START 1 Treaty, the President emphasised that neither in conversations with the Prime Minister, nor in discussions at other levels, did he discern 'a direct linkage ... between the rendering of assistance to Ukraine ... with, for example, whether Ukraine will ratify START, or whether it will accede to the NPT'.[54]

The Ukrainian Government expected that the President's visit would launch a new stage in Ukraine's relations with Great Britain whose importance was accentuated by the necessity of developing links with the G-7 countries as one of the top priorities of Ukraine's foreign policy. Although Britain's economic presence in Ukraine was not large (trade between the two countries amounted to only 10 million pounds in the first nine months of 1992 and, in terms of investment in Ukraine, Britain fell behind Germany, Italy, Canada and the United States) its position in many international financial institutions was highly influential.[55] London remained the financial and stock exchange capital of the world which housed the headquarters of many organisations vital to Ukraine's economy, the EBRD in particular. Besides, British expertise in such areas as public administration, parliamentary activity, banking and law was invaluable and, combined with its 'fair play' code in business, made Britain an important strategic partner for Ukraine.

However, despite the fact that it was in Ukraine's interest to act promptly on the implementation of the agreements signed in London the country's leadership dragged its feet over the ratification of such a basic document as the Treaty on the principles of relations and co-operation. By the time the British side was ready to bring it into force President Kravchuk only submitted a draft decree on the

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[54]ibid.

[55]D.Fairhall, *The Guardian*, 9 February 1993.

ratification of the Treaty to the Verkhovna Rada. As the Head of the Eastern Department at the Foreign Office D.G.Manning informed Ambassador Komissarenko on behalf of the Secretary of State, legal procedures necessary for the ratification had been completed and the Treaty was approved by the Government of Great Britain on 14 June 1993. The Ukrainian Parliament for its part began the consideration of the Treaty in July 1993 and eventually ratified it a year later, on 15 July 1994. Such a delay was connected mainly with the provisions of Article 7 of the Treaty regarding the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missile technology. The article required Ukraine's early accession to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state and as long as this question caused controversy in the Verkhovna Rada the ratification of the UK-Ukrainian Treaty appeared problematic. In an attempt to justify Ukraine's approach one of the country's leading military and nationalist figures Lieutenant-General Tolubko argued in the British press in June 1993 that since Britain's 'former great political leader, Margaret Thatcher, said that nuclear weapons are a deterrent' and its current leaders reiterated this assertion, 'why should Ukraine think otherwise?'[56] Only after the Trilateral Agreement between Ukraine, the US and Russia had been signed in January 1994 and President Kravchuk managed to convince the new Verkhovna Rada elected in March that it was in Ukraine's interest to accelerate the process of its denuclearisation, had it become possible to proceed with the ratification of the Treaty on the principles of relations and co-operation. Nevertheless, throughout 1993 most of its articles were being successfully implemented even in the absence of corresponding legislation. Particularly significant results were achieved in the sphere of military co-operation.

As a follow-up to Defence Minister Morozov's visit to London at the end of 1992, Defence Secretary Malcolm Rifkind arrived in Ukraine on 22 September 1993. This was the first visit to Ukraine by the head of the British defence

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[56]P.Van Ham, *Ukraine, Russia and European Security: Implications for Western Policy.* The Institute for Security Studies of Western European Union, Paris, Paper 13, February 1994.

establishment. A representative delegation led by Rifkind sailed to the south Ukrainian port of Odessa on the British Royal Navy frigate Avenger and was welcomed by Ukrainian Deputy Defence Minister, Colonel-General Ivan Bizhan, commander of Odessa military District, Colonel-General Vitaliy Radetskyy, as well as the British ambassador to Ukraine, Simon Hemans. During his subsequent stay in Kiev Rifkind had a meeting with the Ukrainian Defence Minister and was received by President Kravchuk. At the meeting with the President he discussed the situation in the CIS and Ukraine's relations with its members, Russia in particular.

During talks with his counterpart Rifkind expressed the views of the British Government on the issues of global and European security, Ukrainian-British relations, NATO's new role on the continent and the settlement of the crisis in Yugoslavia. A Memorandum on mutual understanding between the two Defence Ministries signed in conclusion envisaged bilateral consultations of military experts 'on managing armed forces in a democratic society and an exchange of experience as far as the issues of combat and professional training are concerned'.[57] Proceeding from the memorandum a two-year programme of contacts along defence lines was to be drawn up.

Emphasising the importance of the Defence Secretary's visit the Ukrainian Minister stated that it had not only opened wide prospects for the development of Ukrainian-British co-operation in the military sphere but also contributed to the consolidation of trust and security in Europe as a whole. For his part Secretary Rifkind, having expressed confidence that in due course Ukraine would occupy its proper place in Europe and play an important role in solving problems on the continent, admitted: 'I consider my visit to Ukraine to be one of the most significant visits I have paid in the capacity of defence minister'.[58] As evidence of

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[57]*Summary World Broadcast*, 23 September 1993.
[58]ibid.

Ukraine's increasing participation in maintaining European stability, he referred to the fact that Ukrainian servicemen along with their British partners were performing humanitarian duty in Bosnia and reminded his hosts that a few years earlier such co-operation would not have been possible, even in theory.

Yet, the promising development of bilateral relations was soon jeopardised by the defiant exploit of the Ukrainian Parliament. Having ratified START 1 on 18 November 1993, the Verkhovna Rada attached to it serious reservations setting its own terms for the removal of nuclear weapons from the Ukrainian territory.[59] Such an arbitrary approach to the issue of international importance was unacceptable from the British point of view.

In order to express the concerns of the British Government over Ukraine's nuclear policy the Minister of State of the FCO, Douglas Hogg, met Foreign Minister Zlenko on 30 November 1993 in Rome. The talks also touched upon economic issues, one of them being Hogg's suggestion that Ukraine should make a better use of the Know-How Fund in the absence of broad investment in the country on the part of British firms. Hogg's explanation that his Government could not encourage British businessmen to trade with Ukraine as they were motivated by their own interests meant, in the language of diplomacy, that they did not want to take a risk by investing in a country where corruption ruled the economy, laws were often ignored, and the potential for further economic and political destabilisation was unlikely to decrease. However, the offer of the Know-How funding, which looked rather attractive, also proved to be disappointing as later, in January 1994, the officials of the Eastern Department of the FCO at their meeting with the Counsellor of the Ukrainian Embassy, Bilousov, stated that the Fund had already been carrying out a sufficient number of projects in Ukraine including counselling on privatisation and the improvement of agricultural productivity, and therefore could not engage in more activity in the region.

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[59]See Chapter 3 of the thesis, p. 186.

The next month Hogg received a delegation of the Verkhovna Rada, brought on 7 December to London by its chairman Ivan Plyushch on a three-day visit. Although the British Minister made a point of stressing to the Ukrainian guests that his Government still considered Ukraine's policy to be non-nuclear, the delegates chose to focus their attention on different issues. The delegation visited the British Parliament and attended a dinner given in their honour by the Speaker of the House of Commons, Betty Boothroyd. The following day it held a meeting with the President of the EBRD during which Plyushch reminded that Ukraine was counting on the Bank's help in implementing economic reforms.[60] The visit resulted in the conclusion of an agreement on assistance to Ukraine in eliminating the consequences of the Chernobyl disaster.[61] However, no effective solution to the problem of Ukraine's nuclear defiance had been reached.

As it continued to preoccupy the West, decisive steps aimed at curbing this potential threat were made by the US thus proving its indisputable lead in the area of dealing with newly emerged ex-Soviet states. As already discussed, after a series of negotiations, the Trilateral Agreement on nuclear weapons in Ukraine was signed by Ukraine, Russia and the United States on 14 January 1994.

The Stumbling Progress: Strengths and Limitations of British-Ukrainian Co-operation.

