Militarism in post-war Cyprus: The development of the ideology of defence
Abstract:

This article provides a theorisation of militarism in post-war Cyprus. Based, on qualitative empirical research conducted in Cyprus in 2011, the article explores the manifestation and steadfastness of Greek-Cypriot militarism, and the development of this militarism, which appeared after the partition of the island in 1974. In particular, it proposes the ideology of defence as a way to understand post-war Greek-Cypriot militarism. It shows the embedded nature of defence in the idea of the national struggle. It aims at mapping the character of this militarism in order to provide the grounds for future discussion. Only by understanding the interconnecting discourses that made Greek-Cypriot militarism possible in post-war Cyprus, can we understand its past, present and future.

Keywords: militarism, defence, post-war Cyprus, Cyprus Problem, Single Area Defence Doctrine Cyprus-Greece, Greek Cypriot, national struggle, nation-in-arms, military masculinity, femininity.
1. Introduction

Cypriot scenery is coloured by the heavy military presence on the island in the form of military vehicles, outposts and soldiers of six armies: the Greek Cypriot National Guard (NG), the Hellenic force of Cyprus (EL.DY.K), the Turkish Cypriot Security Force (TCSF), the Turkish Armed Forces in Northern Cyprus (KTBK), the British Forces of Cyprus (BFC) and the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). Nicosia, the last divided capital in Europe remains divided into two zones of Greek Cypriot and Turkish armies buffered by the UN forces located in the middle.

“As if sketched in outline upon the peaceful landscapes of the island, the silhouette of communal disorders [...]”

[Lawrence Durrell - Bitter Lemons of Cyprus, 1957].

This article argues that militarisation developed in the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) after the partition and was mobilised by successive governments through a specific defence ideology. In 1974, the country was divided into mono-ethnic Northern and Southern areas, and the Greek Cypriot (GC) community represented exclusively the RoC that controlled the southern zone. This defence ideology, the article argues, became formative of the GC post-war community (1974 onwards). It mobilised the community through specific notions of ‘threat’ and ‘masculine duty’. The political leadership and community ‘defended’ to avoid being perceived as feminine against the results of the Turkish military invasion in 1974 and thereafter occupation of Northern Cyprus. Moreover, ‘defence’ was presented as the existential protection of the GC community from the Turkish army. This army was imagined as heavily threatening and hyper powerful.

The article provides an inquiry into the ideology this extensive defence policy mobilised i.e. the ideology of defence. ‘Defence’ (in Greek: άμυνα) is the specific version of militarism (Huntington, 1957; Enloe, 2004) that appeared in the so-called ‘free’ areas controlled by the RoC (hereinafter referred to as post-war Cyprus). Within

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1 I refer to ‘invasion’ or ‘occupation’ as contested concepts. What is understood by GCs as an ‘invasion’, for the Turkish Cypriot community is largely understood as ‘intervention’. The broader, and also official GC, understanding of the conflict situation as ‘invasion and occupation’, opposes its alternative (and internationally prominent) that it is a ‘bi-communal conflict amongst two ethnic communities; GCs and TCTCs’. 
this nexus of militarisms, as outlined above, ‘defence’ has been one of the strongest discourses projected by the political leadership and state of the RoC. After the war, the political leadership bestowed the National Guard (NG) with the most crucial political and security importance turning ‘defence’ into a vast social and economic investment. ‘Defence’ has been a type of militarism constituted by its elemental discourses of: a ‘nation-in-arms’, and ‘high military investment’ in the face of ‘existential threat’ from the ‘enemy within’. Since the enactment of the 1964 National Guard Law, the NG has maintained, and maintains up to the present day, a conscription service, which has been gradually reduced over the years to its current 24-month period. This is the longest period of conscription service in the European Union.

The idea of a GC masculinist defence culture developed out of the nationalist construction of the emasculation of the GC community by Turkey in ‘74. ‘Defence’ is the militarist frame of the GC national struggle. It is a distinctly and explicitly masculine discourse that fights feminisation in the national struggle for liberation of Northern Cyprus from ‘occupation’. It is central in this analysis to highlight the interpretation of feminisation as devaluation of a certain understanding of the national struggle in the GC nationalist discourse. ‘Defence’ opposes retreat and submissiveness of the GC ‘defensive’ and ‘assertive’ stance in the conflict. The prominent state mobilised slogan ‘I do not forget and I struggle’ (in Greek: Δεν ξεχνώ και αγωνίζομαι) embodied precisely this engendering of GC post-war nationalism. ‘I do not forget’ meant I will not forget what the Turks did to Cyprus and it is ‘my’ masculine duty to ‘struggle’ with military force for ‘defence’ and for liberation of the vulnerable homeland from the ‘occupying’ forces. Any attempt to negotiate or compromise was interpreted by all involved in this ‘struggle’ as a sign of weakness or retreat from a position of rightfulness and steadfastness. Thus, the broader ideology of defence was a defensive model of military readiness, assertion of military strength, protest of the ‘occupation’ and the promise that the lost territory would be regained; i.e. the assertion of ‘not forgetting’ and continued ‘struggling’. This ‘defence’ stance was a joint effort by political leadership and community to avoid being perceived as weak and feminine in comparison with the emasculating ‘faits accomplis’ of ‘occupation’. Namely, these are: being invaded by Turkey- a significant military power in the Middle East; losing a significant part of territory with the NG defeated; and, being a small country, living in fear of another military offensive by Turkey - resulting in complete occupation of the
island and unable to repel the Attila invading forces. The GC post-war national beliefs, therefore, were constitutive of this militarist identity that construes the ‘Turk’ as hyper masculine and extremely threatening.

Despite its political and cultural saliences, militarism in Cyprus as an issue of inquiry itself has attracted little social science research. This absence is surprising given the high levels of militarisation Cyprus has experienced following the war of 1974. In 2013, Cyprus’ was classed as the sixth most militarised country in the world (according to the Global Militarisation Index, GDI), and, from 1990 to 2013, has generally been ranked between the fifth and eighth position. Still, in academic literature, the NG only appears in historical discussions about the appeal for union with Greece (for example, see Bruce, 1985; Byrne, 2000); in discussions about defence spending (Kollias, Naxakis & Zarangas, 2004; Kollias, 2001); and defence acquisition (Tank, 2002). Moreover, post-war militarisation in Cyprus has been discussed in relation to the militarisation and engendering of a conflict heritage site: the Ledra Palace Hotel (Demetriou, 2012) and the relations between and amongst non-conflict British military personnel and local civilians (Higate and Henry, 2011). Therefore, no academic literature addresses Greek-Cypriot militarism specifically.

Militarism in Cyprus received a blowback after the opening of the internal borders between North and South (2003), the accession to the EU (2004) and cultural Westernization of the island. Under these new social and political parameters this is expressed mostly through criticism of the NG and the need for semi or fully professionalization of the NG (Efthymiou, 2014, 2015). Therefore, investigating GC militarism will help us to understand the high levels of militarisation the island has experienced, and most importantly bring out the character of this militarism. Thus the analysis of the article will create the basis for future discussion.

Next, I provide a short account of the Cyprus Problem and the creation of the NG; a discussion of the ideology of defence within contemporary academic discussions on militarism. Building on this background the article will then discuss the development of the ideology of defence in Cyprus.

2. The creation of the Cyprus National Guard

The difficulties between the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots led to excessive
conflict and the politics of nationhood and identity played a central role in the rise of inter-communal tension and the creation of the so-called ‘Cyprus problem’, (Kızılyürek, 2002).

In 1960, following the end of British rule, GCs and TCs accepted a compromise settlement that led to the creation of the RoC (Xydis, 1973) and the island became an independent republic for the first time since antiquity, albeit in a limited way (Faustmann, 1999). In 1960, Cyprus and the guarantor powers (the United Kingdom, Turkey and Greece) each established their own armies in Cyprus. Therefore, four armies were established in Cyprus as part of its independence. For the purposes of this article I discuss only the NG.

The 1960, constitution provided for a police force and army for the RoC (Fisher, 2001); named the Cyprus Army, comprising both Greek and Turkish Cypriots. However, as a result of the interethnic clashes of 1963-4, the Cyprus Army was dissolved. In its place the NG was created consisting only of GCs and in 1964 conscription was introduced, (see: National Guard law (2011). This ethnic change in the composition of the army, therefore, was a manifestation of the deep-rooted separation developing during the period. In this context, the role of the permanent Hellenic Force in Cyprus stationed in Cyprus (EL.DY.K.) established in the Zürich and London Agreements, also changed, and supported the GC National Guard. In the subsequent collaboration of these two armies (GC National Guard and EL.DY.K.) the ‘Turk’ takes the form of the generalised and undifferentiated ‘other’, (Said, 1978). This is the ‘enemy’ of the “Greek nation”, (see Spyrou, 2011). This article will illustrate how the ‘Turk’ is, on an ideological level, a necessary ‘enemy’ for the NG.

The Turkish garrison in Cyprus that remained after the Turkish invasion of Northern Cyprus constitutes today the ‘Turkish Armed Forces in Northern Cyprus’. This garrison is considered by the GCs as the ‘occupation army’. In the GC nationalist imagination the occupying Turkish army is understood as inordinately powerful. This exaggerated image is used to imagine the broader idea of the ‘Turk’, thus the ‘occupying army’ is a GC nationalist militarist discourse of ‘othering’. Within this discourse, the idea of the ‘Turkish Cypriot Security Force’ becomes obsolete and bestowed with little power, thus being viewed as less threatening. This idea of the TC force reflects the broader GC
nationalist discourse where ‘Turkish Cypriots are much more favorable than Turks’ (Spyrou 2011: 538).

The NG (consisting exclusively of GCs) has only fought against the Turkish Cypriot community and Turkey in two minor military clashes in 1964 and 1967 and the war against the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974. The Hellenic Force of Cyprus (EL.DY.K) also fought against the Turkish invaders in 1974. Since the partition, the NG and EL.DY.K together present the armed struggle for the continuation of the “Greek-ness” of the island. I will shortly discuss the methods used in investigating the topic of inquiry.

3. Investigating ‘defence’

The article primarily presents an account of militarism in post-war Cyprus. In doing so, it also draws on 54 interviews and one informal discussion with refugees, which were conducted in 2011. During an intensive four-month period of fieldwork (11th May- 11th September 2011) I conducted semi-structured interviews with Cypriot men and women living in Cyprus, aged between 18-83 years old and from a broad spectrum of socio-economic backgrounds; including representatives from youth sections of political parties and independent political youth groups, soldiers and military officers, as well as some members of the GC political and military leadership who were central to the topics under investigation. These political and military leaders included Glafkos Clerides, President of the RoC 1993 to 2003, Kyriacos Mauronclicas, Cyprus Minister of Defence 2003 to 2006, and General Pandreou (pseudonym) Major General of the NG and, subsequently, Adjunct to the Minister of Defence. Out of the above-mentioned interviews, 20 were conducted with military officers and soldiers. 15 of these were conducted in the NG, whilst 5 soldiers and officers were interviewed outside the army. Moreover, out of the 54 interviewees, approximately half were men and most were reservist. These interviews were conducted to understand how soldiers and military officers, members of the public as well as politicians and defence policy makers, perceive nationalism, militarism and masculinity and the meaning they create from these ideological practices.

In deciding on the interview structure, I first devised a general interview guide to be used with the public. The thematic areas in these interviews were then used to design a
separate interview schedule for soldiers, officers, and an individual format for each one of the politicians. The main body of the interview agenda covered themes directly or indirectly relating to social, military, institutional and political events and processes. The penultimate section of the interview related to the interviewees’ hopes and expectations for the future of Cyprus.

I also draw from the critical discourse analysis (Wodak, 2001) I conducted of political speeches, policy documents made publicly available and media sources to understand the projection and exemplification of discourses in relation to ‘defence’. In conducting critical discourse analysis, I was systematically looking to relate the structures of texts and talks to structures of a socio-political context (Wodak, 2001). The next section provides a theorisation of militarism to discuss its development in post-war Cyprus.