The same day the Foreign and Commonwealth Office issued a statement on the Trilateral Agreement in which it welcomed, on behalf of the whole country, President Kravchuk's endorsement of Ukraine's commitment to accede to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapons state in the shortest possible time. It stressed that the prompt implementation of the agreement would pave the way for the

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[60] *Summary World Broadcast*, 15 December 1993.
[61] *UNIAN news agency*, Kiev, 10 December 1993.

development of a constructive relationship between Ukraine and the United Kingdom. Furthermore, the British side urged both the Ukrainian Cabinet and the Verkhovna Rada to confirm that they would resolve this issue without delay adding that, since it had 'profound implications for European, and global, security, the United Kingdom would regard any such delay with deep concern'.[62]

As one of the major complications in Ukraine's foreign affairs, its unwillingness to proceed with the nuclear disarmament, seemed to be settled, another one was gaining momentum. After candidates of the Russophile political coalition Rossiya (Russia) in Crimea won both the presidential elections in January and the parliamentary elections in March 1994 a drive for greater independence began to increase dramatically on the peninsula. As these separatist tendencies, encouraged by tacit support from Moscow, were endangering the existing borders of Ukraine, on 24 March 1994 the British Government issued a Statement regarding the situation in Crimea.[63] Having confirmed its support for Ukrainian territorial integrity, the British Government expressed the hope that all aspects of the dispute would be resolved by means of negotiations without resort to confrontation.[64]

Discussion of the Crimean problem continued during the third visit by the Foreign Secretary Hurd to Ukraine at the end of May 1994. Before setting off to Kiev the Foreign Secretary made a stop in Moscow in order to ascertain the perspective of the Russian leadership on the Crimean problem. After discussions with President Yeltsin, Speaker of the Parliament Rybkin and Foreign Minister Kozyrev, he concluded: 'It is not their position to intervene'. Speaking at a press conference in Moscow the Foreign Secretary stated that Crimea was a part of

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[62]*Statement on Agreement between Ukraine, Russia and the United States on Nuclear Weapons in Ukraine*, FCO, London, 14 January 1994.

[63]T.Bukkvoll, *Independent Ukraine and European Security*, The Report submitted for discussion at Chatham House, 24 July 1996.

[64]*Text of a Statement from the British Government on the Situation in Crimea*, British Embassy, Kiev, 24 March 1994.

Ukraine and that Ukrainian sovereignty was not under question, despite the fact that one of President Yeltsin's aides classified the situation in Crimea as 'close to critical'. Hurd emphasised that both the Ukrainian and the Crimean governments should do all they could to avoid the use of force and said that he would ask President Kravchuk if the UN Security Council could play a helpful role in the settlement of the dispute.[65]

There is a number of possible explanations of such unconditional support for Ukraine's territorial integrity. Firstly, the British Government feared that the attempts of Crimean leaders at asserting independence would impede Ukraine's compliance with the procedures of nuclear disarmament agreed upon in the Trilateral Statement in January. Secondly, the spread of ethnic separatism in the former Soviet Union and Europe with all ensuing economic and social complications was one of the main concerns on its foreign policy agenda in general. Finally, encouragement or even toleration of separatist tendencies abroad could result for the British Government in the aggravation of the politically unstable situation in certain regions back home. Careful not to jeopardise its own authority in Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales, it felt compelled, therefore, to apply the principle of territorial integrity to other states, including Ukraine.

The question of the Ukrainian leadership's possible resort to its long-standing tactic of using nuclear weapons as a bargaining chip in this situation was the major subject of the Foreign Secretary's discussion with President Kravchuk. Apart from talks with the President, Hurd had meetings with Foreign Minister, Zlenko, the new Minister of Defence, Radetskyy, acting Prime Minister, Landyk, and members of the recently elected Parliament. Ukrainian leaders expressed their unanimous gratitude for Britain's support in the Crimean dispute both by declaring its firm position on the issue and by actively advocating Ukraine's cause in the UN Security Council, as well as for supporting the Trilateral Agreement

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[65]A.Lieven, 'Hurd appeals for a peaceful solution to Crimea dispute', *The Times*, 24 May 1994.

and their readiness to provide assistance with the practical implementation of its provisions.

However, while trying to assuage British anxieties, they seized the opportunity to clarify a number of questions which caused their concern. These included certain aspects of bilateral relations as well as the West's policies towards Ukraine in general. Thus Foreign Minister Zlenko pointed out to his British counterpart that the actual economic co-operation between the two countries was still notably behind their dynamic dialogue in the sphere of general politics. In this context the Ukrainian Minister reiterated his Government's conviction that a policy of the British leadership aimed at encouraging the interest of the country's business circles in trading with Ukraine would be crucial for the improvement of both the Republic's economic situation and the bilateral partnership in general.

Besides, taking into consideration Britain's position in shaping the decisions of major European and international organisations, the Ukrainian officials raised a question regarding the prospects of their country's co-operation with some of them. This included the possibility of joining the Council of Europe and, ultimately, the EU; further stages - beyond the Partnership for Peace Programme - in the development of Ukraine-NATO relations; and Ukraine's application for an associated partner status in the Western European Union. Finally, the Ukrainians reminded the British of their request for security guarantees from the West in the form of a legally binding document as a prerequisite for Ukraine's accession to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Ratification of the NPT by the Ukrainian Parliament also became the subject of a discussion held by Zlenko with Sir Leon Brittan, the Vice-President of the EU Commission and the Commissioner for external economic relations, who visited Kiev in May 1994 in order to complete negotiations on the EU Partnership and Co-operation Agreement with Ukraine initialled on 23 March. The latter was

particularly concerned about the demand of some EU members to make the signing of the Agreement planned for the European Council summit in Corfu on 24-25 June 1994 conditional upon Ukraine's accession to the NPT. As the Ukrainian Government was nurturing hopes for prospective EU membership, it viewed the conclusion of the Agreement as an important step in that direction. Western analysts furthermore rated it as a forthcoming success of Ukrainian diplomacy in obtaining the endorsement of considerable assistance pledged by the EU to Ukraine in implementing economic reforms. Therefore Sir Leon, known for his favourable attitude towards Ukraine, was counted on to ensure the prevention of an undesirable outcome. After talks with the Foreign Minister, Sir Leon assured the Ukrainians that signing the Agreement between Ukraine and the EU was not connected with the nuclear issues and promised to moderate those in Brussels who put forward such claims.[66] When it was finally signed on 14 June 1994 Ukraine became the first CIS member to conclude such an agreement with the European Union (having surpassed even Russia by ten days).[67] As the Agreement granted Ukraine most-favoured nation status the Ukrainian Government deemed it essential to achieve EU consent to conclude a so-called Interim Agreement which would enable the signatories to fulfil the commercial clauses of the main document without waiting for its ratification by all EU member states.

During his stay in Kiev Sir Leon Brittan also had meetings with Deputy Prime Minister Landyk, Minister of Economy, Shpek, and other members of the Cabinet. Having outlined a number of areas in which Ukraine needed technical and expert assistance, they stated that interactions with the EU were less complicated and more effective than with the IMF. It was decided that President Kravchuk would submit to the EU a request for a grant of 200 million Ecu worth of foodstuffs in order to enable Ukraine to sell a part of its agricultural produce

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[66]*Holos Ukrayiny*, 18 May 1994.

[67]R.Wolzcuk, 'Ukraine and Europe: Relations Since Independence', *The Ukrainian Review*, Vol. 44, No. 1, Spring 1997, pp. 38-53.

abroad for hard currency. In conclusion Sir Brittan emphasised the unacceptability of the use of anti-dumping policies against Ukraine for political reasons.

Having concluded an important round in the advancement of Ukraine's economic relations with the West, Ukrainian leaders took a series of further steps in the field of defence and military co-operation. On 12-16 September 1994 representatives of the United Kingdom and Ukraine, which in February became the first CIS member to sign the Partnership for Peace agreement with NATO, took part in the first training exercise conducted under the PFP programme. The exercise code-named Co-operative Bridge '94 brought together approximately 600 soldiers from 13 NATO and Partner countries at the Biedrusko military training area near Poznan in Poland. Its purpose was to share peacekeeping experience, to develop a common understanding of operational procedures, and to improve the abilities of NATO and Partner military forces to work together in international peacekeeping operations.[68]

Later that month a group from the Royal College of Defence Studies in London came to Kiev for a one-week visit. The Royal College, preparing military officers and governmental officials from the UK and other states for senior posts in the management of defence and security policies, had a practice of including trips abroad in its programme. They were designed to broaden the experience of the trainees through contacts with the military and security authorities of different countries. Since the previous year's visit to Ukraine had been found useful it was decided to arrange another such visit in 1994.