4. Theorising Militarism in Cyprus

Militarism itself is a difficult field of study because of the varying forms it takes in different socio-cultural contexts. In turn, militarism is a highly contested concept (Cock, 1989, 2004; Sjoberg and Sandra Via 2010). Although there are many definitions of ‘militarism’, it is not my intention to review them here. Rather, I want to shortly point to some central areas of debate and then propose the argument that GC militarism is a synergy between institutions, culture and society and manifests itself via a reciprocal relationship between the military, state and community.

In sociology, the military has been understood classically as one of the many, and basic, institutions of the state (Weber, 1922; Tilly, 1975; Anderson, 1993). Max Weber (1922) defines the modern bureaucratic state as the community, which successfully believes it holds the monopoly on the legitimate use of force of a certain territory. This becomes particularly important in the context of Cyprus where, following the withdrawal of the Turkish Cypriot community from the government in 1963, the GC political leadership strived to establish the international legitimacy of the RoC, now being controlled exclusively by GCs. Most symbolically, its first concrete sign of doing so was the establishment of the GC National Guard in 1964.

The military is often identified with the state (see e.g. Williams, 1985) and, in effect, conceptualised as a discrete institutional entity (Moskos and Wood, 1988). As such, the emphasis is often placed on the sub-culture of the military as being alien to civilian life.
and the features of the military are seen as a distinct set of behaviours, rules, norms, and values (see for e.g. Kuhlmann and Callaghan, 2011: 36). However, this understanding has been, on the whole, sharply criticised for attempting to demarcate the problem. As Thompson (1982:21) characteristically comments: we speak of ‘the military sector’, but this “suggests the evil is confined in a known and limited place.” Post-war Cyprus is another case that illustrates ‘militarisation is a social process’, which involves the ideological mobilisation of human, economic and political capital. In approaching militarism through this lens we can study the culture and ideology of militarism. It also enables us to better understand the way militarism is constructed, within and outside of the military barracks, as well as within and outside of armed conflict. This is because, whilst the military sector is a central point of militarism, militarism extends beyond the military sector. Likewise, whilst war is an essential condition of militarism, militarism is far broader than war. It comprises an underlying system of institutions, practices, values, and cultures (Sjoberg and Sandra Via 2010: 7). With this perspective we can understand why and how GC militarism gained political and cultural centrality only after the war (1974), even though it was being constructed since the bi communal clashes (1963-4).

In this article I use the term ‘militarism’ to refer to the connecting relationships which constitute the process of militarisation between the ‘military as a formal state institution’, and the ‘militarisation of the state’ and ‘society’. Conceptualising the relationship between the GC military and society as bidirectional, contingent and conditional helps us to understand how the military reflects and represents the wider society at any given historical, political and cultural juncture. Thus, in investigating militarism, we need to direct our attention both to the military as a micro-society conditioned by the broader national society, and also to the modalities and perceptions shaped within the military that then penetrate the larger society (see: Nuciari, 2006: 83). This GC perceived ideological and discursive formation between the army-institution and society, following the Turkish invasion and thereafter ‘occupation’ of Northern Cyprus, turned the meaning of ‘defence’ into not only a militaristic issue, but also a central expression of the ‘fighting spirit’ pushing back the ‘occupation’ forces. Indeed, in the GC national struggle the army occupied the centre of collective consciousness, as Ben-Eliezer (1995:197) also observes about Israel. It is, therefore,
crucial to understand the ideology of defence because defence is an integral part of the national struggle that involved the whole social body.

Consequently, I take the position that militarisation is the process by which military encroachments are acceptable to the population and become seen as ‘common sense’ solutions to civil problems (see for e.g. Enloe 1980). Thus, I see militarism as an ideology, which promotes military ideas and is achieved through persuasion, consensus and complicit cooperation (for e.g. Foucault, 1972 and Gramsci, 1971).

‘Defence’ has been part of the art of governmentality (Foucault, [1978] 1991) of the state of the RoC, in defining its population and the mechanism of security. ‘Defence’ evinced a security concern for every individual and the population as a whole (Dean, 1999: 19, referring to governmentality). Thus ‘defence’ concerns practices of government and self as it becomes part of “the organized practices through which we are governed and through which we govern ourselves.” (ibid: 18).

‘Defence’ (in Greek: ἀμυνω) is a language and a framework of thinking about the links between government, authority, and politics, and questions of identity, self and person (Dean, M 1999:13). Consequently, we need to analyse the macro-level because it has constituted and mobilised the politics of ‘defence’. The micro-level is equally important, as power is a part of everyday routines and practices, appropriated by macro-powers such as the state.

The embedded nature of militarism in society was built on a discursive frame of a specific military model. Post-war Cyprus presents a case of what we can call ‘nation-in-arms’ (Rapoport, 1962; Ben Eliezer, 1995). This is because the fully conscript NG entirely depends on recruiting soldiers from society. The creation of the NG, therefore, brought with it a ‘nation-in-arms’ in the form of conscription, reserve and militia service, which today includes men from the ages of 18 – 55, (see: National Guard law, 2011). Thus, almost every GC family is affected by the military and has a ‘militarised wing’; i.e. has a son as a soldier or reserve or a husband as a reserve or militia. As the next section will illustrate, militarism operating through a ‘nation-in-arms’ model consolidates the links between the army and society. The ideology of defence strengthens these links.
This article draws on specific political, cultural and social discourses, which bind together Cyprus society to the NG. These are argued to be:

- The formulation of a perceived threat by Turkey in relation to another military offensive.
- The orientation of public opinion of ‘threat’ towards the significance of defence.
- The development of the ideology of ‘defence’ and ‘nation-in-arms’ as a response to threat.
- The reproduction of collective representations of ‘citizen-soldier’ and ‘everyday ordinary heroes’.

As outlined so far, militarisation puts forth conflicting understandings of what it means and how it can be measured. Whether one measures the level of militarisation through qualitative or quantitative indicators, taking into account military expenditure, the number and sophistication of the weapons systems in relation to the population, the influence of the military over society or the involvement of the larger society in the ‘military project’, Cyprus remains a highly militarised society. The high levels of militarisation I illustrate in the next section rely on the strong reciprocal relationship between the military and society.

5. Constructing a nation-in-arms: Ordinary men and militarisation

‘Defence’, the version of militarism developed in Cyprus following the events of 1974, can be clearly seen in the deeply entrenched commitment of the population to its idea as a ‘nation-in-arms’. The construction of post-war Cyprus as a ‘nation-in-arms’ has been instrumental in the pursuit of the ideology of defence by the political leadership as it has asserted the state of the RoC with the construction of the community as a ‘nation-in-arms’.

The ‘nation-in-arms’ army depends on the extensive length of the conscription and reserve service. The political leadership, as part of the effort to reproduce its legitimacy against the ‘occupation’, marshalled human resources to create a ‘nation-in-arms’ that

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2 This particular relationship between society, state and armed forces that asserts the state as a masculine militarist entity has been also repeatedly identified in other post-armed conflict divided societies, (for example, Israel, see Ehrich, 1987).
would have defended the community. The NG is an army of nearly 100,000 soldiers (conscripts, reserves and militia) and officers, (see European Defence Agency (EDA)). Therefore, at any time the NG involves 12% of the total population of the RoC in its operations. In more detail, the NG is estimated to consist of 10,000 conscripts, 70,000 reserves and militia (50,000 of whom are readily available) and 12,500 military personnel, (see EDA).

This was part of a bigger effort to lead a nationalist politicisation of the mass army within society. It did so through attempting to solidify the ‘Greek-Cypriot ethnic community’ needing to defend its existence. In other words, the embedded nature of the ‘existential threat’ from Turkey within society was an integrative effort by the political leadership to culturally homogenise an ‘ethnic community’ as a ‘nation-in-arms’. Therefore, this ideology that had the necessity for a GC masculinist defence culture, was contingent on the idea of the community as emasculated by the enormous military of Turkey. Thus, Cyprus needs to be militarised throughout because of hyper-masculinised Turkey, now threatening its overall existence.

This point was reiterated in the interview I conducted with General Pandreou, who commented that the GC community needed to create the NG (and thus also the accompanying ‘nation-in-arms’), in order to face the Turkish expansion policy and the fact that Turkey wanted to occupy the entire island of Cyprus. This nationalist and masculinist militarist expression became the main institutional message, as well as the socio-political mechanism for the construction of ‘defence’ and protest against the ‘occupation’ (I struggle). Thus, the post-war nationalist discourse justified the continuation of this vast masculinist investment in military terms, touching upon the ‘existential threat’ for the continuation of the GC community. In such ways, the culture of militarism and the broader masculinist commitment of the community into the idea of itself as a ‘nation-in-arms’, underscored the effeminate tendencies of circumstance. A similar culture of militarism has appeared in different cultural contexts, for example in India and Ireland (see Banerjee, 2012).

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3 In the last census (2011), the population of Cyprus was slightly more than 800,000 (exactly 838,897), (see Statistical Service Republic of Cyprus).
The feminised notion of Cyprus is specifically based on the idea of the ‘enormous enemy within’ (Kanaaneh, 2013), which invaded the distinctively small Cyprus with brutality and now occupies a significant part of territory. With Cyprus unable to repel the invasion Turkey wants, and is able to, occupy the whole of the island. Thus, ‘defence’ was presented to the population as ‘existential protection’. However, the political aim of ‘defence’ was to construct a diplomatic strength. The purpose was to provide defence against another Turkish attack to delay the process and appeal to the international community to intervene. These points of the relationship between the appeals to the international community and internal response of defence were made in an interview I conducted with Glaftos Clerides, who was President of the RoC (1993-2003), and acting President of the RoC (role was President of the Parliament of the RoC) when the invasion took place. While discussing his efforts to advance the NG in the period before and after the invasion he commented that the purpose of the force was to delay the Turkish military forces for 20–30 days and not allow them to occupy the whole of the island until the UN could interfere and oblige them to start negotiations.

The implementation of the ‘nation-in-arms’ military model by the state was intended to constitute the whole of Cyprus as an armed militarised platform of resistance in the face of another armed event with Turkey. A clear illustration of the state effort to mobilise the population into the ‘nation-in-arms’ model is the extensive and lengthy male conscription and reserve service from the ages of 18 to 55. This notion of the need for the community to be involved in ‘defence’ was also clearly laid out in the revised National Guard law 2011 that provides for the sustenance of conscription. The military idea is that current young male conscripts will provide resistance against the first ‘enemy attack’, whilst the older 70,000 reserves, the backbone of the force, are mobilised. To the present day, most reserves and militia have in their house a military gun, usually a G3 military riffle, and ammunition as well as other weaponry according to rank and specialization. This means that almost every house in Cyprus contains military guns of the NG. As a prominent slogan mobilised by Vassos Lyssarides, a central figure in Cyprus politics in the post-war years, goes ‘every home a castle, every patriot a soldier’ (in Greek: κάθε σπίτι και κάστρο, κάθε πατριώτης και στρατιώτης).

Moreover, a clear example of the state effort to mobilise the population to the importance of ‘defence’ and thus mobilise complicit cooperation into the ‘nation-in-
arms’ is the amount and specificity of defence broadcasts on state television. ‘Defence’ and ‘the army’ are words often used in the Cypriot media. The NG and defence issues still appear on mainstream media almost on a daily basis. Characteristically, a TV programme entitled ‘Defend your Country’ (in Greek: αμύνεσθαι περί πάτρης), focuses exclusively on Cyprus’ defence issues and news from within the force; it runs to the present day on the Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation (RIK) channel. Therefore, although ‘defence’ was an ideology mobilised by the state and exemplified through the NG, it “became a part of the way people live both inside and outside military barracks” (Enloe, 2000: 3-4). It involved and appealed to the entire social body that considered national survival as an urgent existential priority, committed to defending the threatened and vulnerable homeland; ‘I do not forget and I struggle’. Then, ‘defence’ has been embedded into the public understanding of the ‘national struggle’, and ‘ontological security’ (Giddens, 1990: 92) against the ‘existential threat’. The next section will look deeper into how ‘defence’ took part in the national struggle.