As the issue of non-proliferation and Ukraine's policy in this sphere continued to dominate relations between Ukraine and Britain, another delegation, this time dispatched by the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Commons, arrived

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[68]'PFP training exercises get under way', *NATO Review*, No. 5, October 1994.

in Kiev on 2 November 1994 with the aim of obtaining updated information on the position of the Ukrainian leadership regarding the issue of NPT accession, examining the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, biological and conventional weapons, and inspecting the existing measures of arms control. It was also planned to discuss the most effective way in which the UK could contribute to controlling and countering the proliferation threat in the new circumstances pending the Non-Proliferation Treaty Extension Conference in 1995.[69]

During its two-day visit the delegation had meetings with the first Deputy Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada, Olexander Tkachenko, recently appointed Ministers of Defence and Foreign Affairs, Valeriy Shmarov and Gennadiy Udovenko respectively, visited several standing commissions of the Verkhovna Rada and held a round table discussion on the issues of defence and security. 'The visit was very rich in events and we believe we made the best of our time', Head of the Foreign Affairs Committee, David Howell, who led the delegation, pointed out.[70] At the news conference held by David Howell and the Deputy Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada's Commission on Foreign Affairs, Ivan Zayets, a question was asked about security guarantees. Howell stated that the British Parliament would approve the granting of security guarantees to Ukraine in the event of its accession to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (with the US, France and Russia having expressed their readiness earlier). Ambassador Hemans added that the British Government had already provided Ukraine with the draft text confirming that relevant guarantees would be given to Ukraine if it ratified the NPT.[71]

As the Ukrainian Parliament finally passed the Law on Ukraine's accession to the NPT on 16 November 1994 Great Britain, along with other Western states, greeted this long-awaited step with great satisfaction. During the Budapest CSCE

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[69]*Holos Ukrayiny*, 10 November 1994.
[70]*Summary World Broadcast*, 7 November 1994.
[71]ibid.

Summit of Heads of State and Government on 5 December 1994 a Memorandum on security guarantees in connection with Ukraine's accession to the Treaty on Non-proliferation of Nuclear Arms was signed by Ukraine, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the USA.[72]

The new Ukrainian President, Kuchma, elected in July 1994, emphasised that his country's accession to the NPT was an unprecedented act and one of the most prominent events of the year which marked the beginning not only of the new stage in nuclear disarmament but also of international relations on the whole. In his speech after the signing ceremony Kuchma seized the opportunity to outline Ukraine's vision of the role which the CSCE should play in the presently changing circumstances as well as the foundations of the new European security architecture in general.[73] Having emphasised that one of the fundamental principles of the Ukrainian foreign policy was the indivisibility of security aimed at removing the existence of blocs and dividing lines, he pointed out that Ukraine, committed to its status of a neutral state, saw itself as a part of an inclusive security system in Europe.

As Ukraine finally delivered on its non-proliferation promises the West found it possible to address the Republic's economic needs. At the end of November an informal discussion regarding the future of the Ukrainian economy took place at the meeting of the EU Foreign Ministers in Brussels. The final decision on whether the EU should assist Ukraine with covering a total $1 billion gap in its balance of payments in 1994 was to be made a week later at the meeting of the European Finance Ministers. The money was needed to finance energy imports for industrial use, and residential heating, as well as reducing the country's dependence on nuclear energy.

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[72]See Chapter 3, p. 198.

[73]M.Makhinchuk, 'On the way to new Europe', *Uriadovyy Kuryer,* 8 December 1994.

While the US by that time had already pledged $70 million in grants raising it to $100 million in the event of the EU decision to contribute towards a financial aid package for Ukraine, Britain, backed by France, Italy and Belgium, argued that the EU could not take part in a balance-of-payments lending without the security of an IMF stand-by loan which contained strict conditions tied to Ukraine's reform programme. 'The EU is not an international financial institution', one UK official explained. 'That's the job of the World Bank and the IMF'.[74]

Nevertheless, at the end of 1994 the EU agreed to provide an 85 million Ecu (£66,9 million) loan to Ukraine as a part of $5 billion in foreign assistance for stabilisation and debt rescheduling in 1995 (the main donors being Russia, Turkmenistan, the IMF and the World Bank).[75] However, 60 million Ecu of this sum were deducted for food imports in 1992. Thus, with the exception of 500 million Ecu committed by the EU to the closure of Chernobyl reactors, its economic aid to Ukraine remained extremely insufficient. Besides, the co-operation and partnership Agreement signed in June had not come into force as none of the EU member states had ratified it by that time.[76] Although its commercial clauses could be brought into effect without delay due to the conclusion of the Interim agreement, Ukraine's exports of coal, steel, chemicals, textiles and agricultural products governed by the Agreement were subject to various EU restrictions and anti-dumping measures. Considering these materials to be 'sensitive goods' Western European states thereby significantly restricted Ukraine's access to their markets.[77]

Ukraine proved to be equally unfortunate in its attempts at co-operation with the Western European Union. In reply to the former's request for an associated partnership the WEU maintained that such a partnership could be granted only to

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[74]L.Barber, C.Freeland, 'UK, France block Ukraine reform aid', *The Financial Times*, 28 November 1994.
[75]F.S.Larrabee, 'Ukraine's Balancing Act', *Survival*, Vol. 38, No. 2, Summer 1996, p. 153.
[76]'Ukraine and European Security', *Report Submitted on Behalf of the Defence Committee by Sir Russell Johnston, Rapporteur*, Assembly of Western European Union, Document 1464, 24 May 1995, p. 18.
[77]S.Larrabee (1996), p. 153.

six East European countries and the Baltics pending their integration and eventual accession to the EU. Besides, it had been pointed out that the WEU, being not only a defence component of the EU but also the European pillar of NATO, was not in a position to incorporate neutral states nor CIS members. Although the Ukrainian Government had been offered 'an institutionalised regular dialogue', it rather felt that Ukraine was being artificially separated from Europe thus becoming a buffer between the latter and Russia.[78]

While during the Kravchuk years the description 'buffer' prevailed in the official vision of Ukraine's role on the international stage, President Kuchma opted for its more constructive designation as a 'bridge'. The change in terminology reflected a tangible shift in the Republic's activity in the sphere of international relations which occurred after the presidential elections in July 1994. The new President Leonid Kuchma having changed the heads of 'power' Ministries (the Foreign and Defence Ministries in particular) also ensured the modification of their policies. A reorientation in priorities took place and former President Kravchuk's manifest pro-Western and anti-CIS stance gave way to the determination to improve relations with Russia and Ukraine's other immediate neighbours on the ground that old economic ties were more profitable while desirable Western markets proved to be virtually unavailable. The initial euphoria caused by the collapse of the totalitarian system and the opening of new promising prospects was replaced by the acknowledgement that the hope of implanting mechanically the experience of economically developed countries onto Ukrainian soil was illusory. While the eagerness to be accepted in the European club with all the tempting benefits of its membership could be realised only to a small extent, thus bringing rather limited financial gains (taking into account the level of Ukraine's economy which did not allow it to be fully integrated into European structures), the restoration of the economic links with the former Soviet republics, Russia in particular, was being increasingly appreciated as a primary strategic goal. However, the new Ukrainian

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[78]R.Johnston (1995)., p. 18.

leadership made clear that enhanced co-operation with Russia and other CIS countries would neither mean the weakening of Ukraine's relations with the West, nor affect Ukrainian independence or territorial integrity. In order to ensure national security the Ukrainian Government undertook significant steps in the military and defence spheres. Its active pursuit of Ukraine's participation and integration in European structures, including the conclusion of a partnership agreement with the EU, the establishment of a working relationship with the OSCE and a constructive dialogue with both WEU and NATO, as well as an application for a membership in the Council of Europe, necessitated a certain revision of the declared neutral and non-aligned status. Initially designed as a measure against Russia's pressure on Ukraine to accede to the Tashkent Collective Security Agreement of 1992, thus enticing it into entering a new military-political bloc within the former Soviet borders, the commitment to neutrality was modified in a context of creating a new all-European inclusive security system. Thus an intention at least to contemplate the possibilities provided by NATO's readiness to consider any country for potential membership clearly emerged on Ukraine's foreign policy agenda. Arguing that non-alignment in a Europe, no longer divided into two blocs, did not exclude regional co-operation, its leadership began to promote a policy of 'active neutrality'. A combination of these two tendencies - the return to Russia in search of economic partners and aspirations to stability and security provided by Western organisations - made up the new vision of Ukraine's place in the system of international relations: 'The optimal variant for Ukraine is a maximum of close ties with both the West and Russia simultaneously. There is no alternative: West - East'.[79]

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[79]J.Dunn, 'The Determinants and Future of Ukrainian Foreign and Security Policy', Conflict Studies Research Centre, February 1995, p. 14.

In this view the establishment of a close partnership with Great Britain as one of the key European players was regarded by Ukrainian policy-makers as a foreign policy priority. Not only could it protect Ukraine from Russia's possible revanchism in view of the latter's increasingly assertive stance towards the 'near abroad' and an unforseeable outcome of its forthcoming presidential elections but would also improve Ukraine's positions in Europe and provide a firmer ground for its dialogue with North America.