5.1. ‘Keep struggling’

The memories of the war, the division of the island, and the territories lost - all reproduced through popular discourse - connected the ideology of defence with the cultural means by which it was constructed. ‘Defence’, the ‘army’ and notions of ‘returning back’, were part of cultural militarism (as Ben-Eliezer, 1995 and Kimmerling, 1993, argue in relation to Israel). In the GC community, the legitimacy of the national struggle was dependant on the association with military goals, (Enloe, 2004: 145). The centrality of the demand for ‘justice’ and the end to the violations of ‘human rights’ in relation to the war events and ‘occupation’ in public and political discourse (see: Demetriou, 2005) created a naturalisation of the need for defence. Thus, the idea of the masculinist defence culture was a discursive cultural basis of steadfastness for the rightfulness of the GC community emasculated by Turkey. In this way, whilst the community is emasculated by the constant Turkish threat, the NG constitutes the protector of what is left of the country's ‘virtue’ by being highly masculinist. Within this masculinist defence culture, the post-war body politic focused on and demonstrated virility and prowess in the national struggle through its construction of a ‘nation-in-arms’.
Moreover, the protection of the population was built into the ‘existential threat’ within the discursive system the political leadership created and mobilised by embedding militarism in society. The state and its representatives (just like in Israel, see Ehrlich, 1987) used the ‘existential threat’ by systematically repeating it, to coerce the continuous commitment of the community to ‘defence’. Certain post-war discourses acted as compulsive reminders of the country being under constant threat of another invasion from the ‘occupation-army’ thus constituting discursive callings for staying committed to ‘defence’.

The political leadership calling for the need to defend was illustrated to the community through specific gender symbolisms, which were centrally mobilised through state institutions. A key example of this is the portrayal of the mothers, wives and sisters of missing persons as a symbolic means to project and sustain the notion of Cyprus as a victim of the ‘enemy’ (Yakinthou, 2008). Such feminine articulations of powerlessness and victimcy of Cyprus appeared as they were co-constituted with a gender angle alongside the iconography of this ‘enemy’, in dangerous hyper-masculine terms. An example of this is the poster named ‘Attila’s boot’, which, in addition to other places, was present in public school classrooms. The poster illustrates a Turkish soldier during the events of the invasion (1974) mercilessly attacking the whole of Cyprus whilst stepping with vigour on a GC soldier. This Turk is pictured as the militarily gargantuan being able to invade the whole island with brutality. This graphic illustration produced by the state depicts the nationalist rhetoric of the hyper powerful ‘Turkish army’ able to infiltrate the GC existence, calling for the need for it to be halted. These discourses portray post-war Cyprus as a feminised victim in need of protection and deliverance. They are responded to with the masculinist ideology of ‘defence’ and the need for the community to stay committed to ‘defence’. Masculinity and femininity are formulating discourses of the ideology of defence.

5.3. Keep struggling: You Man or Woman!

Defence provided a clear separation of gender roles, integral to its reproduction. The closed-border, which has been open since 2003, was the platform on which the co-constitution of masculinity and femininity of the post-war nationalist discourse was manifested and illustrates how both GC men and women were ideologically engaged in the symbolism and defence of the ‘mother victim’ Cyprus. The guarding of the
border was a promise of the heroic praxis of the ‘nation-in-arms’; that the vulnerable GC community would remain whole in the face of the ‘enemy-within’. Therefore, while the idea of the mothers and wives of the missing persons on the border holding the photos of their loved ones served as an ideological mobilisation of sustaining the memory of the trauma suffered by Cyprus (‘I do not forget’) men had another role to undertake; defending and protecting the “nation” whilst fighting for liberation, (‘I struggle’).

In GC society the exemplification and honouring of the acts of certain national heroes of previous national struggles (mainly the anti-colonial struggle of EOKA 1955-1959 and the Greek war of independence against the Ottoman rule 1821), though part of the cultural ideological basis of the national struggle, have been discourses of an assertive-defensive militarism. Thus, the remembrance of these heroic figures asserted in popular discourse the moments of revolution in which masculinist military endeavours assured the national “self”-assertion. Thereby becoming ideologically conductive to a heroic praxis of the GC everyday organised, mobilised and technologically advanced type of ‘nation-in-arms’ against the hyper masculinised ‘enemy-within’.

This heroic masculinity was exemplified in the national struggle through the understanding of ‘everyday ordinary heroes who serve their military service, then become reserves and then militia (I struggle). Thus ‘defence’ has been an everyday consumed ideology. Women, as discussed above, acquired the role of memory keepers (I do not forget), supporters of the struggle and pain bearers. The next part of the article illustrates the governmental policies and state mechanisms that mobilised the ideology of defence.

5.4. The state and the development of ‘defence’

‘Defence’, the version of militarism developed in Cyprus after 1974, is a focal mechanism of the relationship the successive governments of post-war Cyprus mobilised between their international and internal agenda. The ideology of defence has been the internal front of the Janus-faced international and internal agenda of the RoC. Following the invasion and division of the island, the political leadership has been portraying internationally the state as a victim in ‘existential need’ of the international
community, and internally as the ‘defensive’ potent saviour of the victim GC community from the hyper powerful ‘Turkish army’. 

The bi-communal clashes with Turkish Cypriots in 1963-64 led to the state of the RoC being controlled only by GCs. This has given “GCs complete control over the governance of the country in the eyes of the world” (Ker Lindsay, 2008: 109). The projection of the conflict by GC political leadership to the international community connected the ‘division’ with ‘injustice’ for the GCs (Bryant, 2001). This, in turn, meant a solution based on the recognition of the GC leadership as the only legitimate government on the island (Demetriou, 2005: 11). Through this GC discourse the political leadership appealed to international bodies such as the United Nations and, later on, to the EU for foreign support and political intervention.