Great Britain, for its part, applied the 'play safe' principle to the formation of its policy towards Ukraine. Avoiding, in contrast to the latter, any course of extremes, it therefore neither rushed headlong into investing both financial resources and overzealous diplomatic efforts in the newly emerged country with a great potential for instability nor neglected it by demonstratively giving priority to its big Eastern neighbour. The traditionally cautious British approach to changes and the fear of provoking any external risks to national well-being were masked in this particular situation by justifiable demands for the introduction by the Ukrainian Government of radical political and economic reforms as a precondition of any serious involvement on Britain's part. Beginning with virtually no-presence on Ukrainian soil (with the exception of some links in the spheres of culture and education as well as a few joint-venture enterprises constituting a legacy of past Soviet-British co-operation), the British leadership gradually moved towards laying firm legal and political foundations of a new partnership and developing contacts with long-term prospects in such areas as industry and agriculture, energy supplies, trade, banking, environmental protection, defence and security issues as well further promotion of cultural, academic and educational co-operation. Understanding Ukraine's strategic significance, British politicians concentrated their efforts on the security aspect as the most essential in the whole complex of bilateral relations. While Britain's role in assisting in the development of the Ukrainian economy proved rather insignificant, due to the scepticism of both the British Government and business

circles regarding the expediency of investments in this politically and economically unstable region, its interest in defence and security co-operation with Ukraine was far more substantial. It manifested itself in a form of mutual visits of heads and delegations of the Defence Ministries of the UK and Ukraine; joint training exercises under the NATO Partnership for Peace Programme; participation of both Ukrainian and British servicemen in peacekeeping operations on the Balkans as well as in a dynamic dialogue on the issue of nuclear non-proliferation. In fact, Britain was the only European state that took an active part in addressing the problem of Ukraine's security concerns which, had they been left unresolved, would increase the Republic's potential for posing a threat to European and international stability. Having provided the Ukrainian Government, together with the USA and Russia, with security assurances comprising support for Ukraine's territorial integrity and independence by resisting external interference in its affairs and a pledge to oppose the use of nuclear weapons against it, Great Britain made a significant contribution not only to the process of creating an inclusive all-European security system which was obviously in its own interests but also to the Ukrainian cause of national state-building as it strengthened Ukraine's security and consequently contributed to its endurance as an independent state.

CONCLUSION. A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF BRITISH AND AMERICAN RELATIONS WITH UKRAINE IN THE TWO PERIODS IN QUESTION

This final part of the thesis aims to provide a comprehensive analysis of British and US policies towards Ukraine in the context of its national state-building as well as the latter's efforts to secure diplomatic and material support by the two Western powers in 1917-1921 and 1991-1994. It compares the place of Great Britain and the United States in the sphere of international politics in both periods and the corresponding role each country has played in Ukraine's struggle for independence. It also looks at the changes in both Ukraine's strategic importance and its potential for survival as a nation-state and the way these factors have influenced the attitude of the US and Britain towards it. Finally, the empirical material presented in the four chapters of the thesis is used to conceptualise the impact of external factors on the formation of the nation-state.

At the beginning of the first period Great Britain undoubtedly held the place of world leader due to its historical development, advantageous geopolitical position, economic, military and institutional strength as well as the continuity in exercising its functions as a subject of evolving international law. The first parliamentary state which laid the foundations of democracy and set an example for most of Europe as well as the New World; the initiator of the Industrial revolution and one of its major beneficiaries; the unrivalled maritime power and the world's biggest colonial empire, Great Britain was a decisive factor and dominant player on the international stage at the turn of the twentieth century.

At the same time the United States of America had only begun to assert itself among 'the great and the good' of the world having overcome obstacles on its

way to economic and social prosperity in the relatively recent past (that is, slavery and, connected with it, the 'Prussian' way of economic development in the south as well as national disunity in general). Even having achieved the status of the most productive economy in the world by the end of the Nineteenth century it still could not compete with Great Britain in terms of international influence and authority. The traditional US policy of isolationism confined its foreign affairs to the western hemisphere and until the end of the World War 1 no American President had ever set foot beyond its boundaries. Thus in an attempt to successfully implement the Monroe doctrine and to control exclusively the two American continents the US, albeit intentionally, deprived itself of the opportunity to expand its influence elsewhere. Besides, America's colonial possessions were limited, its fleet was considerably weaker than Britain's and, as a result of the policy of military non-alignment, it had almost no army until 1917 (apart from a small number of National Guards for the protection of its frontiers).

These geopolitical realities clearly defined the role each of the two countries could and did play in shaping the future of Ukraine at the time. As its autonomous existence did not come into perspective until 1917 (the time when the US leadership finally decided to break the tradition of isolationism, build national armed forces and join the European Allies in their exhausting fight against the Central Powers), it is appropriate to discuss initially British and US policies towards Russia in general. The difference between the positions of Great Britain and America in this sphere is naturally striking: while British-Russian relations (albeit not always smoothly) had been developing for centuries in virtually every field - economic, political, military, social, cultural - the US barely had any policy at all. Besides a small wave of emigrants fleeing economic hardships in certain parts of the Russian Empire and a handful of American commercial enterprises on its territory, there were very few links between the two countries.

As to Ukraine it was terra incognita not only for the majority of America's population but also for its educated elite - academics and politicians. On the contrary, in Britain a perceptible interest towards Ukraine (although mainly among researchers and travellers) had existed for some time, and there were studies conducted and books published. However, despite the awareness of Ukraine's distinction from Russia it had never been perceived as more than the part of the latter and for the British establishment to acknowledge that this 'province' had any right to an autonomous, not to mention independent, existence would be tantamount to encouraging separatist tendencies back home. Britain's power rested as much on imperial rule as Russia's and giving even the slightest degree of deliberation to the question of Ukrainian national self-determination would weaken the foundations of the established colonial system.

For their part, the US authorities were not constrained by such considerations since America's economic and political strength did not depend on direct domination over other regions. However, urged by the increasingly vocal anti-isolationist lobby to abandon their traditional policy of non-interference in European affairs, they began to support a strong united Russia mainly as a counterweight to Germany in Europe. US policy-makers realised that they needed allies in the eastern hemisphere if America's international influence was to match its economic precedence. The resolve to forge closer ties with Russia to offset British and French superiority particularly intensified during the war, which was seen as a great opportunity to improve US prestige in world politics. Even the spread of Bolshevism did not prevent the US authorities from the regular issuance of official statements declaring that they always regarded Russia as an ally and therefore felt obliged to advocate its interests, first and foremost its territorial integrity, pending the establishment of a democratic government in the country.

Meanwhile the British determination to regard all political and social developments in Ukraine as internal Russian affairs began to abate when it became clear that the course of events in Russia in late 1917 was taking an undesirable turn for Britain and the other Allies. The seizure of power by the Bolsheviks, who not only brought about internal chaos and terror but also defied all norms of international relations, threatened to aggravate the Entente's positions in the war, consequently ruining its hopes of securing a preferable world order afterwards. In these circumstances British leaders found it more expedient to acknowledge the independence of Ukraine as well as of other regions of the former Empire opposed to the Soviet regime and loyal to the Allied cause. As long as there was a possibility of maintaining an anti-Bolshevik front capable of fighting against the Central Powers the British Cabinet followed a policy of opportunistic diplomacy offering extensive assistance and recognition to those forces on Russia's territory which were ready to continue resistance to both the Bolsheviks and the Germans. In the course of this policy Great Britain declared its support for the first Government of the Ukrainian Republic, the Central Rada, and maintained official relations with it until Ukraine signed a separate peace treaty with the Central Powers. The Rada's successor, an overtly pro-German antidemocratic Hetman Government also enjoyed, albeit briefly, the British support: it was seen as the only force likely to withstand the pressures of Bolshevism in Ukraine at a time when the troops of the defeated Central Powers were retreating from its territory. Yet, in the aftermath of the war when Britain together with other victorious Allies, above all France, was preoccupied with dividing the world into spheres of influence, independent Ukraine could become a nuisance in view of its high potential to provoke Russian revanchism and thereby to endanger the new international security arrangements. The problem was conveniently removed by the fact that the last Ukrainian national Government, the Directory, was not capable of surviving without external support which was not even considered by British leaders who by that time also began to withdraw

their aid to the White Russians. Having realised that it was futile to pin hopes on them to crush the Bolsheviks the British chose a policy of non-antagonism towards Soviet Russia which precipitated Ukraine's subjection to its rule by 1921.

In contrast to such British 'flexibility' the Americans strictly abided by the originally course of supporting an indivisible Russia. Although the Fourteen Points formulated by President Wilson in 1918 theoretically demanded the adjustment of the US 'Russian' policy to the principle of national self-determination, the latter was put into practice rather sparingly and moreover selectively. Thus when Britain and France decided to support anti-Bolshevik forces, the Ukrainian national movement among them, and later began an open intervention, US participation in these joint actions in Russia was rather discreet for fear of encouraging its dismemberment. For this reason none of the Ukrainian Governments dealt with by Britain was ever recognised by the USA nor aided financially. The same consideration underlay President Wilson's persistent refusal to recognise the Government of the Bolsheviks while the British were already conducting de facto relations with them. He argued that the recognition of the Soviet regime as a subject of international relations was impossible not only due to its very nature but also because it would automatically entail the recognition of other governments on Russia's territory not controlled by the Bolsheviks. A letter of the US Secretary of State to the Italian Ambassador elucidating the American position on 'the Russian question viewed more broadly' in August 1920 demonstrated that the Americans had readily sacrificed their widely publicised principles for the sake of restoring the pre-revolutionary status quo in Russia. Having pointed out that friendly relations between the US and Russia could proceed only on two conditions - the elimination of Soviet rule and the preservation of the former Empire's territorial integrity with the exception of Finland, Poland and Armenia whose 'liberation from oppressive alien rule' was legitimate due to their previous

annexation by force - the Secretary thereby revealed two chief distinctive features of the US policy towards Russia and, as a consequence, towards Ukraine.

First, the above statement that only the Finns, the Poles and the Armenians had legitimate grounds for independent existence implied that the Ukrainians along with other numerous peoples of the former Empire either inherently belonged to Great Russia or submitted themselves to its rule voluntarily. The Americans seemed to overlook the fact that while some ethnic groups were simply unable to resist early Russian expansionism due to much lower levels of social and economic development, others were enticed into what may have appeared to be a peaceful union in which case their grounds for separatism at later stages were perfectly justifiable. The unyielding opposition to independence movements within Russia's territory was therefore to a large extent induced by a lack of either understanding, or the willingness to understand, the complexity of the national question in the region.

The second feature, the determination not to resume relations with Russia until a non-Soviet Government had been established, was conditioned by the realisation on the part of the US authorities that in order to ensure America's access to Russian markets a capitalist government identified with the interests of the world's most powerful financial groups was needed in the country. In this view any dealings with Ukraine, where a socialist approach to restructuring the national economy was favoured by two out of three independent governments, both the bourgeois Rada and the leftist Government of Petlyura, would be even more impractical as the economic and political instability of the country constantly threatened by foreign invasion, first of all on the part of Russia, did not encourage trade and investments.

British and US policies also differed in relation to the question of Eastern Galicia, discussed at the Paris Peace Conference and in the course of the Soviet-Polish war. While the British leaders consistently advocated the right of Eastern Galicians to national self-determination (albeit seeing it as the unification with Eastern Ukraine within Russia's boundaries), the Americans took the line of least resistance: having initially supported the British demand for a referendum in the region they eventually complied with the majority of the Allies who decided to leave it to Poland, which was supported by France as a cordon sanitaire between Russia and Europe.

Such were the differences between US and British policies during the first period. However, the common trends in their approaches towards Ukraine had a larger and, overall, a highly negative effect on its attempts at national state-building. Thus President Wilson's Fourteen Points intended to restore international order and justice had been interpreted by both Britain and the US in accordance with their national interests, which excluded independent Ukraine from any serious consideration owing to its potential as a threat to international stability. In this subjective approach to the right to national self-determination lies the major similarity between the US and British policies towards Ukraine. In order to illustrate their double standards in exercising this principle it would seem appropriate to examine one of the numerous documents regarding this subject produced by the Allies at the final stage of the war.

The document, a joint Allied statement, was issued to the delegation of the Central Rada in January 1918 in connection with its request for the recognition of Ukraine's independence by the powers of the Entente. In an attempt to induce the Ukrainian Government to continue its participation in the war they promised a favourable attitude towards Ukraine 'from the point of view of recognizing her independence, her financial help, and military collaboration' provided that its Government met the five points put forward by the Allied

Ministers at Jassy. Among them were the obligations not to conclude a separate peace with the Central Powers, to create a national army capable of resisting external attacks and to establish friendly relations with other autonomous states on Russia's territory as well as with Rumania.[1] It was well known to the Allies that Ukraine had no economic nor military capacity to continue the war and simultaneously to resist Bolshevik attacks, and that without either the Entente's prompt support to the point of direct involvement or the immediate cessation of hostilities with the Russians and the Germans the Ukrainian state's chances of survival would be reduced to naught. Yet they chose to ignore the vital needs of their 'ally' in the hope that the policy of pressure and threats would bring desirable results with a minimum input. In order to add a moral incentive to their virtually unrealisable demands, as well as to rebuke the Ukrainians for their desire to withdraw from the war, the Allies declared:

> '...the powers entered the war ... for the cause of a small Slavonic people which the Central Empires wished to crush; ... the war provoked by Germanic powers had therefore been carried on by the Allied powers to defend the principles of nationalities in accordance with sentiments manifested at all times by the Russian people. Consequently the Allied powers had treated through the mediation of the Imperial Government with entire Russia and the fundamental principles of the treaties of alliance ought to be accepted and recognized by all the states of Russia and especially the Ukraine'.[2]

Thus a statement which was meant to be a panegyric to 'the fundamental principles of nationalities' simultaneously revealed that the virtuous concerns of both the British and the Americans were primarily a disguise for their pragmatic aspirations. Even taking into consideration that self-interest represents one of the principal driving forces in politics, in asserting theirs both the US and Great Britain were rather ruthless and hypocritical: while lecturing the Ukrainian officials on the importance of adhering to certain principles the

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[1]See Chapter 2 of the thesis, p. 107.

[2] Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, Vol. 2, p. 662.

Entente powers not only subjected Ukraine to unjust accusations, but also blatantly ignored and even violated those principles themselves. Having acknowledged the right of national minorities within the boundaries of the Austro-Hungarian Empire to self-determination and consequently to forming their nation-states they preferred the preservation of Russia in its Imperial boundaries, thus denying the national minorities on its territory the same right. In the former case such a policy was a means of completing the destruction of the enemy and undermining any influence it might have had in the future; in the latter - both reviving the former Ally in its familiar and convenient form and preventing the spread of dangerous socialist tendencies.

In contrast to such unscrupulousness of the British and the US Governments the Ukrainian leaderships, regardless of their political platforms and affiliations, displayed a greater degree of integrity. Thus, the Central Rada did not try to conceal the fact that it was conducting negotiations with the Central Powers and even received their financial assistance while categorically refusing to accept Allied money unless they officially recognised Ukraine's independence. The Hetman's Government openly discussed the reasons for the divergence of its course from that of the Entente without resorting to pretentiously dignified phrases (e.g. a speech made by the Ukrainian Minister of Foreign Affairs Vasilenko).[3] Although the two Ukrainian Governments mentioned above were acting as much in accordance with their own interests, at times at the expense of declared principles and convictions, as both the British and the US leaderships, by openly declaring their aims they proved that hypocrisy in international affairs was not in the political arsenal of Ukrainian leaders at that time.

Summarising the above it can be stated that the framework of the two Western powers' policies towards Ukraine during the first period was as follows: Great

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[3]See Chapter 1 of the thesis, p. 65.

Britain (together with France) was shaping the Allied course and the United States were mainly observing (in a sense of both close scrutiny and reluctant compliance) the decisions made in Europe. While fluctuation was characteristic of the British policy (the earlier recognition of the Central Rada gave way to the disruption of all links with it; initially non-existent relations with the subsequent Hetman regime culminated in the declaration of support for it; and finally the repudiation of the Directory as the next Government of Ukraine led to the de facto acknowledgement of Bolshevik rule on its territory), the Americans adopted a policy of non-interference, or rather no policy at all. Whereas British leaders usually notified their American colleagues about already formed plans for further actions, the Americans only examined the received information and occasionally contemplated their possible conduct, never committing themselves to any arrangements. Although US representatives in the region always consulted either British or French counterparts, in fact preferring such contacts to direct communications (at least official) with members of Ukrainian Governments, none of their suggestions as to increasing American presence and influence in Ukraine and in South Russia in general altered the resolve of Washington to refrain from any interactions with Ukraine as an independent state.