Nationalism and militarism are discourses that often invoke images of the feminine victim and masculine protector, which coincide with broader patriarchal structures of active masculinity of the fighter versus the passive femininity of the victim (for example see Massad’s 1995 discussion on Palestinian nationalism). This discrepancy is central to the conceptualisation of the GC national struggle. In the most dominant nationalist discourses following the division of the island, Cyprus was presented to the international community “as small and unprotected, a little Cyprus (i mikrí Kípros) suffering from the unjust bullying of a Turkey with a large and vicious army at its disposal” (Demetriou, 2005: 16). The projection of post-war Cyprus by successive governments to the international community as a victim was internally constitutive of the masculinist post-war internal politics of: ‘We have been victims but we can still win; we will defend ourselves’. Certain results of the war, including the population displacement and the cases of missing persons, were part of the nationalist gendering of post-war Cyprus that was strongly projected to the international community. It ventured the image of Cyprus as a victim suffering from the violation of human rights and injustice at the hands of Turkey. This symbolisation of the nation as a victim and in need of protection was depicted through the metaphor and image of a suffering woman awaiting liberation (Anthias, 1989: 155) and exemplified through the idea of the mothers of the missing persons (Yakinthou, 2008).
The centrality of this gendering of GC post-war nationalism (Hadjipavlou, 2006) was mobilised by the state through the slogan ‘I do not forget and I struggle’, which received overwhelming support (Christou, 2006). Whilst ‘I do not forget’ was an active policy with great appeal and support amongst the public, it also provided the platform for the existence and purpose of the army; i.e. you are not going to ‘forget’ because you are going to ‘defend’; one justified the other. Thus, the iconic image of mothers of the missing persons has a symbolic function for GCs to remember a certain image of the state as a victim (Efthymiou, 2011). This projection has been internally constitutive of self- ‘defence’.

For the GC community, ‘defence’ is a national promise that the ‘fighting spirit’ for the liberation of Cyprus would be sustained against overwhelming odds. In the ever-present scenario of a second invasion, the well-equipped and technologically advanced NG, with the will of the whole of the male population to sacrifice their lives, will hold back the ‘overly powerful enemy’. Thus the ‘male population’ will protect the continuation of the ‘Greek-Cypriot existence’ on the island, until the international community becomes involved. Consequently, the ideology of ‘defence’ made the border the NG’s first priority, ensuring that the ‘enemy within’ would not cross and occupy the rest of the island. This was further symbolically illustrated in the force by the ever-present slogan: ‘A Good Turk is a Dead Turk’, i.e. no Turk alive will cross that border.

Theorising the borders that exist in Cyprus in this way leads one to notice the significance they were given by GCs to the integrity and continuation of their existence. Concurrently, within this ideological script, the importance of men’s military conscription to GC masculinity (and femininity) was set against what is threatened and needing to be protected.

The ideology of ‘defence’ was reflected in the 112-mile long border, dividing the island, heavily guarded by the two opposing armies. The border in Cyprus presents an uncommon situation as it signified the need for ‘defence’ from its creators but also the protest against its existence (I struggle). The national goal, as also clearly evoked through the official and unofficial discourses of the national struggle, was that these borders would one day be overthrown and the ‘enemy within’ would be thrown out of Cyprus. As one of the most popular GC post-war slogans says: ‘All Turks out of Cyprus’ (In Greek: Έξω οι Τούρκοι από την Κύπρο), giving out the message that by achieving
the expulsion of the Turks GCs will, in some way, regain what was lost. Thus, the ideology of defence provided a military ‘defence’ and ‘kinetic’ force against the borders. Kinetic in the sense that the NG maintains a strong ‘fighting spirit’ with the goal of liberating the ‘occupied’ Northern part of Cyprus to enable the refugees to return back to their homes. Ultimately, in this discursive space of victimised, national self-understanding anchored around ‘I do not forget and I struggle’, ‘defence’ has operated as a predominant form, existing through ‘struggling’.

The idea of the GC national struggle did not merely involve the political struggle to bring the ‘occupation’ of Northern Cyprus to an end, but required the commitment of the complete social body. For example, anti-occupation marches and protests, which have been held extremely frequently following the division of the island, were organised by a widest spectrum of political and social factions of Cypriot society. Another significant commitment by civil society has been the annual student anti-occupation overnight protest on the borders, which involves all schools across the country, and the annual Cyprus Federation of Motorcyclists march. Moreover, the strongest commitment of the community to the national struggle is illustrated by “letting” one’s son and/or husband (if between the ages of 18 and 55) be conscripted into the NG as soldier, reserve or militia (see National Guard Law, 2011). Even women are conscripted in civil defence when they turn eighteen and men, following their discharge from the militia service at the age of fifty-five, support the civil defence (see Civil Defence Law 1998). Therefore, this version of militarism appeared in post-war Cyprus as a necessary militaristic measure of the ‘fighting spirit’ and became the most central manifestation of the nationalist response to the ‘occupation’ of Northern Cyprus. ‘Defence’ actualised the ‘national struggle’.

5.5. ‘Investing’ in the face of the ‘existential threat’

The armed forces were presented as a way in which the political leadership had established and reproduced the legitimacy of the state of the RoC (Weber, 1978; Tilly, 1975; Giddens, 1985) against the already established emasculation of the GC community. Within this ideological mechanism the state and its representatives used the sense of ‘existential threat’ to gain and maintain legitimacy and to define standards
for the distribution of resources. The state projected its defensive military prowess through the extensive procurement and presentation of arms and the technological modernisation of the armed forces (see Lima, 2014: 272, who describes a similar conceptual intersection between the development of the idea of defence and modernisation in Brazil). Major arms procurements are a significant sign of the militarisation of a national culture. The post-war political era was characterised by major defence procurements, especially in the 1990s, the most prominent and popular example being the purchase of the surface-to-air defensive S300s missiles from Russia in 1998.

‘Defence’ inextricably gave rise to the preparedness for another Turkish military offensive and this idea of the preparedness of the ‘nation-in-arms’ was used to divert excessive resources towards ‘defence’. The ‘economic miracle’ Cyprus experienced in the post-war years made possible the diversion of extensive resources for military uses (Gergakopoulos, 1999; Kammas, 1992). In 1991, the defence budget reached its highest peak of 9.1% of GDP. Defence spending is an everyday reality for GCs living in Cyprus who pay ‘defence tax’ in almost all of their financial transactions. In Cyprus, there is defence budgetary spending and off-budget expenditure. The latter includes capital expenditures, notably arms purchases. Off-budget expenditures are disbursed from a defence fund financed by a special defence levy. In addition, private companies and the Church of Cyprus, considered to be one of the wealthiest institutions on the island, are said to also contribute directly to the fund. Moreover, the development of the ideology of defence has gone through changes. One of the most significant events in its development has been the state-led doctrine with Greece, discussed below.