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During the following years, however, the USA began to carry out an independent foreign policy in the eastern hemisphere. By the end of World War II the international situation irreversibly turned in America's favour: its economy was not only unaffected by the war but stimulated by the military orders at home and from the Allies; the US army which was literally non-existent some thirty years earlier became one of the largest and strongest in the world; an atomic bomb, the most advanced and insurmountable weapon of mass destruction, was created, thus presenting the US leadership with more

international power than they could ever bargain for; and finally, while in the aftermath of World War I American leaders chose to decline membership in the newly created League of Nations designed to ensure international security, in the 1940s the US became an initiator and one of the five founding states of the UN, the most influential international organisation ever established. Owing to these developments, by the beginning of the 1990s world leadership undoubtedly belonged to the US which presided over the West's long-waged Cold War against the Soviet Union.

At the same time Britain's former insuperable strength declined considerably: its economy, significantly undermined by the hardships of World War II, could not stand up to that of the US; by the end of the Sixties British vast colonial possessions were lost as a result of the indigenous populations' struggle for national liberation; its naval force was deprived of its once formidable strength due to both exhaustion inflicted by the war and the new international legislation which had been gradually modified in favour of the US.[4] Therefore it was not surprising that the approach of the British Government towards the changes in the USSR in the late Eighties and early Nineties resembled the stance of the US leadership on Russian affairs during the first period in question. Having to adapt its conduct to the policies of its more powerful ally in view of the strategic requirements of a concerted Western approach to the realm behind the 'iron curtain' Britain at the same time had considerably less economic interest in the region than the US, thus confining its involvement to predominantly military and defence considerations.

As mentioned above, the postwar political realities - the 'East-West' division, or the 'iron curtain' created by Soviet-American superpower rivalry - structured all developments in the sphere of international relations. The balance of power at the time can be characterised as fairly stable since the escalation of

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[4]See Introduction, p. 23.

the nuclear arms race and the intensification of international tension were unlikely to have a fatal outcome due to the two sides' relative parity in the military domain.

Therefore when centrifugal forces dangerously intensified in the Soviet Union the US revealed a strong resentment at the weakening of its adversary. Ardently expressing their unconditional support for the centre the American leaders warned those Soviet Republics which had already exposed separatist tendencies against the dangers of 'suicidal nationalism'. Ukraine was one of them and the US administration's initial annoyance at its breakaway aspirations affected the former's long-term policy.

It is noteworthy that at the beginning of the second period in question the Americans adopted a pattern of political behaviour reminiscent of, if not identical to, that of the first period: in both cases being rather reluctant to reconcile themselves to the disintegration of the centralised state under Russian rule they found it difficult to acknowledge the new realities shaped by the emergence of the Ukrainian, Baltic, and other republics striving for national sovereignty.

The steadfastly negative US approach to the question of Ukraine's recognition throughout the first period can be well summarised by the instruction sent by the Secretary of State Lansing to the Ambassador in Russia in relation to the news of Ukraine's recognition by France in early 1918: 'This Government [is] not disposed as yet to recognize any independent governments untill the will of Russian people has been more definitely expressed on this general subject'.[5] Although during the second period the US attitude towards this issue was more complex and dynamic President Bush's assertion in August 1991 that 'We will maintain the strongest possible relationship with the Soviet government of

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[5] Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, Vol. 2, p. 657.

President Gorbachev' while pursuing only 'improved relations' with the Republics, reflected a starting point in US-Ukrainian political dialogue and indeed remained its leitmotif for some time.[6]

The juxtaposition of the American attitude towards the question of Ukraine's independence in both periods leads to the conclusion that neither at the time of the celebrated Fourteen Points nor on the verge of their long-awaited victory over the 'Empire of Evil' were US leaders interested in promoting the ideals of national self-determination: in fact they rather conscientiously followed the principle of expediency. In the first period Ukraine, unsustainable as an independent state, was of no strategic interest to the American Government. In the second period, since the major preoccupation of the US administration was connected to nuclear issues, the necessity to maintain a controlled stability on the former Soviet territory ruled all its political decisions, with regard to Ukraine in particular.

Hence it is not surprising that in both periods any favourable policies towards Ukraine were made conditional upon fulfilment of or compliance with certain demands.

Thus in the first period the Allied Ministers at Jassy put forward their 'five points', discussed above, as a prerequisite for the recognition of Ukraine's independence, the appointment of Entente's diplomatic representatives to Kiev, and providing financial support for the Ukrainian Government. During the second period the US official statement, published the day after the independence vote in Ukraine, set four main areas of concern which included compliance with all international accords; commitment to the arms treaties and to a single Soviet command over the nuclear weapons; support for democracy

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6 R.J.Smith, 'US Officials Split Over Response to an Independent Ukraine', *Washington Post*, 25 November 1991.

and market reforms; and an obligation regarding the foreign debts of the former Soviet Union.[7]

In both periods military and defence considerations clearly stood out among the conditions for recognition. During World War I Ukraine was seen as a potential ally capable of keeping the troops of the Central Powers fighting on the eastern front and later as a force which could be utilised in combating the Bolsheviks. At the time of thermonuclear warfare the US realised that Ukraine was effectively a nuclear state whose disarmament became one of the top priorities for the West. Therefore in 1917-1918 compliance with the accords of the Entente previously entered into by Russia and assistance to the Allies in the war by all possible means were required from Ukraine in return for the recognition of its independence. The price it had to pay in 1991 was analogous yet modified by the new political realities: compliance with international arms treaties signed by the USSR (as well as with its other, particularly financial, obligations) and a prompt renunciation of nuclear weapons on its territory threatening the security of the West.

Ukraine's nuclear policy was the most important issue among the matters discussed by the US special emissary with the republic's leadership at Kiev in early December 1991. As a State Department spokesman pointed out, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs, Thomas Niles, was sent to Ukraine not with an ambassadorial mission but with the task of meeting senior Ukrainian officials to find out their position on outstanding military, political and economic issues, including all concerns listed in the White House statement of 2 December.[8] Niles' assignment as well as the subsequent visit by Secretary of State, James Baker, were seen only as a consultation phase which

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[7]See Chapter 3 of the thesis, p. 161.

[8] News Briefing, *State Department Report,* Tuesday, 3 December 1991.

would enable the administration to reach a final decision concerning recognition.

Such a cautious approach to making any commitments to Ukraine as well as to collecting data strongly resembled the watchfulness of American leaders during the first period. Thus when the Central Rada declared the establishment of the Ukrainian People's Republic the US Ambassador in Petrograd reported to Washington in December 1917 his decision to send Consul Jenkins to Kiev: 'Cautioned Jenkins against recognising any government; gave him discretion as to opening consulate' with a view to updating the US authorities on the developments in Ukraine.[9] The same pattern can be seen in the dispatch by the US Commission to Negotiate Peace of the field party to Odessa at the time of the commencement of the Paris Peace Conference, and the mission of Admiral McCully to South Russia at the end of 1919.[10] All these American representatives had been strictly instructed to avoid committing the US Government in any way or giving even the slightest indication of possible recognition. The primary task was the accumulation of information.

Another similarity between US policies in the aftermath of Word War I and at the end of the Cold War was a tendency to regard Ukraine as a buffer between Russia and Eastern Europe. This idea became especially popular among US policy-makers after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the liberation of Eastern European states from its excessive patronage. The necessity to protect these former socialist countries from Moscow's attempts to restore its influence in the region directed the attention of the West to Ukraine as a cordon sanitaire between them and Russia and consequently as a potential linchpin of European stability.[11]

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[9]Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, Vol. 2, p. 650.
[10]See Chapter 2 of the thesis, pp. 117, 122-123.
[11]See Chapter 3 of the thesis, p. 191.

Although during the first period Ukraine was not a stable state with established borders, as different parts of its territory were controlled by different forces at different times thereby making it impossible to appreciate its strategic importance, even then there were propositions to consider using it as a buffer against Russian aggression in Eastern Europe. For instance, in June 1919 the Commission to Negotiate Peace examined and forwarded to the Secretary of State a report written by Major Lawrence Martin of the US Army General Staff who had been travelling through Galician Ukraine until the beginning of the Polish offensive. Having pointed out that the partition of Eastern Galicia between Poland and Rumania would endanger the future of both countries and imperil the peace of Europe, he suggested that 'as the portions of Ukraine under Petlyura and Holubowitz are absolutely non-Bolshevik we can best drive entering wedge into Russia by helping these Ukrainians against Polish imperialism'.[12] Thus an independent Ukraine was advocated as a protection of both Rumania and Poland against Russian revanchism (although this idea had not received the approval of the US administration at the time.)