5.6. Single Area Defence Doctrine Cyprus - Greece

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4 GCs living in Cyprus pay ‘defence tax’ in most of their financial transactions. This is a levy called the ‘Special Contribution for defence tax’, based on the Special Contribution for defence law (Number 117(I)/2002). This law provides that any income is subject to a special contribution for defence (including dividends, interest and rents, where the entire taxable income is subject to a special levy), (see: Cyprus Inland Revenue Department).

5 Also, receipts from increased taxes on gasoline and cigarettes are to be deposited in the defence fund.
The creation of the Single Area Defence Doctrine with Greece (In Greek: Ενιαίο Αμυντικό Δόγμα Ελλάδας-Κύπρου, hereinafter SADD) is a significant event in the development of the ideology of defence. It is a state-led doctrine that reproduces the nationalist idea of a Greek ethnic community – Cyprus together with Greece - that will ‘defend’ itself. The doctrine was developed during the 1990s, a time when both Cyprus and Greece had a strenuous military antagonistic relationship with Turkey. This included a number of events, such as the Greek-Turkish military crisis surrounding the Aegean dispute (1987), the Greek-Turkish military Imia crisis (1996) and the Cypriot-Turkish crisis after the Turkish killing of two GC refugees on the borders (1996).

The doctrine is a territorial military union developed in the 1990s seeking to expand the GC defence and military capabilities in relation to Turkey, with military defence cooperation between Cyprus and Greece. Most importantly, the union provided for a solicited cooperative joint reaction from both armies in case of a potential attack by Turkey in the area of the Cyprus and Greek states. In nationalist popular discourse SADD was perceived as strengthening Cyprus’ defence by creating the enlargement of military borders with the area covered by both the Cypriot and Greek states considered, for ‘defence purposes’, unified. Thus it was perceived as a defence shield for Cyprus who would no longer have to present a defence force alone against Turkey.

The idea of a unified defence becomes concrete during the same period when the NG became modernised and well equipped. Also, military infrastructures were created in Cyprus, specifically to be able to accommodate and be used by specific divisions of the Greek Armed Forces. This included naval and air bases, even though Cyprus does not have any warships or air force. Worth noting is the completion of the first and only military airport of Cyprus named by Greece prime minister A. Papandreou, who first had the idea for the single defence doctrine. Since Cyprus does not have any military aircraft, the purpose of creating a military airport in Cyprus was so that Greek military aircraft could have presence in Cyprus. The SADD provided for structured collaboration at many levels, including coordination between the headquarters of the NG and Greek Armed Force and joint military exercises (namely, Nikhforos, In Greek: 'Νικηφόρος', and 'Toxotis', 'Sagittarius'). Moreover, it was the increase in Cyprus’ defence spending under the SADD that illustrated the determination for ‘defence’.
Defence spending between 1988-99 rose significantly to 5.9% of GDP when compared to the previous period: 1.8% during 1975-86. Thus, compared to the previous 11-year period defence-spending rose by 327%. To highlight the significance of this percentage defence spend further, the United States in 1999 spent 3% of its GDP, whereas the United Kingdom spent only 2.4%. The most noteworthy amounts spent on defence in Cyprus were between 1990-2 with an average of 7.93% of GDPs. This change in defence policy is also reflected by the sharp rise of arms imports, which, as a share of total imports during the 1987-1997 period, rose by more than 300% (3.35% of the GDP), when compared to the previous ten-year period (1977-1987), (see: UN military expenditure data).

This increase in arms procurements as part of the SADD signified the new defence policy aiming for the further advancement of the military capabilities of the NG in cooperation with the Greek military forces against Turkey. As a popular saying that appeared in the national media of both countries goes: ‘Every gun that strengthens the defence of Greece strengthens the defence of Cyprus also’ (In Greek: Κάθε όπλο που ενισχύει την άμυνα της Ελλάδας ενισχύει και την άμυνα της Κύπρου).

The SADD had importantly raised the militarist fighting spirit in Greece and Cyprus. An important symbolism was that the word "Cyprus" was added, in 1994, to the Tomb of the ‘Unknown Soldier’ (which rests exactly in front of the Greek Parliament) illustrating that now Cyprus is part of the Greek struggle. This is perhaps the most central monument in Greece that represents the struggles of the Greek nation. A symbolic manifestation of this “Greek struggle” under the SADD was an operation voluntarily conducted by members of the National Association of Greek Reserve Commando Forces, in 1997, named "Kimon 97" (In Greek: "Κίμων 97"). The Greek reservist groups sent 5 inflatable boats to transfer the Acropolis flame from Athens to Paralimni (Cyprus) where the motorcyclists march Berlin - Paralimni was going to end, an event which resulted in the killings of two Greek-Cypriots on the borders at the hands of the Turks. The head of Mission, noted, "[w]ith our project we wanted to prove by action in all directions our love to the Hellenism of Cyprus and that 'Cyprus is near',

\(^6\) See: UN military expenditure data and Stockholm International Peace Institute for detailed data on defence spending.
is defensible and defended.” (Eleftherotipia, 1997). This nationalist assertion of an ‘existential need’ for the defence of Cyprus was constitutive to the construction of the GC community as a ‘nation-in-arms’. However, as the next section will reveal, socio-political developments in recent years has led to the weakening of the ideology of ‘defence’.

6. Depleting Defence; ‘nation-in-arms’ in nostalgia

The changing national struggle has contributed to the weakening of the ideology of ‘defence’ (Efthymiou, 2015, 2016). The accession of Cyprus to the EU (2004) has marked a new turning point in the GC ‘struggle’. This is a shift in the perception of the national struggle towards a more diplomatic approach, through EU pressures on Turkey (Demetriou, 2008; Bryant, 2004; Yakinthou, 2009), as well as collaborations with stronger military powers (Efthymiou, 2016), rather than military ‘defence’ and ‘kinetic’ force. Moreover, the GC community, which is now sheltering under the EU political family, began to undermine the notion of ‘existential threat’ as it came to understand that a second invasion of Cyprus by Turkey was most unlikely, as this would have meant an attack on the whole of the EU. Furthermore, the opening of the internal borders between North and South (2003) and the ‘enemy-within’ crossing them, having not resulted in any violent clashes in the 14 years following the opening, further contributed to the weakening feeling of ‘existential threat’. The ‘existential threat’ was the focal point for the construction of the ideology of defence and the guarding of the previously un-crossable border from the threatening Turkish army was the main purpose of the ‘nation-in-arms’.