The danger of Russian revanchism for Ukraine's national security constitutes another basis for the comparison of the US policies in the two periods. In both cases support by the West was seen by the Ukrainians as one of the most decisive factors in ensuring the protection of their independence against Russia's ambitions which manifested themselves in a military advance of the Bolshevik forces on Ukraine during the first period, and in stirring regional unrests and exerting economic pressure on it in the second. Direct Western involvement was crucial in securing Ukraine as an independent state: at the beginning of the century in terms of both economic and military support, at the end - by reviving the Ukrainian economy and keeping Russia at bay by diplomatic means.

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[12]Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia, p. 778.

Despite the striking similarity between Ukraine's dependence on the political and financial help of the West, a comparison of the positions adopted by US leaderships with regard to Ukraine in the two periods is complicated by the heterogeneity of American policies in the later period. While the stance of the Bush administration almost until the end of his presidential term paralleled that of President Wilson, which was at worst hostile and at best indifferent, Clinton's policy-makers decided to change this state of affairs in Ukraine's favour. Thus much-needed America's assistance was completely unavailable to the Ukrainians in 1917-1921 and at the beginning of the Nineties. However, after a period of pressure, promises and bargaining, from late 1993 - early 1994 US financial, technical as well as diplomatic support began to flow to Ukraine.

British support for Ukraine's national statehood was equally counted on, much more so during the first period when Great Britain was far more powerful than its transatlantic Ally and had well-established economic and other interests on the territory of the former Russian Empire. Yet, like the American policy in the later period, the approach of the British Cabinet towards Ukraine during and after the World War I was prone to changes. Thus the first Ukrainian national Government, the Central Rada, not only received Britain's official recognition but was also offered financial support (which, in fact, it refused to accept due to political considerations, first of all its inability to continue the war and a pressing need to prevent the Bolshevik invasion, necessitating the conclusion of peace with the Central Powers). Likewise, the Government of the Hetman, despite accusations of being a German puppet, was declared a legitimate authority in Ukraine by Britain after the defeat of the Central Powers in the war and was supported by British (and in larger numbers by French) military forces in its attempts to thwart the invasion by the Bolsheviks. However, when it became clear that the Allied fight with them was too exhausting, all aid was withdrawn and from early 1919 the question of supporting independent Ukraine

was dismissed by British leaders from their foreign policy agenda. On the whole, even the assistance initially offered to Ukraine by Britain was not sufficient to ensure its economic and territorial protection against external threat.

During the second period British willingness and ability to extend the required support were in inverse proportion to those displayed in the earlier period. On the one hand Ukraine's changed strategic importance in Europe and in the world, in particular its nuclear weapons targeted at British territory, attracted far more attention than the necessity to secure as many allies as possible during World War I. On the other hand, the British, while anxious to ensure their own protection, were not in a position to offer extensive economic support and security guarantees to Ukraine in return. As opposed to the earlier period, Great Britain could no longer give away financial incentives and although it actively participated in the process of creating favourable conditions for Ukraine's nuclear disarmament by political and diplomatic means, its contribution to the West's financial support to Ukraine remained rather modest.

The British leaders, co-ordinating their course with that of the US administration, also stipulated their recognition of Ukraine by its compliance with international arms treaties, nuclear non-proliferation agreements, as well as human rights and border disputes regulations. It is not surprising that, following in the US footsteps, the British concentrated their policy towards Ukraine around military and defence issues. One of the major similarities in the US and British attitude towards Ukraine's independence during the second period lies in their common initial perception of it as a hindrance on the way to the establishment of a new world order. Hence their crusade to denuclearise it, exerting all sorts of political pressure.

In this respect an analogy can be drawn between the two Western states' policies in both periods along the lines of their joint efforts to trade the recognition and financial support wanted by Ukraine for its acquiescence in their demands based on the expediency of the moment. In both periods Ukraine was taken into consideration due to its strategic potential. During World War I its usefulness was estimated from the perspective of aiding the Allied cause by keeping Germany at war and later by checking the spread of Bolshevism. As it gradually ceased to be a possibility that Ukraine could achieve these objectives, the former ally lost its appeal to the two Western democracies. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union Ukraine was regarded as an effectively nuclear state whose future policies could greatly affect both European and international security. Yet as soon as the Ukrainian leadership substantiated its pledge to eliminate nuclear weapons from the Republic's territory the West began to turn its back on Ukraine leaving it in the grip of anxiety about a Russian threat to its independence. This, in turn, urged the Ukrainian Government to hold on to the nuclear arsenal as a bargaining chip for obtaining security guarantees and economic aid from the West.

However, there was also a difference between the US and the British approaches towards asserting their strategic interests in connection with Ukraine at the later stage. While the US gradually realised the importance of the policy of encouragement, thus pledging to Ukraine considerable financial assistance for both nuclear dismantlement and economic reforms, Britain's share of the aid package to Ukraine was confined to a less expensive military and defence co-operation and the training of personnel for various governmental and business sectors. The US proved to be an indisputable leader in the dialogue with Ukraine thus achieving the West's goal of denuclearising it by promises of financial assistance while Britain played a second fiddle in the nuclear discourse joining the US in providing Ukraine with security guarantees.

It is also characteristic of the disposition of the US and British influence in the region at the later stage that by the time the Verkhovna Rada proclaimed Ukraine's independence the US already had its consular representatives in Kiev while there was no British presence in the country whatsoever. In addition, the US recognised Ukraine a few days earlier than Britain which, being seemingly insignificant, in fact revealed the predilection of the British Cabinet for a low-profile conduct giving the prerogative to initiate all decisions to the US administration.

Although both extensive American and moderate British support proved to be invaluable in ensuring the successful course of Ukraine's national state-building in the Nineties the latter would have been impossible without the emergence of the necessary internal conditions. In this view it seems appropriate to compare the circumstances in which the Ukrainians attempted to attain independence as well as the processes of decision-making in pursuit of this goal during both periods.

At the time when the first national Government was created the two major features imperative for the establishment of a viable nation-state - a consolidated self-conscious nation and a politically educated elite capable of constituting a competent government - were virtually non-existent in Ukraine.[13] In addition to the fact that its territory was divided between two different states, Russia and Austria-Hungary, geographically its boundaries were vague, the population was a mixture of ethnic Ukrainians, Russians, Poles, Jews and other nationalities, the language and culture in general were to a large extent subjected to foreign (mainly Russian and Polish) influences, and only a small proportion of Ukrainians were aware of their ethnicity. Although there was a long-standing tradition of glorifying the liberation of the Ukrainian people from an alien yoke, this existed mainly in the form of legends and Cossack songs.

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[13]See Introduction to the thesis, pp. 6-7.

And while the conveyors of the national idea had a good, often Western, education and the determination to realise the age-long dream of self-rule, most of them were amateur politicians and inexperienced statesmen. Therefore the combination of these two factors - the inertia of the masses not capable of coalescing into a united force and the incompetence of their leaders to formulate state policies which would enjoy popular support - predetermined the failure of the Ukrainian national movement in 1917-1921. Weakened by inherent drawbacks it was also exposed to external threats represented by both Russian and Polish aspirations to control this opulent land.[14]

In contrast to such predicaments of the first period, by the beginning of the Nineties Ukraine had acquired a considerable degree of national consolidation and political will which created auspicious conditions for successful state-building. Largely because of the Soviet policy of suppressing nationalistic tendencies and at the same time encouraging the development of national cultures in the Republics, the Ukrainian national movement gained enough impetus and strength to enable its leaders to secure popular support and to accumulate a certain degree of political experience. This, activated by the favourable external conditions, resulted in the eventual transformation of Ukraine into an independent state.[15]

Thus the situation which had been formed by the Nineties, despite its numerous problems, offered the best chance the Ukrainians have ever had for the emergence of their independent state. 'The brief opportunity that arose earlier this century was suppressed by the war and civil unrest. At present, Russia's own internal challenges opened a breathing space for the consolidation of Ukrainian independence'.[16]

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[14]ibid., p. 8.
[15]ibid, pp. 8-9.
[16]*Strategic Survey*, 1994/95.

This leads to the final issue which this conclusion aims to discuss - namely how external factors, such as policies of other states and the international environment in general, influence the process of nation-state formation.

In the course of the seventy years dividing the two periods in question the international system underwent substantial changes (commonly referred to as the process of globalisation) which immensely affected not only interactions between states but also the very nature and exercise of state sovereignty both in the domestic and international domains. Thus during the first period a state's sovereignty, and more generally its viability, were mainly defined in terms of its power vis-a-vis other states. Incorporating various internal factors such as population and the size of the territory, geographical position and natural resources, technology and military capabilities, economic strength and political stability, etc., power was the basis of a state's capacity to protect its sovereignty and interests. Correspondingly, all relations between states were conditioned by the competition of powers for the most advantageous positions within the international system, which inevitably resulted in various degrees of conflict and often culminated in war.

However, by the time the events of the second period took place, the international political process was no longer an exclusive zero-sum game of power politics. The traditional perception of international relations as the accumulation of power in pursuit of self-interest, first and foremost survival and well-being, by each of the nation-states at the expense of the others gradually gave way to a new concept of strategic interdependence of all states in the world system.[17]

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[17]E.L.Morse, *Modernization and the Transformation of International Relations*, (New York: Free Press, 1976).

The first characteristic feature of interdependence, the mutual vulnerability of states,[18] became one of the principal reasons for the West's more attentive and eventually favourable approach to the issue of Ukraine's independence in the second period. Although initially it seemed to be mainly defined by concerns regarding the future of nuclear weapons on Ukrainian soil threatening the security of both Western states in question, it quickly became apparent that a much wider range of strategic considerations underlay their new attitude. The fact that developments in Ukraine transcended its national boundaries was demonstrated during the Crimean dispute caused by Russia's (albeit unofficial) claims to the peninsula. The unanimous support for Ukrainian territorial integrity promptly expressed by both the US and Great Britain signified the realisation on their part that the Crimean crisis with its great potential to translate into a violent military conflict would without doubt have a destabilising effect on the whole of Europe and possibly beyond.

Although the possibility of conflict in the interdependent world is far from removed, it is hardly disputable that the ratio of conflict and co-operation in international relations has shifted lately in favour of the latter (despite the awareness of both sides involved that the profit to be gained by each of them might not be of equal weight). Thus the reasoning that the opposite party's advantages resulting from mutually profitable co-operation are preferable to the losses one may endure by engaging in a conflict is becoming an increasingly common criterion of foreign policy formation, which constitutes the second characteristic feature of interdependence.

One of the most perceptible demonstrations that such co-operation is achievable in the world, still divided by economic inequalities, political and ideological disagreements as well as religious and cultural diversity, can be found in the pattern of US-Ukrainian relations in the early nineties. Despite the initial

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[18]See Introduction to the thesis, p. 11.

attempts to pressure newly independent Ukraine into nuclear disarmament with a view to eliminating the threat of both nuclear proliferation and regional destabilization, the US government realised that constructive negotiations (along the lines of 'give and take' rather than 'force') would be more likely to bring desirable results. Consequently, what began as bargaining on the verge of intimidation, potential conflict and the breakdown of relations (which was entirely the case in British-Ukrainian discourse of the first period), was gradually transformed into a mutually beneficial (if unequal) partnership.

In the traditional sphere of diplomacy the expanding interconnectedness of the states in question found its most manifest expression in the exponential growth of contacts between national governments which resulted from the advancement of international communications. The inter-state relations of the first period were mainly confined to the activities of diplomatic representatives who, having been stationed in a foreign country, were significantly restricted in communication with their own governments. Meetings between heads of state or government were rather occasional and usually necessitated by extreme circumstances. Thus, in addition to objective problems, the political dialogue between the two Western states and Ukraine was aggravated by complications and uncertainties connected with the slow transmission of information, and the insufficiency and sometimes unreliability of sources. Contrastingly, regular exchanges of governmental delegations at different levels in order to co-ordinate policies and issues of common interest became a widespread practice during the second period, complementing various means of almost instantaneous communication. Although such personalised contacts alone cannot be credited with the intensification of inter-state co-operation, they certainly helped to promote it.

Finally, as practice demonstrates, the more deeply a state is involved in a network of interstate relationships the less it would be inclined to disrupt the

functioning of such a network and consequently to defy the international law underlying these relations. Perhaps this explains why Ukraine (along with other newly independent states) was so readily accepted by the West into various international agreements and regimes albeit falling short of the full integration into its economic and security structures. For their part, Ukrainian leaders of the second period considered their state's acceptance into international organisations to be as significant a guarantee of a sovereign status as individual support by even the most influential states. This illustrates the third feature, namely the effect of transnational factors on state sovereignty.

The impact of the international dynamics on the modern nation-state is also reflected in a growing general tendency to perceive state sovereignty as irrevocable. While during the first period the destiny of smaller nations depended to a considerable extent upon the ill will or mercy of the 'great powers', territorial conquests have become an extremely rare phenomenon at present. Although in some cases states continue to resort to the external use of force (e.g. the 'humanitarian' intervention of NATO under US pressure in the internal affairs of sovereign Yugoslavia which was nonetheless presented as aiding the Albanian minority in its struggle for survival against the oppressive and undemocratic regime in Belgrade), it is almost unthinkable that once a state had been granted international recognition it would subsequently lose independence as a result of military interference on the part of another state.[19]

Evidence that international politics had undergone certain normative transformation, thus to an extent facilitating the relative ease with which Ukraine attained sovereignty in the second period, is illuminated by an unofficial reaction of a NATO official in Brussels to the general referendum on

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[19]P.A.Reynolds, *An Introduction to International Relations*, (London and New York: Longman, 1986), p. 99.

independence: 'We are not optimistic, but there is nothing we can do. We have to respect the rights of free elections'.[20] The fact that independent Ukraine was more favourably received in the West when it declared (and to some degree demonstrated) that it had embarked on the path to a democratic society is, however, of an ambiguous nature and raises the issue of the US ambition to perpetuate the expansion of its international hegemony. It leads to a more general criticism that the West's attempts to universalise liberal values undermine the foundations of non-Western societies which traditionally do not perceive democracy and capitalism as necessarily positive achievements.[21] However, not only does it seem justifiable to infer that a representative government responsive to its well educated electorate is best qualified to shape its state's external activities in consonance with other such states, thereby enhancing international co-operation and preventing conflicts, but it is a statistically proven fact that conflicts between democratic states occur more rarely (if at all) than between those with different types of government.[22]

Thus in the period of 1991-1994, in contrast to the war, revolution and foreign intervention on the territory of the former Russian Empire in 1917-1921, the imperatives of interdependence, the advantages of near-instant interstate communications at different levels, as well as the universal recognition of national self-determination as a fundamental democratic principle, had decisive influence on the conduct of international relations and its reconfiguration in the course and the wake of the Soviet collapse, thereby promoting the admission of Ukraine to the international community as a recognised state-member.

It is noteworthy that although the phenomenon of interdependence discussed above imposed certain limits on the activities of nation-states (which had in any

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[20] G.Nadler, 'Ukrainian Landslide Breaks off a Nation', *Washington Times*, 3 December 1991, p. A1.
[21]For example, see J.Gray, *Enlightenment's Wake: Politics and Culture at the Close of the Modern Age,* (London: Routledge, 1995).
[22]M.Nicholson, *International Relations. A Concise Introduction*, (Macmillan Press Ltd., 1998), p. 149.

case never been able to act completely independently from external factors), by no means did it precipitate their decline. On the contrary, sovereignty is vigilantly guarded by states, particularly 'where the struggle to achieve independent statehood is still fresh in the collective consciousness'.[23]

To conclude, the changes which occurred in international relations during the course of the twentieth century undeniably proved to be auspicious for the evolution of nation-states. The processes of globalisation which reconstituted their nature paradoxically enhanced their standing in the global system and even facilitated the emergence of new sovereign states. It is the entirely different international environment characterised by growing interdependence which modified the meaning of sovereignty, alongside the emergence of the requisite internal conditions, that enabled Ukraine to sustain its independence at the end of the century and, in contrast to the failed attempt of the first period, to successfully complete the formation of national statehood.

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[23]A.G.McGrew, 'Conceptualizing Global Politics' in A.G.McGrew, P.G.Lewis (eds), *Global Politics. Globalization and the Nation-State*, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992,), p. 2.

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Map 19 Ukraine in the First World War



Map 21 Ukraine in 1917–20

Map 22 Soviet Ukraine during the interwar period

Map 4.3. The Four Largest Regions of Ukraine

Ukraine: Territorial Administrative Structure

Ethnic Ukrainians

Source: 1989 Soviet Census