The successive governments, focused on a new idea of defence, whilst allowing for the mechanics of the ‘older defence’ to decompose. The changing ‘national struggle’ brought with it the ‘defence’ politics of building relationships with larger political entities. ‘New Defence’ is essentially security through sheltering within the auspices of the EU political family and forming relationships with stronger military powers (Efthymiou, 2016). A key aspect of these developments is the territorial borders of the sea between the North and South divide, which did not previously acquire such national significance for GCs in the conflict situation. They appear now to be the new border against which ‘defence’ predominantly manifests itself in relation to ‘occupation’. Thus
the marine territorial borders are replacing the previous importance of the inland border (see: Efthymiou 2016).

In the scope of these social, political and military developments the successive governments adopted a policy of disinvestment in the NG, which has further undermined its concomitant ‘nation-in-arms’ (Efthymiou, 2014). This policy began in the context of the ‘Europeanisation of the conflict’ (Demetriou, 2008; Yakinthou, 2009) and the coordinated bilateral reconciliatory efforts with Turkey, since the opening of the borders (2003) and the soon after UN Annan Plan for reunification (2004). This is evident, amongst other examples, in the dramatic decrease of the defence budget since 2003 which also meant the end to major military procurements. Moreover, the repeated cancellation of certain military parades and exercises and significant changes of ideology in the training of conscripts, such as the removal of masculinist nationalist chanting shows a ‘stepping back’ from a nationalist assertion of militarist politics of the ideology of defence. The politics of ‘new defence’ also created uncertainty around whether the SADD Cyprus – Greece (the high point of military struggle against Turkey) is still in place.

In the backdrop of a disorientated ideology of defence, the masculinist nationalist project of defence is today weakening in Cyprus. The synergy of the socio-political developments with the lack of political vision about the modern army led to the disengagement of the community from its idea as a ‘nation-in-arms’. The ideology of defence was not re-adapted under these new developments. As such, the social ‘stepping back’ from ‘defence’ can be clearly explained at the level of ideology by considering that the men who were to be conscripted into the NG in the coming years were faced with these particular conflicting ideas; ‘occupation’ i.e. needing to defend the border and open-borders and the ‘enemy within’ crossing them versus the possibility of reunification supported by the intensified negotiations, a society that feels relatively safe under the protection of the EU, political neglect of the NG and an ideologically disoriented and undermined force. These conflicting understandings meant that draft dodging rapidly became an exponential phenomenon and the discipline

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7 Such as the abolition of the annual joint GC military exercise 'Nikihforos' (In Greek: 'Νικηφόρος') and Greek exercise "Toxitis" (in Greek: Τοξότης), since the two were held together, in conjunction with the abolition of the Turkish military exercise "Bull" (In Greek: Ταύρος).
in the reserve forces became weakened. The strong rise of the phenomenon signalled a clear cultural shift from the collective project of masculinist solidarity of the defence of the country to the individuals’ own personal goals and understanding of success. It did, however, also show the attenuation of the state’s capacity to mobilize those groups who were the carriers of the national defence project. The community, whilst it is ‘letting go’ of its commitment to ‘defend’ is also, in general terms, in disapproval of the political irresponsibility that led to the disintegration of the country’s defence.

Today, the inability of successive governments to deal with the internal defence issues the disintegrating ideology of defence has created is evident. The phenomenon of draft dodging pertains (SigmaLive, 2013 and 2014), despite repeated efforts to deal with it. More generally, however, these developments have contributed to a crack in the popular acceptance of military service as a man’s duty to GC society and, in synergy with other factors, such as the strong favouritism and nepotism within the force, have led to the erosion of the sacred status once enjoyed by the NG. New questions have arisen for the public in and around a variety of topics such as military service, the responsibility of the government over the army, and use of resources.

Today public opinion supports the abandonment of conscription and, by extension, supports the professionalization and modernisation of the NG (Efthymiou, 2014, 2015). The professional force provides technical rather than patriotic solutions to military threat. Thus, it does not necessitate community ties and emotional attachments to the defence of the country, which, as illustrated, are already significantly weakening. At the time of writing, the government is implementing a plan for gradual semi-professionalization. However, as this change has come so late and is being implemented within the current condition of the NG, outlined above, the semi-professionalization essentially becomes entangled in the process of the disintegration of defence.

7. Conclusion

The post-war political leadership of the RoC has used various channels to formulate a response to the tragedy of the 1974 war both internally and internationally. Internally, it created a masculinised ‘nation-in-arms’ through means of cultural intervention, such as extensive presentation of defence issues in the national media and political discourse,
through the conscription of men from almost every family and through legal enforcement, such as defence tax. Internationally, the geographical size of ‘free’ Cyprus was transformed into a gendered, victimised state that sought the intervention of bigger political entities.

The ideology of defence epitomises the national struggle that ensures the continuation of the GC existence on the island despite the presence of the ‘overly powerful enemy’, whilst ‘struggling’ to liberate North Cyprus through political negotiations and appeals to the international community. ‘Defence’ has been a formative discursive principle with a significant impact on the development of post-war GC community.

Militarism is a deeply entrenched reality within the Cypriot context that provides for military solutions to national, political and social problems. The strong presence of militarism presents an everyday reality to Cypriots, militarism is a natural occurrence in GC perception and individuals are not concerned when regularly faced with military presence across the island (such as military vehicles or soldiers). In essence, Cyprus is camouflaged with six armies that have blended in the G.C. perception to the natural sceneries of the island.

However, socio-political developments in recent years have had major impacts on the ideology of defence (Efthymiou, 2014, 2015, 2016). There has been a certain weakening of this internal response of ‘defence’ following the opening of the borders and the accession of the island to the European Union, as illustrated by the disinvestment of successive governments in ‘defence’ and the rise of social phenomena such as draft dodging. Indeed, many social and political groups in contemporary GC society are no longer willing to view ‘state security’ considerations as the primary criteria for national decision-making. Nor is GC society at large willing to grant the NG its previous status of unquestioned potency and professionalism. This article has provided an account of the development of GC militarism in Cyprus in the post-war years, setting a theoretical framework through the inquiry into the ideology of defence and providing a basis for future research.
References


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